CHAPTER – I
The U.S. - Afghan Relations: Historical Background

I. From Afghan Independence to the End of World War II

The situation of Afghanistan is somewhat unique in the Muslim world. Its existence as a political entity to the rivalry between foreign imperialist powers made it a harmless buffer state.¹ For over a century Afghan policies had been almost entirely dictated by the country’s position between two aggressive and antagonistic powers and the necessity of preserving its independence.² In 1919 Afghanistan under Amanullah’s leadership declared war against British Empire. This less known third Anglo-Afghan war consequently led to the conclusion of the treaty of Rawalpindi in August 1919. Though largely dictated by the Britain this treaty finally gave Afghanistan the freedom to conduct its own foreign affairs. But the British concession was ambiguous, and the Afghans hedged their bets by sending a mission to the newly installed Bolsheviks in Moscow in October 1919. During this visit Russia obtained Afghan support for the Bolsheviks in Muslim central Asia in return for assistance against the British.³

In July 1921 a delegation from Afghanistan led by Wali Muhammad arrived in Washington after making a tour of European capitals, with the objective of establishing diplomatic relations with the United States. However, the delegation reception was not auspicious, as the U.S. government merely expressed regret at the death of Amir Habibullah, and congratulated king Amanullah on his accession. The delegates left Washington extremely disappointed, for Amanullah had hoped to avoid his country’s dependency on Britain or the former Soviet Union by introducing the United States as a balancing third power and as provider of Western know-how to further his policy of modernization.⁴

Haunted by continued British pressure, and cautioned by historical Russian ambitions, Amanullah desperately wanted to forge close ties with the United States, for two important reasons. First, the USA was physically distant great power, capable of helping a country like Afghanistan without acquiring the geographical leverage which had enabled British India and Tsarist Russia to intimidate it. Second, the USA had a relatively unblemished colonial image, which protected, Kabul from criticism for dealing with a colonial power. Indeed initially Washington showed
some receptiveness President Warren G. Harding received Wali’s mission on 26 July 1921, which some Afghans construed as US recognition of both Amanullah’s government and Afghanistan’s independence. But unfortunately both countries could not proceed further on diplomatic front for many years.

It is interesting to note that even after independence the British government evidently used their diplomatic muscle in whatever way possible to keep the Afghan leadership weak and incapable of having any regional impact. This was manifested most sharply in British efforts to frustrate Kabul’s urgent search for wider international recognition of Afghanistan’s independence and alternative sources of foreign aid, partly to counter what it perceived as the persistent British menace.

To execute their plan to accompany independence move with substantial modernization steps Amanullah needed to gain as much international recognition and support as possible. Immediately following the signing of the treaty of Rawalpindi, they dispatched mission, headed by Mohammad Wali a leading figure in the negotiations with the British, to Soviet Russia which was the first to recognize the sovereignty of Afghanistan, and established diplomatic relations in 1919. Hoping for permanent relations with the Bolsheviks he on the same day wrote letters to Japan, America, Persia (Iran), France and Turkey on behalf of “the independent and free government of Afghanistan.” A mission was sent to Tashkent and Moscow, led by Mohammad Ali, and it was received by the Soviet authorities, as it was carrying a letter from king Amanullah to Vladimir Lenin seeking Soviet assistance in the emancipation of Afghanistan. A Soviet diplomat, Michael K. Bravin, was sent to Kabul to prepare the way for the establishment of diplomatic relations, to be followed by a Soviet delegation charged with negotiating a treaty of friendship. The result was the Afghan-Soviet treaty of friendship of 1921, by which the two states recognized their mutual independence and agreed to be bound not to enter into any political or military accord with a third state that might prejudice either of the signatories. The terms of the treaty had serious implications for the content of the Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1921, under which Britain endeavored to exclude Russia from involvement in Afghanistan.

A friendship treaty signed in Moscow on February 28, 1921, formally sealed the friendship and mutual sympathies which had been developing and strengthening between Afghanistan and Russia since last two years. Lenin wrote to Amanullah that the British felt they were being beaten in their own game. Incidentally, the
British refused even to call Amanullah “His Majesty” and had not formally accepted Afghanistan’s independence. The main aim of the British was to keep Afghanistan under its thumb and torpedo any close understanding between Afghanistan and Soviet Russia. Meanwhile the British officers were planning a diplomatic blockade while some of them, like general Malleson, were thinking in military terms. The Soviet leadership suggested to Amanullah a friendship treaty between Afghanistan and Soviet Russia. This scared the British and shattered their diplomatic blockade. The establishment of permanent diplomatic relations between the two great nations opened up broad possibilities of mutual assistance against any encroachment by foreign predators upon other people’s freedom and possessions.

It became clear to Amanullah and his supporters and all along the Soviets’ gestures of friendship and good will had not really been meant to facilitate Afghan independence but to assist themselves in domestic consolidation and socialist empire building, with a special imperative to avoid British opposition through Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the Afghan leaders were in no position to change the situation radically. To confront the Soviets, they needed substantial Western support. They made some efforts to secure it, but to little avail. Ironically, even then neither the British nor the Americans were prepared to respond positively to Kabul’s call for more cooperative relations. In order to attract American friendship and ensure equilibrium in Afghan relations with Moscow, Kabul in 1925 even went as far as to forward the U.S. State Department through the Afghan Minister in Paris to make a draft treaty of friendship with the US but Washington never responded.

However, the close scrutiny of Amanullah’s objectives clearly establishes that his leadership wished only to pursue a balanced and neutral foreign policy and friendship with Soviet Russia was intended to aid the promotion of this policy, which was expected to provide Afghanistan with an anti-British lever, and, by the same token, to induce Britain and other Western powers to put their relations with Afghanistan on a similar footing, this is why, despite all the British discouragement, Amanullah’s leadership never abandoned its efforts to seek American and German friendship. Nor did it ever waved in its staunch ideological opposition to ‘Godless communism’ thus setting limits on the extent to which relations with Moscow could develop. It never envisaged friendship with Soviet Russia as an end in itself, but merely as a means to strengthen a neutral and balanced independent foreign policy for Afghanistan in a Zone of sustained great power rivalry.
A. The establishment of the U.S.-Afghanistan diplomatic relations

Second World War provided the motivation for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Afghanistan when in 1942 the German advance on Stalingrad led to fears that the logistic link through western Iran would be denied to the Allies. Eastern Iran or western Afghanistan were considered as ideal locales for an alternate route and the U.S. presence in Kabul was seen as an essential prerequisite for securing this route. On 6 June 1942, Cornelius Van Engert became the U.S. first resident ambassador in Afghanistan.¹⁴

In fact Afghanistan had shown its interest to establish diplomatic relations with Afghanistan soon after its independence. But the USA was reluctant as it viewed that Afghanistan was still within the British sphere of influence. Since imperial era Americans and British seemed to perceive the world similarly if not identically, and it followed that they should co-operate as best they could in their common interests.¹⁵ By the beginning of the twentieth century, the two countries became associated on various policies.

Despite granting independence to Afghanistan Britain still tried to use their diplomatic muscle in whatever way possible to keep the Afghan leadership weak and incapable of having any regional impact. Britain continued its efforts to frustrate Kabul’s urgent search for wider international recognition of its independence and alternative sources of foreign aid partly to make up for the loss of British support and partly to counter what it perceived as the persistent British menace. British continued to accept only a settlement that retained Afghanistan within the sphere of British colonial interests.

Disappointed with continued British pressure even after independence king Amanullah sent a mission to the newly installed Bolsheviks in Moscow in October 1919. This visit had in fact been preceded by a Bolshevik mission to Kabul to obtain Afghan support for the Bolsheviks in Muslim Central Asia in return for assistance against the British. In July - August 1920 Lenin took the position that the communist parties would assist bourgeois nationalist liberation movements in their struggle against imperialism and even to form alliances with such movements. This was to define Soviet attitudes towards the national revolutions then taking shape in Ataturk’s Turkey, Reza Shah’s Iran, Amanullah’s Afghanistan and Sun yat sen’s China.¹⁶
In the very early years of Soviet rule the West got scared of the spread of Bolshevik doctrines about property, religion, and the relationship of the individual to the state, through propaganda or the communist international established by Lenin in Moscow in 1919. During 1920s and 1930s, the Soviets had called for the world revolution, the destruction of capitalism and the economic system of the United States. The Soviet leadership viewed the capitalism as the chief obstacle to humanity’s liberation movement. From the moment the Soviets seized power its leaders continued to see the capitalist states as enemies and the Soviet relationship with them as one of constant struggle. The United States, however, found it impossible to reconcile itself to the ideology and practices of Soviet Russia, which seemed more alien, and more hostile to democracy, than the ideology and practices of czars.

Indeed initially Washington showed some receptiveness to Afghan requests. President Warren G. Harding received Wali’s mission on 26 July 1921, which some Afghans construed as U.S. recognition of Amanullah’s government and Afghanistan’s independence, and promised to consider seriously the question of U.S. diplomatic representation in Afghanistan, but unfortunately nothing more happened for many years. Another reason which made U.S. to delay its decision to establish diplomatic relations with Afghanistan was Afghan - Soviet treaty of friendship of 1921, by which the two states recognized their mutual independence and agreed to be bound not to enter into any political or military accord with a third state that might prejudice either of the signatories. The terms of the treaty had serious implications for the content of the Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1921, under which Britain endeavored to exclude Russia from involvement in Afghanistan.

On May 27, a message from Lenin and Kalilin greeted the “independent Afghan people heroically upholding their freedom against foreign enslaves” and proposed an exchange of representatives, “the establishment of permanent diplomatic relations between the two great nations will open up broad possibilities of mutual assistance against any encroachment by foreign predators upon other people’s freedom and possessions,” it said. Tarzi in his note to Chicherin said: The main inducement to my government to conclude a treaty of friendship with the government of Russian Soviet Republic was a common policy of overthrowing imperialist despotism all over the world and especially the policy of emancipation.
of all the peoples of the East, without distinction of nationality and religion, from the rule and tyranny of world predators.

On the other hand the US astonishingly displayed as much insensitivity as the British to Afghan needs. The US position was influenced by its ambivalence towards the communist regime in Russia; its perception of Afghanistan as unimportant to USA; its treatment of Afghanistan as part of the British sphere of influence and therefore British responsibility; and more importantly as some informed Afghan sources believe, London’s constant advice to Washington not to help Amanullah get off the British hook - the British continued to give advice until the mid 1930s. The USA neither officially declared support for Afghan independence for another decade nor established full diplomatic relations with Afghanistan until 1942.21

After being freed from their efforts in repressing anti-Bolshevik forces elsewhere in the former czarist empire Bolsheviks started re-conquering Central Asia. This caused serious concern for Afghan rulers and Amanullah once again started looking towards the West for assistance22. The expanding of Russia’s actual control to the current border between Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics had disturbed Afghans.23 This development seriously perturbed the Afghan government, which rapidly became disillusioned with and distrustful of the Soviets. It became clear to Amanullah and his supporters that all along the Soviets’ gestures of friendship and good will had not really been meant to facilitate Afghan independence and modernization but to assist themselves in domestic consolidation and socialist empire building, with a special imperative to avoid British opposition through Afghanistan. However, the Afghan leaders were not in position to change the situation radically. To confront the Soviets, they needed substantial Western support. They made some effort to secure its but to little avail. Ironically, neither the British nor the Americans responded positively to Kabul’s call for more cooperative relations. In order to again attract American friendship and ensure equilibrium in Afghanistan relations with Moscow, Kabul in 1925 even went as far as to forward to the U.S. State Department through the Afghan Minister in Paris (then General Mohammad) Nadir a draft treaty of friendship with the USA; but Washington never responded.24
In 1928, both France and the United States signed a treaty renouncing the resort to war as a national policy. It came to be known as Kellogge-Braind pact. The U.S. ambassador, Amour, in Paris was instructed by the State Department on 22 September, 1928 to transmit two authenticated copies of this treaty to Minister of Afghanistan in Paris. The acting Afghan Minister in Kabul had expressed Afghanistan’s readiness to adhere to, and earnestly participate in the Kellogge-Briand pact (1928). Thus, indirect diplomatic relations were in auguries between Kabul and Washington through Paris. The French Minister in Kabul was further urged to “make the decision of the Afghan government, officially known to the government of the United States of America.” However, the establishment of direct diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Afghanistan still bare no fruit. There were many factors behind the U.S. reluctance to establish direct diplomatic relations with Afghanistan under Amanullah’s leadership as they found his nationalist militancy seriously vulnerable to Bolshevik influence. Other factors included - Amanullah’s Islamic rhetoric, anti-British and anti-colonial and pro-independence agitation and the British still making ‘sphere of influence’ claim on the country.

However, the process of normalization of Afghan-U.S. relations suffered a setback in 1928 following the downfall of Amanullah. Though there was no immediate success in this regard, the United States had started dealing with the government of Afghanistan through French legation in Kabul. After the overthrow of Amanullah in 1929, the British supported a tribal coalition led by the future ruler Nadir Shah. Within six months Nadir Shah came back via India and assumed power in Kabul as king. He got generous help from Britain both in cash and armaments. During Nadir’s rule he adopted a foreign policy of ‘positive neutrality’ and reciprocal friendship with all states. He sought to achieve two immediate objectives ‘non-provocative’ balanced relationships with both Britain and the USSR, and acceptance by the Muslim states. Nadir Shah had appointed his half brother Muhammad Aziz, to be ambassador to Moscow in recognition of the significance of the post. Nadir Shah opened up negotiations for a review of the 1921 treaty, and the new Afghan-Soviet treaty of mutual neutrality and non-aggression signed on 24 June 1931 included a clause specifically calling for the prohibition in both states of activities that might cause either military or political damage. Further Nadir found it expedient to confirm all Amanullah’s treaties with Moscow. And he also supported Soviet initiatives at a number of international conferences.
One of the clauses of non-aggression pact stipulated a ban on activities of organizations hostile to one of the contracting parties on the other’s territory.

In order to strengthen Afghanistan’s independence and international profile Nadir started wooing European powers such as France and Germany. The idea of rapprochement with Berlin was particularly attractive to him, by the same token, he was interested in establishing ties with the USA, but it did not find it feasible to create a mission in Kabul.32

There were many factors behind the U.S. decision about not establishing direct diplomatic relations with Afghanistan during Nadir rule. First, as U.S. administration still opposed relations with Russians.33 As discussed earlier that after Nadir had become ruler of Afghanistan he did not only review the 1921 treaty (which was done by Amanullah) but also a new Afghan treaty was signed on 24 June 1931.34 The new ruler Nadir Shah continued to rely primarily on Germany and the small but vital colony of Germany. Nadir Shah even planned to make Berlin the chief outpost in Europe of Afghan trade, instead of London or Moscow. But such outcome was checked by a dramatic series of events which harmed Afghan-German relations, although German responsibility was in fact only of the most indirect kind.35

An important factor was a friendship treaty with Japan signed in 1930, and development of limited trade and educational ties, between them, but Japan ran into the same reservations and difficulties that faced the United States. These factors caused U.S. reluctance to establish a mission in Kabul, because, in the state Department’s opinion, Afghanistan was “the most frantic, hostile country in the world today”. In its opinion Nadir Shah (the Afghan king) was not able to control the tribes and would soon fall. Nonetheless, U.S. recognition was definitely a boost to Nadir’s regime. As a whole there was no major breakthrough in the efforts for establishing direct relations with the United States.36

After Nadir Shah’s murder, real power came into the hands of his brothers. The boy king was no more than a convenience.37 At that time the new king was Mohammad Zahir Shah, the -19 year old son of Nadir Shah, who was educated in France, from 1933 to 1953. It was three royal uncles, who ruled through Zahir Shah until 1963 when the king became his own Master. Through most of this period it remained an axiom of Afghanistan’s foreign policy to limit dependence on either of the over-powerful, neighbors British India and the USSR.38 In addition, the new
regime faced with a problem; on the one hand they were determined not to accept aid or technicians from the Soviet Union and on the other anti-British feeling were now so strong. According to Frank A. Clement, in this time, Afghanistan made further overtures to the United States and tried to use commerce to forge closer links by offering attractive incentives to U.S. companies. However, Britain negated some of attractiveness of these commercial agreements by creating problems in term of access from Indian ports, insisting that all goods had to be transported by Indian railway even vehicles capable of proceeding under their own power. The US Consul at Karachi was approached about establishing diplomatic relations during a visit to Kabul in 1931, but he could give no reason to the Afghan government for the unwillingness of the United States to open an embassy in Kabul.

During 1934-35 the communist approach shifted from condemnation of social democracy, collective security, and Western militarism to collaboration with other anti-fascist forces in popular fronts, alliance systems, and rearmament. The United States and the U.S.S.R. established diplomatic relations for the first time in November 1933, and in September 1934, the Soviet joined the League of Nations, where Maksim Litvinov became loud proponent of collective security against fascist revisionism.

Afghanistan's continued attempt to obtain prestige grew increasingly difficult in the face of the impending war. In 1937, Afghanistan signed the treaty of Sa'adabad with Turkey and Iran, a harmless pledge of mutual non-aggression that nevertheless marked the first time that either the Turks or the Afghans had shown any friendship for their Persian neighbors. During this period Afghanistan had its first taste of diplomatic relations with the United States. Although the latter had been one of the first countries approached by the Afghans after they gained their external independence, their overtures had been rejected by Harding administration.

In July 1934, after the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the United States recognition of the Soviet Union, a note went to the U.S. Department of state suggesting that it might be well to "strengthen the political and economic relations" which Afghanistan had and still has with the high government of the United States. But it was not until 1936, that the United States charge-d'affaires in Iran visited Afghanistan and concluded a treaty of friendship. No diplomatic section was set up; however, the United States continued to deal with Afghanistan through British offices.
Afghanistan under Zahir Shah emphasized the need to strengthen the political and economic relations with the government of United States. Zahir Shah in his personal letter to U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt informed the latter about the death of his father king Nadir Shah and added that “we are pleased to notify the desire of the Afghan government to strengthen the political and economic relations with the government of United States.” And President Roosevelt in his reply to Zahir Shah informed that: “I cordially reciprocate the sentiments which you express and, in extending recognition to your majesty’s government, take this opportunity of assuring you of my hope that friendly relations will always exist between the United States and Afghanistan.” Thus, it was for the first time that the United States announced its recognition of Afghanistan. Immediately thereafter, Afghanistan proposed a friendship treaty between Afghanistan and the United States. Consequently, on 26 March 1936, the agreement was signed between Kabul and Washington at Paris. Thus, by March 1936, Afghanistan’s government had been recognized by the United States. Afghan government demonstrated its confidence in America altruism by granting a 75 year concession. A concession was signed and ratified with the Inland oil Exploration Company in April 1937, but the company withdrew from the concession in 1938 because of the international situation in Europe.

The Second World War brought with it a challenge in the sphere of the government’s foreign relations. Before the war, the Afghan had accepted economic assistance only from countries that were geographically remote enough (like Germany, Italy and Japan but not Britain and Russia) not to be able to influence their political independence. In October 1936, Germany and Afghanistan entered into a confidential protocol “under which Germany provided Dm 15 million of war materials on credit, to be repaid in part with products from Afghanistan. German become an important player in the economy of Afghanistan and was regarded as politically significant in the country’s attempt to balance the influences of Britain and Russia. In 1937, the German airline, Lufthansa, established a regular service between Berlin and Kabul, with a view to extending the service into China, and in the summer of 1939, a German delegation arrived in Kabul with the objective of exploring the possibility of expanding Trade.
On 22 June 1941, the Nazis attacked the USSR. Stalin entered into an alliance of necessity with old rival Britain, against the common enemy. In the Second World War, maintenance of the allied coalition of the United States, Great Britain, and Russia required exacting exercises of the art of diplomacy. For both powers, close Afghan-German ties became unacceptable, and they demanded expulsion of all Axis citizens from Afghanistan, despite Afghan hasty proclamation of complete neutrality in the World War. Iran’s refusal to obey a similar order led to its occupation by the Soviet and British forces in August 1941. To avoid a similar fate, but Afghan acquiesced to the Soviet British pressure on condition of providing safe conduct to Germans, Italians and Japanese to their countries. A move that Afghanistan resented as an infringement of its sovereignty but still complied with and all Axis nationals left for India under the promise of free passage to a neutral country. Although Axis diplomats were allowed to remain, their attempts to foment an uprising against Britain among the Pushtun tribes on the Indian side of border were unsuccessful, despite sympathy for the Germans because of their traditional enmity with Britain. As during the World War II, Afghanistan briefly became the Switzerland of Central Asia in a new game of intrigue as Allied and Axis coalitions jockeyed for position in the region. One of the reasons of German to be in Afghanistan was its geopolitical importance in this region.

In time of war, this Afghan connection was regarded with even greater suspicion by the British; Kabul was full of hostile embassies so nervous were the British about the harmful influence the Axis powers could have at Kabul and indirectly on the frontier, that presence of any foreigners on the frontier was regarded with the utmost suspicion.

World war II provided the motivation for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Afghanistan when, in 1942, the German advance on Stalingrad led to fears that the logistic link through western Iran would be denied to Allies. Eastern Iran or Western Afghanistan were considered as ideal locales for an alternate route, and a U.S. presence in Kabul was seen as an essential prerequisite for securing this route. On 6 June 1942, Cornelius Van Engert became the U.S. first resident ambassador in Afghanistan, even though the German defeat at Stalingrad meant that Afghanistan was not needed as a supply route for the Allies.
Thus during World War II, Afghanistan maintained a policy of strict neutrality. The government in Kabul realized that its alignment either with Axis or Allied powers could endanger the independence and sovereignty of Afghanistan. The Afghan policy of strict neutrality won appreciation and recognition from the victorious Allied powers.\(^{54}\) The neutrality remained constant throughout the war, although it was strained by an Allied demand, made in the fall of 1941, for the expulsion of all Axis nationals. Not only was this ultimatum a blow to national pride, but it demanded the violation of one of Afghanistan's strongest traditions—the law of hospitality; many of the Afghan leaders advocated resistance, but Hashim Khan (one of uncles of Zahir Shah) saw the situation more clearly; the fate of Reza Shah Pahlavi in Iran was an object lesson.\(^ {55}\)

Thus so far, we have seen that the advent of US-Afghan relations before the Second World War commenced on the basis of mutual desire for friendship and cordiality. Prior to First World War, both the United States and Afghanistan were preoccupied with their regional and domestic roles. Random efforts were made by both the countries to forge closer relations. The subsequent period especially 1930s and 1940s marked a watershed in US-Afghan relations when both side reciprocated positively to each other's friendly gestures. The beginning of 1940 was marked by establishment of relations between Washington D.C. and Kabul at ambassador level. By this time, the Second World War concluded, the US-Afghan relations had been founded on very firm basis.\(^ {56}\)

B. United States and Afghan's Modernization and Economic Development

The U.S. involvement in modernization and economic development of Afghanistan can be traced back to the reign of king Habibullah whose contribution to the process of modernization was not substantial, despite his personal fascination for Western technical inventions. His father had set up workshops with foreign help to manufacture shoes, soup and other articles for his harem and the ladies of the court. He had hired foreign technicians and advisers to assist in introducing new technology in some limited fields, such as mining. Habibullah commissioned an American engineer to build the country's first hydroelectric plant, to supply power to palaces and public buildings in Kabul. To indulge in his passion for motor cars, he had also built a road. But the plan got a set back as the World War I broke out.\(^ {57}\)
Thus during Habibullah’s reign we do not see any major breakthrough in the Afghan’s modernization and its economic relations with the U.S.

During the reign of king Amanullah (1919-1929) Afghanistan gained independence from British colony as a result of the third Anglo-Afghan war of 1919, and the king sought to open up diplomatic relations with the major powers of the world. In addition, the king desperately needed expertise to develop his modernization projects. The United States had shown no interest in establishing diplomatic relations with Afghanistan following its independence. A variety of factors contributed to this reluctance, the foremost being the view that Afghanistan was still within the British sphere of influence. In addition, Afghanistan was not seen as a market for U.S. exports or as a source of strategic raw materials. It is also true that most Americans had little or no knowledge of the country, and there was no public interest in the region. Washington therefore had to rely on Britain for information about the area, and the British government had no desire to encourage U.S. competition in Afghanistan.

In 1921, a delegation from Afghanistan, led by Wali Muhammad, visited Washington with the objective of establishing diplomatic relations with the United States. But no result was achieved. Amanullah had hoped to avoid his country’s dependency on Britain and the Soviet Union by introducing the United States as a balancing third power and as a provider of western know-how to further his policy of modernization. However, during king Amanullah’s reign no major breakthrough in Afghan-US economic relations was achieved.

The Afghan efforts to establish diplomatic relations with Europe yielded some result. In 1923, the German Minister plenipotentiary, Fritz Grobba, was sent to Kabul, and it was clear that Afghanistan and Germany had mutual interests, as the king desperately needed expertise to develop his modernization projects. Germany offered to provide industrial hardware and skilled engineers and technicians at highly competitive rates. The commercial relations between the two countries developed through a consortium of German companies. But due to one or other reasons other European powers did not show any interest in these modernization projects.

Further more, on January 5, 1928, Amanullah left for Europe. In Italy he negotiated about arms purchase, bought 150 fiat cars and arranged for Italian engineers to be sent to Afghanistan which he wanted to modernize at the earliest.
And from Italy he went to France where he signed a treaty with France for some projects, ordered consignments of rifles and ammunition, arranged for more Afghan students to come to France and more French teachers for Afghan schools. Amanullah then moved to Germany where he signed a preliminary agreement for giving concessions to German and French firms to build railways in Afghanistan. He also placed orders for 200 cars and two aircrafts for starting an Afghan civilian air service, an idea which the Germans enthusiastically welcomed.  

After dawn fall of king Amanullah Nadir Shah became the king of Afghanistan. Nadir Shah and his successors were more successful in encouraging the growth of an alternative source of state revenue, through direct and indirect taxes on joint-stock companies, these companies were chiefly engaged in trade, organizing the export of the valuable karakul sheep skins fresh and dried fruits, cotton and wool. They operated largely under the aegis of the private Bank-i-melli, established by the leading Afghan entrepreneur, Abdul Majid Zabuli. It was Zabuli who, as minister of national economy, had visited Washington in 1948 to seek U.S. assistance in the financing of a modest development plan. At the same time, Afghanistan made further overtures to the United States and tried to do more commerce with U.S. companies. However, Britain negated some of the attractiveness of these commercial agreements by creating problems in term of access from Indian ports, insisting that all goods had to be transported by Indian railways, even vehicles capable of proceeding under their own power.  

In July 1934, after the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the United State’s recognition of the Soviet Union, a note went to the U.S. Department of State suggesting that it might be well to strengthen the political and economic relations with Afghanistan. But it was not until 1936 that the United States charge d'affaires in Iran visited Afghanistan and concluded a treaty of friendship. No diplomatic mission was set up, however, the United States continued to deal with Afghanistan through British offices. Same year the Afghan government demonstrated its confidence in American altruism by granting a 75 year concession to the Inland Exploration Company of New York for the development of Afghanistan’s presumed petroleum deposits, the first and only time that such a concession had been given. But the threat of war made American investors reluctant and in 1939 after a few preliminary soundings the Inland Exploration Company gave up its concession.
Under this agreement the American company had acquired the rights of exploring oil in Afghanistan. This agreement was quite useful for the company. Reports indicated that German foreign office and Berlin based Soviet Ambassador made frantic efforts for thwarting the conclusion of this agreement. Seeing that their efforts in thwarting the conclusion of the said agreement could not succeed, the Soviets adhered, to other techniques of pressurizing Afghanistan. Consequently, Moscow laid claim over Afghan territory along the Afghan-Soviet border, which was refuted by the then Afghan government.

After American company had concluded oil exploration agreement with Iran and Afghanistan the Afghan Ambassador in Moscow told the former that the Soviet officials were annoyed because of having not been consulted by Tehran and Kabul in connection with conclusion of such an important agreement. Such an attitude by the Soviet might have been governed by the fact that as they regarded some area of both Iran and Afghanistan reportedly under Soviet influence and under these circumstances they could not afford to be ignored.

Because of these reasons, the Soviet did not allow transition facilities to Afghanistan. There also existed no treaty or agreement between Moscow and Kabul in this regard. The Afghan Ambassador in Moscow is on record of having said that it would have been better if the American did not use Russian rail transport for supplying their material to Afghanistan, otherwise Moscow could exert pressure on Afghanistan. The Afghan Ambassador in Moscow further told that Russia was not prepared to provide transition facilities through its territory because Moscow was trying to impose a trade agreement on Afghanistan which was detrimental to the latter’s interests.

Even the global situation was not conducive for foreign investments during that period. By 1938, the possibilities of the outbreak of hostilities in Europe had become almost certain. The Inland Company thought that, in the event of war, oil field in Afghanistan could be vulnerable to Soviet or Iranian attack and only British help could save them. The US decision served a blow to Afghanistan’s policy of seeking support, services, and investments from distant countries which were, it was hoped, politically disinterested in Afghan affairs. Seeing the US disinterest in large-scale and long-term investments, Afghanistan became determined to refuse concessions to the Russian and British nationals into the country in significant
numbers, and thought of rather relying on Germany, Italian, Japanese and Czech investments and technicians.67

The outbreak of World War II had adverse effect on Afghan economy. Due to war the exports of karakul to the western countries from Afghanistan had almost stopped. At this crucial juncture, the United States came to Afghanistan’s rescue and helped the latter in exporting Karakul to American markets. In December 1942, the State Department of the United States mooted the idea of constructing a road passing through India, Afghanistan and the Soviet Russia to reach China with a view to supply material to China through road transport. Consequently, one Gordon Bowles, a US citizen was sent to India to explore the feasibilities of such a plan. But Soviet refused to permit any American national even for survey purpose in its territory; consequently, Washington shelved this plan.

In April 1944, John L. Savage, an engineer belonging to the United States Bureau of Land Reclamation paid a visit to Afghanistan with a view to help the latter in devising irrigation plans. In 1945, many countries signed an interim agreement with the United States pertaining to international civil aviation matters. The purpose of this agreement was to establish an international organization for civil aviation. Afghanistan also signed this agreement. During the same year, the US Ambassador in Kabul presented a memorandum to the government of Afghanistan urging the latter to bring the production of opium in that country under strict control for exclusive use in medicine and other scientific purposes. The Afghan government accepted the American request, and declared that it was going to ban the production of Opium from 21 March 1945. Later the World War II helped in cementing the bonds of friendship between Washington and Kabul.68

II. U.S.-Afghan relations after the end of the World War II

After the end of World War II United States of America had emerged as the world leader. The Soviet Union had survived the war. It also resulted into the end of British and was quietly preparing to leave India forever.69 It was the time when the Monroe Doctrine had become an intellectual lodestone for U.S. policy makers seeking to stabilize the Middle East after 1945. Hoping to avoid a vacuum in a region whose strategic importance was fast becoming unparalleled, the White House
agreed in March 1947, to assume Britain’s long-standing commitments in Greece and Turkey under the auspices of Truman Doctrine.\textsuperscript{70}

After World War II the shattered and broken British, German, French and other imperialist powers receded. The Americans began to advance the theory of “filling the power vacuum”. The US was interested in acquiring influence in Afghanistan more especially because it was strategically important for the post-war Western policy of encircling and rolling back communism. It had a key position in any military advance toward the Soviet Union whether from Iran or from Pakistan. Attempts were therefore, made to draw the country into the new military pact, Baghdad treaty.\textsuperscript{71} The Afghans quickly realized that the power of Great Britain as a barrier against Soviet expansion had been replaced by that of the United States of America. The reputation of the United States then enjoyed in Asia for its position on imperialism was still important from the Afghan point of view.\textsuperscript{72}

A. The U.S. as a balancing power

In the post-World War II period Afghanistan first tried to keep balanced relations with the Soviet Union and the United States, which now replaced Britain as the leading Western power.\textsuperscript{73} In the countries lying between the Turkish straits and the Himalayas, the United States had largely taken over Great Britain’s historic policy of curbing Russian expansion in the direction of the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and the plains of India. As the decline of British power in the area became more apparent the traditional Anglo-Russian rivalry had broadened into an opposition – animated by somewhat altered conceptions on both sides. The primacy of American responsibilities in Western Asia was formalized by the commencement of the Greek-Turkish aid program in 1947. In Iran and Afghanistan it was signalized by no such dramatic event, but American involvement perceptibly increased as British influence waned.\textsuperscript{74}

In the period 1946-53 Afghanistan tried to maintain balanced relationship with Soviet Union and the United States, engaging both in its economic and infrastructural development. It refused to join the chain of anti-Soviet alliances forged under American initiative; a military alliance between Kabul and Washington was forbidden under the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1931, which was still in force. Immediately after World War II, however, the Afghan king appeared to be looking up to the United States as a protector of its independence from a Soviet threat. The imminent withdrawal of British imperial power from the Indian
subcontinent left Afghanistan without its traditional policy of balancing Russian influence with British.\textsuperscript{75} Further more, the withdrawal of Great Britain from the Indian peninsula has changed the relationship and has altered any ability of Afghanistan to play one side against the other. The country’s willingness to accept aid and support from the United States represented the desire to find an alternative against Soviet pressures.\textsuperscript{76}

As the Afghan Prime Minister, Shah Mahmad Khan, son of king Zahir Shah, declared in 1946 that he was: “Convinced that America’s championship of the small nations guarantees my country’s security against aggression. America’s attitude is our salvation. For the first time in our history we are free of the threat of great powers’ using our mountain passes as pathways of empire. Now we can concentrate our talents and resources on bettering the living conditions of our people.” Though the American response was initially lukewarm it changed significantly after the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine. Consequently, between 1949 and 1979, Afghanistan received massive American economic aid.\textsuperscript{77}

\textbf{B. The U.S. policy of containment and Afghanistan}

Soon after World War II, the cold war developed between the Soviet Union and its former allies.\textsuperscript{78} The United States and the Soviet Union both fought on the side of the allies during World War II. But after the war, the two countries became bitter enemies. The Soviet Union, as a communist country, opposed democracy. It helped communists take control of most of the countries of Eastern Europe and also aided communists who seized control of China.

The Soviet Union and China then set out to spread communism to other lands. The United States as the world’s most powerful democratic nations was threatened by communist take-over. And hence the containment of communism became the major goal of U.S. post-war foreign policy.\textsuperscript{79}

Cold war is the term used to describe the intense rivalry that had existed since the end of World War II between groups of communist and non-communist nations. On the one side were the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its communist allies, often referred to as the Eastern bloc. On the other side were the United States and its democratic allies, usually referred to as Western bloc. The struggle was called the cold war because it had not actually led to fighting or hot war on a wide scale. The cold war has been characterized by mutual distrust.
suspicion, and misunderstanding by both the United States and the Soviet Union, and their allies. The United States accused the USSR of seeking to expand communism throughout the world. The Soviet meanwhile, charged the United States with practicing imperialism and with attempting to stop revolutionary activity in other countries. The United States wanted a world of independent nations based on democratic principle.

Though the cold war did not begin until the end of World War II, in 1945 the U.S.-Soviet relations had been strained since 1917. In that year, a revolution in Russia established a communist dictatorship there. During the 1920’s and 1930’s, the Soviet called for world revolution and the destruction of capitalism, the economic system of the United States. Furthermore, the Soviet leaders viewed capitalism as the chief obstacle to humanity’s liberation. From the very moment the communists seized power in Russia they defined capitalist states as enemies. Since the Soviet defined the capitalist states as foes, the relationship between it and them would be marked by conflict until the victory of what the Soviet call socialism and the defeat of capitalism. The Soviet relationship with them was one of constant struggle.

During World War II, many communists fought alongside the allies, some of which were colonial powers. But after the war, the communists called for an end to colonialism and sought power for themselves. In 1941, during World War II, the Soviet Union joined the Western Allies in fighting against Germany, it seemed possible that a lasting friendship might develop between the United States and the Soviet Union based on their war time cooperation. However, major differences continued to exist between the two, particularly with regard to Eastern Europe. As a result of these differences the United States adopted a “get tough” policy toward the Soviet Union after the war ended. The Soviets responded by accusing the United States and the other capitalist allies of the West of seeking to encircle the Soviet Union so they could eventually overthrow its communist form of government. And the United States began to advance the theory of “filling the power vacuum”. The US was interested in acquiring influence in Afghanistan more especially because it was strategically important for the post-war western policy of encircling and rolling back communism. It had a key position in any military advance towards the Soviet Union whether from Iran or from Pakistan.
American initiative evolved gradually during 1946-1947 and was precipitated by Stalin’s attempt to extend Soviet influence beyond Eastern Europe, and then the Soviets began moving forward the Persian Gulf and into the Mediterranean Greece. Turkey and Iran were the first to feel Soviet pressure. The pressure on Iran began in 1946, when the Soviets refused to withdraw their troops from that country. These troops had been there since late 1941, when the Soviet Union and Britain had invaded Iran to forestall increased Nazi influence. The Soviets had occupied northern Iran and the British the central and southern sections. When the British withdrew, the Soviets sought to convert Iran into a Soviet satellite.

During this period the Soviet Union also exerted pressure on Turkey. By now, the United States was convinced that the Soviet goal was nothing less than domination of Turkey and fulfillment of the historic Soviet ambition to control Constantinople and gain access to the Mediterranean. Control of turkey, of course would have left Moscow in a better position to intimidate Iran and Greece.\(^5\) The Soviet Union was also demanding military base in Turkey\(^6\) the proximity of the Soviet union was something that Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan were never allowed to forget, and there were signs that Moscow might be planning a more determined bid for the favour of the Arab peoples than it had seen fit to make while the fate of Palestine was in the balance.\(^8\)

After World War II The Soviet Union not only moved to Middle East but before the war ended, the Soviet union had already absorbed three nations along the Baltic sea- Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The communism also gained strength in the far East. The Soviet Union had set up a communist government in North Korea after the war. In China, Mao Zedong’s communist after replacing Chiang Kai-Sheik’s nationalist armies had joined the communist world bloc.\(^8\) In all these situations, the American government was once more confronted with the need to support Britain the traditional guardian of area.\(^8\)

At the same time United Stated being conscious of the oil of the Middle East being occupied by Soviet, began to think about the doctrine of containment for the security of Middle East as Britain had reluctantly begun its slow motion retreat from the region giving chance to U.S. to promote its interest in the region.\(^6\) It was in the years after World War I that Americans first became conscious of the oil of Middle East; British and French interests were on the ground first. In Southern Iran the British, through the Anglo-Iranian oil company, attained and held a monopoly; but
in Iraq and in the little Sheikdom of Kuwait American companies won a part interest, and in Saudi Arabia and the Bahrain Island field, they secured complete control. World War II, with its terrific drain on the petroleum resources of United States and Caribbean fields, emphasized the dependence of Western Europe, and even perhaps the future dependence of the United States, on the Middle East.\textsuperscript{91}

Washington knew the importance of Middle Eastern oil which was evidenced in the plan, proposed in 1944, but finally set aside, to build pipeline from the Arabian field to the Mediterranean. The U.S. was also aware of the danger of Soviet to seeking influence in the region. The Soviet troops had remained in northern Iran after the end of Second World War had been withdrawn only as a result of pressure applied through the United Nations. At the Potsdam Conference (1945) and later, the Soviet had asked a trusteeship in the Mediterranean and a major share in control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles. Denied these requests by western governments, the Russian had pressed Turkey for a new regime for the straits and for cession of the provinces of Kars and Ardahan at the eastern end of the black sea. At the same time, the communist were seeking to control of Greece through aid to native guerillas and infiltration. It was these communist pressures, and Great Britain's confessed inability to give further aid in resisting them that led to the setting forth of the Truman Doctrine and the granting of American aid to Greece and Turkey. The Middle East and Gulf oil countries were so important for both U.S. and Russia that each tried its best to control this region and to be under its sphere through political or military alliance.

After 1945 U.S. defined the Soviet Union as a mortal threat to the United States and that dictated global vigilance against Russian-backed communist subversion. U.S. policymakers from Harry Truman to Jimmy Carter waged a cold war against the Kremlin from the sun-drenched shores of the Eastern Mediterranean to the snow capped mountains of Afghanistan. Some historians point to the Red Army's belated departure from Iran in early 1946 and to its sudden arrival in Kabul in late 1979 as proof of Moscow's unwavering drive to dominate the Middle East.\textsuperscript{92}

According to Tucker one of the major turning points in U.S. foreign policy after World War II was the containment policy which became a capsule characterization of post-war American policy toward the Soviet Union. The main aim of this policy was containing wherever possible the expansion of Soviet influence as well as the expansion of communism in general or a policy of moderate
containment that may prove inadequate to sustain the power and discipline even to protect interests on which United States essential security depends.\(^{93}\)

The cold war complicated U.S. relations with Afghanistan because, in its quest for allies to contain the Soviet Union, the United States would not guarantee to protect Afghanistan against Soviet aggression. It preferred to deal with Pakistan for the defense of the Indian subcontinent. As a consequence, Pakistan became a member of the Baghdad Pact, and Afghanistan was forced to adopt a policy of positive neutrality, which gradually led to a growing dependence on the Soviet Union. However, the United States continued to provide assistance to Afghanistan via loans and grants of $286 million between 1950 and 1971, with an emphasis on aid for communications infrastructure, education, and agriculture. But it did not provide military support to guarantee Afghanistan’s independence.\(^{94}\) According to Frank A. Clements, the Afghans were dismayed that the United States repeatedly refused to provide Afghanistan with arms - a decision motivated by the belief that such assistance was more likely to be used against Pakistan as both Afghan and Pakistan having clash over Pushtunistan issue.\(^{95}\)

According to Gorge B. Cressey, if Afghanistan appeared remote, and perhaps unimportant, its problems were nevertheless real to the Afghans. It is well to remember that this country, along with Turkey and Iran, represented almost the only section of the entire Soviet frontier where there was no cushion of buffer of satellite communist states. In his view Afghanistan’s significance to the free world should not be undervalued.\(^{96}\)

C. The U.S. and Pushtunistan issue

After the partition of India a new Muslim state of Pakistan was formed.\(^{97}\) This new states faced with a serious problem of linguistic provincialism especially among the speakers of Pashto (pushto, pakhtu) who wanted that their entire area, which lies in Pakistan and Afghanistan, to be a single political unit.\(^{98}\) But Pakistan announced its “one unit” plan calling for the merger of the provinces of West Pakistan. This decision disturbed the Afghans, to whom the elimination of the North West frontier province seemed part of a move to destroy the identity of the eastern Pushtun. And undoubtedly this was one of the motives behind the plan, for incipient sectionalism remained Pakistan’s most serious problem.\(^{99}\) While, Afghanistan came to be substantially synonymous with the Pushtunistan issue, the argument that all of
Pushtun areas of Pakistan should belong to Afghanistan, or at least be independent, claiming that a large chunk of Northwest Pakistan belongs rightfully to Afghanistan. The Pushtunistan issue had been an important item in Afghanistan politics for years. Afghanistan had long standing claim to the Pushto-speaking areas of Pakistan. The Afghan ruler in 1949 denounced the frontier agreements with the departed British and demanded that the Pushtunistan speaking areas in Pakistan be given independence as a sovereign state of Pushtunistan. In response, Pakistan closed the border, on which Afghanistan depended heavily for imports. Thus ensued a verbal war of attrition between the two Muslim neighbors. The United States, considering Pakistan’s participation in a chain of military alliances ringing the Soviet Union could not but turn down Afghan requests for military aid.

The United States, the new colonialist power, seemed to be more interested in geography than history. Its aid to the new states was not intended for the establishment of democratic institutions or the solution of regional problems, but to create a military line-up against the Soviet Union through defense-treaties. Pakistan was an early recruit to his crusade against communism. After World War II, the United States, as the world’s most powerful democratic nation was threatened by communist takeover. The containment of communism became the major goal of U.S. post-war foreign policy. The conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan over Pushtunistan issue, brought the two sides very close to a major war, on the one hand, and plunged Afghanistan into a serious economics crisis, on the other. Meanwhile Afghanistan quickly realized that while Moscow was prepared to side with Afghan on the crisis and to provide him an expensive alternative air transit route, it was disinclined to support Afghan in a war, for two main reasons: first, Pakistan by now was militarily far more powerful than Afghanistan and Afghan defeat could land the Soviets in a major regional conflict, from which the USA, as an ally of Pakistan, could not remain aloof, second, as the Afghan-Pakistan crisis peaked, with no solution in sight despite an offer of mediation by the Shah of Iran, Moscow found itself embroiled in a more dangerous confrontation with the USA (the Cuban missile crisis), the fallout from which prompted Soviet caution over the ensuing months.

Pakistan retaliated by putting impediments in the way of Afghanistan’s imports and exports, a large proportion of which went through the port of Karachi. Afghanistan, for its part, indulged in spasms of anti-Pakistani and anti-British
feeling, accused the U.K. of encouraging Pakistan’s hostile attitude, and evinced some dissatisfaction also with the supposed pro-Pakistani sentiments of the United States, possibly by way of warning gesture, the Afghan government found employment for a group of Russian technicians and received an official Soviet trade mission in Kabul. 104

After world war II, the South-Asian state with which the United States wished to build a close political—military relationship was Pakistan and it appeared to be far more attractive to Americans than Afghanistan or even Iran in the late forties as the key nation that could make the United States a key lever in the stability and security of the Persian Gulf-South Asian region, and in this major policy decision the United States was strongly influenced by the British foreign office. 105 The US, strategists for their part viewed Afghanistan as of negligible importance to long-term American interests. Since the USA was already treaty-bound with Pakistan on military co-operation it did not feel the need to nurture Afghanistan. The Afghan government, however, saw a clear need to build up its military strength in order to avoid any external incursion into its territory and any undermining of its national interests. Since it conflict over Pushtunistan with Pakistan, various regions in Afghanistan felt the need for a powerful ally. And the Soviet Union was a natural choice. 106 According to Arnold Fletcher, Soviet Union had a willingness to support the Afghans against Pakistan over Pushtunistan conflicts. 107

United States tried to persuade Afghan to solve the problem of Pushtunistan issue with having a talk with Pakistan as US feared that Afghan would turn to Soviet helps. In the words of a senior US State Department official: “we attempted . . . to dissuade the Afghans from pressing this issue, since it could have led to war with Pakistan and created opportunities for Soviet intervention in both countries.” Iran also tried to persuade Daoud to keep distance from Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had supported Daoud over Pushtunistan issue. 108 In 1954, the United States concluded a military treaty with Pakistan, and the later joined the chain of interlocking alliances forged by Washington to contain Soviet influence. That year 1953, was also the year of the death of Stalin. By 1954, the Soviet Union had entered a new era in foreign and domestic policies with Nikita Khrushchev as leader of the CPSU. The Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1931 was extended. In 1954 the Soviet voiced support for Pushtunistan, thus trying to draw Afghanistan toward its
influence as the United States brought Pakistan into own. The Soviets began to extend economic aid to Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{109} According to Mary Bradley, after Pakistan refused to discuss the fate of their Pashtun subjects the irredentist movement had taken on international overtones. American military aid to Pakistan had been cited as influencing and fortifying Pakistan’s stand. The Russians support to Afghans on Pashtun issue encouraged the Afghan government to encourage the movement.\textsuperscript{110}

Soon after the takeover by the Ayub government, tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan aggravated after the modernization of Afghan army and the open support it was receiving from the Soviet Union, reached new heights. In the fall of 1960 and again in 1961 open conflict again over Pashtunistan issue. (Bajaur fighting). The Afghans reacted by breaking off diplomatic relations with Pakistan. Consequently, the end of diplomatic relations closed the border and blocked Afghanistan’s major shipping route. This caused Afghan to turn to Soviet Union, which thus became Afghanistan’s sole means of contact with the outside world. Although Pakistan’s actions were bound to be injurious to American interests in the area, its dependence upon United States aid was not sufficient to prevent its persisting in them indeed, when the United States protested the use of its planes and military equipment in the Bajaur fighting. General Ayub Khan rejected the protest closing the border and halted shipments from the United States for its projects in Afghanistan, since it refused to avail itself of the Soviet route, with the result that the U.S.S.R. gained an enormous advantage over the competition in its economic program.\textsuperscript{111}

Daoud expected this development to exert pressure on Washington to soften Pakistan’s opposition on Pashtunistan issue. As Washington remained reluctant to mediate, Daoud’s tough approach back fired. The result was an escalation in the war of words between Kabul and Karachi, on the one hand, and plunged Afghanistan into a serious economic crisis, on the other. Meanwhile, Daoud quickly realized that while Moscow was prepared to side with him on the crisis and to route,\textsuperscript{112} this issue had created opportunities for Soviet intervention in Afghan again.

The conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan over Pashtunistan issue had erupted again, in 1973. The Baluchi provincial government formed by the opposition National Awami Party (NAP) was suspended by the federal prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the populist leader of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). This action led to an armed insurrection by the Marri and the Mengal tribes
in the form of terrorist attacks, one of which took the life of the local PPP leader, Hayat Mohammad Sherpao, who was promptly declared a Pushtun martyr of the federalist cause.

The situation in Pakistan held out opportunities for Daoud. He quickly established a camp in Kandahar for the training and arming of Baluchi freedom fighters. The Pakistan People’s Party of late Bhutto has taken a softer line on Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and there was evidence of Soviet interest in supporting the PPP. Wali Khan and his supporters had always been believed to have a pro-Soviet orientation. The Pakistan army had shown it to be coup-prone and there had been reports of successive unsuccessful plots against General Zia. Daoud came more closer to the USSR and increased his support to the Pushtunistan movement, so much so that in 1975, Pakistan’s Bhutto accused him of training 15,000 Pushtun and Balochs in Afghanistan for infiltration into the two Pakistani provinces - the North West Frontier and Balochistan. Bhutto retaliated by encouraging Islamic and other anti-Daoud factions to stage armed insurrections in 1975. These turned out to be uncoordinated and ineffective. They were ferociously repressed. Hundreds of Islamists were executed or imprisoned, or fled into exile in Pakistan.

In 1976, after Jimmy Carter had entered the White House, American diplomacy became somewhat active in Afghanistan. The National Security Council, headed by Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, devised the concept of regional influence by letting Shah of Iran to play a greater role in the intermeshing region of the Persian Gulf and South Asia. Afghanistan provided the link between the two even more than Pakistan. The Carter administration encouraged the Shah to take over a large share of the American burden of policing the strategic region of the Gulf. The Shah sought to build bridges of friendship with Afghanistan. He wanted the Persian Gulf and South Asian regions to be less polarized between the two superpowers, and wanted countries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and India to draw a little distant from their respective superpower patron. At the superpower level, the Soviet Union was trying to persuade the Shah to be less dependent on the United States, while the United States pleaded with India and Afghanistan to be ‘genuinely non-aligned’ between Washington and Moscow.

Daoud was also persuaded to be truly non-aligned and was made to realize that support for Pushtunistan made him excessively dependent on the Soviet Union.
Shah tried to improve relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and was not entirely unsuccessful. Daoud halted Afghan mass media attacks on Pakistan and, in 1977, was said to be close to reaching an understanding with Bhutto on the basis of which he could 'expel' the Pashtun and Baloch partisans who had fled to Afghanistan and were allegedly being trained by the Afghan army.  

Within the year Daoud was willing to make a momentous bargain with the Bhutto government and the late Shah of Iran. The Shah and Bhutto jointly began negotiations with the Daoud regime in Kabul and an agreement was finally reached between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Daoud was willing to accept the Durand line as international boundary in exchange for the Pakistani commitment that it would implement the regional autonomy guarantees of its 1973 constitution. The carrot of agreement was a massive aid programme to Afghanistan from Iran nearly US $3 billion in aid for Kabul. It included a commitment to build a rail line South from Kabul through the cities of Kandahar and Heart to the Iranian border directly linking Afghanistan to the Gulf ports, thus ending Afghan dependence on trade via Soviet and Pakistani territory.

In Daoud's strategy, he hoped to obtain economic benefits and more propitious regional environment. Daoud and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto exchanged visits in 1976. The changes in the situation in Pakistan where the elections of 1977 led to Zia ul Haq's successful coup as well as changes within Afghanistan in the end prevented the finalization of an agreement. Daoud visited Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, confirming the re-direction of his foreign policy towards the conservative states of the region, and his decision to keep his distance from the socialist camp. It was in this spirit that he attacked Cuba's adherence to the Soviet line during the preparations for the non-aligned summit of May 1978. These internal and external developments in Daoud's foreign policy were destined to precipitate his break with his communist allies.

After down fall of Daoud's regime a Marxist regime came to power. Afghanistan raised the controversial issues of Baluchi and Pashtun self-determination at the 1978 session of the UN General Assembly. The old geopolitical tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan were renewed, with the difference that there were now in Kabul a Marxist regime potentially more capable of exploiting the divisions and discontents in Pakistan's two most sensitive minority ethnic provinces, Balochistan and the NWFP. After the movement of Soviet troops into
Afghanistan for two years Gen. Zia had been asking the United States, Iran, Saudi Arabia and other countries for money and weapons to halt the spread of Soviet influence from the Durand line to the Arabian Sea. Moscow assured Pakistan that it had no wish to violate the Durand line, Soviet troops operating in Afghanistan scrupulously refrained from crossing the border in pursuit of the Afghan rebels. Pakistan denied the Soviet allegation that it was feeding the insurgency and made an offer of its cooperation in bringing international peace force to be stationed in Afghanistan to see that no foreign power interfere in its internal affairs.

Major U.S. newspapers agreed that Zia was now seeking some accommodation with the Soviets because of his alarm at the possibility of hot pursuit, his fear of his complications with India, the Islamic world and the third world, and his perception of the inadequacy of the aid amount. In the American press there was an understanding of Zia's predicament but little credence in his anti-Soviet intentions. The Washington Post said that if Zia made Pakistan the American surrogate in Southwest Asia, he would expose the smoldering protest movement of the Baluchis to Soviet encouragement. The real Soviet threat to Pakistan was not of a direct invasion but of 'meddling'. However, Zia was aware about the growth of pro-Soviet constituency in the country as well as among Pakistanis living in England. This constituency's strongest base was the Baluchis. It was spreading to the cadres and supporters of the suppressed Pakistan People's Party and had already enlisted its ranking leaders. Intelligence reports reaching New Delhi suggested that in the middle and junior ranks of the officers of the Pakistani armed forces, there were factions that would heed to Moscow because neither the US nor China had given Pakistan a fair price for its friendship. There were warnings that Brezezinki's strategy might prove counterproductive. William Hyland, Kissinger's former deputy, for instance, writing in the Strategic Review of fall 1979, said of impact of the China card on the Soviet Union: these maneuvers must be viewed in the broader context of Soviet global strategy surveying the new quadruple entente. The Soviets could easily perceive that one of the gaps in the 'encirclement' was the area that the British used to call "the northern tier", the string of Middle Eastern states running from Turkey to Afghanistan (more recently termed the 'arc of crisis'. The Soviet seemed to have made a strategic decision to exploit this gap. Their moves included the remarkable new relationship with Afghanistan; the switch in support from Somalia to Ethiopia and the related intervention with Cuban troops.
the signing of a friendship treaty with Turkey in June 1978, the Soviet – inspired coup in South Yemen in the same month, and some probing for an accommodation with Pakistan.\textsuperscript{123}

The Soviet entry into Afghanistan in December 1979 created a new situation and increased the interest of the Soviets and the United States in this area which now had assumed strategic importance.\textsuperscript{124} It is known to have unexplored mineral resources of copper, fluorite, limestone and oil. It is estimated that known gold deposits in Balochistan exceed the value of twelve billion dollars, and the proven Iron-ore deposits are in excess of twenty-three millions tons. It has the reserves to expand considerably its existing production of natural gas, coal, limestone, magnetite, marble, sulphur and barite. Balochistan has a coastline of 750 miles. Its port of Gwadar which, because of Chinese help in its development has acquired greater importance is barely some 250 miles from the straits of Hormuz, the focal point in the oil route from the Russian Gulf to Western Europe and The East.\textsuperscript{125} By 1981 the great powers’ policy towards Balochistan became clear. The United States, after the induction of President Reagan’s Republican administration, decided to prop up Zia ul Haq’s regime with military and economic aid and use Afghanistan as a lever to bleed the Soviet Union the way the later had bled the United States in Vietnam. The United States did not wish to see the Soviets increase their influence in Balochistan and took comfort in the thought that communist cadres or communism had made no inroads into the feudal pattern of Baloch Society.\textsuperscript{126}

D. The U.S. aid programme to counter Soviet influence in Afghanistan

Large scale foreign aid began during World War II (1939-1945). From the early 1940s to the mid 1960s, the United States gave or lent about $140 billion in foreign aid. At one time or another, almost every country in the world has received U.S. aid since World War II. About a third of all U.S. aid has gone to help other nations build up their armed forces and to build up national wealth and income in poor countries. The threat of communism changed the emphasis in foreign aid. Americans were concerned about the communist take-over in China in 1949, the Korean War in 1950’s and increasing cold war tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. To stop the spread of communism, the United States had found the North Atlantic treaty Organization (NATO) and pledged military aid to NATO members. It gave military and economic aid to developing countries facing
Soviet or Chinese pressure. The United States gave mutual security aid to those countries which considered being of major political importance. The Soviet Union also embarked upon the policy of military and economic aid. It provided aid to several countries, including Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, India, North Korea, and Vietnam.\textsuperscript{127}

The underlying objective of the U.S. aid operations in the developing world was not only to save them from communism, but to retain them under their own thumb by keeping their leases on the soil and by exerting, through aid, all-round political, economic and military pressure on them. From 1949 to 1985, the US government spent more than $100,000 million on arms, military equipments and ammunitions in 86 countries.

The loans were used to interfere in the internal affairs of the recipient countries. They are usually granted on the condition.\textsuperscript{128} In cold war period the third world became competition place of superpowers in 1950s when the USSR first bid for allies and client states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America the superpower had wrested for influence through program of military and economic assistance, Afghanistan was one under Soviet influence.\textsuperscript{129}

The auspicious rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union was being fought out through competition in the field of aid, and at least in the short term Afghanistan gained the benefit. From 1950 relations between the great powers were regulated by an informal agreement between the Soviets and the Americans which defined their zone of influence, respectively to the North and South of the Hindu Kush.\textsuperscript{130} As U.S. was alarmed by the speed of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan Washington attempted to counter it by expending its economic aid to the country, which by 1979 amounted $520 million in total. Much of the money was spent on infrastructural projects proved to be beneficial to the Afghans, and it enabled the USA to secure enduring leverage in Afghanistan. The two American projects an international air port in Kandahar and an agro-irrigational venture in Helmand turned out to be prohibitively expensive white elephants. The United States failure to provide military aid and to mediate actively in the Afghan-Pakistan dispute, the very two areas that Moscow had deftly used to penetrate in Afghan.\textsuperscript{131}

In the same, Soviet desired to counter the activity of the United States in Afghanistan, where it was a potential threat to the sensitive area of Soviet Central Asia. Another motive was the desire to put pressure upon Pakistan, and thus to
render its United States bases more vulnerable. Soviet aid to Afghanistan was to stimulate an anti imperialist movement and it was directed against the expansion of these monopolies in the East. The Soviet Union usually made capital investment and provided military assistance. The United States had indeed provided capital to Afghanistan, but this had been in the form of loans and grants rather than capital investment while American military assistance had been negligible.

It seems likely that the extent of Soviet aid to Afghanistan was a practical rather than ideological attempt to tie the developing Afghan economy to that of the Soviet Union. The extent of Soviet aid and the closing of the Afghan export-import route through Pakistan brought about a major shift in Afghanistan trade with most of Afghanistan’s exports and import going to or through the U.S.S.R. Some western observers pointed out that Afghanistan had become so economically dependent on the Soviet Union that the latter could establish political control if it chose. There can be no doubt that the beginning of Soviet aid to Afghanistan was what chiefly fostered the interest of the United States in the country, and the creation of what Henry A. Byvoade, American ambassador to Afghanistan from 1959 to 1961, had called an economic ‘Korea’. In this new economic battleground of the cold war, the USSR has had the advantages of proximity to Afghanistan. The USSR quickly agreed to finance the paving of the streets of Kabul, a relatively, inexpensive project, after the United States had refused to do so.

Though the US denied giving military aid to Afghanistan but it had provided aid in other fields. Aid from the Americans had been generally in the field of communications, infrastructure, education, and agriculture. Education aid programme included grants to Afghan students to study at American universities. The US-Afghan relations in field of education had begun in the early of 1930’s when Afghan students began to go to study in the United States. By 1935 Afghan-American diplomatic relations were established, and in 1942 an American delegation was opened in Kabul. In 1946 the Ministry of Education, admiring American methods and achievements, decided to introduce to some extent, American educational methods. The United States has been active ever since in numerous aspects of Afghan education.

Kabul University opened a faculty of medicine in 1932 during the reign of king Nadir Shah. Other faculties were established in 1946. The institute of education created in 1955, to assist the Ministry in many phases of planning and
improving teaching technique. One young member of the Royal family, who worked at the institute, visited to the United States on a tour of American schools and colleges. Following this visit the Ministry of Education made major decisions regarding the budget, inspection of schools and general maintenance. At the institute they worked with members of the Columbia University teacher college team, first through a training program, followed by a term abroad for further study. Then they returned to become full-fledged members of the institute. In addition, American aid was also sought in the field of education through the US Department of State. A number of teachers were recruited for service in Afghanistan, usually on three year contracts most of these were assigned to Habibia, the oldest and largest of Afghan schools, although a few went to conservative Kandahar. Dr. Paul Bushnell, professor of education at Wooster College, Ohio, was chosen to direct Habibia College, which soon had fourteen American instructors, including four women.

In the 1950s and 1960s when Kabul University grew rapidly, many of the departments, called faculties, were supported and staffed by foreign universities. The faculty of medicine, for instance, was aided and staffed early on by Lyon University, France, agriculture by the University of Wyoming, from USA. Economics (1957, Bochumbonn), education (1962, Columbia University, USA which also sponsored the Ibn Sina teacher training institute in Kabul) and Engineering (1963, US engineering team, formed by a consortium of nine US institutions.) By 1962 over one thousand Afghans had received some American education. These students had been sent to The United States under the auspices of their own government. In addition, the international cooperation administration, and private foundations as the American Friend of the Middle East, with assistance from the US government, had signed contracts with Columbia and Wyoming Universities to bring a number of American teachers to Afghanistan, some of these were assigned to the Afghan School of Vocational Education (Originated by an American, Richard Soderburgh), and others to the University of Kabul, the technological institute, and the teacher training School.

In field of transport aid programme US funds had helped in launching Ariana the first Afghan Airline which operated between the major Afghan cities, with flight to Delhi, Beirut, Mecca, Tehran, Prague, and Frankfort. This was supported by a US company of Pan-American World Airways which had held a 49 percent interest in Ariana Airlines since 1957. Another U.S. aid in the field of
transport was for building canals and some 450 kilometers of inter-project highways.\textsuperscript{145} The vast new network of roads to the south and south–west was built by American companies.\textsuperscript{146} The US also built a highway between Kabul and Kandahar and an ambitiously modern airport in Kandahar that turned out to be a white elephant.\textsuperscript{147} Another aid form was agriculture project which US offered instead to finance new contracts for an American engineering firm that had been commissioned by the Afghan government in 1946 to assist in the planning and implementation of a multi-purpose agricultural project in the Helmand valley.\textsuperscript{148} On November 24, the U.S. Export-Import Bank announced that it was authorizing a $21 million line of credit to finance hydraulic and irrigation works in southwestern Afghanistan’s Helmand River valley.\textsuperscript{149} This project started first by the Afghans alone and later employing Japanese technical assistance, to reclaim the great river basin where ancient irrigation systems had been destroyed. It was a controversial undertaking which required close to $150 million of Afghan and American resources during a fifteen year period. In 1946 the Morrison-Knudsen company took a $17 million contract to construct new and repair existing irrigation dams.\textsuperscript{150} Water from dam was to be carried for and wide by a new network of canals—the Baghra and Nadir Shah— which in the words of American water men, would ‘bring water to the thirsty land’.\textsuperscript{151}

Military aid programme—There were many factors that influenced the Afghan decision to seek military aid from the USA. Afghanistan had sent a mission to make a special plea for the supply of weapons to defend its territory in case of Soviet aggression in the wake of the British withdrawal from India sub-continent and to maintain internal security against tribal insurrections.\textsuperscript{152} Obviously, the existence of large semi-independent groups of well-armed men in the country remained a constant threat to the central government. The mischief of which many the tribal leaders, particularly the unalterably reactionary mullahs, were capable had been amply demonstrated in 1947. In addition, the Afghan leaders feared that the tribes east of Durand line might once again be bribed or induced to invade Afghanistan, as had happened in the past. These groups believed that Pakistan was behind it.\textsuperscript{153} And Afghan fears regarding the USSR were not without foundation. in view of what had occurred since 1945, and what was happening in eastern and southern Europe. Furthermore, the communist parties of Asia, with Soviet support, appeared to be in the ascendant.\textsuperscript{154} As Afghan realized fully that, without the
powerful British presence to balance Soviet pressure to the north, their freedom would be undermined and that they would be easily crushed by Moscow. Drawing from their experience of great game diplomacy, they attempted to negotiate another set of deals with the United States to counterbalance their dependence on Soviet Union. With this aim in view, in 1954 the government of Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud approached the Eisenhower administration in Washington for limited military aid to update its vintage and often obsolete military hardware.\textsuperscript{155}

The Afghan government had sought military aid from the United States in the hope of modernizing the Afghan army, whose equipment was almost ludicrously antiquated. The infantry still carried rifles of Snyder and Lee Enfield type, dating from the nineteenth century, and ammunition was so scare and unreliable that few soldiers were even able to fire their weapons. The twelve biplanes of which the Afghan air force consisted dated from World War I, and the artillery was equally antiquated that some of the Pushtun tribes were better armed hardly contributed to the stability of the government.

The consistent refusal of the United States to provide weapons left Afghanistan the only non communist nation on the Sino-Soviet periphery that had been so neglected. To the argument that such arms would be used against Pakistan rather than the Soviet Union, the Afghans insisted that they had no intention of attacking Pakistan. And without question, however much the hostility between themselves and Pakistan played apart in their desire for a larger and better equipped army.\textsuperscript{156}

After British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the Afghan ruling envisaged creating an American military connection as crucial defense against Soviet power. Despite its prodigious security assistance efforts elsewhere, the Truman Administration remained unimpressed either with Afghanistan’s strategic importance or with the efficacy of American military aid containing Soviet expansion in that theater.\textsuperscript{157} These Afghan demands for economic and military assistance from the United States were therefore highly political. In their concern to maintain their traditional neutrality and independence, the Afghans were only trying to bring into partnership, as they had done in the 1930s with Germany, Japan and Italy, a geographically remote world power that had the capacity to assist.

Again in October 1954 Mohammed Naim, the Foreign Minister (and Daoud’s brother) went to Washington to appeal once again for military assistance.
The reply of Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, was negative. But in turn, instead of asking for arms, Afghanistan should settle the Pushtunistan dispute with Pakistan. In Dulles’s Manichaean world view, Afghan neutrality meant non-alignment a status that had no value to him at a time when he was busily forming military alliances like SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) to contain the Soviet Union. Pakistan had joined SEATO in September 1954. It was to adhere to the Baghdad Pact a year later. Pakistan as a potential ally was not to be antagonized. The US did, however, propose to Afghanistan that if it wished to obtain American arms, it should join the Baghdad pact. Daoud could not do so because of Pakistan’s presence in the pact. Afghanistan was determined to keep to a position of non-alignment or neutrality in its relations with the superpowers. However, Washington was particularly uninterested in providing military aid and in mediating actively and impartially between Kabul and Karachi. It regarded Afghanistan as strategically less important than its two neighbours. In the U.S opinion Afghanistan was not of any great importance to the United States nor was the United States in a position to dislodge the Soviet Union from the vantage point it had achieved since the early fifties. Robert G. Neumann, who was United States ambassador to Afghanistan from 1966 to 1973, has recorded that John Foster Dulles had turned down Afghan requests for military aid because of the location and poor communications of Afghanistan which would require the United States to undertake an enormous logistic effort risking an escalation of the cold war with the USSR. Neumann’s successor, Theodore L. Eliot, jr., gave two additional reasons for the conclusion reached by Dulles. The first was the close relations the United States had build up with Pakistan. The second was that sending military equipment to Afghanistan would so alarm the Soviets that they would make some kind of move against Afghanistan.

It was a formal decline of Daoud’s request led to the latter and his brother Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammad Naim, not only to feel insulted, but also to interpret the rejection as an ominous sign of Washington’s growing commitment to Pakistan against Afghanistan (as well as India). A U.S. diplomatic observer noted in April 1954 that: a belief is growing in Afghan governmental circles that the US has turned its back on Afghanistan.

Daoud now found it imperative to play their ‘Soviet card’ by turning to Moscow for aid. In essence, Daoud’s neutrality in foreign policy clashed with
Washington’s global resolve to help only those states which were prepared to embrace the United States anti-Soviet stance. While, fearing US encirclement and the probability of Washington’s establishing strategic military bases in Iran and Pakistan, the Khrushchev leadership welcomed Afghanistan’s request for support in 1955 and with a long-term view of Soviet interests to exploit the window of opportunity presented by the developments in Afghanistan. Moscow not only began a generous programme of economic and military aid to Afghanistan, but also supported Kabul in its claims against Pakistan.

The underlying Soviet aims were clear to counter-balance the American penetration; to exert pressure on the regional states not to allow the USA to establish missile bases on their soil; and to secure a bridgehead in Afghanistan in an attempt to strengthen Moscow’s bargaining position in the event of fortuitous developments in the region. Such development was a distinct possibility in view of the regional states fragile social and political structures, historical disputes with each other, and involvement with the USA.  

III. United States and Saur revolution

The so called ‘sour revolution’ was in fact a military coup carried out by leftist officers of the armed forces under the direction of the PDPA. It is generally agreed by the two PDPA factions that putsch was planned for the late summer of 1978. In Afghanistan, Parcham and Khalq reunited in July to oppose the regime of Daoud Khan. Thus was the rebirth of the PDPA, with Noor Mohammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal as its first two front-rank leaders. Reports indicated that the two Afghan Marxist groups had reunited under Moscow’s pressure. The truth probably was that the Marxists themselves realized the need to combine forces to be able to defeat Daoud’s plans to eliminate their influence in Afghan politics, and the CPSU encouraged them to reunite.

The conflict between Daoud’s government and PDPA began with Daoud’s foreign policy were destined to precipitate his break with his communist allies Daoud attempted to make regional agreements, with the aim of accelerating Afghanistan’s development and bringing it out of its seclusion. In 1976 the country took a step toward the recognition of the Durand line as the international frontier. This was a move towards abandoning its irredentist ambitions, tending to wards the
resolution of the old quarrel with Pakistan. An agreement would have represented a
decisive change in Daoud’s strategy, from which he hoped to obtain economic
benefits and more propitious regional environment during a visit to Iran the same
year, Daoud obtained a promise of aid for the construction of a railway in western
Afghanistan. The following year, in 1977, Daoud visited Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi
Arabia, confirming the re-direction of his foreign policy towards the conservative
states of the region and his decision to keep his distance from the socialist camp.
These internal and external developments in Daoud’s foreign policy were destined
to precipitate his break with his communist allies. In addition, Daoud’s regime
was in miserable economic shape; a situation which the U.S. government tried to
exploit. This time, however, interference in Afghanistan was carried out in a
massive way, and in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine, through the then Shah of
Iran. The Shah offered $ 2 billion in aid to Afghanistan—for a certain price;
Afghanistan had to move away from being a non-aligned country with close ties to
the Soviet Union which included military cooperation and training to become a pro-
U.S. country. The tilt that Daoud wanted to introduce in the Afghan non-
alignment had been prevented from the view-point of Washington it was an
unfriendly act and tantamount to walking into the enemy camp. If you are not with
us you are against us—that has been the attitude of the USA towards all the nations of
the world. John Foster Dulles had made it most explicit when he characterized
nonalignment as immoral. 

Daoud accepted this conditional aid, and the Shah began to exercise
increasing power in Afghanistan, especially through his CIA trained secret police,
SAVAK. In spite of this aid Daoud did not solve his country’s economic problems
and was faced with mounting opposition. He tried to crush this resistance through
increased repression, carried out largely under the guidance of SAVAK. In early
April, 1978, one of Afghanistan’s popular leftist leaders Mir Akbar Khaiber was
assassinated by the Daoud regime (the Afghan police were, at the time, trained and
devised by West German police officers). To this day no proof has come to light
of the identity of the killers, or whose purposes they were fulfilling – whether the
murder was done by agents of the Daoud regime, or of the US or Soviet embassies,
or indeed whether the murder was yet another example of bitter intra-factional
rivalries inside the Afghan left wing itself. But in the highly-charged atmosphere of
Kabul, the assassination was immediately seized upon as proof positive of
American interference, and the left wing was able to mount massive demonstrations two days later, at the burial, the biggest ever seen in Kabul, estimated by many observers as up to 15,000 strong. A focus of the marchers was the US embassy, where slogans against the CIA and imperialism were enthusiastically shouted by the youthful mourners. A few days later Daoud had virtually arrested all leftist leaders. As they were about to be executed, anti-Daoud section of the Afghan military revolted and ousted him. Noor Mohammad Taraki, a civilian, took power, and Babrak Karmal became Vice President.

The Saur revolution of 1978 itself was frowned upon by not only her neighbors-Iran and Pakistan, but also by China and the USA. While, the neighbors feared that the success of the revolutionary government would encourage similar developments within their own countries, Washington and Peking looked upon it as a gain for the USSR in this part of the world and sought to reverse it. The US Vice President Rockefeller made a significant remark while talking to pressmen in Peshawar: “All this is contrary to our thinking”. Later disclosures clarified the frustration of USA because Washington itself had planned to overthrow Daoud and install his army chief Gulam Hyder Rasooli in his place. The Saur revolution had upset the whole plan.

The April Revolution had led to frantic consultations between Washington, Beijing, Tehran and Islamabad. Immediately thereafter the Shah had meeting with Pentagon experts about the role of CENTO in the context of Afghanistan developments. About the same time the Chinese Foreign Minister paid a visit to Tehran and had discussions about doing something in Afghanistan. In spite of this the other countries ‘directly interested in the developments in Afghanistan’ were found to ‘over look these factors’. The specters of a leftist government in Kabul, in close relationship with the USSR, Sinha remarked, “appeared to western observers and many others as an extension of the Soviet ‘menace’ advancing Moscow one step further in its historical ambition of getting access to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea”. As a super power the United States of America was obviously interested in Afghanistan, the US policy towards Afghanistan, generally speaking has been aimed at enabling Afghanistan to avoid being pushed completely into the Soviet orbit. It was officially reiterated that the policy of the US toward Afghanistan was aimed at ‘promoting Afghanistan’s independence and her genuine policy of non-alignment.’ But the kidnapping and killing of Adolph Dubs, US Ambassador to
Afghanistan, in Kabul on 14 February by four Afghan terrorists marked a distinct worsening of relations between the two countries. This unfortunate incident occurred at a time when the US was attempting to placate the moderates in the government of Mr. Taraki and isolate the extremists in it. The US policy after that, stiffened: "As a sequel, on 22 Feb., came President Carter's order to severely reduce its civil aid programme in Afghanistan."

Russia before the October Revolution, was perceived as a rival imperialism and, thereafter, as an obstruction to imperialist advance. In its propaganda the West still maintained the myth that the USSR, even after the Revolution was successor imperialist and had the same designs in the region as the Czarist Russia had. Its friendly relations with Afghanistan or with any other country for that matter, had always been frowned upon by imperialism whoever developed such friendship or cordiality was declared an enemy. That was so with Amanullah's Afghanistan and Jawaharlal Nehru's India. And that was so with Indira Gandhi's India and Kamal's Afghanistan.

The psychological operations of the Department of the Army, was published by the central office of the US army in Washington, had spelt out the details as follows: "Psychological operations are actions designed to influence foreign nations. Psychological activities are those carried out in peace time or in place other than war theaters, planned and carried out to influence the feelings, attitudes, behavior of foreign groups in a manner favorable to the achievements of the policies of the United States. The element of psychological warfare can only be developed successfully if the daily life of the nation is kept in a state of commotion." Strategy for this include: (1) create discouragement, demoralization apathy, (2) discredit the ideology of the popular movement, (3) promote disorganized and confused behavior, (4) encourage divisive and anti-social actions to undermine the political structure of the country, (5) promote and support movements of resistance against the authorities. That is why Soviet and Afghanistan recognition of this change (in US stance) was marked shortly thereafter by accusations that the resistance was being inspired, supplied and even conducted by Americans presumably in concert with Pakistanis, Iranians, and Chinese who had already been publicly blamed.

The anti-Afghan operations, it must be understood was not an isolated operation. It had wider ramifications than just curbing the freedom of Afghanistan. It was a part of the US aggressive strategy in Asia, components of which were the
development of the central command, further militarization of the military regime in Pakistan, introduction of the Mossad in Sri Lanka and development of new military collaboration with China.176

After the revolution, it took the Khalqite leadership only seven months—until the last week of November 1978 to complete its reforms and get rid of its Parchamit rivals.177 With the proclamation of the Democratic Afghan republic, the PDPA took care to assure the Afghan people that the State would protect their religious faith and that they would be free to observe their religious rites and customs. Nevertheless, as the radical reforms began to be implemented in October 1978, the clergy rose in protest, and by January 1979, the traditional ruling elements—the property-holders and the clergy joined together to mobilize large segments of the urban-rural people in all Afghanistan to offer armed resistance to the Marxist regime.178 The Russians were identified with the repression of the Khalqis. The growing dependence of the Taraki regime on Soviet advisers, arms and finance, when combined with the openly avowed sympathies of Khalq leaders for the 'Great northern neighbors' (as the Soviet Union was styled) had resulted in popular suspicions that Russian communists were now ruling Afghanistan.179

The reforms, on the other hand, provoked unprecedented tension in the countryside. The pressure brought on them forced many tribal chiefs and their followers to move into Pakistan where they received with open arms by the unpopular Zia-Ul-Haq regime, eager for an anti-communist cause to support and the means to consolidate its rule with international assistance. Pakistan also claimed to have spent the equivalent of $145 million on 'humanitarian assistance' to the Afghan refugees. In the meantime the forces of opposition were rallying in Pakistan. Eight training camps were established in the North West frontier province to turn simple Afghan refugees into guerrilla fighters.180

The new government had failed to energize the masses in support of the revolution. It had also failed to persuade the United States, China, Pakistan, and Iran to end their opposition to the new order in Kabul. While, financial help from the United States, other western countries and Saudi Arabia had dried up, enough money had already begun to flow to the regime’s enemies. To counter these external and internal challenges, the regime turned to Moscow.181 Before Taraki and Amin were going to make a new treaty with Soviet a large numbers of Soviet military and civilian advisers were already present in the country. Its signature was also a signal
to the US and its Pakistani ally that their support of counter-revolutionary forces would bring in the Red army.\textsuperscript{182} The Afghan – Soviet treaty of cooperation and friendship signed on 5 December 1978 was an offspring of Afghan government’s military, political, economic cultural, ideological and psychological needs and shortcomings. Under one of the treaty’s articles, Afghanistan could call on Soviet military assistance in its hour of need.\textsuperscript{183}

In 1978 eight training camps had been set up by the new military regime of Pakistan to turn simple Afghan refugees into guerillas. According to western sources, the number of these armed insurrectionists was around 5,000. They attacked Asadabad the principal town of the province, and successfully occupied an important and strategically located fort.\textsuperscript{184}

The Soviet foreign policy since the Bolshevik Revolution had been dominated by a deep fear of military encirclement. International considerations therefore certainly played a part in the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan. As Brezhnev told Pravda after the Soviet invasion, there had been a real threat that Afghanistan would lose its independence and be turned into an imperialist military bridgehead on our southern border. A more immediate cause for concern was the tacit US backing, through its Pakistani and Saudi allies, of the Peshawar-based Afghan Islamist parties. The establishment in Iran of a radically Islamic regime that was as stridently anti-communist as it was anti American, as well as the prospect of an Islamist Afghanistan could have serious repercussions in the contiguous Soviet republics of Central Asia where Muslim revivalist movements were gaining influence.\textsuperscript{185} In addition, Soviet fear of encirclement had increased during the previous few years, following the rapprochement between China and the USA, and the Sino-Japanese treaty of peace and friendship (August 1978). The year 1979 had begun with an invasion on a grand scale – that of Cambodia by Vietnam, the Soviet Union’s client state in the region. China’s response to that challenge was the ‘punishment’ of Vietnam, by sending a punitive expedition into Tonkin.

The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan was unavoidable if Kabul were to be saved from the rebels. In the words of Pravda, ‘the fiery ring of counter revolution backed actively from abroad became tighter round the capital . . . the terse announcement of 27 December stressed the intervention’s legitimacy as well as objectives. Legitimacy rested on the Soviet – Afghan treaty of 1978. The request for military help came from the ‘political leadership’ of the Saur revolution rather
than from the government headed by Amin. The objective was to ‘defend the gain of the April revolution’ and to prevent the imperialist powers from converting a ‘neighborly’ country with a border of great length into a bridgehead for penetration of imperialist aggression against the Soviet State. The Soviet fear of fierce resistance by Muslim tribesmen to radical and anti-religious reforms had created a situation in which it looked as if the Soviet-supported regime might fall, perhaps the Soviet feared that the Islamic fundamentalism then sweeping Iran and Pakistan might also engulf Afghanistan, which lay between these two countries, creating an insecure situation on the Soviets’ southern border where it might affect the approximately 50 million Soviet Muslims living in the area. The Soviets reiterated their determination to defend legitimate interests of national security and a fraternal revolution. The burden of Moscow’s carefully orchestrated articulations was that the United States was turning Wilson’s blind eye on the changes that had occurred to the global balance, that it was determined to take the world back to the wasted epoch of cold war.

For Soviet strategists, at least, intervention in Afghanistan was a defensive move, primarily. However, odd and incomplete the socialist revolution had proved under Taraki and Amin, Afghanistan since 1978 was considered by Moscow as part of the ‘Marxist’ grouping of progressive states. Afghanistan was tied to the Soviet Union and other Socialist states by a whole range of agreements. There was by the end of 1979 a heavy Soviet investment in ‘socialist’ Afghanistan, to be reckoned not in capital alone, but in prestige; thousands of Soviet advisers, civil and military, were propping up the Kabul government, of whom scores had already been killed in the civil war. If Amin’s regime was toppled by the insurgents, then at local levels Soviet soldiers and civilians alike would lose their lives in the general hatred, regardless of what Afghan opposition leaders intended. The Soviet Union offered three basic grounds for its intervention in Afghanistan:

1. A request for military assistance from the Afghanistan government.
2. The Soviet Union’s commitment to give that assistance by the 1978 Treaty.
3. Self-defence against foreign armed aggression in accordance with the UN chatter (article 51).
Meanwhile, Amin had repeatedly declared in 1979 that the Afghan army alone would combat the opposition, and the military situation had by no means deteriorated sharply by the winter of 1979.  

With factional fighting among Afghan communists undermining the war against the Islamic radicals and weakening Moscow’s influence, on Christmas eve the Kremlin airlifted thousand of Russian commandos into Afghanistan, where they installed a staunchly pro-Soviet regime ‘in this extremely difficult situation, which has threatened the gains of the April revolution and the interests of maintaining our national security.’ Brezhnev told the Politburo a week later, “a decision has been made to send the necessary contingent of the Soviet army to Afghanistan”. It was probably a defensive maneuver and not the first step in a Kremlin master plan to drive the United States out of the Persian Gulf. According to Raja Anwa the real background of the military action of 27 December was not short fanciful interpretations of the Soviet move. Amin until then described as a diehard communist, butcher and Russia’s puppet; became overnight a ‘great nationalist’ and ‘martyr’ it was said that the Soviet Union had invaded Kabul because Amin had refused to allow Soviet bases on Afghanistan soil: in order to get rid of the nationalist Amin, the USSR had invaded Kabul and put its real pawn (Kamal) on the Afghan chessboard. It was also argued that by taking the US embassy staff hostage in November 1979, the Iranian students had created a situation where armed American intervention in Iran could take place any time. The Soviet Union, it was alleged, had demanded the Shin Dan air base near the Iranian border so that it could exercise effective control over the Gulf region and perhaps also discourage the US from attacking Iran. Amin’s rejection of the Soviet request for the Shin Dan base, it was stated, had become the direct cause of his fall.

The situation looked different from Washington’s suspicion on Soviet action. The military move into Afghanistan was the first step in a colossally ambitious strategy of regional domination the ‘drive to the south; the taking of regional domination the ‘drive to the south; the taking of a ‘warm water port’ on the Indian Ocean and to control (or even to annex) oil-rich states of the Gulf. The Iranian crisis had led to the collapse of the balance of power in southwest Asia. Brzezinski informed his boss a few hours after the red Army arrived in Kabul, “the age-long dream of Moscow to have direct access to the Indian Ocean will have been fulfilled at America’s expose. Historically, the British provided the barrier to
that drive and Afghanistan was their buffer states, and it could produce Soviet presence right down on the edge of the Arabian and Oman gulfs.” Carter had to move decisively to create a new security framework. Brzezinski insisted not only to reassert U.S. power and influence in the region but also to demonstrate his genuine toughness. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, on the other hand, counseled restrained. “My view was that Moscow has acted as it did . . . to protect Soviet political interests in Afghanistan which they saw endangered”. He recalled in his memories “They feared that the regime would be replaced by a fundamentalist Islamic government and that this would, in turn, be followed by a spread of ‘Khomeini fever to other nations along Russian’s southern border.”

IV. United States and Afghan Crisis: Middle East Factor

Stability in the Middle East has been a vital area of concern for US policy makers since 1946. Hoping to avoid a vacuum in a region whose strategic importance was fast becoming unparalleled, following a decade of ugly Anglo-Arab confrontations that undermined regional security and invited Soviet meddling, in 1957 U.S. policymakers unveiled the Eisenhower Doctrine. This made Washington the senior member of the Anglo-American partnership in the Middle East. When Britain liquidated its last imperial outposts in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf in the late 1960s, U.S. officials edged toward what come to be known as the Nixon Doctrine, which envisioned regional proxies such as Iran and Saudi Arabia serving as junior partner against the Kremlin. When events in Iran and Afghanistan showed that America’s proxies simply could not do the job, Jimmy Carter promulgated his own doctrine and, with a bow to Harry Truman, informed the world in January 1980 that the United States had vital security interest in the Middle East for which it was willing to fight, whether it had dependable partners or not.

On March 25, 1979 in a special coordinating committee meeting Brzezinski circulated a report on the general direction of American foreign policy. It warned that “our policy is neither coherent nor constant; on a number of specific issues, notably Iran and the Middle East; we are in fact losing momentum with potentially very destructive consequences for our interests.” The policy paper called for a unifying theme to give clarity and purpose to American policy. He stressed that the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan must focus our attention on a major new order of politico – economic, military threat to the non – communist world security and Soviet domination of Middle East oil. To counter Soviet aggression according to Brzezinski report, “The United States had to dramatically reassert in its global leadership through an “integrated approach and demonstrate it deterrent capabilities so that we can sustain a credible overall response”.

In addition, the U.S. fear of Soviet foreign policy was a deadly mix of traditional Russian expansionism and the revolutionary drive of ideological communism. It was imperialism multiplied by a factor of two, even without communism, Russia would still be an expansionist power. Communism however, added impetus to the quest for global predominance. For the Soviets, expansionism was the status quo. As Khrushchev told President Kennedy at Vienna in 1961, “the continuing revolutionary process in various countries is the status quo, and anyone who tries to halt this process not only is altering the status quo but is an aggressor”.

According to George B. De Huszar, from the Soviet point of view, the Near and Middle East contains attractive assets. Since Bolshevik revolution in 1917 its basic interest in the Middle East, has not changed. The Soviet Union therefore, has sought to covert Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan into satellite states similar to those which existed in Eastern Europe. The Soviet aims looking toward the security of oil installations in the Baku region, an outlet on the Persian Gulf, and pressure on Turkey for a more favorable straits regime and a pro – Soviet orientation in Turkish policy. Soviet political interests seem equally obvious, involving political “conquest” or subversion of the Middle East. The fact was that the Middle East was the greatest oil bearing region in the world; it was obvious that the Soviet would be interested in controlling the oil pipelines or denying their use to others.

It seems clear from the policies it has pursued, as well as from the obvious interests involved – strategic, political, and economic that the Soviet Union in one way or another, looked toward the domination of the Near and Middle East in order to achieve its objectives in the world, the strategic position of the Near East, together with the resources it commands, made it an obvious place from which the USSR could reach out into South Asia and Africa. It should also be remembered, however, that in the event of such control, the Near East would become a springboard for world revolution in the interest of the Soviet states.
furthermore, because of its geographic position, the Kremlin could choose the particular region where the least opposition was offered. In the west it was near to western Europe; in the south it was close to nations located in the Near and Middle East; it was also close to India, and through its Chinese ally it was close to South East Asia and Japan. The Kremlin was putting pressure on Iran and other. Near Eastern countries were active in Afghanistan which would enable Soviet Russia to dominate the Khyber Pass through which Pakistan could be menaced.\(^{198}\)

Apart from U.S. fear of Soviet foreign policy and its proximity to the Middle Eastern oil producing countries there were still many events that could lead to inviting Soviet influence in this region. South Yemen, under the leadership of the revolutionary Abd-al-fatah Ismail, seemed intent on subverting North Yemen and spreading revolution throughout the peninsula. Soviet bases were being built in Ethiopia and South Yemen. The opposition of the Camp David by Saudi was another important factor. Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal mentioned the “positive” Soviet role in the area. Fahd also referred to the importance of the Soviet role but said that talk of diplomatic relations was premature.\(^{199}\) In late 1970s Saudi leaders distanced themselves from the American camp, and showed an increasing independence in conducting their foreign affairs. By now Moscow had learnt that Saudi Arabia had a unique position in the Arab world and shared goals in common with those of the Soviet Union: containment of Israel, establishment of a Palestinian homeland, and exclusion of Jerusalem from Israeli control.

In the late 1970s the other prominent state in the Arabian Peninsula which actively shared these objectives with the USSR was Kuwait. The presence of a large Palestinian community in the country and the Soviet bloc becoming more supportive of the PLO, the Kuwaiti government improved its relations with the socialist states. In 1976 it followed up a modest arms deal with Moscow with trade pacts with east European countries. Nearly three years later the Kuwaiti army had tested Soviet made ground to ground lunar missile as part of military exercises. Soviet also expressed the hope that these missiles would be available on the expected day of liberation of the Arab land under Israeli occupation.\(^{200}\)

Another event that frustrated the U.S. administration in the Middle East was civil war between Christian and Muslims in Lebanon that each side was supported by an external power. As a result, Israel and Syria almost came to direct confrontation in 1981. It was feared that such a military clash would inflame
regional tensions and would place the Soviet Union in vital position with which Syria had a treaty of friendship.

Another important development was attack on Iraq by Israel as it suspected Iraq of producing nuclear weapons which would be used against it. Iraq also had rejected the Camp David process. This thing became politically damaging as it revived the Arab perception of Israel as the prime foe. This was a set back for U.S. effort to portray the Soviet Union as the chief threat to the region and to forge an anti-Soviet alliance with moderate Arab states. It also endangered further efforts toward achieving a broader Arab-Israel peace.

The 1982 Israel invasion of Lebanon to crush the PLO and solve the political problem of the Palestinians by purely military means dramatically underlined the question of U.S.-Israel common interest. In Arab eyes the United States had tacitly approved the Israel invasion because it had failed to stop it. It now appeared to U.S. that the Palestinian problem could not be subordinated to regional anti-Soviet policy.201 With the worsening relationship between Israel and the Arabs and the continued crisis in U.S.-Iranian relations, Foreign Ministers of 40 Islamic countries assemble in Islamabad grappling with the Afghan question. The PLO delegate warned not to make too much of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan; it would only weaken the Arab's ability to fight for a national home for Palestinians. The foreign minister of Iran accused both superpowers of harboring parallel aggressive designs against the Persian Gulf and Arabia.202 And Syria sought to counter US efforts to arouse Islamic nationalism against the USSR.203

In late 1970s, the Kremlin deployed a pincer movement against the gulf.204 It was an example of Soviet military activity in the early and mid 1970s. According to reports in 1975 Soviet intelligence-gathering vessels were maintaining a constant surveillance of the straits of Hormuz. Soviet Mig 25 reconnaissance aircraft made a number of flights over Iran. The troop movements along the Soviet-Iranian border was also reported several times in 1970s.205 Again in 1978, Soviet transports airlifted twenty thousand Cuban troops into Ethiopia, not only to assist its communist government in its war with Somalia, but also to establish military facilities across the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia. Later that year, a pro-Soviet group in South Yemen took power, thereby giving Moscow a beachhead on the Arabian Peninsula. South Yemen soon launched an overt military attack on North Yemen. From South Yemen terrorists launched operations against Saudi Arabia and
guerrillas conducted attack in a border province of Oman. Same year Soviet Union had signed a treaty of friendship with Turkey. And some probing for an accommodation with Pakistan was also witnessed. In 1978, a military coup put into power the Afghan communist party, which quickly signed treaties with Moscow. When a popular rebellion threatened to topple the communist regime the Soviet Union invaded the country putting its fighter bombers within reach of the straits of Hormuz from their newly acquired Afghan bases. Kremlin leaders were extending their reach to get their hands on the oil jugular from both directions.

The taking of American hostages in Iran was also exploited, not without cynicism, as a target of opportunity. Shortly after the crisis erupted, the New York Times ran a front page story by Hedrick Smith headlined “Iran is helping the U.S. to shed fear of intervening abroad.” Smith reported “an important shift of attitudes in Washington that many believe will have a significant long-term impact on the willingness of the United States to project its power in the third world and to develop greater military capacities for protecting its interests there.” One policymaker said that we are moving away from our post-Vietnam reticence. Democratic National Chairman John White stated that “we may have reached a turning point in our attitude toward ourselves and that is a feeling that we have a right to protect legitimate American interests anywhere in the world”. Senator Frank church indicated support for military intervention in the Middle East if our interests were threatened. According to Warriors, “the search for military bases in the Middle East and the general program of militarization of American society are defensive measures taken to protect potential victims of Russian aggression.” And according to the Wall Street Journal, measures should include: establishment of U.S. bases in the Middle East, development of new weapon systems, unleashing of the CIA and to keep open the chance of covert aid to Afghan rebels. Brown’s statement laid bare that the real reason behind the Carter Doctrine was not only ‘invasion of Afghanistan but rather to continued expansion of U.S. private investments in this area of the world as well as protection against indigenous popular opposition movements fighting repressive U.S. backed regimes. When The Islamic states met in Islamabad to condemn the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, they did not fail to warn against U.S. intervention as well, the Gulf countries were more worried about the potential reaction of the U.S. to the crisis than they were about Soviet intervention itself.
The Americans who were aware of their criminal role in the usurpation of Palestine wanted to usurp the Islamic will and to distort its aspirations by dragging it into the American fold and exploit it to serve American policies and goals. The American game of instigating the Soviets to intervene militarily in Afghanistan was completely exposed when it was ascertained how they tried to exploit their fabricated crisis with Iran in an ugly, opportunist and vulgar manner. In addition, to Brown’s revelation about the real aims of U.S. foreign and military policy, it was the case that month before Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, Zbigniew Brzezinski and the National Security Council proposed to Carter that a new security framework be established in the Middle East.

Even without a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the Carter Doctrine was needed to maintain U.S. imperialism in the Middle East. When the Shah of Iran was toppled from his throne on January 4, 1980, President Jimmy Carter denounced the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan as “hazed aggression” and as a “deliberate effort of a powerful atheistic government to subjugate an independent Islamic people”. This speech launched a large scale media campaign which was marshaled to portray the events in Afghanistan in such a way that the “crisis” there can be used as a pretext for increasing U.S. military presence in the Middle East/South Asia region, and for creating an “interventionist mood” in the U.S. public given this governmental manipulation of the media.213

The Carter Doctrine was a symbol of America’s vital interest in the area. The establishment of the Rapid Deployment Force, the search for bases in Kenya, Somalia, and Oman; the modernization of the base on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean; the presence of sizable U.S. fleet in the Indian Ocean – Persian Gulf area; and the discussions of possible military cooperation with Egypt were part of an effort to establish an American presence and to balance Soviet power in the area.214

Tucker states correctly that “it is the Gulf that forms the indispensable key to the defense of the American global position; in fact there is no doubt that U.S. global dominance in the postwar period has closely linked to control over the major energy reserves of the world, which must remain under U.S. control if this global position is to be maintained. The first priority then for a resurgent America is the restoration of American power generally and above all, in the Persian Gulf.”215
In the case of Gulf oilfield the Carter administration decided to establish a joint task force of 50,000 for safeguarding Gulf oil supplies, and to build up the American fifth fleet, operating from the Island of Diego Garcia, near Mauritius, in the Indian Ocean. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and the proclamation of the Carter doctrine, added urgency to the newly – formed force, now called the Rapid Deployment Force. There was plan to make it 300,000 strong by the mid – 1980 and increased efforts were made to secure American military bases in and around the Gulf.

The Reagan administration went a step beyond, as American Deputy Defense Secretary, Frank Carlucci asked NATO allies to station troops in the Gulf. He secured the immediate support of the British under Secretary of Defense. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher also responded positively to this plan. And a few days later the U.S. Secretary of Defense publicly called for permanent American military bases in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. But Saudi quickly responded in negative. While, Oman’s pro – west stance decided to form a joint task force for the Gulf with American.\textsuperscript{216} Undoubtedly President Carter had no difficulty in rallying support for his policy statement, made in the aftermath of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan – and contained in his State of the Union message to Congress in January 1980 that America would act militarily to defend the Persian Gulf region if it became a target of external aggression. Carter’s objective was to convince Moscow that America – with or without allies would respond militarily to any aggression that might threaten the Gulf or Arabians oil fields.\textsuperscript{217}

With these reason U.S. came to be involved in supporting Afghan Mujahideen to counter Soviet troops when Soviet invaded Afghanistan. As Afghanistan was located in frontier area or buffer zone state of Gulf countries, containing Soviet cross into Gulf country was important. Wall Street Journal, said: "clearly we ought to keep open the chance of covert aid to Afghan rebels."\textsuperscript{218} Thus Afghanistan became an important place for the U.S. in containing Soviet communist.

V. The U.S. backing of Mujahideen against Soviet troops

In April 1981, after elections Reagan became the president of the United States. The basic outline of Reagan’s foreign policy was also two fold: the
reestablishment of American economic and military strength and the roll-back of Soviet influence across the third world.

The second of these policies came to be known as the Reagan Doctrine, which sought to provide assistance to anti-communist guerrillas and government with arms, finance, training and facilities, to note a few examples. The Reagan’s administration supported the Contras in Nicaragua, the anti-Marxist guerrillas in Angola, the right-wing government in El Salvador, the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, and the guerrillas coalition in the Cambodia.\(^{219}\) The central tenet in his foreign policy was anti-Sovietism and the imperative of standing up to the Soviet threat and take responsibility for containing Soviet expansionism in any part of the world.\(^{220}\) In addition, the Reagan Doctrine developed, as the basis, not only for taking a harder line on global containment, but going further than ever before toward roll-back, ousting communist who had come to power.\(^{221}\) According to George Shultz, who saw Reagan foreign policy from the inside, records that he “changed the national and international agenda on issue after issue” notably by challenging conventional wisdom on the possibility of movement toward freedom in the communist-dominated world.\(^{222}\) For Paul Nitze, former director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the “principal task” of America in the early 1980s was to “check, blunt . . . and frustrate . . . Soviet strategies,” which carry in their womb four foreign policy goals – the political separation of NATO Europe from the United States, Soviet influence and control over the Persian Gulf, and the encirclement and neutralization of China.\(^{223}\) Combined with effort to play the Beijing against Moscow, forcing the Soviet Union to build up its military defenses against NATO, Japan, as well as China, neo-conservatives hope to roll back, if not implode, the Soviet empire. Through a window of vulnerability during the 1980s, the committee for the free world (founded in 1981, now defunct) helped to lead anti-communist crusades in Afghanistan, Angola and in other countries in Africa, and in Central America.

In this regard, the Reagan Administration adopted the doctrine of “horizontal escalation” which was intended to roll back post-1975 Soviet throughout the world. The strategy was based upon the concept that rough US-Soviet nuclear parity, with the US even turning toward superiority in delivery capabilities (but not necessarily in explosive “throw-weight”) would be able to match soviet threats across the board without escalating to nuclear war. Here, the Reagan administration
largely utilized surrogate fighters to beat back Soviet backed regimes or Soviet-supported movements. U.S. support for anti-Soviet movements would not so inadvertently set off a number of seemingly permanent brush fires throughout many regions even after the cold war was over. The implications of total confrontation with the USSR had generated a debate in the US foreign policy establishment on how much and what kind of confrontation should be practicable in the 1980s. Three positions seem to have emerged. The hardest position, represented by one of its protagonists, Norman Podhoretz, was that the current confrontation was, or must be one between two irreconcilable ways of human existence, two ideological universes that just cannot live together as equals. “In resisting the advance of Soviet power . . . we are fighting for freedom and against communism, for democracy and against totalitarianism,” while, Robert W. Tucker, who has been persistently pressing since the mid seventies for a formidable American military presence in the Persian Gulf, which would virtually amount to American military control of the region’s petroleum, called in 1981 for “a limited policy of containment” rather than a strategy of total confrontation in the present circumstance.

With such policy there was no doubt that Afghanistan became buffer state for U.S. to block Soviet access into Gulf oilfield and South Asia. Carter’s advisers were asking themselves a question when Ayatollah Khomeini brought the Iranian revolution to a crescendo in early 1979 “how U.S. policy interest be preserved if the Shah Fall’s?” Anarid landlocked, and mountainous kingdom, Afghanistan had always been a buffer state, first between the expending British and Russian empires and then, after 1945 between the free world and the Soviet bloc. As was the case next door in Tehran, rapid modernization generated serious political turmoil in Kabul where Afghan communist seized power in a bloody coup in April 1978.

Nine months before the Red Army rolled into Kabul, Brzezinski had expressed “concern over the Soviets creeping intervention in Afghanistan” and insisted that Washington must be more sympathetic to those Afghans who were determined to pressure their country’s independence, the Pentagon’s Walter Slocomb agreed and wondered whether clandestine US support for Muslim guerillas might succeed in “sucking the Soviet into Vietnamese quagmire”. In April 1979 the special coordination committee an inter-agency group chaired by Brzezinski, instructed the CIA to develop a comprehensive plan for a secret war in Afghanistan backed by the
United States, ranging from indirect financial assistance to the insurgents “to weapon support.”

The US policy of supporting the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan represented revenge for Soviet support to Ho Chi Minh and the North Vietnamese; yet its implications have been even more far-reaching. As an additional element of its cold war strategy of containment, the US effort to undermine the soft Islamic underbelly of the Soviet Union was in many ways, the key not just rolling back Soviet global outreach, but also to impel the implosion of the Soviet empire itself.

The US clandestine support to Islamic Mujahideen in Afghanistan against the Soviet regime which came to be known as the Reagan Doctrine, echoed President Jerry Ford’s post-Vietnam approach. The United States would not send troops around the world to fight in regional conflicts unless the United States faced direct threat. Instead, the United States would send guns and money to anti-communist “freedom fighters.” So among other actions, the Reagan administration—with the general support of both parties in Congress—armed Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan to fight a guerilla war against the Soviet Union. Once again top American policy makers decided that it was easier to see Red than try to gain a clear view of Islamic green.

Evidences clearly show that US was backing Muslim insurgent to fight Soviet communist and spread the ideology of hates and anti-communism. This was an important factor in the development of today’s terror phenomenon. The Iranian revolution of 1979 brought to life a new breed of fanatical religious terrorists and the subsequent rise of fundamentalism, which spread rapidly across the Islamic world. The crucial pan Islamic movement, however, was the jihad against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 where, as was well known, U.S. and British intelligence services were working hand-in-glove with the Jihadists, all the while being well aware of the latter’s extremist tendencies. There are evidences to suggest that that U.S. tried to exploit the religion of Islamic against communist ideology in central Asian population after the outbreak of Iran’s Islamic revolution in 1978-79 which put an end to a decade of relatively stable relations between the Soviet authorities and Islam. The news of the Islamic revolutionary success in Iran seemed to have helped trigger a series of anti-Soviet demonstrations and riots in Dushanbe, Alma-ata, and other cities. Although not all disturbances had religious cause, Islamic ideology played a role in inciting the masses.
Soviet responded to the strengthening of security and law-enforcement aspects in the Muslim republics. The close proximity to Iran, quite expectedly, caused serious concern over the possibility of foreign ideological subversion destabilizing the region. The head of the Turkmenistan KGB, Major General Z. Yusef Zade, went so far as to blame the United States for “trying to exploit the Islamic religion—especially in areas where the Muslim population lives—as one factor in influencing the political situation in our country.” The first Secretary of the Turkmen communist party, Gapurov, is quoted to have warned the central authorities of the foreign propaganda activities being conducted by individuals who had exhibited pan-Turkish or pan-Islamic tendencies. He went to say: “Muslim pseudo confessors, champions of old, reactionary principles and rites, operating willfully in the so called ‘holy places, are trying to kindle religious fanaticism, fuel feelings of national narrow mindedness and instill in family relations harmful feudal survivals and rituals, consequently, extra security measures were taken along the southern borders with Iran and Afghanistan, and the KGB’s presence was substantially increased in the Muslim republics. This policy continued until the mid 1980s.” Thus the Soviet action in Afghanistan was aimed at preventing a spill-over of Islamic revivalism to the Tajik and Turkmen republics of The Soviet Union.

A. Who are Mujahedeen?

In this war against communist, the United States supported the Jihad spirit which led to the fall of Marxist regime in Afghanistan and the spectacular rise of the Taliban. The youth that the United States had helped were educated mostly in the madrassas of the NWFP and Balochistan. They had been well trained and motivated by the time the Taliban came to power. But it was not all madrassas located along Pakistan’s border that were engaged in such work. Actually several of fighters were trained in simply makeshift schools intended to train fighters in the war against the Soviets, where Islam was taught simply in order to strengthen the spirit of Jihad against the Russians. These have been loosely and incorrectly described as ‘madrassas’. In actual fact, they were not even conceived of as religious schools. Rather from their very inception they were intended as militant training camps, but were sought to be passed off as ‘madrassas’ in order to legitimate their operations and to solicit funds from Muslim states. The rapid growth and spread of such
schools must be seen in the context of cold war rivalries, and it is obvious that they had the blessing of the Americans, who through the CIA, pumped in large amounts of weapons and cash to assist the Mujahideen.\footnote{232}

During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there were two types of madrassas that participated in the U.S. and Saudi backed jihad. One group of madrassas had been specifically established to produce jihad literature, mobilize popular sentiment, and provide a platform from which to recruit and train Mujahideen. An example of such madrassas is the Jama'at-i- Islami's Rabita madrassas. The Jama'at-i- Islami has never been a madrassa – based party. The madrassas that it did establish were predominantly a product of jihad in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. The second group comprises various independent associations of madrassas, such as those affiliated with Jamiat-e-ulama Islam. As an institution, JUI was a partner in Afghan jihad. There were also some foreign Mujahideen who came to participate in the Afghan effort. Such as Arab volunteers who come to study in Karachi and Muslim males from Central Asia, North Africa, the Caucasus,\footnote{233} and from Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia, and Mindanao. Osama bin Laden, together with the radical Palestinian preacher Abdallah Azzam, founded the Maktab al- Khidmat (office of service), through which they recruited and controlled foreign Mujahideen volunteers.\footnote{234}

Madrassas such as those of Haqqaniya at Akora khattak particularly benefited from Middle Eastern funding because these madrassas had long – established ties with the University of Madina. Moreover, Saudi Arabia had a deep stake in promoting the jihad effort in Afghanistan.

The message that was disseminated at the various madrassas was originally intended to be anti – communist. The intention was to encourage a supply of recruits to the Afghan conflict. Madrassas and makeshift schools were established within the proliferating refugee camps in Pakistan. Notably, it were these camps and schools that became the cradle of the Taliban. International patrons (the United States, Saudi Arabia, and others) supplied the camps and affiliated schools with arms and text books.\footnote{235}

**B. Sources of finance and arms**

As stated earlier nine months before the red Army rolled into Kabul in April 1979, the special coordination committee, an interagency group chaired by
Brzezinski, instructed the CIA to develop a comprehensive plan for a secret war in Afghanistan backed the United States, ranging from “indirect financial assistance to the insurgents to weapons support.” President Carter had clearly stated that the US had “a moral obligation to help the Afghan resistance.” The US Congress in a rare show of bi-partisanship, and promoted by friends of the Afghan resistance such as Charles – Wilson, Gordon Humphrey, Orrin Hatch and Bill Bradley, also took the lead in voting more money for the Mujahideen than the Reagan administration requested, sometimes by diverting funds from the defense budget to the CIA. Its director, Bill Casey, was also able to persuade sympathetic Arab governments to contribute to a reserve fund that could be kept secret from Congress and the State Department. According to Arney, Saudi Arabia funneled more than half, a billion dollars to CIA accounts in Switzerland and the Cayman Islands. One of the biggest operators was the Saudi businessman, Adnan Rashoggi, who openly helped in procuring and distributing weapons and munitions to the Mujahideen through the ISI. He was an agent of the head of the Saudi intelligence agency, Prince Turki, and also acted as a watchdog on the expenditure of Saudi funds.

The CIA’s as well as Saudi payments for the arms supplied by the various leaders were made out of special Afghan war account managed by the Geneva based Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). Its head was a Pakistani banker from Karachi, Abedi. BCCI’s major owners were Saudi and Arab Emirate political and banking figures. Abedi had close ties with President Zia and the ISI’s General Akhtar who handled the whole supply network to the Afghan resistance on the ground.

The US and Pakistan were also backed by the efforts of Osama bin Laden who was primarily a financier of the Afghan resistance, Makhtab –al- Khidmat (MAT). He was among the first to put those dollars to good use against the Red Army. In late 1982, deputy national security adviser Robert McFarlane asked Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the House of Saud’s representative in Washington, and they channeled almost $ 30 billion into the CIA’s covert crusade in Afghanistan. In addition, the U.S. sponsored Mujahideen who fought against the Soviet Union supplemented the funds they received from the U.S. and the Gulf Sheikhdoms with production and sale of heroin to the tune of $ 20 billion annually, a large network of heroin factories cropped up in the North West frontier province, Balochistan and even Karachi.
With the cold war in full swing, Washington was anxious to check Soviet expansionism, and the fall of the Shah of Iran left Pakistan as its only ally in the region. Under the Reagan administration that the Mujahideen cause was really embraced and in the autumn of 1981 a six-year package of $3.2 billion in economic and military aid to Pakistan was agreed. As it was a covert war against the Soviet Union, the massive CIA weapons pipeline that was put in place to arm the Mujahideen was completely managed and supervised on the ground by the ISI, giving the agency enormous power. The weapons came from China, Israel, Egypt, Poland, and factories set up to copy Soviet arms to disguise their provenance. And CIA put through a program of funneling Soviet-made arms, purchased from Egypt and Somalia.

In the beginning of the year 1979, Zia Nassery, as representative of the “Committee for Struggle” visited New York and Washington and met with two American Senators, Frank George and Jacob Frantz. After the meeting Zia Nassery said: “I have come to the USA for receiving political and financial support for resisting the Afghan authorities. We need money to buy enough quantities of weapons.”

The procurement of weapons was entrusted to the American company called “Interarms” based in Manchester, Britain, and headed by Samuel king. The time magazine reported in 1980 that the main supplier of armaments for the Afghan counter-revolutionaries was a company named “Interarms” which possessed stocks of arms in different places in the world, and had been operating under the chairmanship of Samuel king, a former employee of the CIA. Such kind of job was possible only with the help of agencies like the CIA and the Pentagon. According to a report he got a part of the armaments from Pentagon and with the certification of Pentagon he sold them in different part of the world.

Much of the controversy about the covert American role centers around the quality as well as the quantity of CIA weapons actually reaching the Mujahideen. Some accounts of CIA successes in this regard have been overblown. But according to a reliable Washington, D.C. – based source Sam – 7s and 82mm medium range Soviet-made mortars, the later “Stinger,” or British “Blowpipe” surface to – air missiles and the longer, range British or Finnish 81 mm medium range mortar were supplied. Furthermore, such weapons as anti-tank and anti-personnel mines had also reached into the hands of Mujahideen.
While some western supporters have called for widespread introduction of the "stinger" a more advanced shoulder fired heat seeking missile a few of these weapons had reportedly found their way to the Mujahideen. According to the Times, however, a new version of the Soviet weapon, the Sam-7, was created by forces sympathetic to the resistance, paid for by the United States. Anti-DRA forces in late 1984 were reportedly being trained in Egypt on the missile's use. The acquisition of the better weapons was directly linked to the provision of aid by Western and Arab countries. Between 1980 and early 1992, when military aid officially ceased, the United States gave $2-3 billion to the Mujahideen, to which can be similar sum from the Arab countries. However, President Reagan had been highly cautious during his first term, in spite of his anti-communist rhetoric. For 1983 the CIA asked for a budget of $30 million for the Mujahideen (compared to $24 million for the contras in Honduras). Charles Wilson, a Democratic Senator, obtained an additional $40 million and some Swiss anti-tank guns. In 1985 a distinct turning-point was reached, with a budget of $200 million, which was to reach $280 million by 1989. The other western countries, especially France and Britain, did not publicized the level of their military aid to the Mujahideen, but fighters were trained in Europe and Pakistan, while equipment such as radios, missiles and anti-tank weapons were distributed to the parties. Around 80,000 Mujahideen were reported to have been trained in Pakistan, mainly by Pakistani officers, as well as more unusually by Americans. However, U.S. was aware of the fact that factions within these forces of jihad would soon thereafter turn their fury on the United States.

It was clear that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan was coming to an end due to pressure from the Mujahideen forces operating from within Afghanistan and from bases in Pakistan. In February 1989 the Russian army withdrew from
Afghanistan, having failed to get control of the first third world country it occupied. A turning point came in mid 1986, when the United States began to supply the Afghan rebels with surface – to – air stinger missiles, which forced Soviet aircraft and helicopters to suspend their low – level raids on rebel villages and strongholds. In January 1987 Najibullah announced a cease – fire, but the rebels refused his firms, and the war continued. In February 1988 Gorbachev conceded the need to extract Soviet forces from the stalemated conflict. In April 1988 Afghanistani, Pakistani, and Soviet representatives in Geneva agreed to a disengagement plan based on Soviet withdrawal by February 1989 and non-involvement in each other’s internal affairs. But Soviet refused to halt its own military supplies to Kabul, arguing with some plausibility that its own obligations dated back to the Soviet Union’s treaty of peace and friendship with Afghanistan concluded in 1920. On 14 April 1988, just before the signing ceremony at the Palais de Nations in Geneva, the UN Secretary General received a formal notification that the United States reserved the right to continue supplying the Mujahideen, although it could meet with Soviet restraint. The United States and the Soviet Union pledged to guarantee the settlement in a separate document. The Accords were universally acclaimed by the international community and many exaggerated claims were made regarding their significance – but they guaranteed the continuation of the Afghan civil war. Afghan academic Amin Saikal has rightly viewed the Afghan crisis more as a proxy conflict between the super powers than as one with political and social origins within Afghanistan itself.

During the operation over the past eight years, the United States had sent hundreds of millions of dollars in covert operation. This not only created the possibility of rolling back a forward position of the Soviet empire but also inflicted such cost on the Kremlin that its leaders will have to think twice before again embarking on such an adventure in the future. Brzezinski wrote that “our ultimate goal is the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan . . . Even if this is not attainable; we should make Soviet involvement as costly as possible.”
Notes and References

3 Angelo Rasanayagam, n. 1, p.19.
6 Ibid, p. 63-64.
8 Frank A. Clements, n. 4, pp. 17-18.
9 Sudhan Mukherjee, n. 7, pp. 53-55.
10 Ibid, pp. 51-52.
11 Ibid, pp. 48-49.
12 Amin Saikal, n. 5, pp. 70-71.
14 Frank A. Clements, n. 4, p. 257.
16 Angelo Rasanayagam, n. 1, p. 19.
20 Vera Michele Dean, n. 17, pp. 13-14.
21 Amin Saikal, n. 5, pp. 64-65.
22 Angelo Rasanayagam, n. 1, pp.19-20.
23 Amin Saikal, n. 5, pp. 70-71.
24 Ibid.
27 Mohammad Khalid Ma’a roof, n. 25, p.29.
30 Amin Saikal, n. 5, p. 106.
31 Frank A. Clements, n. 4, pp. 17-18.
32 Amin Saikal, n. 5, pp. 102-103.
34 Amin Saikal, n. 5, pp.17-18.
36 Mohammad Khalid Ma’a roof, n. 25, p.31.
40. Frank A. Clements, n. 4, pp. 256-257.
42. Arnold Fletcher, n. 2, p. 237.
43. Mohammad Khalid Ma’a roof, n. 25, pp. 31-32.
44. Frank A. Clements, n. 4, pp. 256-257.
45. Angelo Rasanayagam, n. 1, p. 25.
46. Frank A. Clements, n. 4, pp. 6-7.
50. Frank A. Clements, n. 4, pp. 6-7.
53. Frank A. Clements, n. 4, pp. 257.
54. Mohammad Khalid Ma’a roof, n. 25, p. 37.
55. Arnold Fletcher, n. 2, p. 239.
56. Mohammad Khalid Ma’a roof, n. 25, p. 37.
57. Angelo Rasanayagam, n. 1, pp. 15-17.
58. Frank A. Clements, n. 4, pp. 6-7.
59. Ibid, pp. 256-257.
60. Mohammad Khalid Ma’a roof, n. 25, p. 98.
61. Frank A. Clements, n. 4, pp. 6-7.
63. Angelo Rasanayagam, n. 1, p. 55.
64. Frank A. Clements, n. 4, pp. 256-257.
67. Ibid, p. 100.
71. Goyal, n. 29, p. 77.
75. Bhabani Sen Gupta, n. 73, pp. 9-10.
77. Bhabani Sen Gupta, n. 73, pp. 9-10.
Burton I. Kaufman, n. 18, p. 762.
Goyal, n. 29, p. 77.
John Spanier, n. 19, pp. 27-29.
Richard P. Stebbines and The Research Staff GF the Council on Foreign Relations, n.74, pp. 385-386.
John Spanier, n.19, pp. 27-29.
Douglas Little, n.70, pp. 308-309.
Douglas Little, n.70, pp. 117-118.
Frank A. Clements, n. 4, pp. 257-258.
Arnold Fletcher, n. 2, pp.249-256.
George B. Cresssey, n. 76, p. 238.
Arnold Fletcher, n. 2, pp. 268-269.
Raja Anwar, n. 37, pp. 30-34.
Amin Saikal, n. 5, pp. 128-129.
Richard P. Stebbins and The Research Staff GF the Council on Foreign Relations, n.74, pp. 418-419.
Bhabani Sen Gupta, n. 73, pp. 10-12.
Amalendu Misra, n. 51, pp. 22-23.
Arnold Fletcher, n. 2, pp. 269-261.
Amin Saikal, n. 5, p. 136.
Bhabani Sen Gupta, n. 73, pp. 10-12.
Mary Bradley Watkins, n. 97, pp. 87-89.
Arnold Fletcher, n. 2, pp. 274-276.
Amin Saikal, n. 5, pp. 128-129.
Anglo Rasanayagam, n. 1, pp. 62-64.
Bhabani Sen Gupta, n. 73, pp. 21-24.
Angelo Rasanayagam, n. 1, pp. 62-64.
Bhabani Sen Gupta, n. 73, pp. 21-24.
Goyal, n. 29, pp. 83-86.
Gilles Dorronsoro, n. 28, pp. 84-85.
Ibid, pp. 151-152.


Ibid, pp. 201-202

Ibid, p. 205.


"20th Century International Relations". *The New Encyclopedia Britannica*, Vol. 21, n 41, pp. 890-891

Gilles Dorronsoro, n. 28, pp 63-65

Amin Saikal, n 5, pp 126-128.

Arnold Fletcher, n 2, pp. 283-285.


Peter King, *Afghanistan Cockpit in High Asia* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1966), pp. 84-86

Frank A. Clements, n. 4, pp 257-258

Angelo Rasanayagam, n. 1, pp. 30-31

Mary Bradley Watkins, n. 97, p 94


Arnold Fletcher, n. 2, p. 244.

Grant M. Farr, n 100, p. 130.

Angelo Rasanayagam, n. 1, pp. 42-43

Arnold Fletcher, n. 2, pp 271-272.

Ibid, p. 271.

Mary Bradley Watkins, n. 97, p 115.

Ibid, pp. 94-100

Peter King, n 134, pp. 84-86

Angelo Rasanayagam, n. 1, pp. 30-31


Richard P. Stebbins and The Research Staff GF the Council on Foreign Relations, n. 74, pp. 418-419.

Mary Bradley Watkins, n. 97, pp. 94-100

Peter King, n 134, pp 161-163.

Angelo Rasanayagam, n. 1, pp. 27-28

Arnold Fletcher, n. 2, pp. 264-266.

Angelo Rasanayagam, n. 1, pp 27-28


Arnold Fletcher, n. 2, pp. 264-266.

Bhabani Sen Gupta, n. 73, pp. 10-12.

Angelo Rasanayagam, n. 1, pp. 28-30.

Raja Anwar, n. 37, pp. 32-35

Anthony Hyman, n. 35, pp 27-29.

Amin Saikal, n 5, pp 121-123.

Bhabani Sen Gupta, n. 73, pp 15-16

Amin Saikal, n, 5, pp. 121-123.

Angelo Rasanayagam, n. 1, p 67.

Bhabani Sen Gupta, n. 73, pp 25-29

Gilles Dorronsoro, n. 28, pp 84-85


Goyal, n 29, p 78

Anthony Hyman, n. 35, pp. 75-76.


Ibid, p. 78.

Ibid, p. 98.


Raja Anwar, n. 37, pp. 151-152.

Bhabani Sen Gupta, n. 73, pp. 56-63.


Angelo Rasayangam, n. 1, pp. 77-82.

Raja Anwar, n. 37, pp. 151-152.

Angelo Rasayangam, n. 1, pp. 77-82.

Raja Anwar, n. 37, pp. 151-152.


Angelo Rasayangam, n. 1, p. 83.


Anthony Hyman, n. 35, pp. 165-167.

Douglas Little, n. 70, pp. 150-151.

Raja Anwar, n. 37, pp. 199-200.

Anthony Hyman, n. 35, pp. 165-167.

Douglas Little, n. 70, pp. 150-151.

Ibid, p. 119.


Ibid, p. 573.


John Spanier, n. 25, pp. 320-324.

Bhabani Sen Gupta, n. 120, pp. 153-154.

Ibid, pp. 86-87.


K. Subrahmanyam, n. 123, p. 3.


Noam Chomsky, n. 93, p. 203.


Pandit Sheel Phadra Yajee, n. 167, pp. 116-118.

Noam Chomsky, n. 93, p. 209.

Ibid, p. 115.

John Spanier, n. 19, pp. 318-320.

Noam Chomsky, n. 93, p. 235.


Ibid, pp. 337-338.
Pandit Sheel Phadra Yajee, n. 167, pp. 116-118.


Ibid, p. 69.


Steffan Halper and Jonathan Clark, n. 219, p. 161.

Bhabani Sen Gupta, n. 120, pp. 226-227.


Bhabani Sen Gupta, n. 120, p. 240.


David Farber, n. 195, p. 187.

Steffan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, n. 219, pp. 276-277.


Bhabani Sen Gupta, n. 73, pp. 133-135.

M. Asghar Khan, n. 124, pp. 232-234.


Ibid, p. 47.

Ibid, pp. 274-278.

Douglas Little, n. 70, pp. 152-153.

Angelo Rasanayagam, n. 1, pp. 104-107.

Hall Gardner, n. 224, pp. 113-114.

Douglas Little, n. 70, pp. 152-153.


Bhabani Sen Gupta, n. 73, pp. 102-104.

Goyal, n. 29, pp. 116-120.


Gilles Dorronsoro, n.28, pp. 207-209.

David Farber, n. 195, pp. 4-5.


David Farber, n. 195, pp. 4-5.

Frank A. Clements, n. 4, pp. 257-258.


Angelo Rasanayagam, n. 1, pp. 123-125.

Ibid. pp.121-122.


Hall Gardner, n. 224, pp. 112-113.