CHAPTER-3

U.S., Afghanistan and the Problem of Terrorism (1996-2001)

I. History of U.S. involvement with Islamic radicals/Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan

We have tried here to understand the nature and dynamics of contemporary Islamist movements, in order to comprehend the basis, structures and strategies of these movements from localized and regional manifestations of protest and confrontation to an international phenomenon of rebellion and terror.

Broadly, these movements may be placed in three different phases of history. The first phase may be located in the break-up of Ottoman Empire after World War I and the subsequent period of struggles for colonization. The second phase may be located in the post-colonial period and the emergence of Muslim countries as independent sovereign states. The third and most crucial phase starts off from the time of convergence of global Islamist groups in Afghanistan against Soviet occupation and ultimate break-up of Soviet Union and the collapse of communism. It is equally important to note that during this phase which is still continuing, the Islamist movements shifted their main operational bases from the boundaries of Arab Muslim world to none Arab Muslim world in a big way.

During the colonial phase instances are available which indicate that Islamist movements did organize themselves to challenge imperialism and colonialism directly. The slogan of *Jihad* raised by Jamaluddin Afghani against British imperialism in the nineteenth century, the Mehdist movement in the nineteenth century in Sudan, the participation of Islamists in the struggle for independence in Algeria, and the active participation of Islamists belonging to the *Deobandi* sect of Muslims in Indian national freedom movement against the British colonialism are some examples of such movements. The Islamist which evolved during the twentieth century acquired varied experiences of assertion and operation until they joined the Afghan war against Soviet occupation in the 1980s. These movements in different regions of the world lead to an international coalition during the Afghan war.¹

The root cause of Islamic radical movement in Afghanistan could be traced back to 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, partly to settle in fighting between rival factions in the communist leadership in Kabul.² With
the proclamation of the democratic Afghan Republic the PDPA assured the Afghan people that the states would protect their religious faith and they would be free to observe their religious. Nevertheless, as the radical reforms began to be implemented in October 1978, the clergy rose in protest, and by January 1979, the traditional ruling elements, the property holders and the clergy, joined together to mobilize large segments of the urban – rural people in all Afghanistan to offer armed resistance to the Marxist regime.³

This situation gave a change to US to carry out its foreign policy to contain the spread of communism. Since World War II, the United States had to assume leadership of the “free world” in order to contain the communists. The United States did everything in its power to prevent the spread of communism in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, as well as in Europe. It included the formation of alliances on the perimeter of the communist bloc, generous military and economic aid to allies, vigorous measures to maintain a favorable climate for American investment abroad and covert operations to prevent communist and other anti – American leader from coming to power.⁴ The primary goal of neo-conservative agenda during the cold war was to impel democratic change in the Soviet system and among other communist states.⁵ During Reagan Administration the basic outline of US’s foreign policy was reestablishment of American economic and military strength and the roll – back of Soviet influence across the third world⁶ and standing up to the Soviet threat and to take responsibility for containing Soviet expansionism in any part of the world.⁷ It sought to provide assistance to anti communist guerillas and government with arms, finance, training and facilities, to note a few examples, the Reagan administration supported the Contras in Nicaragua, the anti-Marxist guerillas in Angola, the right-wing government in El Salvador, the guerillas coalition in the Cambodia and the Mujahideen in Afghanistan.⁸

In the Muslim world, particularly Middle East, Islam was utilized by US in collaboration with its allies to deal a deadly blow to communism and its adversary, Soviet Union.⁹ USA was trying to use the developments occurring in the Moslem world to their advantage holding forth upon the common values of the Christian and Islamic civilizations as opposed to atheistic Communism and flirting with the political and religious leaders of the Moslem world. Western strategists were trying to drive a
wedge of controversy between Moslems and the Soviet Union, to half circle the USSR with crescent of instability. Internationally reactionary circles were trying to point the spearhead of Moslem movements against the progressive forces within the Islamic world, and also against the socialist states, particularly the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{10}

In this regard the Reagan administration adopted the Doctrine of ‘horizontal escalation’ which was intended to roll back communism. Reagan administration largely utilized surrogate fighters to beat back Soviet-backed regimes or Soviet supported movements.\textsuperscript{11} Nine months before the Red Army rolled into Kabul Brzezinski had expressed ‘concern over the Soviets creeping intervention in Afghanistan’ and insisted that Washington must be more sympathetic to those afghans who were determined to pressure their country’s independence, the Pentagon’s Walter Slocomb agreed and wondered whether clandestine US support for Moslem guerillas might succeed in “sucking the Soviets into Vietnamese quagmire”. On April 1979, the social coordination committee an interagency group chaired by Brzezinski, instructed the CIA to develop a comprehensive plan for a secret war in Afghanistan backed by the United States ranging from “indirect financial assistance to the insurgence “ to weapon support.\textsuperscript{12} The \textit{jihad} against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 – where, as was well known, US and British intelligence services were working hand in-glove with the \textit{Jihadists}, all the while being well aware of the latter extremist tendencies. By the time that the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, whole generations which were radicalized by Islamic indoctrination and militarized training of religiously inspired terrorists had been produced and subsequently dispersed across the globe.\textsuperscript{13}

When the Soviet Union took control of Afghanistan and the United States decided to support Ziaul Haq, a natural ally, to engage the Soviet Union in a proxy war in Afghanistan, the United States received powerful support from its ally, Saudi Arabia which provided funds to establish a wide network of \textit{Madrassas} in the country and to the Mujahideen in their \textit{Jihad} in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia, along with the United States financed the ISI in training and arming the anti- Soviet \textit{jihadis}’ in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{14} US Casey committed CIA support to along – standing ISI initiative to recruit radical Muslims from around the world to come to Pakistan and fight with the Afghan Mujahideen. The ISI had encouraged this since 1982, President Zia aimed to
cement Islamic unity, turned Pakistan into the leader of Muslim world and foster an Islamic opposition in Central Asia. As Lieutenant General Hameed Gul, (the head of the ISI of Pakistan) replied to Ahmed Rashid in his interview about the future dissention of Islamic radical “we are fighting a jihad and this is the first Islamic international brigade in the modern era. The communists have their international brigade, the West has NATO, why can’t the Muslims unite and form a common front?” In addition, Zia claimed shortly before his death, as part of a strategic realignment, an Islamic state and an Islamic confederation, part of a pan-Islamist renaissance. It would comprise – apart from an Afghan Pakistani federation – Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and possibly Iran and Turkey. While, Washington wanted to demonstrate that the entire Muslim world was fighting the Soviet Union alongside the Afghans and their American benefactors. And the Saudis saw an opportunity both to promote Wahabism and get rid of its disgruntled radicals.

Pakistan already had standing instructions to all its embassies abroad to give visas, to any one wanting to come and fight with the Mujahideen. In the Middle East the Muslim brotherhood, the Saudi – based World League and Palestinian Islamic radicals organized the recruits and put them into contact with the Pakistanis. The ISI and Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami set up reception committees to welcome, house and train the arriving militants and they encouraged them to join the Mujahideen groups, usually the Hizb-e-Islami. The funds for the enterprise came directly from Saudi intelligence. French scholar Oliver Roy describes it as a joint venture between the Saudis, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-e-Islami, put together by the ISI.

Between 1982 and 1992 some 35,000 Muslim radicals from 43 Islamic countries in the Middle East, North and East Africa, Central Asia and the Far-East came there as the Afghan war was a jihad, pure and simple logical coexistence with other battle fields-Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia or Mindanao would pass their baptism under fire with Afghan Mujahideen. Tens of thousands more foreign Muslim radical came to study in the hundreds of new Madrassas that Zia’s military government began to fund in Pakistan along the Afghan border. As Soviet invaded Afghanistan Pakistan became a “frontline” state. The United States along with Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia was keen to invest in the Madrassa infrastructure to churn out Mujahideen to fight in Afghanistan. During the subsequent six years, as the US backed Mujahideen
effort in Afghanistan continued to gather momentum, 1,000 new Madrassas were established. There were two types of Madrassas that participated in the US and Saudi backed jihad. One group of Madrassas had been specifically established to produced jihad literature, mobilize popular sentiment, and provide a platform from which to recruit and train Mujahideen. An example of such Madrassas is the Jama’at –i-Islami’s Rabita Madrassas. The JI has never been a Madrassas-based party. The Madrassas that it did establish were predominantly a product of the Jihad in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. The second group comprises various independent associations of Madrassas, such as those affiliated with Jamiat-e-Ulama Islam as an institution.

The massage that was disseminated at the various Madrassas was originally intended to be anti-communist. The intention was to encourage a supply of recruits to the Afghan conflict. Madrassas and makeshift schools were established within the proliferating refugee camps in Pakistan. Notably, it is these camps and schools that became the cradle of the Taliban. International patrons (the United States, Saudi Arabia, and others) supplied the camps and affiliated schools with arms and text books. Eventually more than 100,000 Muslim radicals were to have direct contact with Pakistan and Afghanistan and be influenced by the Jihad. In the contrary, wrote Yoginder ‘it is important to remember that not all schools in the Pathan borderlands that look part in the Afghan jihad and later associated themselves with militant activism and terrorism elsewhere were actually established traditional Madrassas. Several of them were simply makeshift schools intended to train fighters in the war against the Soviets, where a mattering of Islam was taught in order to strengthen the spirit of jihad against the Russians. These have been loosely and incorrectly described as ‘Madrassas’ in actual fact, they were not even conceived of a religious schools. Rather from their very inception they were intended as militant training camps, but were sought to be passed off as Madrassas in order to legitimize their operations and to solicit funds from Muslim states. The rapid growth and spread of such schools must be seen in the context of cold war rivalries, and it was obvious that they had the blessings of Americans, who through the CIA, pumped in large amounts of weapons and cash to assist the Mujahideen.

In camps near Peshawar and in Afghanistan, theses radical met each other for the first time and studied, trained and fought together. It was the first opportunity for
most of them to learn about Islamic movements in other countries and their forged tactical and ideological links that would serve them well in the future. The camps become virtual universities for future Islamic radicalism.\textsuperscript{23}

During the Afghan war, the Reagan administration supported the activities of Usamah Bin-Laden’s mentor, Abdullah Azzam. Azzam himself toured the US in the early and mid 1980s to recruit fighters.\textsuperscript{24} Former Associate deputy FBI Director Oliver B. (Buck) Revell, interviewed on Emerson’s PBS program, agreed with Emerson’s assessment. Revell stated that once the Mujahideen and their associates came to the United States, they found a hospitable environment. They could raise money, film videos, run printing presses, and eventually attack the very country whose freedom they enjoyed. Revell said that for the first time in American history, the United States housed a terrorist infrastructure that stretched from the American heartland all the way through the Middle East to Southeast Asia. Ravell stated that it was the most global network of terrorist the United States ever faced.

Emerson credits Abdullah Azzam for completing the most important infrastructure. Azzam left his homeland to join the Mujahideen in the early 1980s. Centering his activities in Pakistan, Azzam soon came to understand the vast amount of support the United States was funneling through the area. Leaving Pakistan he helped establish the Alkifah Refugee center in New York. According to Emerson, American officials did not realize the Alkifah Refugee center was the front for another organisation, an organization calling for jihad. In fact the Alkifah Refugee center’s Arabic letterhead called for holy war.

In 1989, with the Soviets in disarray and their political system on the verge of collapse, Azzam turned his attention to the United States. According to Emerson, Azzam spread his jihad network through 38 states, with multiple bases in Pennsylvania, Michigan, California, Texas, and the New England states. Azzam returned to Pakistan in 1989, only to be killed by an assassin, but his work was completed by several supporters, including his cousin Fayiz Azzam.

Emerson names several prominent officials working in various radical groups in the domestic jihad. Tamim al-Adnani was the most vigorous recruiter and successful fundraiser among all the leaders. Emerson says Tamin al-Adnani has assisted in domestic terrorist incidents, including the world trade center bombing.\textsuperscript{25} Azzam founded the Maktab al-Khidamat (office of services) through which they
recruited and controlled foreign Mujahideen volunteers. But few years later reportedly Azzam wanted to take the jihad from Afghanistan to the oppressed Muslims worldwide, especially in Kashmir and Chechnya, whereas Bin Laden wanted to concentrate on attacks on the United States and the destruction of pro-Western Arab regimes. However, after the death of Azzam in 1989, Osama bin laden took over Azam’s organization and set up Al-Qaeda or military Base as a service centre for Arab – Afghans and their families and to forge a broad – based alliance amongst them. With the help of Bin laden several thousand Arab militants had established bases in the provinces of Kunar, Nuristan and Badakshan.

The US long supplied arms and training to the most ferociously reactionary fighting forces in the Islamic world, including those Mujahideen who spawned a second – generation reform movement known as the Taliban. As journalist Ahmed Rashid, observes that the Clinton Administration was clearly sympathetic to the Taliban, as they were in line with Washington’s anti – Iran policy and were important to the success of any southern pipeline that would avoid Iran.” He also speaks of “the CIA – ISI (Interservice Intelligence, Pakistan) pipeline” that supported the more radical Islamic parties” moreover, “what Washington was not prepared to admit was that the Afghan jihad, with the support of the CIA, had spawned dozens of fundamentalist movements.

It was likely that Bin laden had much cozier ties with the ISI than the CIA itself; this should hardly give US intelligence a solution for its role in strengthening both the ISI as well as jihad international. Even Bin Laden gave US operatives credit for their helping hand in constructing his Afghanistan operation “I set up my first camp where these volunteers were trained by Pakistani and American officers. The weapons were supplied by the Americans, the money by the Saudis.” According to Amin Saikal, after coming into close contact with a number of Pakistani radical Islamists, it was in Peshawar that bin laden set up the original cell of his al-Qaeda network. According to a policy brief prepared for the Kennedy school of government, concurred with bin laden’s version of events: “the US provided the weapon’s and the know – how, the Saudis provided the funds, and we provided the training camps and operations base for the Islamic legions in the early 1980s and then for the Taliban.” In contrast to the tendency of Huntington’s followers to see Islamic militancy as part of the religion’s own inner dynamics, Rashid carefully sketches the sequence of events that facilitated
its triumph, including the CIA – ISI nexus. Beyond Southwest Asia Washington had
given valuable support to rightist Islamic forces throughout the Middle East in often
successful efforts to smash once powerful socialist movements and ideologues of pan-
Arabism.

However, following the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan in 1989, Yael
Shahar (1998) says the Mujahideen saw the fall of the Soviet Union as a sign of total
victory. The Soviet Union had not collapsed under the weight of political, economic,
and military factors but in the mind of the Mujahideen, it fell by the hand of God. The
Soviet retreat was a sign of God’s power, and if God could bring down the Soviet
Union through the work of the Mujahideen, other evil nations were doomed to
destruction. The primary targets of the Mujahideen were Israel and the United
States.

Following the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan, Bin Laden turned to Saudi
regime for being corrupt and against the USA for maintaining such a regime and
enabling Israel to maintain its occupation of Jerusalem (Islam’s third holiest city after
Medina and Mecca) and its brutal suppression of Palestinian resistance. When the
Saudi authorities stripped him of his citizenship, he first moved to Sudan but, by
1996, he had returned to the country that he knew best: Afghanistan yet this time he
returned to an Afghanistan where a new ISI – run militia – that is the Taliban, which
was ideologically very amenable to Bin Laden’s brand of Islam – had seized power in
Kabul. The ISI wanted to use his wealth and Arab connections in support of the
militia’s adventures and also therefore in support of Pakistan’s expanded regional
policy goals.

Bin Laden forged an organic alliance with Mullah Mohammad Omar, based on
the Saudi dissident providing the Taliban with money and Arab fighters and the
Taliban giving the Saudi dissident and his supporter’s sanctuary, aid and all the basic
support that they needed to set up terrorist training camps and expand al-Qaeda into a
trans-national network. Islamist extremist from around the world – including North
America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Central, South and South East Asia –
continued to use Afghanistan as a training ground and base of operations for their
world wide terrorist activities in 1999. The Taliban, which controlled most Afghan
territory, permitted the operation of training and indoctrination facilities for non-
Afghans and provided logistic support to members of various terrorist organisations
and Mujahideen including those waging jihads in Chechnya, Lebanon, Kosovo, Kashmir and elsewhere.

Later, Al-Qaeda reshuffled the entire understanding and assessment on terrorism by creating a complex “confederation” of militant groups and aggregating support networks of Al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin laden brought disparate Islamist groups from the Middle East, Asia and the Horn of Africa together by creating by common platform and a common agenda. Al-Qaeda’s rallying point revolves around the call for universal jihad against the United States, its allies and regimes, including moderate Muslim governments, accused by the group of imposing dysfunctional and immoral ways of life across the globe.

A. Al-Qaeda’s Ideology

The Jihadist stream gathered momentum in the Afghan war during the 1980s when it found a new champion in Abdullah Azzam, a Muslim Brotherhood Palestinian propagandist for the Afghan cause. That time the process for recruiting Mujahideen around the world to come to fight with Afghan Mujahideen, in Middle East was opened mainly channeled through the Muslim Brotherhood. The hub of these informal networks was established in Peshawar through the office of services (Mektab al-khadamat), headed by Abdullah Azzam. in close conjunction with the Saudi activist and tycoon Osama Bin Laden who founded the ‘House of Auxiliaries (Baytul-ansar). And through the Saudi based World Muslim League and Palestinian Islamic radicals organized the recruits and put them into contact with the Pakistanis. The ISI and Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami set up reception committees to welcome those and train the arriving militant and encouraged them to join the Mujahideen groups.

The ideology of using violence to oppose oppressive government has already been in Salafism where jihadi ideology gradually gained ground in Afghanistan and eventually merged with Salafism. Its chief proponent was Abdullah Azzam who in 1984 founded the Maktub al-Kidmat (MAk) an office for recruiting Arabs to fight against the Soviet in Afghanistan. Azzam had a decisive influence on Osama bin Laden. In his work, the main obligation of Muslims is to defend the land of Islam. Azzam writes that jihad is moral obligation for all Muslims, the sixth pillar of the faith. Using epic and mystic language he sets out a vision of the world based on strict Salafism and calls for martyrdom stressing the permanent state of humiliation.
suffered by the umma, as a result of the actions of “crusaders and Zionists”. His work had a decisive influence on the jihadi radicalism of the 1990s.

The global proliferation of fighting Salafism and its fusion with jihadi ideology were further consolidated under Bin Laden. His declaration of war on the West - backed by the creation in 1998 of the World Islamic front for jihad against Jews and crusaders – caused groups that had originally been set up to provide logistical support to Al-Qaeda and had originally sought to purify and punish society, to now set their sights on the West. The struggle was no longer confined to the nearest enemy but also to those further away fighting Salafism assumed the role of globalizing the jihad born out of the Afghan experience and became the core ideology of the new radical Islamism.

Militant Islamists hate the United States primarily for its secularism. Within the Islamic fold the Salafis have been a religious movement committed to returning Islam to a pure form as practiced by Muhammad and his early followers. The Salafis have been strong in Egypt since the Second World War and include the Wahhabis, a puritanical Sunni sect and the official religion of Saudi Arabia. The most important theorist of the extreme Salafis, Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian, recognized the threat that the West’s secularism posed to the Middle East. Qutb believed that only a revolution against the secular regimes of the Middle East could prevent the corruption of Muslim societies, and he advocated a vanguard movement in theory to lead the revolution.

Qutb’s ideology that was written in the book name Milestones; this book was dedicated to the exposition of his vision of the necessity for revolution in order to create a truly Islamic society ruled by Islamic law. This revolution was to be carried out via jihad as holy war, which was declared to be the ongoing permanent duty of Muslims as they engaged in the cosmic battle or good versus evil, played out in everyday life in the struggle of Muslims against non-Muslim governments and ideologies. This ideology Sayyid Qutb elaborated from Ibn-i-Tammiya, where he propounded the ideological underpinning which created a moral and political space for radical Islamists to operate. In this context, Fiyaz identifies that two concepts, Hakmat-i-illahya (Sovereignty of God) and Takfir (committing sin in violation of Islamic tenets) propounded by Ibn-i-Tammiya and generally relied upon by the extremist Islamists the world over to justify their actions need to be revised and
related forcefully. Theses concepts were also elaborated by Abdul Ala Maududi in Pakistan providing intellectual base for extremism.\footnote{45}

The involvement of Egyptian and Saudi extremists in 9/11 has set off a debate on the ideological foundations of extremist Islamists. According to Wael Al-Abrashi: the extremist religious groups had moved from the stage of Takfir to the stage of annihilation and destruction in accordance with the strategy of Al-Qaeda.\footnote{46}

However, Qutb’s vision of global jihad was developed at a time of conflict within a specific environment - Nasser’s secular Egypt and its persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood, yet it was precisely because of this context that his work has been taken as an inspiration for contemporary jihad. Oriented organisations see themselves in similar battles against secular ideologies and repressive authoritarian governments from North Africa to the Middle East to Central and South Asia. The experiences of many of the adherents of these movements fighting for the Mujahideen against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 1980s resulted in practical experience and victory in the cosmic battle of good (Islam) versus evil (atheist communism). Osama bin laden has emerged as the most prominent warrior of this type.\footnote{47} In due respect to the complexity of the concept: if one substitutes secularism for capitalism, Qutb’s revolution would be title different in many ways from Leninist-style revolutions of an early age.

A founder of Egypt’s Islamic Jihad, Muhammad Abdel-Salam al-Farq stressed the importance of jihad as a pillar of Islam. Pure Muslims must promote jihad for its own sake. Believing that the American creed entails private property, and the globalization of the American creed strikes at the core of their identity. In their eyes, the United States caused a triple whammy (an unpleasant situation or event that causes problem for somebody/something). Many Jihadists believe in the superiority of Islamic civilization and justifies violence against both “infidels” and “apostates”, since Islam makes no distinction between the religious and political realms.\footnote{49}

Bodansky says Bin Laden was influenced by the Pan – Islamic movement and the role of Iran. Putting aside differences between Shiites and Sunnis, radical Muslims found Satan arrayed against Islam: Satan came in the form of the United States. Bin Laden worked with the Iranians to bring Sunnis and Shiites together in organisation called the International Muslim Brotherhood, but he wanted to go further. By training
and financing terrorist groups and calling for overthrow of sympathetic Muslim governments.

In the same, Khomeini Ayatollah who led Islamic revolution in Iran also was influenced by Qutb’s ideology when he was exiled in Iraq in 1970. ‘After Khomeini riding victoriously it was necessary to eliminate all opposition if the Islamic revolution was to succeed. The starting point was to attack all things western. He said it was time to launch a holly war against the West and the traitors to Islam.’ Robin Wright (1986) makes this point in her examination of Shiite Islam in ‘Sacred Rage’. According to Wright, Ayatollah Khomeini was guided by the message of Karbala. Alongwith the Shiite clergy of Iran, he believed that the Iranian Revolution was the first step in purifying the world. Israel must be eliminated and returned to Islamic rule. The West had become the handmaiden of the Jews, but the West was and remains the source of imperialism. Its influence is Satanic and must be destroyed. Holly warriors are called to battle. Wright says Iran exports terrorism in this vein with revolutionary zeal.

According to Dor Waxman (1998), Iran has moved from a post revolutionary nationalist phase to the real politics of Pan – Islam. That is Iranian leaders slowly moved away from their blind allegiance to Shiaism and began supporting Militant Sunnis and Shiites. Revolutionary Iranians began sending money and support to Sunni terrorist groups in Lebanon, believing Iranian Shiites and Lebanese Sunnis were working for the same cause. Osama bin laden a Saudi Arabian was one such Sunni.

Khomeini’s own interest in creating an Islamist International – it would later be known Hezbollah (party of God) apparent in August 1979, in Lebanon. The head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards once boasted about having sponsored the attack against French and American peacekeeping forces in Lebanon. Western intelligence agencies suspect that Hezbollah has been working with Bin Laden on international operations since the early 1990s. Hezbollah’s terrorist network in Lebanon contains both Shiite and Sunni groups, and there is also a Saudi Arabian wing that was involved in the Khobar towers bombing which killed 19 U.S. troops in 1996. Also inspired by the Iranian Revolution was the independent Sunni terrorist network that later became the basis of Al-Qaeda. However, Islamism is a self – consciously pan – Muslim phenomenon although Shiite and Sunni have differences along a series of traditional religious, ethnic, or political divides (Shiite versus Sunni, Persian versus Arab, and so
on). The reason is simple: in the eyes or the Islamist groups their common effort to strike at the West while seizing control of the Muslim world is immeasurably more important than whatever might be seen as “dividing” them from one another. 53

Furthermore, Al-Qaeda regards that the secular revolutions backed by the Soviets, such as Al-Fatah and the Baath party governing Iraq and Syria, and the monarchies, such as the Saudis, backed by the United states had to be destroyed. 54

However, The Afghan’s militant Mujahideen (who struggle in the name of Islam) from various Arab and Islamic states who had fought the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, and who are now ready to continue the struggle against every ‘un-Islamic’ regime in the region, believe that they are warriors for the Islamic faith in opposition to forces that seek to threaten or destroy their religious belief. They are convinced that their great honour will be to die in battle defending Islam. Indeed, martyrdom is intertwined with Islamic teaching: no greater martyrdom is possible than that achieved by giving one’s life in armed conflict while defending the religious order. The mujahid believes he is performing the highest service for God, and that he need not fear the consequence. 55

B. Al-Qaeda’s political objectives and its strategy

Following the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan, Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia, where he soon made a public stand against the Saudi regime for being: corrupt and against the USA for maintaining such a regime and enabling Israel to maintain its occupation of Jerusalem (Islam’s third holliest city after Madina and Mecca) and its brutal suppression of Palestinian resistance. 56 In addition, Bin Laden’s organisation Al-Qaeda’s goals, in his own words, are to ‘unite all Muslims and to establish a government which follows the rule of the Calips.’ Bin laden has stated that the only way to establish the Caliphate is by force. 57 But it was simply a means to an end. Afghanistan was a useable base because it was so remote and primitive. The Mujahideen did not believe that the Caliphate could govern from Kabul, Kandahar, or Jalalabad. Afghanistan was useful as a base, but it could not serve as the core of an international Islamic revival. It provided refuge; and facilities for training and planning, but the foundations of the Caliphate would have to be established elsewhere. 58 Al-Qaeda’s goals therefore, are to overthrow nearly all Muslim
governments, which Bin Laden views as corrupt; to drive Western influence from those countries, and eventually to abolish state boundaries.\(^{59}\)

In addition, Al-Qaeda was trapped between the secular revolutionaries backed by the hated Soviets, such as Al Fatah and the Baath party governing Iraq and Syria, and the monarchies, such as the Saudis backed by the United States. The Saudis themselves were religious of the conservative Wahabi school. But sheikdoms had developed a heavy dependency on the United States. They had become complicit with the United States in the same way that the Nasserites had become complicit with the Soviet Union. In their analysis both had to be destroyed.\(^{60}\) Al-Qaeda had a much more sophisticated understanding of the Islamic world than did the left – wing movements in the 1970s and 1980s. Theses were not Qaddafi or Assad – financed groups, trained by communist bloc personnel. Those groups were alien transplants into Arab culture – along with the idea of pan-Arabism. Al-Qaeda grew from the natural soil of Islamic – not Arab – culture and had roots going back centuries. Its dreams were alien to Americans but far more natural to Muslims than the ideologies of groups like the popular front for the liberation of Palestine. Put bluntly, Al-Qaeda’s message had legs, and the likely effect of its actions was much more threatening to the United States than that of previous terrorist groups.\(^{61}\) However, by the time the Afghan war ended, the Soviets had been defeated, the Iraqis had been run back from Kuwait, and the dynamism of the secularists had declined tremendously. By the early 1990s the pendulum had swung toward religious regimes. The Mujahideen put them as hypocrites. And the greatest hypocrites were the Saudi Royal family, which had allowed the United States to use holy ground for its war against Iraq.\(^{62}\)

Anti American feeling had been endemic in the Islamic world. It had been preceded by anti-British feeling. Waves of aggression from inside and outside the Islamic world had created a sense of victimization that had penetrated the marrow of Muslims. There were reasons for anti-Americanism, raging from US support for Israel,\(^{63}\) the Arab world has long felt betrayed by Europe’s colonial powers, and its disillusionment with American begins most importantly with the creation of Israel in 1948. The anger deepened in the wake of America’s support for Israel during the wars of 1967 and 1973, and ever since in its relations with the Palestinians. The daily exposure to Israel’s ironfisted rule over the occupied territories has turned this into the
great cause of the Arab - and indeed the broader Islamic - world elsewhere. They look at American policy in the region as cynically geared to America’s oil interests, supporting thugs and tyrants without any hesitation. Finally, the bombing and isolation of Iraq have become fodder for daily attacks on the United States. While many in the Arab world do not like Saddam Hussein, they believe that the United States has chosen a particularly inhuman method of fighting him - a method that is starving an entire nation.

Had resentment been a sufficient driver, the Islamic world would have boiled over centuries before. The reason it hadn’t was that there were two scales operating. One was the resentment scale – which had already swung into the red centuries earlier and had stayed there. The other measured the sense of helplessness. What had kept the lid on the Islamic world as a whole was not a lack of anger but the sense of Islamic impotence, the sense that Islam’s enemies were overwhelmingly powerful. The sentiment for an Islamic renaissance was there. What was missing was any hope for effective action.

This was the perception of Osama Bin Laden – who tried to turn general principles into a working organization – and his fellow Mujahideen gathered together in Al-Qaeda. From there he set the fuel for an Islamic rising against their own corrupt governments. What had to be generated was a sense of hope. The key to this did not lie in attacking the existing governments in the Islamic world. The only strength and resilience that they had came from their association with the current great power – the United States. Therefore, if the United States could be shown to be weak and vulnerable, the credibility of Islamic states would be completely undermined, this, coupled with built – in resentment, would set the Islamic world on fire and open the door to reestablishing the Caliphate.

This is the key strategic point. Al-Qaeda was not motivated by hatred of the United States, American popular culture, or American democracy. Focus, instead, was on the Islamic world and its governments. Al-Qaeda viewed the United States as the main Christian global power. As such, it had assumed a position as guarantor of existing regimes in the Islamic world. Put differently, even if the United States wasn’t directly responsible, it was viewed as the protector of these regimes by the Islamic masses.
Already in the Islamic world, there was a latent sense that the United States lacked both the power and the moral character to impose its will in the long run. A series of incidents had made this point. The US defeat in Vietnam; the humiliation of the Iran hostage crisis; the withdrawal from Beirut in 1983 after the Marine barracks were destroyed; the withdrawal from Somalia after a handful of Americans were killed; the failure to destroy Saddam Hussein in 1991 – all combined to create a perception of the United States as having tremendous potential power to strike a hard first blow but an inability to force a conflict to successful conclusion. From Al-Qaeda’s point of view, the latent perception of the United States in the Islamic world had to be turned into a self-evident truth. The United States had to be struck by a blow that was both enormous, easily understandable by the Islamic masses, and against which there was no ready defense.

Al-Qaeda rejected the secular Arab movements while adopting its operational style terrorism. The essence of terrorism is this in a society with many unguarded targets a group and explosives is extraordinarily difficult to stop the fewer operatives, the harder it is to find them. It is this combination of the sparseness of groups and the richness of targets that has traditionally made combating terrorists a nightmare. The material damage caused by terrorists was trivial compared to the psychological and therefore political effect. The terror could strike where and when they wanted – that they were in control and held life or death in their hands. The psychological strength of terrorism rested in the idea that no one was safe anywhere – that death was omnipresent. You could not protect yourself, and more important the state could not protect you. The frequency of attack was less important than their effectiveness.

In war, the enemy’s next move is usually predictable. War is a game played with most of the pieces on the table most of the time. A general can understand and predict the behavior of his opponent. What gives terrorism its strength is its extraordinary unpredictability. In a world of many targets and very few terrorists, the terrorists always hold the advantage. Kropotkin wrote; revolutionary terror is propaganda by the deed. A terrorist crime is a crime for publicity. When a bomb explodes, people take notice, and the explosion may draw more attention than a thousand speeches or pictures. If the terror is sustained, more and more people become interested. Many wonder why the atrocities occurred and if the “cause” seems plausible. The perpetrators ultimately may gain sympathy, because citizens, although initially
repelled by the act of terrorism, may also feel that the desperation of the weak must have been generated by monstrously unjust circumstances. Terror publicizes grievances, which the terrorist believes would have been unnoticed without his act. All things being equal, the more spectacular the outrage, the more likely it is that the rest of the world will discuss the grievance and perhaps in time recognize the terrorist as the most suitable spokesman for those aggrieved.\textsuperscript{66} This was what Al-Qaeda wanted to exploit in the United States, but to a degree of effectiveness not hitherto achieved. This was the strategic origin of September 11. Al-Qaeda needed to strike a blow that would be devastating leaving no doubt as to American vulnerability.\textsuperscript{67}

II. The U.S. and Al-Qaeda operations beyond Afghanistan

Osama's experiences during the Afghan jihad had a profound impact on him: apart from him and Mujahideen who came from Arab and Muslim countries to counter these atheist Russians, "Osama discovered that it was not enough to fight in Afghanistan but that we had to fight on all fronts, communist or western oppression."

It was in Afghanistan while fighting the Soviets that Bin Laden heard the call to global jihad because it was there that he, along with his Arab Afghans, experienced first hand the battle between Islam and atheism, making the cosmic conflict of good versus evil. It was in Afghanistan that Bin Laden came to believe that the acme of this religion is jihad. For him as for many of the Mujahideen who fought there, Afghanistan was not about geopolitics. It was about Islam fighting against unbelief.

The fact that the Soviet Union was ultimately defeated by forced withdrawal in 1989 led the Arab-Afghans to interpret their victory as a sign of God's favour and the righteousness of their struggle. They believed that the victory over the Soviets was due to their efforts alone and ignored the other international and domestic issues that contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The result was a sense of vindication – and the belief that this jihad against atheism and the forces of evil had to move next onto the global sense in order to establish a truly global community of the faithful.

It was therefore in 1989 that Al-Qaeda was founded in order to continue the jihad against infidels beyond the border of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{68} According to Tim Weiner, in those nine years since the Soviet withdrawal thousands of Islamic outcasts, radical and visionaries from round the world came to the borderlands of Afghanistan to learn
the lesson of war from the Mujahideen. In an interview in 1994, Noor Amin a commander loyal to Mr. Hekmatyar told Wiener that the whole country (Afghanistan) is a university for jihad or holy war, there are many formal training centers. We have had Egyptians, Sudanese, Arabs and other foreigners trained here as assassins.

Al-Qaeda is multi-national, with members from numerous countries and with a worldwide presence. Senior leaders in the organisation are also senior leaders in other terrorist organisation. Al-Qaeda seeks a global radicalization of existing Islamic groups and the creation of radical Islamic groups where none exist.

Bin Laden advocated the destruction of the United States, which he sees as the Chief obstacle to reform in Muslim societies. Since 1996 his anti-US rhetoric has escalated to the point of calling for worldwide attacks on Americans and its allies including civilians. In February 1998, Bin Laden announced the creation of a new alliance of terrorist organisations, the International Islamic Front for jihad against the Jews and crusaders’ the front included the Egyptian Al-Gama and Al-Islamiya, the Egyptian Islamic jihad, the Harakat ul-ansar and two others groups. The front declared its intention to attack Americans and its allies, including civilians, anywhere in the world.

Bin Laden established recruiting offices in thirty five countries. There were thirty offices in US cities alone – and this large network later became crucial when he created Al-Qaeda in 1989. He had training camps in Afghanistan, the Philippines Sudan, and Somalia over a period of time. Religion was the principal reason foreigners volunteered. Initially, they were fighting a jihad against communism, but later they evolved into an international brigade espousing a distinctive synthesis of extreme Islam and violence that pitted them after 1989 against the existing Muslim states and the United States. The Afghanistan war was the key incubator of Muslim fundamentalism and was crucial in establishing extremist Islamic movements in a number of nations. Many thousands - about 2,000 in Bosnia alone – subsequently fought in Chechnya, Algeria, Somalia, Kosovo, The Philippines, and elsewhere. Some remained in Afghanistan joined later by many others, and were crucial in the formation of the Taliban regime. Al-Qaeda may have trained up to 70,000 potential fighters and terrorists and created cells in at least fifty countries.

The Arab-Afghan and the other Mujahideen, most notably those from Central Asia, therefore returned to their respective homes with their own agendas. Global
jihad continued to provide ideological and religious inspiration but each society had its own specific issues that had to be addressed. The common points were the goals of overthrowing existing infidel governments via armed jihad and creating Islamic states to take their places. It was the global vision not the missionary activities of Saudi Wahhabis, which resulted in the civil wars and armed insurrections ranging from Algeria to Uzbekistan and Chechnya. These wars have at their roots the common perception of unjust, un-Islamic governments repressing religion in the public sphere. This combined with the dire socio-economic conditions and repressive and authoritarian governments in these societies is at the root of the rise of radicalism in these countries. While, extremist violence has proved to be exceptionally dangerous and destabilizing it faces some level of internal and external threat from such movements, weather in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and reaches for outside the MENA area involving Central Asia, South Asia, and the Islamic countries of Southeast Asia, Europe and North America.

While militarism and proliferation pose potential threats to the region’s development and energy exports, the most active threat of violence now comes from this violent extremism. It does not however, have one source or represent one cause; some movements have arisen in response to state terrorism. Some movements have arisen in response to regional conflicts like the Israeli – Palestinian war and other elements have developed more in response to the pressures of social change. The end result is a complex mix of threats including national movements, regional movements like AL-Qaeda.

The ideology and goals of these movements differs from group to group, but there are often loose alliances of groups with different goals. What most do have in common is that their ideology is based on extremist version of Shiite, Sufi, Salafi, and Wahhabi Islam and that the religious goals of each movement are mixed with an anti-secular political agenda and rejection of modern economic priorities and reform. So far they are all small extremist groups that do not represent the views and hopes of the vast majority of the people in the MENA region but several have already proven to be dangerous both inside and outside the Middle East.
A. Middle East

Bin Laden’s goal in the early 1990s was to force the United States out of various countries in the Middle East. Given the increase in violence by militant Islamists in Several Arab states, Bin laden shifted his goals by the mid-1990s to seeking the overthrow of secular and moderate governments in the region. By hoping that after eliminating the "hypocrites" and "apostates" Islamists would reconstitute the *Umma* (nations of believers) along pure Islamic lines and reestablish the Caliphate (the civilization institution). In contrast to national revolutions, this would be civilizational revolutions. Islamists regard the *Umma* in transnational terms as opposed to the order of nation – states foisted on Muslim by the Western “infidels” given the nature of trans-nationalism and the historical legacy of empire in the Middle East. However, moderate regimes might not have to be toppled if they and the masses become subservient to a defector Caliph. Thus, the Declaration of war on America in 1996, he in effect called for the overthrow of the Saudi regime, not just the removal of US military forces from the Arabian Peninsula. In interviews he said: “if the US is beheaded the Arab kingdoms will wither away and the Saudis would suffer the same fate as the Shah of Persia”.

Saudi Arabia - By 1990, Bin Laden was disillusioned by the internal bickering of the Mujahideen and he returned to work in the family business. He founded a welfare organization for Arab-Afghan veterans some 4,000 of whom had settled in Mecca and Medina alone. After Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait he lobbied the Royal family to organize a popular defense of the kingdom and raise a force from the Afghan war veterans to fight Iraq. Instead King Fahd invited the Americans. This came as an enormous shock to Bin Laden as the 540,000 US troops began to arrive. Bin Laden openly criticized the Royal family, lobbying the Saudi Ulema to issue *fatwas*, religious rulings against non-Muslims being based in the country. While, the Saudis understood the political risks they faced by having US troops on their soil, but they also understood the risks they faced if the US did not send troops. The Saudis decided to permit the United States to launch first Desert shield – the defensive operation – and then Desert storm.

To Wahabis in the kingdom the decision was outrageous. The Arabian Peninsula was the birthplace of Islam where Muhammad launched the campaign that created the Islamic empire. It is the home of Mecca and Medina, the holy cities of Islam. The
presence of Christian troops on this soil – at the invitation of the Royal family, no less – was a fundamental violation of the law. Moreover, regardless of Saddam’s foul nature allowing Christians to invade Muslim lands from Saudi Arabia was unacceptable. Those Afghan-veterans who were arriving home in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere they did not share their elder’s sense of vulnerability and dependency on the United States. They believed they could deal with this matter themselves. Believing that, this was an appropriate time and place to reunite the Saudi - Afghans for jihad in defense of the homeland and particularly the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. However Bin Laden’s offer was turned down by Royal family, and they invited American troops to protect Saudi Arabia instead. Bin laden was furious. Bin Laden therefore ended his support for and service to the Saudi regime at this time and declared himself an opponent to and critic of its rule.

Consequently, following his exile to the Sudan in 1992, Bin Laden began to regroup Arab-Afghan veterans who were disgusted with both the American victory over Iraq and the support of Arab governments for the Americans in this – inter – Muslim conflict.

Bin Laden’s opposition to the Royal family led him to create the Advice and Reform Committee (ARC) as an umbrella organisation for several opposition group in Saudi Arabia, the ARC was founded neither as a revolutionary organization for global jihad nor in opposition to the United States. It was founded to call for domestic change. It was not Bin Laden alone doing this job but many Islamists mounted the most serious opposition beginning in spring of 1991. After the gulf war Islamists took the bold step of sending a letter to the king, urging him to implement several reforms, the most important being the creation of an independent consultative council responsible for making domestic and foreign policy. With tensions rising between the opposition and established clerics (Ulema) Islamists wrote the highest cleric, Shayk bin Baz, a 45-page “memorandum of advice” in September 1992 that demanded opposition clerics in effect be given a veto over government policy and judicial actions.

In its early years the committee was dedicated to reform through education. Some of the proclaimed goals of the organization were (A): to achieve the Islamic justice and eradicate all aspects of injustice; (B) to reform the Saudi political system and purify it from corruption and injustice; and (C) to revive the hezba system (the
right of citizens to bring charges against state officials), which should be guided by the teachings of the top Ulama.

Yet the repeated using of the word eradicates left open to interpretation now that these goals were to be achieved. Although the goals proclaimed the desire to reform and purify the Saudi system the use of terms and concepts associated with more radical interpreters of Islam, the eradication of ignorant (jahiliya) rule espoused by Sayyid Qutb and the right of citizens to bring charges against states officials, reminiscent of Ibn Taymiyya’s call for the overthrow of un-Islamic governments suggested that the committee was not dedicated to the use of peaceful methods alone to achieve its goals. The increasingly militant stance of the committee over time particularly its calls for war against the ‘American – Israel alliance and its local supporters suggests that it always recognized the eventuality of armed rebellion. However, the conflict between the government and dissident Islamists came to climax in September 1994 at Burayda, following a mass protest movement led by the radical cleric Salman al-Awdah. Days later the Saudis arrested hundreds, Bin laden has made frequent references to the dissident Islamist movement in Saudi Arabia and has felt a strong identification with its leaders such as Al-Awdah.

Although those who rallied at Burayda were arrested, the Saudis could not prevent organized opposition outside the country. Creating the committee for defense of legitimate rights (CDLR) with five other prominent Islamists, Muhammad al-Mas’ari, a physics professor fled to London in 1994, from where he began sending tapes and faxes back to Saudi Arabia that denounced the regime.

In addition, after his departure from Sudan to Afghanistan in 1996, he announced a new phase in his mission when he issued his ‘declaration of war against the Americans occupying the land of the two holy places, Bin Laden recited the same litany of grievances expressed in Saudi religious dissident letters and petitions of the early 1990s; mismanagement of the economy resulting in inflation, unemployment and poverty; calibrating oil production and pricing to suit the interests of Washington rather than Muslims and inept handling of national defence. The material policy dimension of these issues hardly stems from a Wahhabi critique but stand firmly in the Muslim brotherhood tradition. Likewise, the declaration echoes the Islamic terrorist depiction of traitorous, hypocritical Muslim rulers beholden to the West. Thus, Bin Laden asserted that Al-Saud had been betraying Muslim cause for sixty
years. Abd-al-Aziz-ibn-Saud allegedly helped the British quell the Arab revolt in Palestine in 1936 by calming the Mujahideen with false promises. Likewise, King Fahd lied when he declared in 1990 that American military forces would stay for a very brief time. The religious objections to Al-Saud in the declaration echo Sayyid Qutb’s accusation that Muslim rulers governed through man-made laws rather than the divine law of Shari’a and that they allied with infidel powers against Muslims. therefore, Al-Saud had fallen into apostasy. However, by 1997 Bin laden was no longer calling for a resignation. He was calling for an end to the rule of the Royal family.

Between 1995 and 1997, Bin laden shifted his focus from domestic Saudi issues to broader international concerns, particularly American foreign policy in the Middle East and issues of concern to the broad Muslim community. Most notably the ongoing devastation of Iraq and never ending plight of the Palestinians, Bin Laden’s critiques changed from targeting the Saudi Royal family to targeting the United States and Americans everywhere. The reason for the shift was the growing secularity and criticism of Bin Laden by both the Royal family and the United States. This could be important strategy for Bin Laden to use Saudi oil as a weapon against American. Bin Laden’s publicly stated strategy may ultimately increase the price of oil and deny easy access to Saudi oil for the United States if the current Saudi regime is destabilized and replaced by a less cooperative one. The use of oil as a foreign policy weapon could have devastating economic costs.

However, bombing also entered Bin Laden’s arsenal of mayhem. In 1995, his Afghans killed five American service personnel and two Indian soldiers with a track bombing in Riyadh Saudi Arabia. In 1996 with another truck bomb in Dahran, killing 19 Americans. Even after 11 Sept the extremist Islamist confederation pursued their agenda, when there was suicide attack in Riyadh on 12 May 2003, breaching the security, killing thirty-four people. In this attack the residential compound and the offices of Vinnell Corporation were the main targets killing nine of the company’s employees and injuring several others. Ironically, the attack coincided with the visit of the US Secretary of State Collin Powell to Saudi Arabia. This attack was the response of extremist Islamists towards American presence in Saudi Arabia and in fact, they have been publicly expressing their hostile sentiments in this regard. However, there is also another angle of it. The Vinnell Company has been training Saudi National
Guards (Hirs-ul-watani) for international security of Saudi Arabia. The primary mission was protecting the ruling Saudi Royal family from peacetime internal political unrest. In another incident, a commercial officer of British BAE systems, a leading technology company in defence and civil aviation sectors, (BAE has been providing technical training program and producing qualified Saudi aviation technicians for the last thirty five years) was gunned down in February 2003 in Riyadh. 85

**Yemen** become a target for Al-Qaeda as by the end of the year many of the original Afghan Arabs had left Peshawar, including Bin Laden who had returned to Saudi Arabia. Before leaving he had formed his fledging al Qaeda organization to coordinate jihad activities beyond Afghanistan. At his home in Jeddah, he tried to organize an insurgent army to fight the Marxist government in South Yemen. 86 Recent group of Mujahideen Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) a.k.a. Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA) the Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) emerged publicly in mid 1998 when the group released a series of communiqués that expressed support for Osama Bin Laden and appeal for overthrow of the Yemeni Government and operations against U.S. and other Western interests in Yemen. Al-Qaeda engaged in bombings and kidnappings to promote its goals, kidnapped 16 British, U.S. and Australian tourists in late December 1998 near Mudiyah in Southern Yemen. 87 In December 1992, a bomb exploded in a hotel in Yemen, a hotel that had been housing American troops. U.S. intelligence linked the attack to Bin Laden 88

**Turkey**- The Riyadh bombing were followed by two car bomb attacks on two synagogues in Istanbul, Turkey on 15 November 2003 which left twenty-four persons dead and injured 146 people. Reuters reported that a radical Turkish Islamist group known as IBDA/C the Islamic Great Eastern Raiders /Front- claimed responsibility in a call to Turkey’s semi-official Anatolia news agency. The Turkish interior minister did not rule out the involvement of Al Qaeda. The attacks on synagogues were followed by two other gruesome truck bomb explosions which wrecked the British Consulate and a British Bank, HSBC killing twenty seven people including the British Consul General in Turkey and injuring 450 persons in Istanbul on 20 November 2003. According to New York Times, Turkey had not seen anything like these bombings in its eighty years history as a secular Muslim state, in which more Muslims died than either Christians or Jews.
During the early 1990s, two main Islamist extremist groups, Hizbollah (not related to Lebanese Hizbullohm) and the IBAD/C or the Islamic Great Eastern Raiders/front emerged in Turkey. However, Turkish analyst maintained that many of the members of these groups were trained in Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan in the past decade and they could have developed ties to Al-Qaeda. According to Turkish terrorist expert, Faik Buluk, "we know that they went to areas where Al Qaeda groups were active and ideologically they are with them. Experts on terrorism in Turkey also pointed out that suicide attacks were not the tradition of Turkish terrorists.\(^\text{89}\)

Another group fighting between Turkish armed forces and Kurdistan workers party (PKK) separatists heated up in 2005. In April, 21 PKK fighters and 3 Turkish soldiers were killed near the border with Iraq in the biggest clash in the area since the PKK declared a unilateral truce in 1999. Almost 6,000 PKK guerillas were thought to be based in Iraq.\(^\text{90}\)

**Iraq**- Ansar al-Islam (AI) a.k.a. partisans of Islam, Helpers of Islam, supporters of Islam, is a radical Islamist group of Iraqi Kurds and Arabs who have vowed to establish an independent Islamic state in northern Iraq. It was formed in September 2001, and is closely allied with al-Qaeda. Its members trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and now provide safe haven to Al-Qaeda fighters fleeing Afghanistan. The group receives funding, training, equipment, and combat support from Al-Qaeda.\(^\text{91}\)

**Lebanon**- The problem of terrorism in Lebanon is not new thing but it started since the creation of Israeli state in Middle East. From 1947 to 1967, the Middle East was dominated by a series of short conventional wars; Arabs states that stay around Israel state often maintained an anti-Israeli stance. The amount of tension led to blow between Arab country and Israel in 1967 six day War. This time terrorist group emerged in this region against Israeli-the Palestine Liberation organisation (PLO) began a series of terrorist attacks against civilian Israeli position. It was a turnaround from the old tactics of the stern gang and the Irgun and it served to define Israeli relation with its Arab neighbors. Even Israel struck back against the PLO.

In the meantime, some Arab countries after Six Day War, such as Iraq, led by Ba’ath party, group of Arab Socialists called for both Arab unity and the destruction of Israel. Along with several terrorist groups, they formed a rejectionist front,
rejecting any peace with Israel. And again in 1982, Israel launched a major invasion of Lebanon followed by a full-scale attack in 1982.

In the melee of the 1980, Middle Eastern terrorism fell into several broad categories including suicide bombing and other attack on Israel and airplane were hijacked, airport were attacked: various militants fighting other militants in Lebanon and abroad countries came to play the key roles with different group in Lebanon such as Libya, Syria, and Iran. 92

Iran established itself as the patron of Hizbullah whose principal military activities target Israeli occupation forces in Southern Lebanon. Iran’s ability to influence radical Islamic groups derived legitimacy in Arab eyes to the extent that it concentrated on promoting anti-Israeli operations. Beyond this Iran had little influence on militants in the Arab East, the two Palestinian radical Islamic groups, Al-jihad-al-Islami and Hamas, cooperated with Iran in view of the latter’s willingness to support their operations against the Hebrew state. Hizbullah leaders do not conceal that they receive military and financial aid from Iran, this aid is normally channeled through Syria. 93 According to Laden Boroumand and Roya Boroumand: Western intelligence agencies, suspected that Hezbullah has been working with Bin Laden on international operation since the early 1990, Hezbullah’s terrorist network in Lebanon contains both Shi’ite and Sunni groups and there is also a Saudi Arabian wing that was involved in the Khobar towers bombing which killed 19 U.S. troops in 1996. 94

Furthermore, the struggle for position in regional politics, not ideology, explains why Iran gives material aid to the radicals while Syria provides their leaders with shelter Tehran aspires to convince the skeptical United States which seeks to contain Iran and weary Gulf Cooperation Council states, that its regional interests threaten none of theirs. Iranian support for the radicals serves as a retaliatory message to those who attempt to block what Iran regards as its vital regional interests. Similarly, Syria attempts to use the radicals as bargaining chips in peace negotiations with Israel, and to reserve a place for Damascus in Middle Eastern affairs. 95

Another group of Islamic militants which is linked to Al Qaeda is Asbat al-Ansar, its members are primarily Palestinians and associated with Osama Bin laden and receive money through international Sunni extremist networks and Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network. 96
B. Africa

**Egypt**- In Egypt Osama Bin Laden does not hold a monopoly on religion and violence, Egypt has become the center for two such terrorist organisations. The Islamic Groups (IG) and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The Islamic group is a loose confederation of militants who follow the teaching of Sayyid Qutb, a militant who was executed in 1966. According to the Institute for counter – terrorism (ICI) (2000), the IG grow after many Islamic radicals were released from Egyptian prisons in 1971, they created cells with many names throughout the country and bound themselves in a theological confederation. Fanatics from the IG assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in October 1981.

ICI expert estimated that they have been the culprits behind bombing and assassination attempts in the 1990s, in 1997 they murdered 58 people who were touring Egypt to view the Pyramids. In 1999 the IG declared a cease – fire in the wake of over 1,000 victims since 1992. It has external wings with supporters in several countries, its senior member signed Osama Bin Laden’s fatwa in February 1998 calling for attacks against the United States. The Egyptian Government believes that Iran, Bin laden, and Afghan militant groups support the organization.

Another group is Al-jihad a.k.a. Egyptian Islamic jihad, jihad group. Islamic jihad, Vanguards of conquest. This group active since the late 1970s, merged with Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda organization in June 2001, but may still retain some capability to conduct independent operations. Its primary goal is to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state and to attack U.S. and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad. According to ICI (2000) the group also operates in Sudan, Albania and Azerbaijan. The US Department of State says Islamic Jihad is divided into two segments. One segment works primarily in Egypt, focusing on individual assassinsators, it is particularly known for its attacks on Coptic Christians. The other segment operates under Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan. The Egyptian government and U.S. intelligence services claimed that Iran supports the jihad and its merger with Al-Qaeda also boosts Bin Laden’s support for the group.

**Algeria**- The Salafist Group for call and combat (GSPC), an outgrowth of Armed Islamic group (GIA) an Islamic extremist Group, is composed of radical
Islamists and Algerian veterans of the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. It appears to have eclipsed the GIA since approximately 1998, and is currently the most effective armed group inside Algeria. Its operations are aimed at government and military targets, primarily in rural areas. According to press reporting, some GSPC members in Europe maintain contacts with other North African extremists sympathetic to Al-Qaeda. In late 2002, Algerian authorities announced they had killed a Yemeni Al-Qaeda operative who had been meeting with the GSPC inside Algeria. Algerian expatriates and GSPC members abroad many residing in Western Europe, provide financial and logistic support. In addition, the Algerian government has accused Iran and Sudan of supporting Algerian extremists in past years.

Sudan - Many of the original Afghan Arabs have left Peshawar, including Bin Laden who had returned to Saudi Arabia. Before leaving he had formed his fledgling Al-Qaeda organisation to coordinate jihad activities beyond Afghanistan. He had already sent people to Sudan to set up operations based there. Before he was expelled to Sudan, in Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden opposed the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, consequently he was expelled by Saudi government and left to Sudan. There he found friends in the radical government of Sudan. Infact historical background of the development of the Islamist movement in the Sudan dates to 1946. This date was the beginning of a political process inside the Sudanese Muslim Brethren party that transformed it from an elitist group into an Islamist popular movement known as the Islamic Charter front, the front under the leadership of Hasan al-turabi. And in Sudan he expanded his operations, by the end of 1992. Bin Laden had nearly 500 Afghans working for businesses that he established in Sudan. He also saw internationalism as the best means for striking the United States, and he refused to base his operations in any single country. The Sudan under Sheikh Hassan Al-turabi’s overall influence cooperated closely with Bin Laden during his stays there and was suspected of complicity in many terrorist acts and conspiracies, including the attempted murder of President Mubarak in Ethiopia and New York bombing conspiracies in 1993.

In Sudan, Bin Laden went on offensive in 1993. Using his contacts in Sudan, he began searching for weapons of mass destruction. His Afghans sought to purchase nuclear weapons from underground sources in the Russian federation, and he began
work on a chemical munitions plant in Sudan. The Al chifa plant, reported the New York Times of August 25, was presumed to be cooperating with the Iraqi chemical weapons program and producing an important ingredient of VX nerve gas ethyl methylphosphothionoate. It was attacked by US missiles after truck bombs divested the area around the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dares Salaam, on 7 August, 1998. This time Washington, where President Clinton was under heavy fire because of his sexual scandal and the perjury accusation against him by independent persecutor Kenneth Starr over his affair with former White House intern Monica Lewinsky, was galvanized by the attacks.

Libya - Libyan Islamic fighting group, a.k.a., Al-Jama`al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah, Libyan Fighting Group or Libyan Islamic Group emerged in 1995 among Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. It declared the government of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members maintained a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organized against Libyan Government interests, but others are aligned with Osama Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda organization or are active in the international Mujahideen network.

Morocco - Islamic combatant group (GICM), the goal of which reportedly include establishing an Islamic state in Morocco and supporting Al-Qaeda’s jihad against the West. The group appears to have emerged in the late 1990s and comprised Moroccan recruits who trained in armed camps in Afghanistan. GICM members interact with other North African extremists, particularly in Europe. Its location/area of operation includes Western Europe, Afghanistan, and possibly Morocco.

Tunisia - The Tunisian combatant group (TCG), also known as the Jama’a combatant Tunisian, reportedly is seeking to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia and targets U.S. and Western interests. Probably, founded in 2000, by Tarek Maaroufi and Saifullah Ben Hassina, the loosely organized group has come to be associated with Al-Qaeda and other North African extremist networks that have been implicated in terrorist plots during the past two years. Tunisians associated with the TCG are part of the support network of the broader international jihadist movement. According to European press reports, TCO members in the past have engaged in recruiting for terror training camps in Afghanistan. Some TCG associates were suspected of planning an attack against the U.S., Algerian and Tunisian diplomatic missions in
Rome in January 2001. Some members reportedly maintain ties with the Algerian Salafi Group for preaching and combat (GSPC).112

C. East Africa - Conditions in the East African countries are ideal for conducting terrorist operations. African government officials have correctly characterized as part of the soft underbelly of global terrorism. Porous borders, pervasive corruption and the lack of police capacity allow terrorists to move about freely, they find safe haven and establish logistical hubs, small arms and other weapons are readily available on black markets. A wealth of American, British, and European soft targets, large expatriate communities', tourists, and non-governmental organizations, make these countries attractive arenas for terrorist operations. Kenya shares a border with Somalia, a lawless and disorderly failed state that is widely believed to be a terrorist safe haven. Kenya has been a venue for international terrorism since 1980, when a Palestinian liberation organisation sympathizer bombed a tourist hotel, killing 16 people. In recent years, Al-Qaeda has been the international terrorist organization with the most significant presence in the region. In August 1998, Kenya and Tanzania was the scene of one of Al-Qaeda’s most audacious pre-9/11 operations, when terrorists carried out near – simultaneous suicide attacks on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Darussalam, killing 303 people and injuring more than 50,000. In November 2002 near the coastal Kenya city of Mombassa, terrorist fired surface to air missiles at an Israeli jet packed with passengers. Although the missile missed the plane a subsequent Al-Qaeda suicide bombing at a resort near Mombassa popular with Israeli tourist killed 15 people. According to published accounts, Al-Qaeda has established terror centers in the region. “Sleeper cells” are alleged to exist in Kenya today. Some of the cells appear to be active.113

Somalia - Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) a.k.a. Islamic Union, Somalia’s largest militant Islamic organization rose to power in the early 1990s following the collapse of the Sad Barre regime. It aims to establish an Islamic regime in Somalia and force the secession of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Some elements associated with AIAI maintain ties to Al-Qaeda, conduct terrorist attacks against Ethiopian forces and other Somalia factions.114 In addition Al-Qaeda was active in Somalia when American troops joined an endemic civil war to bring food to the area. In October 1993, a U.S. army black hawk helicopter was downed while on patrol in Mogadishu. U.S. army rangers went to the rescue, and a two-day battle ensued in which 18 Americans lost
their lives. In an interview with ABC news reporter John Miller, Bin Laden claimed that he trained and supported the troops that struck the Americans.\textsuperscript{115}

It was the Bush administration’s September 2001 national security strategy declaration; in the wake of overthrowing the Taliban, stated that weak state can pose as great a danger to our national interest as strong states that most strongly raised the possibility that Africa could be the source of considerable international terrorism or at least provide sanctuary for those engaged in nefarious acts against other nations. Five years after 9/11 Washington planned to create AFRICOM which could have counter-terrorism as one of its central missions.\textsuperscript{116}

D. Central Asia and Caucasus

In the newly independent republics of Central Asia, Islamist movements existed much before the collapse of Soviet Union\textsuperscript{117} where Tajikistan, had been a centre of the Basmachi movement in the early years of Soviet rule. The Basmachis were local guerilla groups led by mullahs, tribal chiefs and landlords who had resisted Soviet rule across the whole of Central Asia and continued their unequal struggle until the 1930s, after the ruthless suppression of the Basmachis, who like the Afghan Mujahideen, were inspired by Islam. In 1993 Tajikistan felt in the trap of civil war again where it was commonly perceived that the Tajik Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) was a fundamentalist party inspired and sustained by their Afghan counterparts. The leader of the Tajik IRP, Mohammad Sharif Himatzade, had fought with other IRP leaders in the Afghan Mujahideen. The IRP received support from Hekmatyar’s Hizbi-i-Islami and from Massoud, who had become a national hero to the Tajiks.\textsuperscript{118} In addition, the translations of the works of Maulana Abdul Ala Maududi (founder of Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan) were being smuggled and distributed in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and northern Caucasus for a long time. The ideological inputs to rise in rebellion against the Soviets were augmented by a campaign of distribution of literature prepared by CIA-ISI during the war in Afghanistan. In the early 1990s the Islamists had established their bases firmly in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In 1992, Islamist rebels, in whose ranks Pakistan’s Afghans Mujahideen from other Islamic countries were represented, seized the regional town of Tavildara 145 km east of the capital Dushanbe.
In Uzbekistan, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) has been conducting an armed struggle to remove the secular states in the entire Central Asia and replacing them with an Islamic caliphate in the region. The leader of the movement, Takhir Yuldashev, is based in Kandahar and has close links with Al-Qaeda.¹¹⁹

Afghani brigade or Afghan-veterans turned to violence against their former paymasters. There were four reported coup attempts against President Gaidar Aliev in October 1994, March 1995, July 1995 and one that had been planned in early 1997. Plans to blow up a bridge over which President Aliev was to pass and other plans to shoot down his plane with a stinger missile were discovered. No group or individual ever claimed these attacks or attempted attacks. The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh lasted in its acute phase from 1988 to 1994. Besides the direct action of the Afghan brigade on the Azeri side, there was terrorism inside Armenia which smacked of Afghani activity.

Russia, The Kremlin’s senior planners had plenty of reasons to fear the backlash of the Afghanistan war in Chechnya. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Groznyy, the Chechen capital, became a transit point for the Afghan veterans, especially the Arab ones. In August 1995, a spokesman of the Russian Federal Security Service reported that units from Afghanistan and Jordan – which has a large and influential Chechen community in residence – were fighting on the side of Chechen President Joukar Dudayev. There were said to be about 300 foreign mercenaries at that time, out of total Chechen guerilla force of 6,000. Shamil Basayev, the leader of the seizure of the Budenovsk hospital and a right-hand man of Dudayev, was reported by the Russians to have been trained in Afghanistan by none other than the disciples of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

Anti-Russian terrorist organisation in Chechnya was believed by Moscow to have links with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. They have also supplied with arms, stolen from or sold by the Russian military. Aided by the Hizbullah organization in Iran and in Lebanon – Dudayev visited Lebanon at least once Afghan war veterans and Iranian volunteers entered Chechnya through Dagestan and Azerbaijan. Mikhail Barsukov, chief of the federal security service in charge of the special units admitted that “the Chechen fighters were a very serious unit, very well trained, very well – prepared” – possibly by Pakistan’s ISI and American CIA during the 1979-89 jihad, or afterward by the jihad’s many alumni.¹²⁰
The Russian army's war against Chechen secessionists remained at a stalemate in 2001. Tens of thousands of Russian troops stationed in the mountainous republic were unable to eliminate the rebels, whose sporadic attacks against Russian forces and pro-Russian Chechens resulted in a steady flow of fatalities. Moscow claimed that the Chechen rebels had links with Afghanistan's Taliban regime and Bin Laden, which made it all the more palatable for Russian press. Vladimir Putin pledged support for U.S. President Bush's call for a war on global terrorism. In December Russia stepped up military operations in response to Chechen raids on its forces.

E. South Asia

Kashmir - The root of jihad ideology in South Asia started in the mid-1920s, Maulana Sayyid Abu A’la Maududi, the founder and head of the Jamaat-e-Islami in India (and following partition in Pakistan), began to articulate an ideology of political Islam that gave primacy to jihad over and above all the other duties imposed by Islam. The four pillar of Islam (prayer, fasting, alms giving and pilgrimage), Maududi said: were “acts of worship” ordained to prepare us for a greater purpose and to train us for a greater duty. Jihad of Islam was in this conception, in, irreducible conflict with all nationalisms, as well as with every form of governance – whether authoritarian or democratic other than Sharia (Islamic law).

But the true mobilization of the Mujahideen in Kashmir started converging in Kashmir in early 1990s. After Soviet troops withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, and in 1990 many South-East and West Asian and worth African Mujahideen had returned backed to their bases in their own countries particularly in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, Sudan and Somalia, most of them stayed back in Afghanistan. These people were later described as Arab Afghans. It is around this time, as maintained by noted Pakistani scholar Pervez Hoodbhoy, that around 1990, Pakistan's military embarked upon a covert war in Kashmir (in India) using radical Islamist proxies trained and based in Pakistan. It was an effort to replay the strategy used by the U.S. in Afghanistan against the Soviets in which Pakistan's military had played a central role.

The foreign militants who participated in Afghanistan's jihad started converging in Kashmir in early 1990s. In September 1992, Voice of America (VOA) broadcast the interviews of an Afghan, an Indonesian, a Malaysian and a Sudanese, who had
joined militant ranks in Kashmir. In an interview to a local Urdu daily newspaper, an Afghan, a Sudanese and an engineer from Bahrain said that after accomplishing the task in Afghanistan they had moved towards Kashmir.  

More evidence showed that Pakistan continued support for a wide range of jihadi groups in its covert war against India. Most prominently, no action whatsoever has been taken against the fifteen constituents of the united Jihad council (UJC) which is responsible for a major proportion of terrorist crime in Jammu and Kashmir: the UJC continues to operate openly from Muzzafarabad in Pakistan – occupied Kashmir, and receives visible support from the state and intelligence structures there, with regard to other terrorist organizations. Nine of these Pakistani groups are currently on the US list of terrorist organisations. Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), Jaish-e-Mohammed(JEM), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and Lashker-e-Jhangri (LeJ) are listed as foreign terrorist organisations. The Al-Badr Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islami (HUJI), Hizbul-Mujahideen (HM) Jamait-ul-Mujahideen and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) are identified as other selected terrorist organizations. Five of these – the HUM, HUJI and JEM (collectively known as the Harkat traid), The JeM and LeJ - are members of Osama Bin Laden’s international Islamic front. 

The Islamic agenda in Kashmir was articulated by the prominent militant group Hizbul Mujahideen, by asserting that – our aim is the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate world over, the other militant group, Jamaitul Mujahideen, asserted that the demand of the right of self – determination ( in Kashmir) was distorting the image of the ongoing movement. It is a struggle for the establishment of Caliphate.  

**Bangladesh** - The extension of jihad in the neighboring countries became gradually visible. The competition for assertion and ascendancy between Bangla nationalists and Islamists had started with the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founder of Bangladesh. The strength of Islamists grew gradually; the Islamists now assert that they would change the democratic system in Bangladesh because they hold existing democracy responsible for anti-Islamisation. The formation of Harkat-i-Jihad-i-Islami, Bangladesh (HUJI-BD) in 1992 was a significant event. This group is believed to have been founded on the financial support of Al-Qaeda. The 1990, Maulana Azizul Haq set up Bangladesh Khilala majlis which aimed at establishing a global state of Islam (Khilafat). He later set up Islami Oikya Jote by incorporating eight Islamist organisations of Bangladesh. According to a
There are thirteen Islamist extremist organisations operating in Bangladesh. The objectives of these groups are Taliban style of government in Bangladesh and assisting the Islamist movements in their resistance in the entire Asian region.  

Myanmar - Al-Qaeda has been long established in neighbouring Bangladesh, where thousands of Muslims have taken refuge due to Myanmar’s military government systematic repression of its Muslim ethnic minorities. The Bengalis, Rohingas, and Kashin. Muslims account for roughly 4 percent of Myanmar’s population. Whenever there are aggrieved people who are persecuted relentlessly, they will look to any means to fight back. Currently, there are three Muslim – based guerrilla movements in Myanmar: the Ommat Liberation Front, the Hawthoolei Muslim Liberation front, and the Muslim Liberation organization of Myanmar. The government has waged a harsh counter insurgency war against these groups and has at times tacitly supported local militias to engage in communal violence against Muslim communities.

Al-Qaeda has recruited Myanmar Muslims from the border region and sent them for training in Afghanistan. HUJI (Harakat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami found in Bangladesh in 1992, led by an associate of Osama Bin Laden. The organization is closely tied to one of the Al-Qaeda linked groups in Pakistan/Kashmir. Several HUJI leaders are veterans of the Soviet – era Mujahideen. They also recruited Rohingas from Myanmar and sent them to fight in Kashmir, Afghanistan and Chechnya.

It is not for the first time that Muslims from Myanmar have been trained in Afghanistan. In the 1980s, there were Muslims from Myanmar in Afghanistan fighting with the Mujahideen. Networks of people and groups already exist. According to Lintner, the foremost expert of insurgent politics in Myanmar, the Muslim Liberation organization of Myanmar, “maintains some contact with Islamic circles in Pakistan.” On January 19, 1999 for example the police arrested seven Al-Qaeda members (one of whom was a Myanmar national) who were plotting to blow up the U.S. embassy in Delhi. More recently, leaflets calling on Muslims to join the Jihad against the Americans were reportedly found in Myanmar.  

F. South-East Asia

In South-East Asia, the process of violent expression of Islamist agenda has been quite gradual and the protest movements which were organized on different
issues, corruption, authoritarianism and restricted form of civil liberties etc., ultimately adopted the radicalized Islamist idiom and utilized the same for mobilization and assertion of the war in Afghanistan which attracted volunteers from the South-East Asia gave impetus to the process of protest movements transforming into Islamist movements. By the time of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the South-East Asian Islamist groups had forged closed links with the groups operating in Afghanistan. 128

In addition, South-East Asia was appealing to the Al-Qaeda leadership in the first place because of the network of Islamic banks, business-friendly environments, and economics that already had records of extensive money laundering. Al-Qaeda saw the region first and foremost, as a back office for its activities (especially to set up front companies, fund-raised recruit, forged documents and purchase weapons) and only later became a theater of operations in its own right. And to using South-east Asia as a back office for its operations, Al-Qaeda set out to accomplish three major goals, first, it sought to draft onto or co-opt preexisting radicals, movement and groups.

The second, goal was to link these groups into a truly transnational network. The hallmark of Al-Qaeda activities in most instances the existing radical groups focused primarily on their domestic grievances and objectives and tended to have little contact with one another. The introduction of Al-Qaeda into the region in the early 1990s changed that completely. Suddenly, network between once unconnected groups were established as Al-Qaeda understood the benefits in educating law enforcement when working across borders.

The third goal was far Al-Qaeda to establish a regional arm of its own that would be able to become financially independent and technically proficient enough to plan and execute terrorist attacks. The organisations become known as Ja-maah-Islamiya. 129

On 9 January 2003 the Singapore government released a white paper on Jamaah Islamiya, maintaining that its goal was to create a Daulah Islamiyah (Islamic State) comprising Malaysia, Indonesia, the Southern Philippines Singapore and Brunei.

Jamaah Islamiya (JI) which had been active since the dependence of Indonesia and had established a network throughout South-East Asia had sent its cadres to
participate in Jihad in Afghanistan. The JI leader Hambali, who was captured in 2003, in Thailand, had forged close links with Al-Qaeda.

**Malaysia** - The problem of Islamic militancy is one that plagued Malaysia long before the September 2001 world trade center and Pentagon terrorist attacks. As early as the 1970s, radical and extremist groups had already started surfacing in this Muslim-majority country. The Penang – based movement formed in 1977 claimed that the Malaysian government was not giving Islam its proper due and aimed to set up a theocratic order by means, of violent jihad. It was only in 1992 that the Malaysian government took action to clamp down on the movement. Another group whose interpretation of Islam threatened the incumbent regime was the Koperasi Angkattan Revolusi Islam Malaysia (KARIM or Malaysian Islamic Revolutionary Front) formed in 1974 in Kuala Lumpur, KARIM preached the overthrow of the government through violence. It was later banned its leaders detained under the internal security Act.

In fact, there are many groups of Islamic movement in Malaysia but the group which was joined by Afghanistan-veteran that is PAS party (the parti Islam se Malaysia), had many supporters who grew disenchanted with Malaysian politics and the democratic process that they felt would continue to maintain the national front monopoly of power. The Malay identity, represented by United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and defined by democratic pluralists in plural cultural terms is rejected by the Islamists represented by Partai Islam se Malaysia (PAS) the latter claims that Islam should be the main component of national identity. In November 2003, as reported by Reuters, PAS published a fifty-three-page document claiming that Islamic way of life was the only way to overcome the pitfalls of Western style democracy in Malaysia. The document unveiled plans to make Shariah law as the supreme law of the country. A small number of PAS members began to advocate a violent jihad and established a covert group, the Kempulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM) which is believed to be the armed wing of PAS, this extremist group within PAS advocates jihad, and it has passed edicts that U.S. soldiers must be killed because they have repeatedly oppressed Islamic countries.

The Kempulan Mujahideen (some times called the Malaysian Mujahideen group) was founded on October 12, 1995, by a veteran of the Afghan Mujahideen,
Zainon Ismail. Between 1979 and 1989, two groups underwent military training with the Mujahideen; most of the trainers were religious students studying in Pakistan who heard the call of jihad. Afghanistan was the core of KMM, some forty-five members of the group, nearly half of the membership, had either fought against the Soviets or had trained in Al-Qaeda camps there in the 1990s. One of the most important veterans was Nik Adli Nik Aziz, who has led the KMM since 1999, upon returning to Malaysia in 1996 from Afghanistan.

By 1999, Nik Adli had become committed to waging a violent jihad against the Malaysian state, which he considered to be secular and oppressive. In 1999 he purchased a large cache of weapons in Thailand, including twenty-four pounds of explosive, that same year he studied bomb-making with the Moro Islamic liberation front in the southern Philippines. He also began to link up with exiled Indonesian radicals such as Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Abdullah Sungkar, Riduan Isamuddin (Hambali), and Mohammad Iqbal Rahman (Abu Jibril), Abdurrahman. The KMM dispatched its members to train in MILF camps as well as fight against Christians in the Maluku Islands in Indonesia starting in 1999.

In addition, the Islamist extremist groups Kumpulan Militant Malaysia (KMM) along with another group Al-Maunah are believed to be responsible for the attacks on the places of warship of minority groups. The Deputy Home Minister Datuk Zainul Abidin Zin informed parliament that the government had detained some members of KMM for an attempted bombing of a shopping mall in Jakarta in August 2001.

After the attacks of 11/September, investigations by US intelligence agencies and their South-East Asian counterparts uncovered Malaysia's pivotal role as a rendezvous point for the planning and facilitation of terrorist attacks in New York and Washington DC. Indeed, it has been suggested that 'since the early 1990s, Al-Qaeda has found Malaysia to be a convenient base of operations, where militant Islamic ideology has been able to graft onto a small but growing community of Islamic radicals. In truth there were already indicators that Malaysia was proving to be a haven for international Islamic militants long before the 11 September attacks. Already in 1995, Wali Khan, Amin Shah an international terrorist and a known associate of Romzi Ahmed Youssef, the man who was responsible for the 1993 world trade center bombings in New York, was arrested in Malaysia. Another known
terrorist linked to Ramzi Youssef Khalid Shaik Mohammad, who emerged as a chief plotter of the 11 September attacks, was also believed to have operated out of Malaysia throughout the 1990s.

One of the suspects involved in the planning and implementation of the 11 September attacks Zacharias Massaoui who has been accused of conspiring with Osama Bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network to launch the attack on civilians in the US was known to have entered Malaysia. During his stay, he was tracked by the Malaysian intelligence service and believed to have received assistance from a former Malaysian military officer, Yazid Sufaat. Yazid was also accused of providing shelter to two Yemeni hijackers who participated in the 11 September attacks, Khalid Al-Midhar and Nawaf Al-Azmi, as well as Taufiq bin Laden Atash, who were later identified as one of the masterminds behind the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen and according to authority of Malaysia’s investigation also found that the chief of Jamaah Islamiya, Riduan Isamuddin or(Hambali) used Malaysia as a platform for orchestrating the activities of the terrorist organisation, known to be the South-East Asian arm of Al-Qaeda. Malaysia was apparently also the location for three meetings of the Rabitatul Mujahideen, a coalition of jihadist groups from Southeast Asia organized around the Ja-maah Islamiya. In 1999-2000 Malaysia’s place in the web of international terrorism, could be because Malaysia provided free Visa to all Middle Eastern people, as Malaysian security officials do admitted in private that Kuala Lumpur’s problems are rooted in its ‘Visa free’ policy towards most Middle Eastern states that enable Al-Qaeda operatives and sympathizers to enter the country in the guise of financials man and tourists.

Indonesia - The collapse of the authoritarian Suharto regime in May 1998 gave a fertile ground for resurgence. Islamic radicalism has been one of the important characteristics of post-Suharto Indonesia. Radical Islamic groups who were suppressed by the Suharto regime have found sufficient freedom to organize themselves consolidate their power and actively play roles in the dynamics of social religious and political affairs in post Suharto Indonesia.

Many names have emerged as leading figures in the rise of Islamic radicalism among them are Habib Rizieq Shihab of front of defenders of Islam or front pembela Islam (FPI), Abu Bakar Ba’asyir of Islamic congregation or Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) and the council of Jihad fighters of Majlis Mujahideen, Agus Dwi Karna of Lashkar
Jundullah, and other names from Darul Islam tentera Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) and Ja'far Umar Thalib of Jihad fighter of Lashkar Jihad. These names have attracted much public attention and made headlines in national and international media. They have emerged as one significant force in the dynamics of social, religious and political change in post Suharto Indonesia.

The most vocal and controversial groups in post-Suharto Indonesia is Ja'far Umar Thalib who used to join Afghan Mujahideen during Afghan-Soviet war 1979-1989. He was the founder and leader of Lashkar Jihad an organization established in January 2000 and disbanded in October 2002.

Indeed, Ja'far believes that the United States, Israel, and Christians are the master minds of religious violence in many parts of the world. One particular issue that significantly contributed to escalated and passionate public debate about Ja’far is an allegation that he has close connections with Osama bin Laden, the prime suspect; of the September 11, 2001 events, he also was alleged that he played a key role in the sending of jihad fighter to various areas in Indonesia where conflicts occurred between Christian and Muslims such as Ambon in Maluku and Poso in Sulawesi. Many suggest that Lashkar jihad worked hand in hand with Osama Bin Laden as part of his terror networks in South-East Asia. Such an allegation was deliberately made by foreign media. In a long article, The Times concluded that Ja’Far has a lot of power and influence and controls between 3,000 and 10,000 armed trained and loyal militiamen. The Times went on to suggest the U.S. government not take Ja’Far lightly. Collectively, it further suggests that Ja’Far must be taken very seriously by the U.S. government because he is as dangerous as Osama Bin Laden.

Indeed US policy makers expressed their deep concerns with the threat of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia; especially the threat of Ja’Far Umar Thalib “Ja’Far is a radical demagogue infused with a worldwide Islamic credo” said Peter Chalk, an analyst with the RAND corporation in Washington. “Lashkar Jihad” he adds, “is one group that might be prepared to aid the logistical relocation of Al-Qaeda forces. Larry Johnson, a former state Department counter terrorism official said “ If these groups are allowed to grow unchecked by local authorities” he adds, “they could pose a threat. 142

Although Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or free Aceh Movement (GAM), the secessionist movement in Aceh formed in 1975, has never been publicly linked to Al-
Qaeda or other Middle Eastern-based Islamic terrorist organisations, it is suspected by US officials of having some ties. Many GAM members fought with the Mujahideen. So linkages are possible though none have ever been confirmed and the organization denies any: "we don't want to have anything to do with an organization that plays the religious card like Al-Qaeda, said a GAM spokesman; they are a nationalist not an Islamic movement."

In June 2000, two of the most senior leaders of Al-Qaeda, Mohammad Atef and Ayman al-Zawahiri, traveled to Indonesia, stopping in Aceh, where they reportedly met with Acehnese leaders hoping to establish a base area and training facilities in Indonesia, to complement Afghanistan. The two Al-Qaeda leaders were favorably impressed by the lack of central government control, the Islamic fervor of the people, and GAM's local support. Despite their favorable impression GAM resisted their overtures and Al-Qaeda did not establish a base in Aceh. GAM leaders, according to a senior U.S. official were extremely sensitive to the U.S. position on this issue and were courting U.S. support and recognitions. To date, only limited direct ties between GAM and Al-Qaeda have been uncovered.\(^{143}\)

Another group of Islamic militant in Indonesia is composed of Afghan-veterans where its leader Hambali\(^{144}\) used to join Afghan Mujahideen during Afghan-Soviet war in 1979-1989. Younger radicals, notably Hambali wanted to bring the conditions on and have formed a cadre of jihadis to bring about the conditions for their political agenda.\(^{145}\) Hambali is part of the JI faction that has conspired to take the struggle directly against Western interest.

JI has also been able to take advantage of communal conflicts in Ambon and Poso central Sulawasi. Neither was started by JI, but the organization and others sympathetic to jihadist goals have attempted to take advantage of both situations. JI and its affiliations were able to exploit – and provided further battle grounds for joining of Afghan-veterans who have experience in Afghan-Soviet war.

JI leaders are linked to the MMI (Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia; Indonesia Mujahidin Council) and MMI's para-military wing in Ambon known as Lashkar Mujahideen. The core of JI met and formed links with Bin Laden's network during the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The main tactic of Lashkar Mujahideen was hit and run raids against Christian leaders and structures, where Lashkar Jihad
was involved in the more “conventional” and high profile objective of taking and holding territory and attempting to force the expulsion of Christian residents.

And recent incident which was carried out by JI, where a major breakthrough for security forces, in undermining terrorist operations in Indonesia, was the arrest in June 2002 of senior Al-Qaeda operative Omar al-Faruq who was residing in Bogor. Omar al-Faruqi’s relations included involvement in the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings in which Churches were targeted in ten cities across Indonesia; an assassination attempt on Megawati, and plans for large scale terrorist attacks against U.S. interest, in Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippine, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam, the goal of these plans, to be carried out by JI, was to create an Islamic state in insular South-East Asia.

The Bali blast represented a shift in JI’s operations. Although the ultimate goal of JI is the creation of a region-wide Islamic state in Southeast Asia, the Bali blast represented more direct solidarity with Al-Qaeda’s cause as Amrozi one of the convicted bombers stated that he hated Americans and expressed remorse that he got Australians instead. Other suspects have, however, confirmed that Australia was the target. A threat by Osama Bin Laden to Australia in late 2001, due to Australia’s involvement in East Timor, adds strongly to the picture that Al-Qaeda and JI have found common ground. However, in Anthony’s conclusion there is also a sizeable element within the Indonesian public who are doubtful about the nature of JI threat, and many interpret the trial of Ba’asyir as an anti-Muslim act. Media reports suggest that many Indonesians believed that U.S. agents were behind the Bali attacks.

**Thailand** - There has never been strong ties between the Muslim insurgency in Thailand and international terrorist groups. Although militants in Southern Thailand have long been a fact of life, for the most part they have given up their campaign to create an independent homeland, most have worked as a logistic operative for the Acehnese rebels, GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement) and the MILF of the Philippines, serving as an important financial and arms conduit. It is clear that Al-Qaeda operative have used Thailand as a base of operations since the mid-1990s. Thailand has been the target of international terrorism since March 1994, a plot by Bin Laden operatives to blow up the Israeli embassy in Bangkok went awry by chance (where in 1994 Ramzi flew to Thailand and swiftly recruited a group of devout young Muslims in Bangkok for an attack on the Israeli
embassy there. When that failed, Ramzi fled back to Pakistan and then flew to
Philippines). 150

Many members of Al-Qaeda operatives have passed through Thailand. After the
September 11 attacks, the Thai Supreme Commander General Surayud Chulanont.
admitted that military intelligence was monitoring a small number of Bin Laden
operatives operating in Thailand and the government was aware that countries in the
Middle East provide training, education and financial support for fundamentalist
groups in the south of Thailand. Likewise, the Secretary General of Thai, NSC
General Vinai Pattiyakul acknowledged that some southern Muslim radicals had been
trained in Afghanistan and Libya.

There are two very small groups, the Wae Ka Kaeh (WKK) and the organisation
Mujahideen Islam Pattani, that are thought to have some ties to Ja-maah Islamiya and
Al-Qaeda; and the head of the WWK fought with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. It is
evident from the confession of Omar al-Faruq (Omar al-Faruq is one of the senior
most Al-Qaeda leaders in Southeast Asia, the Ja-maah Islamiya had tried to establish
links with Muslim militants elsewhere in the region, including Thailand and
Myanmar) that the JI was rapidly trying to expand its contacts with the Guragan
Mujahideen. Another Thai-Muslim militant group Pattani United Liberation
Organization (PULO), is suspected of having ties to the Abu Sayyaf.

On June 10, 2003 Thai police arrested three JI members in Narathiwat province
in Southern Thailand. The arrests were a joint operation between Thai and
Singaporean authorities, following the May 16, 2003 arrest of a senior JI Singapore
cell member in Bangkok, Arifin bin Ali (John wong Ah-Hung) who was rendered to
Singapore, and the three others were planning to execute terrorist attacks against
Western embassies and tourist venues in Pattaya and Phuket. 151

Philippine - In the Southern island of Mindanao Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF) has been struggling for an independent state in the island. The Philippine
government which recognizes MNLF as a representative organisation of Bangsamore
Muslims of Mindanao concluded a peace agreement with the front under the
leadership of Nur Misuari in 1991. The group is also recognized by OIC. The peace
agreement provided for autonomy and speeding up of the pace of development in the
island. However, two other groups, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) the later prefers to call itself AL-Harkatul Islamia, rejected
the agreement. Both the groups, which had considerable experience in Afghanistan, have been demanding the establishment of an independent Islamic state with a complete Islamic system of governance. Out of the two ASG has earned considerable international notoriety for its deadly bombings, assassinations and kidnappings for ransom. The US State Department has listed it as one of the world's most dangerous terrorist organisations.\textsuperscript{152}

G. Europe

The war in Afghanistan provided a stepping stone for escalating violence in the Middle East. Apart from the Afghan episode; direct Western aid proved vital for the escalation of the militants' operations. A Lebanese daily describes the evolving relationship between Islamic fundamentalists and the West as "yesterday's allies and today's enemies."

A report by an Arab magazine claims that at least fifty radical Islamic leaders sought and obtained political asylum in Europe, twelve in England alone. For Muslim radicals, Europe is not just a refuge from Arab states intelligence and security officers, but an important source of money, training and weapon supplies. In January 1995, German authorities revealed that some Arabs train in mountain camps on its territory. This announcement came after the discovery of traditional training camps in Sudan and Afghanistan. Similarly, in March 1994, Algerian security forces seized a large shipment of military hardware loaded in a cargo ship originating from the Netherlands. Some shipments destined for certain Arab countries were intercepted at the French – German borders. Swiss authorities discovered other shipments bound to the Middle East. Arrested Muslim radicals have admitted receiving weapons from the West through several mafia-type connections. Observers seem to believe that wealthy Arab living in Europe, who are sympathetic to the objectives of Islamic militants, contribute generous funds for clandestine arms purchases in the black market.\textsuperscript{153}

H. United States of America

Apart from US facing with Al-Qaeda's threats outside (as mentioned above), its homeland it still facing some group of Islamic militants which are suspected to have links with Al-Qaeda network within its homeland itself. As to how these Islamic militants reached America and when, has been studied by Steven Emerson (a network
news correspondent who has spent several years, covering the Middle East produced a PBS program entitled Jihad in America in 1994)

Emerson believes group of Islamic terrorists began building networks within the United States in the late 1980s, and they did so indirectly with American help. To understand this it is needed to briefly recall events in 1979. Former Associate Deputy FBI Director Oliver B. (Buck) Revel, interviewed on Emerson's PBS program, agreed with Emerson's assessment. Revell states that once the Mujahideen and their associates came to the United States, they found a hospitable environment.

Emerson credits Abdullah Azzam for completing the most important infrastructure. He helped establish the Alkifah Refugee Center in New York. According to Emerson, American did not realize that the Alkifah Refugee Center was the front for another organisation, an organisation calling for jihad. In fact, the Alkifah Refugee center's Arabic letter head calls for holy war.

In 1989, with the Soviets in disarray and their political system on the verge of collapse; Azzam turned his attention to the United States. According to Emerson, Azzam spread his jihad network through 38 states, with multiple bases in Pennsylvania, Michigan, California, Texas and the New England states. Azzam returned to Pakistan in 1989, only to be killed by an assassin, but his work was completed by several supporters, including his cousin Fayiz Azzam.

Emerson names several prominent officials working in various radical groups in the domestic jihad. Tamim al-Adnani was the most vigorous recruiter and successful fundraiser among all the leaders. Emerson says Tamin al-adnani assisted in domestic terrorist incidents, including the world trade center bombing. Fayiz Azzam, Abdullah Azzam cousin, gave rhetorical speeches calling for blood and holy war. Elsayyid Nossari who was charged with murder of militant Rabbani Kahane and convicted of lesser offenses, maintained a clearing house for terrorist literature before his arrest. Even in prison Emerson says Nossari helped plan the world trade center bombing.

Emerson also says well-known terrorist group have established bases in the United States. He claims the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) is Hamas's chief propaganda arm in the United States under the name Asqa vision. Based in Richardson, Texas, the IAP is one of several organizations with links to Hamas. Islamic jihad has a base in Tampa Florida. Hizbullah also has a network in the United States.
Emerson claims to have found over 30 radical Middle Eastern groups in the United States, adding that the FBI has confirmed that terrorist groups have command centers in California, Nevada, Texas, Florida, Illinois, and New Jersey. Buck Revell says the intention of these groups is to harm the United States and keep it from being able to take international action.

In addition, the making violence in the United States was done in response for the American political, economical and military support to Israeli, as one group had mailed letters to five news organisations, claiming responsibility over the incident of the bombing of world trade center’s North tower killing six people, injuring 1,000 and causing $300 million in damage. The letter received by the New York Times reflected this:

“We are the fifth battalion in the Liberation army; declare our responsibility for the explosion on the mentioned building. This action was done in response for the American political economic and military support to Israel the state of terrorism and to the rest of the dictator countries in the region. Our demands are:

1- Stop all military, economic, and political aid to Israel
2- All diplomatic relations with Israeli must stop
3- Not to interfere with any of the Middle East countries interior affairs.

If our demands are not met, all of our functional groups in the army will continue to execute our missions against the military and civilian targets in and out of the United States . . .”

This action is a part of Al-Qaeda political objective, where Bin Laden justified these attacks in his formal declaration of war in February 1998 calling for a jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders and declaring that killing “American and their allies, civilians and military is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.”

Bin Laden was indicted by the United States for allegedly masterminding the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Darussalam, Tanzania. The United States retaliated with missile strikes near Kabul, Afghanistan, destroying what was described by the Pentagon as an extensive terrorist training complex near there.

In November 1999 the United Nations imposed economic sanctions on Afghanistan in response to the Taliban’s refusal to hand over Bin Laden. Gorge Bush
named Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda as the prime suspects in the September 11 attacks against the United States. Bush declared a war against terrorism worldwide and demanded that Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers deliver Bin Laden and his lieutenants to the U.S. government but the Taliban refused. Consequently Taliban regime was overthrown by The United States.

However, whether Osama Bin Laden was behind September 11 or not there is an analysis by Waleed El-Ansary about motivation of terrorist to do this thing. Bin Laden attempted to convey a message to the entire world in his first videotaped statement on Al-Jazeera after 11 September, reiterating his tit-for-tat terrorism strategy in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian issue. He opened by saying that Americans are now experiencing the fear that Palestinians and others have suffered for 80 years, and closed by saying that American will not feel secure until Palestinians and others feel secure:

"And this is America filled with fear from the north to south and east to West. Thank god. And what America is facing today is something very little of what we have tasted. I swear by God the great America will never dream nor those who live in America will never taste security and safety unless we feel security and safety in our land and in Palestine."

In addition the United States will have an incentive to change its Crusader-Zionist foreign policy under the right combination of costs and benefits, and threaten the American people accordingly. He would certainly be familiar with cost-benefit analysis and the importance of “incentive system” because he (Osama) studied management and economics at King Abdul Aziz University in Saudi Arabia while obtaining degrees in public administration and civil engineering. He discussed the economic impact of military strikes against economic targets in his 1996 declaration of war as well as urging that the “economical boycotting of the American goods is a very effective weapon of hitting and weakening the enemy, and it is not under the control of the security forces of the regime”.

Therefore, his publicly declared tit-for-tat strategy espousing terrorist attacks until the United States stops its current foreign policy is a public threat to induce U.S. to adopt a more cooperative foreign policy by changing the current policy’s costs and benefits. As Bin Laden stated in his December 27, 2001 Videotape release:

"They (the 19 terrorist) shook American’s throne and struck the U.S. economy in the heart. This is clear proof that this international usurous, damnable economy which America uses along its military power to impose infidelity and humiliation on weak people – can easily collapse. (The attacks) have inflicted on New York and other markets more than a trillion dollars in loses. If their economy is destroyed, they will be busy with their own affairs rather than enslaving the weak peoples."

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William Beeman points out "... if the people of rogue nation experience enough suffering, they will overthrow their rulers or compel them to adopt more sensible behaviour. The terrorist actions in New York and Washington are a clear and ironic implementation of this strategy against the United States." Indeed, Bin Laden claims the desire to "overthrow of special interest group that is creating the 'war against Islam' urging the American people to elect a government that acts in their interest." 158

III. The U.S. policy towards Al-Qaeda and Afghanistan after 11 September 2001

A. U.S attack on Afghanistan – The terrorist attacks of September 11 in the U.S set off a chain reaction. A year that saw the rigid control of the Taliban on the verge of total victory also witnessed its military defeat and political marginalization.

Though humanitarian aid continued to reach Afghanistan, Taliban attitudes toward the public role of women and sensitivity to foreign influences frustrated the work of aid agencies. Its unyielding policies also provoked international condemnation and economic sanctions. In May the U.S. announced increased assistance for Afghanistan but in that same month the Taliban closed several UN political offices in the country. UN efforts to distribute food in Kabul were threatened in a dispute over the use of Afghan women in this work. In August eight foreign relief workers were detained on charges of promoting Christianity and threatened with the death penalty; after three months in custody, however, they were rescued by U.S. forces in November. In spite of this Taliban could eliminate opium cultivation as, UN Secretary – General Kofi Annan reported in August that opium poppy had almost completely disappeared from Taliban-controlled areas. 159

September 11, 2001, attack confirmed that the US homeland itself was vulnerable to the consequences of its foreign policies and that determined enemies could attack and inflict horrendous damage upon US cities. Terrorism replaced communism as the source of fear and loathing in the war the United States had been fighting abroad since 1947, and it had finally reached its shores.

President Bush immediately declared a war on terrorism and warned that more than sixty countries might be called to account for the war on terror. It begins with Al-Qaeda but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global
reach has been found, stopped and defeated. There would be one battle but a lengthy campaign from this day forward, Bush stated, “Any nation that continues to harbour or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime”. The Al-Qaeda network was worldwide, and it would continue to exist even if Bin Laden was captured or killed. When pressed, the White House admitted that Al-Qaeda’s links with other global terrorist organisations were “amorphous”.

Al-Qaeda was “just one of the networks in forty or fifty countries, as the Defense Secretary argued and although the war in Afghanistan was “important to the credibility” of U.S. efforts, it by no means ended the Pentagon’s ambition to root out terrorism. Even if Bin Laden were killed, it is more powerful than ever, its credibility has been enhanced and since it trained about 20,000 men in Afghanistan alone over the past decade; it now exists in many countries. And there are many Islamic Jihad groups everywhere that have no direct connection with it – only their aims are identical.  

The terrorist network that the United States now seeks to eradicate is a product of the protracted conflicts in Afghanistan and Kashmir and on the West Bank and Gaza strip. The September 11 attacks on the United States might never have occurred had these violent struggles been resolved. Thus helping to settle protracted civil conflicts is not merely good for the world in general: it can also make the United States safer.

Although tragic in purely human terms, losses that the United States has suffered till date have not affected its material position or its core national interests. The United States is still the leading economic and military power in the world and the global consensus that terrorism is serious problem may have enhanced the U.S. influence in the short term. Basic U.S. foreign policy goals are also unaffected. The United States still wants to discourage security competition in Europe and Asia, prevent the emergence of hostile great powers and promote a more open world economy, inhibit the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and expand democracy and respect for human rights.

The campaign against global terrorism became the central aim of U.S. foreign and defense policy, and other international goals will be subordinated to this broad objective. In the short term the campaign has two main objectives, the first, goal is to eradicate Al-Qaeda both by attacking it in Afghanistan and by eliminating its cells in
other countries; the second goal is to replace the Taliban government, both to deny al-Qaeda a state haven and to demonstrate to other government.

Over the longer term, the United States must also take steps to ensure that new Al-Qaeda does not emerge and make it more difficult for potential enemies to acquire even more lethal means (such as nuclear weapons). To achieve these ends, U.S. foreign policy must focus on (1) managing the anti-terrorist coalition; (2) enhancing control over weapons of mass destruction; (3) reconstructing Afghanistan; and (4) rebuilding relations with the Arab world and Islamic world.  

After the September 11 President Bush demanded that Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban regime hand over Bin Laden to the United States, but Mullah Omar reacted with outrage; his government was merely honoring the traditional Pashtun code of **milmastia** that demands protection for all Muslims who seek shelter in their country. Even if such shelter means risking the safety of all inhabitants, to violate the code would constitute betrayal of a brother and a violation of Islamic teaching, “extraditing Osama Bin Laden, Mullah declared is tantamount to leaving a pillar of our religion.”

Following the attack when prince Turki bin Faisal returned to Afghanistan to renegotiate the surrender of Bin Laden to Saudi officials, he found the one-eyed Mullah a changed man. “Mullah Omar was very heated” prince Turki later recalled in a loud voice he denounced “all our efforts and praised Bin Laden as a worthy and legitimate scholar of Islam. He told me we should not do the infidel’s work by taking Osama from them”

The opportunity to separate the Taliban from Al-Qaeda had been lost, and with it the possibility of preventing future acts of terror. “Rather than trying to divide and conquer,” Dr. Larry Goodson, professor of Middle East studies at the US army war college, said in the wake of the missile attacks “we adopted the approach to keep Afghanistan in a box we were not going to recognize them. We were not going to aid them in significant ways. In fact, we took a very hard line toward the Taliban regime,”

Addressing a joint meeting of Congress on September, 20, Bush vowed to direct “every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, and every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence and every necessary weapon of war . . . to defeat the global terror network”. On Oct. 7, with Taliban leaders continuing to
stonewall the United States and its allies regarding the whereabouts of Bin Laden, the U.S. military launched air strikes against Taliban targets in Afghanistan.

Within days of the attacks on the world trade center, the Pentagon and NATO for the first time in its history invoked Article 5 of its charter declaring that the atrocities were an attack on the alliance. As a demonstration of support, Australia invoked the ANZUS Pact putting elements of its armed forces on high state of readiness in case they were called upon to assist the U.S. On September 19 the Organisation of American States (OAS) agreed by acclamation to invoke the Rio Treaty, also a mutual-defense pact.

On September 23, President Bush held a highly confidential telephone conversation with Russia President Vladimir Putin. The seventy minute conversation resulted in an earthshaking shift in the global balance of power that would have a profound impact on Bin Laden and the course of the war on terror. Putin gave the nod for US forces to enter Afghanistan and Central Asia with some condition. In exchange for his consent, Putin gained Bush’s approval of the use of its forces to crack down on rebel groups in Chechnya.

China reacted to this development by moving their nuclear missile and aircraft capable of carrying nuclear bombs transported to bases in the Xinjiang region of northwest China bordering on the Central Asian states and Afghanistan.

As Americans sat glued to their television sets for the latest word on the war on terror few were aware that the doomsday card had been played and world’s three great powers—the United States Russia, and China—were scrambling to get their nuclear weapons in place.

The week after the attacks was a period of shock and rage for most Americans but there was also a feeling of helplessness because of great uncertainty about who exactly had attacked, where precisely in the world they could be found, and how they could be punished. On September 19 the U.S. dispatched more than 100 combat and support aircraft to various bases in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. A large naval task force was sent to join what was first called operation Infinite Justice but later, after complaints were received from Muslims, was renamed operation Enduring Freedom.

Allied air strikes in Afghanistan began on October 7 later U.S. Special Forces including Delta force and Rangers launched ground raids inside the country. The U.S.
enlisted as an ally the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, the principal remaining opposition to the Taliban take over of the Afghanistan, relying on them to provide the bulk of ground troops for the campaign. U.S. reluctantly decided to help the faction Northern Alliance, providing the Northern Alliance with guns, funds, and horrific air cover, as in Vietnam, the United States believed its credibility was at stake. But the Northern Alliance’s principal sponsors after the mid-1990s were Iran and Russia, and the forces that comprise it have often fought each other. Some of its warlords, chieftains and factions took arms and money from others, from the Soviet Union, and Russia which at one time was its major backer. Even India has aided it because of its hostility to Pakistan. Some of its most important leaders fought for the Soviet forces during the 1980s but others opposed them and in the fall of 2001 the Northern Alliance even hired dozens of former Soviet soldiers to advise them.

The northern city of Mazar-e Sharif fell a month later, and on November 13 the Northern Alliance entered Kabul as Taliban forces fled the Capital on December 9, with the fall of the Taliban’s principal city of Kandahar American B-2s began carpet bombing a network of caves in the Tora Bora Mountains of eastern Afghanistan, the last stronghold of forces loyal to Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban. On November 15 anti-Taliban Afghan troops backed by British and American commandos’ surrounded a cave where they thought Bin laden and a dwindling forces of Al-Qaeda fighters were hiding but he was not found. His whereabouts were still unknown up to now. But according Jayanta Kumar Ray, the rapidity with which president Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan capitulated before American demands, in the aftermath of the episode on 11 September 2001, was indeed stunning. No less stunning was the three-way game of deception played by Musharraf after the commencement of the American war in Afghanistan. Musharraf went on deceiving the Americans the Pakistanis, and certainly the Indians. Pakistan offered shelter to 25000-30000 Americans soldiers, and permitted American forces to use some of its airports. The carpet bombing of some regions of Afghanistan by the United States air forces, combined with the ground assaults by the Northern Alliance, led to the fall of the Taliban government in Kabul. Meanwhile, Pakistan deceived America by using American planes to secure safe passage for thousands of Pakistani commanders and soldiers in Afghanistan. Undoubtedly, many Talibans and their leaders (perhaps even Osama Bin Laden) used these plans, disguising themselves as Pakistanis, and fled to
Pakistan, where they secured sanctuaries with the active assistance of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). Recently Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden’s right-hand man, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has issued a vehement video calling for attacks on western interests world wide and regime change in Egypt and Saudi Arabia “the struggle against the corrupt regimes and the corruptors in two phase . . . In the short term, one must take aim at the interests of the Crusaders and Jews,” Al-Zawahiri said in the 95-minute video from Al-Qaeda’s As-Sahab media.

B. U.S. and establishment of Afghan interim regime

After U.S. led coalition forces ousted Taliban regime international moves to solve the resulting political crisis focused on avoiding the chaos and destruction that had followed the Mujahideen (Taliban) takeover from the communist government of Mohammad Najibullah in 1992. On November 27, UN-sponsored conference in Bonn, Germany, was convened to settle for an interim government to replace the Taliban. The largest share of delegates represented the Northern Alliance, whose political leader Burhanuddin Robbani had retained international recognition even after being driven from Kabul in 1996. Supporters of former king Zahir Shah also participated, the result was an agreement that Hamid Karzai, a Pushtun tribal leader and supporter of the former king, would lead an interim administration for six months, when a loya Jirga a traditional Afghan assembly of notables, would choose a new government. On December 22 Karzai and cabinet that included two women were installed in a peaceful ceremony joined by outgoing president Robbani and most of the country’s ethnic and political factions.

Hamid Karzai, who was picked to head an interim authority in Afghanistan by a UN-sponsored international conference in Bonn, German in December 2001, sought to maintain balance among the country’s ethnic and tribal groups while laying a foundation for national institutions. Although he was a Pushtun tribal, Karzai had an armed group of his own security in Kabul maintained by an international security. Assistance Force (ISAF) of 4,000 to 5,000 troops whose command was rotated among various participating countries.

However, there is scarcely any constancy in its views on the future of Afghan politics. The Pentagon was insistent that it would withdraw US soldiers entirely when the fighting ended and when they captured or killed the Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders.
on their list, which they never did. Bin Laden is still free as are most of his key aims. And although the United States was ready to see an international peace keeping force in Kabul under the British and Germans, it was also reluctant to see it established before fighting ended. To complicate the situation, the Northern Alliance opposed any extensive foreign peace keeping force. Russia believes the Northern Alliance alone is the legitimate government of Afghan, Iran agrees with it too.\textsuperscript{177}

U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited Kabul in May and declared that major combat activity by U.S. forces there was over. Still operation enduring freedom, a U.S.-led coalition of 12,500 soldiers, battled throughout the year against terrorist opposition thought to be grouped around al-Qaeda loyalists of Osama Bin Laden and followers of ousted Taliban leader Mohammad Omar, and Hezbi Isalmi forces of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. All three leaders continued to elude capture.

A separate International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) of 5,000 troops contributed by 31 countries was the security guarantor for areas directly under the control of the central government. In August NATO assumed responsibility for ISAF, and in October the UN Security Council authorized NATO to send ISAF troops anywhere in Afghanistan. This was intended as support for President Karzai. Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf had called for ISAF to end what he called a power vacuum in Afghanistan. In July an exchange of fire between Pakistani troops and Afghans had led to charges that Pakistan had violated the Afghan border. After a mob ransacked Pakistanis embassy in Kabul, relations between the two countries became tense.

Reports of raids and bomb attacks by Taliban fighter increased throughout the year although the degree to which they were coordinated was uncertain. In the summer the Taliban reportedly set up a new command structure for southern Afghanistan, its traditions base of support, and week’s later establishment of another Taliban command for northern Afghanistan was claimed.\textsuperscript{178}

Vishal Chandra’s conclusions in his book about the role and response of the West remain exceedingly crucial in the changing scenario. The ongoing US military operations against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban along the Durand line, (see Chapter I) which is backed by the NATO’s expanded role in Southern Afghanistan, are significant to the survival of the Kabul government. But the key question here is for how long can West sponsor Afghanistan? Keeping in view the fact that Afghanistan is
almost decades away from security and stability, are U.S. and NATO prepared for that long haul in Afghanistan? U.S. forces in Afghanistan are said to be over stretched, and the NATO's third phase of expansion at best remains an ambiguous half-hearted mission. There any long-term commitment of the International community towards an externally sponsored security and the political process in Afghanistan remains suspect.

Notes and References

11. Hall Gardner, n. 5, pp.33-34.

Among the other actions, the Reagan administration took with general support of both parties in Congress – armed Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan to fight a guerilla war against Soviet Union.(David Farber, Taken Hostage:The Iran Hostage Crisis and America’s first Encounter with Radical Islam(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), p.187.
Azzam was also a founder of the Palestinian radical Islamist group Hamas.


Ahmed Rashid, n. 15, pp. 129-130.


John Trumpbour, n. 28, pp. 102-103.

Jonathan R. White, n. 25, p. 162.


Azzam born in 1941 in Jenin Palestine on the West Bank was a product of the Palestinian diaspora, steeped in Islamic learning and politics. He answered his first call to battle in the 1967 six-day war, after which he joined the Palestinian resistance, and later left because it was he said merely a political cause insufficiently rooted in Islam. He joined the Muslim Brotherhood and later helped found Hamas as an Islamic alternative to the Palestinian Liberation Organization. He resumed an academic career that earned him degrees in Jordan and Damascus and eventually a Ph.D. from Cairo’s Al Azhar, the high temple of Islamic learning. When the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Azzam was among the first of the non-Afghan Muslim sympathizers to join the cause against the Soviet. He set up his base in Peshawar, capital of Pakistan’s untamed Northwest frontier province, Azzam found his cause: Afghanistan would be the incubator for a new muscular Islam, a religion of warriors like that of the prophet’s time. (Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The Hijackers who they were, why they did it*, New York: Politico’s Publishing, 2005, pp. 93-95).

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hasan Al Banna and has been the model for many later organisations. Al Banna saw the Brotherhood not as engine of radical revolution but of gradual change, and regarded Westerning influence and intellectual emancipation as weakening Islam, while seeking a return to pure Islam and Sharia (Islamic law). In 1994 a secret apparatus of the Brotherhood was formed, rationalized as for the jihad in defense of Islam but mainly used to defend the movement against the government.

The Brotherhood has also established itself in other countries, including Jordan where it had been for some time the biggest single party in the parliament, Syria where it was crushed by the government army in 1982, and the West Bank and Gaza strip in the form of Hamas. And also in Lebanon, the radical Iranian – backed Hizbulloh (party of God). (Naji Abi – Aad and Michel Grenon, *Instability and Conflict in the Middle East: People, Petroleum and security Threats*; Britain: Macmillan Press LTD, 1997, pp. 26-27).


Some Salafi scholars, engrossed in political piety, turned radical. The fight against the non-believers (Kafir) became a religious obligation and the main leitmotif of this sect. The concept of Takfir (declaring someone to be non-believer) became the major source of conflict among Salafis, causing a rift in the movement throughout the Arab world. Reformist Salafis consider that all applications of Takfir require a clear and proven violation. Muslim leaders argue cannot be declared to be non-believers, because there is no clear evidence proving that they have ceased to be Muslims. Consequently, a jihad against Arab regimes is not permitted. The most radical Salafis base their interpretation of jihad on the writings of Ibn Taymiyya and like him, they consider that actions by governments that are contrary to Islamic Law can be considered proof in order to declare them non-believers. The Takfir thus became an instrument that could be used to oppose any regime whatsoever through armed struggle (Juan Jose Escobar Stemman, “Middle East Salafism’s influence and radicalization of Muslim communities in Europe”, in Barry Rubin (ed.), *Political Islam: Critical Concepts in Islamic Studies*, London: Routledge Taylor Francis Group, 2007, pp 83-84).

Ibn Taymiyya lived during the times of the Crusader and Mongol invasions, a circumstance that conditioned his theories on the jihad. When the Mongols invaded Dar al-Islam, they eventually converted to Islam. The dilemma arose as to whether the war against them should be considered a jihad or a war between two Muslim entities. In his *fatwa* on the Mongols, Ibn Taymiyya acknowledged that they practiced the five pillars of Islam, but this did not automatically make them true Muslims. The mainstream view was the under the Shari’a they were Muslims. Ibn Taymiyya introduced a new evaluation criterion: whether or not they respected the five pillars, if someone did not follow one of the precepts of the Shari’a, they ceased being Muslim and could therefore be declared Kafir (Juan Jose Escobar Stemman, “Middle East Salafism’s influence and radicalization of Muslim communities in Europe”, in Barry Rubin (ed.), *Political Islam: Critical Concepts in Islamic Studies*, London: Routledge Taylor Francis Group, 2007, p 93). For further detail about the role of Salafi ideology to Mujahideen see also, Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The Hijackers who were, why they did it* (New York: Polictico’s Publishing, 2005), pp 101-102.


Azzam viewed the Afghanistan war veterans as a mobile strike attack force that could operate anywhere in the Arab world. His work goes beyond the political and ideological radicalism of Qutb (who inspired organizations like Takfir wa Hijra or the Islamic Jihad in Egypt) and calls for the construction of a radical utopia in which violence is religious obligation, part of an international and pan-Islamic jihad against oppression. Azzam was one of the first authors to include Andalusia among the Muslim lands to be retaken through the jihad. See Jason Burke, *Al Qaeda: Casting a Shadow*, (London: Tauris, 2003), P 72, and (Juan Jose Escobar Stemman, “Middle East Salafism’s influence and radicalization of Muslim communities in Europe” in Barry Rubin (Ed) *political Islam critical concepts in Islamic studies*, London: Routledge Taylor Francis group, 2007, p 93).

Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) he joined the Muslim Brotherhood – an Islamic organization dedicated to the Islamization of Egyptian society. As the tension between Nasser (Arab nationalism) and brotherhood came to head in 1954, Nasser used the attempted assassination as justification for crushing the Brotherhood. He thereafter engaged in open...
persecution, oppression, imprisonment and even execution of those affiliated with it. Because Qutb was one of its major leaders and its most influential ideologue by this point, he was particularly singled out by Nasser for harassment, incarceration, and ultimately execution.

Qutb’s experiences of repression, authoritarianism, imprisonment, and torture by his own government led to his radicalization. During his ten years in prison he wrote prolifically. While some of his works, particularly his Quranic commentary, were spiritually attractive to mainstream Muslims. The most influential and widely read of these prison writings for radicals was **Milestones**. This book was dedicated to the exposition of his vision of the necessity for revolution in order to create a truly Islamic society ruled by Islamic law. This revolution was to be carried out via jihad as holy war, which was declared to be the ongoing permanent duty of Muslims as they engaged in the cosmic battle of good versus evil, played out in everyday life in the struggle of Muslims against non-Muslim governments and ideologies. (Natana J. Delong – Bas, *Wahhabi, Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2004, pp. 256-265).

In addition it is said that the West used to support Brotherhood through Saudi Arabia to counter Nasser’s Arab nationalism. As cited in *Al Ahram weekly* (24-30 November 1999): . . . through Saudi Arabia the United States provided direct support to the Muslim Brotherhood the oldest movement in the area. The idea was to counter the rising tide of Arab nationalism and Arab unity championed by Nasser and by the Ba'ath party in Syria and Iraq. The West became more and more convinced that Islam was the weapon to fight communism. (Fatema Mernissi, “Palace fundamentalism and liberal democracy”, in Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells (Ed), *the new crusades: constructing the Muslim Enemy*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2003, pp. 58-59).


Juan Jose Escobar Stemmam, n. 40, p. 93.


Riyaz Punjabi, n. 1, pp. 103-106.

Natana J. Delong – Bas, n. 43, pp. 256-265.

Muhammad Abd Al-Salam Faraj, an Egyptian fundamentalist ideologue, carries the idea of jihad to the point of regarding it an absent obligation, or a forgotten pillar of Islam. Clearly motivated by messianic projections, Faraj believes that jihad is an absolute Muslim duty for reinstating rule by Sharia jihad is so central to Faraj’s thinking that he calls it the sixth pillar of Islam. (Hilal Khashan, “the new world order and the tempo of militant Islam”, in Shahram Akbarzadeh (ed.), *Islam and Globalization: Critical Concepts in Islamic Studies*, London: Routledge Taylor& Francis Group, 2006, p. 266).

Robert S. Snyder, n. 42, p. 171.

Jonathan R. White, n. 25, pp. 162-164.


There was some proof that Saudi is among infidel. According to one of Salafis writing, Islam al-Barqawi, better known as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a Jordanian who during his stay in Afghanistan in 1984-published a book entitled the creed of Abraham (Millat Ibrahim) in which he outlined the doctrine of jihad based on the Wahhabi tradition.
Radical Salafism merged with ultra—intransigent Wahhabism. In 1991 al-Maqdisi, who had links with the most radical circles of Saudi Islamism, published a book called *proof of the infidelity of the Saudi state*, which was distributed widely in the Arabian Peninsula. In 1992 he left Peshawar for Jordan, where he headed the Salafi organization Bayat al-Imam until he was detained by the Jordanian authorities in 1996 and accused of plotting to kill the negotiators of the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. His work influenced the principal ideologists of fighting Salafism in Saudi Arabia during the 1990s. (Juan Jose Escobar Stemmman, “Middle East salafism’s influence and radicalization of Muslim communities in Europe” in Barry Rubin (Ed). *Political Islam: Critical Concepts In Islamic Studies* London: Routledge Taylor Francis group, 2007, pp.83-84).


George Friedman, n.54, p.30.

A Wordsmiths Compilation, n. 57, pp. 171-172.

George Friedman, n. 54, pp.30-32.

Ibid, pp.57-58.

Ibid, pp.30-32.


George Friedman, n. 54, pp.32-35.


George Friedman, n.54, pp.32-35.

Natana J. Delong – Bas, n. 43, pp.266-271.


Riyaz Punjabi, n.1, pp.78-79.


Natana J. Delong – Bas, n. 43, pp.266-271.


Ahmed Rashid, n.15, pp.133-134.

George Friedman, n.54, Pp.21-24.

Natana J. Delong – Bas, n.43, pp.266-271.

Robert S. Snyder, n.42, pp.165-166.

Natana J. Delong – Bas, n.43, pp.266-271.


David Commins, n.37, pp.188-189.
Where he has explained that “Characterized by education and reform” leaders of such a model the evolutionary path, have always argued that ruling an Islamic government should be the step that follows preparing most of the society for accepting the Islamic Shari'a.

In the aftermath of the 1964 October revolution in the Sudan that ousted General Ibrahim Abboud’s military dictatorship (1958-1964) from power through civil disobedience, the Islamists emerged as a small political entity led by Hassan al-Turabi and some of his western educated colleagues from that time until it General Umar al-Bashir expelled him from his post as Secretary General of the National Congress Party in May 2000, Al-Turabi has been the supreme leader of the Islamists in Sudan and one of the most notable Islamists worldwide. He led the movement into a series of transformations, alliances, collaboration and developments over the years starting from the Muslim brotherhood (1964) to the Islamic Charter front (1964-69) to National Islamic Front (1985-98)

Al-Turabi and other Islamists have promoted their own version of modernization theory that has used the state as its central focus. The Islamists theorists by contrast, have
employed an Islamic discourse that attacks vigorously other modernization political
theories and practices such as the Marxists, Arab and African socialists, and other elitist
schools of thought.

107 Jonathan R. White, n.25, p.164.
109 Jonathan R. White, n. 25, Pp.165-166. For further detail about Osama seeking to get
111 Anthony H. Cordesman, n.73, p.411.
112 Ibid, p.412
113 William Rosenau, “Al-Qaeda recruitment trends in Kenya and Tanzania”, in Barry Rubin
114 Anthony H. Cordesman, n.73, P.409.
115 Jonathan R. White, n.25, P.165.
Vol.152, No. 2, pp. 40-44).
pp.163-167.
121 Peter Saracino, “Military Affairs”, *Britannica Yearbook 2002*, (Chicago: Encyclopedia
122 Ajai Sahni, “The dynamics of Islamist terror in South Asia” in Barry Rubin (ed.), *Political
group, 2007), pp. 141-142.
123 Riyaz Punjabi, n.1, pp.79-80.
124 Ajai Sahni, n. 122, p. 145.

The fall of Kabul in 1992 deprived the commitment of foreign militants of much of its
point, but also opened the door to various organisations to install themselves on Afghan
territory, particularly in the east, thus enabling them to escape the influence of Pakistan.
In particular, some Pakistanis set up camps in Afghanistan to train their Mujahideen for
service in Kashmir. This applied particularly to Hezb Ul-Majahidin, the military wing of
Jamaat- I Islami, and to Harakat ul-Ansar, which was still known by this name after it
officially resettled itself Harakat ul-mujahideen. this camp underwent a six-month military
course in the camp initially set up by Hekmatyar for the Arabs, and then closed by the
Taliban.(Gills Dorronsoro, *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan 1979 to the Present*

125 Riyaz Punjabi, n.1, pp.80-81.
127 Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror* (New Delhi: Viva
128 Riyaz Punjabi, n.1, p.87.
129 Zachary Abuza, no.127, pp.121-122.

The origins of the Jamaah Islamiya (JI) network are found in Indonesia, dating back to
the 1960s. In the 1960s, the radical clerics Abdullah Sungkar and Abdil Bakar’ Ba’asyir,
both of Yemeni descent, established a private radio station that advocated the importance
of Sharia, which got them into trouble with the Suharto regime. The two considered
themselves the ideological heirs of Sekarmadjı Maridjan Kartosuwirjo – the founder of
the Darul Islam. The two met when were both leaders and the Geragan Pemuda Islam
Indonesia, an Islamic youth movement.
Caused them fled to Malaysia with the help of Abdul Wahid Kadungga, a radical Muslim who had fled to Europe in 1971 and formed the Muslim youth Association of Europe – which put Kadungga into close contact with Muslim leaders from around the world, and especially the Muslim brotherhood there. The preachers lived in a small town on the Malacca strait, which had ferry service to Indonesia. They served as a way station for Indonesians and Malaysians who were on their way to Afghanistan and Pakistan to study and fight the Soviet or train in one of the forty Al-Qaeda camps that were established in the 1990s. Sungkar traveled to Pakistan and the Afghan border region in the early 1990s where he met Bin Laden and other senior Al-Qaeda members and where he pledged bayat, a form of allegiance to Bin Laden.

In their work of preaching literal interpretation of Islam, Ba’asyir and Sungkar build up a loyal following of supporters and disciples, one of their disciples was Ridwan Isamuddin, known commonly as Hambali, a young Indonesian from west Java, born in 1966. In 1987, he traveled to Afghanistan and became a member of the commando Jihad. He was trained in the camp of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, leader of Ittihad-I-Islami, the Islamic union for the liberation of Afghanistan, one of the seven Mujahideen forces fighting the Soviet. He was trained in bomb-making and combat, but Hambali’s real skills were in organization and management. Hambali became an important figure in the Mujahideen’s back offices, responsible for bringing in foreign jihadis from Southeast Asia and managing logistical, it was in this capacity that he came into close contact with Osama Bin Laden.

Ba’asyir and Sungkar also linked up with another radical Indonesian cleric, Mohamad Iqbal Rahman (Abu Jibnl). Abu Jibnl, the son of a man imprisoned by the Suharto regime for his commitment to establishing an Islamic State, was himself imprisoned in the early 1980s for his radical Islamic activities. Upon his release, he went into self-exile in Malaysia, and from there he was recruited into the ranks of the Mujahideen and fought in Afghanistan. Jibnl was not only a capable fighter but a charismatic leader and became a trainer in Afghan camps. He returned to Malaysia and worked closely with Sungkar and Ba’asyir developing the Ja-Maah Islamiya and became the head of training for Al-Qaeda in all of Southeast Asia. They began to espouse the doctrine of Nusantara Raya the establishment of a pan-Islamic republic, in cooperating Malaysia, Indonesia, Southern Thailand, and the Southern Philippines. (Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror, New Delhi: Viva Books Private Limited, 2005, Pp 125-128.)

130 Riyaz Punjabi, n 1, pp.87-88. See also, Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (New Delhi: Viva Books Private Limited, 2005), pp 153-156


132 Zachary Abuza, n 127, pp 122-125

133 Riyaz Punjabi, n 1, pp 91-94

134 Zachary Abuza, n 127, pp.122-125

135 Riyaz Punjabi, n 1, pp 91-94

136 See also, Joseph Chinyong Liow, n 131, pp 193-195

137 Zachary Abuza, n 127, pp 122-125

138 Riyaz Punjabi, n 1, pp 91-94

139 Joseph Chinyong Liow, n 131, pp 193-195

140 Ibid, pp 196-197

In 1986, with the help of the LIPIA (lembaga ilmu pengetahuan Indonesia, Arab or the Institute for Islamic and Arabic studies) Director, Ja'Far was awarded a scholarship for continuing his study at the Maududi Institute in Lahore, Pakistan, to do advanced Islamic studies. The scholarship came from the U.S. and Saudi Arabian governments. In those days Muslims from different countries were funded by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia to support a jihad (holy war) against the Soviet occupiers of Afghanistan. The jihad concept appealed to Ja'Far, while a student at the Maududi institute he attended a Mujahideen training camp that reportedly included Afghans, Pakistanis, Egyptians, Burmese, Sudanese, Thais and Filipinos besides, he often visited Peshawar where studied Islamic Salafi together with many young activists of the Salafi movement. Being in Peshawar with these young Salafi-Wahhabi activists accelerated the growth of Ja'Far knowledge and interest in the vision and mission of the Salafi Wahhabi movement and gave him the chance to further learn the works of Salafi-wahhabi scholars who were critical of the work of the Muslim brotherhood thinkers, such as Sayyid Qutb, whom he previously admired. (Mohammad Sirozi, “The intellectual roots of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia: Ja'Far Umar Thalib of Lashkar Jihad (Jihad fighters) and his educational background” in Barry Rubin (ed.), *Political Islam Critical Concepts In Islamic Studies*, Vol.3, (London: Routledge Taylor& Francis group, 2007), p 165.


Zachary Abuza, n.127, p. 176.


The JI ideology underlined that genuine Muslims should establish a Pan-Southeast Asian Islamic state or Daulah Islamiya Nusantara. Since it was not possible to set up an Islamic regime peacefully within established national frame works because regional governments were worldly and western oriented. Hence JI was committed to overthrowing the secular regimes in Southeast Asia. See Riyaz Punjabi, n.1, pp.89-90

Anthony L. Smith, n. 144, pp. 217-221

Ibid, p.221.

In Thailand, the Malay Muslim population in the three provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat have been involved in separatist movements since 1960. The prominent separatist group Pattani united liberation organisation has been articulating the separatist sentiments. However, the emergence of Mujahideen Pattani National Liberation Front has changed the complexion of these separatist movements. The Mujahideen Front is seeking the establishment of an independent Islamic State. (Riyaz Punjabi, n.1, p.95).


Riyaz Punjabi, n.1, Pp.94-95.

Hilal Khashan, n. 93, pp.270-271.

Jonathan R. White, n.25, Pp.214-217

Terry McDermott, n 86, P 133.


Waleed El-Ansary, n. 83, pp.200-205


Gabriel Kolko, n. 71, pp. 103-104.

The Russians had covertly armed major components of the Northern Alliance after 1996, in the hope it would create a buffer along its borders and prevent Islamic extremism from spreading to the new independent former Soviet republics (now is Central Asia) (Gabriel Kolko, n. 71, pp. 121-122).


Peter Saracino, n.165, p. 278.


The Loya Jirga is the national Council in which all matters of national importance are discussed. All communities in Afghanistan are presented in this body. The first Loya Jirga was held in 1907, and others have been convened at times of national importance ever since; for this reason representation is based on both geography and ethnicity, with some members elected and others appointed.

The concept of the Loya Jirga is considered crucial to the establishment of representative and stable government in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. The agreement setting up the Afghan interim government, signed at Bonn, Germany, on 5 December 2001, provided for a special commission to be appointed to organize the calling of an emergency Loya Jirga that would be able to revise the appointed interim cabinet and create two-year transitional government. To ensure that a consensus acceptable to the Afghan people is reached, the agreement also laid out details of representation to encompass Afghan refugees, people in the Afghan diaspora, Islamic scholars and intellectuals, and women.

The Karzai cabinet that was finally approved by the Loya Jirga represented a compromise between the ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks of the Northern Alliance and members of the majority Pashtun ethnic group, who had felt sidelined by the interim government set up in December 2001. (Frank A. Clements, Conflict in Afghanistan: A Historical Encyclopedia, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO,Inc., 2003, pp.157-159).


Russia believes that the Northern Alliance alone is the legitimate government and its best-known warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, is a corrupt leader who fought for the Soviets for nearly decade, Iran agrees with it. At the end of 2001 Dostum also became the Pentagon’s military vehicle, but he (as well as other crucial Northern Alliance leaders) refused initially to accept the interim agreement the anti-Taliban parties reached in Bonn in December 2001. Thus the US military opportunities in supporting the Northern Alliance turn out to be consummate political folly. (Gabriel Kolko, n.71, pp.112-113).


Gabriel Kolko, n.71, pp.112-113.