CHAPTER – 3
INDIA AND THE KOREAN CRISIS
CHAPTER -3

INDIA AND THE KOREAN CRISIS

"I agree that European problems are and have been very important but I have felt that in the perspective of things to come, the people were wrong in not devoting the requisite attention to the problems of developing Asia"

Jawaharlal Nehru

South-East Asia may be roughly defined as an area of Continental Asia and the offshore Philippines and Indonesian archipelagoes which lies South of China and East of India. It comprises of nine countries which are Burma, Thailand, Malaya, Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Philippines and Indonesia. Diverse by race, religion and wealth they had before the war nearly one common feature: i.e. with the solitary exception of Thailand all war held under the colonial rule.

The Importance of this region politically economically and strategically in the area of world politics can hardly be exaggerated.

Politically, the end of Western hegemony in this area has created a power vacuum, making it highly susceptible to pressures from without. It has been described as 'a sector of low demographic pressures between the Chinese and Indian anti-hills. As a result the new settlers from India and China have created acute political problem for this region and shaped its attitude to these two populous neighbours. The upsurge of Communist China since 1949 has upset the balance of power in this region and her shadow looms larger here. The interest taken by the Western power in this region provides protection to
the South-Asian countries against the fate of becoming satellite to China. Independence in South-East Asia has not brought peace and stability. On the other hand, it has become increasingly evident that its security needs to be underwritten by powers on its own rims.\(^2\)

Economically, South-East Asia is considered to be one of the vital areas of the world on account of its elephantine resources of tin, rubber, oil and other essential commodities. Since this region provides a very good example of colonial economy for the colonial Powers. So its importance has increased with time. From the very beginning the development of natural resources of this area was in foreign hands. The competition among the imperialist powers has drawn South East Asia into the whirlpool of international politics. India has also considerable economic stakes in South-East Asia. She has been a major economic power in this region and, even before the British invasion; it was the biggest trading country of South-East Asia. The establishment of trading colonies in various South-East Asian Countries lent greater impetus to Indian trade. Moreover the economies of the two are interdependent and complementary, not competitive which further resulted in building closer relations between India and South-East Asia. Also it has been asserted that for India’s defence, South-East Asia is the most vital area. From the point of views of the sinews of war, South-East Asia is the richest area in the world. It produces what India lacks for defence of the Indian Ocean Zone ...we have what they need and we need what they have. In our self-interest alone we must cultivate a close friendship with all these countries.\(^3\)

Strategically: It is of immense significance to Asia. ‘It lies athwart the world’s most important lines of sea and air communications and contains some of the
capital land routes leading North ward into China or Southwards from China towards the Indian Ocean. The industrialization of the West depending on the raw products of tropical countries, combined with the growth of sea and air transport, has made South-East a very important part of world economy.

The peace of the world to a very large extent depends on the peace and security of this area in which every major power in Europe and Asia had some interest or the other. Great Britain, by her position in the vital Indian mainland, by her possession of Malaya and Singapore, and by her overriding interest in the defence of Australia and New Zealand, the United States, by her commitments in the Philippines; the French by their position in Indo-China and Japan, because of her proximity and her dependence on the oil and rubber of the Indies, have all come to regard this area as being of special interest to them. In fact, no area better exemplified the rivalries of imperialism than South-East Asia.

United States Interest in South-East Asia: It was in 1898 when the United States entered the South-East Asia. In the initial stages it took minimal interest in this region like trade and commerce. But in 1949 after the Communists had taken over China and invaded South Korea and Tibet in 1950, there began a re-examination of United States Asian policy which led to more intense involvement in freed Asia. Nevertheless after the World War II South-East Asia loomed so large in American national interests that its started fighting for position with full national interest and started securing military and economic commitments of a scope never previously participated.

The main interest of the United States in South-East Asia Consisted of:
India and the Korean Crises

(a) Containment of Communism (b) Its security concern (c) Trade promotion

Containment of Communism: According to the Cold War Strategists South-East Asia was the last blockade against Communism in all Asia. If communism were to sweep through South-East Asia it would blanket the entire Continent and tip the balance of world power to the Communist bloc.

Security Concerns: Military analysts contend that South-East Asia was of immense importance for United States security even in terms of military strategy. For United States South-East Asia was comparatively more important than Panama and Suez Canal. It was only through the narrow Strait of Malacca may the barrier be penetrated conveniently and if this region passes into the hands of hostile powers, the peninsula and offshore Islands of South-East Asia would cut the world into two. Same principle was applicable regarding American security in the Pacific during the World War II. The question of Japanese domination of Continental East Asia and the island of the Western and South-Eastern Pacific was a vital Pacific issue.

Through such experiences as Pearl Harbour there were abundant evidences of the threat to the American security of Pacific Ocean and domination of Continental Asia by a single power after Peking-Moscow axis established control over a large part of Asia.

From the view point of United states security interest it was important that all practicable measures be taken to prevent further Communist expansion in South-East Asia. Indo-China is a key area of South-East Asia and is under immediate threat of Communist. The neighbouring countries like Thailand and Burma could be expected to fall under Communist domination if a Communist
dominated government controlled Indo-China and the balance of South-East Asia would be in grave hazard.\textsuperscript{11}

For United States, South-East Asia owes a special meaning. It is an area of forward defence of the Pacific. In addition, the United State share to a significant degree the specific interest in South-East Asia of its allies and others whose security would be threatened by a hegemony of single Power in Asia.\textsuperscript{12}

Trade Promotion: For United States, South-East Asia was very important regarding its natural resources. Due to worldwide energy crises and scarcity of other natural resources, the position of South-East Asia as source of raw materials had been enhanced. Consequently, this economic factor was a source of attraction for the foreign countries.\textsuperscript{13} Moreover after the World War II, United States was faced with the traumatic possibility of denial of its economic penetration into the market industries and raw materials in many parts of the world. Thus America was not in favour of South-East Asian valuable material resources going into the hands of hostile power and the West.\textsuperscript{14} Moreover the American's were interested in having South-East Asian market for American products.\textsuperscript{15}

USSR interest in this Region: The Soviet Union had certain well-defined objectives in this part of the globe. Firstly it wanted to avoid an open clash with China. Though China does not want it, the Soviet Union has kept the door open to détente. The second objective of the Soviet Union was to keep both Communist China and the United States out of the entire region. Thirdly Soviet Union wanted to prevent Pakistan from falling entirely into the arms of either the United States or Communist China.\textsuperscript{16}
India's link with South-East Asia reached back into history and legend. Indian philosophy, culture, the three-principle religion i.e. Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam came from India. Many of the political and government devices, the court structure, legal proceedings, art and architecture, languages were all derived from India. All these left an everlasting impact on the countries of South-East Asia. Both India and South-East Asia are strategically very important for each other. Therefore, a friendly, economically strong, politically, stable tension free South-East Asia is vital for peace and security of whole of Asia and so also will contribute to peace and security of India. Likewise, India's central geo-strategic location is significant in the context of South-East Asia. India's relations with South-East Asia are of abiding importance to her. India has vital stakes in South-East Asia whose independence and security is bound up with her own. According to Nehru India was the gateway to both West and South-East Asia. The independence and security of South-East Asia served to strengthen India's own independence and security and any series setback there will constitute a potential threat to India too.

India shares common boundaries with four South-East Asian nations Burma, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. Moreover, a major portion of her foreign trade depends on sea and all the major sea routes through which Indian ships passes. Keeping all this in mind, it seems that India's unpretentious performance in this region could not have been a deliberate choice. Therefore, while constantly keeping in view the interest and policies of other powers that are interested in this region, one has to keep a constant watch over the
developments and events taking place in the area and draw conclusion in a wider perspective. \(^{19}\)

Since 1942 South-East Asia occupies an important place in the strategic Indian defence. This area is of immense importance for India both land wise and sea wise. As a matter of fact this area is regarded as the "core area" of India’s security extending from Durand Line to the Border of Burma. "South-East and Persian comprises the first circle of Indian security while the Indian Ocean region the second one". \(^{20}\)

Additionally, the developments during the World War II also points out to the fact that the security of both India and South-East Asia are interdependent.

South-East Asia is no doubt strategically very important for India. On the contrary, India due to her geo-strategic location is of immense importance as far as South-East Asia security is concerned. Geographically India is adjacent to South-East Asia. Besides geographical nearness, it has a very significant strategic location between the two Oceans i.e. the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. All the important sea routes pass through this region, which are the lifeline for the maritime countries of the world. Moreover, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands make India maritime neighbour of Burma, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. The distance between the Indian islands and the Indonesian Islands of Sabang and Sumatra is only about 100 miles. The Great Channel between them provides direct access to the Strait of Malacca. Not only this, South-East Asia has been regarded as of immense importance from
the point of view of India's defence needs. Conversely, India also can fulfill its defence needs because both are complimentary to each other in this respect.21

Before the establishment of British rule, India had to face no serious problem of security. It was because during the British's period, the Eastern border was secure because of the Franco-British entente. If there was any danger to India, it was from the North-West, which was ensured by establishing "Buffer States". Though British rule brought political and administrative unity to India, it also created many new problems for her, especially between the two world wars. India was drawn into the arena of world politics because she was ruled by the most powerful colonial power of that time.

British being the supreme naval power of that time, added by Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902-20, were a guarantee to the India's security from the side of the sea also. Furthermore, on her South-Eastern side, Netherland a friend of British governed Indonesia Russia was of no threat because she was not strong enough to challenge British authority and pose a threat to India. Moreover, the emergence of Japan as an ambitious naval power and her subsequent abrogation of Anglo-Japanese Treaty, made India the core in the defence of British Empire in South-East Asia, Far East and also Middle East. Consequently, a thorough "reappraisal of India's Strategic situation took place and a new emphasis was laid on India's Oceanic involvement in power relations. Her strategic interests widened considerably and this formed matrix of a new awareness, which was to characterize future policies.22
Additionally with the fall of Singapore in 1942 it was clear that India’s security was intricately linked up with the security of countries along the rim of Indian Ocean.

The loss of Singapore had exposed the coastline of India to combined air and naval attacks from the seas. Malaya, Singapore, Indo-China and Burma were of immense interest to India as compared to Afghanistan and Iran. A hostile power in Cam- Ranh -Bay would be no less dangerous than it would be in the Persian Gulf. What happened in Bangkok was of as much interest to India as what happened in Basra.  

In summation we can say that India and South-East Asia have interdependent security interest and cannot remain unaffected by the developments taking place in each other’s sphere. This has been proved historically that is why Major Anthony Strachey a former Officer of the Indian Navy suggested that “the lessons of the last war is surely that India must always take adequate precautions that her Eastern neighbours do not become the spring board for yet another attack on her”. According to L. Wrigh “to ignore South-East Asia in its strategic thinking for India would be madness”.

**Indo-China:** It is not only geographical and cultural relations but also the common foreign policy adopted by the three countries i.e. Indonesia, Laos and Cambodia during 1950’s, which played a great role in bringing these countries closer to each other. While dealing with India’s relations with the countries of this region, its role as a caretaker of peace in Indo-China is of immense value. Besides working hard for peace there, India prevented other counties from interfering. Nehru said “The Geneva Agreement was essentially
based on the fact that the great power groups should not push in aggressively in the Indo-China states. They should follow an independent and unaligned policy."^{25}

Indo-China situated further in the East constitutes the "Outer line of defence" for India. Out of three Indo-Chinese states Vietnam commands the most important attention. Literally speaking a country, which is in control of three Indo-Chinese regions, will be in a position to pose a threat to India from two fronts firstly through Thailand and Burma and ascending through Malaysia and Singapore.^{26}

The new states formed i.e. North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia by disintegrating Indo-China is today the real trouble spots in South-East Asia. These countries form the whirlpool of destructive conflict between nationalism and communalism. The conflict is still going on in South Vietnam and to save it from Communist take over. North Vietnam has turned Communist. South Vietnam since the fall of Diem in 1963 has been in political turmoil Cambodia has moved closer to China and Laos maintaining precarious West-oriented neutrality. If the violent upheavals and tensions in this region are not immediately resolved it might threaten to engulf the whole of South-East Asia.^{27}

India played an active role in bringing about peace in Indo-China. Though India was not an invitee to the Geneva Conference, but behind the scene activities of Krishna Menon in Geneva brought the parties closer to a settlement.^{28} The Geneva Agreement provided for three ceasefire agreements with regard to three states i.e. Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
The three International Commissions for supervision and control were set up to supervise and control the armistice agreement. The International Commission consisted of representatives of Canada, India and Poland, with India as Chairman. Although it was a "difficult and complicated task a thankless one occasionally", India discharged it with utmost diligence and sincerity.\textsuperscript{29} It was assumed that implementing the agreement would lead to the independence and sovereignty of the three states.

As contemplated by the Geneva Declaration, the general election took place in the year 1955. The Commission had to face many problems because no election had taken place in Vietnam because of which no political settlement had taken place as envisaged by the Geneva Agreement. Further no progress could be made towards consultations between the competent representatives of the two zones on unification on the basis of election. Besides the role played by India as the chairman of the International Commission for supervision and control and India's opinion on vexed problem was considered of immense value by the countries of this region.

Cambodia:- Culturally, Laos and Cambodia belong to the Indian world whereas Vietnam belongs to the Chinese. But in the modern period contacts between India and these states were several. Cambodia had tense relations with Republic of Vietnam and Thailand. Border incidents, territorial claims and press attacks led to constant tensions on Cambodia's border. Under such circumstances, Cambodia received protection and support from India by personal contact and through Internal Commission.
Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Prime Minister of Cambodia visited India on 11 August 1958. He visited India in order to consult with Nehru and “to seek his advice on the difficult relations his country was having with her neighbours”. Thus one of the factors responsible for trouble in Cambodia was its policy of non-alignment which did not find favour with its neighbours which further led to border troubles and closure of frontiers, particularly those with Thailand.

Till the middle of the year 1955, Cambodia was linked with the Western bloc but soon after the Bandung Conference, Cambodia adopted the policy of neutrality and adherence to Panchsheel.

At the Calcutta Conference Prince Norodom Sihanouk expressed deep admiration for Nehru and described Cambodia’s foreign policy as being very close to India. He further added: “our small and peaceful nation, too often threatened, has found immeasurable comfort in the comprehension shown and encouragement given by India by the contribution of her policy, which is a peace policy.

Prince Sihanouk also referred complaints of Vietnamese troop incursions in Cambodia to the International Control Commission. There was a wide difference of opinion with the Commission about its adequacy to discuss such issues. The Canadian delegation was against such discussion. He was of the opinion that in order to respect the Cambodian sovereignty Cambodia should be allowed to deal with such border incidents. They said the border incidents had been referred by the Cambodian government to the Commission, and if the Commission is to fulfill its responsibility and to see that the
Cambodian frontiers are respected as required under various articles of the Geneva Agreement, it was necessary to discuss such affairs. "Failure on its part to take suitable action will tantamount to a failure in its duty". The Indian and Polish Delegate's said. It was out of morality that India supported Cambodia in its trouble. Its support to Cambodia was made ineffective by the Canadian delegate attitude. Disappointed by the Commission and India, Cambodia leaned towards Peking and established diplomatic relations with it. Thus India failed to keep Cambodia out of Chinese sphere of influence.

Although no military alliance was concluded between Cambodia and China but Prince Sihanouk hinted out that "today China is a support of our sovereignty".

Laos: During 1954 the two Northern provinces of Laos who were under the control of Pathet Lao a rebel group in India, through the International Control Commission in Laos tried to restore these provinces to the Royal Laotian Government. Although various agreements were concluded between the Royal Laotian Government and the Pathet Lao, the political and military integration of the Pathet Lao into the national life of Lao was not possible.

The Commission insisted that Laotian Government should reach a political settlement with the Pathet Lao so that it would lead to an overall peaceful settlement in the kingdom.

Repeated intervention on behalf of the Pathet Lao finally gave the government a feeling about the ICC that it was "practically a tool and a spokesman for the policy of the opposition", according to Sissouk Na
Champassak, a member of the Royal Laotian Government. He further added that though India did not provide any help in the Laotian cause but it desired to see Laos freed from its dilemma. Previously India took a favourable view of the Pathet Lao and said that Prince Souvana Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos, in letter to the Commission, required it’s winding up.

The Canadian delegate passed a Resolution at a meeting of the Commission to this effect. The Indian and Polish delegations opposed this. According to the Canadian delegate the task assigned to the Commission had been completed whereas the Polish delegate believed that some task yet remained. Therefore what were needed were not dissolutions but reductions of its activities.

The Indian delegate also refused to agree with the Canadian view and formally put forward for consideration the view that “the three International Commissions have to continue till a political settlement is completed in all three countries” of Indo-China This Resolution by the Canadian delegate “introduced discord and disharmony in the previously smooth and effective working of the Laos Commission”. On 19 July 1958, the Commission decided in favour of an indefinite adjournment, “with a provision that it may be reconvened in accordance with the normal procedure”.

Vietnam: - North and South Vietnam belongs to the Chinese world. For nearly a whole millennium North Vietnam was governed by the Chinese therefore there was a strong feeling of hostility towards the Chinese. But at the same time there was a feeling of kingship with the Chinese and a genuine
respect for Chinese cultural achievement. The Vietnamese feel more at home with them than with any other foreigners.

The attitude of the North Vietnamese towards the Chinese is a complex mixture of hatred, fear and sneaking admiration. Nationalism, though dominated by the Communists, is a powerful force in North Vietnam and if it is given an opportunity, it may yet assert itself to free North Vietnam from the Chinese hold.

Strategically Vietnam is very important as far as security of South-East is concerned. According to Anthony Eden, it acts as a protecting pad for South-East Asia, and any aggressive power in control of it with little difficulty could overwhelm the entire region.

The tragic development in Vietnam was the result of colonialism. Vietnam was the only South-East Asian country in which nationalism had to wage such a fierce struggle against colonialism. It brings to the notice that Communist was taking control of the nationalist movement. As Professor D.G.E. Hall says “her (France) rigorous repression of political agitation and her intransigent opposition to popular sentiments were the real explanation of the Communist success in gaining control over a nationalist movement in Vietnam. Nowhere else in South-East Asia did this happen”. The three forces i.e. Nationalism, colonialism and communism in no other country of South-East Asia got so intricately twined, which resulted in instability and crises which control continues even today.

Burma: - Burma an immediate neighbour of India is of paramount importance for India because she shares common borders both with India and
China and act as a line of communication to a blockade China. A hostile Burma would be a springboard for Chinese aggression. Burma not only controls one of the most important Southward land routes from China but also provide a sanctuary for hostile Nagas and other hill tribal. Besides, this Burma is very rich in natural resources. India was practically depended on Burma for her oil and rice. What Burma is lacking in is the military strength to defend her borders. India’s security is directly threatened if she is occupied by a hostile power. Besides, “the possibility of a direct attack on India, on land, Burma is the weakest link in the defense system of South-East Asia and Singapore. If Burma falls, the whole of South-East Asia collapses, the control of the Bay of Bengal by an enemy power imperils the security of India”.

Moreover “in the circumstances of modern Air and Naval warfare, the occupation of Rangoon, Akyab and Andaman would paralyse India’s coastal communications without even a major attack”. According to K.M.Panikkar the “defence of Burma is in fact the defence of India, and it is India’s primary concern no less than Burma’s to see to it that its frontiers remain inviolate”. Besides India’s own oil resources being limited, the Indian Navy has to depend on Burma oil with a coastline such as India has and with the new problems of South-East Asia defence, the Air and Naval power of India has to be considered in terms of modern requirements. But neither Navy nor Air Force can operate without oil. It is for this reason Burma’s defence has to form part of India’s own defence.

Presently China’s policy regarding her role in the Indian Ocean is quite confusing. Though she abide by the principle of regarding Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, but it cannot be ruled out that she will take part in the armed race in the coming years in a "modest degree". It is expected that in order to
have port facility in the sea she may use Burma. If this development takes place it will really hamper India's security.\footnote{41}

Moreover, Burma is lacking control over the border area where insurgent activities supported by Burmese Communist Party is going on. The Indian Naga insurgents and other such groups have taken refuge in the Naga hills of Burma and are collaborating with local insurgents. These insurgents are posing a serious and long-term threat to both Burma and India. Although PRC, in order to maintain good relations between India and South-East Asia has declared that he has given up the policy of supporting these anti-national elements but her actual intentions are not clear. Thus we conclude that Burma occupies a very significant place in India's security considerations both internal and external.

**Thailand:** Thailand occupies strategically significant position in the East. Indian security may be threatened by an attack from the side of Thailand through Burma on land. Her communication system may be totally in disorder by the control of Malaysia and Singapore. Thailand considerable importance for India was realized during the World War II when it was acutely felt that in Thailand's security lay the security of India. This fact was recognized in the Tripartite agreement of January 1, 1946, which was concluded by Thailand, Great Britain and India.

The Anglo-Siamese Treaty of Friendship, commerce and navigation governs Indo-Thailand relations at present. This will continue until a fresh treaty is finalized. India continued to maintain cordial relations with Thailand, though in the year 1950, Thailand entered into an agreement with the USA for
India and the Korean Crises

military assistance and later joined the SEATO. Thailand also opposed India’s stand on SEATO at the Bandung Conference.\textsuperscript{42}

The attitude of the government of Thailand has been one of sympathetic understanding regarding India’s staying in Thailand. Moreover the Alien Registration Act, introduced in Thailand in 1950 was leniently applied to those Indians who were brought forcibly to Thailand by the Japanese during the World War II.\textsuperscript{43}

Indonesia: Last but far from being the East important to India is her traditional friend Indonesia. The Indonesian area by virtue of her vast population and political wealth and power is one of the riches countries in the world. Her strategic importance for India is countless. Indonesia stands on the line of communication between England and Australia and guards the border of America’s communication with China and Far East. The security of the Indian Ocean and Pacific is largely dependent on strong Indonesia. It may not be an exaggeration to say that Indonesia holds the key to the stability and security of South-East Asia. According to Indian point of view “Indonesia under the control of hostile power can threaten the security of India, bar India’s access to the Pacific and Australia, greatly hinder her communication with Europe and Africa, cut off India’s sources of supplies of food and raw materials and choke of India’s trade”.\textsuperscript{44} Indonesia has great potentialities of being used as a base of operations in linked up with the fate of Singapore, while the security of Singapore itself is dependent on that of Malaya.\textsuperscript{45}

India and Indonesia have common interests, as the developments in the Indian Ocean area do not pose threats to their continued existence as
sovereign states. Moreover, it is in the interest of both to create an atmosphere of security that is needed for the continued development and progress.\textsuperscript{46} Thus India and Indonesia share common interests to work together, to promote peace and security in the Indian Ocean area.

Malaysia: After Burma it is Malaysia, which stands adjacent to India and in strategic and economic importance it lays next to Indonesia. Malaysia is a key factor in the sterling area, with which India is deeply involved. It is among the most important trade centers of the world. India also has close ties with Malaysia because the Indian immigrants constitute an important element in Malaysian politics and economy.\textsuperscript{47}

Though Malaya did not follow India’s lead in espousing non-alignment, and was not a signatory to SEATO, or any other bloc, it usually toed the British line in foreign affairs and the United Nations.\textsuperscript{48} This identical approach of the two nationals was mainly due to the clauses of the agreement which provided independence to Malaya. According to this agreement Malaya was not only to remain in the Commonwealth but to be bound to Great Britain by a treaty of mutual alliance. Nehru was anxious to see Malaya gain independence under non-Communist aegis. He was also anxious to have Malaya in the Commonwealth and maintain closer ties with Britain. Before and after 1963 India had cordial relations with Malaysia inspite of the fact that Malaysia has been actively aligned with the West. Malaysia not only refused to recognize Communist China, but also established diplomatic relations with South Vietnam and helped her in giving military supplies to fight Communists subversion.\textsuperscript{49} Moreover when China attacked India in 1962 Malaysian Prime Minister gave “all out support to India”. Later he even launched a public
campaign, the "save democracy fund", which raised more than one billion dollars to help India defend herself against Chinese aggression.\textsuperscript{50}

India's cordial relationship with Malaysia is a proof of mutual understanding and respect for each other, irrespective of different policies. Further foundation has been laid down for greater cooperation and alliances between the two countries.

Philippines: India's relations with the Philippines remained in a limbo for many years. The reasons behind it were that the Philippines sought security in a military tie-up with the United States because of the American bases built up during the war and because of the American presence, which left very little choice to the island Republic, and somewhat because of the Communist armed revolt in the fifties. The Philippines occupied a strategic position in the Asian Pacific region and the Americans would not leave it at any cost. The nature of the Philippines regime made it truly anti-Communist and during the early years it did not look-kindly upon the Non-aligned Movement.\textsuperscript{51}

India had ancient cultural and political interests with the Philippines. Due to her historical and political background Philippines has never been in the stream of South-East Asian history. Also because of her unequivocal alignment with the USA, her refusal to recognize Communist China, her membership of the SEATO, her strong attack on neutralist policies at Bandung in 1955 led India and Philippines move in opposite directions in the conduct of their foreign policies. There was a change in the situation after the border war with China in 1962 and more perceptibly after 1966 with series of efforts made by India to enlarge contacts with South-East Asia. Trade and cultural contacts
developed appreciably in the subsequent years. There was a steady progress on demarcation on the ground of the boundary between India and Burma. Moreover, continuous efforts were made to bring the two countries closer to each other. The Philippines were invited at the Asian Conference initiated by India. Nehru, in particular was interested in developing Indo-Philippines friendship, and India also concluded a treaty of friendship with the Philippines. Gradually Philippines realized the need for Philippines to identify themselves with the Asian neighbours and with the Asian feelings. Consequently, the Philippines started taking greater interest in building closer relations with the Asian neighbours and specially the South-East Asian, the first to sympathize with India at her plight during countries.

The Indo-Philippines relation has been cordial, and was among the first to sympathize with India at her plight during the Chinese aggression. There was immense goodwill with regard for India in the Philippines, and there was considerable scope for wider collaboration between the two countries.

Korean Crises

Geographically and historically, Korea occupies the heart of the strategic triangle of North Asia, with Siberia on one side, China on another and Japan on the third. Korea has great strategic significance situated on the Far-Eastern cross-road. It could easily be a center for Chinese and Soviet influence into the sea of Japan or a bridgehead for Japanese penetration of the Asian mainland. It is this strategic location and commercial viability which had made it a center of tensions in the Far East and has been a victim of power politics and policy of sphere of influence followed by great powers. In the
preceding hundred years three major International wars have been fought over the control of this region. The Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 and the Korean War of 1950-53, which involved the United States, and Communist China among others as major belligerents.\textsuperscript{58}

Thus divided Korea was a creation of United States Soviet ideological and military rivalry in the Cold War. Presently the intense rivalry between the two political regimes across the demilitarized zones made the balance of power surrounding the Korean peninsula much more unstable\textsuperscript{59}

Since the later part of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, Korea had been a victim of great power conflicts and ambitions. The Russia-Japanese war of 1904-05, had settled the issue in favour of Japan and with American and English consistent; Korea was passed into Japanese control in the year 1910.\textsuperscript{60}

From 1910 down to Pearl Harbour, there was no inclination from great powers to challenge the position of Japan in Korea. Nevertheless, challenge came, once Japan became an active belligerent on the side of Germany and other Axis Powers. By the Cairo Conference held in the year 1943, President Roosevelt of USA, Generalissimo of China and Prime Minister Churchill pledged to determine that Korea in “due course of time would become free and independent”. The pledge was further reaffirmed by the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, which was to be subscribed by the Soviet Union when it declared war against Japan on August 8, 1945.\textsuperscript{61} But in February 1945, it was reported that a ‘secret agreement’ had been signed between the three countries i.e. USA, UK and USSR according to which the country had been divided into two, one half belong to the Russians and the other half to the Americans.
However, on 8 August 1945 the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and occupied the North of 38th parallel. Later on 8th September the United States forces accepted the surrender of the Japanese forces South of 38th parallel. Thus Korea was divided into two parts i.e. North Korea and South Korea and this parallel became an 'Iron curtain' separating the two zones. Although the 38th Parallel was supposed to be a mere military line, it gradually became a virtually permanent political dividing line. At the Moscow Conference, held in December 1945, an agreement was made regarding the procedure to be followed for achieving an independent and democratic Korea. But later on negotiations between the United States and Soviet Military Command broke down.

Thus the real cause of differences stemmed from the fact that for both USA and Russia, Korea was of vital strategic significance.

Importance of Korea for USSR: The Soviet Union wanted to ensure that no hostile power should have invasion bases within the reach of the Russian soil. Since Japan was already under American possession. Therefore Soviet strategy was guided to mask Japan with a line of Russian held bases. The three military air bases in Siberia, the Kurele Islands and Sakhalin were already under its control. But in order to have full control on the Asian mainland, firstly it was essential to have control over Korea.

Importance of Korea for USA: Korea is strategically located in such a manner that it could be a center for Chinese and Soviet influence into the Sea of Japan or a bridgehead for Japanese penetration of the Asian mainland. Thus Korea for USA is of immense value if it wants to keep its hold in the Pacific,
India and the Korean Crises

and to carry out its policy of containment against the Soviet bloc. It is due to this strategic significance that it has been a center of major Far Eastern conflicts. Since the Korean crises in 1950, the center of attraction in International politics shifted from Europe to the Far East and it marked the beginning of Cold War in the area concerned and a major threat to the World War III. “Since there was a fear of expansion of Communism therefore United States decided to establish a government in Korea which would be friendly to Western countries but prove to be a challenge for Communism. Thus Korea became a battleground where conflicting ideologies and ways of life raised their ugly heads.  

It was due to the failure of the United States and USSR to agree on steps to carry out the wartime promises of independence for Korea, which led the United States, on Sep. 17, 1947 to refer the Korean problem to the United Nations General Assembly.  

In the debate that followed, both the contending parties repeated their respective positions. Regardless of the protests from USSR the General Assembly voted a Resolution in order to establish a United Nations Temporary Commission with authority to observe elections for a national assembly which in turn would establish a national government for Korea. But the Commission could not function much effectively as it was not allowed to enter North Korea.  

Both the North and the South Korea wanted to re-unite the country under their respective leadership. On 25 June, 1950 came the cataclysm when North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel and fighting started between the
two. The Communist affirmed that it was the South Korean, which first crossed the frontier. A.A. Gramyko the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of USSR said. “That the present events in Korea which began on 25 June as a result of an offensive attack launched by the forces of the South Korean authorities on Frontier areas of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic was a result of a calculated plan”. This issue of incursion from North Korea into South Korea was brought to the notice of United Nations by USA. Consequently the Security Council met and demanded the immediate withdrawal of the North Koreans to the 38th parallel. A unified Command was set up by the Council under the United Nations flag and on 7 July 1950, and General Mac Arthur was appointed as the Supreme Commander of the United Nations. On 7th October, 1950, General Mac Arthur was authorized to extend the war in North Korea. The crises reached its climax when the United Nations forces approached the Yalu River (which divides Korea from Manchuria) and the Chinese volunteers in large number entered Korea. Thus it was on 11th October 1950, when a spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Minister declared that the Chinese people could not stand idly while Korea was being invaded by the United States and its accomplices. The Intervention of the Chinese volunteers forces, as a reaction to the crossing of the 38th parallel by the United Nations Command made the United Nations condemn China as an ‘aggressor’. The heavily outnumbered troops under the Command of General Mac Arthur fell back and were not able to reintegrate the line till the Chinese were some seventy miles inside South Korea.

In 1951, after serious reverses, the United Nations forces again began to move forward. But in April 1951 there arose another heavy North Korean-
Chinese counter attack which resulted into a virtual Stalemate at the 38th parallel. It was in early July 1951 that negotiations started between the two sides but they could not prove to be a success.

However there were difficulties with regard to the fixation of the armistice line and exchange of prisoners of war. An agreement was signed on the repatriation of prisoners of war on June 8, 1953 and thus hostilities ended. This agreement also provided for the voluntary repatriation of the prisoners of war under the supervision of the neutral nations Repatriation Commission.

India’s opposition of US intervention in the Korean crises

India was willing to see a negotiated settlement of the Korean problem as it believed that the division of Korea would be disastrous for the future of Korea and would endanger peace and stability in the Far East. According to K.P.S. Menon, “If the Koreans are tenacious of independence, they are equally tenacious of their unity. Nothing is more remarkable than the homogeneity of the Korean nation. They belong to the same race, speak the same language and are fond of the same traditions. The North cannot live without the South, nor can the South without the North. The South is agricultural and the North is industrial; the South is the Bread-basket of Asia, the North is a reservoir of power...Korea is thus indivisible, whether you look at problems from an economic, political or historical point of view. Deep down in the heart of every Korean, whether in the North or in the South, is this longing for unity...Distracted and disillusioned, Koreans of all shades of opinion have been approaching us and telling us that ‘the United Nations is our last hope.’ If
this last hope, too is shattered Korea may blow up and it may be the beginning of vaster cataclysm in Asia and the world". 79

Thus, when further negotiations between USA and USSR failed it was on 17 September 1947, USA referred the issue of the independence of Korea to the second session of the United Nations General Assembly. India besides UK, USA, China and Syria mooted the idea of the inclusion of the Korean issue in the agenda of the United Nations. It was however opposed by the Soviet Union on the grounds that the United Nations has no right to take up the matter because according to them the purpose of the United Nations is to deal with questions which arises after war and not during war. 80 India as Chairman of the (nine member) United Nations Temporary Commission in 1947 stressed the need to unify Korea by ascertaining the wishes of the people through fair and free elections in both part of Korea as it believed that a real national government could not be created by having elections only in the South In the words of K.P.S. Menon.

"I have grave doubts as to whether the national government which may emerge out of these elections will be really national. I have grave doubts, whether we can ensure a free atmosphere for the elections..............I may say that the attitude of my government is that we must try to implement the Resolution of the General Assembly whenever and to the extent that circumstances permit". 81

But later, since there was no other way left, India also favoured elections in the South only, and on conditions that the door to future unification be left open and continuous efforts should be made to achieve unity by consultation
between the North and the South. Keeping this in mind the government of India made following suggestions for elections.

Firstly "That a general election to be held not on a zonal basis but under the supervision and control of the United Nations Temporary Commission.

Secondly, the elections to be held on the basis of adult suffrage without any political discrimination by secret ballot.

Thirdly, the Korean Assembly should meet immediately after it had been elected to form a national government.

Fourthly, the national government immediately after its formation should establish its own national security forces and dissolve all military and semi-military formation not included there in and

Lastly, a definite time limit should be fixed for the withdrawal of the occupation forces".

After elections had taken place, India insisted that further efforts should be made to facilitate the unification of South and North Korea. M.C. Sheetalvad, an eminent Indian Scholar, argued that reunion between North and South Zone was of paramount importance and efforts should be made to achieve it by all means. He also made the following suggestions.

1. Independence throughout the whole of Korea should be achieved as soon as possible with the East possible delay;

2. Independence to be granted to Korea as an integral unit and the Assembly should not approve of any arrangements which might lead to weakening of the prospect of achieving that aim and
3. The Assembly should give its full support to ensure that every efforts be made for conciliation between the people of the two zones.\textsuperscript{83} Moreover, she did not agree that elections should be conducted by the occupying powers. Elections were held on May 10, 1948 in the United States zone and the Republic of Korea was formally proclaimed on July 15. On September 9, the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea was proclaimed in North Korea without any reference to the United Nations Commission. India refused to recognize the Republic of Korea as she felt that, it would perpetuate the partition and it might come in the way of unification of the two parts of Korea.

**Role played by India in the United Nations after 1950 when Aggression had taken place:** On 25\textsuperscript{th} June 1950, when armed conflict broke out between the North and the South Korea. Nehru at a Press Conference of July 7, 1950, clarified India’s stand regarding the Korean crisis and stated, “It was clear without even great enquiry that this was a well planned and large scale invasion”.\textsuperscript{84} The invasion of South Korea by North Korea threatened the peace of the world. The United Nations Commission of which India was Chairman, lost no time in drawing the attention of the Secretary General to the situation, which it felt, was serious.\textsuperscript{85} It suggested that the Secretary General might consider the possibility of bringing the matter to the notice of the Security Council. In the first Resolution adopted on 25\textsuperscript{th} June 1950 the Security Council noted “with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constituted a breach of the peace”.\textsuperscript{86} The Resolution called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and called upon the North Korean authorities to withdraw there armed forces to the 38\textsuperscript{th} parallel
forthwith. The Security Council also called upon the members to render assistance, to the United Nations in the execution of this Resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities. India, along with eight others Security Council members, voted for the Resolution.

On 27 June 1950 the President of the United States ordered United States air and naval forces to give the South Korean Government troops and support. Later, on the same day, in the absence of the representative of the Soviet Union, a permanent member, in the Council adopted a Resolution by 7 votes to 1 (Yugoslavia) with two abstentions (India and Egypt). The Resolution read: “Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by force from North Korea constitutes a breach of peace recommends that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace in the area”. The representative of India, not having received instructions from his government, did not take part in the vote on that Resolution. On 30th June 1950 India informed the Security Council that it accepted the Resolution because it was “opposed to any attempt to settle international dispute by resort to aggression”. Moreover the halting of aggression and the quick restoration of peaceful conditions were essential preludes to a satisfactory settlement. It was also made clear that the acceptance of this Resolution did not involve any modification of India’s general foreign policy. The Indian delegates explained.

“This policy is based on the promotion of world peace and the development of friendly relations with all countries. It remains an independent policy, which will continue to be determined solely by India’s ideals and
The Government of India earnestly hopes that even at this stage it may be possible to put an end to the fighting and to settle the dispute by negotiation. It was this emphasis which India placed on negotiation even at the time it accepted the Security Councils recommendations for collective measures which made the Indian attitude different from that of other governments which accepted the decision.

India again abstained from the vote on 7th July 1950, when a Resolution requesting all member states to make military forces available to a unified United Nations Command under the United States was passed in the Security Council and also withheld military cooperation from the United Nations Operation in Korea. This was because it did not like the idea of the taking a military action to repel the aggression and also, disapproved of the manner in which the United Nations intervention was being organized. It also criticized the very Character of the United Nations Command, which, in point of composition, control, direction and objectives was virtually a United States Command fighting under the United Nations flag. The funds needed for the operation were contributed entirely by the United States and not by the United Nations. It was also significant that the Indian Government did not send armed forces to Korea. On the same day Nehru, in his Press Conference, explained why India declined to send armed forces to Korea, and said “Any military assistance is beyond India’s capacity and would make little difference. India’s defence forces have been organized essentially for defence and not for service in distant theatres of war”. The reason given by the Indian Government for not sending the armed forces was that they were only adequate for the defence
of the country. Another consideration in India’s decision not to send its armed forces was that it was keen on playing the role of a neutral mediator in the crises.

Jawaharlal Nehru earnestly tried to find a basis for terminating the conflict. Thus when both the parties i.e. Western bloc and Communist bloc started giving Korean war a global shape, Nehru sent personal messages to Stalin and Dean Acheson on July 13 and 15 July 1950, respectively for a speedy and peaceful settlement of the Korean dispute. The message stated:

"India’s purpose is to localize the conflict and to facilitate an early peaceful settlement by breaking the present deadlock in the Security Council so that representatives of the Peoples Government of China can take a seat in the Council, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics can return to it, and whether within or through informal contacts outside the council, the USA, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and China with the help and cooperation of other peace-loving nations, can find a basis for terminating the conflict and for a permanent solution of the Korean problem."^2

But Nehru received no encouraging response from any of the parties.^3 Thus India’s efforts to mediate and secure a peaceful settlement of the crises in accordance with the two Resolutions of the United Nations Council were not appreciated by the United States which alleged that India was following a policy of appeasement.^4 They thought that Nehru was trying to conciliate the Communist bloc, which was associated with aggression. On July 18, 1950, in his reply to Nehru’s appeal Dean Acheson politically rejected India’s suggestion for seating Communist China at the United Nations and said:
“There has not been at any time any obstacle to the full participation by the Soviet Union in the work of the United Nations except the decision of the Soviet Union itself. In our opinion, the decision between competing claimant governments for China’s seat in the United Nations is one which must be reached by the United Nations on its merits. It is a question on which there is at present a wide diversity of views among the membership of the United Nations. I know you will agree that the decisions should not be dictated by an unlawful aggression or by any other conduct which should subject the United Nations to Coercion or duress”. 95

It was clear from this reply that the United States regarded Indian suggestions as implying concessions to the Communist powers as a price to be paid for the North Korean aggression and leaving the Korean question open without asking any commitments on the part of the Communists. In Washington “Nehru’s message caused understandable annoyance. The United States was now being asked to buy off a Communist aggression, already underway”. 96 According to India’s opinion these concessions seemed to be necessary parts of the process of easing tensions for a general settlement in the Far East. As a result wide differences arose between the two countries. In the eyes of the United States the fact of Communist aggression was of uppermost importance while India saw the Korean question together with other, Far Eastern issues which in a way blurred the fact of Communist aggression. Washington was convinced that it was better to fight the aggression than to secure peace by making concession, which it had refused in the earlier part of the year and was all the more unwilling to grant when the only new factor in the situation was an act of aggression against the United Nations. 97
Nehru showed his annoyance while giving speech in the Indian Parliament on Aug. 3, 1950 and said, “If we are energetic in condemning the aggression by North Korea, it is necessary to add that we are by no means satisfied by existing conditions in either North or South Korea. The policy of the Western powers is dominated more by European problem than by those of Asia, and they continue to take decisions which affect vast areas of Asia without understanding the effective needs and the spirit of these people. In the West there is little understanding of the Eastern outlook..... we can understand the outlook of the Asiatic countries very much better than the West. Yet the future of Asia is still determined by the Statesmen of the Western world”.  

Nehru further emphasized that any attempt to tackle Asian problem without taking Asia into account was bound to prove fruitless. And certainly this was a major cause of difference with the West, and was the best way to solve the far Eastern problems.  

By September 1950 the Korean War had taken a turn in favour of the United Nations. The General Assembly implicitly endorsed on 7th October 1950 the crossing of the 38th parallel by the United Nations forces as India regarded this as an unfortunate step. Its general line was that the United Nations forces enter Korea in defence of South Korea and not for the subjugation of North Korea. Nehru publicly stated his firm and vigorous opposition to the crossing of the 38th parallel by the United Nations forces and warned the United Nations that “We are of the opinion that every efforts should be made to bring the Korean war to a conclusion and that it would be wrong to carry out military operations, when peaceful methods can bring about the necessary result”. This observation was partly a result of the declaration
made by Mr. Chou En Lai on 30th September, that China would not stand aside if the United Nations Force were to cross the 38th parallel, and this crossing could quite possibly lead to an extension of the conflict. Sir B.N. Rao the Indian representative to the United Nations, also expressed the same sentiment and said "Faith in the United Nations were even to appear to authorize unification of Korea.....after the Organization had resisted the attempt of North Korea to unify the country by force against South Korea".

India also expressed her opposition to the branding of China as aggressor by the United Nations. On United States initiative on January 20, 1951, as she thought that such a step might result in an extensive flare-up in Korea and even disrupt the Organization itself. The American Government believed that India's attitude of Neutrality in the Korean crises was inconsistent with its support for the United Nations. Replying to it India pointed out that Peking entry into the war was defensive and not aggressive and that it was only a reaction to the crossing of the 38th parallel by the forces of the United Nations Command. Later when Soviet Resolution in the Security Council condemning the United States for committing armed aggression on Chinese territory and for intervening militarily in Korea and demanding withdrawal of the American forces was put to the vote, India again abstained as India believed that such allegation and counter allegations would result in making the settlement of the dispute through negotiations increasingly difficult. Moreover it was felt by India, that by remaining non-aligned on the issue it would be able to serve the cause of peace in a better way.
Appreciation of India’s Role in the Korean Crises with special Reference to Nehru:

Korea lying at the crossroads of Asia was of immense importance for the three big powers in Asia i.e. China, Japan and India. Anything effecting Korea would have an immediate effect on these countries. Therefore, Nehru strongly demanded that since Korean crises was an Asiatic problem and so it should be solved by Asians as they are in a best position to understand the whole issue.

Moreover, India’s political and geographical importance in Asia leads it to play an active role in this conflict. Politically there were three big powers in Asia i.e. Japan, the people’s Republic of China and India since Japan was aligned with the USA and China with the USSR. So India remained the only country with it policy of non-alignment, which could hold the balance of power there. Therefore, Korean issue was not an isolated phenomenon but it fell within the broader context of India’s general foreign policy. Thus The Korean war gave an opportunity to examine the potentialities of the policy of non-alignment, formulated by Nehru. This was nothing but a mere manifestation of Cold War politics. Had Nehru not been there to mediate in the crises, the war had all the possibilities of turning into a global war with the direct participation of the two blocs. Nehru took initiatives to localize the conflict. According to him “we are compelled by circumstances to play our part in Asia and in the world, because we are convinced that unless these basic problem of Asia are solved there can be no world peace”. Thus, Nehru’s approach to the whole crises was positive, constructive and neutral.
On June 25, 1950, when the war broke out in Korea, the United Nations Security Council passed a Resolution accusing North Korea of aggression. The USSR had already withdrawn from the Security Council in January, for not replacing Chiang Kai-Shek's representatives by the representatives of Red China. President Truman dispatched the American troops in support of South Korea as Security Council Resolution authorized the United States to enforce necessary sanctions.

When both the parties i.e. Western bloc and Communist bloc started giving Korean war a global shape Nehru through his mediatory efforts helped in bringing the opposing sides together for negotiation rather than providing support to one side militarily. In accordance with this policy he wrote letters to Marshal Stalin of USSR and Dean Acheson of the USA on July 13 and 15 respectively asking for ending the war. In his letter to Marshal Stalin Nehru Stated:

"India's purpose is to localize the conflict and to facilitate an early peaceful settlement by breaking the present deadlock in the Security Council, so that representatives of the People's Government of China can take a seat in the Council, the USSR can return to it, and, whether within or through informal contacts outside the Council, the USA, the USSR and China, with the help and cooperation of other peace-loving nations, can find a basis for terminating the conflict and for a permanent solution of the Korean problem". 107

Nehru's proposal that China should be admitted into the United Nations and the North Korea be given a hearing was accepted by Stalin.
Stalin in his reply to Nehru said. "I welcome your peaceful regulation of the Korean question through the Security Council with the obligatory participation of the representative of five Great Powers, including the People’s Government of China". 108

One of the important development that took place in the world body, after Nehru’s initiative for a peaceful settlement, was the return of USSR to the Security Council without any commitment to stop fighting in Korea to which she could have committed had Mao’s China been admitted into the Security Council. However, Nehru’s proposal was rejected by the United States. Even in India, Nehru faced criticism in the Parliament. Shyama Prasad Mookherjee termed Nehru’s message to the USSR and the United States as “appeasement” of the Soviet Union. To which Nehru replied in the Parliament in the following words: “we differ in the method of approach ....we do not open the lock of men’s hearts with hammers, bayonets and bombs, but I am more convinced of this than anything else that in the ultimate analysis, no problem is solved by the bomb and bayonet and the tank”. 109

To quote the British Labour leader Fenner Brockway, “Nehru exerting a restraining influence on China, had alone more than anything else, to prevent the Korean conflict from involving the world”. 110

K.M. Panikkar, Indian Ambassador in Peking at that time, had become an important diplomat to serve as a link between the Chinese authorities and the government of India, on one hand, the China and the West, on the other. On October 2, 1950 through Panikkar Chinese
Premier conveyed that "if the American crossed the 38th Parallel China would be forced to intervene in Korea...The South Koreans did not matter but American intrusion into North Korea would encounter Chinese resistance". China considered the stationing of American troops in Taiwan as a direct threat to its mainland. Panikkar had informed Nehru of the gist of this conversation that night. According to Panikkar, the United Nations was aware of the Chinese stand, but it did not care for Chou En-Lai's warning and on October 8, United Nations force crossed the 38th Parallel in order to bring about the unification of Korea. It was indeed a tragic decision. At this stage it was not a war for the unification of Korea but it was a direct and conscious show down between China and United States.

At that time, Nehru was alone in the world making all possible efforts so that Korean war may not escalate into a global war. He was afraid because with the United States intervention and with the Chinese admission in the war, there were possibilities of all the supporters of Communist or Western democratic ideology, to join the war and it would have resulted into a large-scale disaster of lives and property.

The Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference held in January 1951, provided Nehru with a good opportunity to carry out discussions with various heads of States regarding Korean crises. There at London, he prepared a number of proposals to the Chinese authorities through the Indian Ambassador in Peking. In the same manner Benegal Rau, the then, Indian representative, interpreted proposals prepared for Soviet Union to its authorities proposed to convene a Conference on Korea. It
was speculated that he might visit Moscow and Peking with the peace proposal. On 11 January 1951, the Amrita Bazar Patrika reported on concluding session, of the Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference in the following words;

“Nehru would visit Paris where he will discuss all the relevant factors in this regard with India’s Ambassadors in Europe, USA and USSR who have been asked to assemble there at the time and if all goes according to plan, Nehru would fly to Moscow from Paris to confer with Stalin. From Moscow he would proceed to Peking and confer with Mao Tse-Tung”.

“In Paris Nehru had three rounds of Conference with the Indian diplomats and diplomatic chiefs in European capitals he also had discussions with the United Nations Secretary General Trygve Lie and the French President and the Prime Minister. At Paris, he discussed the plan about cessation of hostilities in Korea and the strategy to prevent a world conflict with Radhakrishnan, Krishna Menon, Benegal Rau, Bajpai and Vijaya lakshmi Pandit- the leader of the Indian delegation at the United Nations”.

Nehru had also discussed the Korean question with world leaders attending the Commonwealth Prime Minister Conference held in London. At the later date, cables were “being exchanged between Indian house, Kremlin and Peking”. The UK, Ceylon Pakistan agreed with Nehru’s proposal that the recognition of the Peking regime by all Commonwealth countries and giving Mao a seat in the United Nations
must come first, while Austria, New Zealand and South Africa realized that Nehru’s approach to the Far East problem was realistic.\(^{115}\)

It was a part of Nehru’s diplomacy that by not condemning China as an aggression in Korea, he had helped elevating India’s stature in international politics and thus saved India from the accusation of being allied with the United States. The American Resolution was defeated and at the same time Nehru’s worthiness as a great statesman was realized by almost the entire world as he exercised a great influence on China and USSR so far the settlement of Korean conflict was concerned. Nehru in his letter to Chou En-Lai, a Chinese Premier, dated January 23, 1951 pleaded:

“The occasion demands the highest statesmanship which, by its vision and generosity will upset the forces making for war and give to Asia not only peace and strength but also a moral leadership. The new China is in a position today to give such a far seeing and generous lead for peace, which can result in an immediate removal of tension and fear from the world. We in India and China have suffered enough humiliation in the past and have resented it and fought against it. We should follow a different course and try to secure a stable peace through a peaceful and cooperative approach. This would be no sign of weakness but of strength and confidence in us”.\(^{116}\)

However, Nehru was influential in reaching to the point of solution of Korean problem but the question of exchange of prisoners of war (POWS) had, however, become a thorny issue, defying solution to
cessation of hostilities in Korea. The Chinese Government demanded that the transfer of POWS should be in accordance with the Geneva Convention, which meant that once the prisoners were released they would be outside the control of the detaining authority. But neither the USA nor China were signatories to the Geneva Convention.\textsuperscript{117}

Thus the question regarding prisoners of War became a thorny issue before the armistice agreement. The most important obstacle to the armistice agreement was the question of disposal of the prisoners of war. China and North Korea wanted all the POWS to be repatriated whether they liked it or not, while the prisoners of wars expressed their wish against repatriation. Nehru played a significant role in the solution of this Knotty question and instructed Vijay Lakshmi Pandit and Krishna Menon to met privately with both the Communist and Western delegations. India worked hard for about a month and finally moved a Resolution in the seventh session of the General Assembly, on 3\textsuperscript{rd} December 1952:

The release and repatriation of the prisoners of war shall be effected in accordance with "the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war" dated 12 August, 1949, the well established principals and practices of international law and relative provisions of the draft Armistice Agreement,

Force shall not be used be against the prisoners of war to prevent or effect their return to their homelands,........prisoners of war shall be treated in accordance with the General spirit of the Convention.
This Resolution was made up of Nehru’s proposal (acceptable to China) that prisoners should be repatriated under the supervision of Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission consisting of representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland. The umpire was to be appointed by the Commission itself. Nehru warned that if India’s peace proposal for ending the Korean war were not accepted “then the world would be taking step towards another great war”. Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary Commanded the Indian proposals as “timely and constructive”. But this Resolution was seen with suspicion by both USA and USSR. USSR termed the Indian Resolution as a “rotten solution” because of the bitter attack on the Indian Resolution by the Russian representative. The United States representative Acheson, overcoming the earlier suspicion of Indian motive “had warmly commended the Indian initiative and expressed agreement with the Intention of the Resolution”. The United States agreed to vote for the Indian Resolution. It was a great success on the part of Indian diplomacy; but the real credit should be given to the Cold War politics. However, on December 3, the General Assembly adopted the Indian Resolution by 55 votes to 5, the minority being the Communist bloc. Consequently, Nehru came under bitter attack both from Russia and China. He was blamed of aspiring for Asian Leadership Nehru’s increasing influence made them realize that a “small power was assuming too much importance in an area meant primarily for the giants”.
However, the United States delegation assured India of making all possible efforts to support the proposal. The armistice would not have been possible unless the United States delegation was ready to understand and follow other views and opinions other than its own.

However, China exhibited a different kind of mental set up after Stalin’s death in March 1953 as they now accepted the Indian proposal that all the prisoners who did not wish to be repatriated should be handed over to the neutral state. Hence they were now accepting the Indian proposal against which they voted earlier. Not only were the terms of this agreement similar to the provisions of the Indian Resolution of 3rd December 1952, but also India was asked to take over the Chairmanship of this Commission that was being set up under the agreement. Hence only, after two months China signed the prisoners of war agreement and this could be possible only because of India, as India intensely lobbied for the acceptance of the Chinese proposal of setting up a Repatriation Commission of five neutral states.

In the meantime, in June 1953, some 27000 out of 35,000 anti-Communist North Korean prisoners had escaped from prisons, of which Americans were usually in charge a thousand of whom were recaptured and some killed and injured. About 9,000 prisoners remained in custody. The Chinese Government was very much disturbed over these happenings in South Korea. However, India with the help of UK, succeeded in resolving the issue and finally on 27 July 1953, armistice was signed, thus ending the impasse over the issue of POWS. 122 This was a personal triumph to Nehru and Menon. Anthony Eden highly
appreciated the success of the Indian diplomacy in the House of Commons: "It is only fair that I should add a tribute to the Indian delegation and Mr. Krishna Menon\textsuperscript{123} in particular for their wise statesmanship". \textsuperscript{124}

India took over the Chairmanship of the Neutral National Repatriation Commission. The custody of about 22,604 POWS from the United Nations Command and 359 from the Command of the Korean Peoples Army and Chinese Peoples Volunteers was given to India. The prisoners were repatriated at will without any force or threat of force. A custodial force of about 6000 soldiers was provided by India to perform this task. According to the report of the United Nations Command on the operation of the Neutral National Repatriation Commission "some 22,000 former soldiers of the North Korean and Chinese Communist Armies, having freely chosen not to return to Communist control, were released from prisoners of war status."\textsuperscript{125} Some 88 POWS desired to go to neutral nations, and thus they landed in India along with her custodial force. The Government of India provided them protection. President Eisenhowever of United States in his letter to Nehru very much appreciated the efficient functioning of Indian Custodial Forces in the following words.

"I want to express to you my appreciation and that of my countrymen for the performance of the Indian Custodial Forces. No military unit in recent years has undertaken a more delicate and demanding peacetime mission than that faced by the Indian forces in Korea. The vast majority of prisoners placed in their charge had from
month of imprisonment and uncertainty become highly nervous and volatile. The confidence inspired by the exemplary tact, fairness and firmness shown by the Indian officials and men led to their two able commanders Lieutenant General Thimayya and Major General Thorat did much to alleviate the fears and doubts of these prisoners...They deserve the highest commendation".126

Above all Nehru's role of mediation became very effective and successful during the Korean crises. He did whatever circumstances demanded and said to his critics "we went to Korea because if we had not gone, there would have been no truce and no ceasefire and the war would have gone on with the danger of its expansion". Thus the de-escalation of the Korean war was Nehru's first major contribution towards world peace. He was a man of caliber, who showed the guts of taking over the most delicate task i.e. the task of mediation in the international affairs. He said, if India had not sent the custodial force "she would have helped in aggravating the perilous situation in the world. There was not other country that could do it or that would have been acceptable to both the parties".127

However after so many years of discussion in the United Nations, the Korean settlement is still far and has once again become a major problem threatening the peace and security of the entire world.

Mistrust of North Korea has been bedrock of US policy since war on the Korean Peninsula ended in 1953. Pyongyang's erratic behaviour consistently confirm such skepticism.128
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the Pentagon made a decision to reorient the United States military. Instead of being tooled for a single conflict against a rival Super Power, United States forces needed the ability to wage two wars simultaneously against "rogue states" in different parts of the world. The most commonly cited pair of potential enemies being Iraq and North Korea. But now the Bush administration has shown a sign of sudden change in its statement and has stated repeatedly that it wants no military conflict with North Korea now, or in the foreseeable future. Korea had already pulled out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and tossed weapons inspectors out of his country. Moreover, a United States intelligence source revealed that North Korea had activated a coal-fired steam plant, a sign that Kim Jong II is now getting ready to cook up some plutonium. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has passed the North Korean nuclear football to the United Nations Security Council, saying that it was the Councils turn to do something about North Korea's weapons programme. Meanwhile, CIA Director George Tenet reminded a Senate Committee that Kim Jong II has stockpiles of missiles that can reach South Korea and Japan, and he's developing longer-range models, including the Taepo Dong-2 three-stage missile design to reach the Continent of United States. Moreover he is also known to have up to 5,000 tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas and sarin, and biological weapons arsenal believed to include anthrax, small pox and the plague. In response to it Japan told the News Agency that if Tokyo were to receive intelligence that North Korea was preparing a missile attack, Japan would have the legal right to launch a strike in self-defense. Suddenly the Continent seemed to be much
closer worst-case scenario: war in Asia, with nuclear-armed North Korea on one side, Japan and the United States on the other and South Korea perilously trapped in the middle.\textsuperscript{130}

However, North Korea is insisting on direct talks with the United States and wants to be treated as an equal, without sharing prestige with South Korea or Japan. On the other hand the United States vows that it will never hold direct one-on-one talks with the North Korea unless Kim Jong II first promises to abandon nuclear-weapons development. What Washington has in mind is that the crises should be multilaterally resolved by the international community and, was happy that the IAEA referred the North Korean issue to the Security Council. The most logical step in that process would be United Nations sanctions against North Korea, which Pyongyang has said it would consider as a declaration of war. In fact the Security Council is unlikely to do anything soon.

However in recent weeks, hopes had risen that North Korea might return to the six-nation talks, especially after Bush refrained from any direct criticism of North Korea when he started his second term last month.\textsuperscript{131} Nehru type of mature diplomacy is needed to solve the nuclear problems with North Korea.
REFERENCES:


2. A.B.Shah; India’s Defence And Foreign Policies, (Manaktalas, Bombay), p.102.


7. John Kerry King; n.1, p.2.

8. Ibid., p.2.


11. B.S. Steinberg; “The Korean war; A Case Study in Indian Neutralism”, (Orbis Winter, 1965) p.41.


14. B.S. Steinberg; n. 11, p.41.

15. Ibid., p.42.


18. V.P. Dutt; India's Foreign Policy In a Changing World, (Vikas publishing House, New Delhi, 1999), p.345.


21. Ton That Thien; n.3, p.73.

22. Ibid., pp.66-67

23. Ibid., pp.68-69.

24. Ibid, p.68.


27. A.B. Shah; n.4, p.116.

29. See Nehru’s Statement in the Lok Sabha on 25 March 1957.

30. Cambodia had recognized the Peoples Republic of China in 1958 and Thailand was a member of the SEATO.

31. The diplomatic relations between Thailand and Cambodia were suspended from 1 September 1958. At the request of the Government of Cambodia, India had agreed to look after Cambodia’s interest in Thailand.


33. The Hindustan Times, (Delhi), 25 August 1958.

34. For details see the minutes of the extraordinary meeting of the ICC on 9 May 1957.

35. Cambodia recognized the peoples Republic of China in July 1958. Soon after there was a massive economic aid to Cambodia from Peking.


38. B.S.N. Murti; n.26, pp.148.

39. Ton That Thien; XLIII, India And South East Asia, 1947-1960, p. 69.
India and the Korean Crises

40. K.M. Panikkar; n. 5, pp. 40-46.
41. Bajpai; n. 20, p. 97.
42. A.B. Shah; n. 27, p.114.
43. B.S.N. Murti; n. 38, p.157.
44. Ton That Thien; n. 36, p.70.
45. B.S.N. Murti; n. 43, p.147.
46. Welcome address by Major General (Rtd.) Soedjono Haemardam, Honorary Chairman C.S.I.S.
47. A.B. Shah; n. 42, p.111.
49. A.B. Shah; n. 47, pp.112-113.
51. V.P. Dutt; India and South-East Asia, (Vikas publishing House, New Delhi), p.381.
52. V.P. Dutt; n.18, p.379.
53. Ibid., p.344
54. A.B. Shah; n.49, p.115.
55. Ibid., p.116.
Francis Parakatil; India and the United Nations Peace Keeping

57. B. Shiva Rao and C. Kondpi; 'India and the Korean Crises' India
Quarterly, Vol. VII (4), October-December 1951, p.295, also see
‘Nehru’ s Statement on Korea, Parliamentary Debate, Vol. V(4) Columns
219-36.

58. R.C. Sharma; Korea, India and the Third World, (Rajesh Publication,

59. Ibid., pp.107.

60. M. Frederick Nelson; Korea and the Old Order in Eastern Asia
(Louisiania State University Press, Louisiania, 1946).

61. Korea’s independence, Department of State Publication 2933

62. Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946, The Far East 1942-1946,

63. The area of the Republic of Korea is 98, 477 Sq km. and its population
31,139,000 (1969), Area of the Democratic Republic is 120,538 Sq km
and its population 13,300,000 (1969).

64. Korea 1945 to 1948, a report on Political Developments and Economic
resources with selected documents, Department of State Publications
pp.43-46.

66. The United States, United Kingdom and China declared in the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943 that ‘in due course Korea shall become free and independent’. See USA Department of State Occupation of Japan pp.51-52 (Appendix 1). The Declaration was reaffirmed by the Potsdam Declaration of July, 26, 1945.

67. UN. Doc. A/BUR/85, September 17, 1947; also see the address delivered by US Secretary of State George C. Marshall on Sept.17 before the General Assembly, GAOR. Plenary, 82nd Meeting, September 17, 1947 Vol.1, pp. 21-22.


70. For details see survey of International Affairs 1947-1948, pp.311-328


74. S/1588; D.S.B., July 17, 1950, p.83.


76. S/1894; Documents on International Affairs 1949-50, p.674.

77. For details, see Survey of International Affairs 1951, pp. 435-453.
78. Text of the UN Memorandum on the Breakdown of talks with the Communist, July 12, 1951, in D.S.B., July 23, 1951, pp. 151-152.


81. Ibid., p.82.

82. Shiv Dayal; India’s Role in the Korean Question: A Study in the settlement of International Disputes under the United Nations (S. Chand and Company, Delhi, 1959).

83. Ibid p.59.


85. GAOR, Supplement 16, A/1350, 4 September 1950 (Report of the UN Commission on Korea), pt.1 p.2.


87. UN Doc S/1508/Resolution.1, 27 June 1950.

88. Cablegram from Nehru to the Secretary General, UN Doc.S/1520, 29 June 1950.


98. Extract in Document on International Affairs 1949-50, pp.708-709


102. L.M. Goodrich; “UN and Korea”, India Quaterly, No.7, July-September, 1951, p.265.

103. General Assembly Official Record, Session 5, First ctee, mtg.350, 3 October 1950, p.33.


108. Cross Road (Bombay), 4 August 1950.


110. Statesman, (New Delhi), 1 November 1950.


113. G. Ramachandram; Nehru and World Peace, (Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1990), p.64.


115. Indian Express (New Delhi), 14 January 1951.


119. Times of India (New Delhi), 24 November 1952.


122. G. Ramachandram; n.113, p.67.

123. The Then Foreign Secretary of India. Had Menon not been there “Nehruism” and especially the Policy of Non-alignment” would not have been so much successful on global scale.

124. T.J.S. George; n.121, p.171.


130. Time, New Delhi, 14 February, 2003, p.16.

131. The Times of India, New Delhi, 11 February, 2005, p.1