CHAPTER - 5
CONGO AND THE UNITED NATIONS
India and Africa:

Geographically Africa constitutes an area of immense importance for India. Africa inhabited by some 750 million people, which consists of around 13 percent of the world's population of which nearly 560 million lives in the sub-Saharan Africa covering about 18% of the land surface of the world. Besides, a host of African countries are a part of the Indian Ocean rim and their cooperation and help is essential in order to have faster economic growth in the area.¹

To draw up a close picture of Indo-Africa relations towards the year 2000 A.D. in a profile suitable for future generations, it will be of immense value to discuss briefly the past and present day perceptions of these relations. This is, of course important and relevant because future is inevitably linked with the past and present, and more particularly when dealing with relations between India and Africa.²

Indo-African relationship is not only age old but has been throughout cordial and friendly both the countries being next shore neighbours. It is because of this geographical juxtaposition that the people of India and Africa have showed sharing of many things in common including a threat from Indian Ocean. Since long back they commonly shared Indian Ocean for navigation and communication. The Indian Ocean rather than dividing the people of Africa and India unites them. There are records to show that free, friendly and
flourishing trade used to flow between the two peoples for over two thousand
years.³

India’s relations with African states are based on its historical ties and the pursuit of a common policy of non-alignment, promotion of international peace anti-colonialism and anti-racialism.⁴ It was in South Africa only where Mahatma Gandhi began his struggle against colonial and racial injustice through Satyagraha.⁵ The colonial people all over the world were very much impressed by the success they attained with the Gandhian technique of mass movement. Among the African nationalist the Indian National Congress became a model for waging successful mass nationalist struggle.⁶ Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana wrote “After months of studying Gandhi’s policy and watching the effect it had, I began to see that, when backed by a strong political Organization, it could be the solution to the colonial problem”.

Not only Gandhiji but also Nehru took deep interest in African developments. He strongly condemned various attempts made by the imperialist countries to take recourse to various pretext to suppress the African people and to maintain the supremacy of the white settlers. He made it very clear in his speech that India stands squarely by the Africans when he “is being kicked, hounded and shot down” and when the Indians there were praying for safety.⁷ His other achievement was the policy of non-alignment which India adopted in order to keep out of the military blocs in the Cold War and secondly to assert its own rule as a sovereign state in world affairs. Furthermore, non-alignment enabled an ex-colony to maintain good relations with a metropolitan power without any way making it subordinate to the latter. Mrs. Indira Gandhi continued the policy of supporting the struggle for racial equality and freedom
in Africa and developing close relations with them. India provided with essential aid including military, for the struggle that was going on in Namibia, and Zimbabwe (formerly known as Rhodesia, MPLA in Angola, FRELIMO in Mozambique and PAIGE in Guinea Bissau).

Rajiv Gandhi not only continued with the trend of providing support to African cause, but also made it an important constituent of his activist foreign policy. He accorded full diplomatic recognition to the Namibian national front, SWAPO even before independence had been formally achieved.

It is against this background we may describe the history of India’s relations with Africa under three phases:

1. **The first 15 years (i.e. 1947 -62):** During this period our first Nehru himself has given shape and direction to most aspects of India’s foreign policy.

2. **The second phase starts from 1962 and continues till 1977:** During this period India laboured under the military reverses of the border conflict with China.

3. The third phase includes Mrs. Indira Gandhi leadership period i.e. (1977-80)

4. Lastly, the post 1980 phase starting with the victory of Mrs. Indira Gandhi in 1980 witnessed in essence the continuation and enlargement of India’s involvement in African affairs on lines laid down during the three phase. This phase helps in identifying elements of continuity and change in India’s attitude towards Africa over the last three decades in a chronological order.
Phase One (1947-62):

Jawaharlal Nehru had deep sensitivity to the vitality and creativity of Africa. The awakening of Asia was of his making. The awakening of Africa he viewed, with some awe, as "an epic of history". As a great artist sees in a flawless marble the image that is waiting to be carved, so did Nehru see in slumbering Africa its brilliant promise. He talked movingly poignantly, of dark Africa, because he saw unerringly ahead the abounding radiance bursting out of the Continent.⁹

Nehru’s personal adherence to Asia Africa renaissance inspired India to pledge support to India on two major fronts.

a. Their anti-colonial struggle to achieve independence, and

b. The struggle in South Africa to end racial domination of a minority.

It was before independence when Nehru with his breadth of vision evoked awareness in the minds of the Indians about the problems of the African people. The experience of having been a colony herself for a long time has naturally made India to take up the cause of countries struggling for independence. India has supported Africans ungrudgingly on this issue. In his first statement on India’s foreign policy as Prime Minister of India, Nehru said on September 7, 1946 in a broadcast from New Delhi: “We believe that peace and freedom are indivisible and the denial of freedom anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflict and war. We are particularly interested in the emancipation of colonial and dependent people and in the recognition in theory and practice of equal opportunities for all races”.¹⁰ Even while, addressing the Asian Relations Conference in 1947 and at the Afro-Asian
Conference in Bandung in 1955. Nehru returned to his favourite themes of ending colonialism in Africa. While addressing the Asian Relations Conference in 1949, he encouraged the Asian countries to be aware of their responsibility towards Africa. He says, “We of Asia have a special responsibility to the people of Africa. We must help them to their rightful place in the human family. The freedom that we envisage are not to be confined to this nation or that or to a particular people, but must spread over the whole human race. It must be the freedom of the common man everywhere and full opportunities for him to develop”.

Finally, Bandung stressed on the emotional link between the people of Asia and Africa, who for long generations had been subjected to European domination and exploitation. To quote Nasser: - “The Truth is Nehru is not only an exponent of the dreams deeply nestled in the hearts of the people of India. He is also the expression of human conscience itself, particularly for people who lived more or less though the same experiences and faced the same problem as India did”.

It was under the leadership of Nehru that India’s policy towards Africa was promulgated. The cause of freedom movement in Asia advanced very quickly after the World War II and it was particularly India’s freedom, which paved the way for agitation in Africa against the colonial powers. Moreover new hopes had cropped up with the emergence of the United Nations with its firm inflection on self-determination and political liberation. In the words of George Padmore “The name of Nehru is known throughout Asia and Africa where he is not only revered as a distinguished Indian patriot but looked upon
as an uncompromising in the struggle of colonial people for their independence and self-determination.\textsuperscript{13}

Nehru frequently strove against confining the colonial struggle to certain narrow objectives. Narrowness of human character according to him is detrimental to human growth especially in the context of socio-economic change. And this posture of Nehru’s idea had profound influence upon the thinking of Asian and African leaders. He convinced them that the national liberation of any country is not an objective in itself but merely a means to that objective. Undoubtedly it was Nehru’s international outlook, which inspired and convinced the young leaders of Africa. No other leader of Asia had strengthened the bond between the people of the two countries as Nehru had. The intimate friendship between Kwami Nkrumah and Nehru was testimony of the reciprocity of sentiments between Nehru and African leaders.\textsuperscript{14}

Undoubtedly it was Nehru’s thinking on “human liberation” which had a profound effect on the African rulers and the ruled alike. It was Nehru’s dynamic leadership, which enabled these newly emerged people to get their rightful place in the country of nations. Apart from this his profound impact worked against extreme nationalism, against over religiousness and dogmatism etc.\textsuperscript{15}

Nehru in 1953 said: “I have had a long time a strong feeling for the martyrdom of Africa, not today, but for centuries. Probably, that Continent has suffered more in many ways than any other part of the world. My dearest sympathy goes to these people and I would like them to turn a corner, which leads them to greater well being and freedom.”
Role Played by India against Racialism during the Post war Period:

It was in the year 1910, when the white minorities declared their independence from British and started on with the worst form of racial rule, which later on culminated into the policy of apartheid. The world apathy at the time, for apartheid the most obnoxious revulsion of human rights in the history of mankind aroused Indian to stand as pioneers against its abolition. Gandhiji was the first among them to be painfully conscious of the sufferings of the Africans in South Africa. He suffered with them for years, fighting non-violently for their self-respect. Even in the midst of our own travails, we should never forget those of others. Nehru noble spirit had revolted at what he had heard and read.  

It was India, which led a crusade against racial discrimination and apartheid and the colonial rule in Africa in the United Nations and other world forums. It was India, which in the beginning fought alone for the cause of the African people. In view, of its historic (unique role in the struggle against Apartheid) beginning with Gandhiji, in South Africa. India observed the United Nations anti-apartheid year in a befitting manner. For this purpose a national committee was set up which coordinated activities like seminars pamphlets and film shows to tell the people of India that apartheid is a crime against humanity affront to man conscience. As soon as the curse of racial discrimination vanishes in South Africa the better it is. As A. B. Vajpayee said, we are firmly convinced that in the world where progress and humanitarianism have become the touchstone of human development, we cannot allow such regressive and inhuman practices to continue.
India's dispute with South Africa arose because of discriminatory treatment meted out to the people of Indian origin in the Union. During the British rule some five million Indians had migrated to the different colonies of the British Empire, under the system of indentured labour. The ill treatment meted out to the Indians abroad agitated the minds of the Indian national leaders especially Gandhiji. He out of concern for the fate of his country men in the racially structured society of South Africa was drawn into active politics. Indian nationalist of all shades pledge to give their full support in improving the status and conditions of people living abroad. But soon it was realized that the suffering of Indian's in that country was the part of suffering of the entire mass of people whose majority constituted of blacks. However, India very soon recognized that opposition to racial discrimination could only rest on the human right provision of the United Nations Charter. It therefore started severing its economic relations with South Africa and extended diplomatic and moral support to the liberation movement in South Africa. This change in policy was underscored in President Dr. Rajendra Prasad's address to Parliament in 1952. "The question", he observed, "is no longer merely one of Indians of South Africa, it has already assumed a greater and wider significance. It is a question of the future of Africans more than that of Indians in South Africa".

From 1952 onwards, in its struggle against racial discrimination in South Africa, India included the cause of Africans as well and after Sharpeville massacre (1960) it gave paramount to African interests and asked the people of Indian origin to merge their interests with the interests of the Africans. India
was the first country to break diplomatic relations with South Africa in 1954 and severe economic relations against racial discrimination.

It was by 1960, after Sharpeville massacre, the change in attitude of India came to be endorsed by the United Nations Security Resolution recognizing that South Africa race policies “might endanger international peace and security”. 21

Curiously enough, it was not the involvement of India in the affairs of the South Africa that may be held responsible for shaping its anti-colonial policies in other part of the Continent. On the other hand it was India’s realization that in order to protect the Indian community in East Africa in particular would be exploited by the racist colonial elements as indicated by India’s expansionist intentions. This fear was not baseless. Already the Government of South Africa had started a campaign against India’s “imperialist ambitions” in Africa. At a press conference held in London in 1954, South African High Commissioner stated that if Nehru could weaken European influence in Africa then it would mean Africa for the Indians.

Taking it as a catchword from South Africa, the European settlers in Kenya also cited the presence of the Indian community in East Africa as evidence of India’s future designs to colonize Africa. In 1948, the governor of Kenya in a secret letter to the colonial Secretary described Nehru as a “Hindu Communist” who was plotting to grab Tanganyika under the camouflage flag of United Nations Trusteeship. This prolonged anti-Indian campaign by these racist-colonial elements did not prove useless; it gradually soured the relations between Africans and Indians. During 1948-49 several riots took place in
Kenya, Uganda and South Africa between the two communities. In the Eyes of Europeans Indians were “dirty, unscrupulous and generally harmful” race came to be shared by a large number of African also.

Thus Nehru was persuaded to send Apa Pant as High Commissioner to Kenya. Apa Pant carried Nehru’s command to pledge India’s support to the African cause even at the cost of abandoning the interests of Indian settlers in East Africa. India with all efforts prevented the Europeans from converting Kenya into a “white man” country. Nehru acknowledged the danger of Kenya becoming an extension of South Africa. It would prove to be disastrous from African point of view as well as for India it could have disrupted the peace zone India wanted to establish in the Indian Ocean. Hence, soon after arrival in Nairobi, Apa Pant made known his government policy to back the African nationalist no matter how the Europeans or the colonial office felt about it. It was clearly Nehru’s approach to Kenya that set the tone of India’s general African policy. The main constituent of its policy were –

I. Emphasis on de-colonization and the achievement of African majority rule.

II. Opposition to racial domination in East, Central and South Africa and

III. Advice to Indian settlers to integrate themselves into the indigenous population.

How in the later years Nehru became somewhat impatient with the Indian in Africa and declared in the Lok Sabha on 15 September 1953 “they (i.e. the Indians) could expect no help from us, no protection from us if they seek any special rights in Africa which were not in the interest of Africa”.


With regards to de-colonization India’s policies were based on two basic premises-

1. In their struggle for independence, the Africans should follow peaceful constitutional path.

2. Secondly, the international balance of forces would force the colonial powers to wind up their empires in India.

In the year (1952-53) when the Mao rebellion erupted in Kenya the ruling congress party of India issued a Resolution stating that the use of violence in the struggle for freedom “is undesirable and harmful” and that the adoption of the method of violence by some African groups has injured their cause greatly. Nehru was greatly perturbed to see the situation. His gesture in sending an Indian lawyer to Nairobi to defend Kenyatta for his alleged complicity in the Mao rebellion is still remembered by Kenyans, as the gesture was a symbol of Indian solidarity with the struggling people of Kenya.

Another African issue that disturbed India was the cold blooded murder of Prime Minister Lumumba of Congo by the Belgians in 1960. Attempts were made by the secessionist elements to break up the country. But India was keen on seeing a United Congo, and agreed to send troops to strengthen the United Nations.

The Liberation of Portuguese colonies of Africa, Angola and Mozambique, were close to India’s heart. Indian support to the freedom of Portuguese colonies became more intense after the liberation of Goa in 1961, especially in the United Nations.
The Algerian war of independence is a heroic saga of the valiant peoples struggle while France was meeting its Waterloo in North Africa, India an advocacy of Algeria’s right to freedom in the United Nations helped to forge Afro-Asian unity on this issue.

The tripartite aggression by Britain, France and Israel over Egypt following Nasser’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal in 1956 found Nehru angry and concerned. Supporting Nasser Government right to take over the Suez Canal, India strongly criticized the tripartite attack.

Towards the close of the 1950’s India’s global concern was extended beyond the limited horizon of Asia-Africanism. India’s participation in the Bandung conference of 1955 and the Cairo Afro-Asian people’s solidarity Conference in 1957 to express its solidarity with the African people struggling for the concern of decolonization and Pan African unity. By the end of 1950’s some problems arose in the Indo-African relations due to personal difference between Nehru and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and by the passing of leadership of Afro-Asian movement to Egypt by Cairo Summit (1957) showing disrespect to India, which wanted to assume the leadership. Enlarging the Gulf was the increasing Chinese influence among the Africans.

These developments did not unnecessarily disturb India. India’s earlier zeal to contest Western dominance seemed to be declining particularly in regard to African matters. The business of maintaining close relations with the Africans was left to the technical and diplomatic staff. Nehru however showed his unconcerned about the principles he had implemented for cementing the
relations among the third world countries. He was emphatic in his assertion that India should not create nor lead any third bloc.

In 1960, India was suggested to join the Africans to fight Portuguese colonialism; Nehru reportedly came out with the remark that Goa’s liberation was an exclusively Indian problem just as the liberation of Mozambique or Angola was an African problem.\(^{26}\)

Since Bandung Conference onwards the Chinese militancy and advocacy of armed struggle supported by material help proved more influential for Africans as compared to the non-violent policy and materially nil support of India. India’s isolation from the Afro-Asian was further exposed during the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962 and only four African countries Congo (Leopoldville), Ethiopia, Libya and Nigeria gave diplomatic support to India, six other states expressed “sympathy and concern; while Ghana, Tanzania and Guinea openly took an anti-India stand”.\(^{27}\) India’s military defeat at the hands of China greatly undermined its policy in the world forum.

**Second Phase 1962-71:**

After the Indo-China conflict of 1962, India thought about reframing its African policy on a different set of premises. Instead of proving support to the nations of Africa, in block, which seemed to satisfy neither the radicals nor the conservatives, it became somewhat more selective. It was essential for it to develop close diplomatic and economic relations with those countries, which stood by it during the crises. In particular, its pledge increased technical assistance to Ethiopia, Nigeria and concentrated its efforts on winning Kenya’s
goodwill. It also encouraged Indian industrialists to invest in the building of an industrial estate of twenty-two units in Nairobi.

For a time, India’s basic drive in Africa became one of winning support from those who were openly suspicious of China. But the year 1964, when the American Navy entered the Indian Ocean marked significant changes in the Indian policy. African issues like apartheid and de-colonization became major concerns for India. Once again concrete and vigorous efforts were made to revive the friendship between the two countries. It even changed its earlier policy of not extending support to violent struggles of nationalists and supported all the violent liberation struggles in Southern Africa. This change was felt in 1963 when a high powered delegation led by Mrs. Indira Gandhi was sent to a number of African countries which besides other things, was to access the Chinese influence in Africa and the possibility of forging technical and economic cooperation there. This was soon followed by many major policy decisions like launching of Indian technical and economic cooperation programme (ITEC) in September 1964, and to provide aid to African countries. India imposed economic sanction against Rhodesia when the “White” minority captured power by unilateral declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965. At the same time it began giving assistance to the liberation movements through the Dare-Es-Salaam based committee of the Organization of African unity.

In the year 1967 during Mrs. Indira Gandhi reign, She took personal interest in cultivating good relations with the African Liberation Movements on a new footing. In 1973 addressing a meeting of the Indian diplomats in Africa She urged them to make the Africans aware of the dark forces of imperialism. She was in no mood of repeating her father mistake of deferring decisions on
disputed matters. She emphasized the South-South cooperation under the nonaligned movement and gave material support to the liberation struggle besides technical and economic cooperation with 'black states'. India also demanded the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations and the Commonwealth. In the year 1970 when the expulsion move began in the United Nations General Assembly, It supported all the moves of the United Nations against South African racist government. It was the first one to impose ban on sports with South Africa and played commendable role in the United Nations special committee against apartheid. At the same time India kept on playing important role against colonialism and policy of apartheid at the non-aligned movement and the Commonwealth as well as it argued the South African issues in various International Conferences.

Third Phase 1977-80:

The same policy continued in the year 1977-80. Though there was a change in the ruling party at New Delhi during 1977-80. The Janta Party which assumed the office during this period not only continued its predecessor Congress Party’s formulated policies towards Southern Africa but provided it further dynamism on April 1977, A.B. Vajpayee issued a statement on the South African situation at the Commonwealth Conference as follows: -

“India’s commitment to independence and racial dignity in Africa even pre-dates our own struggle for independence. In fact we have always believed that our own freedom could not be considered fulfilled until we have redeemed Gandhiji’s pledge to end racial inequality in Southern Africa...when it is from the standpoint of de-colonization, self-determination, principles of human
rights, racial equality, or just the several international obligations of peace and cooperation, it is incumbent on us to persuade if possible or throttle if necessary the white minority regime, and to do so quickly. ²⁹

In 1980, the Congress again came to power under the leadership of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. This time India hosted the seventh non-aligned summit and as a chairman of the movement, she performed remarkable leadership role for the people of Southern Africa. Side by side her material support to the liberation struggles and the diplomacy of the South-South cooperation was given more emphasis the policy towards Southern Africa reached its climax during the reign of Rajiv Gandhi (1984-89). Who showed personal commitment to the cause of African people and chalked out concrete plans to participate in the regional economic recovery of the Southern African countries. On one hand he intensified India’s policy of struggle against apartheid at all levels provided diplomatic and material support to the liberation struggle but at the same time he realized that without adequate material backing to the African states fighting against racialism and colonialism no success could be achieved, therefore he tried to provide adequate economic backing to its policy in Southern Africa.

With the above policy one can wrongly surmise taking a first glance that India’s policy towards Africa shaped by its history, geography, economy and culture has only been a benevolent job or at the most it wanted to get the numerical supports of the African countries in international forum. But in fact the security of Southern Africa became highly linked with the Indian security. Following the successful tests of long range ‘Polarize A-3’ submarine launched Ballistic missile in 1963; the USA took the decision around November 1963, to form a separate Indian command. This was also confirmed by the Chairman of
the United States Joint Staff General Maxwell Taylor, at New Delhi on 19 December 1963 who was visiting India. Moreover, the entry of the American Navy in the Indian Ocean in April 1964, followed by the USSR navy in 1968 and the power rivalry in the area and the establishment of American permanent Naval and Air force bases in the Indian Ocean (Diego Garcia) and their inventions in Southern African crises. Moreover the formation of United States, South Africa, China and Pakistan axis etc posed a severe threat to the Indian security. Thus the security of India became linked with peace decolonization and end of Apartheid in Southern Africa.

Africa is one subject on which the Indian Government political parties and people are at one and that, perhaps, is one of the abiding legacies Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru had left behind. Summarizing the contribution of India to the total heritage of the Asian African world Ali A Mazruti wrote:

When one day India enters the ranks of the Super Power two individual in history would still remain important for beyond India’s border….. Gandhiji, who helped to shape the doctrine of passive resistance as a strategy of liberation in colonial days, and the Brahmin aristocrat Nehru, who helped to shape the doctrine of non-alignment as a strategy of liberation after colonial rule? 30

Congo Crises “The Congo is a very big issue today in world affairs. It is big because it affects the future of the United Nations….. and also the other countries of Africa”. 31

As soon as the name ‘Congo’ strikes in our psyche the picture of war, secession, instability, revolution, rebellion, assassination and hanging
automatically comes to our mind. Not very long ago, the Congo was an African country. It was given the name as “Belgian Congo” and the international press often called it a model colony. But since 1960 it has become different from other African countries and is no longer a model colony.\textsuperscript{32}

The crises that have taken place in the Republic of Congo after it achieved its independence on 30 June 1960, created one of the most complex and controversial issues of the post world war era. It endangered not only the political independence and territorial integrity of Congo but also international peace and security.\textsuperscript{33} It was one of the principal international crises of the post war period, in which major powers were brought to the brink of a confrontation. During that time African states were divided among themselves, and the United Nations was called upon to play expected and unexpected roles in the course of which it was attacked by some of its members, its Secretary General was killed and its mere existence was called in question. Not only this it had even plunged the United Nations into serious crises with Soviet Union threatening to withdraw from the United Nations and gave the Cold War a new turn by again raking up the East-West tensions. When Khrushchev declared war on the United Nations, it seemed, as though the split in the United Nations was unavoidable. The sole credit goes to Nehru, who undertook the rescue mission of his life to save the United Nations from disaster. The causes, which led to this catastrophe, were firstly the hurry-scurry shown by the Belgian while shifting from the colony, which they had not at all prepared for independence. Secondly the large size of Congo, with its ethnic and tribal diversity, thirdly the revolt which broke out in the army soon after
independence. Fourthly, the attempt made to separate the rich-Southern province of Katanga and make it a separate state and finally, the fact that the United Nations was required to perform numerous tasks and was hampered in them due to insufficiency of its own machinery and due to the hostile and independent actions taken by the Government of British and Russia.34

Congo comprises of three permanent characteristics i.e. the huge size of the territory; its immense wealth comprising of both agricultural and mineral, and thirdly its geographic location on the African Continent.

Congo is an immense territory; ten times the size of Great Britain. Thus the size of Congo should be taken into consideration while comparing it with other African states.35

Apart from this the country has the "Curse" if one may use the term of possessing enormous wealth. It is a producer of 7% of world's copper, 67% of cobalt and one third of world's industrial diamonds. Besides it is a producer of large quantities of cadmium, gold, silver, zinc, iron, tungsten etc.36 It is the wealth of the Congo which has aroused the envy of the outside world. In fact, much of the interest shown in the Congo is inspired by an awareness of this wealth, which is a source of prosperity for a country but which may even lead to strife and brings unhappiness.37

Lastly, there is the strategic as well as geographic position of the Congo. Sudan and the Central African bound the Republic of Congo situated as it is in the geographic heart of Africa. The Republic in the North by Uganda and Tanzania in the East, Zambia in the South and the Congo (Brazaville) and the Portuguese colony of Angola in the West.38 Because of its position Congo can
be either a bridge or a barrier between the different parts of the Continent, and its stability and political orientation are therefore of crucial importance to Africa and to those with interest in Africa.39

Because of its geopolitical situation, as well as richness of the country it had prompted a competition between the Cold War antagonists for the control of this region. It is therefore aptly remarked, that “the Congo is a bride everybody wants”.40

A second Congolese reality is the divisive factor of tribalism. It is a country consisting of more than 200 tribes who speaks more than 200 principal languages and dialects. Tribal loyalties as well as ancient enmities forms the characteristics features of Congolese societies which however had impeded the growth of national unity in the country.41

However the tragedy of Congo, revolved around the fact that the Belgians had proved themselves to be totally “Unfit” to shoulder their responsibilities as a colonial power.42

In short, the Congo at the time of independence represented a combination of factors, which were bound to wreck the new ships of state sooner or later.

Congo had been a vast territory possessed by a Belgium company, which established trade station on the lower Congo during 1879 to 1884. For more than four centuries until 1908, the Congo had been subjected to the most ruthless and barbarious exploitation of African labour. Approximately more than 30 million people were enslaved and traded abroad under Belgium sovereignty.43 The barbarous rule of the Belgium king, aroused widespread
public outcry in Europe and forced the Belgium government to assume full colonial responsibility for the Congo in 1908. The kind of rule that followed did introduce some humanitarian measures like the establishment of schools and hospitals but it was merely a policy of “Benevolent paternalism” which was the corner stone of Belgium colonial policy. The primary objective of this policy was to keep the Congolese economically satisfied; socially content and politically ignorant. Belgium in fact tried to suppress the growth of Congolese nationalism. No attempt was made to provide for participation or even association of the Congolese people with the administration of the country. Almost no thought or preparation was given to Congolese independence.

The end of the World War II marked a change in the life of the Congolese people and in their attitude towards the Belgium colonial rule. This change was brought up mostly by the emergence of Evolues in the Congolese society. After 1945, there were particular events, which helped the Congolese to visualize the possibility of achieving their independence. It was for the first time that the Congolese leaders were seen overseas, when they visited the Brussels world fair. The first meeting of all African Heads of State at Accra attracted the world attention, and General De Gaulle’s launching of the French community at Congo Brazzaville had a remarkable effect on the thinking minds in Central Africa. In 1957 for the first time Municipal elections were held in the three largest cities of Leopoldville, Elizabethville and Jadotville. These municipal elections led to the emergence of political parties, which had previously been banned. Moreover it encouraged the development of national movements for the independence and unity of provinces, which further led to
the emergence of brilliant political leaders like Patrice Lumumba, Joseph Kassavubu, Moise Tshombe, Albert Kalonji and Antoine Gizena.48

In 1959, political unrest suddenly broke-out the Belgium authorities firstly resorted to repressive measures and then gave in to the Congolese demand for independence. The series of events paved the way for a ‘Round Table Conference’ to be held in Brussels in January 1960. They also worked out a constitutional system and set June 30, as the date for granting independence.

The Congolese were lacking not only any experience of self-government but also training and experience of running day-to-day administration. As far as education is concerned they were only provided primary education obviously to avoid their rising “above a certain educational stage”.49 According to the United Nations representative, Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal of India, “at the time of independence, there were only 17 Congolese University graduate, no doctors, no Engineers, no professors, no Architects and few if any qualified lawyers”.50

As a guarantee and help to the new Republic, on 29 June 1960, both the Belgian and Congo governments signed a ‘Treaty of Friendship’. According to the terms and conditions of this treaty “Belgium military detachments were to remain in the Congo and Belgium officers were to continue to ensure the command of the ‘Force Publique’. (Later called Armee National Du-Cong-ANC) as no Congolese had until then obtained even the lowest officer qualifications. Belgium was to place advisers at the disposal of the administration until command could be taken by Congolese who had acquired adequate training”. 51 All this shows that even though Congo had achieved
independence only in name. In reality it was the Belgium who still exercised its full control over Congo. The dream of the Congolese for a happy and prosperous Congo after independence was dashed. The expected leaders who took hold of Congo after independence had no experience of public life, as all of them were too young and parochial in perspective. So it resulted in widespread chaos, fear and mutual recrimination of few political leaders.

Secondly, there was no change in the administrative structure except for the new positions occupied by the Prime Minister and the President.

Within a week after the declaration of independence the Congolese army mutinied because the soldiers were not getting increase in emoluments in Leopoldville and saw very rare chance of achieving officer's rank. Moreover, the Congolese nationals were not in favour of being commanded by the same officers as before independence. During the mutiny the Congolese soldiers captured the means of communications and threaten the Europeans to the street at gunpoint. The situation reached out of control, since maintenance of law and order was under Belgian officers who themselves were the targets. Thus the whole administration became paralyzed. Moreover, the infant Congo did not have its own armed forces for its protection. Even the chief commander was the Belgian national. The same conditions continued for two three years even after independence. Thirdly the sudden withdrawal of Belgian personnel from every walk of life created vacuum and left Congo in a state of anarchy and confusion.
Thus the history of Congolese independence was too short as there was no pre-arrangement for administrative training done by the previous government although, the history of brutal exploitation was too long.

**India’s Policy towards Congo**

India’s relations with African states are based on its historical ties and pursuit of a common policy of non-alignment, promotion of international peace, anti-colonialism and anti-racialism. With these perspectives in mind, India with utmost interest and with the most friendly and sympathetic feelings welcomed the independence of the Congo. Nevertheless, the tragic events, which followed after independence, saddened and were a matter of concern to the government and people of India. India having its own experience of Colonialism saw, that the root to all problems in the Congo was Belgium colonialism. Nehru was of the opinion that the striking failure of the Belgian colonial system, which left Congo in such a state, was the result of long years of colonial rule, which drained wealth from the country for the enrichment of the colonial power, while leaving the people of the country utterly poor and backward.

It was unavoidable that, on gaining independence, the Congolese Army should revolt. Conditions under the Belgians rule had virtually ensured this. Indian papers informed that it was the Belgians who were responsible for the disorder among the Congolese soldiery, in not paying their wages etc before leaving Congo. Mr. Krishna Menon rightly said in the General Assembly on 20 November 1961, “the very fact that a metropolitan country after years of rule, leaves a territory in such a state of anarchy that after its withdrawal civil
war and outside intervention follow, provides the worst picture of colonial rule that has come before this assembly".\(^{54}\)

The Government of India persuades that even after independence the Belgians were the root cause of all ill evil in Congo. It was patent that the old colonial power was coming back to a very considerable extent, not principally as military troops, but as civilians, technicians, advisers and experts etc to create trouble in an independent state.\(^{55}\)

Soon after these incidents took place the Congolese Government at the suggestion of the United States Ambassador Timberloke appealed to the United Nations for military and technical assistance including military advisors, experts and technicians to assist in developing a national army for the Congo to maintain national security, law and order. But before the United Nations could act on this request the situation aggravated when Belgian warships and planes attacked the port city of Matadi. More than 300 paratroopers were landed in different parts of the country to protect Belgian lives and property.\(^{56}\)

The brutal fighting and counter attack by Congolese mutineers aggravated the situation. By July 13, the Belgium troops had expelled all the Congolese forces and had occupied the European area of Leopoldville where Parliament was situated. Lumumba the Prime Minister of Congo reacted very angrily at the violation of the Treaty of Friendship between Belgium and Congo.\(^{57}\) On 29 June 1960 Moise Tshombe soon announced the cessation of Katanga from Congo. When President Kasavuba and Prime Minister Lumumba visited Katanga, they were not allowed to land in Elizabethville as the airport was under the control of the Belgian troops. Tsombe was supported by the
Belgium and the Congolese Government anticipated this. Thus on July 12, the Government of Congo appealed to the United Nations for urgent military aid to protect the national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression.\textsuperscript{58}

Thus whether an aggression according to Congo or a humanitarian act to protect the lives of its national (according to Belgians point of view) under the terms of the United Nations Charter, it appealed to be a classic situation that called for action to offset a threat to international peace.\textsuperscript{59} Prime Minister Lumumba also warned that if the United Nations assistance failed to come immediately then Congo would be obliged to seek assistance from other sources.

**Congo and the United Nations:**

On July 12, 1960 Joseph Kasavubu the President and Patrice Lumumbu, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Congo, appealed to the United Nations for "urgent military assistance to protect the national territory of Congo against the external aggression launched by Belgian metropolitan troops in violation of the Treaty of Friendship."\textsuperscript{60} They viewed "the unsolicited Belgium action" as an "act of aggression" against the new Republic of Congo. They further added.

"The real cause of most of the disturbances can be found in colonialist machinations. We accuse the Belgium Government of having carefully prepared the secession of Katanga with a view to maintaining a hold on our country. The essential purpose of the requested military aid is to protect the national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression which is a threat to international peace."\textsuperscript{61}
Clarifying its position on the purpose of United Nations Military assistance, he further adds.

The purpose of the aid requested is not to restore the internal situation in the Congo but rather to protect the national territory against acts of aggression committed by the Belgian metropolitan troops. Prime Minister Lumumba also warned that if the United Nations assistance failed to come immediately then Congo would be obliged to seek assistance from other sources. The Secretary General Hammarskjöld responded immediately to the request of the Congolese Government by invoking Article 99 of the Charter.

The Security Council on July 14, 1960 adopted a Resolution sponsored by Tunisia, United States and Soviet Union voting for it and Britain, China and France abstaining from it. It called for the withdrawal of Belgium troops from Congo and authorized the Secretary General to "take necessary steps in consultation with the Government of the Republic of Congo, to provide the government with such assistance as may be necessary".

The Secretary General after having carefully analyzed the request brought to it before the Security Council saying that the Belgian troops are being in the Congo "The presence of these troops is a source of internal and potential international tensions. It is in this light, I personally wish to see the request for Military assistance, which has been addressed by the Government of Congo. Although I am fully aware of all the problems, difficulties and even risk involved ... It is therefore my conclusion that the United Nations should accede to the request of Congo". 
On 14th July, 1950 the Security Council adopted a Resolution in which it stated that it:

1. Call upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw there troops from the territory of the Republic of Congo.

2. Decides to authorized the Secretary General to take the necessary steps in concentration with the Government of the Republic of Congo, to provide the Government with such Military assistance as may be necessary.66

India called upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from Congo. It vehemently criticized Belgium intervention in the Congo as a violation of the territorial integrity of the Republic, and as an attack on the Congolese people and their independence.67 India welcomed the Council’s decision to help Congo in protecting its territorial integrity and Political unity. India also feared that the vacuum created by the departure of the Belgians might lead to the involvement of the big powers from one side or the other.

In the light of the experience gained by him during the Organization of the UNEF the Secretary General decided to raise troops exclusively from the African nations and organized a force called ONUC ‘Opération des Nations Unies au Congo’. ONUC was, on one hand a civilian operation and on the other an international armed peace force.68

The ONUC was based on following objective: -

1. Withdrawal of Belgian troops

2. Maintenance of law and order
3. The termination of the secession of Katanga and the provision of technical assistance.

In July 1960, soon after independence the mutiny first started in Leopoldville the Capital of Congo where the United Nations forces was deployed occupying key posts such as Radio stations, Airports etc. President Joseph Kasavubu and Prince Patrice Lumumba headed the government that took after independence. Both had been members of the Congolese national movement. Kasavubu the most conservative of the two was not excessively hostile towards Belgium and the Western powers. The office of the Presidency, which he came to occupy, was largely an honorific post.69

It was the unity of Congo, which mostly distracted Lumumba so he again requested ONUC to subdue Katanga even with force if there was no other way. Since ONUC refused to interfere in the internal conflict this made Lumumba very bitter against the United Nations. Moreover, Lumumba’s friendship with Russia70 and the massacre of Kasai by Lumumba’s force frightened President Kasavuba. As a result Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba saying that he had “betrayed his office by providing discord within the government depriving the citizens of their fundamental liberties and plunging the country into fratricidal civil war”. 71 Lumumba on his part discharged President Kasavuba. Consequently Kasavuba dismissed Lumumba and in turn Lumumba dismissed Kasavuba. But the Parliament refused to accept the dismissal of either of them. In the meantime Colonel Mobuta, who had been appointed as the Chief of the Army by Prime Minister Lumumba came in the forefront within a short span. Colonel Mobuta turned against Prime Minister, Lumumba became hostile to even President Kasavuba and in a Coup d’etat
captured power and abolished the Parliament. These internal political conflicts reflected the influence of the 'Cold War' with Prime Minister Lumumba increasingly representing the aspirations of the Soviet Union and President Kasavubu those of the West. Meanwhile President Kasavubu refusing to accept the decision of the Parliament about himself and Prime Minister Lumumba appointed Joseph Illeo as the new Prime Minister in place of Prime Minister Lumumba. All this created a puzzling situation on one side there was Colonel Mobutu who would not allow the Parliament to meet, and on the other hand there was President Kasavuba who would not get the power to function except through colonel Mobutu. There was Prime Minister Lumumba who was actually in some kind of semi-detention and later on assassinated. Prime Minister Illeo who had no function to perform and colonel Mobutu who had come to power by a coup d'etat having no legal sanctions at all.

All this resulted in a chaotic situation in which power and authority was getting diffused all over again. The constitutional advisors still held the view that Lumumba was the legally elected Prime Minister. These developments in Congo plunged the United Nations into a serious crisis. The Soviet Union suspected the involvement of Western powers in the murder of Lumumba. Meanwhile Colonel Mobutu ordered the Russian and the Czech Embassies to have Congo. This obviously infuriated Nikita Khruschev. He accused the United Nations of being partial and the United Nations Secretary General of partisan actions. Khruschev threatened to withdraw from the United Nations. The Congo crises had thus, become another Cold War issue of serious consequences. The General Assembly session, which was scheduled to begin from September 20, became crucial because of East-West Tensions. Khruschev
strongly condemned the handling of the Congo question by the United Nations. He even demanded the shifting of the United Nations headquarters from New York and also demanded the resignation of Secretary General Hammarskjold for following one sided pro-Western line in the Congo Crises. Khruschev wanted replacement of the office of the Secretary General by a three member executive committee one each from the Western and the Eastern blocs and the third from the neutral countries with all the three enjoying the Veto powers.

At this time Nehru happened to be at the United Nations. He along with others suggested that during these circumstances real authority which should decide finally should be the Parliament and that President Kasavuba was also a legal entity. It was the Western powers which supported Kasavuba in the Political crises of Congo, while the African countries recognized Lumumba as the legitimate head of the Government in Congo. Meanwhile Colonel Mobutu got Lumumba arrested which resulted in civil war in Congo. Throughout these developments, the United Nations peace keeping forces in Congo remained a mere spectator and could not assist Lumumba in maintaining law and order. The Belgian Government supported colonel Mabutu in suppressing his opponents. Ultimately Lumumba was murdered while trying to flee the country. The Soviet Union suspected the involvement of Western powers in the murder of Lumumba. Colonel Mobutu made the United Nations forces ineffective. This development in Congo plunged the United Nations into a serious crisis. The United Nations, which, had previously done commendable work there, became a less and less effective and colonel Mobutu became very strong. The situation further deteriorated because the army was not disciplined and was not behaving properly. Congo faced further disintegration when the
Katanga province declared independence under Tshombe. Moreover Colonel Mobutu had appointed certain students as Commissioners to carry on the government and Belgians duly advised them. In the Katanga province the Belgian officials, experts and advisers surrounded Prime Minister Tshombe.

Taking advantage of this delay and disintegration Belgians returned to Congo in considerable numbers and indirectly exercised authority. They openly favoured Mobutu and Tshombe of Katanga. Thus, in a different form, there was return of the Belgians in the Congo in all fields. In such a situation the work of the United Nations to maintain law and order had become extremely difficult. It was a dilemma that if the United Nations withdrew, it would lead to absolute chaos and civil war of the worst type and possible intervention by foreign powers. On the other hand the situation itself had rendered the functioning of the United Nations ineffective.

Because of the United Nations ineffectiveness, a great deal of resentment arose among the members of the United Nations, particularly among those who had sent forces to the Congo. Several of them even decided to withdraw their troops from the Congo. As, according to Nehru, they did not agree with the policy, or rather the absence of policy, that was pursued by the United Nations. All sorts of disgraceful things took place under the plea that the United Nations mandate which was limited prevented the United Nations from interfering. The United Nations did a good job so far as feeding of the people and looking after them was concerned but in the political field it remained a silent spectator. Its passivity was however, in favour of those people who had seized power and were exploiting it to their own advantage throughout the strife torn country especially in Katanga. India was well aware
of the difficulties entailed by such a withdrawal of troops from the Congo, for though it was not happy with the United Nations record in the Congo, it felt that its presence was perhaps a lesser evil; for the withdrawal of the United Nations Force would open the door to civil strife and further foreign intervention, and would, in fact be an act of despair and a confession of defeat causing serious damage. Moreover there would also be the danger of ‘big’ powers coming in a big way to help their respective coteries, or those whom they acknowledge which would ultimately have disastrous effects. Moreover such a failure India believed would redound to the great discredit of the United Nations and make it difficult for it to function in future in a similar emergency.

India’s Support to strong United Nations actions in Congo:-

India persistently urged the United Nations to take immediate and effective action, including the use of force if necessary to accomplish its mission in the Congo. This mission included.

1. The first step to be taken is for the Parliament to meet and it is the duty of the United Nations to facilitate this meeting.

2. Elimination of all Belgian whether civilians, military personnel, or paramilitary personnel from all parts of the Congo. India believed that the root cause of all the trouble in the Congo was Belgians intervention and the continuing presence of its nationals is a source of constant irritation. Moreover they were obstructing the work of the United Nations.

liberal interpretation of the mandate contained in these Resolutions and of the agreement signed between the United Nations and the Congolese Central Government. According to him the mandate was large enough to permit even the use of force to achieve the objectives of the ONUC. The use of force on the part of the ONUC to prevent a civil war, preserve the integrity of the Republic and to eliminate mercenaries and other foreign personnel not under the United Nations Command was not only justified but, was even imperative in view of the changed circumstances.

4. India even urged the United Nations to use force to subdue Katanga and to check other secessionist movements. It condemned Kasavubu’s threat to prevent the implementation of the Resolution of 21 February 1961, as an open act of hostility towards the United Nations. The United States and the UK contended that any United Nations action to prevent the Congolese leaders from hiring Belgian civilian technicians would result in United Nations intervention in the internal affairs of the Congo. India challenged this position and called for a “full implementation” of the various United Nations Resolutions.

5. India voiced firm faith in the right of the Congolese people to decide things for themselves and was of the opinion that the elected parliament was the only proper authority to determine the legality of the claims of the various Congolese leaders to governmental authority, as well as to settle the question of political leadership. It was convinced that only by establishing an effective and lawful government with the consent of the Congolese Parliament could the success of the ONUC be ensured.
6. Attempt to achieve a military solution of the present crises must be checked immediately to avert imminent danger of civil war and possible military intervention.

7. Moreover, Political personalities who are being detained in the Republic of Congo should be released so that they may attend Parliament and establish a government of national unity.

8. Effective measures should be immediately taken by the United Nations to enforce the Security Council and the General Assembly Resolutions calling upon all states to refrain from sending any military assistance to any side in the Republic of Congo except through the United Nations. The deliberate violation of this injunction is largely responsible for the continuing deterioration and disintegration.\(^{82}\)

Though the first stage of the crises in Congo which started with the disintegration of the country into the 4 key fragments i.e. Katanga, South Kasai, Congo (Leopoldville) and Congo (Stanleyville) and which had reached its climax with the announcement of the assassination of Prime Minister Lumumba in February 1961, had came to an end with the concerted admission of the Adoula Government in August 1961. His government represented a careful balancing of the political groups. The Congo crises thus entered a new phase. The constitutional crises, which had started on Sept 5, 1960, had been over. There remained another task of eliminating the Katanga secession, which was a more difficult obstruction to overcome. The failure of the Adoule Tshombe talks had convinced that there was no possibility of an agreed reintegration of Katanga. The United Nations had suffered humiliating reverses
in Katanga. To withdraw from the Congo without achieving reunification of the country would have been to concede complete failure. On August 10, 1962, U Thant Plan was announced. The Plan provided a federal constitution with equitable distribution between the center and the provinces of taxes, revenues and foreign exchange earnings, integration of armed forces and general amnesty. On September 3, U Thant Plan was accepted, by Tshombe and on January 14, 1963, Tshombe announced that the Katanga secession was terminative. Thus Congo again became a single country. But as soon as the United Nations forces withdraw the internal cleavage became more difficult to bridge. 83

After 2 years of self imposed exile, Tshombe appeared on the scene of Congo on June 26, 1964. After having some private discussion with the President, the Prime Minister Adoula and other leaders of the country, Tshombe was sworn in as the fourth Prime Minister on July 10, his coming up on the political scene of the Congo created a new situation in the political life of the country as well as in the international field. Russia and China condemned the usurpation of Power by Tshombe in the Congo. He was barred from participating in the second non-aligned Conference at Cairo in October 1964, by the United Arab Republic (UAR) government. As Tshombe became Prime Minister, the Pro-Lumumba group, which was deadly against him, became actively hostile. Since these rebels knew that the Belgian and the British mercenaries and the Americans were under the garb of the rescue force, to give support to Tshombe, they pressed for the evacuation of the white hostages. Public opinion in the Congo turned against the Belgians the British and the Americans, since they were positively helping Tshombe who disturbed
the unity and integrity of the Congo. When Tshome appealed for cooperation
the people paid him back in his own coin. As a result, the year 1964 produced
a chain of revolts culminating in the re-establishment of a rebel base in
Stanleyville from August to November, which shook the fragile structure to its
foundation. Thus the revolution without revolutionaries of 1960 had been very
hasty and could not produce any results. But the mutiny of 1960, resulted in
terrifying display of violence, which led to complete destruction of
administrative and economic structure. Not only had this but it even destroyed
the very means for social change.\textsuperscript{84}

It was on November 26, 1966 that General Mobutu, ousted President
Joseph Kasavubu in a bloodless coup d'\'etat. A new cabinet headed by Colonel
Leonard Mulaba was placed on November 20, 1965. A government crises had
developed on November when both houses of Parliament refused to confirm
Prime Minister Mulumba and his cabinet, which had assumed office on
October 18, 1965. Tshombe who had been dismissed by Kasavubu previously
was involved in bringing about Mulumba's defeat. Kasavubu renominated
Mulamba as Prime Minister on November 15 and asked him to form a new
government, while Tshombe was sentenced to death in Absenlia.

During the period December 1965 to November 1966 President Mobutu
took various steps, in order to increase his power. On October 26, 1966 Mobutu
dismissed Premier Leonard Mulumba. On his turning down an alternative post
of a Defence Minister, General Mobutu took over himself the Premiershi in a
move to put Congo on the path of a pure Presidential system.
Due to the increase in foreign interference the prospects of achieving peace in Congo became remote.

**Foreign Intervention Opposition in India:**

India considered the critical situation in Congo as directly related to the larger problem of world peace. While extending support to the United Nations and in making a sizeable contribution of armed personnel to the ONUC, it was inspired, primarily by its concern for the success of the United Nations in the maintenance of the Congo territorial integrity and political unity and the restoration of law and order in the Republic. According to the Indian view it was of immense importance to insulate the newborn Republic from the Cold War in order to prevent the return of the colonial power under the garb of neo-colonialism.

The great powers took advantage of the troubled situation in Congo to serve their own political ends. The Soviet Union condemned Belgium as an aggressor and demanded that the United Nations to take such enforcement measures as to secure an immediate elimination of all Belgium from the whole of the Congo, it even charged the Western powers with complicity in the misadventures of the NATO ally.\(^{85}\)

The real cause of the trouble in the Congo was that the Westerners wanted to keep their economic interest intact. Moreover, the Communist wanted to gain a foothold in Africa for further expansion. The Asian African nations, generally wanted to give Africa back to the Africans. Mao, watching from a distance, wondered if he could take Africa for himself.\(^{86}\)
Moreover the great powers like the Soviet Union and the United States took advantage of the troubled situation in Congo to serve their own political ends. The Soviet Union at the request of Lumumba sent him technician and equipments unilaterally. Its real motive behind it was to establish the authority of the leftist Prime Minister throughout the Congo. This led to increase in the struggle for power between the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic. It was also not unconnected with tribal power politics. Further, Congo’s constitutional crises were internationalized when Soviet and Africans radicals supported Lumumba and Gizenga and the conservative Africans of Brazzaville and the Western bloc supported Kasavuba and Tshombe. The United States, under John F. Kennedy, supported the United Nations and thus saved itself from the antipathy of being a colonialist power. It further prevented the Soviet Union from gaining a foothold in Africa.

Thus, the Congo problem because of foreign interference became difficult and could not be easily solved. Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal’s experience in Congo and ultimately his resignation were all due to such kind of pressure being brought upon the United Nations by great powers. Even the air accident in which the Secretary General was on a peace mission to Congo was due to the conspiracy of the Western powers. There was also a strong belief in Indian minds that the great powers were, not innocent even in the Secretary General death. ‘The Hindu’ of 20th September, 1961 reported a strong suspicion that Mr. Hammarskjold’s aircraft was deliberately shot down by a Katanga plane and said if this were proved to be true then it is Britain who is to be held responsible for the crime. The death of the Secretary General further increased anti-British feelings in India. Some of the Indian press noted that never even
during Suez crises the Britain’s had been so blood stained as they are now. Consequently the Hindu added: “If Britain is really interested in bringing about a peaceful settlement of the Katanga problem it is up to her to persuade Sir Roy to stop supplying arms to Mr. Tshombe. This went so far as to lead to demands in Indian press that if this “calculated political pantomime”...were not stopped India should withdraw from the Commonwealth.

India being a non-aligned country did not support either of the two Super Power’s indiscriminately. The Indians could not understand how great powers. Like the United States could do nothing to discourage the Belgians. ‘The Hindu’ on 20th September 1961 said “if the United Nations has not been able to restore normality and unity in the Congo, it is because the great powers have been active below the surface in fostering the forces of separatism and in the creation of puppets”. It was also noted that this failure of the great powers in the Security Council had resulted in the incapacitation of the council in the Congo.

India, as always tried to be objective in its appraisal of every issue pertaining to the ONUC, and to ensure that it did not become a part of the Cold War between the two Super Power, when Khruschev sought the support of Nehru for his efforts to bring about a structural re-Organization of the United Nations with special reference to Secretariat Nehru refused to obligate. Though he also wanted certain structural changes, he told Khruschev that a re-Organization of the United Nations at this stage was likely to hinder the working of ONUC. The Soviet Union condemned Hammarskjold for his failure in preventing the murder of Lumumba. But Nehru felt that since the Secretary General was handling a difficult job, so it was not proper to hold him alone
responsible for the failure of ONUC. According to Nehru many of the tragedies in Congo, could be attributed to the Cold War mentality of the various countries and to the inadequacy or delayed decisions taken by the Security Council and the General Assembly.

India also urged the United Nations to prevent foreign powers from giving direct military assistance to the various groups in the Congo as such assistance was likely to weaken the authority of the United Nations in the Congo and leads to the disintegration of the Republic. It further held that all assistance to the Congo should be channelized through the United Nations. On the contrary the Soviet Union tried to give military assistance directly to Lumumba’s Government.

Krishna Menon, even, arranged a private talk between Nehru’s and Khrushchev. But before that, Nehru had a meeting with President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Mac Millan. He discussed with them the crises faced by the United Nations. Thus, Nehru and Mac Millan assumed the role of mediators between USA and USSR. However, “Mac Millan did it press hard in his role for the fear of American displeasure. Hence Nehru used his good offices to both sides to bring about a fresh East-West detente”. 91 Thus it was Nehru, Marshal Tito, Abdul Nasser, Nkrumah and Sukarno, who tried to bring about reconciliation between the Russian delegation and the United Nations Secretary General, on the controversy about the role of the United Nations and the Secretary General in the Congo crises. Nehru did not agree to the opinions shared by Khrushchev about the role of the Secretary General in the Congo Crises. In fact, he was the one to persuade Khrushchev that Hammarskjold was “acting impartially in major crises among big powers”. 92 Even Nasser shared
the same view. Everyone looked for the mediatory role played by Nehru the Indian Prime Minister. Eisenhower and Mac Millan met Nehru separately. He remained in the Center of the world stage and “this is about the most difficult role ever played by Nehru his habitual modesty appears to be standing him in good stead”. As a result Eisenhower adopted a conciliatory attitude as is evident from the White House communique calling for calm voice, issued after the Nehru-Eisenhower meeting. According to the Westerners “if any one could succeed in persuading Mr. Khrushchev to hold his horses at the present time it would be Nehru.” While Reuter reported “Nehru arrived.........in what may diplomats regard as the most important international peace mission of his career”. No doubt, the ground for Nehru’s efforts to ease East-West tensions that threatened to destroy the effectiveness of the United Nations was undoubtedly laid down behind the scene talks of Krishna Menon with top leaders. He was supported by Nasser and Tito in his efforts.

Nehru thus held joint discussions with Tito, Nasser, Nkrumah and Sukarno on 29th September as a result, the big five neutral countries i.e. India, UAR, Indonesia, Ghana and Yugoslavia sponsored the Five Power Resolution. Nehru introduced the Resolution in the General Assembly “to bring together President Eisenhower and Nikita Khrushchev for ‘renewed contacts’. The session turned out to be “the most stormy and critical in the United Nations history”.

While addressing to the General Assembly four days later, Prime Minister Nehru said:
I presented on behalf of Ghana, the United Arab Republic, Indonesia, Yugoslavia and India, a Resolution to the General Assembly...The main purpose of the Resolution is to help avoid a deadlock in the international situation...we are deeply concerned with the recent deterioration in international relation which threatens the world with grave consequence...responsibility for this deadlock has to be shared by all of us. But in the circumstances as they exist today, a great deal depends upon two mighty nations the USA and the Soviet Union and if even a small step can be taken by them, the world will have a sign of relief.96

Thus the Five Power Resolution did not seek to pre-judge any issue or to bring pressure to bear on any country or individual. Later on, it led to renewed contacts between Kennedy and Khrushchev. Khrushchev and Nehru even exchanged letters on the Congo-United Nations crises and Nehru while exercising a moderating influence on Khrushchev sought his support in dismissing Hammarskjöld. While agreeing with the Soviet Premier that Belgians should completely withdraw from the Congo Nehru told Khrushchev that the withdrawal of the United Nations from Congo would have disastrous consequences.97 Nehru was also against the dismissal of the United Nations Secretary General, although the United Nations had failed in Congo. Thus on various occasions Nehru opposed the Resolution put forward by the General Assembly, by the United States and its allies, and at times came forward with counter proposals. Thus the "greatest peace mission" of Nehru ultimately helped to resolve the United Nations crises. The United Nations actually received a new lease of life.
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3. Surendra Chopra; Studies in India’s Foreign Policy, (Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, 1980), p. 347.


5. V.P. Dutt; n.1, p. 297.


7. V.P. Dutt; n. 5, pp.462-3.

8. Ibid.


11. Jawaharlal Nehru; India’s Foreign Policy, Inaugural address at the Asian Relation Conference, New Delhi, March 23, 1947, p. 253.


14. Ibid.

15. Gamal Abdul Nasser; A Study of “where Two Worlds Meet” Nehru; n.12, p.85.


22. Nehru himself got in touch with a number of Africans, including Jomo Kenyatta. On the eve of his election as President of the Kenya African National Union in June 1947, Kenyatta sent a letter to Nehru with one of the members of a Kenya-African delegation to India. Nehru sent back a message which pledged not only India’s support for the Kenyan struggle but also reminded the Indians in Kenya of the need to identify themselves with the Africans.


30. A. Mazrui Ali; African’s International Relations (Boulder, colo, 1977), p.120.


34. Peter Calvocoressi; World Politics Since 1945, (Longman Publication, Delhi), p. 349.


37. T.R. Kazkanza; n. 35, p.56.


40. G. Mennon Williams; Africa for the Africans (Michigan, 1969), p.86. Mennon Williams was assistant secretary of state for African Affairs from 1961 to 1966.


44. Ram Chandra Pradhan; n.33, pp. 5-6.

46. Evolves is a term “used to describe Congolese who ‘evolved’ through education from a purely tribal way of living. They were the emergent ‘middle class’ which Belgian policy aimed to produce, and were regarded by Belgians and looked upon themselves, as the elite the urbanized party Westernized, ‘new men’ of the Congolese society”.


57. Ibid.


59. Tondel; n.47, p.18.


61. UN Doc S/4382 (Telegram I) Telegram dated 12 and 13 July 1960 from the President and the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo to the Secretary General Security Council Official Records, 15th year, July, August and September 1960, p.11.

62. Ibid., p.12

63. Art 99 of the Charter states “the Secretary General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security”. This was the second occasion in 25 years of the United Nations when the Secretary General had used this article the first being in the case of Korea.


71. Burns and Heathcote, Peace Keeping by UN Forces, p.46.
73. Ibid., pp., 366-368.
75. P.M. Nehru’s Statement in Lok Sabha on December 12, 1960, Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. VI, December 1960, p.366.
76. Ibid p. 372.
77. Ceylon, Guinea, Indonesia, the UAR and Yugoslavia withdraw their forces from the Congo during December 1961.
79. Ibid.
81. UN Doc. S/4389/Add.5,18 July, 1960
82. PM Nehru’s Statement in Lok Sabha on December 12, 1960. Foreign Affairs Record Vol VI December, 1960, p.369, See United Nations in
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84. Ibid.


92. Indian Express (Delhi), 26 September, 1960.

93. Times of India (New Delhi), 28 September, 1960.


95. Ibid.


97. Times of India (New Delhi), 28 February, 1961.