CHAPTER I

AMERICAN-KOREAN RELATIONS:

A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Official diplomatic and commercial relations between America and Korea began with the signing of the Treaty of Amity and commerce in spring of 1882.¹

1. The treaty was signed at Inch'on on 22 May, 1882. The US Senate advice and consent to ratification with an understanding, came on 9 January, 1883. It was ratified by the President of the United States, with an understanding, 13 February, 1883. The US "understanding" reads as follows. "It is the understanding of the Senate in agreeing to foregoing resolution, that the clause, 'Nor are they permitted to transport nature produce from one open port to another open port in Article VI of said treaty, is not intended to prohibit and does not prohibited American ships from going from one open port to another open port in Korea to receive Korean cargo for exportation, or to discharge foreign cargo".

The treaty was ratified by Korea on 18 May, 1883 and the ratifications were exchanged at Seoul 19 May 1883. It entered into force the same day. It was proclaimed by the President of the United States 4 June, 1883. The treaty was terminated on 29 August, 1910, the date of the Japanese annexation of Korea.

However, the hard-won diplomatic and commercial relationship between the two countries was abruptly terminated in November 1905. Korea quickly became a forgotten nation so far as the vast majority of Americans were concerned, and its cry for help was ignored by the American government for nearly a half century. Ironically, the United States fought a costly war to free the Korean people from Japanese colonial rule, and restored new relations with the people of Korea.

**The Early Relationship**

As early as 1834, Edmund Roberts who visited Japan in 1832 to open trade was convinced that the relationship between Korea and the United States would be established soon or later. Efforts made by the American government to open relations brought about a more or less satisfactory result in 1854, but Korea remained the "hermit kingdom". Meanwhile, Congressman Ze'doc Pratt introduced, and the House adopted a resolution on February 15, 1845 calling
for the extension of American commerce to the Far East because it was important "to the general interests of the United States" to establish diplomatic and commercial relations with Korea and Japan.

Although a treaty was signed with Japan March 1854, opening two Japanese ports for American ships in distress, no overtures were made to Korea at that time to open the "hermit kingdom". It was not until Secretary of State William H. Seward, who was convinced that "the Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and the vast region beyond (would) become the chief theater of events in the world's great hereafter", took the initiative to open Korea in 1867 in cooperation with France following the occurrence of the case of the General Sherman in the summer of 1866.

While a bloody anti-Christian persecution was in progress, the persecution which caused the death of nine French Catholic priests and several
thousand Korean converts in 1866, an American merchant ship named the General Sherman, sailed up the Taedong River toward Pyongyang in defiance of Korean officials, and grounded near Yangyak Island. Ostensibly it came to trade, but the Koreans were suspicious that the real objective of the trip was to rob the tombs of their ancient kings. Moreover, the General Sherman's crew (mainly Malays and Chinese) probably provoked the local inhabitants. In any case, the Korean inhabitants attacked the ship, burned her, and massacred her crew. The dispatch of a point force of Americans and French to Korea was contemplated by Secretary Seward.

No joint expedition of American and French forces was sent to Korea, but Secretary Seward's nephew George F. Seward, who was U.S. Consul at Shanghai, was instructed to proceed to Korea to secure a treaty in 1867. Secretary Seward wrote to his nephew stating that his mission was to be a friendly one, "reserving the question of force, if
You will however give notice to the Korean government," Secretary Seward instructed, "if you find it expedient, that this government cannot condone the outrage committed in the case of the General Sherman to remain indefinitely without receiving proper guaranty of adequate and ample redress.  

Seward's expedition to Korea was not undertaken when it became clear that it was not likely to be a successful mission. The case of the General Sherman, however, had to be settled. As a result, in 1868 Secretary Seward launched a diplomatic move while preparing to dispatch an American search party to Korea. At the same time, he sought Japanese assistance in settling the case of the General Sherman and establishing proper guaranty of adequate and ample redress.

diplomatic and commercial relations with Korea.

When the Japanese were unable to achieve their objectives in Korea, the United States decided to settle the Korean question alone, and instructed its minister to China, Frederick F. Low and Admiral John Rogers to undertake the mission.

The American expeditionary force consisting of five warships proceeded to Korea in May 1871, and in the words of the New York herald Tribune "Our Little War with the Heathen" began. The American expedition, like that of the French in 1866, failed to achieve its objectives and withdrew from Korean waters in July after demolishing Korean forts on and around the island of Kanghwa and the

Han River⁴. The American expeditionary force, while accomplishing nothing positive, led the Korean government to adopt an official anti-Western policy in 1871.

Following the conclusion of the Korean-Japanese treaty in 1876, American interest in the opening of Korea revived. As a result, in 1878, Secretary of State William M. Everts and Secretary of the Navy R.W. Thompson instructed Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt, who had been sent to Korea in 1866-67 to investigate the General Sherman affair, to make efforts to open Korea by peaceful means. He was assured that "a moderate and conciliatory course toward (Korea) would result in opening the ports of that country to American commerce" with the help of the Japanese.

⁴ For details, see "Our Little War with the Nahm, American Heritage, XIX, 3 (April, 1968), pp. 18-23, 72-75.
The efforts made by the Japanese, however, brought about no satisfactory results for the Americans. The timely incitation extended to Commodore Shufeldt by Li Hung-chang, one of the most prominent officials of the Peking government, prepared the way for the establishment of diplomatic and commercial relations between the United States and Korea on May 22, 1882. Ironically, Secretary of State James G. Blaine had said in his instruction to Shufeldt dated November 14, 1881, that the United States had "no political or commercial interest" in Korea, but he hoped that "the advantages resulting from the growing and friendly relations between (China, Japan) and the United States will have attracted the attention and awakened the interest of the Korean government". Be that as it may, the Korean government signed the first diplomatic and commercial treaty with a Western nation, a treaty which professor Tyler Dennett pointed out to have "set Korea adrift on an ocean of intrigue which it was quite helpless to
Cordial relations between the United States and Korea were cultivated despite the reluctance and disinterest displayed by the State Department. The first American Minister to Korea, General Lucius H. Foote, the Naval Attache, Ensign George C. Foulke, Dr. Horace N. Allen, a Presbyterian medical missionary, and others who arrived in Korea shortly after the signing of the 1882 treaty contributed much to the growth of friendly attitudes on the part of the Korean government toward the United States. The first Korean diplomatic mission was dispatched to the United States in September 1883, and a Korean diplomatic office was established in Washington in 1887 despite strong Chinese objections.

In a sense, the relationship between the two countries may be viewed as a one-sided affair of Korea for the United States, the reluctant partner.

5. Dennett, n. 2 pp. 461-462.
By and large, the Korean leaders displayed their romantic view in American-Korean relations. Many official and unofficial writings of American diplomatic personnel to Korea offer certain clues for us to detect Korean attitudes toward the United States. On the whole, Korea expected much more from the United States than the latter was willing or able to offer, resulting in extreme disappointment, disillusionment, or even anger on the part of the Korean government.

Some Koreans viewed the Shufeldt treaty as a wedge to free Korea from Chinese domination. and when General Foote arrived in Korea in May 1883 as the fifth American minister to Korea, the Korean government...

king "danced with joy,"⁷ for he along with others regarded the United States as the "symbol of a beneficient power that would indisputably guarantee the integrity of the Korean nation". Believing that the United States was a friendly and beneficient power capable of protecting Korea's independence, the Korean king took positive steps to promote close ties with the United States: he promoted confidential relationship with American ministers, he sought American drill masters for his army, he employed American teachers for the school for the children of the nobility⁸, he employed Americans in

7. Foulk to Secretary of the Navy, enclosure to No. 128, Foots to Frelynghysen, December 17,184.

8. They were Reverends Dr.H.Bunker, Homer B.Hulbert, and George W.Gilmore.
very important government positions, he made special grants to American-sponsored educational institutions, and he stood firm on his decision to establish diplomatic offices in the United States despite the strong Chinese opposition.

On the other hand, the American government showed only casual interest in Korea at best, despite the fact that Minister Foote felt that the influence of the United States should become a permanent factor in the progress of Korea. Neither the U.S. government, nor the American people knew much, or cared to know about Korea, her culture, history and people. Even the usual college graduate

knew more about the moon than he did about Korea. Meanwhile, the casual interests of the Americans in Korea turned into indifference. Occasionally, some Americans reacted intensely and emotionally to developments in Korea, with sudden fluctuation of feelings ranging from sympathy to contempt.

The Korean policy of the United States was to maintain a position of impartial neutrality towards the international disputes evolving around the peninsula kingdom and its neighbouring countries while securing special rights and privileges for the Americans in Korea. In reality, the role of the United States was "little more than a sympathetic and detached on-looker". All American representatives in Korea were opposed to Chinese domination over Korea, while some of them showed their preference of the Japanese over the Chinese. nearly all of them were mainly concerned with the securing of special concessions for American missionaries and businessmen in Korea. Some, like Minister John M. B. Sill, misread the intentions of
the Japanese and Russians, while others, like Durham White Stevens, actively promoted Japanese interests and domination in Korea. Some, such as Drs. Allen and Underwood, say the steadily growing Japanese influence and domination in Korea, and made attempts to strengthen the cause of the Korean nationalistic reformers Dr. Allen, who went to Korea as a medical missionary, and later became in 1890 Secretary of the American Legation, and then the U.S. Minister to Korea in 1897, wrote in 1899 that "Japanese have become aggressive here until they now seem to regard Korea as their own peculiar sphere of action and all others to be more interlopers." Meanwhile, he endeavored industriously to secure electric, pearl and timber concessions for American firms, and made successful efforts to secure gold mine and railroad concessions for an American promoter James R. Morse.

Korea received little political assistance from the United States. The United States maintained its strict neutrality in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, and in 1899 when the Korean emperor asked the American Minister Allen to solicit his government's aid to establish Korea's political neutrality to protect its independence, President McKinley refused to act. When the Russo-Japanese War came in 1904 over the Korean and Manchurian issues, the United States, not only refused to help Korea, but actually approved the Japanese actions in Korea. Korea became a Japanese protectorate in November 1905.

Neither Minister Allen, nor William Sands, an American adviser to the Korean emperor, had any love for the Korean emperor or the Koreans. Sands saw the Korean emperor as "confused politically, weak in personality", and was obsessed by his "life-long and well-grounded fear of personal
violence."\textsuperscript{11} Korea was "so corrupt, and the country is in such a state of misrule and disrule", wrote Minister Allen, "that it seems necessary at times to speak of practices while will, if unchecked, become beyond control to the severe detriment of interests purely American."\textsuperscript{12} Allen even complained that "The Koreans have the idea that we don't count any more."\textsuperscript{13}

While the Americans in Korea were expressing negative and unfavourable views about the Korean government and the state of the Kingdom, policy makers in the United States showed their preference for Japanese control in Korea over either that of Russia, or "a state of misrule and disrule" under the Koreans themselves. As early as 1900, president


\textsuperscript{12} Quoted in Harrington, n. \textsuperscript{10}., p. 308.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 309.
Theodore Roosevelt favoured Japanese control over Korea. He wrote to a German friend of his, Speck von Sternburg, that he would "like to see Japan have Korea", because Japan deserved it in order to check Russia.\textsuperscript{14} When, in 1903 Minister Allen expressed his view that the United States should help Russia against Japan, William W. Rock-hill, the author of American "Open Door" policy in China, told Allen that the Japanese should not only be supported, but also should be allowed to swallow Korea and should be helped to check the Tsarist drive to get Manchuria.\textsuperscript{15} Rockhill, who was director of the International Bureau of American Republics, was regarded as the Far Eastern expert of the State Department. Roosevelt called him "the author of and sponsor of our Asiatic policy."\textsuperscript{16} Soon after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Roosevelt told


\textsuperscript{15} Quoted in Harrington, n.. 10., p.314.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
Sternburg to inform the Kaiser that the United States was willing to see Japan take Korea.\textsuperscript{17}

Shortly before the Japanese launched a war against the Russian empire, the Japanese minister to the United States communicated Japan's wish to provide "protection, supervision, and guidance" to Korea. The American president fully concurred.\textsuperscript{18} Roosevelt justified the American policy on the ground that the United States "cannot possibly interfere for the Koreans against Japan when the Koreans could not strike on blow in their own

\textsuperscript{17} Beale, n. 14 ., p. 314.

defence."

Witnessing the gathering war clouds over Korea, and being uninformed of American attitudes toward Korea, the Korean emperor sought American assistance in maintaining the independence of Korea. Allen wrote: "the Emperor always turns to me and the more they (Japan and Russia) scare him the more eager he is to turn everything over to the Americans." But, Allen was powerless to help him, for his voice meant nothing to the policy-makers in Washington.

In February 1904, the Russo-Japanese War broke out, and when the Japanese carried out their military occupation of Korea, neither Great Britain

See also Komura to Takahira, January 8, in *NGB, XXXVII, Supplement on the Russo-Japanese War.* V, 203-204, 206-207.

20. Quoted in Harrington, m. 10 ., p.309; Sands, n. 11 p. 48.
which had concluded an alliance with Japan in 1902), nor the United States lodged any protest against such a gross violation of international law. What was more, in July, Secretary of War William Howard Taft negotiated with the Japanese in Tokyo a secret agreement which sealed the fate of Korea. In Tokyo, Taft talked with Prime Minister Katsura Taro of Japan and exchanged views, and in a secret "agreed memorandum" the United States approved Japan's suzerainty over Korea in return for Japanese disavowal of any aggressive intentions toward the Philippines.\textsuperscript{21} Roosevelt approved the action taken by Taft.\textsuperscript{22} It was a typical diplomatic quid pro quo.

\textsuperscript{21} The secret agreement was concluded without the knowledge of Lloyd C. Griscom, American Minister to Japan. For text of the agreement, see Dennett, Roosevelt, pp.112-114; NGB, XXXVIII, part I, 450-451.

\textsuperscript{22} Roosevelt wired Taft on July 31, and said: "Your conversation with Count Katsura absolutely correct in every respect. Wish you would state to Katsura and I confirm every word you have said". Beale, n. 14, p. 157.
arrangement between two imperialist powers, a Japanese Korea for an American Philippines. Ironically, the United States had to fight a costly war to free Korea, as well as the Philippines from the Japanese who had taken it over in the early stage of World War II.

As Korea encountered critical problems in the midst of the Russo-Japanese War, the United States showed no intention of becoming her guardian. "Our interests (in Korea were, "said Secretary of State John Hay to the Korean envoy in 1905, "rather commercial than political" when the Korean envoy sought American aid to protect Korea's sovereign rights and independence. A similar statement was made by William W. Rockhill, who had been charge d'affaire in Korea, in his letter to Minister Allen. "I cannot see any possibility of this government using its influence 'to bolster up the Empire of Korea in its independence,"

23. Rockhill to Allen, February 20, 1904, Quoted in Harrington, n. 10., p.324.
"I fancy that the Japanese will settle this question when the present war is finished. The annexation of Korea to Japan seems to be absolutely indicated as the one great and final step westward of the extension of the Japanese Empire. I think when this comes about it will be better for the Korean people and also for the peace in the Far East." \(^{24}\)

The policy makers in Washington knew that it was the Japanese intention to establish a protectorateship of Japan over Korea, and eventually to annexure. Early in November 1905 Katsura informed Roosevelt through Takahira Kogoro in Washington in strict confidence that Japan planned to take charge of Korea's external affairs, and received American approval\(^{25}\). This was not necessary, for Roosevelt had not only realized that such a step would be taken by the Japanese earlier, but also encouraged the Japanese to do so. During the peace negotiations at Portsmouth, Roosevelt said to Baron Kaneko Kentaro, one of his close friends and a member of

24. Ibid.,

25. Katsura to Takahira, November 6, 1905, NGB, XXXVII, Part I, 529.
the Japanese delegation, "sooner or later it will be better for Japan to take-over Korea. I rather think that Japan should take-over Korea for the sake of the Koreans and for Asia. Not now, but soon." 26 "I was pro-Japanese before," wrote Roosevelt to Rockhill in August 1905, "but after my experience with the peace commissioners I am far stronger pro-Japanese than before." 27


With the signing of the Treaty of Protection dated November 17, 1905, Japan forced Korea to accept its guardianship. The United States was the first Western power to withdraw their legation from Korea. Korea mourned along. Following the establishment of the Residency-General of Japan in Korea, the Japanese step by step took away the sovereign rights of the Korean monarch as they tightened their grip, and they reduced the Korean emperor to a protesting but powerless figurehead.

The unhappy Korean emperor made fruitless efforts to protect his sovereign rights and the independence of his empire. In October 1905 when the intentions of the Japanese had been clearly shown, the Korean emperor sent Dr. Homer B. Hulbert to Washington to seek American help. But he was unable to see Roosevelt who "completely ignored the appeal" of the Korean emperor. In December Min Young-ch'an, a special envoy of the Korean emperor, arrived in Washington to make a plea for American support in
The Liberation and Allied Occupation of Korea

In constrast to the period between 1910 and 1945, during which the United States paid scant attention to the difficult situation of the Korean people under Japanese colonial control, the United States became increasingly involved in the affairs of the Korea following the termination of World War II. The decision made by the Allied Powers at Cairo, Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam between 1943 and 1945, thrust the United States into a dominant role in Far East affairs. The development and application of American foreign policy for Asia fundamentally changed by the antecedents, the circumstances, and the results of World War II. As for American policy towards Korea, the United States which had been either unable or unwilling to render assistance to the Korean nationalists who were fighting at home and abroad for Korea's freedom and independence, at last officially declared in the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, which was cosigned by Great
Britain and the Republic of China, that it was "mindful of the enslavement of the Korean people" by the Japanese and it was "determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."\(^2\)

Certainly, the Koreans viewed the United States in August 1945 as their friend and liberator, and the regenerator of their hopes and aspirations. However, they were destined to drink bitter cups once again. Their friend and liberator came as conqueror, their "liberated" land became partitioned and occupied by foreign troops, and the southern half of Korea was put under an alien military rule again. They narrowly escaped the five-year trusteeship of the Allied Powers, but they witnessed the growth of the Cold War in Korea and the emergence of two states in their land, each claiming legitimacy and jurisdiction over the entire

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The partition of Korea brought about many tragic consequences, including the Korean War and subsequent problems related to the relaxation of tension of the peninsula and the growth of autocratic rule associated with the national security question. Well documented studies showed that it was the opinion of President Roosevelt that the liberated Asian colonial people would not be ready to enjoy their freedom and national independence at the end of World War II. Consequently, he insisted that they "should be put under the tutelage of the Great Powers and be educated in democratic institutions." In other words, the colonial peoples, such as Korean should enjoy their freedom and independence only after "a


period of training as the 38th parallel line which had been established as a "temporary military demarcation line" between the two Allied Powers became a political boundary of two Korean states. Under the decision made by the United Nations General Assembly in November 1947, the first democratic and free elections were carried out only in the south in order to establish a government of Korea. Following the May elections of 1948, the National Assembly of Korea was established, and the Republic of Korea was inaugurated on August 15, 1948, ending American military rule in the south.


The American occupation of South Korea accomplished little, except that it prevented mass starvation and total collapse of public order. The American occupation of South Korea was destined to be a failure. There were many reasons. For one thing, as an authority on Korea pointed out, "Aside from an expressed intention to further the establishment of a Korean government, there seemed to be little underlying continuity in American policy during the three-year period." As a matter of fact, there was no American policy toward Korea with the exception of that which aimed at the removal of the Japanese from their colony. The United States was destined to confront in Korea immense problems, but "the almost impromptu way in which the occupation was undertaken with very little prior preparation' made the failure of the American occupation virtually inevitable. George McCune

remarked. 35

The production of a viable democracy in a country which had been politically dead for thirty-five years demanded more positive encouragement than the occupation force was prepared to give. In the absence of uninterrupted and definitive guidance upon matters of policy by Washington, the occupation authorities were often so uncertain and cautious about inaugurating definite policies as to appear dominated by the situation. 36

Be that as it may, with the establishment of the Republic of Korea in the south, a new relationship between the United States and the newly created republic developed.

Relations During the Crisis

After a brief period of uncertainties from 1948 to 1950, cordial relations developed between the United States and the Republic of Korea despite

35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
many problems which caused difficulties on both sides. Unlike in the 19th century, the United States demonstrated its positive interest in domestic and foreign affairs of Korea, while the Korean government and people displayed their traditional pro-American sentiments. The United States and its allies fought the North Korean and Chinese Communists and preserved the Republic. The American commitment to South Korea's national security after 1953, and U.S. economic and other forms of aid not only sustained the life of the nation, but also helped South Korea to achieve what it calls "the Miracle on the Han River" during the past decade. The American contribution to cultural and educational development in South Korea was incalculable.

Close cooperation between the two countries, while promoting the national strength of South Korea, maintained a stable international situation in East Asia. Strong economic ties between South
Korea and the United States also developed. Such close ties not only benefited the two countries, but may have prevented another war in Korea while enhancing the security of Japan. The recent problems related to the Korean attempts to buy Congressional influence notwithstanding, the American-Korean relationship is likely to take deeper roots.

Following their issuance of a statement on August 12 in which the United States government stated the Korean government which was established under the United Nations sponsorship was the Government of Korea, Washington named John J. Muccio as its first ambassador to the Korean republic, and with the inauguration of the Republic of Korea on August 15, 1948, the American military rule was terminated. The United Nations General Assembly recognized the Republic of Korea on December 12, and the United States accorded de jure recognition of

the Republic on January 1, 1949.

An American spokesman stated in 1948 that the inauguration of the Korean republic was not a final step in the execution of American commitments to establish a "free and independent Korea", but would have to be followed by economic assistance of a character which would enable the Republic to become a "solvent trading partner in the world economy and to withstand communist ideological penetration from within as well as attack from without." But, in reality the United States had no Korean policy other than the prevention of a collapse of the Korean economy. The United States seemed to withdraw completely its political and military commitments from Korea as the Joint Chiefs of Staff had resolved that "under no circumstances would the United States engage in the military defence of the Korean peninsula."

Undoubtedly, the fall of the

Nationalists in China had a direct impact on American policy toward Korea. Secretary of State Dean Acheson told a Congressional committee that the American line of defense in the Far East extends from Alaska through the Aleutian chain, Japan, and Okinawa to the Philippines and made no mention of Korea. In his remarks of January 12, 1950 in a speech before the National Press Club, he reiterated that the United States defense perimeter runs along the Aleutian islands to Japan, and from Japan to the Philippines, and again he made no reference to Korea.

The United States signed on December 10, 1948 an economic aid agreement with the Republic of Korea, and in June 1949 President Truman requested the sum of $150 million for Korea for the 1949-50 fiscal year. His message to Congress reflected the fear of Acheson that if no new economic aid was provided to Korea, the Republic would fall "within three months." But it was not until December 19 that an amount of $30 million for the period ending
February 15, 1950 was voted in the House, and in February 1950 the House approved a $60 million appropriation extending economic aid for Korea until June 30, 1950.

Despite strong objections of the South Korean government, the United States withdrew its troops from Korea by the end of June 1949, leaving behind poorly indoctrinated, trained, and supplied soldiers of the newly created Korean army and a small United States Military Advisory Group (KMAG)\textsuperscript{39}. However, a bilateral agreement was concluded between the United States and Korea on January 26, 1950 so that Korea could receive United States Military aid under the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of October 6, 1949. Under this agreement, South Korea received $10 million out of the total of $1,314 million (or eight-tenth of one percent) which was appropriated to implement the Mutual Defence Assistance Act. The

\textsuperscript{39} Truman, Harry S., \textit{Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1952}, Vol. 2 (Garden City, 1956) P. 333.
American military aid was mostly for maintenance material and spare parts for American military equipment left behind in Korea. KMAG repeatedly warned that "Korea is threatened with the same disaster that befell China."  

South Korea, which seemed to have been abandoned by the United States, was invaded by the North Korean Communist troops of June 25, 1950. As many had feared, the Korean War finally came. The general consensus of opinion was that the North Korean Communists had miscalculated American intentions when they launched the war. "The Korean war began in a way in which wars often begin," said Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 1953, "a potential aggressor miscalculated."  

The devastating war in Korea was brought to an end, thanks to a high price paid by the United

States and other nations which repelled the aggressors, with the signing of the Korean armistice on July 27, 1953. The sixteen nations which had fought in Korea signed a Joint Policy Declaration concerning the Korean Armistice in which they pledged that if there were a renewal of the armed attack, they would be prompt again in resisting aggressors. On August 7, 1953 the United States initiated a draft of the mutual security pact with the Republic of Korea and guaranteed the security of South Korea which refused to become a signator in the Korean armistice.

Following the signing of the armistice, a joint statement was issued by the United States and Korea in which they pledged continued cooperation and agreed that in the political conference of the signatures of the Armistice which was to follow within three months, according to the terms in the Korean armistice, they would "seek to achieve the peaceful unification of historic Korea as a free and
independent nation." They added that if it appeared, after ninety days, that attempts to achieve mutual objectives were fruitless, both countries would make "a concurrent withdrawal from the conference" and then would "consult further regarding the attainment of a unified, free and independent Korea..." 42

42. Press release. Joint Statement of President Syng-man Rhee and Secretary of State Dulles, August 7, 1953.