The beginning of 1950s witnessed an era whereby both the United States and United Nations deeply involved in promotion of international peace and security as an agenda of post-Cold War besides ensuring to expedite the process of decolonization and thus big or small nations to have equal rights in international affairs with a particular emphasis on the right of self-determination and assertion of newly independent nations. The task, however, had been difficult yet, the United States and United Nations authorities resolutely carried out the set objectives to a successful conclusion by venturing into two major intractable cases like the Korean and Congo crises in 1950s and 1960s. The two crises have taken as a test case in the thesis to arrive at exact and accurate results as was anticipated by the United States and United Nations.

The clash of interests of the United
States and former Soviet Union was over the US controlled South-Korea and Soviet Union controlled North-Korea indicating in fact the ideological warfare which ultimately resulted on June 25, 1950.

The Congo case was more complex as it got formal independence on June 30, 1960 but the political control was still in the hands of Belgians. The United States under the aegis of United Nations could able to defuse tensions both in Korean peninsula and Congo and eventually restored the confidence of member states in the Charter of the United Nations.

With the post world war II division between the communist bloc and the West, the United States quickly emerged in the Security Council as a leader of the democratic nations in the UN and fought the diplomatic battle to promote the right of self-determination of every nation and determined to stop the communism by every means not only in Europe but in Asia and Africa well. A large majority of the
US public was in favour of the general support to the United Nations for achieving these goals. The former Senator Barry Goldwater eloquently once expressed the Americans willingness to support the functioning of the United Nations in these words: "The United Nations —is at best an instrument of international accord. It is useful to the West now for a special reason; it provides a forum in which to discuss communist violation of the Charter."

Controversies arising in the Cold War situation had been dominated by direct and serious conflict between the major communist and non-communist powers because the interest of the United States had been adversely affected by such disputes. The United States was compelled to move to the United Nations. Wherever feasible to maximize support for its own strategy and to confound the communist enemy. But because of the intense hostility and massive
power involved, it became difficult for the United States to mobilise strong support for its position in these cases within the United Nations. Despite the difficulties, the United States and its allies considered advantageous to use the United Nations as a major instrument for dealing with some of the most dangerous Cold War conflicts. The study is concerned with two major cases of international crises in Korean and Congo. During the intense Cold War period of first two decades of the formation of the United Nations the Korean crisis (1950-53) and Congo crisis (1960-64) lingered for very long duration. Congo was the largest military operation which the UN had been involved, not only the largest military operation, but the largest financial operation as well. The UN maintained a force of some 20,000 (ONUC) at the cost of over $ 1000,000,000 a year. The budget for maintaining the UN forces in the Congo had been
greater than the total normal budget of the UN prior to that activities. In the operation in Korea, it was involved with a larger number of forces. But it was somewhat questionable whether it could be called a UN operation. The UN had delegated authority in the Korean matter to the United States and the forces were in large measure from the United States forces and the forces from the South Korea. In fact, the United Nations came nearest to establishing a fighting force. It did create a United Nations Command and requested members to make forces available to it. But this was a mere an extension of existing command of the United States in Far Eastern military operation under the command of General MacArthur. The action taken by the Arthur and his forces was in fact United Nations action and of course justified norms of international law.

The Secretariat of the UN had no part in operation or even deployment of troops. By the end of
1950, the only foreign ground troops fighting by the American side were from the United Kingdom, Australia, France, Greece, Turkey, the Netherland, the Philippines, Thailand and Turkey. The Unified Command in Korea consisted of about a quarter of million American compared with only about 36,000 troops from all other Member States combined.

Korean crisis had got special significance as it had extended the dimension of the moral authority of the General Assembly. The General Assembly became a definite alternative to the Security Council for the first time in Korean crisis. The United States was successful in shifting the discussion from the Security Council to the General Assembly which was dominated by Anglo-American majority in 1950s and 60s. It was noticiable through Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950 which demonstrated for the empowerment of General Assembly as the generation of
international peace and security in case the consensus fail in the Security Council. The Security Council had been unable to act owing to acute differences among its permanent members. The Assembly was able to play a complementary role by endorsing the resolution of the Security Council. The lesson learnt from the Korean experience proved fruitful in resolving the Congo crisis. When the then Secretary General proceeded to recruit forces he emphasised the need that the conditions for the forces to be sent should be that they should include no forces from any of the great powers. It was realised that to have a genuine UN forces it ought to be recruited from a good many of the smaller countries or from countries at least which were not the major protagonists in the Cold War. It was also recognized that it would be desirable to have a large number of forces from Africa and this was one of the provisions made in the recruitment of forces. At the same time it was also
provided that there should be some troops from outside Africa, so that it could be regarded, as United Nations universal operation. This shows a tremendous influence in strengthening the UN against the opinion of one protagonist or other in the Cold War, could be exercised by the uncommitted states. The uncommitted states consisted a large proportion of the members of the General Assembly and it appeared that these states had expressed their solidarity with the UN mission in Korea as they felt that United Nations also could protect their interests in the World.

US officials, who frequently offered technical, military and political advice, as did the officials of other interested states. The United States acted as a balance wheel between the sometimes irreconcilable positions of the militant Afro-Asian leaders and more conservative European
Spokesmen. It was precisely this mediating role that drew criticism from both sides. Nevertheless, the United States and the United Nations established the credibility of ensuring peace and security whenever and wherever threatened. Both Korean and Congo crises gave a new impetus to the American policy makers in the State Department that the United States had responsibility towards the world community to promote the rights of self-determination and self-assertion either be in political, social, cultural or economic spheres of any nation in any parts of the world.