APPENDIX-I*

SELECT ON RESOLUTIONS ON KOREA

, RESOLUTION S/1501, 25 JUNE 1950

The Security Council,

Recalling the finding of the General Assembly in its resolution of 21 October 1949 that the Government of the Republic of Korea is a lawfully established government "having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; and that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such government in Korea";

Mindful of the concern expressed by the General Assembly in its resolution of 12 December 1948 and 21 October 1949 of the consequences which might follow unless Member States refrained from acts derogatory to the results sought to be achieved by the United Nations in bringing about the complete independence and unity of Korea; and the concern expressed that the situation described by the United Nations Commission on Korea in its report menaces the safety and well being of the Republic of Korea and of the people of Korea and might lead to open military conflict there;

Noting with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea,

Determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace,

I. Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities; and calls upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel;

II. Requests the United Nations Commission on Korea

(a) To communicate its fully considered recommendations on the situation with the least possible delay,

(b) To observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th parallel, and

(c) To keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this resolution;

III. Calls upon all Members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.

The Security Council,
Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,
Having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, and
Having called upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel, and
Having noted from the report of the United Nations Commission for Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security, and
Having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security,
Recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.

The Security Council,
Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,
Having recommended that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area,
1. Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which governments and peoples of the United Nations have given to its resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to restore international peace and security in the area;
2. Notes that Members of the United Nations have transmitted to the United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic of Korea;
3. Recommends that all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States;
4. Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces;
5. Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating;
6. Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command.
The General Assembly,

Recognizing that the first two stated Purposes of the United Nations are:

"To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace", and

"To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace",

Reaffirming that it remains the primary duty of all Members of the United Nations, when involved in an international dispute, to seek settlement of such a dispute by peaceful means through the procedures laid down in Chapter VI of the Charter, and recalling the successful achievements of the United Nations in this regard on a number of previous occasions,

Finding that international tension exists on a dangerous scale,

Recalling its resolution 290 (IV) entitled "Essentials of Peace", which states that disregard of the Principles of the Charter of the United Nations is primarily responsible for the continuance of international tension, and desiring to contribute further to the objectives of that resolution,

Reaffirming the importance of the exercise by the Security Council of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the duty of the permanent members to seek unanimity and to exercise restraint in the use of the veto,

Reaffirming that the initiative in negotiating the agreements for armed forces provided for in Article 43 of the Charter belongs to the Security Council and desiring to ensure that, pending the conclusion of such agreements, the United Nations has, at its disposal means for maintaining international peace and security,

Conscious that failure of the Security Council to discharge its responsibilities on behalf of all the Member States, particularly those responsibilities referred to in the two preceding paragraphs, does not relieve Member States of their obligations or the United Nations of its responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and security,

Recognizing in particular that such failure does not deprive the General Assembly of its rights or relieve it of its responsibilities under the Charter in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recognizing that discharge by the General Assembly of its responsibilities in these respects calls for possibilities of observation which would ascertain the facts and expose aggressors; for the existence of armed forces which could be used collectively; and for the possibility of timely recommendation by the General Assembly to Members of the United Nations for collective action which, to be effective, should be prompt,
1. **Resolves** that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations;

2. **Adopts** for this purpose the amendments to its rules of procedure set forth in the annex to the present resolution;

3. **Establishes** a Peace Observation Commission which, for the calendar years 1951 and 1952, shall be composed of fourteen Members, namely: China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Uruguay, and which could observe and report on the situation in any area where there exists international tension the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Upon the invitation or with the consent of the State into whose territory the Commission would go, the General Assembly, or the Interim Committee when the Assembly is not in session, may utilize the Commission if the Security Council is not exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter with respect to the matter in question. Decisions to utilize the Commission shall be made on the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members present and voting. The Security Council may also utilize the Commission in accordance with its authority under the Charter;

4. **Decides** that the Commission shall have authority in its discretion to appoint sub-commissions and to utilize the services of observers to assist it in the performance of its functions;

5. **Recommends** to all governments and authorities that they co-operate with the Commission and assist it in the performance of its functions;

6. **Requests** the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities, utilizing, where directed by the Commission, the United Nations Panel of Field Observers envisaged in General Assembly resolution 297 B (IV);

7. **Invites** each Member of the United Nations to survey its resources in order to determine the nature and scope of the assistance it may be in a position to render in support of any recommendations of the Security Council or of the General Assembly for the restoration of international peace and security;

8. **Recommends** to the States Members of the United Nations that each Member maintain within its national armed forces elements so trained, organized and equipped that they could promptly be made available, in accordance with its constitutional processes, for service as a United Nations unit or units, upon recommendation by the Security Council or the General Assembly, without prejudice to the use of such elements in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter;
9. Invites the Members of the United Nations to inform the Collective Measures Committee provided for in paragraph II as soon as possible of the measures taken in implementation of the preceding paragraph;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, with the approval of the Committee provided for in paragraph II, a panel of military experts who could be made available, on request, to Member States wishing to obtain technical advice regarding the organization, training, and equipment for prompt service as United Nations units of the elements referred to in paragraph 8;

11. Establishes a Collective Measures Committee consisting of fourteen Members, namely: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Egypt, France, Mexico, Philippines, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, and directs the Committee, in consultation with the Secretary-General and with such Member States as the Committee finds appropriate, to study and make a report to the Security Council and the General Assembly, not later than 1 September 1951, on methods, including those in section C of the present resolution, which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, taking account of collective self-defence and regional arrangements (Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter);

12. Recommends to all Member States that they co-operate with the Committee and assist it in the performance of its functions;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to furnish the staff and facilities necessary for the effective accomplishment of the purposes set forth in sections C and D of the present resolution;

14. Is fully conscious that, in adopting the proposals set forth above, enduring peace will not be secured solely by collective security arrangements against breaches of international peace and acts of aggression, but that a genuine and lasting peace depends also upon the observance of all the Principles and Purposes established in the Charter of the United Nations, upon the implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and other principal organs of the United Nations intended to achieve the maintenance of international peace and security, and especially upon respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all and on the establishment and maintenance of conditions of economic and social well-being in all countries; and accordingly.

15. Urges Member States to respect fully, and to intensify, joint action, in co-operation with the United Nations, to develop and stimulate universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to intensify individual and collective efforts to achieve conditions of economic stability and social progress, particularly through the development of underdeveloped countries and areas.
For the purpose of maintaining international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and, in particular, with Chapters V, VI and VII of the Charter,

The General Assembly

Recommends to the Security Council:

That it should take the necessary steps to ensure that the action provided for under the Charter is taken with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression and with respect to the peaceful settlement of disputes or situations likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security;

That it should devise measures for the earliest application of Articles 43, 45, 46 and 47 of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the placing of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council by the States Members of the United Nations and the effective functioning of the Military Staff Committee;

The above dispositions should in no manner prevent the General Assembly from fulfilling its functions under resolution 377 A (V).

The General Assembly

Recognizing that the primary function of the United Nations Organization is to maintain and promote peace, security and justice among all nations,

Recognizing the responsibility of all Member States to promote the cause of international peace in accordance with their obligations as provided in the Charter,

Recognizing that the Charter charges the Security Council with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security,

Reaffirming the importance of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council on all problems which are likely to threaten world peace,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 190 (III) entitled “Appeal to the Great Powers to renew their efforts to compose their differences and establish a lasting peace”,

Recommends to the permanent members of the Security Council that:

(a) They meet and discuss, collectively or otherwise, and, if necessary, with other States concerned, all problems which are likely to threaten international peace and hamper the activities of the United Nations, with a view to their resolving fundamental differences and reaching agreement in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Charter;

(b) They advise the General Assembly and, when it is not in session, the Members of the United Nations, as soon as appropriate, of the results of their consultations.
The General Assembly,

Having considered the situation in the Republic of the Congo,

Taking note of the resolutions of 14 and 22 July and of 9 August of the Security Council,

Taking into account the unsatisfactory economic and political conditions that continue in the Republic of the Congo,

Considering that, with a view to preserving the unity, territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, to protecting and advancing the welfare of its people, and to safeguarding international peace, it is essential for the United Nations to continue to assist the Central Government of the Congo,

1. Fully supports the resolution of 14 and 22 July and of 5 August of the Security Council;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to take vigorous action in accordance with the terms of the aforesaid resolutions and to assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order throughout the territory of the Republic of the Congo and to safeguard its unity, territorial integrity and political independence in the interests of international peace and security;

3. Appeals to all Congolese within the Republic of the Congo to seek a speedy solution by peaceful means of all their internal conflicts for the unity and integrity of the Congo, with the assistance, as appropriate, of Asian and African representatives appointed by the Advisory Committee on the Congo, in consultation with the Secretary-General, for the purpose of conciliation;

4. Appeals to all Member Governments for urgent voluntary contributions to a United Nations Fund for the Congo to be used under United Nations control and in consultation with the Central Government for the purpose of rendering the fullest possible assistance to achieve the objective mentioned in the preamble;

5. Requests
   (a) All States to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Congo of its authority and also to refrain from any action which might undermine the unity, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of the Congo;
   (b) All Member States, in accordance with Articles 25 and 49 of the Charter, to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council and to afford mutual assistance in carrying out measures decided upon by the Security Council;

The Security Council,

Having considered the situation in the Congo,

Having learned with deep regret the announcement of the killing of the Congolese leaders, Mr. Patrice Lumumba, Mr. Maurice Mpolo and Mr. Joseph Okito,

Deeply concerned at the grave repercussions of these crimes and the danger of wide-spread civil war and bloodshed in the Congo and the threat to international peace and security,

Noting the Report of the Secretary-General's Special Representative (S/4691) dated 12 February 1961 bringing to light the development of a serious civil war situation and preparations therefor,

1. Urges that the United Nations take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort;

2. Urges that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries;

3. Calls upon all States to take immediate and energetic measures to prevent the departure of such personnel for the Congo from their territories, and for the denial of transit and other facilities to them;
The Security Council,

Gravely concerned at the continuing deterioration in the Congo, and the prevalence of conditions which seriously imperil peace and order, and the unity and territorial integrity of the Congo, and threaten international peace and security,

Noting with deep regret and concern the systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the general absence of rule of law in the Congo,

Recognizing the imperative necessity of the restoration of parliamentary institutions in the Congo in accordance with the fundamental law of the country, so that the will of the people should be reflected through the freely elected Parliament,

Convinced that the solution of the problem of the Congo lies in the hands of the Congolese people themselves without any interference from outside and that there can be no solution without conciliation,

Convinced further that the imposition of any solution, including the formation of any government not based on genuine conciliation would, far from settling any issues, greatly enhance the dangers of conflict within the Congo and threat to international peace and security,

1. Urges the convening of the Parliament and the taking of necessary protective measures in that connection;

2. Urges that Congolese armed units and personnel should be reorganized and brought under discipline and control, and arrangements be made on impartial and equitable bases to that end and with a view to the elimination of any possibility of interference by such units and personnel in the political life of the Congo;

3. Calls upon all States to extend their full co-operation and assistance and take such measures as may be necessary on their part, for the implementation of this resolution.

[This resolution was adopted by nine votes to zero, with two abstentions—France, the U.S.S.R.]

S'5002, 24 November 1961

The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions S'4387, S/4405, S/4426 and S/4741,
Recalling further General Assembly resolutions 1474 (ES-IV), 1592 (XV),
Reaffirming the policies and purposes of the United Nations with respect to the Congo (Leopoldville) as set out in the aforesaid resolutions, namely:

(a) To maintain the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo;
(b) To assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order;
(c) To prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo;
(d) To secure the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all foreign military, para-military and advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries; and
(e) To render technical assistance,

Welcoming the restoration of the national Parliament of the Congo in accordance with the Loi fondamentale and the consequent formation of a Central Government on 2 August 1961,

Deploring all armed action in opposition to the authority of the Government of the Republic of the Congo, specifically secessionist activities and armed action now being carried on by the Provincial Administration of Katanga with the aid of external resources and foreign mercenaries, and completely rejecting the claim that Katanga is a "sovereign independent nation;"

Noting with deep regret the recent and past actions of violence against United Nations personnel,

Recognizing the Government of the Republic of the Congo as exclusively responsible for the conduct of the external affairs of the Congo,

Bearing in mind the imperative necessity of speedy and effective action to implement fully the policies and purposes of the United Nations in the Congo to end the unfortunate plight of the Congolese people, necessary both in the interests of world peace and international co-operation, and stability and progress of Africa as a whole,

1. Strongly deprecates the secessionist activities illegally carried out by the provincial administration of Katanga, with the aid of external resources and manned by foreign mercenaries;
2. Further deprecates the armed action against United Nations forces and personnel in the pursuit of such activities;
3. Insists that such activities shall cease forthwith, and calls upon all concerned to desist therefrom;
4. Authorizes the Secretary-General to take vigorous action, including the use of requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries as laid down in paragraph A-2 of the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961;
5. Further requests the Secretary-General to take all necessary measures to prevent the entry or return of such elements under whatever guise and also of arms, equipment or other material in support of such activities.

6. Requests all States to refrain from the supply of arms, equipment or other material which could be used for warlike purposes, and to take the necessary measures to prevent their nationals from doing the same, and also to deny transportation and transit facilities for such supplies across their territories, except in accordance with the decisions, policies and purposes of the United Nations;

7. Calls upon all Member States to refrain from promoting, condoning, or giving support by acts of omission or commission, directly or indirectly, to activities against the United Nations often resulting in armed hostilities against the United Nations forces and personnel;

8. Declares that all secessionist activities against the Republic of the Congo are contrary to the Loi fondamentale and Security Council decisions and specifically demands that such activities which are now taking place in Katanga shall cease forthwith;

9. Declares full and firm support for the Central Government of the Congo, and the determination to assist that Government in accordance with the decision of the United Nations to maintain law and order and national integrity, to provide technical assistance and to implement those decisions;

10. Urges all Member States to lend their support, according to their national procedures, to the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo, in conformity with the Charter and the decisions of the United Nations;

11. Requests all Member States to refrain from any action which may directly or indirectly impede the policies and purposes of the United Nations in the Congo and is contrary to its decisions and the general purpose of the Charter.
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS
AND THE CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT

[This 'basic agreement' between Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and the
Congo was initialled on July 29, 1960. It was circulated as document
S/4389/Add. 5.]

1. The Government of the Republic of the Congo states that, in the exercise of its sovereign rights with respect to any question concerning the presence and functioning of the United Nations Force in the Congo, it will be guided, in good faith, by the fact that it has requested military assistance from the United Nations and by its acceptance of the resolutions of the Security Council of 14 and 22 July 1960; it likewise states that it will ensure the freedom of movement of the Force in the interior of the country and will accord the requisite privileges and immunities to all personnel associated with the activities of the Force.

2. The United Nations takes note of this statement of the Government of the Republic of the Congo and states that, with regard to the activities of the United Nations Force in the Congo, it will be guided, in good faith, by the task assigned to the Force in the aforementioned resolutions; in particular the United Nations reaffirms, considering it to be in accordance with the wishes of the Government of the Republic of the Congo, that it is prepared to maintain the United Nations Force in the Congo, until such time as it deems the latter's task to have been fully accomplished.

3. The Government of the Republic of the Congo and the Secretary-General state their intention to proceed immediately, in the light of paragraphs 1 and 2 above, to explore jointly specific aspects of the functioning of the United Nations Force in the Congo, notably with respect to its deployment, the question of its lines of communication and supply, its lodging and its provisioning; the Government of the Republic of the Congo, confirming its intention to facilitate the functioning of the United Nations Force in the Congo, and the United Nations have agreed to work together to hasten the implementation of the guiding principles laid down in consequence of the work of joint exploration on the basis of the resolutions of the Security Council.

4. The foregoing provisions shall likewise be applicable, as appropriate, to the non-military aspects of the United Nations operation in the Congo.

*M.V. Naidu, Collective Security and the United Nations,
Macmillan, Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, 1974.
### APPENDIX-III*

**OUNC: LOCATION AND STRENGTH STATEMENT**

#### A. OUNC location statement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial No.</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Unit/Sub-Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>OUNC Headquarters</td>
<td></td>
<td>Leopoldville</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Signal squadron</td>
<td>Leopoldville</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Supply platoon</td>
<td>Leopoldville</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Ordnance company</td>
<td>Leopoldville</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Brigade of 3 battalions and 2 police companies</td>
<td>Leopoldville</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Battalion HQ and 2 companies</td>
<td>Leopoldville</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1 company</td>
<td>Leopoldville</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>UAR</td>
<td>1 company</td>
<td>Leopoldville</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Brigade HQ</td>
<td>Leopoldville</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>HQ 1st Battalion</td>
<td>Thysville</td>
<td>1 platoon in Boende</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>Company HQ and 1 platoon</td>
<td>Boma</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>Platoon</td>
<td>Thysville</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>Platoon</td>
<td>Lukula</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>Platoon</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>Company</td>
<td>Matadi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>Company HQ and 1 platoon</td>
<td>Songololo</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Lufu</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>Platoon</td>
<td>Lukuwa</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td>Platoon</td>
<td>Moerbeke</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>HQ and 2 Battalion</td>
<td>Kilwet</td>
<td>2 companies in Katanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td>Company</td>
<td>Leeverville</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td>Platoon</td>
<td>Banga</td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
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<td>Platoon</td>
<td>Kizia</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td>Company HQ and 2 platoons</td>
<td>Popokabaka</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Battalion HQ</td>
<td>Banningville</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td>Company</td>
<td>Dima</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td>Company HQ and 1 platoon</td>
<td>Musie</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td>Platoon</td>
<td>Kwamouth</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td>Platoon</td>
<td>Bolobo</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>Company HQ and 2 platoons</td>
<td>Inongo</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td>Platoon</td>
<td>Kiri</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td>Company HQ and 1 platoon</td>
<td>Oshwe</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td>Platoon</td>
<td>Nioki</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
<td>Platoon</td>
<td>Mabenga</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td>Company</td>
<td>Coquilhatville</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>Platoon</td>
<td>Boende</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td>UAR</td>
<td>Gemena</td>
<td>1 company in Leopoldville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td>Battalion less 3 companies</td>
<td>Lisala</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
<td>Company less 1 platoon</td>
<td>Bumba</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td>Company</td>
<td>Libonge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Brigade HQ</td>
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<th>Location</th>
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<tr>
<td>51</td>
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April 10, 1949

Dear Dr. Chough:

I thought your radiogram inquiring as to the advisability of openly asking for military aid was very timely. However, I did not wish to proceed openly in the matter for fear it might spoil some confidential arrangements made by Mr. Muccio, who was reported to have secured "something."** When he came to see me with Mr. Drumright, I quietly asked him what had been accomplished, and he said this: "The military aid has been granted and the President has signed certain documents relating to it." I am not sure whether he referred to the President's signature on the military aid request or on the ECA agreement. He further said that the publicity regarding a direct request for further military aid might hurt the plan. I thought he was right. There are lots of people who oppose giving arms to Koreans as they would oppose giving sharp knives to children. Our enemies have spread propaganda to the effect that the ignorant, thoughtless Koreans might attack the Soviet Union, thus bringing about a clash between Russia and the United States. This idea is prevalent among some Americans in Korea even now. For such reasons, the thought of giving military aid to Korea is considered dangerous to the United States.

*This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government. Copy.

**The words "to have secured something" are underlined in ink in the original.

What you and I are trying to do is to convince the world that we are not as foolish as we have been represented to be. We must make it known that we can manage our own affairs as well as any other well organized nation can. It is in this respect that publicity work is most important. The Americans are beginning to learn more about us and their estimate of our strength and capability is rising higher every day. But unless we can be sure of having the support of some of the leading newspapers in the United States, it would be too risky to make an open demand for arms and ammunition. This is why I have thought it best to keep your mission confidential.

Now on the other hand, I want to tell you why we need feel no timidity when we have the opportunity to make our sentiments on this matter known to the proper authorities. We are perhaps in greater need of arms and ammunition than any other nation, largely because of conditions imposed upon us by the Great Powers themselves. At the same time, there is more reason for the United States to arm us than to arm any other people, because of the obligation it owes us.

We have more justifiable grounds for demanding arms than any other nation in the world. It was the United States that invited the Soviet Union to occupy northern Korea, and it was the United States that prevented us for two and a half years from arming ourselves. Despite these facts, among the nations of Northeast Asia, Korea is the only one that has been fighting the Communists successfully.

While the United States as the Arsenal of Democracy was freely granting Lend Lease aid and military equipments to every Allied nation, we were the only people denied the privilege of securing any aid. During all the past years we have had to fight the common enemy alone and unaided. Now as the Americans are withdrawing their occupation forces from Korea, would it not be a gross crime to leave us alone and unaided, ill equipped for national defense, while the north Korean Communist force is armed and aided by the Soviet Union? It the northern army should invade our country and force us to accept a Communist rule, would not the United States be responsible for it?

Ever since the attack on Pearl Harbor we urged and begged the State Department to give us military and economic assistance, so that after the defeat of Japan we would have an army of our own to defend our own homeland against Communist attack. We told them plainly that if the Communists were allowed to occupy Korea a situation would be created disadvantageous not only to Korea but also to the United States. This statement was made repeatedly, both orally and in writing, as is fully evidenced in the contents of the State Department files. They turned a deaf ear to our
appeals, and you know the result. Both the United States and Korea are paying the price for the mistakes made by the State Department at that time.

Now we are asking for arms both for our own defense and for the security of the United States. If they fail us again, both Korea and the United States will suffer. We might as well go on record to this effect, to show that we see in advance what is coming and to warn against a repetition of the earlier mistake. Whether our American friends realize it or not, it is up to us to make plain the warning and the appeal.

I think you should frankly discuss this situation in fullest confidence with high officials of both the United Nations and the United States. In a strictly confidential manner tell them what plans we have for the unification of north and south. As a matter of fact, we are ready for the unification now in every respect but one; namely, we lack arms and ammunition. A large proportion of the Korean Communist Army is ready to mutiny and help us chase out of the country such Communist hirelings as Kim Il Sung and others. And the civilian population in the north will join with them in cleaning up and keeping under control all the terroristic Communist elements. They are all ready to do it without our aid. They have asked us to give them the signal by radio or by other secret message, setting the time and date. In fact they are urging us to do it.

However, we are urging them to wait for the simple reason that we do not have sufficient arms and ammunition for the next necessary step. Supposing we do clean up the north and settle everything quietly to our satisfaction? Who is there to keep the Chinese Eighth Route Army, the Yenan group, and the Siberian forces from moving in again? We have to be prepared with a sufficient military force so that we can proceed into the north to join with our loyal army there, and to move the Iron Curtain from the 38th parallel up to the Yalu River, and there to guard it against infiltration from without.

For this operation we need two naval vessels of 8,000 tons each, with 18 inch guns, for the defense of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. We need fast running patrol boats to guard against Communist underground movements along our coasts. We need 200,000 soldiers trained and organized for defense along the northern border. We need planes for defense and anti-aircraft guns. And we need them now.

Some Americans worry about the lack of technicians, but they do not know that we have ten or twelve aviators who were among the best in Japan, three of whom were accounted the best in the Orient. We have sea captains who can direct our merchant marine. For our army, we can or-
ganize a force of 200,000 men in a short time. We have several hundred thousand returned soldiers who were forced to join the conscript army during the war. They are, in fact, veteran soldiers. They were put into the front lines by the Japanese, and many of them were killed in the South Pacific Island and Manchurian operations. Most of the officers were trained in Japanese universities. People do not know much about them for they keep quiet for fear they may be branded as pro-Japanese. They are loyal citizens and are ready to give their lives for their country. If we get sufficient arms, we can prepare them in no time.

This outline will show you why I wish you to keep the request confidential, and also suggests the line of approach you may find effective in your talks with United States and United Nations officials. Our need is great, and it will be disastrous for both Korea and the United States if it is not heeded. The mistake of withholding arms from Koreans must not be made again, as it was made during the war.

I shall expect your confidential reports on the reactions you receive from the high officials, and we shall try to help in all ways we can from here.

Sincerely yours,
(Syngman Rhee)

Dr. Pyung Ok Chough
Washington DC

* In some places Pyung Ok Chough is spelled as Cho Byung-ok.
April 10, 1947

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Photostatic copy of the 1st page of Document No. 1
September 30, 1949

To: Dr. Robert T. Oliver
From: President Syngman Rhee

I received your letters and thank you for them.

I do not want to register Mr. Krock as lobbyist or anything of that kind. Please contact Mr. K.** and Mr. Mead in a very confidential way and find out all what is necessary. In case you think that it would not be advisable to employ Mr. K. in regard to what Mr. W.*# told you we may have to drop the matter. In my last letter I asked you to find out from the National Press Club more about K. We simply cannot engage anyone who has not a good business reputation. Please be very careful in dealing with this matter.

There is some criticism about the work we are doing. But I wrote to them that you are doing all right, so do not let that worry you but be on friendly terms with everybody and carry on your work at your best ability. The more I think of your work the more I feel convinced that you can be more helpful here in Korea. I need someone to take care of my important work and I am thinking seriously of asking you to come at the end of your term of service in the university. Do not whisper it to anybody but keep it in mind and as soon

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** As in the original.
as you can get out I wish you would come and work for me right in my office.
How often I wish we had you here.

I wish I had time to write out from time to time some of my thoughts relating to the changing events both here and in America. So far it has been impossible. I will try however. One thing is that I want to tell you briefly concerning our situation.

I feel strongly that now is the most psychological moment when we should take an aggressive measure and join with our loyal communist army in the north to clean up the rest of them in Pyongyang. We will drive some of Kim Il Sung’s men to the mountain region and where we will gradually starve them out. Then our line of defense must be strengthened along the Tuman and Yalu Rivers. We will be in a 100% better position. The natural boundary line along the river and the Paikdoo Mts can be made almost impenetrable with sufficient number of planes and two or three fast running naval vessels standing at the mouths of the two rivers with fighting planes defending all the coast lines including Cheju Island. What Koreans of old did repeatedly during the last 2,000 years in defending their nation against great invasions of Emperor Tang, Emperor Soo, the Mongols and the Japs. I believe we are ready to repeat the successful defense of our nation against foreign invasions. All the Chinese, Japanese and the Korean communist army in Manchuria and Siberia may do all they want to but we will be able to fight them off. We want to do regardless of what outside nations may do against us. I believe the Soviet Union will not be foolhardy enough to start invasions at the present time. Our people are clamoring for it. Our people in the north want us to let them do it now but we are doing everything we can to quiet them down and it is a mighty difficult task. I want you to express this situation very clearly and convincingly and show a copy to Ambassador Chang and Ambassador Chough. We will all quietly work together, you in Washington and in New York and our two Ambassadors and other friends, and we here in Seoul and Tokyo toward one end; that they agree to our cleaning up and setting our house in order. Use the old phrase that Churchill used once, “Give us the tools and we will do the job.” Convince the American statesmen and the general public and let them quietly agree that we go ahead and carry out our program and give us all the material backing we need. The longer we drag along the harder it will be. Soviet’s cold war is always a winning war. First they give the communist agitators money, weapons and propaganda literature to stir up the people to fight among themselves. Then later they get the communist converts into a gang of terrorists, assassins and robbers by killing, and burning and making the whole human society hell. So long as they continue robbing they have enough to support themselves. They do everything to make trouble for others. By so doing the communists are
strengthening themselves and spreading wider and digging deeper all the time. The more robbery they commit the more money they get. With the money they carry on their killing and burning activities. But the nationalists everywhere have no one to count on for help. They have to use every means of their own to defend themselves and these sort of things continue herein hereout. They cannot keep fighting. They are forced sooner or later to give in and that is what happened in China and everywhere else. What the Americans are doing now in the so-called cold war is a losing battle and if we continue in this losing battle by sitting still and warding off these gangsters no human flesh and nerve can hold on very long. When the Koreans are willing to get up and clean them up once and for all it is the most psychological moment to do-it now. I am sure we can settle this question within a reasonable short time if we are only allowed to do it.

Please put this whole story in a very convincing statement and quietly approach some influential people here and there and let us get their support. If you could get this story into President Truman's ear I think it will have some desired effect.
To : Dr. Robert T. Oliver  
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September 30, 1949

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There is some criticism about the work we are doing. But I wrote to them that you are doing all right, so do not let that worry you but be on friendly terms with everybody and carry on your work at your best ability. The more I think of your work the more I feel convinced that you can be more helpful here in Korea. I need someone to take care of my important work and I am thinking seriously of asking you to come at the end of your term of service in the university. Do not whisper it to anybody but keep it in mind and as soon as you can get out I wish you would come and work for me right in my office. Now often I wish we had you here.

I wish I had time to write out from time to time some of my thoughts relating to the changing events both here and in America. So far it has been impossible. I will try however. One thing is that I want to tell you briefly concerning our situation.

I feel strongly that now is the most psychological moment when we should take an aggressive measure and join with our loyal communist army in the north to clean up the rest of them in Pyongyang. We will drive some of Kim Il Sung's men to the mountain region and where we will gradually starve them out. Then our line of defense must be strengthened along the Tuman and Yalu Rivers. We will be in a 100% better position. The natural boundary line along the river and the Tuman Hts can be made almost impenetrable with sufficient number of planes and two or three fast running naval vessels standing at the mouth of the two rivers with fighting planes defending all the coast lines including Cheju Island. What Koreans of old did repeatedly during the last 2,000 years in defending their nation against great invasions of Emperor Tang, Emperor Sun, the Mongols and the Japs, I believe we are ready to repeat the successful defense of our nation against...
LETTER FROM CHANG MYUN, SOUTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON TO SYNGMAN RHEE, DATED JANUARY 11, 1950

Confidential

KOREAN EMBASSY
Washington D.C.

January 11, 1950

Your Excellency:

This letter is being prepared just before the pouch leaves for the airport so that I may give you some encouraging news which I have received confidentially from a top level, reliable source in the Pentagon. I am informed that the State Department and the Pentagon are planning a firm stand with respect to the U.S. Oriental policy. In this anti-Communist plan Korea will occupy an important position. I have every hope that we will get much more help, militarily speaking, as a result.

I have had word from a confidential source in the State Department that President Truman will sign, very soon, authorization which will grant permission for armament for Korean ships and planes. Thus I am confident that there will be no delay at Pearl Harbor in installing guns on the Bakdusan, for the President's order will remove the principal and important obstacle.

The Turkish representative on UNCOK has met with me and I found
him to be a strong and sympathetic person. I feel sure he will make a good Commission member.

With sentiments of loyalty and esteem, I am

Respectfully yours,

John M. Chang*

His Excellency
Dr. Syngman Rhee
President of the
Republic of Korea
January 11, 1950

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Dr. Syngman Rhee
President of the
Republic of Korea
LETTER FROM REAR ADMIRAL SOHN WON-IL, SOUTH KOREAN CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, TO ADMIRAL RADFORD, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF U.S. PACIFIC FLEET, U.S. NAVY, DATED JULY 18, 1949

REPUBLIC OF KOREA
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

Washington Embassy
Muccio
Tokyo
Admiral Sohn

Office of Chief of Naval Operation

My dear Admiral Radford:

The Government of the Republic of Korea desires to express to you its sincere appreciation for the friendly visit made by a unit of your fleet consisting of the Cruiser Manchester and the auxiliary destroyers under the command of Admiral T.H. Binford.

This visit has greatly enhanced the already existing good feeling between the United States and Korea. We particularly appreciate this significant manifestation of your friendship for us, and we are desirous to express our gratitude in return. We have learned to respect and admire the noble spirit shown by Admiral Binford and by the officers and enlisted men under

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* This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government. Copy.
** Letterhead.
*** These four lines were inserted in ink, presumably for distribution.
his command. This Government hopes that this unit, in its present form or enlarged grouping, will call on us again and often. Indeed, we shall be glad to afford the facilities of our several ports, including Inchun, Pusan, Yosu, Mukho and the Naval Base of Chinhae, as temporary Mobile Bases of any such a unit of your Fleet.

Such an arrangement as this will not only further solidify the friendly relationship between our two nations but also be a source of encouragement to all the peace-loving democratic nations, in and around the Pacific. We cannot convey this suggestion to the Secretary of the United States Navy. We may not be able to offer you all the conveniences and facilities for the comfort of our visitors but we shall strive to be genial hosts.

I take this opportunity to convey to you the high esteem of our President, Dr. Syngman Rhee, and the hope that you will also honor us by a personal visit in a near future.

Most sincerely yours,
Won Il Sohn
Rear Admiral
Chief of Naval Operation

Admiral A. W. Radford
Commander-in-Chief
United States Pacific Fleet
United States Navy
Office of Chief of Naval Operation, July 14, 1943

My dear Admiral Radford:

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Sincerely yours,

Kim Il Soth
Vice Admiral
Chief of Naval Operation

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Admiral A. W. Radford
Commander-in-Chief
United States Pacific Fleet
United States Navy
Dear Mr. President:

I have the honour to make a brief report covering the following subjects:

**THE KOREAN PROBLEM AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

In view of the fact that I have made telegraphic reports at the various stages of the deliberations, that you must have heard a detailed report from Arnold Noble and that various official documents of the United Nations covering proceedings on the Korean discussion are to be sent to the Foreign Minister, I shall not dwell much upon details of the deliberations. I want only to point out that the Four Powers draft resolution was passed by the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority; that is to say, 55 to 6, in spite of the opposition from the Soviet Bloc. It is gratifying to note those friendly nations which had supported Korea's case in Paris last year are still steady and strong in sympathy toward Korea, in spite of the continuous and tragic development in China since then.

**THE NEW FEATURES OF THE RESOLUTION**

The characteristic difference between the December 13th, 1953 resolution and the present Four Powers draft resolution lies in the fact that the present resolution emphasizes the urgency of observation on the security situation existing in Korea now, and in the future. That is the reason why military experts are to be attached to the United Nations Commission on Korea. With the unification of Korea as the ultimate objective, the Commission's chief function this year is to make observations on the security situation. The second difference is found in that the existence of the Commission is indefinite; it will continue its work until the problem of unification has been achieved.

**THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMISSION**

I am happy to report that as the result of strong presentation made by our Delegation, the United States Delegation and the State Department, the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the Secretariat seemed to have given due attention to the need of strengthening the Commission. Syria is dropped and Turkey is nominated in lieu of that former troublesome member country. Secretary-General Lie has further assured me he had requested various member governments on the United Nations Commission on Korea to nominate their representatives from among persons of strong convictions and high experience and rank, with a view of having a system of permanent chairmanship that will ensure steady and stabilized functioning of the Commission.

**THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SECRETARIAT**

As reported to you by radiogram, Mr. Bertil Ramborg was appointed as the new principal secretary in lieu of Dr. Berthelmer. The Secretary-General and Mr. Cordier [American], Executive Assistant to Secretary-General Trygve Lie, have assured me that Mr. Ramborg is a man of strong convictions and leadership. He is a Swedish citizen and has been in charge of the Division of Communications and Records. He had ten years' experience in the foreign service of the Swedish Government. They further have assured me that those five objectionable persons, namely, Shanghai, Kita, and three others will be changed and that an entirely new and sound secretariat will be constituted.

H.E. Dr. Syngman Rhee
President of the Republic of Korea
Seoul, Korea.
MEMORANDUM OF SYNGMAN RHEE TO CHANG MYUN, SOUTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, AND CHO BYUNG-OK, AMBASSADOR PLENIPOTENTIARY AND PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, DATED JULY 18, 1949

July 18, 1949

MEMORANDUM

To: Ambassadors Chang and Chough
From: President Syngman Rhee

Ambassador Chang's letters of 13th with the enclosures and the Korean letter, and Ambassador Chough's letters of July 7 and 12 have arrived. I will make my answer to you both in the form of a memorandum so that it will answer both of your letters.

Since Ambassador Chough represents this government to the UN with complete authority to take up any matter I wonder whether it is necessary for you to get separate authorization in making membership application to various organizations belonging to the UN. If necessary, we will make separate credentials each time. But you have the authority to apply after being authorized by your government for memberships to UNWHO and UNESCO.

I feel that you should have someone to be in charge of the office during your absence. The young man you suggest cannot be adequate to act.
In your behalf, He is young and his qualifications are limited altogether. He is not the person for such a position. Roy Kim who was serving in AMG* as one of the officers in the Property Custody is now visiting with the Businessmen's Goodwill Party. We have used him in our office for some time and he proves himself very helpful and careful. He speaks and writes English very well and takes shorthand. If you care to use him, wire me at once and we will arrange to have him remain there to help you.

I am sure your trip to Canada will be highly successful and hope you will find it enjoyable as well.

Ambassador Chang's report on the interviews made together with Dr. Chough came together with Ambassador Chough's report covering the nearly same although your report is more in detail from which I gather more of the true aspects. I thank you for them.

I am so happy that our two Ambassadors in America are working in such complete cooperation. Very few representatives of other countries have shown such good spirit. I have nothing to worry about at that end and that harmony alone is sufficient to increase the prestige and solidity of our people and government.

As you will find my answer covering the general topics in my memorandum a copy of which will be sent to Dr. Chough, I am answering several questions relating only to the matters of personal interest. I am sorry to disappoint you but the chancery building project is far beyond our limit. In the first place we have no money to meet this obligation. If we can pay in Korean Won we can meet it but since we have to pay in dollars we cannot pay $50,000 for the building with the equipments and the architect and all that. If you want to build it half a year or so later when we have some of our gold mines developed and some commodities exported we may be able to consider it, but at the present time it is a matter of physical impossibility. Why don't you make a temporary arrangement for the chancery to be accommodated in the Embassy building and get along as best as you can. The architects do not have to be so high-priced people. We can get some smaller companies 2 or 3 companies be invited to submit their bids and if their plan is satisfactory we agree to pay so much. I do not think we have to pay 10 per cent fee for the plan alone, and that building also need not be so complete. Please do all you can to minimize the obligation on dollar basis as much as you can.

It seems to me that J.J. Williams is taking more time in our service than I thought he could spare. If he keeps up as he is doing now please quietly ask

* "American Military Government"
him what his railroad fares are and we might grant him expenses on a diem basis if he is in Washington. I am afraid if we ask him to present his bills we might not be able to pay for it.

REGARDING STAGGERS

We are not paying him anything for his service or even the time he spends. Ask him confidentially how much you should give him not as compensation but actually for the time he uses in serving us—if he does any important work you ask him to do. We do not want him to have a hand in everything but what you think is important. Everything should be itemized so that it will go on our files. All these things must be understood so that you are to decide what expense to pay and what not. That is to say, when you deliberately ask them to do certain things you must clearly state that their carefares* and hotel bills you will pay. No one in the Embassy's service Korean or foreign should decide so much for one trip.

Sorry I had to take this paragraph out** We received the papers for the SS Washington bought by the ECA.

About the Washington mail. We are still trying to make the ECA pay for it because the boat was not chartered by the Korean Government. Please do not pay unless you have direct orders from me.

REGARDING NATIONAL DEFENCE

We declare that our defense program consists of the following figures: 100,000 standing army; 200,000 reserve force and 100,000 police force; total of 400,000 are to be trained and equipped for our national defense. We have now 35,000 police and it will take a long time to reach that maximum number, but that is our aim. I do not think anybody can interpret it as militaristic expansion project.

The American officials in Washington are of the information that 50,000 fully armed, 15,000 lightly armed, and 35,000 police reasonably armed. These are the information furnished by General Roberts and we cannot give full credence to his reports. We are going to check these.

Since the beginning of the arms discussion I appointed our government representatives to sign the receipt of every item that we receive from the Americans and ask them to get the signature of the American

* As in the original, evidently misspelt.
** The preceding paragraph (regarding the steamship Washington) has been crossed out in the original and is omitted here.
officials showing what they are turning over to us and what we are receiving. There will be no disagreement in the reports regarding the quantities of arms and ammunition we receive.

You have already received one list of the materials turned over to us. As soon as we have another list we shall not fail to forward it to you.

MILITARY AID

The ECA bill should be passed before we take up the military aid. I am glad our Ambassadors and our friends have done so well that the ECA bill is progressing very nicely and I hope this will be adopted by the end of this month. However, the military aid is the most important one. If things come out as I hope I am sure we will get a large portion of the military aid appropriation of 1 billion 4 million dollars requested by President Truman for several European nations and Korea. These funds will be handled solely by President Truman, and I hope we can convince the President that Korea needs a lion's share, and I believe we deserve it. America's investment on Korea will pay more dividend to the United States than all the other receiving nations can yield. However, we must pave the way and if there is any obstacle we must leave no stone unturned until such obstacles are removed. General Roberts, head of the military mission was chosen by Gen. Hodge because Roberts' idea regarding Korea are just about the same. Roberts has no sympathy whatever for the Korean people or for the government. The best way to handle this question is to use Dr. Chough's suggestion that we ask for an official of a higher rank to head the mission. I am confidentially sending word to Gen. MacArthur asking him to appoint Gen. Coulter to head the mission. Whether Gen. MacArthur is in a position to do it or not is more or less uncertain. At any rate the presence of Gen. Roberts here at this time is not helpful to say the least, and if we can possibly get him out of Korea our case will be won hundred percent. Of course, we do not make this an open issue just as China did about General Stilwell. If we can succeed in quietly replacing him it would all be the better. If not we may have to make open demand which we are trying to avoid.

It was very wise of you and friends in Washington to advise us against any attempt to purchase weapons of war or planes at this time. I was so mad when they said we had more weapons than necessary and we did not need planes or naval vessels since the United States planes could be here within four or five hours, and I told them that we are going to arm ourselves sufficiently for our protection either with or
without United States aid. We inquired all around and we have offers of all kinds of weapons but we have postponed it. We are appointing competent men to survey the entire field of our defense program and make a complete list of things we need and let you have it as soon as we can.

LOAN PAYMENT

We have mailed you the minutes of my conversations with Ambassador Muccio. Please go over carefully the part covering the loan of $25,000,000 the payment for the U.S. war surplus materials as both of you know the circumstances surrounding the signing of this loan are highly questionable. Although the agreement was signed by the Representative Democratic Council and was also included in the financial settlement agreement, none of us ever thought that we would be asked to pay it and I had to be quite frank with Ambassador Muccio regarding it. They told me that we had to sign and I told them that we would rather pay it out of our aid fund and forget it. They can do as they please with the money which is supposed to be spent for the educational work of Americans. The Fulbright Act regulations are such that we have little voice in the matter. We are to spend money for the educational purpose in Korea and pay the expenses for American professors to come and lecture here and all that. They said that the Committee is composed of four Americans and four Koreans with the American Ambassador here as Chairman. That is not all.

They asked us to sell the Banto Hotel together with a number of some important buildings in Seoul. As a matter of fact we do not want to go on the record that the Korean government sold any of our properties to any foreign government and we would rather offer them as a gift with the understanding that when they are through with the buildings sooner or later they will give the Korean government the first opportunity to purchase it back according to the prevailing market price then. And we made the deeds including the words “free gift” and the paper was beautifully made and presented in a ceremony in presence of American and Korean officials. Now they told me that Washington declined to accept it as a gift. They want to deduct several million dollars as their price out of the $25,000,000 loan. I do not know if I should ask you to take it up with the State Department and find out their definite reply regarding this or let it go as it is. I am requested to sign the Fulbright proposition and as I do not wish to show my ugly face I am inclined to sign it whatever it is.
REGARDING OFFICIAL STATEMENT

I know that the June 8th statement was meant to be the guarantee that we asked them to make but it was not at all sufficient and our newspapers make quite a headline. If such a statement has any value at all the publicity about it in America should make it worth any. Time and again we found out that any such statement regarding international situation does not mean much unless the American people are informed of the fact that their nation is committing itself to certain obligations. Whether the State Department will make it known to America to that extent I do not know.

The treaty of commerce and amity is rather urgent. American businessmen are so anxious to open trade. We cannot afford to make an open door to everybody without any rules or regulations and therefore we are very anxious to get this commerce treaty signed soon.

REGARDING CHINHAE BAY

We had another visit by a unit of the United States Pacific Fleet under the command of Rear Admiral Binford. We had a little conversation with him and he is so impressed of the Bay and of our situation in general that he suggested we address a letter to the commanding officer of the U.S. Pacific Fleet to accept our offer of the privilege of using all our open ports as temporary mobile bases. That means they can visit and stop or stay any time at our invitation, and I think it would be helpful for both countries in safeguarding peace and security of the Pacific. Such a letter will be sent soon.

Since no naval or air officer of high rank can be employed by the Korean Government as it being against the law of the United States—we may have to find some other way of securing the services of able, experienced United States officials. Whether we should ask President Truman or the State Department authorities I do not know. If you think it available please quietly call on Admiral Yarnel and give him the best regards from Mrs. Rhee and myself to him and Mrs. Yarnel. They are our good friends. I would like you to tell him that we should like him to come and visit us as our guest sometime in the near future, if he would accept our invitation. When he comes we could ask him to stay and he may suggest some plan. However, it should be done as top secret. Of course, we do not want to create any impression that we are giving any of our naval or air base to the United States or any other
foreign power because that will create bad impression all around. You understand that, I am sure.

Noble's article seems to reflect the idea of the officials in the State Department. These are all the views of the pro-Japanese sentiment. We strongly object to the Japanese possession of Manchuria. If Japan had to have it she may be allowed to take north of Mukden up to Harbin and Vladivostok. But from Mukden to south Korea we will not allow any other nation to occupy it even temporarily. We will fight to the nail, and this idea should be gradually made known, although at present people may misunderstand our motive and the result may be hurtful to us. We might as well let the world know that we are strongly opposed to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria or any other part especially the part adjacent to Korea. We will never allow Japan to occupy that part of Manchuria without our opposition.

From Noble's article in the Saturday Evening Post you will see that he is propagandizing that Japan should be included in the Pacific Periphery Alliance which each state is bound to defend Japan. If you would particularly read Page 82 you will see that arming Japan is the main purpose of this article and is sugar-coated enough to make the American people take it. Particularly on the second column of Page 84 he outlined that the first half of the Pacific Periphery Alliance should be strong precise military alliance. The second pact is the Asiatic Pacific Pact which includes Korea, should be etc. etc.
REPORT OF CHO BYUNG-OK, AMBASSADOR PLENIPOTENTIARY, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND PERMANENT OBSERVER TO THE UNITED NATIONS, TO SYNGMAN RHEE, DATED OCTOBER 12, 1949*

TELEPHONE
LONGACRE 3-4420†

CABLE ADDRESS
KORUNMISON‡

PERMANENT OBSERVER OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
EMPIRE STATE BUILDING
ROOM 6010
350 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 1, N.Y.**

October 12, 1949

Dear Mr. President:

THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Heated discussions are going on now at Lake Success on such important problems as the Greek problem, the Italian Colonies, Human Rights and Religious Freedom, the China question and Atomic Energy Control.

As for our problem it will probably come up before the General Assembly in the latter part of next week even though there may be usual delay tactics that will be employed by the Soviet Bloc. The resolution affecting Korea

* This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government.
† Letterhead.
‡ Marked in pencil by Syngman Rhee personally, presumably an abbreviation of "read."
which had been adopted at the Special Political Committee will certainly pass through the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority.

AS REGARDS JOHNSTON

In compliance with your wishes, I had taken up the case of Dick Johnston with General Adler of The New York Times and he had assured me that he would not make an immediate change of position for Johnston, which fact was indicated also in General Adler's letter to me.

I have made an appointment with Mr. Sultzberger for today to deliver personally your letter to him.

YOUR LETTER TO OLIVER

It was with great care and interest that I read your letter to Dr. Oliver with regard to the question of unification, rather the disposal of the puppet regime in the North. The proposals you expounded therein are, under the circumstances prevailing, the only logical and ultimate method of bringing about our desired unification. However, after taking into consideration all the factors involved I am inclined to view that the time is not opportune as yet to carry out such a project. In the first place, I seriously question our preparedness, and the international opinion will not approve of such an action to be taken. It must be recalled that the Greek Government itself has been persuaded by the friendly powers from taking military steps against Albania.

I do not see what or how Oliver can do under the present circumstances in connection with this serious problem. I am sure he cannot publicize such a proposal as our fixed government policy. Nor do I think that it would be wise for him to make public such matters of secret import. I have discussed it with Ambassador Chang and Dr. Oliver and we unanimously agree that this matter should be regarded as the basic plan of our Government that should be carried out when we are ready and the time is opportune.

Dear Mr. President, please forgive me for laying before you such outspoken views but I should like to assure you that I have felt that it is my bounding duty to be candid in order to be of loyal service to you.

PACIFIC PACT

Ambassador Chang and I have had a full exchange of views on the subject matter. In view of the situation existing, which was described in my last report, we do not see how the proposal you have in mind can be effected as a reality. The matter of the Pacific Pact is entirely entrusted by Quirino in the hands of Romulo and he in turn has a program somewhat different from that which you, Generalissimo Chiang and President Quirino had in
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WEEKLY REPORTS.

   On July 8th, in the afternoon, I and Dr. Chough visited the War Department and had an interview with Gen. Wedemeyer and Brig.-Gen. Timberman, a member of his staff. We explained to them that at present our country is in urgent need of reinforcement of the armed forces on account of the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces, and asked them what measures the U.S. Military authorities would take. Brig.-Gen. Timberman answered.

   "As far as we American authorities can see, Korea has nothing to worry about. Because:
   1. Taking into account the international situation, the Soviet Union will certainly not attack Korea with her own troops.
   2. The Chinese Communist Army, too, will not possibly invade Korea.
   3. As the North Korean Communist Army is inferior to that of South
Korea in its numerical strength as well as in its equipments, it will certainly not itself start the expedition against the South.

4. The South Korean National Army is splendid in its numerical strength and in its equipments.

5. When the U.S. Forces pulled out, they left a large quantity of weapons; and munitions, too, must be sufficiently reserved.

6. As for further military aid to Korea, as soon as the sum of aid is fixed by Congress, we will decide on kinds and quantities of weapons to be delivered, taking account of the opinion of the Chief of the Military Advisory Group in Korea.

(Lieut.-Gen. Wedemeyer could not abide the interview very long as he did not have much time).

We said, we were told that we were very short of ammunition, and in the event of an actual warfare it would last only for a couple of days; and we asked him, if that was true. He answered: "We haven't received any such report from Brig.-Gen. Roberts, and we don't think you are short of ammunition." He said further: "It was a matter of course that the U.S. troops pulled out this time." He said, anyhow it was an established fact that the United States would militarily assist Korea; and after the decision by Congress, further aid would be itemized in accordance with the recommendations by the Military Advisory Group, etc.

It is certain that American military aid in the future will depend a great deal on the will and attitude of Brig.-Gen. Roberts, Chief of the Military Advisory Group—a fact which Your Excellency will have to consider. It seems to be adequate to make a confidential proposal for the change of his post through Ambassador Muccio.

As for the ammunition, I also had a talk with Mr. Bond of the State Department. They say here that there are about fifteen million rounds in all, of which not the whole quantity will be handed over to the Korean National Army, but will be kept by the U.S. Military Advisory Group and delivered occasionally. We insisted that the whole quantity should be handed over to the Korean National Army so that we could use them as occasion demanded. Any way, for the sake of further negotiations, too, we need an itemized table of weapons and munitions we received when the last troops of the U.S. Forces withdrew. I hope Your Excellency will send me the table.

We asked both Generals to do their utmost for the military aid of our country. Mr. Staggers will have an interview with Mr. Wedemeyer this afternoon, and appeal to him again.
2. Regarding interview with Acheson, Secretary of State.

On July 11th, at 3.00 p.m., I and Dr. Chough made a call on Mr. Acheson. Dr. Chough conveyed to him the following three points as Your Excellency's message:

1. For the Korean National Army and the security forces, at least 100,000 standing army, 50,000 reserve force, 50,000 police force and 200,000 militia must be equipped and be ready for any emergency. The United States shall supply us with arms sufficient to meet this.

2. It must be clearly mentioned that in the event of invasion of foreign forces or of the North Korean Communist Army under command of a certain foreign power, the United States shall positively come to our military assistance or back us.

3. The United States shall take an active part in supporting a Pacific Pact or a similar union of Asiatic countries for their common security.

Thereupon, Mr. Acheson answered as follows:

1. As for the first item, it will be carried out by decision of Congress;

2. As for the second item, though no specific statement can be made concerning any individual state, we think measures for Korea, as was declared by the State Department on June 8th, can fully comply with the demands (Original enclosed);

3. As for the third item, for the time being, the United States cannot officially take part in it.

Though the United States hesitates in officially taking part in the matter of the 3rd item, we can gather from yesterday's statement of Mr. McDermott, official reporter of the State Department, that for the first time the United States is deeply interested in a union of Asiatic countries against the communist influence; and we can expect that in due time she will take an active part in it.

The press here published a good account of Mr. Chiang Kai-shek's interview with the President of the Philippines concerning the Pacific Pact as well as Your Excellency's statement. Herewith I enclose selections of them for Your Excellency's reference.

I made a statement concerning the so-called September Elections in North Korea, which I am also enclosing.

Mr. Staggers has just come back, having had a confidential talk with
Gen. Wedemeyer for two hours concerning the situation in our country. Gen. Wedemeyer's attitude is through and through sympathetic and co-operative, by which we are very much enlightened. The talk includes Brig-Gen. Roberts' case, question of establishing a Korean-American Joint Commission concerning the arms etc. I cannot make reports on it this time; but Mr. Staggers will make a detailed report by the next mail.

Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the United States of America.

Seal*

* A square seal, “the seal of the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the U.S.A.” in Chinese ideographs.
No. 8

SCHEME (A) OF INTELLIGENCE WORK FOR THE YEAR 1950, PREPARED BY SECTION III, INTELLIGENCE BUREAU OF THE SOUTH KOREAN ARMY HEADQUARTERS*

(STRict MILITary SECRECY) **

SCHEME OF INTELLIGENCE WORK FOR THE YEAR 1950.

Section III, Intelligence Bureau,
Army Headquarters.

Policy:

In consideration of the tense international situation at home and abroad, the fundamental policy of the intelligence work shall hinge upon execution of matters of importance. Extermination of puppet organizations of North Korea shall be aimed at by means of secret warfares, and with might and main, successful intelligence works shall be carried out for a rapid frustration of the said organizations for the restoration of lost territories.

INTELLIGENCE:

TARGETS:

I. Military intelligence:

1) Formations and equipments of the stationed units;
2) Movements and defence of the 38th parallel line;
3) Ideological tendencies of the People’s Army officers;
4) Attitude of the Army towards the government and the people;

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* This document was found in Section III, Intelligence Bureau of the South Korean Army Headquarters. The original is in Korean. This document is divided into A and B Sections by the editor in view of the difference in their contents.

** Stamp.
5) How far the Army participates in politics;
6) How much the population has confidence in the Army;
7) Relations between the Army and political parties and social organizations;
8) Morale and discipline;
9) How far the Soviet military advisers have a hand in the North Korean affairs;
10) Relations with the Eighth Route Army in Manchuria;
11) Operation plans;
12) Anti-army and anti-war sentiments of the Army personnel;
13) Military finance and funds;
14) How the Army is supplied;
15) Military intelligence work versus the South.

II. Political, economic and ideological intelligence:

1) Popular rumours about the lower administration officials
2) Collections, labour service, requisitions, taxes;
3) Complaints of the civilians against the officials;
4) Political co-operation of the people;
5) Industrial conditions;
6) Rehabilitation of business and industry;
7) How far the communist regime is understood;
8) How transportation facilities are being operated;
9) Foreign trades;
10) How far the international situation is understood;
11) Propagandas at home and abroad;
12) Education and culture;
13) Ideological tendencies of the students;
14) Materials delivered to the Soviet Union.

ESSENTIAL POINTS:

Main points of the intelligence work:

I. The main point of the intelligence work lies in getting the mainstay of secret agents as follows, and equipping them with the qualifications of best workers through a thorough-going training:

1) One who has knowledge of military affairs, is interested in getting wind of secrets, and predisposed to adventure;
2) One who is clever, has sound judgement and knows the art of social intercourse;
3) A quick witted, told and self-possessed person;
4) A shrewd person with a wealth of common sense and who is skilled in techniques;
5) One who has a strong lust for fame and money;

II. Together with the permanent secret agents, liaison agents shall also be used, and through their intimate connections informations shall be transmitted; liaison agents shall be selected as follows:
1) One who is skilled in feigning a pedlar, also skilled in arts and techniques;
2) Beggars who hang about the taverns, and give performances of dancing, singing and musical instruments;
3) Barbers, photographers, train conductors and engineers;
4) Pedlars of miscellaneous goods, motorcar drivers, fishermen, etc.;
5) Cooks, bar-maids, waitresses and day-labourers.

Powerful nets of intelligence service shall be laid with the above-mentioned permanent and liaison secret agents; they must assume an ever-growing dimension, and at the same time they shall have cells as follows:

III. Cell organizations:
1) Cells, up to 5 in number, shall be organized around a leading agent; each cell shall consist of 3 to 5 persons, and they shall incessantly bring in informations;
2) In each cell, the person who is in charge shall have direct contacts with the permanent agent, and other cell members shall work by themselves;
3) One who is in charge of the cell shall give only partial orders to the agents under him, and the full account of an affair shall not be revealed;

IV. To bribe persons in important positions in various organs:
1) To make use of officers and men of the Army, who are prone to conversion, and pilfer confidential documents;
2) To infiltrate into important organs such as police stations, Counter-Intelligence Bureaus, etc., and steal confidential documents or obtain secrets;
3) To buy off workers and purveyors of prohibited military areas for sketches of important buildings.

INTRIGUES:

TARGETS:

I. Intrigues for Destrucutions:
1) Concerning railroads:
   a) To destroy bridges and tunnels;
   b) To derail and overturn military trains;
   c) To destroy freight cars and station buildings;
   d) Collision;
   e) To destroy main railway factories.

2) Heavy industry, firms and factories:
   a) Munitions factories of the People's Army;
   b) Various important factories of the Army;
   c) Public buildings;
   d) Aerodromes;
   e) Power plants and transformer stations;
   f) Broadcasting stations;
   g) Cylinder-press of newspapers.

II. Incendiariism: To set afire
   1) Public buildings,
   2) Dwelling houses,
   3) Public halls,
   4) Military barracks and school buildings,
   5) Buildings of political parties and other organs,
   6) Aerodromes,
   7) Power plants and transformer stations,
   8) Broadcasting stations,
   9) Various factories of the Army.

III. To infect with bacteria:
   1) Army kitchens,
   2) Dining rooms of the police,
   3) Banquet halls of the Army, government, party, etc.,
   4) City reservoirs, rivers,
   5) Houses of the leaders of the Army, government and the party.

IV. Propaganda:
   1) To distribute leaflets;
   2) To post wall newspapers;
   3) To scribble on walls;
   4) To circulate sensational rumours;
   5) To inspire liberalistic ideas;
   6) To stir up people against the war, against military service;
   7) To instigate anti-communist ideas;
   8) To provoke revolts and nationalistic uprising;
9) To instigate strikes;
10) To instigate sabotages;
11) To propagandize the might of the National Army of the Republic of Korea;
12) To instigate migration to South Korea;
13) To propagandize freedom in South Korea.

V. Economic intrigues:
1) To corner and hold back main goods;
2) To waste daily necessities;
3) To counterfeit North Korean bank notes;
4) To hinder collections of provisions.

VI. Assassination:
1) The biggest ringleaders of North Korea;
2) Higher officers of the People's Army;
3) Higher officers of the Home Ministry;
4) Leaders of the political parties and social organizations;
5) Persons in charge of cultural organizations;
6) Highest cadres of the ministries;
7) Highest cadres and those of middle rank in charge of intelligence work on South Korea;
8) Bad elements in the intelligence service, policemen and officials;
9) Previous officers of the National Army who have deserted to the north, and the ringleader in the desertion of s/s Smith to the north.

ESSENTIAL POINTS:
1) Bold and valiant persons shall be selected from the agents in service, and they shall receive sufficient remunerations; at the same time orders shall be given in accordance with their specific characters;
2) Agents shall personally and secretly take up the execution of destroying main buildings; at the same time they shall pick up adequate collaborators on the spot of their actions;
3) Prior to destroying the objects, thorough-going study of the situation shall be done;
4) In setting buildings afire, employees in the buildings shall be bribed, but the agents shall personally make a careful survey of the matter beforehand;
5) In assassinations, cell members shall bribe waitresses or kitchen workers, and have them poison the persons in question;
6) Skilled agents shall manage to be near the leaders, and poison them during meals or at drinking parties;
7) Employees at the city reservoirs shall be bribed into poisoning the water;
8) Kitchens of the Army and public organizations shall be poisoned;
9) Purveyors and peddlars who regularly visit the Army or main organs shall be utilized for mixing poisons in food supplies;
10) In propaganda intrigues, circulations of leaflets and northbound broadcasts, which have already been in use, shall be intensified;
11) Students who harbour patriotic ideas shall be utilized for posting wall newspapers or scribbling on walls;
12) Propaganda leaflets shall be dispatched to youth organizations through mails;
13) In the main cities secret senders shall be set, and counter-propaganda shall be broadcasted as occasion allows;
14) Songs in praise of the Republic of Korea shall be propagated among the primary school children;
15) Dynamite, etc. shall be buried at aerodromes or main bridges.

MAIN POINTS OF COMMUNICATING INTELLIGENCE:
1) Secret ink-cloth shall be used if there is no wireless set;
2) Colourless letters shall be used in newspapers or magazines;
3) Ciphers shall be used in disguised mails;
4) Bacteria shall be disguised as ordinary drugs;
5) Other tools and materials, mentioned in the instructions, shall be obtained from the spot if possible, and shall be sent over only when they are not obtainable there.

UTILIZATION OF ENEMY SPIES:
TARGETS:
1) North Korean secret agents who have reliable guarantors in South Korea;
2) Members of the South Korean Workers' Party, who are disposed to conversion;
3) To select adequate persons from converted captives;
4) To select adequate persons from businessmen who trade between the north and south;
5) To utilize spies who live permanently in South Korea;
6) To utilize north Korean ships now in South Korea for smuggling;
7) R.H. special service; R.C.K. special service; N.N. special service;
R.I.W. special service; K.P. special service.

ESSENTIAL POINTS:

1) To take advantage of criminal acts, i.e. weaknesses of the person in question, pretend to pardon him leniently, fully protect him and utilize him;
2) To double the pay, when employing spies of north Korean intelligence organs, and try to get accurate informations;
3) To train North Korean spies for not less than a week how to give false informations, when sending them back;
4) The person who manipulates an enemy spy must be very careful that the latter does not know that the southern authorities are aware of his double-dealings. He shall keep his eye on the enemy spy in strict secret.

WORK FOR CONVERSION:

TARGETS:

1) On officers and men of the People’s Army;
2) On officers and men of the Police;
3) On leading cadres of various political parties and social organizations;
4) On technicians in heavy industry;
5) On leading railway cadres as well as engineers and assistants;
6) On officers and men of the Air Force;
7) On officers and men of the Marines;
8) On cadres in freight vessel service;
9) On leading intelligentsia in the organs and magazines of communist hordes;
10) On higher officials in administrative bodies.

ESSENTIAL POINTS:

1) To send back patriotic young men from the North, and send them to the People’s Army, to influence those who are prone to ideological conversion or those who have joined the army by force, and to persuade them to desert or revolt;
2) To praise incessantly the might of the South Korean National Army by means of leaflets;
3) To allure the person in question into conversion through his relatives, schoolmates and other friends.
EXPLANATORY NOTES.

This is a U.S. military map found in the South Korean Army Headquarters, published by Army Map Service, U.S. Army in 1943. (Scale 1:1,000,000)

Lines, arrows and other conventional signs indicated in this map show the plan drawn up by the American imperialists and the Syngman Rhee clique for an attack on north Korea.

This map shows that there were to be two South Korean armies stationed along the 38th parallel for the attack on the north. The first army was to begin military operations against north Korea between the Yellow Sea coast and Kolangpo, north-east of Kaesung; whilst the second army was to begin operations between Kolangpo and the east coast.

The first army was to deal the main blow from its right flank in Kaesung area, directly opposite Pyongyang; whilst its left flank was to attack from Ongchin area on Sinchon and afterwards on Sariwon. In addition, a landing under air cover in Hanchon area was to be carried out from Inchon, and to advance towards Pyongyang.

The first army was to consist of two echelons. The first echelon was to be composed of the 1st and 2nd divisions and one regiment, and the second echelon was to be composed of the 5th division, three independent regiments and several A.A. gun companies.

The second army was to start an attack on the north from Tongduchon, Chunchon and Hanchi areas, and a landing under air cover in Dyengpyeng area was to be carried out from Chumunjin, to cut off communications between Pyongyang and South and North Hamgyeng.

The second army was also to consist of two echelons. The first echelon was to be composed of the 7th and 8th divisions, and the second echelon
was to be composed of the 6th division, independent regiments and A.A. gun companies.

In addition to the 1st and 2nd armies there were to be reserve units consisting of the 3rd division (5 regiments) and mechanized divisions.

In the area along the 38th parallel, about ten divisions were to be concentrated for starting the offensive against North Korea.
Photostatic copy of Strategic Map for Attack on North Korea
No. 9
PERSONNEL AND EXPENSE FOR OUTSIDE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN VARIOUS PLACES

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Expense per person in won</th>
<th>Expense per month in won</th>
<th>Expense per year in won</th>
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<tr>
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* This is precisely the figure given in the original.—Ed.
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* As in original.—Ed.
## FOR UTILIZATION OF ENEMY SPIES

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<th>Target</th>
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<th>Expense per year in won</th>
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<td>6,000,000—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2,400,000—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.N.</td>
<td>Supreme People's Assembly</td>
<td>200,000—</td>
<td>2,400,000—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.U.N.</td>
<td>Counter Intelligence Bureau</td>
<td>100,000—</td>
<td>1,200,000—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.I.P.</td>
<td>Special Service</td>
<td>300,000—</td>
<td>3,600,000—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1,300,000—wons</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,600,000—wons</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand Total: One hundred and four million and one hundred and twenty thousand wonS.
KOREA
Scale of miles

NORTH KOREA

MANCHURIA

MANCHURIA

JAPAN

SEA OF

KOREA

KOREA

KOREA

LINE OF MAXIMUM ADVANCE, 1950
(SOVIET UNION FORCES)

LINE OF MAXIMUM ADVANCE, 1950
(UNITED NATIONS FORCES)

MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE
AND DEMILITARIZED ZONE
UNDER ARMISTICE AGREEMENT,
JULY 27, 1953

July, 1953