CONCLUSION

Every President, beginning with Harry S. Truman who assured the first General Assembly on October 23, 1946 that the policy of the United States would be to "support the United Nations with all the resources we posses---- not as a temporary expedient but as a permanent partnership."¹ indeed had a profound impact on the subsequent Presidents who further reiterated to defend the cause of international peace and security in every corner of the world.

With the post world war II division between the communist bloc and the West, the United States quickly emerged in the Security Council as a leader of the democratic nations in the UN and fought the diplomatic battle to promote the right of self-determination of every nation and determined to stop the communism by every means not only in Europe but in Asia and Africa well. A large majority of the

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US public was in favour of the general support to the United Nations for achieving these goals. The former Senator Barry Goldwater eloquently once expressed the Americans willingness to support the functioning of the United Nations in these words: "The United Nations --is at best an instrument of international accord. It is useful to the West now for a special reason; it provides a forum in which to discuss communist violation of the Charter."²

Controversies arising in the Cold War situation had been dominated by direct and serious conflict between the major communist and non-communist powers because the interest of the United States had been adversely affected by such disputes. The United States was compelled to move to the United Nations. Wherever feasible to maximize support for its own strategy and to confound the communist enemy. But because of the intense hostility and massive

power involved, it became difficult for the United States to mobilise strong support for its position in these cases within the United Nations. Despite the difficulties, the United States and its allies considered advantageous to use the United Nations as a major instrument for dealing with some of the most dangerous Cold War conflicts. The study is concerned with two major cases of international crises in Korea and Congo. During the intense Cold War period of first two decades of the formation of the United Nations the Korean crisis (1950-53) and Congo crisis (1960-64) lingered for very long duration. Congo was the largest military operation which the UN had been involved, not only the largest military operation, but the largest financial operation as well. The UN maintained a force of some 20,000 (ONUC) at the cost of over $1,000,000,000 a year. The budget for maintaining the UN forces in the Congo had been

greater than the total normal budget of the UN prior to that activities. In the operation in Korea, it was involved with a larger number of forces. But it was somewhat questionable whether it could be called a UN operation. The UN had delegated authority in the Korean matter to the United States and the forces were in large measure from the United States forces and the forces from the South Korea. Infact the United Nations came nearest to establishing a fighting force. It did create a United Nations Command and requested members to make forces available to it. But this was a mere an extension of existing command of the United States in Far Eastern military operation under the command of General Mac Arthur. The action taken by the Arthur and his forces was in fact United Nations action and of course justified norms of international law.

The Secretariat of the UN had no part in operation or even deployment of troops. By the end of

1950, the only foreign ground troops fighting by the American side were from the United Kingdom, Australia, France, Greece, Turkey, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Thailand and Turkey. The Unified Command in Korea consisted of about a quarter of a million American compared with only about 36,000 troops from all other Member States combined.

Korean crisis had got special significance as it had extended the dimension of the moral authority of the General Assembly. The General Assembly became a definite alternative to the Security Council for the first time in Korean crisis. The United States was successful in shifting the discussion from the Security Council to the General Assembly which was dominated by Anglo-American majority in 1950s and 60s. It was noticeable through Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950 which demonstrated for the empowerment of General Assembly as the generation of

6. In 1951, group troops were also furnished by Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, Luxemburg and New Zealand.
international peace and security in case the consensus fail in the Security Control. The Security Council had been unable to act owing to acute differences among its permanent members. The Assembly was able to play a complementary role by endorsing the resolution of the Security Council. The lesson learnt from the Korean experienced proved fruitful in resolving the Congo crisis. When the then Secretary General proceeded to recruit forces he emphasised the need that the conditions for the forces to be sent should be that they should include no forces from any of the great powers. It was realised that to have a genuine UN forces it ought to be recruited from a good many of the smaller countries or from countries at least which were not the major protagonists in the Cold War. It was also recognized that it would be desirable to have a large number of forces from Africa and this was one of the provisions made in the recruitment of forces. At the same time it was also

provided that there should be some troops from outside Africa, so that it could be regarded, as United Nations universal operation. This shows a tremendous influence in strengthening the UN against the opinion of one protagonist or other in the Cold War, could be exercised by the uncommitted states. The uncommitted states consisted a large proportion of the members of the General Assembly and it appeared that these states had expressed their solidarity with the UN mission in Korea as they felt that United Nations also could protect their interests in the World.

Management of Korean Realities

The United States had pursued two major objectives in Korea: first, to achieve the establishment of a Unified, independent and democratic Korea in accordance with the promise of the Cairo Declaration and secondly pending or failing the achievement of that goal to contain communist

expansion and prevent the communists from taking over the whole of Korea. During period September 1947 to June 1950, the emphasis at least in the public statements was on achieving the first objectives, a satisfactory settlement of the whole problem. From June 1950 on the defeat of communist military aggression became a dominant motive in invoking United Nations action, though the desirability of achieving a satisfactory political settlement was never lost.

When the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan on August, 1945, which posed the US government the question of where to draw the dividing line for the US and Soviet occupation zones on the Korean peninsula. Some American diplomats, seeing through the Soviet manoeuvre recommended that their government speed up military actions of the Far East and US troops accept surrender of the Japanese troops at least in the entire peninsula to prevent
governmental forces entry into Korea. But when Soviet troops promptly initiated direct military action against Northern Korea after their entry into the war, on Aug. 9, the nearest American forces were on Okinawa Island.

Under the circumstances that UN government accepting a recommendation from Colonels G.H. Bonesteel, who later served as commander in Chief of the United Nations Command in Korea and Dean Rusk (Later Secretary of State) of the war Department General Staff on August 11, 1945 decided that Soviet Union would be authorized to receive the Japanese surrender north of the 38th Parallel and the U.S. would receive the South of that line. On August 13, the Plan was transmitted to and accepted by the government of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and

China. It was sent on August 15 to the MacArthur Command for immediate implementation of General Order No.1. The order provided that after the US and USSR occupation commandery of the Korean peninsula received the surrender of Japanese troops in their respective areas, the civil administrative function should be integrated and turned over to a committee of commanders from these countries taking part in the occupation of the Korean peninsula to place the entire area of Korea under integrated control. The order on the other hand helped turn the military division by stipulating that during the receipt of surrender period the US and USSR occupation commanders would be responsible for the administration of civil affairs in their respective areas. The Soviet forces, who entered northern Korean ahead of the America landing in South Korea, had no time embarked on a carefully prepared scenario to build a communist society in their occupation area of North Korea.

11. Ibid.
At 4 a.m. Sunday, June 25, 1950, the North Korean forces unleashed an unprovoked attack all along the 38th parallel. Before the invasion many reports on the impending invasion were filed to the Army Headquarters from frontline divisions. But Army Generals did not take them seriously. Unexpectedly the United States took speedy action to repel the aggressors. On a US initiative, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution on June 27, 1950 in the Soviet delegates absence, which stated the armed action by north Korea was by express act of aggression. Counter to the UN Charter and called upon the members of the United Nations to furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as might be necessary to repel the armed attack.

On July 7th Security Council resolved to establish a Unified Command Under the United States for the integrated control of forces which UN member countries dispatched to Korea and requested the US to designate the commander of such forces. Accepting
the resolution the United States established the United Nations Command in Tokyo on July 8 with General Douglas MacArthur as its Commanding General.

On the battlefield, the North Korean invasion forces advanced as far as the Poyong-Taeyu-Masan Pimeter. But the tide of war soon turned aside. Seoul was recaptured on September 28. The UN forces and the South Korean Army pushed the retreating North Korean forces beyond the 38th parallel and captured Pyongyang on October 20. The South Korean 6th Division reached the border town of Chosan along the Yalu River on October 26, 1950. The unification of the Korean people was certainly within sight as the Communists were driven back and were badly disarmed both by the United Nations and United States troops. General MacArthur declared that all UN forces could return home before Christmas after successfully ending operations. Towards the end of October, however the situation began to change.
Red Chinese forces intervened in the war as "peoples volunteer Army" and began to push the UN forces back to the South in "human wave" tactics. The UN forces, heavily outnumbered by more than one million Chinese troops, retreated South of the 38th Parallel. For a period of roughly years thereafter, bloody battles ragged along a line cutting across the central part of the peninsula in hot contest for each mountain peak and every inch of land.

Truce talks began July 10, 1951, between the United Nations Command and the communist forces (North Korea and Red Chinese Armies). The ceasefire negotiations dragged on for about two years before the armistice was finally signed on July 27, 1953, by ONUC Commander General Mark Clark, North Korean Commander kim II-Sung and Chinese "Peoples volunteer Army" commanding peng Te-huaian. Three years war was thus brought to a halt but it could not unify the divided Korea.
American Experience in Congo

American Policy in Congo crisis was designed to support the principles of national unity and independence, internal security, and territorial integrity. The United States faithfully and consistently supported the central government of the Congo since June 1960—under President Eisenhower, under President Kennedy, and under President Lyndon B. Johnson—and under Congolese President Karavubu and his Prime Minister, Iko, Adoula, and Tshombe. The US Administration devoted more attention to the rest of Africa Combined because of the immediate dangers, commercial opportunities and available expanding market. Wayne Fredericks of the State Department's African Bureau, said: "if we don't have a Congo Policy', we don't have an African Policy".12

Washington was deeply concerned with the lawlessness and disorder that followed the July 1960 mutiny of Armee Nationale Congolaise (ANC), Prime Minister Patric Lumumba's dismissal of its Belgian

Office corps, and exodus of Belgian administrative and technical personnel from the Congo. The Department of State feared that the Soviet Union would exploit the chaos for purposes inimical to stability and the best interests of the Congolese, and regarded Moscow, not, Brussels, as the chief threat to the Congo's independence. Although the United States was the only government to receive a formal invitation from Leopoldville to provide military assistance of restore law and order, Washington from the outset and for a variety of reasons channelled its aid through the United Nations.

Direct US military aid was quickly ruled out lest it be used as a pretext for more substantial Soviet intervention on behalf of Lumumba which could lead confrontation of the two great powers. The leaders did not fear a political contest with the communist bloc in Congo, but they wanted the contest to be conducted by acceptable rules and at minimum risk.
Given these considerations, US Ambassador-designate Clare H. Timberlake advised President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba to appeal for UN aid. This was on July 10, and on July 12, 1960 a group of Congolese cabinet members asked Timberlake to request 3,000 American troops to restore order. At his insistence they formalized the request in writing. Since the matter was already before the UN Secretary, General, President, Eisenhower declined to act unilaterally on the invitation. Two and a half years later Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland summed up the initial US response: "Should the Congo's chaos be attacked by a hostility assembled international peace force; or should we send in a division of United States Marines; or should we just sit on our hands and wait for our adversaries to exploit the situation?" We wisely decided, he continued, "not to risk a confrontation of nuclear powers in the Central Africa." We believed, he added, that a UN force would serve the national interest of the United States.

By virtue of its power and active involvement, the United States had a greater impact on the Charter, effectiveness and duration of the UN Congo operation than any other government. Though it sent no troops and was not a member of the Secretary General's Congo Advisory Committee, the opinion could not have been authorized without Washington's assurance of political and financial and logistical support. Had American support been withdrawn at any point, the efforts would have collapsed or been greatly reduced in size. The widespread assumption of consistent US support made possible the political, financial and manpower support from many other states. Especially important were the troops contributions of India and Ethiopia, each of which made available more than 100,000 men.

Washington became the informal leader of a relatively stable coalition of states that supported, each for its own reasons, the UN
resolutions and their interpretation and implementation by Hamersk Ford and UThant. As the only great power and the only permanent member of the Security Council that steadfastly backed the operation, the United State was inevitably thrust into a position of influence and responsibility. This leadership role was further strengthened because there was substantial concurrence between the US goals of stability in Central Africa and the prevention of communist penetration, and the Security Council resolutions calling for the restoration of law and order and prohibiting states from unilateral intervention.

Washington turned both as a generator and a balance wheel. It generated ideas and plans and constantly sought to achieve a working consensus among the associated states. The Secretary General, the senior members in the "Congo Club" and UN officials in Leopoldville and Elizabethville frequently sought American counsel. US officials, who
offered technical, military and political advice, as did the officials of other interested states. The United States acted as a balance wheel between the sometimes irreconcilable positions of the militant Afro-Asian leaders and more conservative European Spokesmen. It was precisely this mediating role that drew criticism from both sides. Nevertheless, the United States and the United Nations established the credibility of ensuring peace and security whenever and wherever threatened. Both Korean and Congo crises gave a new impetus to the American policy makers in the State Department that the United States had responsibility towards the world community to promote the rights of self-determination and self-assertion either be in political, social, cultural or economic spheres of any nation in any parts of the world.