CHAPTER IV

PARTY SYSTEM: POLITICAL STABILITY
AND LEGITIMACY IN INDONESIA
Party system in a democratic polity plays a significant role in the process of creating political stability and legitimacy. The different demands and supports of the people are aggregated and channelized to the government through political parties in which they are processed to become decisions and actions. The balance between the demands and the supports and the decisions and the actions will give stability to the government. Besides, legitimacy of the government becomes the pre-condition of political stability. Thus party system and political stability and legitimacy relates with each other.

The historical development of party systems in Indonesia has been discussed in the previous chapter. Different party systems were adopted in the different periods of Indonesian history. The description of party politics in the pre-independence days gave a better understanding to the subsequent political processes of party politics in an independent Indonesia. The various political groupings and ideologies emerged during the 1920s and the 1930s later dominated the party politics in an independent Indonesia. The influence of these groupings and ideologies in Indonesian party politics continued to persist even after the long period of repressive policy from President Sukarno and President Suharto. Consequently, party politics influenced the process of answering the problem of political instability and legitimacy crisis in the Republic. Different party systems adopted throughout the history of Indonesian politics gave different results to this question. Thus in this chapter, the different party systems that emerged and adopted by the government in the history of an independent Indonesia will be analyzed and discussed to understand its relation with political stability and legitimacy and to further reconstruct the Indonesian party system in order to arrive at a stable, performing, democratic and legitimate government.
The analysis and discussion on the relationship between party systems and political stability and legitimacy in Indonesia are divided into several periods. Five divisions are proposed in this chapter, starting with the declaration of independence on 17 August 1945 until the departure of President Suharto in 1998. The divisions of these periods are: (i) the Revolutionary Period; (ii) the Parliamentary Democracy Period; (iii) the Old Order or Guided Democracy Period; (iv) the New Order or Pancasila Democracy Period; and, (v) the Post-Suharto Period.

4.1 The Revolutionary Period (1945 – 1949)

When the nationalist leaders declared Indonesian independence in the wake of a power vacuum situation on 17 August 1945, a clear picture of a party system that would produce a stable, legitimate and functioning government in an independent Indonesia had not been agreed altogether. The Constitution according to which the new government was to function was also drafted in a hurried process. The PPKI established by the Japanese government for preparing the process of transfer of power into the hands of the Indonesians failed to prepare a comprehensive Constitution in time and rushed to complete the draft of the Constitution which later to be declared as the 1945 Constitution a day after the proclamation of Indonesian independence. Thus, the 1945 Constitution was lacking in any detailed provisions and consisted mostly of broad principles established in line with the Western liberal democracy modelled on a presidential system of government.
The presidential cabinet adopted by the Republic based on the 1945 Constitution gave executive power to the president. The appointment of Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta as the Indonesian President and Vice-President respectively by the PPKI confirmed the adoption of the presidential system of government. Their appointment for the highest job in the Republic resulted in the domination of two different personalities in Indonesian politics. While Sukarno, a Javanese, represented the visionary leader of the Republic, Muhammad Hatta, a skilful manager, came to represent the Outer Islands. KNIP, an emergency body established by PPKI in the absence of the MPR and the DPR became the supporting body to the President. Appointment of its members was the prerogative of the president and vice-president thus the formalization of the first presidential cabinet under the leadership of President Sukarno. However, the political tension amongst the political elites in the new Republic was at its high. The struggle for power that followed the formation of the Republic was the phenomenon of the day. Charismatic leaders with different ideologies such as Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahrir, Tan Malaka, Amir Sjarifudin and others tried to dominate the political scene. Thus, the newly established KNIP was not spared from this struggle of political domination. While Sukarno and Hatta, two nationalist leaders, succeeded to occupy the post of President and Vice-President, the socialist groups under the leadership of Sjahrir succeeded in dominating the KNIP. With two different political groupings dominating the decision making body, the struggle for political control did not end. On the contrary, it started to expand thus causing political instability and legitimacy crisis in Indonesia.

The political instability and legitimacy crisis that emerged as the result of the power struggle among the Indonesian leadership continued to expand when the Dutch, who still
eagerly wanted to re-assert its colonial domination in Indonesia after the Japanese defeat, questioned the legitimacy of President Sukarno and Vice-President Hatta as the legitimate rulers of Indonesia. Because, although Sukarno and Hatta were recognized by most Indonesians as the only legitimate leaders but their previous affiliation and cooperation with the Japanese government during the brief period of the Japanese occupation raised the debate on the independency of Indonesia as a truly independent nation and not a mere puppet of the Japanese government. Besides, the absence of any political parties during this period due to their dissolution by the Japanese government raised some doubt of any democratic practice in the nation. The idea proposed by President Sukarno of establishing a single, revolutionary party as a medium of nation building process did not erase this doubt. Thus, with the legitimacy of Sukarno’s presidency being questioned and a single party was perceived as a dilution from the democratic principles as stipulated by the Indonesian Constitution, the Government issued a Government Act on 3 November 1945 to allow the Indonesian people to form any political organizations with whatever ideology they preferred. Soon, the old and new political parties emerged and started to play their roles in the political process in the Republic. The fractured history of party politics in the pre-independence period was revived in independent Indonesia. This Government Act opened the door for the establishment of a multi-party system in Indonesia and at the same time, the early resignation of a Presidential Cabinet led by Sukarno. Because, with the adoption of a multi-party system the government also decided to convert the presidential system into a parliamentary system of government through another Government Act issued on 14 November 1945 thus creating the chance for other national leaders to lead the nation. The adoption of the parliamentary system made the Council of Ministers answerable to the Parliament, the KNIP, and not to the President. Even though the change from a presidential
system to a parliamentary system of government was without any amendment to the Presidential Constitution, this decision was taken as a tactical emergency move by the Indonesian leaders to win over the support of the international community on Indonesia’s commitment towards democracy and a strategic move towards achieving full independence for the Republic. The adoption of a multi-party system followed by the change in the system of government witnessed the emergence of the dominating role of political parties in the political process. An active role of the political parties is very necessary for the effective functioning of a parliamentary system. The emergence of a majority party in the Parliament as well as strong opposition guarantees the stability of a government. On the other hand, the absence of any majority party in the Parliament might result into coalition politics where political parties make an alliance to form a majority power in the Parliament to form a government. The difficult nature of a coalition politics often resulted in the instability of government due to the failure of the political parties to create a stable and working coalition. At the same time, the absence of any strong opposition in the parliament creates the imbalance in the equilibrium.

On 14 November 1945, Sjahrir, the most prominent of the small group of nationalist leaders who had refused to cooperate with the Japanese, succeeded in establishing himself into the position of Prime Minister to lead the first parliamentary cabinet of a minority government based on his essentially social-democratic Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) hence creating a ‘legitimate’ government for the process of further negotiation with the Dutch government to achieve full recognition for Indonesia as an independent state. His energy, intellect and commitment to modernity made him the ideal person to attempt this move to persuade the Western world that Indonesia could and should run its own affairs.
However, the growing opposition from forces determined to oppose the Dutch by whatever means necessary gathered around Tan Malaka, a veteran Trotskyite whose *Persatuan Perdjuangan* (Unity of Struggle Front) rapidly attracting a huge following, forced Sjahrir to tender his resignation in February 1946. But the inability of the diverse elements in the *Persatuan Perdjuangan* to form a new cabinet made President Sukarno to invite Sjahrir to form another cabinet based on a wider parliamentary support. However, instead of starting the process of negotiation with the Dutch, the first action of the second Sjahrir cabinet was to eliminate the opposition by arresting Tan Malaka and the leadership of the *Persatuan Perdjuangan* and jailing them without trial. In retaliation, elements of the Third Regular Army Division arrested the Prime Minister in late June 1946. Thus, fearing the matter would spill out of hands, the President stepped in to solve the problem by arresting the conspirators while troops loyal to the PSI freed Sjahrir, who then formed his third and more representative cabinet in October 1946.³

By November 1946, Sjahrir concluded the so-called Linggarjati Agreement with the Dutch in which the latter recognized the republic's *de facto* authority over Java and Sumatera. But what first could have been taken as a diplomatic victory soon turned out to be an illusion when on 27 May 1947 the Dutch issued an ultimatum demanding its recognition as the *de jure* authority over the whole Indonesia until the formation of the United States of Indonesia in January 1949. PM Sjahrir was prepared to accept these terms but members of his own party, led by Minister of Defense Amir Sjarifuddin, refused to endorse his policies thus forcing his resignation on 27 June 1947 just to be succeeded by Amir Sjarifuddin who himself was eventually prepared to offer even further concessions to the Dutch government. But the police action launched by the Dutch forces in the following
months nullified the agreement. Under pressure from the UN, the Dutch government agreed to a cease-fire in August 1947 followed by the signing of another agreement between the two governments. However, having signed the agreement Amir Sjarifuddin found himself deserted by his coalition partners that on 23 January 1948 tendered his resignation to the President. With no parliamentary leader capable of establishing a new coalition government that would take up the political responsibility under the existing circumstances, President Sukarno appointed his Vice-President, Muhammad Hatta, to form a “business cabinet” whose tasks were to reform the economic and administrative structures of the rump republic, and particularly to support the reform of the bloated defense apparatus. But before any reform could be started, the young Republic erupted in a violence when on 13 September 1948, under the leadership of Amir Sjarifuddin who now declared himself to be a Communist for a long time, troops about to be discharged under General Nasution’s military reform plan and loyal to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) seized the city of Solo in Central Java, while the leader of the PKI, Musso, in nearby Madiun, East Java, called for the overthrow of President Sukarno and Hatta cabinet. However, by the end of the month loyalist troops had recaptured all the strongholds of the rebels.

The years of struggle for independence seemed to be over by this time but on 17 December 1948 the Dutch issued another ultimatum demanding their terms of a special veto powers in the creation of the United States of Indonesia to be accepted. Muhammad Hatta had no choice but to accept these demands but requested that guidelines to be laid down. However, before the cabinet could formulate a reply, the Dutch forces attacked the provisional capital, Jogjakarta on 19 December 1948 and captured President Sukarno, Vice-President Hatta, Sjahrir and all cabinet ministers present in Jogjakarta. This left the
Republic with no civilian government. Indonesian Army under the leadership of the ailing General Sudirman, however, refused to accept the situation and determined to maintain control of the countryside. They launched guerrilla warfare against the Dutch. The celebrated attack followed by a six-hour occupation of the Jogjakarta city by the Indonesian Army in March 1949 had distorted the claim by the Dutch government over the non-existence of the Indonesian Republic. This attack also opened up more international pressure on the Dutch government to quickly resolve the problem in Indonesia.

It was by mid 1949 that the Dutch government realized the futility of the military solution to the conflict and at the same time, the Republican Army had also created a military government in liberated areas. This development in the Republic proved to be fruitful: the international opinion had decidedly turned against the Dutch government thus leaving it with no other choice but to release and restore President Sukarno and Vice-President Hatta to Jogjakarta and to begin another round of negotiations at what was called the Round Table Conference which this time led to a formal transfer of sovereignty to the Republic in the last days of December 1949. The conclusions of the Conference agreed to recognize the new republic as the United States of Indonesia, a federal concept for Indonesia, with President Sukarno as figurehead leader and Vice-President Hatta as leader of a “business” cabinet in a parliamentary system of government.

The problem of political instability and legitimacy in Indonesia during this revolutionary period was started with the appointment of Sukarno and Hatta as the President and Vice-President of the newly independent Republic. The power struggle between the political elites over the system of government and the mounting pressure from
the Dutch became two crucial factors that contributed to this problem. While the Dutch
government accused the new leaderships of Indonesia to be illegitimate for their alleged
cooperation with the Japanese government, the political elites, especially the socialist
groups, questioned the possibility of an authoritarian rule under Sukarno – Hatta. On the
other hand, Sukarno – Hatta owed their legitimacy as the Indonesian leader from the
masses for their unquestioning devotion to the nation. Besides, their charismatic
personalities became the added source of their political legitimacy in Indonesia. The
incident in early 1946 in the KNIP showed this unquestioning legitimacy of their
leadership. The refusal of the Working Committee of the KNIP to accept the Presidential
Decree on the reformation of the membership in the KNIP prompted the resignation threat
from Sukarno – Hatta. Facing the possible breakdown in the government with this threat,
the Working Committee of the KNIP reverted back their decision and obliged to reform its
membership into a more representative body.

The legitimacy of Sukarno – Hatta as the leaders in Indonesia alone, however, could
not save the Republic from the instability crisis. The revolutionary government was lacking
of political stability. The Parliamentary system of government adopted in the early days of
the Republic following the introduction of a multi-party system witnessed series of cabinet
reshuffles, attempted coups and a Communist revolt. The issuance of a Government Act on
freedom of formation of political organizations opened up of the channel for political
participation. However, this decision was not followed by the development of political
institutionalisation. The imbalance between political participation and political
institutionalisation during this revolutionary period contributed to the political instability
crisis. Besides, external factor in the form of military actions from the Dutch forces also
contributed to the instability in the government. The Cabinets were only feeble coalitions failing to secure a base for sufficient support.

The inability of the party system in assimilating the new social forces produced by the revolution and the low level of balance between political participation and institutionalisation had severely obstructed the equilibrium of political stability as well as the legitimacy of government. The high level of political legitimacy of the President in a parliamentary system of government could not produce political stability in the government in which several changes of Cabinets occurred during this period. The high level of political legitimacy in the form of the acceptance of the people over the leadership of Sukarno – Hatta with a relatively low level of political stability became the phenomenon of the revolutionary period.

The complicated process of revolution for independence includes incidents as follows: the power vacuum created by the Japanese defeat; the proclamation of independence by Sukarno and Hatta and their subsequent appointment by the PPKI as the President and Vice-President of the new Indonesian Republic respectively; the landing of Dutch forces intent on re-claiming the former possessions; armed conflicts and diplomatic maneuvering lasting for four years; political changes within the Republic during the same time; the ‘police actions’ by the Dutch forces; UN intervention and pressure from the US; and lastly the transfer of sovereignty at the Round Table Conference at The Hague. The qualitative transformation from power vacuum to birth of the Republic was undertaken in a relatively quick sequence where the lack of necessary apparatus for the functioning of a government had contributed to the problem of political instability and legitimacy crisis.
4.2 The Parliamentary Democracy Period (1950 – 1959)

The agreed concept of federal order for Indonesia in the Round Table Conference was not to last for long when in August 1950 President Sukarno decided to return to a unitary state while retaining the parliamentary system of government, vesting the decision-making power primarily to the Parliament and the Cabinet with reservation of some important powers to the president. A new set of a Provisional Constitution was carefully drawn and introduced in 1950 for a parliamentary government to function, while dropping the Constitution drafted for the United States Republic of Indonesia. At the same time, the Constituent Assembly was working on the formulation of a new Constitution for the Republic. However, the new arrangement gave no difference result that for the next five years the main feature of Indonesian politics was dominated by political instability and legitimacy crisis where constant change of cabinets and government coalitions occurred.

The political instability and legitimacy crisis during this period was started after the resignation of Hatta’s Cabinet with the establishment of a coalition cabinet led by Natsir in September 1950 with the support from his progressive Muslim party, the Masyumi, the Christian parties and the PSI. The primary tasks of this Cabinet were restoring public peace and order and resolving the economic problems. But being very active in economic policy, this cabinet was politically vulnerable that a confrontation with President Sukarno on West Irian issue brought down this Cabinet after only six months in office. Natsir’s departure opened up the door for the formation of a cabinet by another Masyumi politician, Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, in April 1951 excluding the PSI but including the Indonesian National Party
(PNI). Politically, the new Cabinet enjoyed President Sukarno's personal support but conspicuously lacked the understanding with the Army leaders. It was the foreign policy which brought the Cabinet's demise. By February the following year the Sukiman Cabinet had resigned due to the issue of the signing of Mutual Security Agreement with the United States. Another coalition government led by a PNI politician, Wilopo, with the support from the Masyumi and the PSI, replaced Sukiman's cabinet. However, the political enemies of Wilopo, mostly from his own party, worked toward his downfall immediately after the formation of his Cabinet by using the defence policy. The result was the permission from the cabinet for the military leaders to submit a petition to the President on 17 October 1952 to dissolve the incumbent appointed parliament and schedule elections for a new parliament. Refusal of the petition by the President resulted in an open mutiny in three of the army's seven divisions against the headquarters. Wilopo decided to sack Nasution, who was then the Army Chief of Staff after the death of General Sudirman in 1950, in early 1953 in order to stay in the office but this decision did not save his Cabinet that facing a motion of no confidence he was certain to lose, Wilopo resigned on 2 July 1953. Ali Sastroamidjojo, another PNI politician, took charge to form different coalition government based on the PNI, the conservative Muslim party, the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), minor nationalist and leftist parties, and the Communists, who had promised parliamentary support and were represented in the cabinet indirectly through the Communist Peasant Front. But, again, the defence policy had taken another toll on the life of a Cabinet when the Army refused to accept the decision by the Government for appointing a relatively junior officer as the new Army Chief of Staff. Disenchanted with Ali's defence policy and his general highhandedness in Cabinet deliberation, the coalition partners pulled out of the Government thus forcing Ali to resign as Prime Minister on 24 July 1955.5
In the absence of President Sukarno, Vice-President Hatta appointed a Masyumi politician, Burhanuddin Harahap, as Indonesian Prime Minister who then formed a coalition Cabinet based on his own party with the support from the NU and the PSI. The immediate task of this new Cabinet was to hold the long delayed Parliamentary elections scheduled for 29 September 1955 and, in December, the elections for a Constituent Assembly charged with working out a new constitution.

The frequent changes of Cabinets in the Indonesian Parliament for the past five years after the formal transfer of power in December 1949 had contributed to the instability of government and the scheduled elections was aimed at the creation of a more stable and legitimate government. The fragile coalition politics that had been dominating the national politics needed to be strengthened, or to be avoided if possible, through this election. But the result of the election told different story when the total number of the votes was split between several major parties with no single party secured majority in the Parliament. The hope of creating a more stable and legitimate government came to a surprise result when 27 out of 36 contestants got one seat or more in the Parliament. The result was a split mandate distributed among four national parties: the PNI, Masyumi, NU and PKI which secured 22.3 %, 20.9 %, 18.4 % and 16.4 % respectively. The following table shows the complete result of this election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Results of the Indonesian Parliamentary Election of 1955</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parties</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The results of the elections for the constituent assembly were not markedly different and it meant that the coalition politics still received enough electoral backing in office.\(^7\)

The successful administration of the elections, however, failed to hold together the coalition Cabinet led by Burhanuddin Harahap. The NU decided to pull out of the existing coalition Cabinet to enable new coalition negotiations on the basis of the election results. The exit of the NU from the coalition forced the resignation of Burhanuddin Harahap as Prime Minister along with his Cabinet in March 1956. Apart from successfully administering the elections in 1955, another notable contribution of the Burhanuddin cabinet was its effort to mend the civil-military relationship severed by the previous government through the re-appointment of Nasution, a senior figure in the military, as the Army Chief of Staff. But the invitation extended to Ali who had had a difficult record with the Army by President Sukarno to form the new government based on the coalition of the PNI, the *Masyumi* and the NU on 20 March 1956 had left many Army officers disillusioned.\(^8\) The hope of mending the civil-military relation had backfired that Nasution’s re-appointment by the previous Burhanuddin Harahap’s government meant the resumption of his effort to professionalize the Army and particularly to break the warlord-like powers
of military commanders outside Java thus intensifying the conflict between Java and the 
Outer Islands. The result was several non-violent revolts by regional Army commanders in 
several parts of the country like in West Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi as a show of 
their disenchantment towards the Cabinet as well as to the Army Chief of Staff who was 
seen to be collaborating with the Cabinet. The situation was aggravated with the corruption 
scandals and the acceleration of ethnic conflict between the Javanese and people from the 
Outer Islands who saw the export-consuming Java was milking the export-producing Outer 
Islands in which their wealth had been disproportionately used for the benefit of Java and 
not for improving the condition in the Outer Islands thus accelerating the decreasing 
credibility of the second Ali cabinet. Thus, faced with revolts everywhere outside Java, 
hostile coalition partners incensed by the resignation of Hatta, a native of Sumatra, from the 
vice-presidency as a protest against the increasingly anti-liberal utterances of President 
Sukarno and the discriminatory policy of the cabinet vis-à-vis the Outer Islands and the 
mounting criticism from the President on the political system that had brought this 
Government into power, Ali, after declaring a state of war and siege, handed in his 
resignation to President Sukarno on 14 March 1957.

The resignation of the second Ali Cabinet was nothing extraordinary. But there 
were two things that differentiated it from the previous Cabinets: it was the first and only 
Indonesian Cabinet ever to be assembled on the basis of the result of the free and 
democratic elections and, second, that the division in the society was so grave that no 
coalition could be formed in its wake. The already existing political adversary between 
political groups, especially between the PNI and Masyumi, deepened even further with the 
long period and fierce election campaign. Hence the failure of any political party to secure
majority votes in the elections forced the formation of a coalition cabinet in the already ideologically divided nation. The lack of national consensus brought down the second Ali cabinet and the impracticability of establishing another working coalition government. The result was the appointment of Djuanda, a Sundanese politician with no party affiliation, to form a business cabinet that was to govern through a martial law with direct support from the President and the Army headquarters. The most important task of the Djuanda Cabinet was to bring the regional unrest under control. But instead of bringing the House in order, new regional rebellions came up like the PRRI/Permesta in Sumatra supported by several Masyumi and PSI leaderships and the Darul Islam movement in West Java, Aceh and South Sulawesi. The inability of the Government to suppress these rebellions had resulted in the increasing military role through its ‘middle way’ concept proposed by Nasution that the military should not assume political power but should play a political role as one of the forces in deciding the fate of the nation. Taking on the opportunity provided by the situation, President Sukarno, with the military backing, issued a Presidential Decree on 5 July 1959 thus ending the Djuanda Cabinet and the Parliamentary government. The Decree meant the re-promulgation of the Presidential Constitution of 1945 thus providing the best possible chance for President Sukarno to materialize his idea of sustainable government in Indonesia through what he called a “Guided Democracy”, a democracy with a leadership.

The transfer of power in 1949 also marked the new beginning of a party politics in Indonesian parliament. With the adoption of a parliamentary constitution in the form of a Provisional Constitution of 1950, the Constitutional flaw found in the previous period was corrected. The adoption of this Provisional Constitution of 1950 reflected the conviction of the Indonesians on their commitment to the representative form of government and
naturally embraced such concepts as a parliamentary system based on popular sovereignty and universal suffrage, freedom of association, and freedom of speech. As such these elements were recognized, if not practiced, during the revolutionary period, but the 1950 Provisional Constitution explicitly provided for a parliamentary cabinet, limiting the role of president and vice-president to an almost symbolic one. This Provisional Constitution certainly provided a democratic framework for the functioning of parliamentary cabinet in the spirit of a multiparty system. But this Constitutional change did not bring any difference to the problem of political instability and legitimacy crisis in the government. Coalition politics still dominated the political scene during this period. If the Socialist group dominated the revolutionary period, this period of parliamentary politics was dominated by the power struggle between the Secular-Nationalist group and the Muslim group with the Communist PKI loomed large as the dark horse. The absence of general elections in the first five years of this parliamentary democracy period also contributed to this problem. Ideological differences between these groups, however, deepened even further when parliamentary elections was finally held in 1955. The two-year long period of election campaign was the major cause for the deepening of this political divide. The elections failed to produce a working government due to the absence of any majority power in the parliament. The high level of political participation in this multi-party system where more than 35 political parties and individuals competed in the elections with a relatively low level of political institutionalization failed to contribute any political stability to the government. The fractured mandate in this elections resulted in a weak government and weak opposition. At the same time, the extra-parliamentary forces in the form of the military, the President and the regional conflicts became several other factors that led into the continuity of the problem. The following table explained the difficult coalition politics
that resulted in the instability and legitimacy crisis in the wake of parliamentary cabinet based on the 1950 Provisional Constitution.

Parliamentary Cabinets from 1950 to 1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Cabinets</th>
<th>Coalition Partners</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Reasons of the Fall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Natsir – Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX (PM: Natsir)</td>
<td>Masyumi, PSI, non-party</td>
<td>6/9/50 to 21/3/51 (6.5 mth)</td>
<td>Differences with the President on West Irian matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sukiman – Suwirjo (PM: Sukiman)</td>
<td>Masyumi, PNI</td>
<td>26/4/51 to 23/2/52 (10 mth)</td>
<td>Disagreements on ‘Mutual Security Act’ with the US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Wilopo – Prawoto (PM: Wilopo)</td>
<td>PNI, Masyumi, PSI</td>
<td>30/3/52 to 2/6/53 (1 year &amp; 2 mth)</td>
<td>The infamous 17 October 1952 military incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ali – Wongsonegoro (PM: Ali)</td>
<td>PNI, PIR (small nationalist parties)</td>
<td>31/7/53 to 24/7/55 (2 years)</td>
<td>The appointment of a relatively junior officer as the Army Chief of Staff, neglecting the objection raised by the military hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Burhanuddin Harahap – Djanu Ismail (PM: Burhanuddin Harahap)</td>
<td>Masyumi and some smaller parties</td>
<td>11/8/55 to 3/3/56 (7 mth)</td>
<td>A perceived possible change in the parliamentary composition based on the result of 1955 election made NU pulled out of coalition thus leading to its fall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ali – Roem (PM: Ali)</td>
<td>PNI, Masyumi, NU</td>
<td>20/3/56 to 3/3/57 (1 year)</td>
<td>The ambition of civilian politicians to control the military backfired, rebellions in various parts of the country, pressure from the President to dispose the system to be replaced by guided democracy, and the military ascendancy in the national politics, corruption scandals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Djuanda (PM: Djuanda)</td>
<td>Non-party, PNI, NU</td>
<td>8/4/57 to 5/7/59 (2 years &amp; 3 mth)</td>
<td>Due to the Presidential Decree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first five cabinets were formed before the Parliamentary election in 1955 while the second Ali cabinet was the only parliamentary cabinet ever established through general election. The coalition government enjoyed relatively far greater stability of its position in the Parliament as compared to the last five cabinets. It also could claim the legitimacy as a democratic government represented through a democratically administered general election. But the inability of the coalition to face the challenges from the extra-parliamentary powers, particularly the Army, the President and various communal political forces awakened through the elections had contributed to its downfall and the subsequent demise of the parliamentary democracy. The Djuanda cabinet was an interim cabinet of a non-party basis installed by President Sukarno before the introduction of Guided Democracy in 1959. Thus with the fall of the second Ali cabinet in March 1957, Parliamentary Democracy had already been ended in reality.

Two different pattern of cabinets arose from their style of government: one was the kind of problem-solving by the Natsir and Wilopo cabinets and the other that by the two Ali cabinets with the Sukiman and Harahap cabinets placed somewhere in between. The first pattern placed policy priority on the strengthening of law and order, improving administrative machinery (both civil and military), solving the economic problems, particularly production increases and gradual nationalization of the economy, and establishing rules for the parliamentary democracy. On the other hand, the preference of resources through deficit financing rather than production increase, undisciplined expansion of administrative machinery left unchecked, corrupt practices and spoilsmanship were all salient features of the second cabinet pattern; it placed utmost importance on the safety of the regime. The first pattern depended predominantly on economic and administrative
performance for legitimacy with nothing done on its own to boost legitimacy as such. Thus once the Korean War boom was over, the declined in effectiveness of the first pattern due to its lack of sufficient reserve support on the emotional level started to take its toll. October 17 Affair with its aftermath was a fatal blow to this pattern and the general elections adding another. The second pattern showed the dependency towards nationalist ideology for its legitimacy. It was due to the excessive attachment to its position of power that it went beyond its means of distribution, which ultimately led into the loss of legitimacy through political corruptions. The Provisional Constitution of 1950 designed particularly for a parliamentary system failed to provide a strong legal support because of the ambiguity left on the power of the presidency thus helping President Sukarno to expand his influences as a strong extra-parliamentary force in the actual working of government. The multiparty system adopted to support the system also failed to produce a stable coalition government. The absence of a national consensus due to the deep ideological adversary among the parties aggravated the situation. The parliamentary elections in 1955 failed to produce a single majority power and led into a fractured mandate that far from reducing political instability. It, on the contrary, substantially increased political instability due to the weak government and weak opposition. The fierce and long period of election campaign which mostly contained of an appeal to the communal ties had resulted in the deepening of regional, cultural and religious differences and cleavages instead of a national consensus making the government depended on continual jostling and bargaining between the parties thus lacking political stability and legitimacy. In the eyes of the peoples and their leaders in the regions, there was little left of the moral authority of the government to rule them. None of those who held the position during the period enjoyed a level of public
support and respect as well as political pre- eminent necessary for them to be able to assert themselves and maintain political stability and legitimacy.

The parliamentary democracy period witnessed the most vibrant practice of party politics in Indonesia. Power struggle between different political groupings and ideologies dominated the national politics. However, this high level of political participation was lacking of political institutionalization in which the imbalance between these two factors created the crisis of political instability as well as legitimacy crisis. The multi-party system had opened up the wider chances for the people to participate in the decision making process but the lack of government’s ability to provide better political institutionalization had backfired in which frequent changes of government, 5 different governments in a period of 5 years, dominated the period. Even the parliamentary elections failed to produce a stable government. Instead, it deepened the ideological cleavage in the ideologically torn party politics. The multi-party system which was hoped to provide chances for the people to participate in the decision making process was unable to provide the necessary passage of transforming the demands and supports into decisions and actions. The fractured mandate resulted in the formation of weak government as well as weak opposition thereby resulting in the instability crisis. The political stability in this period was at a relatively low level while at the same time, the government was facing the crisis of political legitimacy.

4.3 The Old Order or Guided Democracy Period (1959 – 1965)

The fundamental contradiction between the political system and the socio-economic reality made the un-adapted Western liberal democracy failed to work effectively to
provide a stable political order and effective government. It also failed to maintain and enhance Indonesian unity and bring together the diverse ethnic and class components of the Indonesian population into a united nation. It was not that the Western democracy itself was intrinsically wrong and defective, but that much of the then Indonesian reality was not in harmony with the system. At the same time, the party system had created an excessive and unmanageable political pluralism. The ideological adversary among political parties was so grave that after the failure of the second Ali cabinet formed on the basis of the winners of the election excluding the PKI, no coalition Cabinet could be formed after its dissolution. The hostility of political ideologies reflected in these parties which deepened even further through the long period of fierce election campaign made it difficult to achieve a national consensus. The result was rebellions in different parts of the country and the emergence of dominating extra-parliamentary forces in the national politics. Disappointed with the functioning of Parliamentary Cabinets, President Sukarno, with the support from the military, introduced his concept of democracy with a leadership called Guided Democracy. It was in this concept of democracy with a leadership that Indonesia experienced further involvement of the military in the national politics through its middle way concept and the diminishing role of political parties. The introduction of the system was marked by the re-promulgation of the 1945 Constitution through a Presidential Decree in 1959 where the executive powers lay at the hands of the president.

The change of executive powers into the hands of the President also resulted in the transformation of the pattern of party politics. The proposed system of a presidential cabinet put the political parties into a secondary role. The failure in the natural reduction on the number of political parties through general election in 1955 had inspired President
Sukarno to simplify the party system through Presidential Legislation. This decision put the political parties under government's control and minimized their role in the decision making process as compared to the role they played in the previous period. With the introduction of Guided Democracy where a National Front was established as a representative body for the representatives of political parties, National Council was also formed to accommodate the representatives of the functional groups as well as the military in the decision making process. With the establishment of these controlled bodies the dominating role of political parties in the Indonesian politics slowly diminished. However, the diminishing role of political parties became the blessing in disguise for the Army and the Communist group, the PKI, as also for the President. It opened up the chance for greater role of the Army in the national politics. Because although alienated by the early socialist cabinets and the conduct of parliamentary politics between 1952 and 1956, Army leaders have maintained its tolerance to the parliamentary democracy as long as parliamentarians were able and willing to put together government coalitions. Only when parliament ceased to function did they seek to involve themselves in the processes of decision making, not as usurpers of all power but as one of the forces determining the fate of the nation. President Sukarno provided this chance for the army to involve more on the decision making process by providing military representatives some seats in the National Council.

The struggle of power between these forces dominated the political process in the Guided Democracy period. The reduction in the number and the diminishing role of political parties, except for the PKI, which was heavily favoured by the President as his source of support against the growing power of the Army, had changed their pattern of interaction. Multiparty phenomenon in the parliamentary politics was slowly transformed
into a disguised authoritarian one-party system of Guided Democracy. This change was expected to create more stable and legitimate government in the absence of ideological adversaries and extreme number of political parties. However, the strong and stable government, which was expected at the beginning of Guided Democracy, had deteriorated into impotency and corruption. The neglect of domestic affairs by putting heavy emphasis on diplomacy, conservatism in all domestic policies in which the regime was seeking to maintain the status quo and the indoctrination of state ideology were important reasons for the failure of the short lived Guided Democracy. The National Front established by the President as a political body for the representatives of political parties was heavily dominated by the PKI. At the same time, there was growing rivalry between the Communist group and the Army. The legitimacy of the government that was based on the charisma of President Sukarno was incapable of institutionalizing the rule of succession thus when the question of succession came up, it aggravated internal strife among the competitors, the Army and the PKI. The culmination of this power struggle occurred when a certain group in the military associated to the PKI launched a military coup in late September 1965. The Army, however, easily eliminated this coup attempt. The slipping balancing act by the President resulted in the assertion of the Army's influence in the national politics, thus erasing the influence of the Communist group and put President Sukarno himself into sideline.

In all these situations, the national economy became the victim that suffered the most. While the political groups struggled for their survival in the national politics, the economy was mostly neglected. The concept of Guided Democracy introduced by President Sukarno was accompanied by a guided economic policy, which put the national economy at
the foremost concern of the State. But the perpetual power struggle between major powers in the national politics resulted in the negligence of the national economic policy hence producing a neglected and broken national economy with high inflation, minus economic growth as well as high percentage of unemployment.

The inability of the system of government in the previous period to perform had prompted the transformation of the pattern of party politics as well as the political process in Indonesia. The ever-increasing power of the extra-parliamentary forces finally succeeded in controlling, and even transforming the parliamentary system, into a different pattern of politics in which the domination of a charismatic figure in the form of President Sukarno overshadowed the political role played by political parties. The system of Guided Democracy transformed executive powers from the Parliament to the hands of the President. It provided President Sukarno with immense political power thus allowing him to control the power struggle between different forces in the Republic. The struggle for domination over the political process in the national politics between the Communist group in the National Front and the Indonesian Army in the National Council resulted in the crisis of legitimacy in the government. The personal charisma that became the source of President Sukarno’s political legitimacy eroded quickly over his leniency towards the Communist group after their alleged involvement in the failed and bloody coup of 30 September 1965. The relatively low level of political participation as well as political institutionalization had resulted in the crises. The transformation from a multi-party system into an authoritarian single party system in the form of the domination of the Communist group in the National Front failed to create political stability and legitimacy. Although this period witnessed no change of government at the Centre as compared to the several changes of government in
the previous periods, but the continuing struggle of power in the national politics had led into the crisis of political instability as well as legitimacy crisis. The coup in September the incident in September 1965 scripted the final departure of this regime thus ending the Guided Democracy and the birth of the New Order. In its short rule, the Guided Democracy regime was successful to maintain a relative stability through a controlled political participation. But the increasing pressure for wider political participation in contrast with the lack of political institutionalization had resulted in its breakdown. The moral authority of the leadership of the Guided Democracy regime was also diminishing thus attributing to its downfall.

4.4 The New Order or Pancasila Democracy Period (1966 – 1998)

The relative political stability in which no change of government occurred in the period of 1960 – 1965 was a contribution of President Sukarno’s ability to merge and manipulate the diverse ideological forces into one body of National Front besides the formal limitation in the number of political parties. With the President having the support from the National Council, a relatively stable government was functioning. But the slipping balance of power between the President, the military and the Communist group resulted in the political instability and legitimacy crisis in the wake of a failed coup in late 1965. The emergence of the Army as the sole remaining power that survived the power struggle in the Guided Democracy period led to the creation of a new system of interaction of political parties. General Suharto, a relatively unknown personality in the Army who at the time held the post of Commander of Kostrad, rose to the top of the military order for his successful operation against the Communist coup. His ability to manipulate the Muslim sentiment
against the PKI while securing necessary executive power from the President through Supersemar as well as full support from the Army were important keys for his success to eliminate the Communist influences in the process of establishing a new political system to rebuild the political pattern as well as in rehabilitating the ailing national economy. His ascendance into the highest political office in Indonesia marked the domination of the military, especially the Army, in the national politics. In order to forge a stable government, the regime under the leadership of General Suharto created a system that would suit to the need of the regime labeled as the New Order. Learning from the mistakes from the previous regime, the New Order determined to bring changes to Indonesia.

The end of Sukarno and the imminent emergence of military dictatorship insight did not bother much in the mind of the political elites. The self-inflicted impotence of the parties carried over into Guided Democracy and the New Order proved to be too costly for the functioning of political parties as agents of democracy. The golden opportunity available for the political parties to play important role in the political processes in the formative stages of the New Order, 1967 – 1969 had been lost. The rejection of the proposal of a two party system by the West Java Army leadership and its allies as an alternative for the liberal, parliamentary democracy, which was perceived to be the source of instability with its unimpressive track record curtailed the hope of political parties to act as agents of democracy in the post-Sukarno Indonesia. It was only the Parkindo, a relatively small Christian party, that realized that this might be the last opportunity for a long time to come to create a truly democratic order, and offered to merge itself into such an order. However, all other national parties declined to do so only to find themselves a few years later in a three-“party” system in which the traditional parties command some influence
only by virtue of the *musyawarah*-type of parliamentary debate, without which they would jointly be outvoted on every single issue. The acute ideological rivalry in the previous periods were not to be repeated in which General Suharto had proposed a new system of government known as the *Pancasila* Democracy. The flaw of the Guided Democracy system under President Sukarno was eliminated by seeking refuge under the State’s philosophy, the *Pancasila*, thereby reducing the possibility of an ideological rivalry among the people. Thus if during Guided Democracy the PKI dominated the political process through the effective use of the National Front, the Army with its New Order used the GOLKAR as its civilian hand while further limiting the number of political parties. The introduction of a Political Law number 3 on political parties and GOLKAR in 1975 deepened the control of the regime over party politics and political participation. The single party authoritarian during the President Sukarno period was transformed into a limited party system. The government forced the merger of the existing nine political parties into two different groups, the PPP and PDI, whereas the functional groups which dominated the National Council in the Guided Democracy were christened into one service group called the GOLKAR hence the creation of a limited party system with two political parties and one service group operated in the polity. The political law issued by the New Order regime resulted in the creation of a floating mass in which it enabled the regime to control the functioning of the decision making process. With the GOLKAR winning every elections held by the regime, a possible domination of a single political power, the Army through the GOLKAR, became imminent. Besides, these elections also served as the legal source of legitimacy for the regime. The limited party system introduced by the regime slowly became a dominant party system where the GOLKAR became the hegemonic party while the PPP and the PDI were merely the supporting parties, the weak opposition. Another
Political Law number 3 introduced in 1985 where the adoption of the *Pancasila* as the sole organizational ideology perfected the model of an ideological hegemonic party system of the New Order regime. The imposition of the *Pancasila* as the sole guiding philosophy for all political groups became the ready-made condition for the process of creating a stable government. This ideological hegemonic party in the form of the GOLKAR controlled the political process and the functioning of the government policies.

The development mantra as another source of legitimacy for the New Order worked quite well all the way from the beginning. Its success in reducing the high inflation rate, the opening of more and more employment opportunities, improvement of education facilities and other development works had helped to sustain a steady and stable government. However, the limitation of political participation felt by the increasing number of the middle class group as a result of the improving economic condition had boomeranged the government. The rampant practice of corruptions, cronyism and nepotism added to the worsening of the situation. The disbandment of both PUDI (*Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia*, Uni Democratic Indonesia Party) and PRD (*Partai Rakyat Demokratik*, Democratic People’s Party) by the government in the late 1990s seen as ‘rebel parties’ formed by democratic activists indicated the highhandedness of the government and their authoritarianism. The severe economic crisis in the late 1997 contributed to the culmination of the mounting disappointment among the people. The massive popular pressure built up among the people finally forced the government to resign having successfully occupied the office for more than three decades. The strict control over people’s participation through the limitation of political parties and ideological indoctrination had finally failed to keep the regime in office. The imbalance in the surge of political participation as a result of
modernization process and the lack of political institutionalization had resulted in the crisis of political stability and legitimacy.

The eventuality of the power struggle between President Sukarno, the Army and the Communist group during Guided Democracy period had left the Army as the sole winner. Determined to create a stable and legitimate government, the New Order under the leadership of General Suharto manipulated all necessary powers and supports to materialize this effort. Learning from the mistakes in the previous regime, the New Order leadership further limited the number of political parties and homogenized the political ideologies. The Pancasila was adopted as the sole political ideology for all political organizations thus leaving other ideologies away from national politics. Besides, development became the keyword for the New Order leadership to achieve this goal. This strategic approach taken by the New Order leadership paid off when it succeeded in improving the national economy, increasing the literacy rate in the population as well as successfully administering regular parliamentary elections. These successes eventually brought some degree of legitimacy to the regime as well as some degree of stability to the government. However, the increasing political awareness of the population in the tightly controlled political activities during this period as well as the deteriorating economy in the late 1997 provided the perfect combination to the eventual break up of the political stability and legitimacy of the regime. The relative stability and legitimacy enjoyed by the regime for more than three decades after its establishment in 1966 through controlled political participation and steady growth of national economy failed to sustain the continuity of the regime. The imbalance between political participation and political institutionalization contributed to its fall. The ideological hegemonic party system in the form of the GOLKAR’s domination in the
national politics could not provide the necessary channels for the increasing demand of political participation. This situation combined with the ageing leader, rampant practice of corruption, cronyism and nepotism led to the eventual break up of the regime and the emergence of the problem of political instability and legitimacy crisis.

4.5 The Post-Suharto Period (1999 – Present)

The end of the ideological hegemonic party system of the New Order under the popular pressure for wider political participation prompted the government to re-introduce the multiparty system. The political instability and legitimacy crisis in the government after the departure of the New Order regime made the reconstruction of political structure the most priority of the transitional government of President B.J. Habibie. The already non-functioning political structure was reformed to improve the channels for political participation. The new administration introduced the multiparty system to allow greater political participation for the Indonesian people, thereby ensuring the possibility of arriving at the creation of a stable and legitimate government.

The revival of political parties with its different ideologies in the post-Suharto Indonesia witnessed the similar scenario of party politics as occurred in the early years of the Republic. The amendment of the 1945 Constitution and the introduction of new election law provided necessary legal constitutional framework for the functioning of the system. However, the 1999 general election failed to produce the expected result of a majority party in the Parliament. A fractured mandate was the outcome of this election thereby resulting in the continuance of political instability. The Nationalist-Secular parties (the PDI-P, the
GOLKAR) dominated the center stage of the national politics followed closely by the Nationalist-Religious parties of Islamic ideology (the PKB, the PPP, the PAN, the PBB). This split mandate led to the formation of a coalition government, a political pattern similar to the parliamentary cabinet in the 1950s. An imminent crisis of political instability, however, became clear when Abdurrahman Wahid, whose party, the PKB, only secured minority seats in the parliament, with some calculated support of the shaky coalition of the Poros Tengah (Central Axis of the Muslim parties) and the GOLKAR, was elected by the MPR as the next Indonesian President, defeating the favorite, Megawati Sukarnoputri, whose party, the PDI-P, secured the most number of the total votes in the election. Lacking of majority support and a seemingly erratic style of leadership disappointed his coalition partners and led into his early exit from the office, barely two years after his election from a normal five years of a Presidential tenure. Megawati Sukarnoputri, his Vice-President, was elected by the MPR as his replacement. The relatively better source of support for Megawati Sukarnoputri as compared to Abdurrahman Wahid’s became the important key for the working of her coalition cabinet in which it helped her to complete the remaining three years in office.

The departure of the New Order regime under tremendous popular pressure for greater opportunities of political participation contributed to the introduction of an altogether different pattern of political process. The repressive and controlled policy of the New Order was quickly transformed into an open and more democratic system of government. Representative democracy was revived in the post-Suharto Indonesia. A new pattern of party politics was practiced in which different political groupings with different ideologies re-emerged and started to play more meaningful roles in the decision making
process. Party politics of the parliamentary democracy period in the 1950s started to dominate the political process in search of an answer to the problem of political stability and legitimacy in the post-Suharto Indonesia.

The successful transformation of party politics in the post-Suharto Indonesia, however, failed to provide a stable and legitimate government at the Centre. The indirect election of the executive proved to be another source to the problem of political instability. The introduction of a direct presidential election is expected to be an important key to the creation of more legitimacy and stability in the government. The directly elected executive as well as the members of parliaments achieves more political legitimacy as compared to the one indirectly elected or appointed office bearers. They are more accountable to the electorates. Thus with possibly greater legitimacy in the executive through direct presidential election as well as a balance between political participation and institutionalization in a representative politics political stability in the post-Suharto Indonesia seems obtainable. The following table describes the different degrees of political stability and legitimacy as well as the various party systems adopted in Indonesia from independence till present.

**Party Systems and Political Stability and Legitimacy in Indonesia**

(1945 – 2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Party System</th>
<th>Political Participation</th>
<th>Political Institutionalization</th>
<th>Political Stability</th>
<th>Political Legitimacy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary Period</td>
<td>Extreme Pluralism</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<td>Low</td>
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<td>(1945 – 1949)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parliamentary Period</td>
<td>Extreme Pluralism</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium to Low</td>
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Throughout the history of party politics in Indonesia since its independence in 1945, different regimes in different periods have adopted different types of party systems in the hope of achieving political stability and legitimacy. The result is, however, relatively similar to each other. From an ideological adversary dominated multi-party system in the early days of the Republic (1945 – 1959), to the Communist dominated single party authoritarian of President Sukarno period (1960 – 1965), the military dominated ideological hegemonic party of General Suharto (1966 – 1998) and back to the extreme pluralism of the post-Suharto period (1999 – present), the answer to the problem of political stability and legitimacy in a democratic framework remained elusive. If the introduction of extreme pluralism in the early days of the Republic guaranteed wider political participation but resulted in the formation of weak governments and weak opposition thus resulting in the political instability, the domination of the PKI during the Guided Democracy period and the GOLKAR in the New Order witnessed some degree of political stability with limited degree of political participation. The legitimacy of these political orders in which political stability was maintained, however, failed to withstand the waves of change. The slipping balance between the Army and the PKI in the Guided Democracy period rapidly eroded the legitimacy of President Sukarno thus leading into the end of the Guided Democracy.
Similarly, the erosion in the economic development, which was the practical basis of political legitimacy for the New Order, in the form of a severe economic crisis in the late 1997 proved to be fatal for the safety and the continuity of the regime in which it finally bowed out of office after more than three decades running the government. The domination of the GOLKAR as an ideological hegemonic party failed to keep the balance of equilibrium during the New Order period.

The re-introduction of an extreme pluralism in the post-Suharto Indonesia along with the implementation of a direct presidential election is seen as the process of arriving at the answer to the problem. However, fractured mandate that led to the failure of transforming the legitimacy into a stable polity in the 1950s remains to be the phenomenon of party politics in this post-Suharto period as shown on the result of the elections held in the post-Suharto period in which noo party emerged as the majority power in the House. The political map of the 1950s re-emerged in this post-Suharto party politics where different political ideologies dominated the process of party politics. However, with the direct presidential election is in practice from the 2004 elections the level of political legitimacy of the executive is relatively high. This legitimacy is expected to be transformed into some degree of political stability in the polity. An understanding coalition of like-minded political parties based on common minimum programs will help the transformation process of this legitimacy into a stable and performing government. However, the high level of political legitimacy of the executive with a possible domination of his/her party or coalition partners in the House does not rule out the possibility of an authoritarian regime in the post-Suharto Indonesia. An absence of strong opposition as a check and a balancing force to the dominating power of the executive supports this proposition. The failure of an
extreme pluralism to provide the balance of equilibrium as has been shown in the history of
Indonesian party politics will lead this young democratic Republic to the instability crisis,
or worse, an authoritarian regime. Thus to avoid this possible situation, a suitable party
system that leads to the establishment of a stable and legitimate polity is necessary, failing
of which the question of political stability and legitimacy in Indonesian polity remains
problematic.
Notes:


5. Ibid, p. 432.


8. Ibid, pp. 433.


