Chapter – I

INDIA AND THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Disarmament and Evolution of CTBT

Efforts to control arms and armaments are not new in the field of international relations. Ever since the dawn of history man has been producing armaments to protect himself from attack, either of the animals or his fellow human beings. The arms race has become, perhaps it has been for hundred years, the most important fact in men’s affairs. It is itself the strangest paradox in history.

Human beings have always depended on the use of physical coercion or threat, to influence the behaviour of their groups. The size of these groups has largely depended on the destructiveness of the tools possessed by these groups. Slowly but gradually, in this century the controlling group has come to be called as nation-state and possesses the tools that include nuclear arms, missiles of all types and chemical weapons. The controlling groups are now preparing themselves to engage in wars even in the outerspace. Another ancient phenomenon which continues even now is that there have always been efforts to reduce or eliminate these armaments of mass destruction.

The Old Testament speaks of “engines invented by cunning men to shoot arrows and great stones”. In New Testament days, the Romans had catapults, chariots, swords, spears, shields and helmets; gunpowder, invented by the Chinese was first known in Europe in the early fourteenth century. After 500 years, it had much improved the catapult artillery of the Romans. There were more guns that the Romans had; they had larger charges and longer range; they were used, not in sieges only, but in the open field too. Gunpowder gave infantry the rifle, cavalry, the carbine and the pistol. Daggers were turned into bayonets in the seventeenth century. However, these were only minor changes.
The success of Krupp's steel guns in the Franco-Prussian War started a revolution in the armaments of land forces. This continued without intermission until the outbreak of the 1914 war.2

During this period there was an equally active competition in naval armaments. Beginning from 1884, not only was the number of warships much increased, but also their size and speed, the calibre and range of their guns, their protective belts of armour plate. The submarine was introduced, and was sold by Sir Basil Zaharoff in quick succession, first to Greece and then to Turkey; the larger navies soon took it up. In the years immediately preceding the 1914 war, both the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente expanded their fleets as swiftly as they could; dreadnoughts, super-dreadnoughts, cruisers, destroyers and submarines increased in power and numbers.

The 1914 war brought further big improvements in the weapons with which it began. It also led to new weapons and methods of war fighting: fighter aircraft, which did artillery spotting, reconnaissance, and close support for the infantry; embryo bombers; tanks; many varieties of poison gas; flame-throwers; trench mortars; the artillery, barrage; and many more; it enormously multiplied the number of machine-guns, mortars, light and heavy field artillery with which each division was equipped.

These weapons greatly added to the terrors and hardships of the fighting men, and, at sea and in the land-battle zones, of civilians as well.3

After the First World War, the competitive improvement in the quality of weapons continued without a break. It was still with the weapons of the 1914 war that the 1939 war began. Besides the development of the war of 1914-19 weapons, the 1939 war also brought the introduction of new weapons of many kinds. The scientists were called in to help in great numbers. They were given great resources; and they produced astonishing
results. Hitler made the first beginning in a new kind of war. Finally, in 1945, came the first atomic bomb.

No less striking was the fact that when the war was over these methods of warfare were accepted as normal and conventional by all governments and staffs. The "established rules of International Law" have perished in the flames of war.

Since 1945 the scientists have been given far greater resources than they ever had, even during the 1939 war. In the consequence, there has been a development of weapons, which makes the achievements even of that war pale into insignificance. It has not been confined to Russia and the United States, as is sometimes believed. Other nations, too, have been striving to develop new weapons and to improve the weapons that already exist. The arms race was a major factor in the causation of the 1914 war. The failure of the Disarmament Conference in 1933 was the turning point at which Hitler's war began. Unless governments are able to make any general treaty now, the arms race will go on, with very dire consequences. Every year the race goes on with greater vigour, the danger that it brings grows more acute that might take the world to the final catastrophe. Any lethargy in disarmament efforts could prove fatal.

Athens and Sparta argued over Athen's decision to extend its walls, purely defensive in nature. Sparta saw the walls as offensive. Efforts to negotiate failed, and Peloponnesian war resulted.

Modern efforts to control arms and armaments are generally traced to the Hague Conference of 1899 and 1907. Both conferences are said to be well meaning efforts but complicated by military realities and uncertainties. The question of disarmament in the form of restriction, on the use of poisonous gas, bacteriological warfare, etc had been raised in the Hague Conference. But no significant advances could be made. The proposals received their death warrant on the conference table itself.
Moves to take more effective steps to stop arms race and to bring complete disarmament is an essential precondition for tackling global problems which are becoming increasingly acute. More serious and concrete attempts were made since the Versailles Conference. One such attempt was the establishment and formation of League of Nations to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligation and not to resort to war.

Numerous attempts were made in that direction including the Treaty signed under the banner of League of Nations on Control of Traffic in arms in St. Germain-Enlaye on September 10, 1919. But all the negotiations inside and outside the League including Treaty of September 10, 1919 failed to reap real fruits. The Locarno Treaties of 1925 resumed the negotiations that had failed earlier.

All the human beings on this planet live under the shadow of weapons, fearsome in their numbers, and awe-some in their capacity to inflict pain and destruction. A commission for the disarmament conference was established consisting of selected League members. The conference considered proposals and reports but no agreement could be reached, for no country was prepared to consider the question with an open mind and from the wider international point of view. Nearly 337 proposals were made, three of the most important were put forward by France, the U.S.A. and Soviet Union respectively. The Conference met at last on February 2, 1932 with sixty-one members. Germany one of the League members demanded for equality with other powers. Rejection of her demand met not only with walk out of her from the Disarmament Conference, but she also resigned from League of Nations. Various steps were made to end the deadlock but all of them met with failure.

The Disarmament Conference yet secured certain principles and laid the foundation, in the early stage of disarmament, for bilateral negotiations.
Different countries took part in different Conferences and negotiations, Washington Conference of 1921-22\textsuperscript{11} can be presented as an example of such an effort is also known as Power Treaty.\textsuperscript{12} With the rise of Nazism and Fascism in Germany and Italy the world war II broke out. The terms of Washington Conference came to an end in 1936 and from the very next year no important attempts at disarmament were made till the close of the World War II. All attempts made during the inter war period and before the beginning of the League of Nations proved to be abortive. Following the action on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Soviet Union exploded atomic bomb on September 23, 1949. This was followed by the explosion of Hydrogen bomb by U.S.A. Later Soviet Union made one of its own.

Disarmament and arms control has, thus posed an important and pertinent question – either to save our planet or to perish it in flames. There is existence of modern weapons, ten million times or more powerful than any thing the world has ever seen and only minutes away from any target on earth. The explosions by USA and former Soviet Union brought Afro-Asian countries under pressure. The pressure brought big giants, UK, USSR, USA, Canada and France on negotiating table at Geneva on May 10, 1955. This could be regarded as the second important step towards disarmament. Earlier on June 14, 1946, The Atomic Energy Commission was established to look after the assigned work. The Commission was the result of Trinity Declaration of November 15,1945. On 27 Dec. 1945, the Three Powers Trinity (UK, USSR, USA) formally proposed the establishment of such a commission to United Nations.\textsuperscript{13} Thus with a view to deal with the problem of nuclear proliferation the first session of UN adopted Resolution 1(1) on January 24, 1946 providing for the establishment of UNAEC (United Nations Atomic Energy Commission)\textsuperscript{14}.

The ongoing arms race in general and between former Soviet union and U.S.A. in particular led US to propose Baruch Plan.\textsuperscript{15} The essence of
this Plan was mainly to prevent former Soviet Union from acquiring more nuclear weapons. The Baruch Plan for international control of atomic energy without eliminating the US nuclear weapons monopoly was presented before the UNAEC on June, 14, 1946.\(^{16}\) Acquisition of nuclear capability by the Soviet Union by 1949 led the UN to establish a Disarmament Commission in 1952 with limited membership, which was expanded in 1959 to include all the members of the United Nations.

The Geneva Summit of May 10, 1955 and disarmament talks between great powers during 1958-1960 were done outside the UN and were mainly the outcome of negotiations between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Khuruschev. In 1958 Soviet Union took unilateral decision to terminate the test of Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs.

The General Assembly held in 1959 [Resolution 1378 (XIV)] proclaimed the goal of general and complete disarmament.\(^ {17}\) The agreements outside the UN between two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union could not materialise because of the strained relations between the two around 1960.

In 1960 U.S. temporarily postponed tests of Atomic bombs. A ten nations (Canada, France, Italy, Great Britain, U.S., Bulgaria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Soviet Union) committee was convened at Geneva on March 25, 1960. Failure of the Ten Nation Committee to reach any final agreement led to the resumption of atomic tests. Their resumption brought neutral nations together at Belgrade Conference, demanded a final end to such tests. In December 1961, an agreement to set up an Eighteen Nations Committee and General Assembly [Resolution 17222 (XVI)] welcomed the agreed principles for disarmament negotiations by United States and former Soviet Union.\(^ {18}\) Ten years later, in 1969, the goal was far from being achieved. Of course, a resounding victory for the cause of disarmament was achieved outside the United Nations when the nuclear test
ban agreement was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963. The only thing that 18 Nation Committee did was to submit an agreed draft on Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to the UN Political Committee which approved it by an overwhelming majority vote. India along with 22 other nations, including France and China, abstained. France and China have adopted it only after stockpiling nuclear arms. In the light of the increased militarisation of states and the everpresent threat of nuclear war, the UN declared the 1970s, the 1980s and 1990s as disarmament decades.

The steps taken so far by the superpowers with regard to the so called “Nuclear Disarmament” have rather proved instrumental in the institutionalization of vertical proliferation, legitimization of the status quo of the Nuclear Club and the assumption that nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon powers will not disappear giving the necessary impetus to horizontal proliferation. The horizontal proliferation is “the bye-product of vertical proliferation”. Nuclear proliferation, either vertical or horizontal, is equally sinful. The question of stopping all nuclear weapon tests had been on the agenda of multilateral, bilateral (US-Soviet Union) and trilateral (UK-US-former Soviet Union) negotiations since the early 1950s but no comprehensive ban was reached to take it to its final end. The 1963 multilateral Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) prohibited any nuclear explosions (including those, which may be intended for non-military purposes) in the atmosphere, outer space or under water or in any other environment if the explosion would cause any radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the country conducting it.

The PTBT has certainly helped to curb the radioactive pollution. But, by the time treaty was concluded the two main testing states knew that this activity could be continued underground. Thus the nuclear arms race was allowed to continue unhhampered.
There is no denying the fact that some developing countries have acquired the nuclear capability. In this context where each country is feeling a sense of insecurity, the desire to acquire nuclear weapons has become inevitable. Thus the industrial and scientific potentials of the PNE (Peaceful Nuclear Explosion) attracted various countries, mostly the developing ones.

In 1969, the USA and Soviet Union initiated bilateral negotiations on possible restriction regarding their strategic nuclear arsenals. The first phase of these Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT-1) ended in 1972 with the conclusion of a treaty limiting Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems. The interim agreement also took place on the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The second phase, 1979, SALT-II Treaty (never ratified) sets for both parties an initial ceiling. The SALT-II agreement has serious shortcomings. Real progress would require not only substantial reductions, but also tight constraints.

The real race of armaments and the concept of proliferation divided the nations into two divisions, nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). While both the parties talk about the dangers of nuclear weapons but the main objective of nuclear weapon states behind their negotiations is only to prohibit the NNWS to gain nuclear capability. In the wake of various amendments and suggestions mooted by India and other countries to the American and Soviet draft treaties, both former Soviet Union and United States after scrutinizing these amendments presented a joint draft treaty on March 11, 1968, which thereafter, formed the base of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968.

Until the formation of the NPT the superpowers, in particular, have stockpiled thousands and thousands of warheads. The predominant theme of US-USSR negotiations have been the maintenance of East-west balance accompanied by the precious balance for them. The talk in terms of mutual
limitation in number of ICBM, SLBM, SLCM, MARV, MIRV and so on and so forth.²⁶

All the treaties including SALT-I and others raised a point of uncertainty, which occupies a dominant position in international relations. The non-nuclear weapon states threatened by power hegemony and by the waves of the cold war joined together under the banner of NAM (Non-Aligned Movement). Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India and the Chairman of NAM, invited a meeting of six nations to consider the issue. Mrs. Gandhi said, “the people we represent are no less threatened by nuclear war than the citizens of nuclear weapon states’.²⁷

On 28 Jan. 1985, leaders of six nations again met under the Chairmanship of Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India, and issued a declaration known as the ‘New Delhi Declaration’. The Declaration urged the NWS to immediately halt the testing of all nuclear weapons and to conclude at an early date a treaty on nuclear test ban. The six nations met in Mexico in August 1986 where India, Tanzania, Mexico, Argentina, Greece and Sweden stressed the NWS to conclude a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.²⁸

The substantial international pressure on the United States and on the United Kingdom to reopen negotiations on a comprehensive ban of nuclear weapon tests paved the way for the signing of the NPT in 1968. It prohibits the transfer by nuclear weapon states to any recipient non-nuclear weapon states nuclear technology and to undertake to conclude safeguard’s agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful use to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The treaty also said, the nuclear weapon states are not allowed to assist, encourage or induce any no-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or acquire the devices in question.²⁹
However, without a process of actual disarmament, the future of NPT may be at risk. The arms race undermines the credibility of the treaty in the eyes of its non-nuclear weapon states and parties and provides an excuse to non-parties for not joining the treaty. Steps to reduce such tensions were taken at the 1978 UN General Assembly Special session on disarmament, the USA, the UK and the USSR each made an official statement giving assurances to the countries concerned, but the statements showed significant disparities. The clause 3 of Article IX of the NPT says that a nuclear weapon state is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to Jan.1, 1967\textsuperscript{20} under such a clause the classic problem of cheating has been recognized and discussed by both the Soviet Union and the United States.

In the wake of the keen interest shown by the increasing number of NNWS, a majority of whom constitutes developing countries, in the development of nuclear power, the civilian use of nuclear energy is being identified as horizontal proliferation. India’s peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) of 1974 has been interpreted by western nuclear experts as an event having opened the floodgates of proliferation,\textsuperscript{31} as envisaging second nuclear age and as having brought forth ‘proliferation-phase two’ and so forth. William Einstein, Consultant on Disarmament to UN Secretary General has expressed the view that ‘the risks of proliferation’ have increased with the sudden surge of interest in nuclear weapons to spread to a number of smaller countries, the outlook for world survival becomes much more gloomy.\textsuperscript{32}

From August 27 to September 21, 1985 parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons met at a conference in Geneva to review the operation, earlier two similar conferences were held in, 1970, and in 1980, but failed to conclude any such draft of wider strength. Even the third NPT Review Conference held in Geneva failed to conclude the demands of non-
aligned non-nuclear weapon states. This has created a stalemate between NWS and NNWS. It was attended by 86 out of 130 states parties.

The Conference, of course, emphasized the importance of nuclear weapon-free zones arrangements for the cause of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. It mentioned in this context the successful operation of the 1967 Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) welcomed the endorsement in 1985 by the South Pacific Forum of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and urged implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear weapon free zone in the region of the Middle East. South Africa was claimed to have frustrated the implementation of the UN-Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa by developing nuclear capability.

One of the major successes of the review Conference, with the exception of the USA and the UK, deeply regretted that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) had not been concluded. It called on the nuclear weapon parties to the NPT to resume trilateral negotiations in 1985, and called on all nuclear weapon states to participate in multilateral negotiations and the conclusion of such a treaty is a matter of highest priority in Geneva Conference on disarmament.

The dispute which arose on the subject of nuclear testing almost brought about the collapse of the Conference, particularly insistent on the immediate resumption of negotiations for a CTBT, where the non-aligned states, which recalled the NPT preamble reiterating the determination of the parties to the 1963, PTBT to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all times and to continue negotiations to this end.

Over 2000 nuclear explosions were registered during the 51 years between the conduct of the first nuclear explosive test and opening it for being signed by states in September 1996. Unlike many other multilateral arms control agreements, the NPT of 1968 is not of a permanent duration.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a culmination of 40 years of efforts to ban nuclear test explosions and thereby, halt the development of new weapons of mass destruction.\(^3\)\(^4\)

The intensive negotiations on CTBT began at the Conference on Disarmament of Geneva in Jan 1994. Two and a half years later, however the painstakingly elaborate draft treaty could not command consensus at the close of the negotiations in Aug. 1996.\(^3\)\(^5\)

During the cold war, three treaties on nuclear testing, one multilateral PTBT, 1963 and two bilateral, 1974 and 1976 excluding NPT of 1968 were registered, but none of them was comprehensive enough. The CTBT is 'comprehensive' in that it bans nuclear test explosions in all environments. Not only military but also non-military nuclear explosions are banned under its context. A text identical to that discussed at the Conference on Disarmament was then sponsored by 127 states and formally submitted to the UN General Assembly where it was adopted as a treaty by an overwhelming majority on September 10, 1996. The Treaty was opened for signature on September 24, 1996 at the UN Headquarters in New York. On the very 1st day of its opening, 71 states signed including the five nuclear weapon powers and 27 of the other 44 states, required by article XIV of the Treaty to ratify it, to enable it to be enforced.

A meeting took place on November 19, 1996 where a Preparatory Commission for CTBT, organization was established as an international organisation\(^3\)\(^6\) financed by the State signatories to establish the Global Verification Regime of the Treaty and to prepare for its entry into force.

The CTBT consists of a preamble, 17 Articles, an annexe containing a list of states grouped by region, and in relation to the entry into force provision (article XIV), and a protocol.
Nuclearisation of World Politics

The rapid proliferation of Nuclear weapons constitutes a danger of unimaginable magnitude, which can result in complete annihilation of human civilization from the face of earth. The first successful detonation of nuclear device by the United States at Alamogordo on 16 July 1995 unveiled the gigantic secret of atomic energy which if used cautiously could be a blessing or else it could unleash catastrophe. The catastrophe aspect was proved in on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August 1945 respectively.

The emergence of US as the only nuclear power gave rise to cold war and prompted Soviet Union to make efforts in that direction. By 1949 the Soviet Union had succeeded in acquiring these weapons. It continued to swell with UK (1952) France (1960) and China (1964), acquiring the nuclear status. Thus, by 1964, the number of nuclear weapon states went up to five.

Vertical and Horizontal Proliferation

Nuclearisation of politics can be understood by the typology of nuclear proliferation. Proliferation is of two types: vertical and horizontal. The vertical proliferation can be defined as an augmentation in number and types of nuclear weapons in the possession of NWS whereas horizontal proliferation refers to the spread of nuclear weapons to the NNWS or latter’s capability to manufacture them. There is no denying the fact that some developing countries like India, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, Taiwan, Argentina, Brazil etc. have acquired the nuclear capability.

The non nuclear weapon states (NNWS) or the developing world regards nuclear proliferation mainly as a political issue and not as a technical issue as projected by the NWS. “The will to go nuclear” and the decision making about it is indeed a political process no matter at which level the technological sophistication be.
While making the NPT draft vertical proliferation was not included in the NPT. Actually it was deliberately left out because its inclusion was detrimental to US interests. Basically, in mid 1950's the idea of Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty was mooted by the US to control the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the then potential industrial powers like West Germany and Japan. Thus, it is obvious that right from the beginning, it has complicated the whole issue of nuclearisation.

Nuclear command and control have assumed extraordinary significance in the contemporary era of “information revolution” and “information warfare”. With its focus on such elements as command and control warfare, the military technological revolution, net war, cyber war, electronic warfare, military discipline and disinformation, and communication security, information warfare, according to some has introduced a “comprehensive paradigm shift in war fighting” rendering classical nuclear deterrence obsolete.

Scale of Proliferation

Since ancient times, there has always been technological developments in weaponry, but since world war II the scale of expenditure and the pace of change have been in a totally different language.

The qualitative changes are even more likely than quantitative increases to cause uncertainty and insecurity and to stimulate more changes in response. The qualitative arms race is fuelled by military research and development (R & D). There was a substantial rise in the volume of world military R & D expenditures since 1980. The estimated rate of growth per year, which was some thing under 1% from 1974 to 1980 was around 5-8 percent from 1980-83 and seems to have been more than 10% from 1983 to 1984.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>USA¹</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>UK¹</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>India</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>562</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>134</td>
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¹All British tests from 1962 have been conducted jointly with United States at the Nevada Test Site. Therefore, the figure for US tests is actually higher than indicated here.

The volume growth in deliveries of major conventional weapons in the five-year period 1981-1985 the USA was the leading arms supplier with about 39% of total arms exports. The share of the Soviet Union was about 28%. The Soviet Union was the largest supplier of major weapons to the third world during 1981-85. The Soviet share was 32% and the US share was around 27% whereas US exports go mostly to industrialized countries, Soviet exports are predominantly directed towards the third world.⁴⁷

France has further consolidated its position as third ranked exporter of major weapons followed by the UK, Germany and Italy. Together, the four major West European arms exporters now account for almost 28% of arms exports to the third world. Between 1978-82 that share was around 18%. In addition new West European arms exporters have gained market shares, most notably Spain. Spain ranked eighth among arms exporters to the third world in 1981-85 with a share of almost 2%.

China, Israel and Brazil are ranked seventh, ninth and tenth, respectively, among the exporters of major weapons to the third world. The largest arms-importing region is Middle East with a share of about 50% of total third world imports during 1981-85.⁴⁸

The three highest-ranking arms-importing countries are in the Middle East, Iraq, Egypt and Syria alone account for at-most 32% of third world arms imports during 1981-1985⁴⁹

The annual value of the production of major weapons in the third world has grown fairly constant from 1950 to 1984. In 1950 production was valued at
about $2.3 millions. In 1984 this value was almost 600 times higher. At production in the third world stood still at a low level in the early 1960s. It regained some momentum during the second half of the decade: additional countries (Brazil, Israel and South Africa) entered into Arms Production while others, notably India, expanded their activities. More & more countries joined the ranks of arms producers.

If the growth in production slowed down in 1980s then at about the same time, the arms trade with third world also ceased to grow, most of the countries continued to produce arms and imported and exported them.

In 1985, for the first time in many years, there was some sense of movement in nuclear arms control talks. Both USA and USSR had put forward several new arms reduction proposals, culminating in both super powers offering cuts of 50% in strategic nuclear forces. Both nations also called for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as their ultimate arms control objective. Both Reagan and Gorbachev presented their programmes of action.

Nevertheless, while the words were about reduction, the actions were about increases. All human beings on this planet live under the shadow of weapons. The World Health Organization in 1985 had estimated that a large-scale nuclear war might kill 1.1 billion people & seriously injure an equal number. Thus nearly half of the population of the globe in 1984 could be an immediate casualty in a nuclear war.

The threshold for triggering a nuclear war in the form of nuclear winter is around 500-2000 nuclear warheads. This threshold war crossed by United States in 1953 and by the Soviet Union in 1966.

The USA and Nuclearization of World Politics

The United States is the only state that has used an atomic bomb in anger. On August 6, 1945, the “Enola Gay” a US B-29, dropped the bomb on Hiroshima city. Three days later a second bomb destroyed Nagasaki. Since
that time the US and Soviet Union in particular, and other countries as well, have engaged in a nuclear arms race. According to many international scholars the nuclear arms race is the dominant single feature of post-world war II history.

Soviet-American nuclear rivalry soon moved from developing fission weapons to developing fusion weapons. The United States exploded its first fusion device in late 1952, and Soviets followed suit less than a year later.

In 1972 Soviet and American leaders reached an agreement on the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) placed a cap on the quantity of Soviet and US delivery vehicles, and an accompanying protocol limited the number of Antiballistic Missile Systems (ABMs) each side could deploy. No limits were placed on qualitative improvements however, and the nuclear arms race continued.

A SALT-II agreement that effected some limitations on qualitative improvements was negotiated by 1979, but the US Senate never ratified it.\textsuperscript{54} By the 1980s the nuclear arms race had become a confused arena for sophisticated arguments, expensive weapons systems, and bewildering acronyms. The most pessimistic estimates are that as many as forty states may have the nuclear capability in near future excluding the Big-5.

Since World War II military expenditures of nation-states have expanded astronomically, very few nations can claim for not having contributed to this explosion. The continuing influence of nuclear power in world politics appears inescapable. The pattern of relations among states is fundamentally one of inequality.

There is a growing international realization that South Asia and North East Asia are among the major trouble spots of the world. Next to Europe, Asia is the only other region where major military powers exist.\textsuperscript{55} But in contrast to Europe they are more rivals than partners.
Pakistan has close military ties with United States. India is a party to a Treaty of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union. The members of ASEAN (the Associations of South East Asian Nations) consider themselves as non-aligned. But strictly speaking they all have links of various kinds with western countries.

Asia has the greatest concentration of armed forces – nonetheless, there are three nuclear weapons states present in Asia: the Soviet Union, China and the United States. The first two are Asian powers themselves and the latter maintains major nuclear forces in the region.  

The testing of nuclear weapons by China is continuing, though at a very slow pace. From 1964 to 1982 China conducted a total of 26 nuclear tests, as compared with about 700 tests by United States and 500 by Soviet Union in the period of 1945-82.  

Finally in June 1982 China announced that it was developing a three stage liquid-fuelled rocket capable of launching satellites into geostationary orbit. Such a satellite could fulfil important military missions in the fields of communications, early warning and metrology.  

Military systems have experienced massive change over the post world war II period. Global military expenditure, measured in constant values, has also changed markedly, roughly quadrupling during 1950-1985. This constant proportionate increase is what we mean by a ‘compound interest’ type of growth.  

In the first half of the 1950s the US government developed the hydrogen bomb and stepped up its atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons (with the hydrogen bombs invention, both fission-based atomic bombs and fusion based hydrogen bombs became known as nuclear weapons). The main goal in the testing programme was to increase the destructive power and efficiency of nuclear weapons. This involved experiments to test new designs.
and to gain a better understanding of the internal workings, the Physics of the weapons themselves.\textsuperscript{62}

In the early 1950s, the development of the thermo-nuclear, or hydrogen bomb led to much higher yield weapons. It was clear to observers at the time that “with the advent of thermo-nuclear weapons... yields would increase a thousand fold”.\textsuperscript{63}

History, particularly recent history, has shown that South Asia can not been seen in isolation from its neighbouring regions. South Asia comprises densely populated large states – India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, two Island communities – Sri Lanka and Maldives and two landlocked Himalayan states – Nepal and Bhutan. All are members of the NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) and the Group of 77 and four – India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives – are also members of the commonwealth (Pakistan has recently been expelled). All South Asian countries are distinguished for being in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) category of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{64}

In the light of above setting, conflicts, which have their own specific cause, identities and characteristics, can not be ruled out in the region.

On 11 May 1998, India crossed the nuclear Rubicon, embarking on a journey that can only bring greater insecurity, tension and maldevelopment even as it represents another crucial phase in the ongoing efforts of the Sangh combine to totally transform the character of Indian society and to impose its version of what constitutes the Indian nation and nationalism.\textsuperscript{65}

Three kinds of arguments can be put forward to explain why the Indian government embarked on this course. The first has to do with supposed changes in the external security environment, or perceptions about such changes i.e. Pakistan and/or China have become more nuclearly threatening and belligerent. The second kind claims that the nuclear hypocrisis of existing NWSs and their reluctance to move rapidly to full nuclear disarmament has finally “driven” India out of frustration/impatience to try and gate crash into
their club. The third set of argument focuses on changed self-perceptions and the domestic factors behind such changes.\textsuperscript{66}

This was not surprising, Sino-Pakistan and Sino-Indian ties were always situated in a wider context of cold war relationships, more specifically Sino-Soviet, Sino-US and US-Soviet ties. Here the crucial axis for most of the three decades of the sixties, seventies, and eighties was Sino-Soviet hostility.

India valued Soviet diplomatic support on Kashmir, its military supplies and economic assistance and in the context of the 1971 Bangladesh war for independence, the strategic counter weight the Indo-Soviet Treaty of that year provided against the Sino-Pakistan–US axis that was emerging at the time.

The nuclear arms race started slowly enough, at least on the public level and entrapped India, Pakistan, Iran and Libya and goes mad with the other countries of Asia.

Since the World War II military, expenditures of nation states have expanded astronomically. Very few nations can claim not having contributed to this explosion. During the 1970s alone, as the following Table indicates, world military expenditures in real terms expanded by roughly 20 percent.\textsuperscript{67}

The growth of military expenditures, 1960-80 in billions of constant 1979 dollars.

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The industrialised states of the East and the West, as well as China, account for 75 percent of the world's military expenditures, but third world states have actively increased their military budgets as well. Mr. Macmillan has said that control over nuclear weapons cannot really be established until a
system is evolved by which the production of all fissionable material can be accurately checked.68

The NPT has been wrecked by proliferation regimes in various third world countries. Most recent example being A.Q. Khan (Pakistan's nuclear hero), China, North Korea and European nations and permissiveness towards it by Washington during the 80s and 90s. It is in this context that India's national security advisor Brajesh Mishra said at the 40th Munich Conference on Security, "extra-ordinary measures are being contemplated to guarantee security from these challenges. A multilateral consultative machinery with international credibility can provide legitimacy to such measures. But for it to be effective, it has to be evolved with wide and representative consultations. I would also add that clubbing partners against proliferation with countries of true proliferation concern is a self defeating approach, which can only weaken the cause of genuine non-proliferation". Is Washington Listening?69

When did Washington come to take note of Khan's proliferation activities that if Khan could handle successfully the proliferation from Europe to Pakistan he could with equal case do it for Iran and Libya. However, in the eighties, the US and other western countries supported the WMD proliferation of both Saddam Hussain and Zia-Ul-Haq.70

Ten years after the cold war ended, the world still has enough firepower in its 30,000 plus nuclear weapons arsenal to cause a million Hiroshima's; indeed wipe out the human race altogether.71

Associated with nuclear weapons is not just a highly evolved sophisticated military infrastructure, command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) systems. Equally vital is what has been called 'nuclearism' or psychological, political, and military dependence on nuclear weapons, the embrace of the weapons as a solution to a wide variety of human dilemmas, most ironically that of "security"72. Wars involve the deliberate use of lethal violence, which can be justified only because we recognize two orders of fact,
each of them compelling, each of them terrible. Wars are just, only in so far as they are waged in self defence or in pursuit of causes that are noble, and oppose injustice and tyranny.

The great significance at the international level of the crossing of the nuclear threshold in South Asia lies in the challenges it poses to the advocates of nuclear disarmament, the vast majority of the world’s peoples and states, the five recognized NWSs, and more generally, to global nuclear order, itself skewed and unequal.

The global nuclear order is non-proliferation oriented, not disarmament oriented. It is based on three foundations; the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, the P5 state’s nuclear oligopoly and their continued reliance on nuclear weapons for security, and their reluctance to move quickly towards the abolition of nuclear weapons, and number of specific arrangements that restrict the sale of nuclear materials or transfer of nuclear and related technologies, e.g. the London Supplier’s Group (LSG) the Zangger Accords, or the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

The NPT places no real, operational compulsions or injunctions upon the nuclear weapon states to demonstrate tangible progress towards the goal of nuclear abolition. For reasons of legal logic alone, Article VI has considerable weight in the overall framework of the Treaty. As Mueller, Fischer. and Koetter argue, If Article VI is removed from the NPT, the remaining obligations of the NWSs (essentially not to transfer nuclear weapons to NNWSs) cannot be said to establish an adequate reciprocal commitment for the renunciation of nuclear weapons by their non-nuclear weapon Treaty Partners.

NPT ‘has succeeded beyond the expectations of its founders’, in reducing the number of potential proliferants from 20 or 30 to about half a dozen, as from the circumstance that without its basic discipline and constraints, including international safeguards —and despite its flaws — it
would be considerably more difficult, if not possible to negotiate arms control, arms reduction and disarmament measures.\textsuperscript{76}

A March 1998 report of the National Resources Defence Council (NRDC), Washington DC, USA, a US-based NGO, provides, for the first time, authoritative estimates of the sizes and locations of the nuclear arsenals of the US, Russia, the UK, France and China.

NRDC assessed the nuclear arsenals of the five countries as follows:

The United States: nearly 12,000 nuclear weapons (deployed or stored) are located in 14 states.

Russia: Some 22,500 weapons are deployed or stored at about 90 sites in Russia.

The United Kingdom: The UK stockpile is about to be composed of a single weapon type; the Trident II missile on vanguard class submarines.

France: The French stockpile totals some 450 warheads of three types at four locations.

China: The Chinese stockpile is estimated at about 400 located at some 20 sites.

South Asia’s nuclearization, then, presents different dilemmas, challenges and problems to the different actors concerned and involved. The most important of these are the challenges it presents to the advocates of nuclear disarmament and to the peace movements in different parts of the world. It is to these challenges that we now turn.

There is a growing international realisation that South Asia and Northeast Asia are among the major trouble-spots of the world.\textsuperscript{77} There can be no doubt that the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union have for some time possessed a sufficient stock of nuclear and thermo-nuclear devices to destroy each other many times over and still have sufficient remaining to deal with any other powers capable of retaliation in kind\textsuperscript{78}, while
these ramifications of the complexities of European power politics were building up another event of global dimensions that upset the world balance of power was the Sino-Soviet rift which finally became an established fact in 1960, and gave an impetus to the loosening of the ties between the allies on either side of the iron curtain.79

We live in an era in which a military victory can simultaneously prove to be major political and diplomatic debacle or a breakthrough in the non-violent sectors of the spectrum of conflict, such as economic and psychological warfare, may yield far greater results than the employment of overt military power.

The world has reached up to the mark where the runners run a mad nuclear race. The original powers, United States, Britain, France, Russia and China where following by Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran and Libya. The new group holds the composition.80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>First device or test</th>
<th>Estimated weapons</th>
<th>Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Device as early as 1967</td>
<td>75-200</td>
<td>Extensive delivery capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Test in 1974</td>
<td>30 to 35</td>
<td>Further tests in May 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Pak</td>
<td>Test in 1998</td>
<td>24 to 48</td>
<td>3,000 centrifuges in operation by early 1990s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>Device possibly in 1990s</td>
<td>2 to 5</td>
<td>Plutonium weapons, centrifuge operation starting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Claims, efforts are peaceful</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Aims to build 50,000 centrifuges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Recently abandoned</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Unknown number of centrifuges</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is a divergence of opinion between the NWS and NNWS about the question whether proliferation is a technical problem or a political issue. The NNWS or the developing world regard nuclear proliferation mainly as a
political issue and not as a technical issue as projected by the NWS. 81 "The will to go nuclear and the decision making about it is indeed a political process no matter at what level the technological sophistication be". 82 The decisions by West Germany, Canada, Sweden or Japan not to go nuclear are mainly governed by their respective political constraints despite the fact that these countries possess sophisticated nuclear technology. 83

The denial of nuclear technology by the NWS to NNWS even for PNE (Peaceful Nuclear Explosion) purposes is biased and unilateral action. India after its PNE of 18 May 1974 has been subjected to harsher restrictions, and embargoes by the United States and Canada. The developing countries including India having been voicing their concern in this regard.

Scene in the West Asia

West Asia has been for some years now, particularly after the Gulf War, the world's largest arms market. This particularly applies to the grouping of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. 84 The total armed forces of the GCC comes to approximately 2,50,000. The land forces, given the terrain and presumed threat, have concentrated on mechanized forces. The combined armies would field about 1800 Main Battle Tanks (MBT) with about 500 top of the line M1 Abrams and 150 Le Clere. The rest are combinations of US M60s and French AMX-30S. The GCC countries have also taken pains to strengthen their air forces and can field some 650 combat aircraft, again a combination of US and French aircrafts, including F16s and Mirage 2000s. The other interesting aspect of the military buildup in GCC is the presence of CSS-2 missiles in Saudi Arabia. These Chinese missiles have a range of 2,800 km and were designed to carry nuclear warheads.

The other country in West Asia whose military buildup is of interest is that of Iran. The current budget of Iran is about $ 5.7 billion. It has
approximately 5,500,000 men under arms; the bulk, about 3,500,000 being in the army.*^85

South East Asia has been, for some time, the second largest importer of arms after West Asia. This is a reflection of the insecurities felt in the region due to both the rapid modernization of the Chinese armed forces and the gradual reduction of US military presence in the area.86

Presently South Africa has modest armed forces equipped and trained for internal security duties. The current strength is about 63,000 personnel of which 43,000 are in the Army. Republic of South Africa has however realized that it needs to modernize its armed forces particularly its navy and air force. Plans in the pipeline call for the purchase of three modern diesel submarines and four corvettes for the Navy; 28 JAS Grippin aircrafts from Sweden and 24 Hawks from the UK. It is also to purchase A119 helicopters from Italy. These purchases show a definite intent to play a role in the Indian Ocean and its vicinity.87

In addition to the conventional arms buildup, there has also been a build-up of nuclear weapons in the whole world.

INDIA'S DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY COMPULSIONS

India stands at the center of the SAARC region both location wise and area-wise. Moreover, with its population and area, India is the largest country in the SAARC region. It has an area of 32,88,000 square kilometers and its share in the region’s area is around 73.4 per cent. The country lies south of the Himalayas and extends to the Indian Ocean. India is located between latitude 8°04' and 37°18' north and longitude 68°08' and 97°24' east. It is bordered by four SAARC countries namely Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh besides China and Burma. The other two SAARC countries namely Sri Lanka and Maldives, though not connected by common border being Islands, can be also considered as border countries. The population of India had crossed 1

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billion by the time of the census of 2001 and it was over 77 per cent of the total population of the region.\textsuperscript{88}

India’s historical development, no less than her recent experience inevitably beckoned towards an independent foreign policy stance. India was too big a country to become a camp follower of any other country. Besides, the country had gone through the experience of a prolonged struggle against British imperialism, the mightiest of western imperialists, and was pulsating with nationalist urges and impulses.

India fought a prolonged struggle for freedom. Innumerable people courted arrests, resisted the Raj in a hundred and one ways and challenged the might of the British Empire. India’s entire background was consistently anti-imperialistic. The history and geography of India could not fail to determine the thrust and focus of India’s foreign policy. Jawaharlal Nehru pointed out the geographical parameters, he said, India was at the gateway to both South-east Asia as well as the Middle East. Anything happening in the South Asia, South East Asia, the Gulf region, West Asia and the Indian Ocean region affected India, and India could not lose her eyes to it.\textsuperscript{89}

The quest for security has led to different courses of action among the newly emerging countries. Some have sought to involve the big powers and buy security through alignment. Many others decided that security could best be ensured by keeping away from international power politics. Under Jawaharlal India concluded very early that involvement in military blocs of the big powers would not enhance her security but could very well escalate the pressures on her and in fact encourage destabilization. Staying out of power blocs and remaining non-aligned appeared to offer a better mix of security and independence. Security, however, remained a primary and continuing concern of India’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{90}

The general, domestic, regional and international balance in the first decade after independence posed a number of complex and uncongenial
problems. India’s Independence was fragile, the unity of the country was somewhat tenuous and integration was still an aspired for goal. Partition of the country had brought in its trial large-scale exodus of populations and sufferings and serious problems of law and order and economic instability in many parts of the country. There were fissiparous tendencies and forces within the country and pressures from aboard to make India toe the line.\textsuperscript{91}

India had to function for the first time as an independent country in a new regional balance of forces. All the South Asian countries were now independent and with some, there were historical problems, and with some there were consequences of a large, developing, giant size country like India emerging into independence as their neighbour. Outside of South Asia the other neighbour China too was be-stir with energy and power and has gone through a communist revolution.

Nevertheless, the regional balance was neither beyond manageable negotiation and adjustment nor disconcertingly unfavourable. India’s internal weaknesses have long been regarded as its distinguishing quality. In the 1950s American policymakers viewed Indian domestic politics as a critical battleground in the larger war against communism. Fearing that hungry people would be attracted to communism, Americans sent massive shipments of food, and more creatively, helped India build competence in agriculture and scientific research. Other vulnerabilities included the gross inequalities of the caste system, India’s regional and linguistic based separatist movements and the desperate plight of many Indian girls and women. In recent years, there has been evidence of corruption and administrative mismanagement on a very large scale.\textsuperscript{92} Of India’s weaknesses, the economy has been singled out as a critical problem.\textsuperscript{93} Economic, ideological, federal, and domestic, ethnic and religious considerations were quietly important in shaping India’s Policy.\textsuperscript{94} Nehru and his colleagues believed that non-alignment would prevent India from becoming entangled in larger global conflicts and thus shield the fragile Indian economy
from outside forces as it erected a modern infrastructure. Non-alignment would also keep the ideological battles of the super powers away from India.

India’s thinking about defence and external affairs was from the inception of the freedom movement, coloured by antimilitarism. Leaders of the National Congress spoke against large military outlays and the onerous burden, which these outlays put on India’s poverty stricken people. With the advent first of Mahatma Gandhi and later of Jawaharlal Nehru, the external policy of the national movement became pronouncedly idealistic. The leadership was completely innocent of the peremptory requirements of national security and reasons of state.\textsuperscript{95}

When the nationalist leaders took charge of the destiny of divided India, they were confronted with the unpleasant reality of rivalries among states and had willy-nilly to address themselves to the problems of defence. When the tribal leaders abetted by Pakistan, invaded Kashmir, the Government leaders realized that non-violence was of no avail. Only Indian troops airlifted to Kashmir post haste could stem the raiders’ advance, save Srinagar and liberate a major portion of the valley. Force had to be applied also in Hyderabad and Goa. The Prime Minister’s statement that Goa was a ‘pimple’ and could be settled “gently” showed a surprising, ignorance of the ways of the Portuguese dictator, Salazar. But Jawaharlal Nehru refused to learn. Even the bitter experience of the border war with China did not fully cure the government of the malady as events soon after Nehru’s death confirmed.\textsuperscript{96}

Among those who wielded supreme power in India after 1947, Mrs. Gandhi had some instinctive understanding of these basic requirements. But she was not able to rise above manipulative politics. It was the second decade of independence, which turned out to be more dangerous and more difficult. It was during this period that India’s foreign policy and its basic postulates faced the harshest challenges both from abroad and from within the country. Jawaharlal’s foreign policy framework received hammer blows and
precariously reeled under their impact. The short border war in 1962 with shock and the shame of reversals on the Himalayan heights and the exposure of military weaknesses of India that acted as an albatross around the neck (of Indian foreign policy) for many a subsequent years, which the country took nearly another decade to shake off and to recover from its inhibiting impact.

Disputes over national policies were sorted out within the congress party. According to Indian and foreign observers alike, India’s one party dominant system – ‘the Congress’ system, conferred great advantages on a developing country. Congress governed at the Center and in most of the states, providing over all political stability. India challenged the assumption that only rich countries could be democracies.

These policies and assumptions have all been challenged in the past fifteen years. One by one, the images of a stable, orderly, peaceful, and progressive India have given way to a series of interacting social, political and progressive economic revolutions. Since the late 1980’s; India has become a “revolutionary state” experiencing political, social and economic upheavals. The West Indian-British author V.S. Naipaul has called this process “A Million Mutinies Now”. There are not so much “bloody revolutions” as “bleeding revolutions”. As Indian anthropologist M.N. Srinivas has observed, “Indians are actually living in a revolution, although it is not always recognized by many of them nor, for that matter, by the outside world”.

These revolutions include the bursting forth of hitherto quiescent groups, usually from low castes, with demands for ethnic and linguistic autonomy, a changed center-state relationship, a transformed Indian Diaspora, and a direct challenge to India’s secular order. On top of this, the global information revolution is spreading throughout the country. All of this has occurred at a time when nearby regional conflicts are spilling over into India, and Delhi’s foreign policy, loosened from its non-aligned moorings, is more than ever a function of these profound domestic economic, political and social revolutions.
India’s lone security-related economic and technical success has been in the area of missile development and related space launch vehicles and satellites. The most prominent spokesman for this position is the current president of India, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam. He has frequently argued that Indian defense science provides the model for the rest of Indian society. One of Kalam’s boasts is that India has the ability to design a “state of the-art” ABM System, an ICBM, and a supersonic earth-orbiting plane. “If adequate funds are made available for the project.” \(^{100}\) Similar boasts are regularly heard from India’s nuclear establishment. Yet India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) can not produce a modern aircraft or Tank, and some now doubt that the May 1998 nuclear tests were as successful as claimed or that India has more nuclear weapons than Pakistan. \(^{101}\)

Indian economic reforms, the so-called first war, are still in their infancy. So far, they have concentrated on improving the climate for foreign investors. Surprisingly, some of the greatest problems may arise in the software and computer industry.

The Indian constitution established a ‘unitary political system’ making the centre responsible for defense and foreign policy, and giving the states presumptive authority over law and order, education, and social policies. In practice, the balance of power has always tilted towards the center. The centralisation of power within Congress coincided with an eighteen-month. “Emergency” (during 1975-77) that brought autocracy to India. The Emergency contributed to a resurgence of regional parties. Dissident Congress party leaders who had been rejected by New Delhi but who still had a strong base in the states sometimes formed these state parties. This movement of power to the states, and perhaps the creation of many new and smaller states, has implications for India’s role in the region and its relations with other countries.

A new wave of state creation began in 2000 as a result of the BJP's pledges when it was in opposition. Three new states were created. India’s
approximately forty political parties are found mostly at the state level and there are at least seven national parties. All but three or four of these forty parties have their power in a single state.\textsuperscript{102} State-level parties have determined election outcomes as well as the fate of coalitions, turning the tables in Indian politics. Most of India’s state based parties are opposed to Delhi’s heavy hand. From their perspective, the government of India should be just strong enough to carry out minimum security needs and provide financial support to state development plans; most would also prefer greater freedom to directly negotiate foreign, economic, cultural, and even political ties.

Political organization, political tradition, structure of government and enlightened leadership also contribute to the shaping of an effective foreign policy. The traditions of peace, truth and non-violence enabled India to insist on peaceful settlement of international disputes and encourage disarmament.

Jawaharlal Nehru was the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister from 1947 till his death in 1964. The foundations of India’s foreign policy were firmly laid by him. Nehru, as the head of the Interim Government, had declared as early as September 7, 1946 principal objectives of India’s foreign policy. In a broadcast to the nation he had said:

We shall take full part in international conferences as a free nation with our own policy and not merely as a satellite of another nation, we hope to develop close and direct contacts with other nations and to cooperate with them in the furtherance of world peace and freedom. We are particularly interested in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples, and in the recognition in theory and practice of equal, opportunities for all races.\textsuperscript{103} But, Nehru was not a realist of Kautilya-Morganthan School. He was deeply impressed by his leader, Mahatma Gandhi who was an idealist and insisted on application of moral principles in the conduct of all politics. Nehru therefore, did not find any incompatibility between India’s national interest and the legitimate interests of other nations.
Dealing with "national interest as an end", J. Bandhopadhyaya refers to realism and idealism and concludes that, "On the whole it would be correct to say that there is a stronger accent on idealism in the modern Indian thinking on international relations... than in any other country in the world". 104 Kautilya the master of statecraft in India, in the 4th century BC; considered politics as 'a game of power, and justified increase in the prince’s power through conquest by all means at his disposal. Among the modern Indian statesmen, "Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel is often regarded as a Realist par excellence". 105

India has a parliamentary executive more or less similar to the executive in Britain. Making of foreign policy is essentially the responsibility of the cabinet as a whole. Decision-making is a cumulative process involving a number of elements and a complex procedure. It is of course, a difficult process, because much dependence on such variable factors as individual personalities and the nature of the situation whose combined effect can not be precisely gauged. But in any proper assessment of the factors shaping foreign policy, none of these numerous elements can be ignored.106

Ever since 1947 when India became independent, she has taken an active part in the work of the United Nations. Testifying to the useful and effective part that she has played, Lord Birdwood, a member of United Kingdom delegation to the fourteenth session of the General Assembly, stated that India was "an effective and balancing influence in the world affairs so far as the United Nations' organization is concerned"107: India has taken the view that the collective security function of the United Nations as envisaged in chapter VIII of the Charter should not be emphasized because of the cold war which developed soon after the charter was signed.108 The cold war has made it difficult for the permanent members; the agreements by which armed forces were to make available to the Security Council for the maintenance of security were never effectively made.
India has always approached the subject of security in its larger framework, beyond that implicit in defence and military forces. The concept of security has involved the preservation and perpetuation of the core values.

**Core Values of National Security**

(a) Democratic political setup  
(b) Secular state  
(c) Socialist nature of the state.  
(d) Attainment of egalitarian society  
(e) Maintenance of Internal peace and security  
(f) Economic development and progress

These values had shaped the Indian civilization and they provide the foundations on which modern India could be built taking into account the historical and socio-economic conditions in the country.

Kautilya, the military thinker, had classified four threats to national security in *Arthashastra*:

(a) External threats with external complicity. Ex- China and Pakistan.  
(b) Internal threat with external complexity Ex. – The problem of Mizo and Nagaland.  
(c) External threats with internal complicity Ex. – Kashmir issue.  
(d) Internal threats with internal complexity Ex. – Naxalite problem

Further argument is, socio-political dimensions be placed in 'D' categories because we have serious problems from socio-political dimensions to the national security.\(^{109}\)

We have entered the 21st century in an age of information and technology. Social development will help the nation despite diversities of regions, religions, languages, classes, castes and customs; however over all integration of identities exist. Political leaders speak of unity in diversity.
However, there is no denying the fact that Indian society is being subjected to considerable stresses and strains.

India's main foreign policy objectives are based on peaceful coexistence, self-reliance and cooperation, non-alignment, support for decolonisations, disarmament, restructuring of the iniquitous International Economic Order and the global fight against racialism. India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru laid down the basic parameters of India's foreign policy and his unique contribution was the concept of non-alignment. The fundamental aim was to preserve India's freedom of option and decision-making in an autonomous way, in a world bristling with animosities and bloc antagonism.

If we look at the Indian situation, the seven countries of South Asia, which have got 20 percent of the global population within their borders—India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Maldives account for hardly 1.2 per cent of the world's military expenditure. That is the international situation.

The main preoccupation of Indian foreign policy since the achievement of freedom had been relations with Pakistan. Pakistan's military link with America greatly strengthened the combat strength of the Pakistani Army, although India was much larger than Pakistan in terms of its geographical extent and population and also was industrially much more advanced. The military link between Pakistan and United States, the Pakistan Army had continued to grow both in numbers, in fire power and in strength.

The deterioration of the Sino-Indian relations, the growing American involvement in Vietnam, and the liberal sympathies of the Kennedy administration all combined together to introduce a new element in the triangular relationship between India, Pakistan and the United States.

Pakistan in its single-minded pursuit of its objective of forging of an anti-Indian coalition had established intimate relations with China. From the
days Pakistani leaders had taken great pains to explain to the Chinese the real significance of their participation in CENTO and SEATO Pacts. The Pakistani overture to China at Bandung had thus met with an understanding response from China.

India-Pakistan bilateral relations continued to show a downward trend. Pakistan's sustained efforts to internationalise the Kashmir issue, its unabated support to subversion and terrorism directed against India, its intransigence on the issue of resumption of bilateral dialogue with India, and its persistent negative approach have vitiated the atmosphere and prevented a meaningful progress in bilateral relations. In addition to training, equipping funding and guiding militants, Pakistan has stepped up its transborder terrorism by inducting mercenaries from third countries into Jammu and Kashmir. India apprised the international community of the politically motivated act by Pakistan and emphasized that all outstanding issues between the two countries need to be resolved peacefully and bilaterally within the framework of the Shimla Agreement.

Pakistan acquired the nuclear capability on the pretext of "security" threat from India's PNE (Peaceful Nuclear Explosion) of 1974. In Sept. 1965, after western media circulated reports from New Delhi that India would shortly explode a nuclear device, there was a flutter in Pakistani media.

Since Pakistan can beat back an attack supported by the bulk of the conventional arms possessed by India, the only course open to that country is to acquire nuclear arms and keep them ready for use against Pakistan... If India decides to let its nuclear ambitions have free scope... its purpose will be to blackmail its small neighbours especially Pakistan.

The late Z.A. Bhutto, who is considered as the architect of Pakistan's nuclear policy, wrote in 1967 that India was determined to detonate a nuclear bomb and if Pakistan restricted or suspended its nuclear programme, it would enable India to blackmail Pakistan. Despite India's declared declaration it
would never use nuclear energy for military purpose and that the PNE of 18 May 1974 was part of the programme of study of peaceful uses of nuclear explosions\textsuperscript{116}, Pakistan has continued to have apprehensions. Pakistan's then Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto, in a press statement on 19 May 1974 said, "...Given the brutal fact of 18 May explosion, Pakistan can not be expected to rest on technicalities and protocol."\textsuperscript{117} Despite repeated efforts by the then Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi to make it clear to the whole world particularly Pakistan that all these nuclear explosions are for peaceful purposes, Pakistan has sought refuge in the security argument and embarked on its massive programme of acquiring nuclear capability and to manufacture nuclear weapons. The "Security" argument has thus been the main plank to acquire nuclear capability by the NNWS. Thus, the industrial and scientific potentials of the PNE attracted various countries, mostly the developing ones like, India, Egypt, Brazil, Australia, Romania and many others to harness this potential for their economic development.\textsuperscript{118} The potential use of PNE evoked considerable interest both among the NWS as well as among the NNWS.

The nuclear curtain in South Asia is finally lifted following multiple nuclear tests conducted by India in May 1998, chased immediately by Pakistan, declared themselves "nuclear weapon states" but the P-5 (Permanent members of the Security council and nuclear weapon states) have refused to give them entry into privileged nuclear club, arguing that post-NPT nuclear states are legally debarred from joining it. The US, including G-8 members in retaliation announced economic sanctions against both countries and has urged them to sign the CTBT unconditionally. But to the dismay and anguish of America, the Indian Prime Minister has refused to sign the CTBT under the duress of any power.\textsuperscript{119}

The strategic neighbourhood of a country extends beyond its immediate neighbours. This is the area where its important commercial and security interests lie. In the long-term perspective, countries situated on the east
coast of Africa from South Africa to Somalia, including Sudan and Egypt, and the Gulf countries are of strategic interest to India. For somewhat similar reasons, and for the additional reason of tangible Chinese presence, the region to the South East of Myanmar, including the States of Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia is of great strategic interest to India. These two regions may be described as India’s extended neighbourhood. However, the core area which is of immediate strategic concern to India consists of Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia (Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan), Pakistan, China, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. Internal and external developments in these countries impinge on India in a major way. This region is to be regarded as India’s immediate neighbourhood.

India’s security is vitally dependent on developments in this region. In recent years India has faced the biggest threat to its security from the low-intensity war waged by Pakistan against the Indian State over the issue of Kashmir.¹²⁰

What have made India the only major factor in Pakistan’s foreign policy are not merely the disputes, which bedevil their mutual relations, but also the more basic factors involved in making of attitudes. Keith Callard has summed up some of these in his political study of Pakistan. Maintaining that problems of relations with India have dominated foreign affairs, defense and economic policy and has lain, behind many of the moves of internal politics, Callard continues, ‘In large measure Pakistani feeling towards India has been a continuation of the political struggle before partition....’ The idea that a country has a foreign enemy is easy for the mass of the people to understand, and it also provides a powerful stimulus to unity. For Pakistan India has filled this role.¹²¹

A number of questions were raised about the Government of India’s decision to go nuclear in terms of its defence capacities. They need answers. The answer lies simply in the security environment around India stretching
from Diego-Garcia in the West in an encircling are right upto Pakistan, the
Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. There are a number of countries with a nuclear
weapons presence in this region, one of which Pakistan has threatened to use
nuclear weapons missile capacities against India. More than once Pakistan’s
relations with other nuclear weapons powers such as China and the US cannot
be ignored by India.122

The ongoing process of normalisation between New Delhi and Beijing
must continue through various CBMs. The only significant irritant between the
two, as on today, is the sensitive border issue. Both Beijing and New Delhi
must find ways of avoiding war or a war-like situation, for any war could go
nuclear.123

China’s modernization and military build up has concentrated on the
navy and air force. It has a large submarine force of some 71 submarines of
varying vintage as also one nuclear submarine. It is trying to modernize its
conventional submarines and design and build better nuclear submarines.124

To India, the Chinese military build up poses two threats. One is direct
to our northern borders using the unsettled Sino-Indian border dispute as a
pretext. China has considerably improved its military infrastructure in Tibet, by
constructing some 13 air bases and laying the Gormo-Lhasa oil Pipeline that
eases its problem of supplying fuel to its forces in Tibet. China’s growing
influence in Myanmar opens another possible thrust line to the North-East
States.125 The second, more insidious and long term threat lies in China’s effort
to become the sole Asian ‘power’.

Crucial developments have taken place in the strategic neighbourhood
of India. Some have emerged as threats while others have offered opportunities
on which future strategies could be based. There are only minor irritants in
India’s relations with its smaller neighbours but they are no less significant. For
instance, the ISI is using the Nepalese territory for anti-India activities. North­
east insurgents and militants are using southern Bhutan for their purposes. The
ISI also tried to get foothold in Sri-Lanka when its army was in trouble. India’s ties with Myanmar have improved but it is nowhere near multifaceted relations of the Chinese. Though Pakistan’s relations with Bangladesh deteriorated at the governmental level, the ISI has been able to develop links with ascendant Muslim fundamentalists. India needs to devise a cohesive policy to deal with these security concerns. In spite of India’s efforts for arriving at a long term comprehensive and equitable arrangement on water sharing, Bangladesh continues to raise the issue in international fora.

**Nuclear Politics**

Like all age-old games of politics, nuclear weapons in South Asia are the offspring of nuclear politics played by India and Pakistan. South Asia has turned out to be one of the most dangerous nuclear “hotspots”. When India conducted multiple nuclear testing in May 1998 which was followed by Pakistan’s tests of 28 and 30 May 1998. Records assiduously maintained and collected by the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies in Monterey Institute of International studies, California; indicate that Pakistan went into high gear to become a nuclear weapons state from 1977.  

The nuclearisation in South Asia has caused a great anxiety to the entire world community, staunchly condemning the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan. The P-5 advised India and Pakistan to resolve their bilateral disputes, especially the Kashmir problem, peacefully. The root cause of the nuclear arms race in South Asia is the persisting psycho-cultural incompatibilities between India and Pakistan stemming from the historical hostility between them.

**Indian Ocean Region and the Issue of Peace Zone**

The old dictum “if you want peace understand war” was true in the past but in the present context, particularly after the second world war, it has become more significant, because of the “enormous damage, the maiming and loss of lives” caused by war. It left the man shaken and broken, of course
with conviction and desire for establishment of perennial peace. But the efforts made by various agencies and leaders have failed to create an atmosphere free from tensions and conflicts. Although no major war engulfing the whole world has taken place, there have been serious conflicts, particularly in Asia, which certainly brought the world nearer the precipice of another world war. Therefore, the present peace based on the theory of deterrence is dangerous as it aims at increasing war capabilities of nations. Moreover, such a policy ensures a short term but elusive and slippery stability. It is bound to either breakdown at any time, or with the passage of time, would cease to deter.\textsuperscript{128} To quote Headley Bull, "Arms control is relevant when tension is at a certain point, about which it is impossible and beneath which, it is unnecessary".\textsuperscript{129}

There is, therefore, a great need in some regions of the world, which are susceptible to tensions in the near future, such as Indian Ocean, to establish a zone of peace.

**The Establishment of Peace Zone**

The idea of 'zone of peace' seeks to ensure that neither would the non-littoral states in future have permanent naval forces stationed in the Indian Ocean nor would they seek military bases in the region. Militarization of the Indian Ocean by the outside powers is a matter of serious concern primarily to the countries of the region. It has also been argued "one of the immediate dangers of this apparent trend is that the Indian ocean, which has been relatively free in this respect is in danger of becoming a satellite of the security system of major powers, both as a launching area as well as a target."\textsuperscript{130}

The idea of nuclear weapon free zone has been invoking considerable interest in as much as it entails the regional prescription of nuclear weapons through self-renunciation by the regional states and the inhibitions of the external nuclear powers. According to Felix Calderon, the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone has, \textit{stricto sensu} two aspects one related to its adoption de jure, and other relates to its validity defacto.\textsuperscript{131}
The de jure adoption of NWFZ (Nuclear Weapons Free Zone) implies the solution of a series of problems of theoretical nature where as the defacto adoption pertains to a process which can be prolonged indefinitely, especially when new developments occur. However Calderon is of the view that the creation de jure of a NWFZ is one thing and its de facto application is another.\textsuperscript{132}

The main difficulties in establishing the NWFZs are primarily of a theoretical nature for want of adequate consensus among experts regarding the meaning and scope of NWFZs concept. Even the condensed study carried out in 1975 by the adhoc group of qualified governmental experts on behalf of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), which was published in 1976 by the UN under the title, comprehensive study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in all its aspects,\textsuperscript{133} did not include a definition of the NWFZ. The other crucial question like transit, the zone application and PNE were left out by the above mentioned study.

The general impression has been created that the creation of NWFZs could “contribute to the general purpose of preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons”\textsuperscript{134} such an attitude has been developed mainly due to the adoption of Tlatelolco Treaty, India’s PNE of 18 May, 1974 and the intense debate in the UN which followed India’s PNE.

No precise definition of NWFZ has been advanced so far. The available definitions are either confined to the simple use of synonyms or more emphasis on legal formalities and yet some combine both with the political dimensions of the concept.

In the context of the peace zone in the Indian Ocean, it has been suggested that not only “measures of arms control and disarmament, but also political measures to promote peace and security in the region, be strengthened”.\textsuperscript{135} The increase in American naval patrolling in the Indian Ocean leads to an impression that ‘US will with draw from its forward
fortresses on the Asian mainland and re-establish them instead on the oceanic region. The strategic characteristic of future warfare in the region will place greater reliance on the oceans as it would provide bases for launching of submarines and missiles. It is redundant to discuss whether or not the American presence in the Indian Ocean is due to the Soviet naval presence because the rivalry in the Indian Ocean has a wider context than the regional power conflict, and therefore, is a part of their policy of "maintaining a stable worldwide balance of power." The united front, which was formed for the "maintenance of international peace and security" has rightly assessed that with the end of colonialism in the Indian Ocean littoral here has been "intensification of big power rivalry in the region", causing threat to the freedom of Afro-Asian nations.

The adoption of the policy of non-alignment by a majority of the regional nations is a step towards the fulfillment of their "desire to transform the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace as a necessary condition for maintaining and preserving their political independence and sovereignty". Therefore, the origin of the idea of establishing a peace zone in the Indian Ocean can be traced from the Cairo Conference of the non-aligned states held in 1964 (5 to 10 October). It condemned the efforts of the imperialists to establish bases in the Indian Ocean as a calculated effort to intimidate emerging countries of Afro-Asia and an unwarranted extension of the policy of neo-colonialism and imperialism. In the Conference emerged a mutual agreed resolution regarding the establishment of a nuclear free zone in different parts of the world including Afro-Asia. It was also accepted that the intrusion of big powers rivalry into the Indian Ocean would threaten the political freedom of the countries in the region. At the present movement, we are telling the United States and other powers 'please, all of you go away from here', let us keep the Indian Ocean as an Ocean of peace. Even though that resolution was passed decades ago no body has left the Indian ocean, on the other hand, they have
been putting more vessels into the Indian ocean and they have been building more bases in the Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{142}

The creation of a zone of peace was expected to be a positive step towards the goal of reduction of tensions in this region and as such to contribute to the strength of international peace and solidarity. It was also found most essential to restrict the mad race of rivalries because under the "impact of future changes in technology and strategy, the oceans are likely to be of ever more military interest in the future than now".\textsuperscript{143}

A peace zone in the Indian Ocean will provide countries of the region with time to develop trends towards integration and co-operation so that, in course of time, the Indian Ocean region could move from an area of low solidarity to an area of high solidarity. Needless to say that the concept also aims at opposing the establishment of military bases in the regions that would destabilize the region and threaten its security.\textsuperscript{144}

In tune with the spirit and ideals of Bandung (1955) and Cairo (1964) conferences of the non-aligned nations, the concept of Indian Ocean as a peace zone was first formulated in September 1970 in the Lusaka Conference of the non-aligned nations. It was declared that the defensive and offensive armaments should be excluded from the entire high sea area of the Indian Ocean, within limits to be specified later.\textsuperscript{145} It was also accepted that the warships and other ships carrying war material would have no right of transit except for emergency reasons of a mechanical, technical or humanitarian nature. There would be a ban on naval manoeuvres, naval intelligence operations and weapon's tests. Army, navy and airforce bases would also be prohibited.\textsuperscript{146} After this the efforts were to be concentrated on the removal of the existing external military bases from the territories of the littoral and, if possible, from the hinterland states of the Indian Ocean.

The concept of peace zone has five major aspects: (1) The Resolution of a nuclear-free zone, which figured in the 1970 Lusaka
Conference and was confirmed by the UN General Assembly in 1971, urged the United States, Soviet Union, Britain and France which have the capability of deploying nuclear weapons in the area to renounce the nuclear build up. It also enjoined upon the regional countries to give an undertaking that they would neither allow external powers to build up nuclear bases in their territories nor would they develop nuclear war potential themselves. (2) The Resolution aimed at halting the future escalation and expansion of military presence of great powers in the Indian Ocean. (3) To eliminate the great powers rivalry from the ocean region. (4) The Resolution also stressed the need for settling regional disputes through peaceful means and mutual negotiations without any external interference. (5) The Resolution envisaged elimination of colonialism and racism from the oceanic islands and the mainland of Afro-Asia. The resolution in the end called upon all states to “consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which great power rivalries and competitions whether army, navy or airforce – are excluded. They should also be free of nuclear weapons”. ¹⁴⁷

Till the post World War II the British played a dominant role in the Indian Ocean basin throughout and then gradually moved out after being forced to grant independence to the countries of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. Some ten years later Britain announced its intention to withdraw from East of the Suez Canal.¹⁴⁸

For centuries the old colonial powers – Britain, France, the Netherlands and Portugal were the masters of the Indian Ocean and its coasts. From the end of the nineteenth century, the United States began its political and economic penetration into this sea.¹⁴⁹

Since then, US is playing a leading role in this region, the very idea of a peace zone in the Indian Ocean and of an international conference to create that zone is plainly repugnant to the US ruling quarters. To the Pentagon it is not a zone of peace but a zone of US military pre-dominance,
to that extent that they want to turn the Indian ocean into a hot bed of rivalries, and to this end they are setting up new military bases and modernizing old ones in the region, stationing there a Rapid Deployment Force poised against the Indian Ocean countries and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{150}

The big power presence is a fact, which cannot be wished away by the non-aligned powers in their resolutions to make the area a zone of peace. What can be realistically sought under the present set of circumstances, is a \textit{modus vivendi} which ensures that the contest is kept within bounds.\textsuperscript{151} The progress of the concept in the United Nations and elsewhere seems largely illusory and that the opposition to it from some quarters is greater today than it was in 1964. Despite the rivalry between the big powers, there has always been a threat that the same force will be used against these states in case of an emergency\textsuperscript{152} to achieve their imperialistic interests.

The failure of the 1971 UN Resolution declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and free from the big power competition was evidently exhibited in Feb. 1974 with the Anglo-American declaration to expand their military facilities to the extent of turning the Island of Diego Garcia into a full-fledged naval-cum-air force base. The great powers rather than caring for the regional sentiments have been working more to realise their expansionist policies, and any pressure by regional powers against the wishes of the big powers might lead to a refusal by the latter to help the weak and under developed nations “even in case of a natural calamity”.\textsuperscript{153}

In the light of the developments, that balance of power unaccompanied by the conditions of arms limitation would make the threat of war an imminent reality for the increasing supply of arms in this region tends to escalate crisis into war. In the past, efforts were made from time to time for a negotiated disarmament and strategic limitation talks. Test Ban Treaty 1963, Nuclear Free Zones and Non-Aligned Nations efforts and the negotiations for demilitarisation have also been regarded as the prerogatives
for the establishment of the perennial peace. Though much success could not be achieved, yet at least, future catastrophe can be delayed and the destruction can be minimised.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was signed on 14 February 1967. It is the only agreement concluded so far for establishing a nuclear weapons free-zone in a densely populated area. Despite the fact that Tlateloleo Treaty establishes Latin America as a NWFZ, yet it suffers from two loopholes. Argentina and Brazil, two leading countries possessing nuclear capability are main holdouts. Besides the Additional Protocol II has not been ratified by the Soviet Union.

A proposal was put forward by Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Andrei Gromyko to the United Nations on 7 December, 1964 in the form of a "Memorandum on measures for further easing international tension and restricting the arms race." Regarding the developments in the Indian Ocean, it proposed, in Section 3 dealing with 'Dismantling of bases on the territories of Foreign States, in view of attempts of some states, particularly the Anglo-Americans' 'to set-up new military bases in the Indian Ocean against the clearly expressed wishes of the people of that region, must be vigorously condemned. There can be no justification for the preservation or the establishment in future, of military bases on dependent territories where those bases serve as an instrument of colonialism.' Whereas, Section 6 of the Memorandum relating to the establishment of nuclear free zones'.

Similarly, the regional states can exercise tremendous pressure both diplomatic and political by not entering into the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Although the political fragmentation and diversity of their interests do not permit the implementation of any positive collective proposal.

The dilemma faced by the Indian Ocean countries with regard to the establishment of a military presence in the region as it affects the regional
development, they cannot also force the outside powers to vacate the area and; their consent to a limited military presence of the outside powers would only legitimise it.

Convinced of the utility and popularity of the concept of Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, Sri-Lanka’s Prime Minister, Mrs. Bandaranaike, found an opportunity in the Conference of Commonwealth prime ministers held on 21 January 1971, at Singapore, to elicit commitment of the Commonwealth countries to the concept. She called the member countries “to give serious considerations to accept the principle, a formulation acceptable to everybody on the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and a nuclear weapon free zone.\textsuperscript{157}

At the initiative of Sri Lanka, the 26\textsuperscript{th} session of UN General Assembly adopted a Resolution declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. The Resolution submitted by thirteen nations was put to vote at the 2022\textsuperscript{nd} plenary meeting of the 26\textsuperscript{th} Session of the UN General Assembly on 16\textsuperscript{th} December, 1971.\textsuperscript{158} It was passed by 61 votes in favour and 55 abstentions with none voting against it. It forms a significant landmark both in philosophical and theoretical aspects. Its operative part, in the opinion of K.P. Misra, is more important than the preamble. It has been the main target of criticism for it deals with immediate and practical problems. It involves almost all countries – the major powers, the maritime uses of the Indian Ocean and the littoral states. Its ambiguity relates to the extent of Indian Ocean, boundaries of the zone of peace, the great power rivalry, the response and reaction of littoral states. The multidimensional aspect of this part of the resolution of course, makes it vague and amorphous.

It is noteworthy that India’s maritime security concern is dictated by its enormous responsibility in safeguarding the far flung Island territories.\textsuperscript{159} This aspect of the security problem came into sharp focus in 1965 (during the Indo-Pak war) when Indonesia offered to support Pakistan by carrying
out diversionary naval attack on the Andaman Islands. Also, the war with Pakistan in 1971 exposed some other vulnerabilities. The Pakistani submarine PNS Ghazi, which was on a mission to torpedo INS Vikrant was lying in wait in the harbour channel of Vishakapatnam port when a chance discovery led to its destruction. If to this is added the big power rivalry for bases and ‘recreation’ facilities in the Indian Ocean and specially their military strategic linkages with some of the littoral powers – US Administration’s decision to move the nuclear powered aircraft carrier ‘Enterprise’ to the Bay of Bengal in 1971 in support of Pakistan is an example – the rationale (and the compulsions) behind India’s opposition to the big power presence in the Indian Ocean becomes understandable. In addition to the diplomatic efforts Indian decision makers have also taken care to strengthen the country’s naval capabilities.

Since Sri Lankan effort of 16th December 1971 UN General Assembly Resolution, the first concrete step in the direction of establishing peace zone in the Indian Ocean, its true nature was embryonic which was yet to assume a fuller shape. It is interesting to notice that while Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) and Indonesia protested strongly to the entry of the US Seventh fleet into the Indian Ocean in December, 1963, India’s reactions were somewhat mild and low keyed. India however supported in 1964, the declaration of the second Non-Aligned Conference held at Cairo in October 1964.

Nevertheless, the attainment of the resolution was expected to help the people “to exclude the Indian Ocean from their policy of competitive expansion of armaments in that area in not too distant future.”

In January 1973, the UN General Assembly at its 27th session passed a resolution 2992 (XXVII), which among other things, decided to establish an Adhoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. The Adhoc Committee which was to consist of fifteen members was entrusted with the task of
studying the implications of the peace zone proposal with special reference to the practical measures that may be taken to the furtherance of the objectives of the Resolution, having due regard to the security interests of the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean. The Resolution urged all the States concerned to extend their cooperation in the discharge of their functions.

On 13 December, 1973, the General Assembly passed another Resolution 3080 (XXVIII) reaffirming its conviction that action in furtherance of the objectives of the Declaration would be a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security. The significance of the Resolution 3080 lies in the fact that it requested the Secretary-General to prepare a factual statement of the great powers military presence in all its aspects in the Indian Ocean, with special reference to their naval deployments, conceived in the context of great power rivalry. The Expert Committee, which was constituted by the Secretary-General, submitted its report in May 1974, which included a factual statement of the military presence of great powers.

India considers the Indian Ocean rivalry as a regional issue, threatening not only its security, but that of the countries of the entire littoral and hinterland states. Accordingly, India wanted the countries of the region to take up the issue collectively and orient their foreign policy towards eliminating the big power rivalry in the region.

The strategic environment in the Indian Ocean region began to deteriorate, in the wake of Arab-Israeli Conflict (1973). The then US Defence Secretary, James Schlesinges’s disclosure at a press conference about Pentagon’s new policy of increasing the US naval strength in the Indian Ocean, drew a firm protest from India. India’s Ambassador in Washington T.N.Kaul refusing the US argument, that, the US presence is not directed against India’s security, emphasized that the presence of the
naval forces of the super power injected elements of tension into the region and as a littoral state, India has just cause for concern. In the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the United States renewed its efforts to increase its presence in the Indian Ocean resulted in the US-UK agreement on naval and air base in Diego-Garcia in February 1974.

One of the Strategies adopted by the western powers was to favour and support proposals aimed at regional denuclearisation by making the concept of peace zone totally ambiguous. For example. The proposal for declaring South Asia as a nuclear weapons free zone, as proposed by Pakistan “especially after India exploded a nuclear device” in May 1974. The Pakistani proposal came up before the 29th session of the General Assembly. The proposal side-tracked the main issue involved, viz. the dangers from the presence of nuclear arsenals in the Indian Ocean, got the unanimous backing of the western powers. The U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3259 (XXIX, 1974) which referred to the need for cooperation among the regional states as one of the conditions for the establishment of the zone of peace in the Indian Ocean meant, in some respects, a dilution of the 1971 Resolution.

Yet another important strategy employed by the western powers in their attempts to scuttle the 1971 Resolution was the proposal for a balanced presence of the powers in the Indian Ocean. Familiarly known as the Kennedy-Pell Resolution. The operative part of the Resolution said that the President of the United States should seek direct negotiation with the USSR designed to achieve agreement on limiting deployment of their respective naval and other military forces in the Indian Ocean and littoral states.

The proposal for balanced presence came to be projected by the United States again when Carter became the President. The former Soviet Union responded to the President Carter’s proposal positively and thus began the first Naval Arms Limitation Talks (NALT) at Moscow in June 1977.
The second, the third and the fourth round of NALT talks were held, but no significant change resulted. The breakdown of talks was due to differences between the two superpowers.

India expressed disappointment over the failure of the NALT between the super powers. In addition to the diplomatic efforts undertaken as analyzed, India's Indian Ocean policy also took care to strengthen and modernize the country's much-neglected navy.

So far India had been raising objections to the activities of big powers in the Indian Ocean at every opportunity. It is important to mention here in a meeting of Adhoc Committee in 1974, India was chosen as a target by some of the delegates, particularly of China and Pakistan, who expressed their concern about India's nuclear explosion of 18 May 1974.

The American decision to send the nuclear powered aircraft carrier 'Enterprise' to the Bay of Bengal in Dec. 1971, as a gesture of their strategic military support to Pakistan, developments in the Iranian Navy in the Seventies, was a clear indication of the future big power presence in the Indian Ocean. Expressing India's concern at the presence of two super powers in the India Ocean, the then Prime Minister of India, Morarji Desai stated on 30 October, 1978 that "India is keen to ensure that the Indian Ocean which is of potential tensions, is kept free of great powers." Six months latter, on March 12, 1979, Mr. A.B. Vajpayee repeated the apprehension of the previous government in Indian Parliament.

In order to divert India's attention from the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, Pakistan tried to twist the concept by mooting the idea of regional collective security. To counter the concept it was proposed that the peace zones must be envisaged through "a system of universal collective Security" by India's permanent representative of United Nations, Rikhi Jaipal. The American interest in the Indian Ocean emerged as a part of the "Global Strategy" in the post world war II period to contain the expansion of
communism in the Afro-Asian region. With the passage of time it assumed a variety of dimensions especially politico – military. Since the end of the second world war, external powers are following a policy to have a dominant position in this region. The Pentagon strategists believe that the “Diego Garcia” base will enable them to exercise a far more effective control over the political and economic policies of South Asian, Middle Eastern and East African countries. This process is designed to demonstrate US resolve to protect oil routes and without contributing to an arms race in the region.

America, like any other major power, still relies heavily on force and the threat of force to gain political objectives in the third world. Confronted with the Soviet expansionism, American primary concern is to make the Soviet Union retreat to its national boundaries. The ‘superpower interventions’ (Editorial, The Tribune, 25 October, 1979). Soviet naval entry into the Indian Ocean can only be traced from the year 1968 much after the US had already established a chain of bases, including those from where the nuclear propelled submarines too could be operated.

The American military build up in the Indian Ocean was a potent danger to India’s security and integrity. The US government, however, assured not to violate the declaration of 1971 about the Indian Ocean. Ignoring its assurance, the US started looking upon its naval and air bases in the Indian Ocean and even increased military build up. Since the beginning of the eighties the US had been holding regular military exercises in the Indian Ocean, particularly in the Diego-Garcia which was unlawfully occupied by Britain. The US took steps to ensure that if the situation compels it would deploy military forces both in quantity and quality. The American move was a clear manifestation of violating UN declaration of making Indian Ocean a zone of peace.

The Indian Ocean was becoming an increasingly dangerous seat of international tension. The non-aligned countries were trying to raise world
public opinion in favour of zone of peace. The Soviet government was even ready to work actively in that direction together with other states concerned. In a Seminar on Indian Ocean, External affairs minister P.V. Narasimha Rao stated, ‘if the Indian Ocean is made a zone of peace, it would contribute significantly to reduce international tensions and in eliminating the problems that had arisen among the littoral countries’.

Increasing numbers of American fleet alarmed the coastal states of the Indian Ocean. The non-aligned countries took up the issue in their meetings. It was believed that the US was virtually transforming Indian Ocean into an American Ocean.

Supply of sophisticated arms, nuclear weapons and aircraft to Pakistan created consternation among the adjoining nations of the Indian Ocean. Then Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, argued that, “India was earnestly trying to prevent the cold war in the Indian Sub-continent. The USSR was eager to resume bilateral talks with the US on the limitation and reduction of military activities in the Indian Ocean.” It stood for the relaxation of tension, for removing the threat of war, for broadening peaceful cooperation throughout the world.

As a principal country on its shores India had vital stakes in keeping the Indian Ocean an area of peace from military bases, nuclear weapons and big powers rivalry, particularly the deployment of RDF (Rapid Deployment Force) of the US. To protect the interests of the littoral states and to keep the ocean free from the US battleground, the NAM has to play a major role; the non-aligned nations should show exemplary solidarity in realising the goal.

The security environment of India is complex and somehow always tense. There were multiple threats to India by China’s modernization programmes and its border dispute with India, acquisition of sophisticated weaponry by Pakistan and its terroristic and proxy war activities within the
Indian territory and bilateral, although narrow frequency, disputes with other neighbouring states, were few of them. The quest for security is the utmost importance to the government of India, so it insisted on the obedience to the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. In this regard and in the wake of the Kargil War (1999), and the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee (1999), the Indian Prime Minister set up a group of Ministers (GOM) “to review the national security system in its entirety” in April 2000. On the Indian Ocean, the GOM report states:

‘The heavily militarised Indian Ocean will continue to adversely affect India’s economic, political, and military interests in the area. India has a vital interest in the security and stability of the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) in the Indian Ocean; our energy security is closely linked to maritime security.\textsuperscript{180} The cardinal principle of India’s ocean policy was based on peaceful approach, which opposed military installations of big powers in the Indian Ocean.’

India could not depend either on US or the USSR as in case it depends on USSR, it would be disastrous because it would have international repercussions with potentialities to develop into the Third World War. Nor India could depend on China. The growing Chinese nuclear capability was itself a matter of concern. It is surprising enough why the militarisation continued even after the UN declaration supporting India’s stand of a zone of peace? The growing inter-regional rivalries and lack of enthusiasm prompted foreign powers to intrude into the Ocean and the Zone of peace has been turned into a zone of conflict.
References


38. According to a report prepared by the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1976, about half a million people had died, as cited in United Nations (UN), Every One’s United Nations (New York) 1979, p. 54.
52. M. Zuberi, *Problems of Living in Nuclear Age*, Discussion Series (iii), Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development, Chandigarh (India), 1985, p. 25.


65. The Sangh Combine is the name given to collective comprising of the Rashtriya Swayami Sevak Sangh (RSS), The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), the Bajrang Dal and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The RSS (National Volunteer Corps) is said to be the father of this collective.


74. The London Suppliers Group (LSG) established in 1975, following India’s first nuclear explosion by seven industrially developed countries working behind closed doors. The LSG now has over 30 members.

- The Zangger Committee named after its first Chairman Prof. Claude Zangger of Switzerland.

- The MTCR is a closed door group set up in 1987 by different states to restrict transfers or sales of missiles or components of missiles above the range of 300 Km. It is essentially a non-proliferation measure.

75. SIPRI/OUP, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order, 1994, p. 7.


85. *Ibid.*, p. 120.


92. The numbers pertaining to baby girls come from UNICEF and are cited in the *Barbara Crosetter India, Facing the Twenty First Century*, Indian University Press, 1993, p. 50.


103. Jawaharlal Nehru's Broadcast to the Nation, September 7, 1946.


120. Satish Kumar, *op.cit.*, pp. 116-117.


145. SIPRI Year Book, Stockholm, 1974, p. 60.
156. *Ibid*.
161. Ibid.
162. *Indian Express*, New Delhi, 11th October, 1974.
164. Ibid.