CONCLUSION

Ever since the nuclear bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nations have been trying to put curbs on their use. The aim is to free the world from the scourge of the third world war which would be definitely, a nuclear one. There should be no doubt about the seriousness of these efforts. India, as a nation, has taken up the role of leading the nations in the pursuit of peace through disarmament and arms control. The struggle in which we are engaged in these times is worldwide, and the outcome of disarmament and arms control measures over the coming years would depend on many things. The outcome of such efforts would rest heavily on developments of the mind and spirit, and perhaps as much on decisions of the public policy. Yet, the idea of disarmament lost may mean a world lost. After the experience of the world war, few can deny the special significance of the challenge in the field of disarmaments.

Man creates things, manipulates them and ultimately fails to exercise control over them. Ashoka innovated dharma, used it and was called Chakravartin. Delhi Sultans introduced Iqtadars and excelled for centuries. Mughals evolved Manasabdari and managed to rule India for what seemed to be ages. But when they failed to do so, they perished. Those factors that brought them to power and helped them to sustain it and flourish turned into the reasons for their decay and decline.

The US hegemony began with the dropping of nuclear bomb on Nagasaki and Hiroshima in 1945. This nuclear bomb was the cause of the ‘birth’ of US as a world power. If things go the way they do at the moment, the same creation of US would have led to its demise. Success has a big problem. It detaches you from the masses and places you in isolation in an exclusive category. It gradually drives you away from reality. Reality never changes. It remains the same, success promotes double standards. It compels one to treat others as insects.
US made nuclear bomb and also the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) to stop others from making n-bombs. Some thing that Shah Jahani did to the architects of Taj Mahal after making the Taj.

The NPT is designed to preserve the US monopoly over nuclear bomb. The implication for India was that on the one hand the NPT legitimized, China as NWS on the other hand it sought to prevent India from becoming a NWS. This is inimical to India’s security. The treaty is limited in scope because it bans nuclear explosions but allows non-explosive nuclear testing. It would drive testing to the laboratories by those who have the resources to do so. The treaty does not address the question of subcritical testing and computer simulation.

It has been stated that the P-5 have reached a secret informal understanding to confine the alternative high-tech non-explosive tests to themselves and to ensure that they are permanently on the Executive Council of the CTBT organization. It does not set a time frame for total global disarmament.

The NPT is absolutely meant to serve the interests of the nuclear haves. It is an expression of monopolistic approach of USA and other nuclear powers.

US must realize that history is about to repeat itself and only US can stop this cycle. This would, however, would not be easy. The NPT must be made rational, if it has to be universally accepted so is the case with CTBT.

All those who have nuclear capabilities must be recognized without doubt, but if armaments are a right of a few then disarmament should also be applied equally. Either none should have it or everybody should be allowed to have them. We have seen that the nuclear capabilities of two rival parties have ensured balance of power and ultimately peace has continued to be restored. If this happens, we will survive and so will the US. Otherwise all will perish as it happened in the past, during the two world wars.
The vast stockpiles and tremendous buildup of arms and armed forces and competition for qualitative refinement of weapons of all kinds to which scientific resources and technological advances are diverted, pose incalculable threats to peace. This situation both reflects and aggravates international tensions, sharpens conflicts in various regions, exacerbates the differences between opposite military alliances, jeopardizes the security of all states, heightens the sense of insecurity among all states including the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWSs) and increases the threat of nuclear war.

The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts for the achievement and further relaxation of international tensions, to establish international relations based on peaceful co-existence and trust between all states and to develop broad international cooperation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realisation of the purposes and is incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organisation (UNO), especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of a state.

One of the reasons for arms race is the legitimate right to security that exists for every state. The right is universal, it is the same for all and sanctioned by the Charter of the United Nation’s Organisation (UNO). No state, weak or strong, rich or poor is ready to abdicate responsibility for its basic security. In short run goals, no nation can be asked to reduce its defences to levels below the threats it faces. But without arms control among nations in the long run, weapons will be piled on weapons, with a huge loss of security for all.

In the existence of such harsh facts, security can no more be regarded as merely national security or even bloc security, new weapons have made security a question of human survival. Therefore, the issue of security
involves the questions of attitudes and perceptions, strategic doctrine, the technological impact, its vertical and horizontal aspects, its national, regional and international dimensions and its non-military extensions.

The attitudes of the nations are ambivalent, sometimes they seek security by entering into alliances, and sometimes it is obtained by regional and widened economic and cultural cooperation and disarmament agreements.

Possession of nuclear arms by a few states which are militarily significant gives currency to the notion that states which aspire to great power status need to acquire nuclear weapons.

If attitudes can be changed, war can be prevented. Efforts must be aimed at all who directly or indirectly influence decision makers.

Different strategic doctrines have been adopted at different times by each super-power to provide what is thought to be necessary to enhance and protect its national security.

Whatever be the character of nuclear arms race, each super-power perceives that its national security depends heavily on nuclear weapon systems and on a continuous upgrading of the capability of those systems. SALT, far from being a step towards disarmament has served to strengthen the super-power conviction that deterrence must be based on a balance of terror.

Medium level nuclear powers – China–UK and France besides meeting their requirements of national security are also led by the concern for national prestige. In case of France, there is the added desire to secure at the same time capability, which might provide a measure of independence from the US deterrent. Like the UK, France also sought to exert a certain influence on the use of that deterrent.
The example of NWS allow a justification for other states to acquire nuclear weapons. At the same time the technical and economic difficulties in going nuclear are gradually decreasing with time.

Because of the existence of nuclear weapons, those states which do not possess them have chosen various means to shield themselves against the possibility of a nuclear attack — no-use assurance, nuclear umbrella nuclear weapons and regional security. Some countries seek their security within the framework of a military alliance, others through agreements on regional cooperation.

In an alliance, the nuclear weapons of the super powers, offer an 'umbrella' — either explicit or implicit — to allied countries and thus provide a deterrent against all forms of military attacks, conventional as well as nuclear.

The question of the relationship between armaments and disarmament, on the one hand, and other aspects of social, economic and political development, on the other, has received all too little attention in the past.

Both aspects of the problem need to be taken into account; on the one hand, the volume of resources consumed on the arms race, and the socially constructive uses to which they could be put; and on the other hand, the social, political, economic and institutional processes, both domestic and international, whereby changes in military policies affect the future course of development in other fields which are themselves affected by it.

Disarmament on one hand, and development, on the other, which nations are committed to pursue vigorously, each in its own right, are in fact intimately linked. Research and development is one area where the misdirection of efforts is glaring. In this, as in other respects, vast resources, badly needed for development, are being consumed as countries make ever-greater sacrifices for military purposes.
Conversely, substantial progress in the field of development is increasingly understood to be essential for the preservation of world peace and security. Genuine security cannot be assured by the accumulation of armaments. It can only be assured through disarmament, cooperation and the growth of exchange and inter-dependence in world of diminishing inequalities.

Substantial progress in the field of disarmament would release internal material, financial and human resources, relax climate of fear, hostility and confrontation, remove some of the barriers now hampering international exchanges in general and the free circulation of raw materials and advanced technology in particular, would facilitate the free choice by each country of its particular path towards development and last but not the least, would present major savings in industrialised countries and would make possible substantial increases in development assistance. In fact, disarmament should be so designed that the close connection between disarmament and development gets full recognition. Purposes of part of the resources released, provisions to ensure that measures of armament limitation are so designed that they do not impede the transfer of technology for peaceful ends and other similar provisions must be an integral part of disarmament measures. It is evident that no scheme of global peace and disarmament can last unless it is linked to the creation of an equitable world economic order. Disarmament could and should serve the larger purpose of ameliorating the economic injustice and deprivation to which two thirds of mankind is subject today. Military spending is an impediment to economic growth. Arms race is an obstacle to the establishment of new international economic order.

The maintenance of security is precarious as long as nations individually retain the capacity to wage war; the achievement of socio-economic development is ethically requisite as long as nations have to shoulder the burden of enormous military spending.
Recognition of this fact has promoted the prolonged, complex and yet inconclusive search for disarmament negotiations. Even those who genuinely advocate and seek disarmament are not at all agreed on the nature of the problems they expect disarmament to solve.

Seven critical issues have arisen persistently throughout the long struggle for disarmament.

- Disarmament – Security, which comes first?
- Political conditions for disarmament.
- Total or partial disarmament?
- Who must disarm?
- Methods of limitation.
- Towards balanced and phased disarmament.

In 1947, when India emerged as a free country to take its rightful place in the comity of nations, the nuclear age had already dawned. Its leaders then took the crucial decision to opt for self reliance and freedom of thought and action, rejected the cold war paradigm whose shadows were already appearing on the horizon and instead of aligning themselves with either bloc, chose the difficult path of remaining unaligned. It is this initiative that laid the foundation for the achievement of 11 and 13 May 1998 made possible by exemplary cooperation among the scientists from the department of Atomic Energy and Defence Research and Development Organisation. This has required the building up of national strength through our own resources, our skills and creativity and the dedication of people. Among the earliest initiatives taken was the development of science and inculcation of the scientific spirit.

Disarmament was then and continues to be a major plank in India’s foreign policy now. It was, in essence, and remains still, the natural course for a country that had waged a unique struggle for independence on the basis of ‘ahimsa’ and ‘satyagraha’.
But the development of nuclear technology transformed the nature of global security. A nuclear weapon free world would therefore, enhance not only India's security but also the security of all nations. This is the principal plank of India's nuclear policy. In the absence of universal and non-discriminatory disarmament initiative, India cannot accept a regime that creates an arbitrary division between nuclear haves and have-nots.

In the 50s, nuclear weapons testing took place on the ground and the characteristic mushroom cloud becomes the visible symbol of the nuclear age. India then took the lead in calling for an end to all nuclear weapon testing as the first step for ending the nuclear arms race. Addressing the Lok Sabha on 2 April 1954, shortly after a major hydrogen bomb test had been conducted. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru stated, "nuclear, chemical and biological energy and power should not be used to forge weapons of mass destruction". He called for negotiations for prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and in the interim, a standstill agreement to halt nuclear testing. The world had by then witnessed less than 65 tests. More than three decades passed and after over 2000 tests had been conducted, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was opened for signature in 1996 following two and a half years of negotiations in which India had participated actively. In its final shape, this treaty left a lot to be desired. It was neither comprehensive nor was it related to disarmament, truthfully.

In 1965, along with small groups of non-aligned countries, India had put forward the idea of an international non-proliferation agreement under which the nuclear weapon states would agree to give up their arsenals provided other countries refrained from developing or acquiring such weapons. This balance of rights and obligations was absent when the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) emerged in 1968.

At global level, there is no evidence yet on the part of the nuclear weapon states to take decisive and irreversible steps in moving towards a
nuclear weapon free world. Instead, the NPT has been extended indefinitely and unconditionally, perpetuating the existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the five countries that are also permanent members of the UN, Security Council. Some of these countries have doctrines that permit the first use of nuclear weapons; these countries are also engaged in programmes for modernisation of their nuclear arsenals.

India’s policies towards her neighbours and other countries too have not changed; India remains fully committed to the promotion of peace with stability, aims to resolve all outstanding issues through bilateral dialogue and negotiations.

India is a nuclear weapon state. This is a reality that cannot be denied. It is not a conferment that it seeks; nor is it a status for others to grant. It is an endowment to the nation by her scientists and engineers. It is India’s due, the right of one-sixth of humankind. India, mindful of its international obligations, shall not use these weapons to commit aggression or to mount threats against any country; here are weapons of self-defence and to ensure that in turn, India is also not subjected to nuclear threats or coercion.

India remains committed to the basic tenets of her foreign policy - a conviction that global elimination of nuclear weapons will enhance its security as well as that of the rest of the world. It will continue to urge countries, particularly other nuclear weapon states, to adopt measures that would contribute meaningfully to such an objective.

A number of initiatives have been taken in the past. In 1978 India proposed negotiations for an international convention that would prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This was followed by another initiative in 1982 calling for a nuclear freeze, prohibition on production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and related delivery systems. In 1988, India put forward an ‘Action Plan’ for phased elimination of all nuclear weapons with a specific time frame. It is her regret that these proposals did
not receive a positive response from other nuclear weapon states. Had their response been positive, India need not have gone for the current tests. This difference is the cornerstone of her nuclear doctrine. It is marked by restraint and one of the many efforts striving for the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.

India has not violated any international agreement, neither in 1974, nor in 1998. The restraint exercised for 24 years, after having demonstrated her capability in 1974, is in itself a unique example.

Subsequent to the tests, government has already stated that India will now observe a voluntary moratorium and refrain from conducting underground nuclear tests. It has also indicated willingness to move towards a de-jure formalisation of this declaration. The basic obligation of the CTBT are thus met; to refrain from undertaking nuclear test explosions. This voluntary declaration is intended to convey to the international community the seriousness of her intent for meaningful engagement.

India has maintained effective export controls on nuclear materials as well as related technologies even though it is neither a party to the NPT nor a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Nonetheless, India is committed to non-proliferation and the maintaining of stringent export controls to ensure that there is no leakage.

From the perspective of international stability, the problem is not that certain states simply possess nuclear weapons. The real danger is that they might abuse their nuclear capabilities to underpin aggressive policies vis-à-vis their neighbours or perceived enemies. Countries with the irresponsible governments, that have managed to achieve nuclear status might even detonate a nuclear weapon, either intentionally or accidentally as a result of mishandling or due to lack of enough controls.

The ideal solution to achieve nuclear stability in South Asia would be to lock China, India and Pakistan into a triangular nuclear agreement. The
reality on the ground however is still far from this ideal. Although there is no ‘hot’ dispute between India China, the fear in Delhi of being overwhelmed by a superior nuclear China is greater than the fear of nuclear instability with Pakistan.

The prospects of peace and stability in Southern Asia are primarily dependent on ushering harmony into India-Pakistan ties. Apart from India and Pakistan, China has become another influential actor in Southern Asia, India and China have been able to mitigate the intensity of their adverse ties by initiating CBMs through the JWG and by promoting trade and commerce. However the India-Pakistan ties despite several attempts at seeking harmony in the past have been far from peaceful. The intractable question of Kashmir has proved to be the central cause for the on going disharmony between the two countries.

In China’s foreign policy calculations South Asia is a key region for the extension of its dominance and influence, it puts forward its claim over the region more strongly than the Soviet Union. Due to the absence of a collective regional approach, Chinese leaders were eager to transform the subcontinent into its sphere of influence. However, India’s proclaimed role of a leader of the non-aligned world proved a deterrent to fulfilling its autonomous role in the region.

Sino-US rapprochement was viewed by India as a dangerous factor to the strategic equilibrium of the region. The United States wanted to project China as a potential deterrent to the Soviet Union. One must not forget that China is now more concerned with the superpowers and its efforts and strategies are intrinsically directed at them to maximize its global as well as its regional interests.

Thus, unless there is an identity of views between India and China in their policies towards South and South East Asia, there does not appear to be positive signs of reconciliation between the two countries on the border
question. Though the process of normalization has begun, it is bound to be a prolonged process

China is eager to cultivate a special relationship with Nepal and Pakistan in order to promote its strategic and military interests. Ideologically, there is nothing common between these countries. On the other hand, China and Pakistan have two diametrically opposed, social and political systems. However the factors governing their relations are Sino-Soviet hostility, Sino-Indian adverse relations and the Sino-American axis which seeks to contain Soviet influence in the region

China is one of the main sources of military aid and assistance to Pakistan. Chinese aid to Pakistan began in the wake of persisting hostilities between India and China.

US bilateral and multilateral aid is chiefly determined in accordance with its political expediency, strategic needs, policy choices, criteria and diplomatic goals in the structure of, super power relationship. Given this framework, the US has peripheral interests in the Maldives, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal in order of priority. However, its chief concern is with India and Pakistan, although with divergent aims and objectives.

US arms policy towards the subcontinent has given rise to the emergence of new initiatives so far as recent developments in Iran are concerned. There is also the possibility of a new kind of alliance amidst US, China, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The security system of South Asia is also becoming serious.

If Pakistan is transformed into a strategic base of a US-China, sponsored security framework for the subcontinent, India’s security and its political affairs are bound to undergo a critical change. This dimension of US arms policy towards the subcontinent must be taken into consideration by Indian strategic and military planners.
The US must abandon its excessive military aid to Pakistan in its own interests and those of the subcontinent.

If the United States does not exercise a restraint over the present regime of Pakistan and accelerates the arms race in the subcontinent, the whole region might be drawn into the theatre of war in view of the changed security scenario and the qualitative character of arms that both countries are acquiring from diverse sources.

Thus, all South Asian countries except India have been supporting the UN proposals for de-nuclearisation of the sub-continent. New Delhi agrees that acceptance of the nuclear free zone concept is tantamount to granting legitimacy to the nuclear monopoly of the great powers.

India argues that, given the internal dynamics of the region, if the nuclear free zone concept is accepted, it would intensify the security dependence of countries of the subcontinent on extra-regional powers which may gradually erode their politico-social institutions.

The Indian Ocean has been the principal focus of great power rivalry, especially after the British withdrawal from the region. In its quest for a global balanced power in one’s favour, each superpower is seriously engaged in deploying and increasing naval forces in the Indian Ocean.

Geo-political compulsions propel India to evolve a viable Indian Ocean policy. Not only does India jet out like a dagger into the heart of the Indian Ocean but in turn is enclosed by its waters and also by four continents, Antarctica, Africa, Asia and Australia.

India-China-Pakistan nuclear relationship may become dangerously unstable in a crisis involving any two of the three countries. There are three aspects of crisis instability that are worth noting here; the escalation of conventional hostilities to the nuclear level; the difficulties engendered by
India's two-front nuclear problem and the role of nuclear powers outside the triangle.

Given these dangerous possibilities, what can and should India China and Pakistan do to invest in the stability of their nuclear relationships. Broadly speaking, there are two lines of policy open to them; political initiatives to reduce tensions and encourage an enduring settlement of bilateral disputes, and arms control initiatives that stabilize the military relationship. These are complementary tracks and could be pursued, more or less, simultaneously.

One argues that, though the measures listed here are eminently sensible, they are mostly unviable in the present strategic environment. On the other hand, there are other factors at work, which dampen instability and give the three countries time to come round to pursue a systematic political programme of arms control and risk reduction.

Four factors are helping to maintain a certain degree of stability between India, China and Pakistan;

- a recognition of the devastating costs of nuclear weapons use.
- technological limits affecting the nuclear weapons programmes of all three countries.
- the economic costs of nuclear weapons.
- strategic restraint arising from the accords already in place between India and Pakistan, and India and China.

It is, therefore, visualized that the politics of the sub-continent will have a compulsory and continuous impact on all nations of the region.