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Introductory

India has never been an expansionist power. It never went out of its frontiers to wage war. It never sought to build empires. If anything it only spread the message of peace and harmonious coexistence. Nehru often talked of the conditioning of the Indian mind during our struggle for freedom. What was this conditioning? The struggle for India’s independence was led by the apostle of non-violence and peace- Mahatma Gandhi. That was a conditioning in itself. We appealed to what was good and noble in the British character and sometimes it worked. We probably helped the British to see reason.

The struggle for freedom also conditioned our mind to look upon colonialism, capitalism and imperialism as inimical not only to humanitarian values but the basic interests of Asia and Africa and even the world as a whole. We were conditioned to hate racialism. It is from these ancient ethos and recent experiences that the outlook of modern India is born. Being tolerant, India would not become bigoted, being peaceful, it would not brandish the sword, and being independent in mind and thought, it would not align with either of the contending blocs.

India has faith in the innate good sense of the world, for even when powerful sections of the European ruling classes bowed to Fascism and Nazism, the world as a whole rejected these pernicious ideologies. Nehru wrote: “my whole nature rebelled against them”.

There was no one in the Indian nationalist movement who knew global trends so well as Nehru. Of course he had certain advantages because of his family background and opportunities it provided. He had a European teacher and
got the best possible education. But while other Indian students in England were preparing themselves to become pillars of Raj, Nehru was deeply moved by the new winds stirring in Europe. Nehru refused to join the bandwagon of officers because in Nehru the revolt against the subjugation of this country was spreading like a prairie fire.

Nehru was a committed socialist, though not a Marxist as such. In fact, he was opposed to being identified exclusively with any body of thought. He was eclectic, borrowing from the best of all traditions. He was opposed to violence, considering war and conquests as barbarous and unworthy of civilised human beings. He was staunch independent and would not accept the dictates of other people. He came into conflict with the question of imperialism and then with Indian Communists. As a democrat, he considered accommodation an essential virtue.

Nehru saw politics in terms of social change and was also aware of the play of economic interests in political developments. He knew that the foreign policy of the major Western powers was influenced by interests of the capitalist class. Nehru wrote: “this aggressive policy (of the great powers) is due to the capitalist influence, is dictated by the interests of the British plutocracy and we in India have to pay for their lust for profit.” Nehru believed that future belongs to socialism. He admired the new society that the Soviet Union was creating and hoped that the Soviet experiment would blaze a new trail for the world. He also thought that the Soviet Union was the main bulwark against imperialism. Nehru adopted the policy of non-alignment because for him alignment with either of the power blocs was dangerous for the freedom of India. The large number of the third world countries that later become non-aligned had shared India’s experiences in varying degrees and they also influenced by pragmatic considerations.
India's relations with the Arab world are age old and historic and generally cordial. The ancient Babylonian and Egyptian culture has resemblance to the brilliant culture of Harrappa and Mohanjodaro. History is strewn with the evidences of mutually advantageous relations between the two regions, for example, it was the Indian muslin which the Egyptians used to wrap the mummies, similarly it was the Arab craftsman which is believed to have produced figurines for the Indian Temples and homes. After the advent of Islam, the Arab-Indian contacts were further strengthened. It was the Arabs who attempted the first written history of India and drew its maps. They learnt a great deal from Indian science and medicine and spread it across the world.

With the onset of Industrial Revolution in Europe these two regions came under a slow but steady process of commercial penetration and political subjugation. India became a British colony and West Asia the only route to it. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Western powers scrambled for a foothold in the Arab world to reach out to India. Thus, West Asia became a region not only important in itself but as the way to somewhere else, and that somewhere else was India.

The experience of colonialism was same for both the regions, the development of Indian attitude towards the Palestine question and subsequent policies towards the Arab-Jew conflict were the outcome of these colonial experiences. In supporting the Arabs, treating the Jewish problem in West Asia as a minority question and hence opposing partition, the Indian National Congress fought for its concept of a secular Indian state based upon the territorial integrity of the Indian Sub-Continent. As is given in detail in the subsequent chapters that the development of India's attitude towards the Palestine problem was consistent and represented a varying blend of self interest, adjustment to changes in the political conditions governing the situation as well as convictions relating to what was right and what was wrong. The Palestine issue in its evolution to its present
state passed through four distinct phases, the first phase related to the problems from the Ottoman empire and the subsequent issue of the Balfour Declaration of 1917, the second phase, consisted of enormously complicated situation which emerged from the Nazi holocaust in Europe and flow of Jewish refugees into Palestine. The third phase was related to the partition of Palestine and the problem of the treatment and resettlement of the Arab refugees. The fourth and last phase was characterised by the juxtaposition of Arab hostility to the new Jewish state of Israel and the emergence of Arab nationalism collided with the super power interest in the region. The Indian National Congress and subsequently the Government of India responded to the evolution of the Palestine issue in each of its phases.

a. Pre – Independence Foreign Policy Postures:

The end of the First World War found India in a state of excitement and unrest. The tempo of political activity became accelerated. The events of war and the new ideas to which it gave birth could not fail to affect India profoundly. India's loyal and generous response and her immense contribution in war earned for her a grateful British promise of ultimate 'responsible government' and dominion status within the empire. India was represented at the Imperial war Cabinet and the Imperial war Conferences of 1917-18. At the conclusion of the war India, like the dominions signed the peace treaties and was represented at the League of Nations. But even after it foreign affairs were never allowed to be debated in the Indian Legislature. The Viceroy of India, as an agent of the British government, retained exclusive and the nascent Indian outlook on world affairs. When the Indian National Congress began to take notice of the British foreign policy and its implications for the empire's colonies, it developed a strong urge to maintain her independent foreign affairs and to keep away from the policies which were being pursued by the Imperial powers for their own purposes. The Montague-Chelmsford reforms of 1919 greatly disappointed the Indians, they
considered them to be an inadequate recompense of India’s sacrifices during the war and a breach of earlier British promises about granting India self-government. In seeking independence from Britain both in the national and international spheres and in employing the method of non-cooperating with British government for its achievement, the Congress adopted not isolation, but international cooperation. In its fight for freedom, the Indian National Congress increasingly voiced sympathy with the freedom struggles of other countries. The first such country to receive sympathy from Indian National Congress was Turkey. The Muslims were full of misgivings about the fate of Turkey. The Khilafat Conference occupied itself with mobilising Indian opinion for exerting pressure on the British government to do justice to Turkey and the Caliph. In the meanwhile on 13th April, 1919, the Amritsar massacre had occurred, killing about four hundred and injuring twelve hundred completely unarmed persons for the fault of holding a public meeting in defiance of the government order of holding public meetings this gruesome act was made.

On May 14th, 1920, the Gazette of India Extraordinary announced the terms of the treaty of Sevres dismembering Turkey, it caused great indignation among Muslims. By that time it had also become clear that the British were far from feeling repentant about the Amritsar massacre. All this made a revolutionary change in the nature of the people of India. The Indian National Congress at its regular annual session held in December, 1920, adopted the attainment of Swaraj (self-government or independence) by the people of India and by all legitimate and peaceful means as its goal and laid down the framework of an active and well knit organisation based on mass support. Nehru defined it as:

"The whole look of Congress changed, European clothes vanished and soon only khadi [cloth produced by hand spinning and hand weaving which Gandhi popularised] was to be seen, a new class of delegates, chiefly drawn from the lower middle class became the type of Congressmen, the language used became
increasingly Hindustani or sometimes the language of the province where the session was held, as many of the delegates did not understand English, and there was also a growing prejudice against using a foreign language in our national work, and a new life and enthusiasm and earnestness became evident in Congress gatherings.\(^4\)

In May, 1921, on the implications of breaking up of a war between Britain and Afghanistan, Gandhi declared, that it would be a crime to help the British government as it had lost the confidence of the Indian nation.\(^5\)

In November, 1921, the Delhi resolution of Congress disassociated Itself from the imperial foreign policy of Britain, was a watershed in the history of entire colonial world. It asserted that the Viceroy’s government did not represent Indian opinion since it pursued the imperial objectives.

The resolution informed the neighbouring and other non-Indian States that:

a) The present Government of India in no way represents Indian opinion and that their policy has been traditionally guided by considerations more of holding India in subjugation than of protecting her border;

b) India as a self governing country can have nothing to fear from neighbouring states or any state, as her people have no designs upon any of them and hence no intentions of establishing any trade relations hostile to or not designed by the people of such states;

c) The people of India regard most treaties entered into with the Imperial government, and would therefore urge the states having no ill will against the people of India and having no designs to injure her interests, to refrain from entering any treaty with the Imperial power.

The Indian National Congress as it was active to deal nationalism also worked to make itself appropriate to deal with the international relations. At the
same time it didn’t want to go far from the Western countries, it wanted to work in cooperation with them.

This shows that the Indian National Congress was neither thinking of neutralism or isolation nor in terms of conflict with the West. It considered the struggle for freedom as a part of the ‘global struggle.’

Jawaharlal Nehru, who at that time was working as the Vice-President of the Allahabad district Congress Committee of the Indian National Congress, was watching each and every message of world situation, he was having it in mind that isolation was both undesirable and impossible, he had to put India fit into the world. He was convinced that the only way of looking at Indian problems was to see them in world setting.

Reacting over the mandate system of Britain and France, the Congress Called it as a cloak to cover the imperialist greed. The Congress did not limit its sympathy for the Arabs to those in the mandated territories. In 1924, the All India Congress Committee sent its sympathy to the Egyptian people and hoped that they would rise superior to the terrorism set up in their land.6

The Congress heavily denounced the Balfour Declaration of 1917 as the betrayal of Arabs by the British. For Nehru the Arab struggle against British imperialism in Palestine was as much a part of this great world conflict as was India’s struggle for freedom.7

During the year 1926-27, Nehru visited Italy, Switzerland, England, Belgium, France, Germany, Holland and then U.S.S.R. This trip of Nehru greatly contributed to the ever growing awareness of international affairs, while in Berlin, Nehru came to know about the Brussels Congress of Oppressed Nationalities which was going to be held in Brussels, hearing to this, an idea came to his mind that the Indian National Congress might take an official part in this Congress of Oppressed Nationalities. His idea was approved by the Indian
National Congress and he was appointed as the Indian Congress representative for this purpose. This Conference gave an excellent opportunity to Nehru to express his views at an international forum and to assess the mood and course of international affairs and events.

At Brussels invited members of various developed national liberation movements and various Communist parties joined together to discuss common problems; sympathetic anti-imperialists from the metropolitan countries and prominent intellectuals lent their weight to the proceedings. Sun Yat Sen’s widow Song Quingling, brought to the Congress the legitimacy of a national movement struggling against the informal empire of the Western powers in China, ironically a merely two months before the Kuomintang Communist party alliance collapsed in violence in Shanghai, initiated by his sister’s husband, Chiang Kai Shek. Nehru invited Song Quingling to the next session of the Indian National Congress, but the British government refused her visa.

Nehru spoke against western domination over Asian and African countries and successfully tied up India with changing world situations and other world problems. He said, “India is a world problem and as in the past, so in the future other countries and people will be vitally affected by the conditions of India.”

In the Conference, Nehru revealed acute consciousness of Asian affairs. He said, “standing on the watershed which divides two epochs of human history and endeavour we can look back on our long past and look forward to the future that is taking shape before our eyes. Asia, after a long period of quiescence, has suddenly become important again in world affairs.” He also addressed the African Nationalist sentiments and asked the international conscience not to forget the countries of Africa as they had suffered so much and had been exploited too much in the past. For him it was a narrow out look to think of China, India and other countries and to ignore or forget Africa.
The resolution on India, drafted by Jawaharlal Nehru, accorded the warm support of the Conference to the liberation of India from foreign domination and all kinds of exploitation as an essential step in the full emancipation of the people of the world. The people and workers of other countries should fully cooperate in the task and in particular take effective steps to prevent dispatch of foreign troops to India and the retention of an army of occupation in India. In the last paragraph of the resolution Nehru expressed the hope of the Conference that the Indian National Movement would base its programme on the full emancipation of the peasants and workers of India, “without which there can be no real freedom”, and would cooperate with the movements for emancipation in other parts of the world.\textsuperscript{11}

The Brussels Conference decided to establish the League against Imperialism for national independence, to organise cooperation between the nationalist movements in the colonial countries, labour and anti-imperialist movements in the exploiting countries. Nehru along with Albert Einstein, Romain Roland, Madam Sun Yat Sen, and George Lansbury elected one of the honourary Presidents of this League.

In Brussels Nehru noted in one of his speeches that in the years to come, it would be American imperialism that would be the major threat to the world, and that it would either replace British imperialism as the major threat or lead to the formation of a powerful Anglo-Saxon bloc to dominate the world.\textsuperscript{12}

The participation of Nehru as the representative of the Indian National Congress in the Brussels Congress of 1927, marked a landmark in the evolution of India’s foreign policy. The Brussels Congress greatly influenced him and helped him to create new interests and new ways of looking at the world affairs.

From Brussels Conference the Indian National Congress adopted an ideological character. It accepted the Marxist interpretation of the nature of the
Imperialism and Colonialism though not the ways of Communists. While in Russia, Nehru was so fascinated by the Russian socialism that he adopted it as one of the fundamentals of the Indian National Congress, and by now there had emerged a socialist youth wing in the Indian National Congress under Nehru's leadership and the atmosphere in the country was one of pervading socialist thought. Contacts among various countries and their nationalist movements became more frequent.

In 1928, the Congress warmly assured the people of Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Iraq for its full support and sympathy with them in their struggle for freedom from Western imperialism, which was also a great menace to the Indian struggle. The Congress declared that the Indian struggle was a part of the general world struggle against world imperialism and hence desired that India should develop contact with other countries and peoples who were also combating imperialism. It also decided to open foreign department in its office to develop such contacts.

The Congress in 1931-32, showed great awareness of the value of the world opinion, particularly, the American opinion in advancing India towards the goal of independence. When the Congress Working Committee decided on January 1st, 1932, to resume Civil Disobedience Movement it invited the free peoples of the world and their governments to watch the struggle and extend their support. In a message to the United States Gandhi hoped that his numerous American friends would watch the movement and use the influence of their great country for the sake of oppressed humanity.

In 1933, Nehru took the opportunity to share his thoughts with the countrymen through a series of articles on the national and international situation, which were subsequently published in a pamphlet entitled 'Whither India', he emphasised that it was only in a world perspective that Indian problem of independence could be properly understood, the Congress followed the lead given by Nehru.
The world scenario was changing dramatically. Nazism and Fascism were gaining strength day by day, Nehru was painfully watching the rise of Hitler and Mussolini. He disapproved their theory and practice and hated their way of ruling. Nehru asked for no truce or pacts with these dictatorial parties. India was critically watching the activities and the behaviour of the world countries. As after the World War I the League of Nations was founded in 1920, with a view to safeguard the nations from the scourge of war, and to solve the problems between nations through mutual settlement, the Indian National Congress was watching the activities of the League and the big power pressure upon it.

India's opposition to Nazism and Fascism was clearly seen in its reaction to the Italian invasion and conquest of Abyssinia. In October 1935, Italy invaded Abyssinia and the world was shocked. Nehru condemned the brutal fascist imperialism, he strongly criticized the great powers and the League of Nations for this aggression, he said that this aggression has shown the hypocrisy and duplicity of the great powers and utter futility of the League of Nations. In his Presidential address to the Lucknow Congress in April 1936, he described the bloody and cruel war in Abyssinia as an example of how hungry and predatory imperialism behaved in its mad search for colonial domains. In this connection Nehru specially criticised the role of Great Britain for indirectly encouraging the Italian aggression and when Britain decided to recognise the Italian conquest, Nehru disassociated India from this move, 'the British government, he declared, 'may forget their solemn pledges and betray the League and the cause of peace, but India must make it abundantly clear that she will not be a party to this shameful policy.' The Congress expressed India's sympathy with the Abyssinian people and declared their fight to be a part of the old exploited nation's fight for freedom. It observed May 9th, 1936, as the Abyssinia Day by holding meetings and processions in sympathy with Abyssinia over her defeat.
Nehru was equally conscious of imperialist designs for maintaining colonialism in Arab countries. His sympathies were entirely with the Arabs in the struggle against British rule as well as against the aims of the Zionists. Nehru admitted that the Jews had the right to look Jerusalem as their Holy land but not to settle there as the natives. He criticised the Balfour Declaration of 1917, as the gross betrayal of Arabs by British imperialism. Against this background the Congress Working Committee in 1936, sent its greetings to the Arabs of Palestine and sympathised with them in their struggle for independence, and September 27, 1936 was celebrated as the Palestine Day all over India. A mass meeting was held in Allahabad in support of the Arabs, speaking on the occasion Nehru observed that in Palestine the problem concerned the Arabs and the Jews but it was never a religious problem as some of the Indian Muslims thought to be. It was a problem of growing nationalism desiring freedom from the clutches of imperialism, he appreciated the brave Arab people for putting up a valiant fight in the cause of national independence. Nehru believed that the solution to the Palestine problem was for the Arabs and the Jews endeavour to create an independent democratic state in Palestine with adequate protection of Jewish rights. If Nehru’s plan would have been accepted the problem might have resolved much earlier.

The outbreak of Civil war in Spain in 1936 shook Indians specially Nehru. Since the early thirties Spain had been the scene of grim tussle between the reactionary elements - the Land, the Church and the Army aided by Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany on one side and the Republicans including Liberal Democrats, Socialists, Anarcho-Syndicalists and Communists on the other side.

In the Spanish struggle all the values of European civilisation - democracy, socialism, human dignity, self determination and individual freedom which Nehru held dear to his heart seem to be at stake. In the annual session of the Congress in 1936, Nehru put the national spotlight on Spain,
"In Spain today, he declared, our battles are being fought and we watch this struggle not merely with the sympathy of friendly outsiders but with the painful anxiety of those who are themselves involved in it."\(^\text{19}\)

The struggle between the democratic forces and the Fascist forces in Spain was not only significant for Spain but for India also. When the Spanish Republic was destroyed Nehru's faith in the West was severely shaken. "In February, 1937, Nehru appealed to the Indian people to give whatever material aid they could to the Republicans in Spain, particularly medical supplies and food or money with which to purchase them."\(^\text{20}\) He was so attached to the Republican side that in June, 1938, he visited Spain as a guest of the Republican government.

India denounced the Japanese attack on China in 1937. When the Congress held its annual session in February, 1938, it declared that the Japanese aggression was fought with the gravest consequences for the future of world peace and freedom in Asia and reiterated the call for boycotting Japanese goods.\(^\text{21}\) It declared June 12\(^\text{th}\), 1938, as the China Day throughout India and decided to send an ambulance unit to China, on 1\(^\text{st}\) September, 1938 this unit sailed from Bombay to China. This action of Congress was much appreciated by the Chinese people, they seemed anxious and eager for friendship with India. Nehru visited China in August, 1939, he spent a fortnight there as the guest of Chinese government, he was treated with great hospitality.

Nehru's opposition to Fascism, Nazism and the British imperialism was further increasing. The German aggression on Czechoslovakia and the Munich Agreement aroused in Nehru anger and distrust, this incident aroused and pained all Indians. The international situation was deteriorating and it was likely to be heading towards the Second World War. On the one hand the Congress strongly criticised the aggressive action of Fascism and Nazism and extended its support to the victims, and showed its willingness to join hands with other peoples of the world in the preservation of peace and freedom. On the other hand it insisted on
the immediate recognition of Indian independence and repeatedly declared that imperialism itself was one of the greatest causes of war, but Britain was not willing to accept the demand of India’s independence, Nehru thought that so long as freedom was not given to India there would continue a contradiction in India’s policy towards war, Congress support for British imperialism in war was obviously a wrong policy for the country. This conflict would only resolve when subjection was removed and a free India could determine her own policy in regard to war and peace as well as other matters.

Congress was ready to help Britain in prosecuting war if it could thereby secure India’s independence. On the other hand under Nehru’s guidance Congress was pursuing its own foreign policy. Thus in March, 1939, at its annual session it dissociated India entirely from British foreign policy and described it as one of the deliberate betrayal of democracy, an end to the system of collective security, enemies of democracy and freedom. It stated that in the world crisis its sympathies are entirely with the people who stood for democracy and freedom, but it also recalled Congress opposition to all attempts to impose a war on India. In the first week of September, 1939, the Second World War broke out, on 3rd September, 1939, the British Viceroy Lord Linlithgo declared India a belligerent state, without consulting the Indian Legislative Assembly he sent Indian troops abroad. The Congress considered this neglect as an insult and humiliation, it dissociated itself from British foreign policy and issued a resolution which might be considered as a serious attempt on the part of India towards the formulation of her independent foreign policy. It was for the people of India to determine whether India would join a war or not. Nehru, who was visualising a danger to the international code of conduct and democratic values was quick to issue a statement of war aims which included the liberation of countries taken by Hitler and Mussolini, the ending of Nazism and Fascism, no truce or pacts with these powers and the extension of democracy and freedom by winding up of imperialist structure and the application of the principles of self determination.
Though Nehru failed to convince Gandhi about the prevalent international situation, he, however, happened to be the sole draftsman of this resolution.\textsuperscript{25}

The Viceroy’s response was vague, dismissing Congress demand for the immediate transfer of power as impractical, and to consult different communities, political parties and princes at the end of the war to consider the modification in the act of 1935 so that India may attain her due place in the great dominions. The Congress considered the response to be inadequate and disappointing, it called upon its ministries in the provinces to resign. The Congress therefore, decided to launch civil disobedience movement. Mean while the war had taken a turn for the worse. In June, 1940, France had collapsed. Hitler was marching from one victory to another and England stood open to invasion. The Congress, notably Nehru grew more sensitive to the world situation. Congress Working Committee met in an emergency session and again put its demand for independence, but the British response was increasingly bolder and more reassuring. The British government emphasised the difference among the Indian parties and invited a certain number of representative Indians to join the war advisory council, the Congress rejected the proposal. Though, Nehru was not the Congress President at that time but he came to the front and said that Congress could not participate actively until its freedom was acknowledged. On the day following Pearl Harbour, Nehru expressed his skepticism over the practicability of the doctrine of non-violence in the face of a full fledged war.

Nehru was aghast at the prospect of war, seeing danger to India from almost every corner. In the meanwhile amidst turmoil, Chiang Kai Shek of China had paid a visit to India and made earnest appeal to the British government to give Indians real political power as early as possible. In March 1942, Sir Stafford Cripps came to India with new proposals of British war cabinet. These proposals in short offered full dominion status to India. Cripps also pledged British acceptance of a Constitution so framed, subject to the right of any province to
remain outside the dominion. The right of no accession for the provinces was of
great importance, it implied the British acceptance of partition of India and formation
of Pakistan next five years. The Congress rejected the offer and in August 1942,
the All India Congress Committee met in Bombay, there Nehru moved the Quit
India resolution. The resolution was passed on August 8th, 1942, and in the
morning of 9th August 1942, all prominent leaders of Congress including Nehru
were sent to Jail. As being the architect of India's foreign policy, Nehru while in
jail clearly foresaw the emergence of the two power blocs in the post war world,
he noted that international supremacy would be of two powers, U.S.A and Soviet
Union and much in the world was going to depend upon the policy pursued by
these two countries. Beside the question of freedom, the upper most concern in
Nehru's mind was India's attitude towards these emerging superpowers. With
the end of the Second World War in 1945, the world was divided into two power
blocs. Nehru was released and made a declaration on 7th September 1946 as the
Vice-President of the Interim Government that:

"We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of
the groups, aligned against one another which have led in the past two world
wars and which may again lead to disaster on an even vaster scale. We believe
that peace and freedom are indivisible and the denial of freedom anywhere must
endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflict and war. We are particularly
interested in the emancipation of the colonial and dependent countries and
peoples, and in the recognition in theory and practice of equal opportunities for
all races."

In March, 1947, before the transfer of power had taken place and India had
emerged as the full fledged independent nation, Jawaharlal Nehru made his formal
debut on the stage of international politics in the Asian Relations Conference, which
was sponsored by the Indian Council of World Affairs, a non-political organisation
devoted to study the International Affairs. In this Conference more than 22 nations
including Arabs and Jews from West Asia, Uzbeks and Kazakhs from Soviet Central Asia, Burmese, Indonesians and Indo-Chinese from South East Asia, Chinese and Koreans from East Asia, representing diverse nations, culture and languages were brought together to assert Asia’s position in the world political community and to exchange ideas about the problems common to all these countries in the post war world. There had arrived a certain stage in human affairs when idea of one world and some kind of a world federation seemed to be essential, though there were many dangers and obstacles in the way. United Nations, he said, should be supported which was painfully emerging from its infancy. But in order to have one world they must also in Asian think of the countries of Asia cooperating together for that larger ideal. He served notice of Asia’s “special responsibility” for Africa and concluded with a plea for faith in the human spirit.  

On August 15, 1947, India got independence, and also partitioned. The entire responsibility of forming India’s foreign policy fell on the shoulders of Nehru, the factors that immediately influenced India’s foreign policy formation were, her precarious economic situation at home and a devastating global conflict. India had neither friends nor enemies, so India had to be extra careful in formulating her own foreign policy. The spectrum of world powers thus represent a hazy picture. It was under these confused and unstable conditions India had to adjust herself with the power blocs. Since the freedom from want was the fundamental need, naturally a significant foreign policy could be developed on the basis of the vital internal policy. Nehru declared a policy of socialism at home for securing economic stability and industrial progress, and of non-alignment, of friendship with all, malice towards none; of unstinted support to a colonial country’s freedom, fight against racial discrimination to secure world cooperation abroad. This policy was partly due to the tendencies generated by India’s immediate problems and partly to his world view of things.  

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Long before independence was achieved, Nehru decided that fundamental task of the Government of India was to raise the standard of living of the mass of the people, the country's revenue had to be earmarked for bringing about economic and social change, and with this end in view, he thought that foreign policy should be so evolved that it might play an essential and constructive role towards the realisation of this objective. In December 1947, in a speech to Constituent Assembly Nehru had made his position clear when he said-

"whatever policy we may lay down, the art of conducting foreign affairs of the country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country. We may talk about international goodwill and mean what we say, may talk about peace and freedom and earnestly mean what we say, but in ultimate analysis a government functions for the good of the country it governs." 29

The study of India's foreign policy has, therefore, become the study of the way in which Nehru thought and acted inspite of obstructions. The peculiarities of decade in which he formulated his policy of non-alignment was greatly relevant. Since the attitudes of the satellite countries were entirely determined by Washington and Moscow in the early forties, his main concern was to define his relationship vis-à-vis these two powers. India requested the U.S.A. to extend her cooperation and sympathised with this attitude of many Asian nations, for she herself had a long record of neutrality and non-involvement, but Indian foreign policy was viewed with anger and sometimes with contempt in both the camps.

b. India's Foreign Policy with Special Reference to NAM:

The foreign policy of a country can not be linked with any static concepts, it is influenced at times by circumstances over which the national government has no control. India started to pursue its foreign policy much before the independence, because of international developments and British attitude at home but the shaping of India's foreign policy was largely influenced by the
World War II developments: the weakening of the forces of imperialism and reaction, the growth of the democracy and progress, the breaking away of a number of countries in Europe and Asia from capitalist system and formation of a world socialist system, and the upsurge of the national liberation movements. With the new alignment of forces in the world arena, India as newly independent country needed to formulate her own foreign policy. The heavy responsibility of formulating the foreign policy fell on the shoulders of Nehru, who before independence had been main spokesman of the Congress foreign policy. Nehru developed the strong urge to maintain India's independence in foreign affairs and to keep away from the policies being pursued by the big powers for their own purposes.

Though the factors which govern the foreign policy of India are numerous but most important of these are historical, geographical, strategic and economic. National self interest is, however, the guiding principle. India could not remain uninfluenced by all these factors which have been continuously affecting the formulation and conduct of her foreign policy.

India's historical development, no less than her recent experience, inevitably beckoned towards an independent foreign policy stance. India fought a prolonged struggle for freedom, India's entire background was consistently anti-imperialist and she necessarily sympathised with the struggle against Western colonialism, no matter where it was being carried on. It could not be surprising that an integral part of an independent India's foreign policy was 'the policy of standing up for the weak and the oppressed in various continents'. It was in this context that Nehru in a foreign policy statement on 11th, March 1950, told the Lok Sabha that, "it is a policy which flows from our past, from recent history and from our national movement and its development from various ideals we have proclaimed."
Jawaharlal Nehru himself pointed out the Geographical parameters of India’s foreign policy, he said that “India was the gateway to both South-east Asia as well as the Middle East, anything happening in South Asia, South-east Asia, the Gulf region, West Asia and the Indian Ocean region affected India, he further said,

“look at the map, if you have to consider any question concerning South–east Asia, you can not do without India. So also with the Far–east, while the Middle East may not be connected with South east Asia, both are connected with India. Even if you think in terms of regional organisations in India, you have to keep in touch with the other regions.”

When the British government left India there was widespread poverty and misery. The social and economic system lost its vitality and life had become stagnant. Poverty, hunger, illiteracy and diseases became the common elements of India. Indeed, the conditions were so miserable that nearly two third of the total population were either under nourished or disease ridden.

Apart from the terrible economic crisis at home, India was fully aware of the international realities which were the legacy of a devastating global conflict. The spectrum of world politics was presenting a hazy picture. The need of the time was a cooperative effort on the part of the bigger nations, but in this explosive international situation in which clashing ideologies, conflicting ambitions, antagonistic economic interests, territorial disputes, racial and religious animosities were posing a danger to the world peace. India had to adjust herself with the power blocs without in anyway compromising its own basic position on fundamental issues. In 1947, Nehru declared that “ultimately, foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy and until India has properly evolve her economic policy her foreign policy will be rather vague, rather inchoate and will be groping.” In order to improve economic conditions, India felt it imperative that there should be international peace so that its government could muster all its
strength and resources to tackle its domestic problems effectively. Long before the independence was achieved, Nehru had decided that the fundamental task of the Government of India was to raise the standard of living, this clearly meant that as far as possible, the country's revenue had to be earmarked for bringing about the economic and social change.

India got independence on August 15th, 1947, and a new government was formed under the Prime Ministership of Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru. As the world was divided into two camps and the world scenario was posing a worst picture than ever, Nehru as the sole spokesman of India's foreign policy thought that India's foreign policy should be so evolved that it might play an essential and constructive role. In a speech of Constituent Assembly in December 1947, he made it clear when he said that—

"we have sought to avoid foreign entanglements by not joining one bloc or the other. The natural result has been that neither of these big blocs looks on us with favour. They think that we are undependable, because we can not be made to vote this way or that way."

As the year 1947, was of great uncertainty, newly independent India was in a state of dilemma. Stalin’s Russia was not much adored by the nationalist leaders of the colonies, though it stood committed to the freedom of the colonies. As for America, Nehru had already presaged its emergence as an imperialist power on the ruins of nineteenth century empires. In this confused state his faith in a brave new world of socialism stood firm. In a resolution which he moved in the Constituent Assembly, formed in December 1946, on the eventual goal of an 'independent sovereign republic' Nehru reiterated his faith in socialism and a socialist form of society, he adopted the policy of socialism at home for securing economic stability and industrial progress, and of non-alignment, friendship with all, malice towards none, unstinted support to colonial country's freedom fight against racial discrimination for securing world cooperation abroad. The policy
was partly due to the tendencies generated by India’s immediate problems and partly due to his world view of things. The foreign policy of India that Nehru adopted is based on the following principles,
a) Non-alignment with any of two groups between which the world is divided today;
b) Knitting together the South east Asian countries for mutual economic and other interests;
c) Contributing to world peace wherever and whenever possible;
d) Championing the cause of the weak, even at the risk of estranging vested interests;
e) Making the best use of United Nations for the purpose for which it was created;
f) Establishing diplomatic contacts with all leading countries in the world so that India may know and be known in all the four corners of the world.

Nehru’s declaration that India would not align with any power blocs was the starting point of the policy of non-alignment, because by the time the Cold War had begun and the world was divided into two power blocs. New Delhi, however, got deeply absorbed in the post partition problems, soon came the Kashmir conflict and the revelations that the U.K and the U.S.A were opposed to India and were on the side of Pakistan, this further confirmed Nehru’s faith in his policy to remain nonaligned.

Though Nehru was committed to socialism and planning, certain vested interests wanted India to seek the goodwill of the west for loans, investments, and technological aids. They wanted him to follow a policy of extra friendship towards the West, but Western attitudes on almost all issues continued to be hostile to India.
Nehru visited U.S.A in October 1949 to make it conscious of Indian needs and situations. In his address to Columbia university on 17th October, 1949, Nehru said:

"The pursuit of peace not through alignment with any major power or group of powers; but through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue; the liberation of the subject peoples; the maintenance of freedom - both national and individual; the elimination of racial discrimination; and the elimination of want, disease and ignorance which afflict the greater part of the world's population."

In the meantime, Pakistan's attack on Kashmir forced India to shop for defense equipments from abroad. The U.K. was not in a position to help much and the U.S.A. refused to supply equipments on the ground that these were needed for the NATO forces, on the other hand Cold War was vying in Europe. By the middle of the year 1950 Korean war broke out, this war put the non-alignment to test. Nehru did not want to offend China and put India as a negotiator. India played a very constructive role in the Korean question as a peace maker. In the U.N. it denounced North Korea as aggressor. In this event India's role was appreciated by the U.S.S.R, but Nehru's faith in U.N. was shaken because of the domination of the big powers over it, and the way Kashmir question was handled in this great body. India's cooperation with Asian and African nations and movements, the image of Nehru as a great leader of the liberation movements, and New Delhi's efforts at the U.N. to coordinate the activities of the newly independent nations helped in the growth of the non-aligned movement.

In 1950's India's policy of nonalignment came under severe attack in U.S.A. Nehru was under pressure both at home and abroad to change his policy one way or the other. Even the Chinese were using provocative language, it blamed that Nehru was on the way to selling India to American imperialism.
While Nehru was steadfastly opposing the American imperialism and that he did till his death. When India was caught up in famines which led to the import of food. India naturally looked to U.S.A. for capital goods and loans. India asked for an urgent wheat loan in 1950, the United States government thought it was an opportunity to twist India’s arm for its Cold War aims and required India to make certain adjustments in its foreign policy as a *quid pro quo* for the aid of wheat. The reason was India’s attitude in Korean war. The aid was not made urgent the U.S.A. processed it in the middle of 1951. The same year India launched its first five year plan, which was a landmark in economic planning, it showed its firm commitment to planned development as opposed to the West’s doctrine of laissez faire.

In the period 1952 onwards there was a race for joining military blocs. India and several other newly independent countries were engaged in opposing military alliances that were being imposed on them. But through non-alignment and its principles of not being aligned with any of the military blocs saved India and other newly independent countries from this menace.

The first effort to incorporate the principles of non-alignment in a major document was the India China Agreement on India’s trade with Tibet. This document is well known as ‘Panchsheel’, in the preamble to the agreement signed on 29th April, 1954, the five principles of peaceful co-existence, these were:

a) respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty,

b) non-aggression,

c) non-interference,

d) equality and mutual benefit,

e) peaceful co-existence.

These principles had their foundation on three different sources:
a) they were declaratory of some essential principles laid down by the U.N. Charter,
b) the general acceptance of the principles of co-existence in the numerous treaties and international agreements,
c) and unanimous acceptance of these principles by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

These were the decisive years of India's foreign policy. Both India and China were well aware of the possible conflict between their respective national interest and the irritants left over by imperialism. The agreement was an attempt to reconcile India's national interests and aspirations and to find a peaceful method of resolving the differences through peaceful means and direct diplomatic negotiations between the two countries. It was an attempt to rule out war between the two nations and ensure peaceful settlement of their disputes. The two Prime Ministers hoped that the adoption of these principles by nations would help in creating a climate of peace in the world, lessening the incidence of war and strengthening the foundations of peace. Thus, Nehru was the first statesman to formulate these principles into a code of conduct governing bilateral relations between two sovereign countries with different social, economic and political systems. India emerged as a great factor in world politics. Within a few months of signing the Sino-Indian Agreement, many countries expressed their adherence to the Panchsheel. Burma, China, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, Vietnam, Yugoslavia and Cambodia had commended the Panchsheel worth of universal respect and a support in the extension of international relations. They realised that under the prevailing world situation peace could rest only on the principles of co-existence.

The same year in 1954, the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, Pakistan, India and Indonesia met at Bogor and decided to convene a Conference to promote goodwill and cooperation among Afro-Asian nations; to consider social, economic and cultural problems and the problems of special interest to their
peoples and to review the position of Afro-Asia in contribution to the world peace and cooperation. They decided that the Conference should be composed of all the independent and near independent nations of the two continents (Africa and Asia). The invitations were send to thirty countries, and the Conference was to be held at the level of Prime Ministers or Foreign Ministers, as for the invitation of the Asian countries, the most controversial question was whether or not the Chinese people's Republic should be invited. After much discussion it was decided that China would be invited, Burma insisted for inviting Israel but India and Pakistan steadfastly opposed it, because Israel was in a state of war with the Arabs.

The Conference took place in Bandung (Indonesia), from April 18-24, 1955, it was attended by the delegations of 29 countries. The Conference declared that friendly cooperation in accordance with the principles of Panchsheel would effectively contribute to the maintenance of peace and security, while cooperation in the economic, social and cultural fields would help bring about a common prosperity and happiness to all. The declaration at Bandung contained the following ten principles:

a) Respect for fundamental Human Rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the U.N.

b) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.

c) Recognition of the equality of all races and the equality of nations, large and small.

d) Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

e) Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself, singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the U.N.
f) 1. Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve the 
particular interests of any of the big powers.

2. Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries.

g) Refraining from acts of threats of aggression or the use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any country.

h) Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, 
conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means 
of the parties own choice in conformity with the Charter of the U.N.

i) Promotion of mutual interests of cooperation.

j) Respect for justice and international obligation.\(^{38}\)

The Bandung Conference was the scene of an acute struggle between the 
non-aligned countries and countries entangle with the imperialist powers in all 
sorts of economic, military and political commitments. At Bandung Nehru said "I 
do not want any country in Asia to be lulled into a sense of, shall I say, 
dependence upon others, because that saps- that undermines the growth of that 
élan of a nation- that spirit of self dependence of having faith in themselves."\(^{39}\)

The Bandung Conference helped many representatives of Asian and African 
countries to rectify some wrong ideas about the socialist states and helped China 
to gain a foothold on the international scene, it condemned the imperial system of 
colonialism which was considered an evil to be eliminated as soon as possible. 
On April 24\(^{th}\), 1955, the Bandung Conference finished its work. After the exhibition 
of the influence of bloc politics at Bandung it began to be realised that the 
nations which were truly independent and uncommitted to either bloc came 
together to raise their voice in support of freedom and peace. It was the Bandung 
that the history changed in a sensational way, breaking away from the past 
patterns of international behaviour, which was based more on a master slave 
relationship. Despite the wide diversity of every kind among the participants in
Bandung, a unity had been patently constructed. The big powers which were hostile and disdainful towards the Conference, were started to examine their attitude towards Asia and Africa. In this Conference India sided with China and helped her to maintain international relations, specially with the African countries. The Conference also decried the production and use of the weapons of mass destruction, it called for their total prohibition for the establishment and maintenance of such prohibition by an efficient international control. It also denounced nuclear tests.

Now India moved towards Soviet Union to make her efforts for the betterment of relations. The history of India’s relations with Soviet Union was sometimes better and sometimes bitter. In 1946-47, session of the U.N. there was close cooperation between India and Soviet Union because of their similar attitude in the issues like colonialism, racialism, disarmament, banning of atomic weapons etc. but when India became independent and formed its foreign policy, the policy of non-alignment made both U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. unhappy. In 1947, session of General Assembly India could not get a Security Council seat due to their opposition.  

India’s support to ruthless suppression of the communist element in Indonesia and Nehru’s visit to U.S. in 1949, in the context of the victory of Communism in China brought a bitter taste in the Soviet Union. But India’s mediation in the Korean war and its non-participation in San Francisco Conference in 1951, as a silent protest against the exclusion of the Soviet Union and Communist China from deliberations on proposed draft of Japanese Peace Treaty, won the Russian admiration for India. In 1952, the Russian delegate broke his country’s silence on the Kashmir question and took a definitely pro Indian view by lending support to the Kashmir issue. Soviet Union was greatly impressed with the Indian role at the Bandung Conference, as it helped to establish the position of Red China as a guardian of peace.
In 1955, the Soviet government invited Nehru to visit U.S.S.R. and in June 1955, Nehru and his daughter Indira Gandhi along with the government delegation visited Moscow. The Indian Prime Minister spent many hours talking with Soviet leaders, about the results of the talks, Nehru said at a press conference that the Soviet government had expressed its readiness to assist India in carrying out her development plans and that Soviet aid was without any political strings whatsoever.

As a logical sequel of the Indo-Soviet relations, Nehru invited the Soviet leaders to pay a return visit to India. It was so immediate that the Soviet leaders Bulganin and Khrushchev paid this return visit in November, 1955. And the visit by Soviet leaders was highly successful.

In the mean time, in 1956, two major crises broke out, the commitment of India's foreign policy to national interest and world peace was shown in two crises (1) Suez crisis (2) Hungarian crisis. In the Suez crisis of July, 1956, India sided with Arab countries, it condemned the aggression as Israel’s naked invasion of Egypt and the consequent Anglo-French intervention. In the U.N. India demanded immediate withdrawal of forces by all the three powers Israel, Britain and France from Arab territories. In January, 1957, the Eisenhower doctrine was propounded, which claimed that the withdrawal from the Middle East of Britain and France had left a power vacuum there which the United States had to fill so as to prevent the U.S.S.R. from doing it. Nehru strongly reacted over it by declaring that if at all there is a power vacuum in the Middle East, that had to fill through their strength, unity and progress. Speaking at the National Congress session on January 6th, 1957, Nehru said that this power vacuum theory was wholly wrong as it created a race among big powers to cut out spheres of influence in other countries and subvert their independence. It is worth noting that when the Western powers staged economic boycott of Egypt, blocking among other things all Egyptian assets in foreign banks, India granted Egypt a loan of
Rs. 50 million, though it was not a big loan, it represented a moral and political assistance to Egypt. But in the Hungarian crisis of Oct. 1956, India's reaction was opposite as its reaction in Egypt, India showed a lack of response on the issue because it never wanted to antagonise the U.S.S.R. by supporting the Western powers on Hungarian crisis. India voted against the U.N. resolution calling for the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Hungary. Thus, India was the only non-Communist country to oppose the resolution.

As in the light of growing Indo-Soviet relations, it was obvious for India to defend Soviet Union, as it was the biggest ally of India who was lending all types of support to it. In 1958 the Indian government took a somewhat less active role in the settlement of international problems.

In 1959, in connection with an armed insurrection in Tibet, many Tibetan Buddhists together with Dalai Lama fled to India and took refuge there. The friendly trend of India and China received a rude shock when China claimed over Indian borders. This claim forced the Nehru government to build up its armed forces along the border with China. A serious border incident occurred on 25th August, 1959, when an exchange of fire took place between the border guards, each side accusing the other of having been first to fire. It was a test of Soviet Union's friendly attitude towards India. But Soviet Union put pressure on China and India to further discuss the boundary matter, the Prime Ministers of the two countries agreed for meeting and discussing the issue but nothing came out of this discussion.

In 1960, the world scenario was a bit changed over the war in Congo. After attaining independence Congo became the theatre of power politics. There were three main concentrations of authority, Leopoldville- where President Kasavubu with the help of Western powers was trying to carry on the work of the central government of Congo, Elizabethville- where Tshombe with the help of Belgium was trying to establish an independent state of Katanga, and
Stanleyville, where followers of Lumumba were claiming legal authority over the whole of Congo with the support of the socialist countries. For India, the choice was difficult and embarrassing as she wanted to use all her influence to keep the state of Congo intact; territorially and politically. India persistently pleaded for settling the internal conflict in accordance with the Constitution of Congo and asked the interested foreign powers to keep aloof and let the United Nations play an effective role in restoring normalcy. After the murder of Lumumba, India sent combat troops to Congo at the request of the U.N. Secretary General. In Congo, India had always held that the United Nation's forces should enter. In the wake of the Congo crisis, the non-aligned countries felt the need of having a non-aligned Conference just to assert themselves in world affairs. Tito took the initiative of holding the first Conference of the non-aligned countries in 1961, it was in recognition of this initiative that this Conference was held at Belgrade. Though the suggestions for holding the first non-aligned Conference had come first from Tito, it had, of course, had some stronger support of other stalwarts of the non-Communist world, notably Nehru, Nasser, Soekarno and Nkrumah. The bitter experience at Congo led Nkrumah to sound this idea. In the 1960, session of the General Assembly the conviction of holding such a meeting became more firm, the agenda gave due attention to India's views for strengthening of international peace and security. Imperialism was regarded a positive factor contributing to the outbreak of wars. There were also references to 'non-interference' and 'non-intervention' reflecting concern over the U.S. role in Cuba and the French and Belgian atrocities in Congo. The outcome of the need of having a non-aligned countries Conference was the Belgrade Conference of 1961, which was held at Belgrade from September 1-6. At Belgrade all agreed that non-alignment meant abiding peace and freedom to be free, Sukarno said:

"and now we have this present Conference......to draw the non-aligned countries into a coordinated accumulated moral force in order to help preserve
world peace and bring about a new stable equilibrium, based on a world order of social justice and prosperity." 45

In the 27 point declaration the Belgrade Summit made the following demands:

a) immediate cessation of all forms of counter revolutions, intervention and invasion of Asia, Africa and Latin America;

b) granting of independence to Algeria, Angola, withdrawal of French troops from Tunisia, termination of the imperialist intervention in Congo;

c) an end to the policy of Apartheid in South Africa;

d) restoration of the legitimate rights of the Arab peoples of Palestine.

The non-aligned nations brought several proposals before the world assembly and called for general and complete disarmament. They asked for a stage by stage approach to arms reduction. The ultimate goal of the non-aligned nations was an operative test ban accord prohibiting all nuclear explosions.

At the end of the Belgrade Conference, the Chinese showed their ire on India, they denounced the principles of Belgrade Conference. The Sino-Indian boundary dispute was getting warmer day by day from 20th October, 1962, heavy fighting broke out all along the Sino-Indian border. The non-aligned Colombo Conference countries in December, 1962, appealed to Chinese government, calling upon its troops to withdraw 20 kilometers to that line which was previously drawn between India and China. But the Chinese continued their attack and their government issued a statement which served a clear notice to India and the world that this incursion is not merely a border fight but a full scale invasion on India. On India's part the Indian defense system was not so organised from the point of view of the war. The Chinese attack on India was compared as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour of December, 1941, in both cases the attack was unexpected. India turned towards the big powers for help. It first moved towards U.S.A. Y.B. Chavan the then Defense Minister himself led the mission to America,
but America was unresponsive. He then went to Britain, there too he met a cold reception. Britain could not supply even an old submarine of which we were in need. In fact Britain and America were afraid of hurting their ally Pakistan which was on the side of China. Chavan then moved to U.S.S.R. and got all that he wanted. Nehru regarded the Chinese incursion not only as a serious threat to India's security but also a great personal trouble, an attempt to undermine that in which he had profound faith; whom India helped to get a foothold in Afro-Asian countries. The Soviet Union whom India had not supported as much as she did with China, helped India at the time when Sino-Indian war was at its peak and India was looking for the arms to defend herself, when U.S. and U.K. both refused to give arms to India, Soviet Union gave whatever India needed.

The Sino-Indian rift brought a setback in India's foreign policy, Nehru's critics did not lay down their arms, they waited and watched for an opportunity to change the course of India's foreign policy. Such an opportunity came their way with the Chinese aggression of 1962. The opposition bloc was seeking to obtain the resignation of the Nehru government, insisting on complete rejection of non-alignment. All this made it incumbent on Nehru government to follow the course of non-alignment more consistently and simultaneously to build up country's defense capacity. After sometime the United States thought of it and in November 1962, India began to receive arms from the United States and Commonwealth countries. The U.S. and India signed an agreement on military aid. Under the agreement India consented to allow American advisers and observers to exercise control over the use of arms and also agreed to make available to the United States a certain amount of military information. Now that India had accepted military aid from the West. It sent to India numerous military diplomatic missions which used negotiations about the arms supply to influence India's foreign policy, these missions tried to persuade India to abandon non-alignment, it was simple that the Western imperialists chose other ways of involving India in their military strategic plans, they were not going to miss such a good chance of
pushing India out of the path of non-alignment. But Nehru with his vision of world history had kept the doors open to the Soviet Union. The new rapprochement between India and Soviet Union started in 1963, when the Soviet government offered to help India to construct an integral iron and steel plant at Bokaro. India previously turned to the United States for assistance, but U.S. ruling circles haggled over the terms of aid as long as Soviet Union constructed the Bhilai iron and steel plant, and finally it refused to build the plant at Bokaro. The Indian government then took further steps to build up inter-state and cultural relations with the Soviet Union. In July 1963, Indira Gandhi paid a visit to the Soviet Union. She went to Moscow for the opening of Indian Exhibition and had talks with the Soviet government representatives. Closer friendship between India and Soviet Union manifested itself convincingly in April 1964, at Jakarta during a meeting of 22 representatives of Asian and African countries assembled to discuss the programme of 2nd non-aligned Conference.

After the death of Nehru in 1964, Lal Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi very well carried the foreign policy of India with non-alignment as its principle. Indira Gandhi in her statement on foreign policy on January 26, 1966, said:

"the fundamental principles laid down by my father, to which he and Shastri ji dedicated their lives, will continue to guide us; it will be my sincere endeavour to work for the strengthening of peace and international cooperation, so that people in all lands live in equality, free from domination and fear."

Many ups and downs came but India never changed her foreign policy as adopted by Nehru. The Indian attitude in Czech crisis of 1968, was commendable. When this issue was being voted upon in the General Assembly India was among the absentees, thus, India in a polite manner made it clear that the military intervention in Czechoslovakia was improper, India did not involve herself unnecessarily in the issues which arose during this period and those where her vital national interests were involved. India made persistent and integrated efforts
Introductory

to normalise her relations with neighbours, in April, 1968, treaties relating with training and education were signed with Burma, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia and Philippines, in June, 1974, an agreement took place between India and Sri Lanka through which India gave recognition to the sovereignty of Sri Lanka over Kachcha Tibu island and a treaty was also signed on sea boundary at Palk Straits. In the first half of 1976, an agreement was signed between India and China to exchange ambassadors and hopes of full diplomatic relations with Pakistan were also enlivened. India’s relations with socialist countries remained cordial and full of warmth.

Following the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, both the super powers initiated their naval buildup in the Indian Ocean region, the U.S. to bring the whole Ocean area under her sphere of influence. It was a serious matter of concern and had a significant impact on India’s national interests, India felt that if the Indian Ocean region falls under the domination of a hostile power or powers, her maritime vulnerability would immediately become obvious. India had energetically supported collective attempts to exclude great power competition in the region. In the conferences of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers and the non-aligned countries as well as in the United Nations, India had given total support to the attempts to create a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. The question of a ‘peace zone’ had represented a problem for both U.S. and Soviet diplomacy because neither Washington nor Moscow desired a total naval withdrawal. But under diplomatic pressure from regional states Kremlin showed some cooperativeness, Moscow announced its readiness to act for the conversion of the Indian Ocean into a peace zone on the basis of equality with the other great powers. The denial of U.S. to withdraw its navy from Indian Ocean made India unhappy about the United States. New Delhi emphasised that any build up by the U.S. only encourage Soviet rivalry. The United States presence in the region was often a source of irritation in Indo-U.S. relations during 1970’s, but contributed towards cordial Indo-Soviet relations.
The relevance of non-alignment can be seen in the 50th anniversary of the Bandung Conference which was held on 24th April, 2005, at Bandung. In this Afro-Asian Summit the Asian continent was represented by our Prime Minister Mr. Manmohan Singh, addressing the Conference Mr. Singh declared that non-alignment remains a ‘valid and effective instrument’ to ensure the creation of ‘a more just and fair’ global order and stressed for its revitalisation. He remarked that India and other countries had literally followed 50 year old footsteps to the building where the historic Conference was held and in which Prime Minister Nehru played a leading role. Pointing out that NAM has played a central role in the struggle for political emancipation in the past, we need to revitalise this movement to make it a vehicle for social and economic emancipation in our times.

Apart from this, India also supports strongly the peaceful settlement of international disputes as it has become imperative need for the survival in this nuclear age. Further more, it is essential that each problem should be approached in a peaceful and friendly way. The only alternative to the principle of co-existence of co-destruction or co-extinction. India feels that nations should at all times avoid a war like approach to the world problems. India always supports the Palestinian cause, it was the first non-Arab state to recognise the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. India has always extended its consistent and unwavering support to the Palestinian issue in the United Nations and other U.N. fora. India has supported the Middle East Peace Process since its launching in 1991 and committed to the peaceful settlement of the dispute.

To wit, the challenges are many, the prospects grim, the time short, yet the need for non-alignment is enormous. Its continued relevance is best epitomised in the words of its founder-member, Jawaharlal Nehru, “if you give it up, there is no other policy for (the non-alignment) to adopt with the slightest advantage.”
c. Cold War Rivalry and its Impact on India:

The differences between the Western bloc and the Soviet Union began to assume serious proportions after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. Although Stalin’s Soviet Union joined the Allied powers to fight against the axis powers in the Second World War, as the Russian army, and had contributed to the victory of the Allied powers, as a matter of fact the Americans and the Russians became partners against Hitler, they began having serious differences over post war reconstruction policies and ideologies. They opposed ideologies of Soviet style Marxism-Leninism and American style bourgeois democracy were viewed as one of the major factors of the Cold War. To the Americans the Communist ideology was expansionist, atheistic, militaristic form of Soviet organisation that presents a threat of immense proportion to the civilised West. Any cooperation with such an ideology was both dangerous and abhorrent. To the Soviet Union, Western democracy particularly evidenced in the United States, was a genuine threat to the survival of the Soviet state and the ideals of Marxism-Leninism. Then the Soviet and American leaders found it possible to selectively choose among the historical record, real and imagined objectives, ideological preconceptions, and their own personal biases to arrive at an image of the other that was malevolent and evil. Events were interpreted in the light of expectation, and both sides have ample evidence to 'prove' the worst intentions of the other.

The Cold War broke out on 15th November 1945, when the U.S., Britain and Canada issued a three power declaration refusing to export the secret of atomic bomb to the Soviet Union and affirming their decision that “the disclosure of detailed information concerning the practical industrial (and military) application of atomic energy would not contribute to the devising of effective reciprocal and enforceable safeguards. This declaration was the opening of bi-polarity.”

Thus, when the Cold War between the Western powers and the Soviet Union was intensifying, Winston Churchill made a speech at Fulton, on March 5th,
1946, which came to be known as the ‘Iron Curtain’ speech, in which he denounced Stalinism as a challenge and peril to Christian civilisation. In an interview on March 10th, 1946, Stalin considered Churchill’s speech as a call for war on the Soviet Union. He feared the Anglo-American combination against the Soviet Union. As the end of the World War II brought bipolarity, for all practical purposes two worlds existed. The first world was centered on the United States, with its global military might and massive economic strength, the second was centered on the U.S.S.R., with its powerful army and growing economic base. A classical balance of power existed in the international arena, with the economically powerful U.S. armed primarily with its arsenal of nuclear weapons, confronted with the economically destroyed Soviet Union, employing the world’s largest army. American nuclear weapons held the Soviet Union hostage, whereas the Soviet army held the Western Europe hostage. Both feared the other, and neither side dared to act.

The first world, that was the United States, had moved to a position of clear and unchallenged leadership of Great Britain’s February 1947 realisation that it no longer had the economic wherewithal to combat insurrectionist forces in Greece. In rapid succession the Truman administration formulated the Truman Doctrine, in which the American President declared that America’s policy would be one of tendering support to “the peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures; and the Marshall plan, in which the United States sent billions of dollars of economic aid to Western Europe to restore Europe’s war shattered economy and to prevent the expansion of Communism.”30 Within two years of this in 1949, the United states, Canada and several other countries had concluded the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), at first 16 nations joined NATO. By 1955, the United States expanded its alliance system and had constructed a global system of treaties such as NATO, the Organisation of American states treaty (the Rio Pact), the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO), The Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), and the
The second world, that was of those countries in which the Communist countries held sway, and Soviet Union enjoyed pre-eminence over them. During this period the U.S.S.R. also initiated the formation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Militarily the U.S.S.R. constructed its own system of bilateral treaties with its Eastern European neighbours, concluded a mutual defence pact with China after Mao-Tse-Tung’s 1949 victory, and capped its treaty system with the Warsaw pact in 1955.

Relations between the two powers improved somewhat following the death of Josef Stalin in 1953, the wars in Korea and French Indo-China were brought to an end, and the first post-war summit meeting of Soviet and Western leaders was held in Geneva in July, 1955, but the result of this meeting was nothing more than a surface ‘thaw’. By the end of 1955, the world was divided into two hostile camps dominated by the American and Soviet Union States, both sides in this bi-polar system viewed other international actors as being either Soviet and American surrogates. Throughout the 1955 to 1969 era thaw and accommodation followed by periods of renewed Cold War tensions. The opening event of this period was the first meeting in ten years between an American President and a Soviet Premier in the Geneva Summit of 1955, the spirit of this Summit indicated a new willingness of both sides to discuss global issues. But this rapport ended very quickly, as the Soviet tanks rolled into Hungary and British, French and Israeli forces invaded Egypt in 1956. For the next two years U.S., Soviet relations remained tense.

Unfortunately for both the United States and Soviet Union it became increasingly difficult to cooperate with certain of their allies. In NATO, France in particular questioned and challenged the American dominance. Not trusting American guarantees of coming to Europe’s assistance in the event of a war in
Europe, France developed her own nuclear capabilities, exploding its first nuclear weapon in 1964, and in 1966, France withdrew its forces from NATO military command.

On the other hand Soviet Union was having even greater difficulties in keeping its allies in line. Anti-Communist and anti-Soviet sentiments grew up in East Germany, Poland and Hungary between 1954-68, Albania formally withdrew itself from the Warsaw pact in 1968, Soviet Chinese relations began to deteriorate from 1960, and by the end of the decade Soviet and Chinese forces were engaged in open conflict along the Sino-Soviet border. Additionally, as more and more colonies escaped from their colonial yokes and joined the ranks of sovereign nation states, and a third world was created, separate and distinct from the first world of western industrial democratic states and the second world of the Communist states. Many of these third world states were willing to accept economic and military aid and technological assistance from whoever offered it but they chose to remain non-aligned.

The differences between the 'free world' and the 'Communist world' became irreconcilable and the world was being divided into the Western bloc and the Eastern bloc, immediately following the independence of India. The domestic and global interests of these two blocs remained mutually exclusive. India like many other nations was presented with the alternative of being on the side of one bloc or the other or to remain neutral between two rival camps. In this game of power politics a sustained attempt was made to draw the newly independent states of Asia and Africa into the nexus of the Cold War. To India and the other newly independent states the choice was obvious, it was open to them to participate in the Cold War, which implied signing of military pacts and compromising the newly won political independence, on the other hand, the choice was to keep out of the bi-polar conflicts, preserving the political independence and playing a positive role in the world affairs retaining the right to decide the
Nehru was interested in promoting an area of peace 'to distinguish it from the area of bloc politics which was an area of war'. He hoped that by promoting the area of peace, he could serve as a 'go between' for the two camps and help reduce tensions between them through non-association or non-alignment with either of the two blocs, thus, Nehru founded the policy of non-alignment to establish the area of peace. Non-alignment was the result of emerging historical process in the world intensively dividing onto two hostile camps, there must be something, an area of peace to serve as a moral force and as an instrument of the world peace.

As the gap between Soviet Union and U.S.A. increased, great efforts were made by both countries to persuade Nehru to abandon the path of independent foreign policy, but Nehru always defended it. His foreign policy stance irritated both the sides.

After the surrender of Japan in 1945, Korea had been occupied by U.S. and U.S.S.R. with the 38th parallel forming an artificial dividing line between North Korea and South Korea their zones of occupation. The Korean war that started on 25th June, 1950, was one of the issues which caused a tense political struggle in India as well as abroad, it specially provided a sore spot in the Indo-American relations. It had a great impact on the evolution of the entire foreign policy line of the Indian government. Throughout the crisis, India played the role of a mediator by making full efforts to end the war in Korea. It completely denounced the American aggression on Korea and threat of using an atomic bomb, Indians saw the American action as the corroding element in the shining armor of collective security. There was also a change in Soviet relations towards India, in the last phase of his life in 1952-53, Stalin was slowly beginning to realize that India could play a useful role in the international affairs, seemed to coincide with an increase in tensions in U.S., India relations. At the time of the
Korean Peace Conference held in Geneva in 1954, the Soviet Union recognised the need to invite India in any conference which involved the future of the Asian peoples. While the United States voted against India’s participation in the Korean peace talks. Washington’s decision to sponsor arms aid to Pakistan and to create the South East Asia Treaty Organisation in 1954, under the U.S. leadership, the Soviet Union realised that it was in its interest to support India so as to enable it to withstand the pressures of the Western powers and continued to follow its independent foreign policy. This was symbolised by the signing of Indo-Soviet agreement in February 1955, for the setting up of a steel plant at Bhilai, and later the same year exchange of visits between Nehru on the one hand and the Soviet leaders Khrushchev and Bulganin on the other. The year after Khrushchev and Bulganin’s visit to India, two very important events- the Suez Canal crisis and the Hungarian crisis - took place which tested the U.S.S.R. India relationship.

The Suez crisis revealed the common approach of India and the U.S.S.R. Nehru sharply reacted to the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt. At the London Conference which was convened to settle the Suez Crisis, the Soviet Union supported the proposals made by the Indian delegation, and Indian proposals were described as a plan for just and peaceful settlement of the Suez problem. On the issue of the Hungarian crisis the Soviets were pleased with New Delhi’s initial reaction to the crisis, they became rather irritated later when India called for the entry of the United Nation’s observers into Hungary and self determination for the people of Hungary. But when the Hungarian question was discussed in the U.N. the Indian delegate Krishna Menon did not take an anti-Indian stand.

In January 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine was propounded, which claimed that the withdrawal of Britain and France from Middle East would left a ‘power vacuum’ there which the U.S. had to fill so as to prevent the Soviet Union from entering the area. Jawaharlal Nehru reacted over this doctrine by declaring that if at all there is a power vacuum in the Middle East that had to be filled through their strength, unity and progress. He further said: “if any outside power came
into the West Asia it might give help for some time, but it would sow the seeds of the conflict. Instead of peace reigning, there would be a tussle for supremacy in the region among the foreign powers. The doctrine resulted in the overthrow of the neutralists and pro-Egyptian government of Jordan and an impending Syrian attack on Jordan.

In 1957 Soviet launching of Sputnik-I, the world’s first artificial satellite and Soviet development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, ensued a new round of Soviet American confrontations. It became all riskier because now both sides possessed nuclear weapons. The Berlin crisis of 1958-62 was an open exhibition of this nuclear rivalry.

In 1962 the invasion of Cuba by refugee elements, backed by the U.S. and its decision to impose trade blockade, drove Cuba to seek a number of trade and military agreements with the U.S.S.R. The presence of Soviet military personnel and the information that Soviet had placed guided missiles aimed at the United States in Cuba, made U.S.A. worried. It gave birth to serious military confrontations between the two great powers. All U.N. efforts for conciliation between the two contending powers miserably failed. The crisis was only averted when great wisdom was shown on the part of the Soviet Union when Nikita Khrushchev ordered the removal of the missiles from Cuba which were aiming towards U.S. India showed reluctant attitude even when the U.S. had made gross violation of the International Law and Human Rights. In October, 1962, China invaded India. These two crises made Soviet Union panic with the danger of a military confrontation with United States. By the late 1960s, the U.S.S.R. had developed a nuclear capability sufficient to devastate the United States and Western Europe. The United States had already had such a capacity to devastate the U.S.S.R. and this ‘balance of terror’ made the détente more powerful, which had started with the war in Vietnam in 1950s. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Of 1963, was a turning point in the Cold War. The treaty was accorded considerable
symbolic significance on both sides and seemed to signify that U.S. and Soviet leaders wanted to end a costly risk that was increasing the danger of a real war. In 1968, ninety eight states signed the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (N.P.T.). That was the most promising and most frustrating treaty in the history of efforts to control nuclear weapons. It was monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). But India refused to sign N.P.T. because of its discriminatory provisions. India said that this treaty makes discrimination between a nuclear weapon state and a non-nuclear weapon state, by allowing a nuclear weapon state to continue to proliferate nuclear armaments while non-nuclear weapon states are denied the use of nuclear energy even for peaceful purposes. In 1950s Nehru had stated that India would never use nuclear energy for military purposes. The attempt of super powers to persuade India to sign the N.P.T. through the threat of punishment could not exceed certain restrictions, rooted in the competitive relationship between the Washington and Moscow that took precedence over their consensus on the N.P.T.; neither side could be certain that the other would not try to conclude a covert agreement with New Delhi. Moreover Washington and Moscow attempted to use the nuclear non-proliferation issue to entrench the super power détente, but New Delhi saw no incentive to assist their endeavour. The super powers were continuously pressurising India to sign N.P.T., but India maintained her independence by not signing N.P.T. and made her nuclear option open.

In 1972, Soviet and American leaders reached an agreement on the First Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I). This agreement placed a cap on the quantity of the Soviet and U.S. delivery vehicles, and an accompanying protocol limited the number of anti-ballistic missile systems each side could deploy. No limits were placed on qualitative improvements and the nuclear arms race continued. India’s plan for conducting Peaceful Nuclear Explosion was actually announced in May 1970, this decision was a demonstration of India’s freedom in decision making vis-à-vis super powers, and a reinforcement of her non-alignment
policy. The test was meant to have an impact on the super powers, indicating not only a disapproval of their attitudes towards India in the past, but also a desire to be consulted over matters of regional importance in the future. The Tashkent Agreement, the N.P.T., and the Bangladesh crisis of 1971, particularly made India to decide for conducting the tests. Thus the manner of the super powers’ decision making in the strategic crises confronted by India appeared to have an impact on Mrs. Gandhi’s perceptions. As the crises created greater sensitivity towards security and prestige, she seemed to look favourably upon the contentions promoting the national interest. There were advantages in having a nuclear status because no nuclear state’s territory had ever attacked. So on May 18, 1974, India conducted a nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes. The test could also be seen as a reaffirmation of India’s opposition to the N.P.T. and determination to challenge the discriminatory international system represented by this treaty.

On India’s P.N.E., the U.S., Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said the explosion did not alter the balance of power on the sub-continent, and so it did not warned any change in the United States’ foreign policy in that region. Dr. Kissinger felt that India’s emergence as a peaceful nuclear power need not have any negative impact.

In Moscow there was no sign to use its diplomatic influence on New Delhi. Neither it wanted to face the possibility of losing a major ally by imposing pressure against India’s nuclear policy, and this was probably the circumstance that Moscow confronted with New Delhi. Moscow appeared to have regarded the issue from the perspective of promoting Indo-Soviet ties, in a similar way as Washington appeared to perceive it in the context of Indo-U.S. relations.

The super powers recognised that India’s nuclear stance did not threaten their predominance within the contemporary structure of international power. But in fact the super powers were irritated by the complications that the Indian nuclear tests
added to their contemporary attempts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear arms. The nuclear test was seen by informal sources at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva as a major setback for the United States and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{54}

The Vietnam war which continued around 25 years, from 1950s-1975, was a part of soviet-Americans détente. U.S. concluded that the struggle in Vietnam was not between colonial power and the freedom fighter but rather between anti-Communist and Communist. The way U.S. policy makers looked at the world scenario no other alternative than the U.S. intervention in Vietnam was possible. This U.S. involvement was undertaken with the specific purpose of preventing the expansion of Soviet controlled monolithic communism into the vital Geopolitical and resourceful area of South East Asia. During these 25 years of war from 1950s to 1975, over 50,000 American lives were lost and over $200 billion were spent, but all these expenditures and U.S. sacrifices proved futile as North Vietnamese forces over ran South Vietnam during March-April 1975. Soviet arms help to North Vietnam over ran South Vietnam. Henry Kissinger accused the Soviet Union of ‘breaking the rule of détente’. In so far as the Vietnamese crisis was concerned, India’s consistent efforts had been that the U.S. bombardment should be stopped and be followed by the cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of forces from Vietnam. Although the conflict was viewed through bipolar binoculars, it was also seen as a part of a larger strategic picture that pitted East against the West in geopolitical terms. The Soviets, pointed Vietnam as a classical case of capitalist imperialism and American expansionistic aggressiveness.

Rigid bi-polarity and tense Cold War conditions offered the most conducive atmosphere for non-alignment, obsessed and pre-occupied with the task of securing the obedience of the emerging free nations by force if necessary, both the super powers initially questioned the moral basis and modus operandi of non-alignment. Indian non-alignment was viewed as a camouflage and a matter of time by both Moscow and Washington. In their opinion, it was impossible for the emerging
nations to successfully follow a socialist economy as India did— but the emerging nations with the help of non-alignment resisted the fore of two super powers. The Soviet Union helped India while the relations with the U.S. remained complex.

The relations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. deteriorated since the war in Vietnam and U.S. intervention in it. In 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, in late 1979, nearly 100,000 Soviet troops entered Afghanistan. Soviet’s claimed that the Amin government had invited them into Afghanistan. But in the first wave of Soviet intervention, Amin was murdered, allegedly by Soviet troops. The United States condemned the Soviet actions in Afghanistan in the same terms as the U.S.S.R. had used to describe the U.S. actions in Vietnam. Most of the world nations had criticised the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as vehemently as they had criticised the U.S. presence in Vietnam. The U.S. sought and Pakistan was too willing to offer herself as a ‘front line’ state in the U.S. strategy of keeping military pressure upon the Soviet Union. But the Carter administration first consulted to India and India refused to be a party in such a game plan. India criticised the Soviet invasion and demanded that Soviet soldiers should withdraw from Afghanistan territory as their presence would have extensive negative consequences for the whole region. India abstained when a resolution demanding the ‘immediate unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops in Afghanistan’ was put to the vote in General Assembly. India’s reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, was fairly positive and in accordance with her policy of ‘genuine non-alignment’. India tried to project a balanced policy that in reality had meant carefully apportioning rebuffs as equally as possible to the competing super powers.

The détente between the United States and the Soviet Union did not demonstrate a trend towards an improved strategic environment for India. Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union desired an India which is too powerful, that is self-reliant in her economic development and military capability.
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the Cold War was raised to its high pitch, Americans made Afghanistan, the Soviet Union’s Vietnam. The U.S. began a defense build up to confront the Soviet Union every where in Asia, Africa and Europe. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was based on multiple perceptions, but the Soviet and U.S. perceptions of each other’s actions were fundamentally opposed. The U.S. government’s view of the Soviet actions emphasised only two: that the Soviet Union sought to add to the territory under its influence, and that the U.S.S.R. sought to place itself in a position where it could cut off the West’s oil imports from the Persian Gulf. The Soviet Union argued that it was defending the cause of peace and progress, which not coincidentally furthered Soviet national interest. Whereas the U.S. maintained that the Soviet Union was engaged in aggressive expansionism.

By early 80s, it was apparent to the rulers of Soviet Union that their country needed reforms if it was going to survive. The 1980s clearly saw operation of what Prof. Cohen described as system of balance of power between the U.S.-Pakistan-China on one side and India and the Soviet Union on the other. Since the Indo-Pak war of 1965, the United States had cut off its military relations with India. The U.S. reluctance to accommodate India’s military needs because of Pakistan’s pressure on U.S. and then developing closer relations with the Soviet Union had led India to rely upon the Soviet military hardware to the extent of 70% by early 1980s. But in the changing scenario when Soviet leaders were thinking of reforms India thought of repairing her relations with the U.S. In July 1982, President Ronald Reagan invited Mrs. Gandhi to visit the U.S. Mrs. Gandhi described her visit as “an adventure in search of understanding and friendship.”

With the rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, the situation began to change dramatically. Gorbachev inaugurated a reversal of Cold War policies, with the cooperation of President Reagan, arms reduction agreements were signed.
Gorbachev recognised the serious economic situation and desired to reform it, while intending to perpetuate control by the Communist party. Once he allowed freedom of speech a policy called Glasnost, he suddenly watched the whole society rejected Communism and demanded democracy. The myth of international Communism was shattered. While maintaining a sure hold over Eastern Europe the Soviet Union attempted to gain better relationship with the West, particularly the U.S., both super powers realised the futility of edging towards a nuclear war. Gorbachev also made it clear to the leaders of Eastern European Communist states that Soviet troops would no longer be available to keep them in power. This policy triggered the rapid collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. It began in Poland, spread to Hungary and Czechoslovakia and then to Eastern Germany. The new Soviet democratisation spilled over the rest of the Eastern Europe dramatically. By the end of 1989, the Communist domination had ended, the Soviets also ended their ten year long war in Afghanistan. With the breaching of Berlin wall there was no turning back, on November 9, 1989, East German authorities allowed the opening of the Berlin wall, the destruction of large sections of the wall signaled the end of the Cold War, by October 1990, the East and West Germany were reunited. On July 1, 1991, the Warsaw pact voted itself out of existence and by the end of 1991, the Soviet Union itself had ceased to exist, breaking apart into its constituents and new independent republics - the end of Soviet system itself, finally brought the Cold War to an end and there remained in the world only one super power - the United States.

The end of Cold War had given the United Nations a new lease on life because from the time of its birth the U.N. was merely a tool in the hands of super powers. The U.N. now started to play that role which it had to play decades before.

The impact of Cold War on the newly independent countries like India was very bad, at the time when India should devout all her resources to economic
reconstruction, the Cold War highlighted inter state conflicts, encouraged various
segments within the third world countries which made them for the seizure of
power at the behest of extreme ideologies of one kind or another, and prevented
them from a peaceful settlement of disputes. It accelerated defense expenditure
virtually all over the world. The Cold War was often fought by making several
third world countries spent an inordinately large share of their GNPs on
unproductive defense expenditure. The existence of over large military machines
on the other hand encouraged inter state conflicts at the least provocation. It has
been estimated that during the Cold War almost 300 conflicts, wars and smaller
military engagements took place in the third world.\textsuperscript{56}

The effect of the swings of pendulum were particularly and deeply
experienced by India which had at least thirty years of close bilateral politico
strategic and economic relationship with the Soviet Union, which was a historic
necessity created by the geo-political compulsions as a result of America’s Cold
War policies. With this end of Cold War, the Soviet, American and Indian policy
makers called upon to re-evaluate their bilateral relations. If we peep into history
we will find that India and U.S. more often saw themselves into two opposite
ends in the Geo-political game, since Pakistan was drawn into America led
military alliances, to sub serve her own ends rather than to be a game player in
achieving the U.S. objectives. In 1984, President Reagan himself accepted that
“India is not pro or anti to any other country but instead is pro India, we accept
that position.”\textsuperscript{57}

In the absence of the Cold War and a rival power, the U.S. would
increasingly see India as a regional power to maintain peace and stability in
South Asia. India alone among the Indian Ocean littoral nations have a blue
water navy which can play a major role in maintaining freedom of seas in
cooperation with the U.S. and other interested nations. This was this cooperation
in 1991 Gulf War India provided refueling facilities to the U.S. Air force planes and there was a qualitative change in the Indo-U.S. defense cooperation.

As a matter of fact, U.S. had also set in motion its policy of developing independent military relations with India. The U.S. for its own global role wanted India to move towards greater autonomy in military arena. The first beginning in this area was made during the Rajiv regime when the U.S. and India signed memorandum of understanding (MOU) in 1984 for transfer of technology for dual use. Ever since then, momentum in Indian-American cooperation in strengthening of military relations has been maintained. Earlier main obstacle was the U.S. perception of a close relationship between India and U.S.S.R; Hence the fear of transferred technology falling in the Soviet hands. Now no such fear on ideological grounds exists though the U.S. may still like to safeguard its scientific inventions on commercial grounds. With the end of Cold War, there was greater scope for military cooperation between the two democracies. This cooperation was because the U.S. has seen India as a growing middle power.

The end of cold war did not signaled the end of international strife, old problems remained but they were no longer flourish under the East-West competition. In the Middle East, for example, the weakness of Soviet Union after 1989, meant that such war like states as Iraq and Syria could no longer rely on it for weapons and support. Thus, when Iraq invaded tiny Kuwait in August 1990, it found itself opposed by a whole U.N. coalition of armed forces, including those of Syria. The success of offensive against Iraq rearranged conditions in the Middle East. The United States, the sole super power after the demise of Soviet Union found itself with new allies, it now started seeing its objectives in the region, but for this it was important to bring peace in the West Asian region. It enabled President George Bush and Secretary of State, James Baker, to persuade Israel and its Arab enemies to sit down at the negotiating table to work out a means of living together, the peace talks began in September
1991. India has a deep interest and stake in the security of the region. It participated in various multilateral talks and the working groups to signal her continuing commitment to find a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the West Asian region. India has extended unqualified support to the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), on the basis of the Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, as well as 425, which among other things allowing the legitimate rights of the Palestinians to be achieved and all the states of the region including Israel and Palestine to coexist peacefully within secure and internationally recognised boundaries. India shares a common desire for peace, stability and security in the region. India pledged US $ 3 million assistance to the Palestinians at the International Donors’ Conference, it regularly contributes to the UNRWA, for the benefit of the Palestinian refugees. On the Palestinian refugee problem in a press conference on 11th June 1951, had remarked that “the refugee problem is a problem which should be dealt with from the human aspect, friendly and helpful in every way”. 
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