Appendices
APPENDIX - I

NEHRU'S SPEECH ON JUNE 13, 1936, ON ARABS AND JEWS IN PALESTINE

My expression of sympathy with the Arab national movement and their struggle for freedom has brought me some protests from Jews in India. I venture therefore to state a little more fully what my attitude is to this problem of Palestine.

Few people, I imagine, can withhold their deep sympathy from the Jews for the long centuries of the most terrible oppression to which they have been subjected all over Europe. Fewer still can repress their indignation at the barbarities and racial suppression of the Jews which the Nazis have indulged in during the last few years, and which continue today. Even outside Germany, Jew baiting has become a favourite pastime of various Fascist groups. This revival in an intense form of racial intolerance and race war is utterly repugnant to me and I have been deeply distressed at the sufferings of vast numbers of people of the Jewish race. Many of these unfortunate exiles, with no country or whom to call their own, are known to me, and some I consider it an honour to call my friends.

I approach this question therefore with every sympathy for the Jews. So far as I am concerned the racial or the religious issue does not affect my opinion.

But my reading of war-time and post-war history shows that there was a gross betrayal of the Arabs by British imperialism. The many promises that were made to them by colonel Lawrence and others, on behalf of the British Government, and which resulted in the Arabs helping the British and allied
powers during the war, were consistently ignored after the war was over. All the Arabs, in Syria, Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine, smarted under this betrayal, but the position of the Arabs in Palestine was undoubtedly the worst of all. Having been promised freedom and independence repeatedly from 1915 onwards, suddenly they found themselves converted into a mandatory territory with a new burden added on — the promise of the creation of a national home for the Jews — a burden which almost made it impossible them to realise independence.

The Jews have a right to look to Jerusalem and their Holy Land and to have access to them. But the position after the Balfour Declaration was very different. A new state within a state was sought to be created in Palestine, an ever-growing state with a backing of British imperialism behind it, and the hope was held out that this new Jewish state would, in the near future, become so powerful in the whole of Palestine. Zionist policy aimed at this domination and worked for it, though, I believe, some sections of Jewish opinion were opposed to this aggressive attitude. Inevitably, the Zionists oppose the Arabs and looked for protection and support to the British Government.

Such case as the Zionists had might be called a moral one, their ancient associations with their Holy Land and their present reverence for it. One may sympathise with it. But what of the Arabs? For them also it was a holy land — both for the Muslims and the Christian Arabs. For thirteen hundred years or more they had lived there and all their national and racial interests had taken strong roots there. Palestine was not an empty land fit for colonisation by outsiders. It was a well populated and full land with little room for large numbers of colonists from abroad. Is it any wonder that the Arabs objected to this intrusion? And their objection grew as they realised that the aim of British imperialism was to make the Arab–Jew problem a permanent obstacle to their independence. We in India have sufficient experience of similar obstacles being placed in the way of our freedom by British imperialism.
It is quite possible that a number of Jews might have found welcome in Palestine and settled down there. But when the Zionists came with the avowed object of pushing out the Arabs from all places of importance and of dominating the country, they could hardly be welcomed. And the fact that they have brought much money from outside and stated industries and schools and universities, can not diminish the opposition of the Arabs, who see with dismay the prospect of their becoming permanently a subject race, dominated, politically and economically, by the Zionists and the British Government.

The problem of Palestine is thus essentially a nationalist one—a people struggling for independence against imperialists control and exploitation. It is not a racial or religious one. Perhaps some of our Muslim fellow-countrymen extend their sympathy to the Arabs because of the religious bond. But the Arabs are wiser and they lay stress only on nationalism and independence, and it is well to remember that all Arabs, Christian as well as Muslims, stand together in this struggle against British imperialism. Indeed some of the most prominent leaders of the Arabs in this national struggle have been Christians.

If the Jews had been wise they would have thrown in their lot with the Arab struggle for independence. Instead they have chosen to side with British imperialism and to see its protection against the people of the country. Ultimately therefore the struggle revolves itself into one of nationalism versus imperialism, and all other minor aspects of it, such as the Arab–Jew problem, though important today, have little historical significance. In the same way the communal problem, spoilt child of British imperialism, looms large in India today, but in the wide range of history it loses all importance.

India and Palestine have both their national problems and both struggle for independence; they have something in common in this struggle and the opponent is the same. In both cases, as elsewhere, nationalism comes into contact with new
social forces and it affected thereby, and gradually takes shape as an aspect of the world problem, which affects us all alike whether we realise it or not. We must therefore understand each other and sympathise with each other.

As we take this long view the Arab-Jew question fades into insignificance. The Arabs of Palestine will no doubt gain their independence, but this is likely to be a part of the large unity of Arab peoples for which the countries of Western Asia have so long hankered after, and this again will be part of the new order which will emerge out of present day chaos. The Jews, if they are wise, will except the teaching of history, and make friends with the Arabs and throw their weight on the side of the independence of Palestine, and not seek a position of advantage and dominance with the help of imperialist power.

I trust, therefore, that the people of India will send their warmest greetings and good wishes to the Arabs of Palestine in their brave struggle for freedom against a powerful adversary.
APPENDIX - II

NEHRU'S SPEECH ON PALESTINE DAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1936

Political India is full today of talk of the coming provincial elections and candidates for these elections are cropping up everywhere. As the days go by we shall probably hear more and more of these elections and the air will be full of sound and fury which always accompany them. Other questions also occupy our minds such as the communal question or even the petty controversy about Hindi and Urdu. And yet how petty all these are before the mighty problems of poverty and unemployment—the poverty that crushes our millions, the unemployment that has us by the throat. Inevitably we must think of these problems for our sphere of thought and action is India.

But to confine ourselves to Indian problems is not good enough, it is not even sufficient for our own national purposes or our struggle for freedom. Every tyro in public life knows that the politics and economics of different countries are related to each other, that the world hangs together today as it has never done before, and the great problems we have to face are essentially world problems. To ignore this world aspect of any major issue is to lose perspective and invite error.

Therefore let us look round the world today with all its conflict and tension and cruelty and unhappiness, and behind all, its vast questioning. We meet today especially to think of the little country of Palestine and of its troubles. In a world view this problem of Palestine has relatively little importance for bigger things are happening elsewhere. And yet it has an intrinsic importance of its own and it throws a light on the working of imperialism from which we ourselves
suffer. Therefore it is right that we should consider it and send our greetings to those who are struggling for freedom there.

But before we turn our thoughts to Palestine I should like to take you to Spain for a while for that will give us a broader view of the world stage. It is in Spain today that the most vital happenings are taking place, frightful and terrible events, of enormous consequence to the future of Europe and the world. Our fate in India is bound up with them more than we realise.

What has happened in Spain? Some months ago there were normal democratic elections there and as a result a popular radical party—a joint popular front—came into power. They formed a Government of a liberal democratic variety. It was not a Communist or even a Socialist Government. There was not a single Communist or socialist in it. They started with a programme of liberal reform to take Spain out of the feudal and reactionary ruts in which it had lived for so long. They made good progress, and then suddenly there was a military rebellion, headed by the army chiefs and other reactionaries. And this rebellion first started not in Spain, but in Morocco with the aid of non-Spanish troops. It was a rebellion against law and order—words so dear to the British Government—against the constituted government of the country, against a moderate liberal regime.

How did these military bosses dare to raise the flag of rebellion? It is clear enough now. They did it with the material aid of the Fascist countries, of Germany and Italy and, it is interesting to note, financial aid from the big financiers of the city of London.

The Spanish Government and the people were taken aback. It was terribly difficult for unorganised and improperly armed masses to face an organised and well equipped army in rebellion. And this was why the rebels expected an easy victory. But the Spanish people rose at the bidding of their popular government
and without discipline or proper arms they faces bravely the rebel armies, most of which consisted of Moroccan troops. There was a mass levy of the people, even boys and girls rushed to the rescue of their hard-won liberty. We saw a strange sight — these masses fighting against regular armies and holding them often in check.

The reactions in other countries were noteworthy. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy were entirely on the side of the rebels and gave them every help. France sympathised with the Spanish Government but dared not help. In England great newspapers, like the Times, frankly sympathised with the rebels, thus indicating clearly the attitude of the British Government and the British ruling classes. British financiers rejoiced at the victories of the rebels. European Governments evolved a policy of non-intervention which meant in effect that the Spanish Government could not be helped, but the rebels could draw aid from outside.

And so this terrible tussle goes on in Spain with every thing weighted in favour of the rebels. And yet the ordinary people, men and women, boys and girls, are keeping their end up and giving their lives in thousands to prevent their country from falling under a bloody and most reactionary tyranny.

In Spain today we see clearly the terrible conflict of the forces of progress and the forces of reaction, the conflict which is latent all over the world. On the issue of this conflict depends whether Europe and the world will be dominated by Fascism or not. On that issue depends vast and bloody war all over the world. The triumph of the rebel means the strangling of France by three Fascist countries surrounding her. It means that Fascism will make a triumphant attempt at world dominion in co-operation with the Fascism of Japan.

In this vital issue we find the ruling classes and government of Britain definitely favouring Fascism. We find imperialist Britain with her much vaunted
democracy sympathising with those who are trying to crush democracy in Spain. For it must be remembered that the struggle in Spain is not between Communism or Socialism and Fascism, but between democracy and a cruel military Fascism.

This is not really surprising for essentially Imperialism and Fascism are of one family and if a crisis comes they stand together. All over the world today they oppose the forces of progress—in Europe of social progress, in India and other subject countries of even political progress. Between imperialist and Fascist powers there is also inherent conflict for many of them want a greater share in the spoils of exploitation. But despite this mutual conflict they sympathise with and aid each other as against the social urge to freedom and the nationalist struggle for political freedom. And thus we find the Indian struggle for independence a part of this world struggle against Imperialism and Fascism. So also the struggle that is going on against British Imperialism in Palestine.

We must have this larger and clearer view or else we shall lose ourselves in a maze and fail to understand events. But if we have this to guide us and to provide us with a yard measure we shall be able to judge of happenings correctly and we shall know which group or individual is on this side of the struggle or that. In India we find sometimes persons posing as experts on foreign affairs expressing sympathy for the rebel cause in Spain or Fascism generally, and some of our newspapers unthinkingly accept this outlook. Essentially this is propaganda for the Fascist and reactionary cause. It is not surprising that reactionaries in India should sympathise with reactionaries elsewhere.

In Palestine the problem seems to be one of Arabs and Jews, and some of our Muslim friends here look upon it as a religious problem demanding sympathy for their co-religionists. That is a wrong and misleading outlook. It is a problem of a growing nationalism desiring freedom and being suppressed by imperialism. In this process, British imperialism, as in India, has tried to play off one
community against another and set the Jews against the Arabs. Like our own communal problem, they have sought to produce a communal problem in Palestine. So also the French Government have done in Syria. We must learn from this what the true genesis of this communal problem is in subject countries and try to remove the root cause.

It is true that at present there is ill-will and conflict between the Arabs and Jews in Palestine. It is also true that a true solution will come by an understanding between them based on the freedom of the country. The Jews have been and are the victims of a cruel Fascism and we must feel for their sufferings. It is a misfortune that they should allow themselves to be exploited in Palestine by British imperialism. Their future in Palestine lies in co-operation with the Arabs and in recognition of the fact that Palestine is and must continue to be essentially an Arab country. If that is admitted co-operation is easy and Jews will be welcomed in Palestine, as well as in Trans-Jordan, to help, as they are in a position to do, in the development of the country. Arabs and Jews have cooperated in the past and lived together as friends. There is no reason why they should not do so again.

For the moment the immediate issue is the fresh determination of British imperialism to crush the Arab movement. Large additional British armies are being sent to Palestine almost to conquer the country afresh. Martial law will flourish there. Our sympathies and good wishes must go out to the people of Palestine in this hour of their distress. The crushing of their movement is a blow to our nationalist strength as well as to theirs. We hang together in this world struggle for freedom.

I am aware that outrages and regrettable happenings have taken place in Palestine. We must disapprove of them for they tarnish and weaken a good cause.

It also know that various feudal elements are trying to exploit the nationalist
sentiment to their own advantage. But, in spite of all this, let us remember that essentially the struggle is one of Arab nationalism seeking freedom against British imperialism, and all the power of that imperialism is trying to crush it. It can not ultimately be crushed for nationalism and the will to freedom survive.

But though we send our sympathy and good wishes to the people of Palestine, the real way to help is to play our own part worthily in our own freedom struggle in India. That is but another, and perhaps the most important, aspect of the great struggle against world imperialism. It is absurd for people to talk of sympathy for the Arabs, and then cooperate with British imperialism in India.

For us therefore the problem becomes one of carrying on our own struggle for independence. All those who stress other and smaller aspects, like the communal aspect, divert attention from the real issue. In this struggle we shall waste our energy and injure the cause if we think in terms of minor improvements with the help of that very imperialism which we seek to combat. In the congress election manifesto this vital background of our struggle has been emphasised. This manifesto has been welcomed by the country as a whole, though there are some people who have grown angry over it. We see here the essential difference between our great organisation standing for anti-imperialism and certain principles, and others who have no clear vision and who always think in terms of individuals and petty reforms or communal favours. If the country wants freedom it has only one course open to it — to line up with the Congress. Our doors are open to all on this basis; we are not exclusive. But those who think in terms of cooperation with British imperialism have no common ground with us. They may be estimable people, as many of them are, but the question is not of individuals but of principles. And in the great world crisis that overshadow the horizon, it is essential that we should offer a strong and united front to the forces of imperialism and reaction. Only the Congress offers that front.
The Congress attitude is clear. Only in one matter—the question of accepting office under the new constitution—is it still undecided. My own view about this has been repeatedly stated and I hold by it with the same conviction as ever. It is that we must not accept offices or ministries or else we help in working the new act. This flows naturally from the Congress Manifesto and I trust that when the time comes, this decision will be taken.
APPENDIX - III

NEHRU’S SPEECH AT THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY (LEGISLATIVE)
DECEMBER 4, 1947

Sir, I welcome this occasion. Although we are discussing this subject of foreign affairs not directly but by way of a cut motion, nevertheless, it is a novel occasion for this House and I think it is good that we realise what it conveys.

It means ultimately that we are entering into the international field, not only by going into conferences and the like, but by really putting international questions before the country, before this House for its decision. There is no immediate question before this House today. But undoubtedly as time goes on, the major international questions will have to be decided by this House.

Listening to the debate, to the speeches made by Honourable Members, I find, as was perhaps natural, that there was no immediate issue, no particular question for discussion, but rather pious hopes, vague ideals and sometimes a measure of, let us say, denunciation of things that had happened in the world. It has been a vague debate, with nothing pointed about it to which one could attach oneself. Many of the Honourable Members have been good enough to speak gently and generously of what has been done in the realm of foreign affairs on behalf of the Government of India during the past year. I am grateful to them, but may I say in reply that I am in complete disagreement with them?

I think the Government of India during the past year has not done what it should have done. That, perhaps, has not been so much the fault of the Government of India as such, but rather of circumstances. Anyway, what we have envisaged that we ought to do, we have not been able to do, largely because other circumstances arose in this country which have prevented its being done.
We are not out of those difficulties, internal and other. We have not had a free hand in our external relations, and therefore, I would beg the House to judge of this period in the context of what has been happening in this country, not only during the past unhappy three or four months, but in the course of the past year when we lived in the middle of the internal conflict and confusion which drained away our energy and did not leave us time to attend to other matters.

That has been the dominant feature of our politics during the past year and undoubtedly that has affected our foreign policy in the sense of our not giving enough time and energy to it. Nevertheless, I think we have advanced in that field. Again, it is difficult to say how you measure advance in such a field. My Honourable friend, Dr. Khare, was critical of various things, as he has very right to be, and his criticism took the shape of a written speech to which your attention, Sir, was not drawn! I was glad of the Honourable Dr. Khare’s intrusion in this debate, because the debate was getting rather heavy and he brought a touch of comedy and humour into it as well as unreality. When the Honourable Member represented the Government in this House, it was a little difficult to attach much importance to what he said. I suppose now it is less difficult to do so, or a little more difficult to do so! So I will not venture to say anything or to reply to what he said because it seems to me totally inconsequential and without any meaning.

But coming to other subjects, the main subject in foreign policy today is vaguely talked of in terms of “Do you belong to this group or that group?” that is an utter simplification of issues and it is all very well for the Honourable Maulana to hold forth that India will go to war under this banner or that banner. But that surely is not the way that a responsible House or a responsible country views the situation.
We have proclaimed during this past year that we will not attach ourselves to any particular group. That has nothing to do with neutrality or passivity or anything else. If there is a big war, there is no particular reason why we should jump into it. Nevertheless, it is a little difficult nowadays in world wars to be neutral. Any person with any knowledge of international affairs knows that. The point is not what will happen when there is war. Are we going to proclaim to the world, taking the advice of Maulana Hasrat Mohani, that when wars come, we stand by Russia? Is that his idea of foreign policy or any policy? That shows to me an amazing ignorance of how foreign affairs can be conducted. We are not going to join a war if we can help it: and we are going to join the side which is to our interest when the time comes to make the choice. There the matter ends.

But talking about foreign policies, the House must remember that these are not just empty struggles on a chess board. Behind them lie all manner of things. Ultimately, foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy, her foreign policy will be rather vague, rather inchoate, and will be groping. It is well for us to say that we stand for peace and freedom and yet that does not convey much to anybody, except a pious hope. We do stand for peace and freedom. I think there is something to be said for it. There is some meaning when we say that we stand for the freedom of Asian countries and for the elimination of imperialistic control over them. There is some meaning in that.

Undoubtedly it has some substance, but a vague statement that we stand for peace and freedom by itself has no particular meaning, because every country is prepared to say the same thing, whether it means it or not. What then do we stand for? Well, you have to develop this argument in the economic field. As it happens today, in spite of the fact that we have been for sometime in authority as a Government, I regret that we have not produce any constructive economic scheme or economic policy so far. Again my excuse is that we have been going
through such amazing times which have taken up all our energy and attention that it was difficult to do so. Nevertheless, we shall have to do so, that will govern our foreign policy, more than all the speeches in this House.

We have sought to avoid foreign entanglements by not joining one bloc or the other. The natural result has been that neither of these big blocs looks on us with favour. They think that we are undependable, because we can not be made to vote this way or that way.

Last year when our delegation went to the United Nations, it was the first time that a more or less independent delegation went from India. It was looked at a little askance. They did not know what it was going to do. When they found that we acted according to our own will, they did not like it. We were unpopular last year at the United Nations. I do not mean individually, but in regard to our policy. They could not quite make out what we were or what we were aiming at. There was a suspicion in the minds of the first group that we were really allied to the other group in secret, though we were trying to hide the fact, and the other group thought that we were allied to the first group in secret though we were trying to hide the fact.

This year there was a slight change in this attitude. We did many things which both the groups disliked, but the comprehension came to them that we were not really allied to either group, that we were trying to act according to our own lights and according to the merits of the dispute as they seemed to us. They did not like that, of course, because the position today is that there is so much passion and so much fear and suspicion of each other between these great rival powers and groups that anybody who is not with them is considered against them. So they did not like what we did in many instances: nevertheless, they respected us much more, because they realised what we had an independent policy, that we were not going to be dragooned this way or that, that we might make a mistake just like anyone else, nevertheless, we were going to stick to our
own policy and programme, so that while possibly we irritated some of our friends even a little more than last year, we got on much better with everybody, because they understood that we did stand for something.

To give the House an instance of how we acted, take the Palestine affair which has given rise and will give rise to a great deal of trouble. We took up a certain attitude in regard to it which was roughly a federal state with autonomous parts. It was opposed to both the other attitudes which were before the United Nations. One was partition which has now been adopted: the other was a unitary state. We suggested a federal state with, naturally, an Arab majority in charge of the federal state but with autonomy for the other regions—Jewish regions.

After a great deal of thought we decided that this was not only a fair and equitable solution of the problem, but the only real solution of the problem. Any other solution would have meant fighting and conflict. Nevertheless, our solution—which as the House will remember was the solution given in the minority report of the Palestine Committee—did not find favour with most people in the United Nations. Some of the major powers were out for partition; they, therefore, pressed for it and ultimately got it. Others were so keen on the unitary state idea and were so sure of preventing partition at any rate or preventing a two thirds majority in favour of partition that they did not accept our suggestion. When during the last few days somehow partition suddenly became inevitable and votes veered round to it, owing to the pressure of some of the great powers, it was realised that the Indian solution was probably the best and an attempt was made in the last 48 hours to bring forward the Indian solution, not by us but by those who had wanted a unitary state.

It was then too late. There were procedural difficulties and many of the persons who might have accepted this solution had already pledged themselves to partition. And so ultimately partition was decided upon by a two-thirds majority,
with a large number abstaining from voting, with the result again of trouble now and a great deal of trouble in the future in the Middle East.

I point this out to the House as an instance, that in spite of considerable difficulty and being told by many of our friends on either side that we must line up this way or that, we refused to do so that I have no doubt that ours would have brought about the best solution.

This applies to many other things. But inevitably it means that to some extent we have to plough a lonely furrow in the United Nations and at international conferences of this type. Nonetheless, that is the only honourable and right position for us to take and I am quite sure that by adopting that position, we shall ultimately gain in international prestige, that is to say, when we take a long view of the situation, not a short view of getting immediately a vote here and there.

I have no doubt that fairly soon, in the course of two or three years, the world will find this attitude justified and that India will not only be respected by the major protagonists in the struggle for power, but a large number of the smaller nations which today are rather helpless will probably look to India more than to other countries for a lead in such matters.

May I in this connection say that during this last session of the United Nations General Assembly, many very difficult and very controversial issues were raised, and our delegation had to face extraordinarily intricate situations? I should like to pay a tribute to our delegation, especially to the leader of the delegation. The Honourable members often put questions about the appointment of Ambassadors, members of delegations and the like and rightly so, because the House should be interested in such important appointments. May I say to this House that nothing is more difficult than to make these appointments, because they are not just appointments of able persons, but appointments of particular
persons to particular places where they must fit in, which is an extraordinarily difficult thing?

In the key places of the world the ideal Ambassador must be some kind of a superman. It is so difficult now not only to understand the intricacies—that is not difficult,—but to remain friends with everybody and yet to advance your cause. After all we have in the past discussed foreign affairs from the outside, in other assemblies, or here perhaps, rather in an academic way, rather as in a college debating society. That is, we talked of high policies, but we did not come to grips with them when we had to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a question and face the consequences.

If the House will forgive my saying so, even in today’s debate many of the speeches were of an academic kind which did not take into account the vital questions which concern the world today, which may mean peace or war. But when the House does have to face the question and take a decision which may lead to war or peace, when one comes face to face with realities, then one can not rely merely on idealistic principles.

Foreign affairs are utterly idealistic today. A false step, a false phrase, makes all the difference. The first thing that an Ambassador of ours has to learn is to shut his mouth and give up public or even private speaking. It is not a habit which we have developed in our past careers—that of being completely silent. Yet this habit has to be developed, and in private one has to be silent lest what one says injures the cause of the nation, creates international ill-will.

It is in this background that I should like the House to consider international affairs—this realistic background, this notion that it is not merely some naughty men playing about and quarrelling with one another, some statesmen in America and the U.S.S.R. or British imperialism that we can not get rid of the habit.
To come to grips with the subject, in its economic, political and various other aspects, to try to understand it, is what ultimately matters. Whatever policy you may lay down, the art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country. We may talk about international goodwill and mean what we say. We may talk about peace and freedom and earnestly mean what we say. But in the ultimate analysis, a government functions for the good of the country it governs and no government dare do anything which in the short run or long run is manifestly to the disadvantage of that country.

Therefore, whether a country is imperialistic or communist, its foreign minister thinks primarily of the interests of their country regardless of other consequences, or take a short distance view. Others may think that in the long-term policy the interest of another country is as important to them as that of their own country. The interest of peace is more important, because if war comes everyone suffers, so that in the long distance view, self interest may itself demand a policy of co-operation with other nations, goodwill for other nations, as indeed it does demand.

Every intelligent person can see that if you have a narrow national policy it may enthuse the multitude for the moment, just as the communal cry has done, but it is bad for the nation and it is bad internationally, because you lose sight of the ultimate good and thereby endanger your own good. Therefore, you propose to look after India's interests in the context of world co-operation and world peace, in so far as world peace can be preserved.

We propose to keep on the closest terms of friendship with other countries unless they themselves create difficulties. We shall be friends with America. We intend co-operating with the United States of America and we intend co-operating fully with the Soviet Union. We have had, as the House
knows, a distinguished Representative of the United States here for some time past within a week or two we shall have a distinguished Representative of the Soviet Union here, in the Soviet embassy which is being opened in New Delhi.

I do not want to say much more at this stage about foreign affairs partly for lack of time, partly because it is a little difficult to discuss these matters. Some of the Honourable members might, perhaps want to talk about what should be done in China, Japan, Siam and Peru, but I fear it would be a little irresponsible of me to talk about these various matters. Naturally India is interested in Asian countries even more than the rest of the world. We have had an Asian Conference, and at this moment we have a distinguished visitor here, the Prime Minister of Burma.

May I say in this connection that some people are under a misapprehension? They think that we are conducting special negotiations with the Burmese delegation here. That is not quite true. It is primarily a visit of courtesy. At the same time, of course, we have broadly explored various questions, discussed various matters of common concern, not with the idea of suddenly coming to decisions in regard to these intricate matters now, but rather with a view to laying the foundations for future talks. May I also say that Prime Minister of Burma is interested, as many of us have been, in closer association, not only between Burma and India, but between various other countries of Asia also? We have discussed that also, again not with a view to coming suddenly to decisions, because these things take a little time to grow. It all indicates the new spirit of Asia which wants Asian countries to draw closer together in their own defence and to promote world peace.

Coming to another part of this cut motion in regard to Indians in the British Commonwealth, this is an old subject and a painful subject. I entirely agree with any criticism that may be made that we have not been able to do anything substantial in this direction. Something has been done in Canada and
elsewhere, but nothing substantial has yet been done. Now, the odd thing is that this subject becomes more and more difficult to deal with and not easier. Indians have gone to the British Colonies and Dominions in the past in various capacities, as merchants, traders, workers, indentured labourers and the rest.

The history of Indian emigration abroad, including that of the humblest of those who went from India, reads almost like a romance. How these Indians went abroad! Not even citizens of a free country, working under all possible disadvantages, yet they made good wherever they went. They worked hard for themselves, and for the country of their adoption. They made good themselves and profited the country they had gone to.

It is a romance and it is something which India can be proud of, and may I say most of all of those poor indentured labourers who went out under unhappy conditions, through their labour, gradually worked their way up? It is also true that India is a country, which in spite of everything, has abounding vitality and spreads abroad. It rather frightens our neighbour countries, just as china which is also a country with abounding vitality and an abounding population. We spread. We tend to overwhelm others both by virtue of our numbers, and sometimes by virtue of the economic position we might develop there.

That naturally frightens others who may not have that vitality in them, and they want to protect themselves against it. Questions then arise of vested interests which India has developed or Indians have developed there. Such questions have arisen, and while on the one hand we are obviously intent on protecting the interests of Indians abroad, on the other hand we can not protect any vested interests which injure the cause of the country they are in. there is that difficulty. Nevertheless, undoubtedly we shall try to do our best to protect all legitimate interests.
Now, one word more. I will not take more of the time of the House. An Honourable Member, Mr. Kamath I think, referred one of the minor headaches I have had to suffer from is a relatively new tendency in old and new newspapers alike to publish without check or hindrance the most amazing lies. It is impossible to keep pace with it. It is undesirable to go about contradicting every little thing they say. It just cannot be done, and new types of papers and journals which have been inflicted by some I have come across, which do not raise either the stature of Indian journalism or anything else. So many of these stories are untrue. I think I read somewhere in a Delhi paper about the U.P. Government presenting Rs. 20,000 and 200 sari's to Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit on her departure to Moscow. I read all manner of the most malicious and unfounded and false statements in these papers about Mr. Asaf Ali.

Now, coming to the question of cost, the figure Mr. Kamath mentioned, 5 lakhs, have of course no relation to the fact. I do not know what the figure is.

I suggest that if Mr. Kamath makes any statements, he might investigate the facts before he makes them.

What I should like this House to remember is that these ambassadorial appointments have to keep up a certain dignity and a certain status. It is not good our sending an Ambassador and not giving him a house to live in, not giving him furniture in the house, not providing him with the minimum wherewith he can meet and entertain other diplomats properly and decently. I doubt if any country, big or small, is conducting its ambassadorial establishments so cheaply as we are doing.

A great deal of criticism has been made about our ambassador in Moscow getting furniture from Stockholm. Well, how a house has to be furnished in Moscow, of course, Honourable members do not realise. It just is not possible to furnish easily in Moscow. You get an empty house. We thought of sending things
from India, but it was almost a physical impossibility unless to spend vast sums on aeroplanes to carry chairs and tables from here. Of course, it could have been furnished alternatively with Russian furniture. The Russian people, and all credit to them for this, ever since the war, are so intent on doing what they consider to be the fundamental things, that they refuse to waste their time on the accessories of life. They have to rebuild their country after the most horrible suffering and damage suffered in the war and they are concentrating on major undertakings. They go about in patched-up clothes and broken down shoes. It does not matter, but they are building dams, reservoirs and factories and the rest which they consider more important. So it is not easy to get any of these small accessories of life for the moment.

The only things you can get in Russia are antique pieces of Czarist days which are frightfully expensive. The result is that our Embassy in Moscow had to go to Stockholm for its chairs and tables, and as these were urgently required—office equipment, etc.—our Ambassador had to go there. But, of course, the visit to Stockholm was not merely, members of the House should realise, to buy furniture. When an Ambassador goes somewhere, that Ambassador does other work too, and any kind of shopping that might be done in incidental.

I am grateful to the House for their kind sentiments and their expressions of goodwill for our attempt to follow a certain rather vague policy in regard to foreign affairs. I wish it were a more definite policy. I think it is growing more definite, and in this connection may I say that at present moment no country, including the Big Powers with their long traditions in foreign affairs, has anything which could be called a precise and definite foreign policy, because the world itself is in a fluid condition. Of course, if you call this a definite policy, that of one great country looking with bitter dislike upon another and suspecting it,—that may be the foundation of a policy, but that is not a policy, it is mere passion and prejudice. Otherwise there is hardly any very definite policy in any country
and each country is trying to fit in its policy from day to day to changing circumstances.
Our general view in regard to West Asia has been frequently stated. Our approach is not inimical to any country there. It is friendly to all countries, but inevitably our sympathies are with the Arab countries and Arab nationalism which represents today the urge of the people. Also according to our general policy as well as our views on the present situation in West Asia, we do not accept that foreign troops should be used in any territory in the area in the circumstances prevailing there. We are convinced that there can be no settlement and no return to normality till foreign troops are removed from the area. Sometimes it is stated that these countries should be treated like tender infants and be under the guardianship of bigger countries. But it is quite clear that they do not like this offer of guardianship and patronage, and in fact resent such suggestions.

One has to take, to some extent, a historical view of the developments in West Asia. For hundreds of years these countries in West Asia were under Turkish domination. They came out of it at the end of the First World War. The Western powers decided what they liked about these countries without really caring much for the wishes of the people. Probably there was no organised way for the people to express their views. New nations were created, and the contacts of the Western powers were with the rulers of their own creation or, chiefly, with the landed gentry. There were few contacts with people. The whole period between the two world wars was one when Arab nationalism was trying to push out this foreign domination and was gradually making some progress in that direction. Then came the war and the post-war period, when much has happened in the various countries of the Middle East.
The major fact in West Asia is the growth of Arab nationalism in a very powerful, resurgent way. Egypt took the lead in this matter and, under the wise leadership of President Nasser, has played a very important part. Nasser, in fact became the most prominent symbol of Arab nationalism. This fact, which was patent, was neither liked nor appreciated by many powers, and an attempt was made to split the Arab countries, in fact Arab nationalism.

The House may remember the talk about building up the "northern tier defence" and about the Baghdad Pact. The motives were supposed to be to protect these countries from attack or invasion from the Soviet Union and to give them security and peace. As a matter of fact, the result was quite the contrary. The troubles of these countries only increased because of such an approach. The Arab countries, at any rate the Governments, were divided—some in the Baghdad Pact and some outside it. While the Governments carried on a cold war against each other, the people almost in every Arab country were powerfully affected by this tide of Arab nationalism. Thus in the countries associated with the Baghdad Pact there was a hiatus between the Governments and the people, the people looking more and more towards Arab nationalism and the Governments looking in another direction and rather ranged against the spirit of Arab nationalism. How big this hiatus was can be seen from the coup d'etat in Baghdad which surprised everyone. I believe it surprised even the people in Iraq and Egypt. The surprise was not essentially that it took place but the speed with which it took place and the complete success which attended it. It showed how utterly divorced from public opinion the Government of Iraq was. When the change came, it brought tremendous relief all over Iraq, and the people flocked to the side of the new Government. So this attempt at not recognizing the spirit of Arab nationalism, even trying to come in its way and obstructing it, really achieved the opposite effect—it encouraged nationalism as such an approach will inevitably do. This has resulted in the Arab nations coming nearer to one another and will no doubt bring about a great deal of co-operation between them. It was said that some
kind of an Arab empire was being built up, which was dangerous. I do not know about the future, but I see no empire, much less than Arab empire.

The theory of the vacuum is sometimes advanced, as if the removal of the influence of some great powers must necessarily be filled in by some other powers. It is an extraordinary appraisal of the situation which does not recognise the effect of Arab nationalism which has become such a dominant force.

We are convinced that any effective solution of the problems of West Asia must be based on the recognition of the dominant urge and force of Arab nationalism. Any settlement must have the goodwill and co-operation of the Arab nations. The need of the European countries for oil is patent, but there should be no difficulty in arriving at a friendly arrangement which ensures the supply of oil. However, the presence of foreign forces of any kind in this area will be a constant irritant, leading to trouble. Peace in this area, as indeed anywhere else, will come if the area is removed from the orbit of the cold war. Every one of the Arab countries has tremendous problems of development to face. If the threat of war is removed from them, they will apply themselves to these problems and become a source of strength to the forces of peace.

There is another aspect of the West Asian problem which can not be ignored. This is the continuing element of danger in the relations between the Arab countries and Israel. Ever since Israel came into existence, it has been a source of constant irritation to the Arab countries. The invasion of Egypt by Israel two years ago is fresh in our memory. Apart from this, there is the big problem of the old Palestine refugees. The Arab countries have looked upon Israel as an outpost from which their freedom might at any time be threatened. Israel, on the other hand, fears the Arab countries which surrounded it. There can be no real peace in the area till this difficult problem is settled in a satisfactory way. Naturally, a settlement can be reached only with the goodwill of the countries of this area. There can be no settlement by war which, if it occurs, may well
become a major war. I do not suggest that any attempt should, or can, be made to deal with this problem now. The question should not be raised at this stage, but will have to wait for some time. Only then the other problems of West Asia have advanced towards a solution and the passions have cooled to some extent can this difficult problem be tackled.
APPENDIX - V


'A'

The General Assembly,

Having met in special session at the request of the mandatory Power to constitute and instruct a special committee to prepare for the consideration of the question of the future government of Palestine at the second regular session;

Having constituted a Special Committee and instructed it to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and to prepare proposals for the solution of the problem, and

Having received and examined the report of the Special Committee (document A/364) including a number of unanimous recommendations and a plan of partition with economic union approved by the majority of the Special Committee,

Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations;

Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory Power that it plans to complete its evacuation of Palestine by 1 August 1948;

Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below;

Requests that
(a) The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation;

(b) The Security Council consider, if circumstances during the transitional period require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council should supplement the authorisation of the General Assembly by taking measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution;

(c) The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution;

(d) The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilities envisaged for it in this plan;

*Calls upon* the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect;

*Appeals* to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations, and

*Authorises* the Secretary-General to reimburse travel and subsistence expenses of the members of the Commission referred to in Part I, Section B, paragraph 1 below, on such basis and in such form as he may determine most appropriate in the circumstances, and to provide the Commission with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the Commission by the General Assembly.
The General Assembly

Authorises the Secretary-General to draw from the Working Capital Fund a sum not to exceed $2,000,000 for the purposes set forth in the last paragraph of the resolution on the future government of Palestine.

[At its hundred and twenty-eighth plenary meeting on 29 November 1947 the General Assembly, in accordance with the terms of the above resolution [181 A], elected the following members of the United Nations Commission on Palestine: Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama and Philippines.]

PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION

PART I

Future constitution and government of Palestine

A. TERMINATION OF MANDATE, PARTITION AND INDEPENDENCE

1. The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.

2. The armed forces of the mandatory Power shall be progressively withdrawn from Palestine, the withdrawal to be completed as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.

The mandatory Power shall advise the Commission, as far in advance as possible, of its intention to terminate the Mandate and to evacuate each area.

The mandatory Power shall use its best endeavours to ensure than an area situated in the territory of the Jewish State, including a seaport and hinterland adequate to
provide facilities for a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated at the earliest possible date and in any event not later than 1 February 1948.

3. Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in part III of this plan, shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948. The boundaries of the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem shall be as described in parts II and III below.

4. The period between the adoption by the General Assembly of its recommendation on the question of Palestine and the establishment of the independence of the Arab and Jewish States shall be a transitional period.

B. STEPS PREPARATORY TO INDEPENDENCE

1. A Commission shall be set up consisting of one representative of each of five Member States. The Members represented on the Commission shall be elected by the General Assembly on as broad a basis, geographically and otherwise, as possible.

2. The administration of Palestine shall, as the mandatory Power withdraws its armed forces, be progressively turned over to the Commission; which shall act in conformity with the recommendations of the General Assembly, under the guidance of the Security Council. The mandatory Power shall to the fullest possible extent coordinate its plans for withdrawal with the plans of the Commission to take over and administer areas which have been evacuated.

In the discharge of this administrative responsibility the Commission shall have authority to issue necessary regulations and take other measures as required. The mandatory Power shall not take any action to prevent, obstruct or delay the implementation by the Commission of the measures recommended by the General Assembly.
3. On its arrival in Palestine the Commission shall proceed to carry out measures for the establishment of the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem in accordance with the general lines of the recommendations of the General Assembly on the partition of Palestine. Nevertheless, the boundaries as described in part II of this plan are to be modified in such a way that village areas as a rule will not be divided by state boundaries unless pressing reasons make that necessary.

4. The Commission, after consultation with the democratic parties and other public organisations of The Arab and Jewish States, shall select and establish in each State as rapidly as possible a Provisional Council of Government. The activities of both the Arab and Jewish Provisional Councils of Government shall be carried out under the general direction of the Commission.

If by 1 April 1948 a Provisional Council of Government cannot be selected for either of the States, or, if selected, cannot carry out its functions, the Commission shall communicate that fact to the Security Council for such action with respect to that State as the Security Council may deem proper, and to the Secretary-General for communication to the Members of the United Nations.

5. Subject to the provisions of these recommendations, during the transitional period the Provisional Councils of Government, acting under the Commission, shall have full authority in the areas under their control, including authority over matters of immigration and land regulation.

6. The Provisional Council of Government of each State acting under the Commission, shall progressively receive from the Commission full responsibility for the administration of that State in the period between the termination of the Mandate and the establishment of the State's independence.

7. The Commission shall instruct the Provisional Councils of Government of both the Arab and Jewish States, after their formation, to proceed to the establishment of administrative organs of government, central and local.
8. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, within the shortest time possible, recruit an armed militia from the residents of that State, sufficient in number to maintain internal order and to prevent frontier clashes.

This armed militia in each State shall, for operational purposes, be under the command of Jewish or Arab officers resident in that State, but general political and military control, including the choice of the militia's High Command, shall be exercised by the Commission.

9. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, not later than two months after the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, hold elections to the Constituent Assembly which shall be conducted on democratic lines. The election regulations in each State shall be drawn up by the Provisional Council of Government and approved by the Commission. Qualified voters for each State for this election shall be persons over eighteen years of age who are: (a) Palestinian citizens residing in that State and (b) Arabs and Jews residing in the State, although not Palestinian citizens, who, before voting, have signed a notice of intention to become citizens of such State.

Arabs and Jews residing in the City of Jerusalem who have signed a notice of intention to become citizens, the Arabs of the Arab State and the Jews of the Jewish State, shall be entitled to vote in the Arab and Jewish States respectively. Women may vote and be elected to the Constituent Assemblies. During the transitional period no Jew shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Arab State, and no Arab shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Jewish State, except by special leave of the Commission.

10. The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft a democratic constitution for its State and choose a provisional government to succeed the Provisional Council of Government appointed by the Commission. The constitutions of the States shall
embody chapters 1 and 2 of the Declaration provided for in section C below and include inter alia provisions for:

(a) Establishing in each State a legislative body elected by universal suffrage and by secret ballot on the basis of proportional representation, and an executive body responsible to the legislature;

(b) Settling all international disputes in which the State may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;

(c) Accepting the obligation of the State to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;

(d) Guaranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion, language, speech and publication, education, assembly and association;

(e) Preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents and citizens of the other State in Palestine and the City of Jerusalem, subject to considerations of national security, provided that each State shall control residence within its borders.

11. The Commission shall appoint a preparatory economic commission of three members to make whatever arrangements are possible for economic co-operation, with a view to establishing, as soon as practicable, the Economic Union and the Joint Economic Board, as provided in section D below.
12. During the period between the adoption of the recommendations on the question of Palestine by the General Assembly and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power in Palestine shall maintain full responsibility for administration in areas from which it has not withdrawn its armed forces. The Commission shall assist the mandatory Power in the carrying out of these functions. Similarly the mandatory Power shall co-operate with the Commission in the execution of its functions.

13. With a view to ensuring that there shall be continuity in the functioning of administrative services and that, on the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, the whole administration shall be in the charge of the Provisional Councils and the Joint Economic Board, respectively, acting under the Commission, there shall be a progressive transfer, from the mandatory Power to the Commission, of responsibility for all the functions of government, including that of maintaining law and order in the areas from which the forces of the mandatory Power have been withdrawn.

14. The Commission shall be guided in its activities by the recommendations of the General Assembly and by such instructions as the Security Council may consider necessary to issue.

The measures taken by the Commission, within the recommendations of the General Assembly, shall become immediately effective unless the Commission has previously received contrary instructions from the Security Council.

The Commission shall render periodic monthly progress reports, or more frequently if desirable, to the Security Council.

15. The Commission shall make its final report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to the Security Council simultaneously.
C. DECLARATION

A declaration shall be made to the United Nations by the provisional government of each proposed State before independence. It shall contain inter alia the following clauses:

General Provision

The stipulations contained in the declaration are recognised as fundamental laws of the State and no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.

Chapter 1

Holy Places, religious buildings and sites

1. Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.

2. In so far as Holy Places are concerned, the liberty of access, visit and transit shall be guaranteed, in conformity with existing rights, to all residents and citizens of the other State and of the City of Jerusalem, as well as to aliens, without distinction as to nationality, subject to requirements of national security, public order and decorum.

Similarly, freedom of worship shall be guaranteed in conformity with existing rights, subject to the maintenance of public order and decorum.

3. Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Government that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Government may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Government may carry it out
itself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.

4. No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the State. No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly's recommendations.

5. The Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall have the right to determine whether the provisions of the Constitution of the State in relation to Holy Places, religious buildings and sites within the borders of the State and the religious rights appertaining thereto, are being properly applied and respected, and to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community with respect to such places, buildings and sites. He shall receive full co-operation and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of his functions in the State.

Chapter 2

Religious and Minority Rights

1. Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, shall be ensured to all.

2. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the ground of race, religion, language or sex.
3. All persons within the jurisdiction of the State shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.

4. The family law and personal status of the various minorities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.

5. Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.

6. The State shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish minority, respectively, in its own language and its cultural traditions. The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the State may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.

7. No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any citizen of the State of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

8. No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish State (by a Jew in the Arab State) shall be allowed except for public purposes. In all cases of expropriation full compensation as fixed by the Supreme Court shall be paid previous to dispossession.
Chapter 3

Citizenship, international conventions and financial obligations

1. Citizenship. Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident and enjoy full civil and political rights. Persons over the age of eighteen years may opt, within one year from the date of recognition of independence of the State in which they reside, for citizenship of the other State, providing that no Arab residing in the area of the proposed Arab State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Jewish State and no Jew residing in the proposed Jewish State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Arab State. The exercise of this right of option will be taken to include the wives and children under eighteen years of age of persons so opting.

Arabs residing in the area of the proposed Jewish State and Jews residing in the area of the proposed Arab State who have signed a notice of intention to opt for citizenship of the other State shall be eligible to vote in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of that State, but not in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of the State in which they reside.

2. International conventions.

(a) The State shall be bound by all the international agreements and conventions, both general and special, to which Palestine has become a party. Subject to any right of denunciation provided for therein, such agreements and conventions shall be respected by the State throughout the period for which they were concluded.
(b) Any dispute about the applicability and continued validity of international conventions or treaties signed or adhered to by the mandatory Power on behalf of Palestine shall be referred to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

3. Financial obligations.

(a) The State shall respect and fulfil all financial obligations of whatever nature assumed on behalf of Palestine by the mandatory Power during the exercise of the Mandate and recognised by the State. This provision includes the right of public servants to pensions, compensation or gratuities.

(b) These obligations shall be fulfilled through participation in the Joint economic Board in respect of those obligations applicable to Palestine as a whole, and individually in respect of those applicable to, and fairly apportionable between, the States.

(c) A Court of Claims, affiliated with the Joint Economic Board, and composed of one member appointed by the United Nations, one representative of the United Kingdom and one representative of the State concerned, should be established. Any dispute between the United Kingdom and the State respecting claims not recognized by the latter should be referred to that Court.

(d) Commercial concessions granted in respect of any part of Palestine prior to the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly shall continue to be valid according to their terms, unless modified by agreement between the concession-holder and the State.
Chapter 4

Miscellaneous provisions

The provisions of chapters 1 and 2 of the declaration shall be under the guarantee of the United Nations, and no modifications shall be made in them without the assent of the General Assembly of the United nations. Any Member of the United Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the General Assembly any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these stipulations, and the General Assembly may thereupon make such recommendations as it may deem proper in the circumstances.

1. Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation of this declaration shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.

D. ECONOMIC UNION AND TRANSIT

1. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall enter into an undertaking with respect to economic union and transit. This undertaking shall be drafted by the commission provided for in section B, paragraph 1, utilising to the greatest possible extent the advice and co-operation of representative organisations and bodies from each of the proposed States. It shall contain provisions to establish the Economic Union of Palestine and provide for other matters of common interest. If by 1 April 1948 the Provisional Councils of Government have not entered into the undertaking, the undertaking shall be put into force by the Commission.

The Economic Union of Palestine

2. The objectives of the Economic Union of Palestine shall be:

(a) A customs union;
(b) A joint currency system providing for a single foreign exchange rate;

(c) Operation in the common interest on a non-discriminatory basis of railways; inter-State highways; postal, telephone and telegraphic services, and port and airports involved in international trade and commerce;

(d) Joint economic development, especially in respect of irrigation, land reclamation and soil conservation;

(e) Access for both States and for the City of Jerusalem on a non-discriminatory basis to water and power facilities.

3. There shall be established a Joint Economic Board, which shall consist of three representatives of each of the two States and three foreign members appointed by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The foreign members shall be appointed in the first instance for a term of three years; they shall serve as individuals and not as representatives of States.

4. The functions of the Joint Economic Board shall be to implement either directly or by delegation the measures necessary to realise the objectives of the Economic Union. It shall have all powers of organisation and administration necessary to fulfil its functions.

5. The States shall bind themselves to put into effect the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The Board's decisions shall be taken by a majority vote.

6. In the event of failure of a State to take the necessary action the Board may, by a vote of six members, decide to withhold an appropriate portion of that part of the customs revenue to which the State in question is entitled under the Economic Union. Should the State persist in its failure to co-operate, the Board may decide by a simple majority vote upon such further sanctions, including disposition of funds which it has withheld, as it may deem appropriate.
7. In relation to economic development, the functions of the Board shall be the planning, investigation and encouragement of joint development projects, but it shall not undertake such projects except with the assent of both States and the City of Jerusalem, in the event that Jerusalem is directly involved in the development project.

8. In regard to the joint currency system the currencies circulating in the two States and the City of Jerusalem shall be issued under the authority of the Joint Economic Board, which shall be the sole issuing authority and which shall determine the reserves to be held against such currencies.

9. So far as is consistent with paragraph 2 (b) above, each State may operate its own central bank, control its own fiscal and credit policy, its foreign exchange receipts and expenditures, the grant of import licenses, and may conduct international financial operations on its own faith and credit. During the first two years after the termination of the Mandate, the Joint Economic Board shall have the authority to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that—to the extent that the total foreign exchange revenues of the two States from the export of goods and services permit, and provided that each State takes appropriate measures to conserve its own foreign exchange resources—each State shall have available, in any twelve months' period, foreign exchange sufficient to assure the supply of quantities of imported goods and services for consumption in its territory equivalent to the quantities of such goods and services consumed in that territory in the twelve months' period ending 31 December 1947.

10. All economic authority not specifically vested in the Joint Economic Board is reserved to each State.

11. There shall be a common customs tariff with complete freedom of trade between the States, and between the States and the City of Jerusalem.
12. The tariff schedules shall be drawn up by a Tariff Commission, consisting of representatives of each of the States in equal numbers, and shall be submitted to the Joint Economic Board for approval by a majority vote. In case of disagreement in the Tariff Commission, the Joint Economic Board shall arbitrate the points of difference. In the event that the Tariff Commission fails to draw up any schedule by a date to be fixed, the Joint Economic Board shall determine the tariff schedule.

13. The following items shall be a first charge on the customs and other common revenue of the Joint Economic Board:

(a) The expenses of the customs service and of the operation of the joint services;

(b) The administrative expenses of the Joint Economic Board;

(c) The financial obligations of the Administration of Palestine consisting of:

(i) The service of the outstanding public debt;

(ii) The cost of superannuation benefits, now being paid or falling due in the future, in accordance with the rules and to the extent established by paragraph 3 of chapter 3 above.

14. After these obligations have been met in full, the surplus revenue from the customs and other common services shall be divided in the following manner: not less than 5 per cent and not more than 10 per cent to the City of Jerusalem; the residue shall be allocated to each State by the Joint Economic Board equitably, with the objective of maintaining a sufficient and suitable level of government and social services in each State, except that the share of either State shall not exceed the amount of that State's contribution to the revenues of the Economic Union by more than approximately four million pounds in any year. The amount granted may be adjusted by the Board according to the price level in relation to
the prices prevailing at the time of the establishment of the Union. After five years, the principles of the distribution of the joint revenues may be revised by the Joint Economic Board on a basis of equity.

15. All international conventions and treaties affecting customs tariff rates, and those communications services under the jurisdiction of the Joint Economic Board, shall be entered into by both States. In these matters, the two States shall be bound to act in accordance with the majority vote of the Joint Economic Board.

16. The Joint Economic Board shall endeavour to secure for Palestine’s export fair and equal access to world markets.

17. All enterprises operated by the Joint Economic Board shall pay fair wages on a uniform basis.

Freedom of transit and visit

18. The undertaking shall contain provisions preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents or citizens of both States and of the City of Jerusalem, subject to security considerations; provided that each state and the City shall control residence within its borders.

Termination, modification and interpretation of the undertaking

19. The undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall remain in force for a period of ten years. It shall continue in force until notice of termination, to take effect two years thereafter, is given by either of the parties.

20. During the initial ten-year period, the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom may not be modified except by consent of both parties and with the approval of the General Assembly.
21. Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation of the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the international Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.

E. ASSETS

1. The movable assets of the Administration of Palestine shall be allocated to the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem on an equitable basis. Allocations should be made by the United Nations Commission referred to in section B, paragraph 1, above. Immovable assets shall become the property of the government of the territory in which they are situated.

2. During the period between the appointment of the United Nations Commission and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power shall, except in respect of ordinary operations, consult with the Commission on any measure which it may contemplate involving the liquidation, disposal or encumbering of the assets of the Palestine Government, such as the accumulated treasury surplus, the proceeds of Government bond issues, State lands or any other asset.

F. ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

When the independence of either the Arab or the Jewish State as envisaged in this plan has become effective and the declaration and undertaking, as envisaged in this plan, have been signed by either of them, sympathetic consideration should be given to its application for admission to membership in the United Nations in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations.

PART II

Boundaries 5
A. THE ARAB STATE

The area of the Arab State in Western Galilee is bounded on the west by the Mediterranean and on the north by the frontier of the Lebanon from Ras en Naqura to a point north of Saliha. From there the boundary proceeds southwards, leaving the built-up area of Saliha in the Arab State, to join the southernmost point of this village. Thence it follows the western boundary line of the villages of Alma, Rihaniya and Teitaba, thence following the northern boundary line of Meirun village to join the Acre-Safad sub-district boundary line. It follows this line to a point west of Es Sammu’i village and joins it again at the northernmost point of Farradiya. Thence it follows the sub-district boundary line to the Acre-Safad main road. From here it follows the western boundary of Kafr I’nan village until it reaches the Tiberias-Acre sub-district boundary line, passing to the west of the junction of the Acre-Safad and Lubiya-Kafr I’nan roads. From south-west corner of Kafr I’nan village the boundary line follows the western boundary of the Tiberias sub-district to a point close to the boundary line between the villages of Maghar and Eilabun, thence bulging out to the west to include as much of the eastern part of the plain of Battuf as is necessary for the reservoir proposed by the Jewish Agency for the irrigation of lands to the south and east.

The boundary rejoins the Tiberias sub-district boundary at a point on the Nazareth-Tiberias road south-east of the built-up area of Tur’an; thence it runs southwards, at first following the sub-district boundary and then passing between the Kadoorie Agricultural School and Mount Tabor, to a point due south at the base of Mount Tabor. From here it runs due west, parallel to the horizontal grid line 230, to the north-east corner of the village lands of Tel Adashim. It then runs to the north-west corner of these lands, whence it turns south and west so as to include in the Arab State the sources of the Nazareth water supply in Yafa village. On reaching Ginneiger it follows the eastern, northern and western boundaries of the lands of this village to their south-west corner, whence it proceeds in a straight line to a point on the Haifa-Afula railway on the boundary between the villages of Sarid and El Mujeidil. This is the point of intersection.
The south-western boundary of the area of the Arab State in Galilee takes a line from this point, passing northwards along the eastern boundaries of Sarid and Gevat to the north-eastern corner of Nahalal, proceeding thence across the land of Kefar ha Horesh to a central point on the southern boundary of the village of 'Ilut, thence westwards along that village boundary to the eastern boundary of Beit Lahm, thence northwards and north-eastwards along its western boundary to the north-eastern corner of Waldheim and thence north-westwards across the village lands of Shafa 'Amr to the south-eastern corner of Ramat Yohan'an. From here it runs due north-north-east to a point on the Shafa 'Amr-Haifa road, west of its junction with the road to l'Billin. From there it proceeds north-east to a point on the southern boundary of l'Billin situated to the west of the l'Billin-Birwa road. Thence along that boundary to its westernmost point, whence it turns to the north, follows across the village land of Tamra to the north-westernmost corner and along the western boundary of Julis until it reaches the Acre-Safad road. It then runs westwards along the southern side of the Safad-Acre road to the Galilee-Haifa District boundary, from which point it follows that boundary to the sea.

The boundary of the hill country of Samaria and Judea starts on the Jordan River at the Wadi Malih south-east of Beisan and runs due west to meet the Beisan-Jericho road and then follows the western side of that road in a north-westerly direction to the junction of the boundaries of the sub-districts of Beisan, Nablus, and Jenin. From that point it follows the Nablus-Jenin sub-district boundary westwards for a distance of about three kilometres and then turns north-westwards, passing to the east of the built-up areas of the villages of Jalbun and Faqqu'a, to the boundary of the sub-districts of Jenin and Beisan at a point north-east of Nuris. Thence it proceeds first north-westwards to a point due north of the built-up area of Zir'in and then westwards to the Afula-Jenin railway, thence north-westwards along the district boundary line to the point of intersection on the Hejaz railway. From here the boundary runs south-westwards, including the built-up area and some of the land of the village of Kh.Lid in the Arab State to cross the Haifa-Jenin road at a point on the district boundary between Haifa and Samaria west of El Mansi. It follows this boundary to the southernmost point of the village of El Buteimat. From here
it follows the northern and eastern boundaries of the village of Ar’ara, rejoining the Haifa-Samaria district boundary at Wadi’Ara, and thence proceeding south-south-westwards in an approximately straight line joining up with the western boundary of Qaqun to a point east of the railway line on the eastern boundary of Qaqun village. From here it runs along the railway line some distance to the east of it to a point just east of the Tulkarm railway station. Thence the boundary follows a line half-way between the railway and the Tulkarm-Qalqiliya-Jaljuliya and Ras el Ein road to a point just east of Ras el Ein station, whence it proceeds along the railway some distance to the east of it to the point on the railway line south of the junction of the Haifa-Lydda and Beit Nabala lines, whence it proceeds along the southern border of Lydda airport to its south-west corner, thence in a south-westerly direction to a point just west of the built-up area of Sarafand el’Amar, whence it turns south, passing just to the west of the built-up area of Abu el Fadil to the north-east corner of the lands of Beer Ya’Aqov. (The boundary line should be so demarcated as to allow direct access from the Arab State to the airport.) Thence the boundary line follows the western and southern boundaries of Ramle village, to the north-east corner of El Na’ana village, thence in a straight line to the southernmost point of El Barriya, along the eastern boundary of that village and the southern boundary of ‘Innaba village. Thence it turns north to follow the southern side of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road until El Qubab, whence it follows the road to the boundary of Abu Shusha. It runs along the eastern boundaries of Abu Shusa, Seidun, Hulda to the southernmost point of Hulda, thence westwards in a straight line to the north-eastern corner of Umm Kalkha, thence following the northern boundaries of Umm Kalkha, Qazaza and the northern and western boundaries of Mukhezin to the Gaza District boundary and thence runs across the village lands of El Mismiya, El Kabira, and Yasur to the southern point of intersection, which is midway between the built-up areas of Yasur and Batani Sharqi.

From the southern point of intersection the boundary lines run north-westwards between the villages of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the sea at a point half way between Nabi Yunis and Minat el Qila, and south-eastwards to a point west of Qastina, whence it turns in a south-westerly direction, passing to the east of the built-up areas of Es Sawafir, Es
Sharqiya and Ibdis. From the south-east corner of Ibdis village it runs to a point south-west of the built-up area of Beit 'Affa, crossing the Hebron-El Majdal road just to the west of the built-up area of Iraq Suweidan. Thence it proceeds southwards along the western village boundary of El Faluja to the Beersheba sub-district boundary. It then runs across the tribal lands of 'Arab el Jubarat to a point on the boundary between the sub-districts of Beersheba and Hebron north of Kh. Khuweilifa, whence it proceeds in a south-westerly direction to a point on the Beersheba-Gaza main road two kilometres to the north-west of the town. It then turns south-eastwards to reach Wadi Sab' at a point situated one kilometre to the west of it. From here it turns north-eastwards and proceeds along Wadi Sab' and along the Beersheba-Hebron road for a distance of one kilometre, whence it turns eastwards and runs in a straight line to Kh. Kuseifa to join the Beersheba-Hebron sub-district boundary. It then follows the Beersheba-Hebron boundary eastwards to a point north of Ras Ez Zuweira, only departing from it so as to cut across the base of the indentation between vertical grid lines 150 and 160.

About five kilometres north-east of Ras ez Zuweira it turns north, excluding from the Arab State a strip along the coast of the Dead Sea not more than seven kilometres in depth, as far as Ein Geddi, whence it turns due east to join the Transjordan frontier in the Dead Sea.

The northern boundary of the Arab section of the coastal plain runs from a point between Minat el Qila and Nabi Yunis, passing between the built-up areas of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the point of intersection. From here it turns south-westwards, running across the lands of Batani Sharqi, along the eastern boundary of the lands of Beit Daras and across the lands of Julis, leaving the built-up areas of Batani Sharqi and Julis to the westwards, as far as the north-west corner of the lands of Beit Tima. Thence it runs east of El Jiya across the village lands of El Barbara along the eastern boundaries of the villages of Beit Jirja, Deir Suneid and Dimra. From the south-east corner of Dimra the boundary passes across the lands of Beit Hanun, leaving the Jewish lands of Nir-Am to the eastwards. From the south-east corner of Dimra the boundary passes across the lands
of Beit Hanun, leaving the Jewish lands of Nir-Am to the eastwards. From the south-east corner of Beit Hanun the line runs south-west to a point south of the parallel grid line 100, then turns north-west for two kilometres, turning again in a south-westerly direction and continuing in an almost straight line to the north-west corner of the village lands of Kirbet Ikhza’a. From there it follows the boundary line of this village to its southernmost point. It then runs in a southerly direction along the vertical grid line 90 to its junction with the horizontal grid line 70. It then turns south-eastwards to Kh. el Ruheiba and then proceeds in a southerly direction to a point known as El Baha, beyond which it crosses the Beersheba-El ’Auja main road to the west of Kh. el Mushrif’a. From there it joins Wadi El Zaiyatin just to the west of El Subeita. From there it turns to the north-east and then to the south-east following this Wadi and passes to the east of ’Abda to join Wadi Nafkh. It then bulges to the south-west along Wadi Nafkh. It then bulges to the south-west along Wadi Nafkh, Wadi Ajrim and Wadi Lassan to the point where Wadi Lassan crosses the Egyptian frontier.

The area of the Arab enclave of Jaffa consists of that part of the town-planning area of Jaffa which lies to the west of the Jewish quarters lying south of Tel-Aviv, to the west of the continuation of Herzl street up to its junction with the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, to the south-west of the section of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road lying south-east of that junction, to the west of Miqve Israel lands, to the north-west of Holon local council area, to the north of the line linking up the north-west corner of Holon with the north-east corner of Bat Yam local council area and to the north of Bat Yam local council area. The question of Karton quarter will be decided by the Boundary Commission, bearing in mind among other considerations the desirability of including the smallest possible number of its Arab inhabitants and the largest possible number of its Jewish inhabitants in the Jewish State.

B. THE JEWISH STATE

The north-eastern sector of the Jewish State (Eastern) Galilee) is bounded on the north and west by the Lebanese frontier and on the east by the frontiers of Syria and Transjordan. It includes the whole of the Hula Basin, Lake Tiberias, the whole of the
Beisan sub-district, the boundary line being extended to the crest of the Gilboa mountains and the Wadi Malih. From there the Jewish State extends north-west, following the boundary described in respect of the Arab State.

The Jewish Section of the coastal plain extends from a point between Minat et Qila and Nabi Yunis in the Gaza sub-district and includes the towns of Haifa and Tel-Aviv, leaving Jaffa as an enclave of the Arab State. The eastern frontier of the Jewish State follows the boundary described in respect of the Arab State.

The Beersheba area comprises the whole of the Beersheba sub-district, including the Negeb and the eastern part of the Gaza sub-district, but excluding the town of Beersheba and those areas described in respect of the Arab State. It includes also a strip of land along the Dead Sea stretching from the Beersheba-Hebron sub-district boundary line to Ein Geddi, as described in respect of the Arab State.

C. THE CITY OF JERUSALEM

The boundaries of the City of Jerusalem are as defined in the recommendations on the City of Jerusalem. (See Part III, Section B, below).

PART III

City of Jerusalem

A. SPECIAL REGIME

The City of Jerusalem shall be established as a corpus separatum under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Authority on behalf of the United Nations.
B. BOUNDARIES OF THE CITY

The City of Jerusalem shall include the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern Shu‘fat, as indicated on the attached sketch-map (annex B).

C. STATUTE OF THE CITY

The Trusteeship Council shall, within five months of the approval of the present plan, elaborate and approve a detailed Statute of the City which shall contain inter alia the substance of the following provisions:

1. *Government machinery; special objectives.*

   The Administering Authority in discharging its administrative obligations shall pursue the following special objectives:

   (a) To protect and to preserve the unique spiritual and religious interests located in the city of the three great monotheistic faiths throughout the world, Christian, Jewish and Moslem; to this end to ensure that order and peace, and especially religious peace, reign in Jerusalem;

   (b) To foster co-operation among all the inhabitants of the city in their own interests as well as in order to encourage and support the peaceful development of the mutual relations between the two Palestinian peoples throughout the Holy Land; to promote the security, well-being and any constructive measures of development of the residents, having regard to the special circumstances and customs of the various peoples and communities.
2. *Governor and administrative staff*

A Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall be appointed by the Trusteeship Council and shall be responsible to it. He shall be selected on the basis of special qualifications and without regard to nationality. He shall not, however, be a citizen of either State in Palestine.

The Governor shall represent the United Nations in the City and shall exercise on their behalf all powers of administration, including the conduct of external affairs. He shall be assisted by an administrative staff classed as international officers in the meaning of Article 100 of the Charter and chosen whenever practicable from the residents of the city and of the rest of Palestine on a non-discriminatory basis. A detailed plan for the organization of the administration of the city shall be submitted by the Governor to the Trusteeship Council and duly approved by it.

3. *Local autonomy*

(a) The existing local autonomous units in the territory of the city (villages, townships and municipalities) shall enjoy wide powers of local government and administration.

(b) The Governor shall study and submit for the consideration and decision of the Trusteeship Council a plan for the establishment of a special town units consisting respectively, of the Jewish and Arab sections of new Jerusalem. The new town units shall continue to form part of the present municipality of Jerusalem.

4. *Security measures*

(a) The City of Jerusalem shall be demilitarised; its neutrality shall be declared and preserved, and no para-military formations, exercises or activities shall be permitted within its borders.
(b) Should the administration of the City of Jerusalem be seriously obstructed or prevented by the non-co-operation or interference of one or more sections of the population, the Governor shall have authority to take such measures as may be necessary to restore the effective functioning of the administration.

(c) To assist in the maintenance of internal law and order and especially for the protection of the Holy Places and religious buildings and sites in the city, the Governor shall organise a special police force of adequate strength, the members of which shall be recruited outside of Palestine. The Governor shall be empowered to direct such budgetary provision as may be necessary for the maintenance of this force.

5. Legislative organisation

A Legislative Council, elected by adult residents of the city irrespective of nationality on the basis of universal and secret suffrage and proportional representation, shall have powers of legislation and taxation. No legislative measures shall, however, conflict or interfere with the provisions which will be set forth in the Statute of the City, nor shall any law, regulation, or official action prevail over them. The Statute shall grant to the Governor a right of vetoing bills inconsistent with the provisions referred to in the preceding sentence. It shall also empower him to promulgate temporary ordinances in case the council fails to adopt in time a bill deemed essential to the normal functioning of the administration.

6. Administration of justice

The Statute shall provide for the establishment of an independent judiciary system, including a court of appeal. All the inhabitants of the City shall be subject to it.
7. Economic union and economic regime.

The City of Jerusalem shall be included in the Economic Union of Palestine and be bound by all stipulations of the undertaking and of any treaties issued therefrom, as well as by the decision of the Joint Economic Board. The headquarters of the Economic Board shall be established in the territory of the City.

The Statute shall provide for the regulation of economic matters not falling within the regime of the Economic Union, on the basis of equal treatment and non-discrimination for all members of the United Nations and their nationals.

8. Freedom of transit and visit; control of residents.

Subject to considerations of security, and of economic welfare as determined by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council, freedom of entry into, and residence within, the borders of the City shall be guaranteed for the residents or citizens of the Arab and Jewish States. Immigration into, and residence within, the borders of the city for nationals of other States shall be controlled by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council.

9. Relations with the Arab and Jewish States.

Representatives of the Arab and Jewish States shall be accredited to the Governor of the City and charged with the protection of the interests of their States and nationals in connection with the international administration of the City.

10. Official languages.

Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of the city. This will not preclude the adoption of one or more additional working languages, as may be required.

All the residents shall become ipso facto citizens of the City of Jerusalem unless they opt for citizenship of the State of which they have been citizens or, if Arabs or Jews, have filed notice of intention to become citizens of the Arab or Jewish State respectively, according to part I, section B, paragraph 9, of this plan. The Trusteeship Council shall make arrangements for consular protection of the citizens of the City outside its territory.

12. Freedoms of Citizens

(a) Subject only to the requirements of public order and morals, the inhabitants of the City shall be ensured the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of conscience, religion and worship, language, education, speech and press, assembly and association, and petition.

(b) No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the grounds of race, religion, language or sex.

(c) All persons within the City shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.

(d) The family law and personal status of the various persons and communities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.

(e) Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.
(f) The City shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish communities respectively, in their own languages and in accordance with their cultural traditions.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the City may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.

(g) No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any inhabitant of the City of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.


(a) Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.

(b) Free access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites and the free exercise of worship shall be secured in conformity with existing rights and subject to the requirements of public order and decorum.

(c) Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Governor that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Governor may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Governor may carry it out himself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.
(d) No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the City. No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly's recommendations.

14. Special powers of the Governor in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in the City and in any part of Palestine.

(a) The protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites located in the City of Jerusalem shall be a special concern of the Governor.

(b) With relation to such places, buildings and sites in Palestine outside the city, the Governor shall determine, on the ground of powers granted to him by the Constitutions of both States, whether the provisions of the Constitutions of the Arab and Jewish States in Palestine dealing therewith and the religious rights appertaining thereto are being properly applied and respected.

(c) The Governor shall also be empowered to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in any part of Palestine. In this task he may be assisted by a consultative council of representatives of different denominations acting in an advisory capacity.

D. DURATION OF THE SPECIAL REGIME

The Statute elaborated by the Trusteeship Council on the aforementioned principles shall come into force not later than 1 October 1948. It shall remain in force in the first instance for a period of ten years, unless the Trusteeship Council finds it
necessary to undertake a re-examination of these provisions at an earlier date. After the expiration of this period the whole scheme shall be subject to re-examination by the Trusteeship Council in the light of the experience acquired with its functioning. The residents of the City shall be then free to express by means of a referendum their wishes as to possible modifications of the regime of the City.

PART IV

CAPITULATIONS

States whose nationals have in the past enjoyed in Palestine the privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection, as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are invited to renounce any right pertaining to them to the re-establishment of such privileges and immunities in the proposed Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem.

[Hundred and twenty-eighth plenary meeting 29 November 1947]
APPENDIX - VI


The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasising the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasising further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

   (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

   (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

   (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarised zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

[Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting]
The Security Council,

1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

[Adopted at the 1747th meeting by 14 votes to none].

One member (China) did not participate in the voting.
APPENDIX - VIII


This resolution, introduced by Russia, adopts the quartet roadmap for peace between Palestinians and Israel as UN policy, explicitly endorses a permanent two-state solution to the conflict and calls on the sides to implement their obligations under the roadmap. These include a cessation of violence, reform of the Palestinian authority, dismantling the terrorist infrastructure on the part of the Palestinians, and dismantling of illegal outposts by Israel. The resolution gave new life to the faltering roadmap following the fall of the reformist Palestinian government of Mahmoud Abbas and continued violence initiated by both sides.

The UN press release noted:

The Security Council this afternoon endorsed the Middle East Quartet's Road Map towards a permanent, two-State solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

By its unanimous adoption of resolution 1515 (2003), the Council called on the parties to fulfil their obligations under the plan in cooperation with the Quartet.

In its preambular section, the text also reiterated the Council's demand for an immediate cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terrorism, provocation, incitement and destruction. It emphasized that a just and lasting peace should take into account the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese tracks, as well as the Israeli-Palestinian question.

[On 20 December 2002, the "Quartet" (Russian Federation, United States, European Union, United Nations) reached agreement on the text of the Road Map with the goal of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and ending the occupation that...
began in 1967. That goal was to be achieved on the basis of the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, the principle of land for peace, Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and 1397 (2002), agreements reached previously by the parties, and the "Arab Initiative" of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah endorsed by the Council of the League of Arab States on 28 March 2002. The performance-based and goal-driven Road Map presented clear phases, time lines, target dates and benchmarks aimed at the progression by the two parties through reciprocal steps in the political, security, economic, humanitarian and institution-building fields, under the auspices of the Quartet. The Road Map was officially submitted to the parties on 30 April 2003.]

Resolution 1515 (2003)

The Security Council,

"Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 1397 (2002) and the Madrid principles,

"Expressing its grave concern at the continuation of the tragic and violent events in the Middle East,

"Reiterating the demand for an immediate cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terrorism, provocation, incitement and destruction,

"Reaffirming its vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders,

"Emphasising the need to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, including the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese tracks,

"Welcoming and encouraging the diplomatic efforts of the international Quartet and others,
"1. Endorses the Quartet Performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (S/2003/529);

"2. Calls on the parties to fulfil their obligations under the Roadmap in cooperation with the Quartet and to achieve the vision of two States living side by side in peace and security;

"3. Decides to remain seized of the matter."