Burma's former Prime Minister, UNU once described Burma as "tender ground among cactus," a reference to its having common borders on the West and North with India and China. Burma's leaders have always been particularly concerned with the giant neighbour to the North and have tried to prevent the nation from becoming a battleground of great power conflict. In a discussion of Burma's policy of "neutralism" a seasoned Burmese politician remarked, "Back of all of our public statements about non-alignment friendship with all countries, positive neutralism, and the like, is a constant awareness of our big and powerful neighbour to the north; we do not fear Communism as an ideology so much as we fear the day when China's masses must find living space in our under-populated country." An American educated Burmese professor once remarked that, "Burma's foreign policy is founded on the immutable axiom of 700 million Chinese to our north." Burma's attitude towards China and other major

powers and the policy that has been designed to deal with their presence is exemplified by a statement of a former President of the AFPFL Ukyaw Nien, "Small nations always mistrust bigger ones, especially those close by. For years past, every Burmese mistrusted China, whether under Mao or Chiang. They also mistrust India; for that matter, they also mistrust Soviet Russia and even America. We do not consider China a menace, but we accept a possibility of China one day invading us. We are entering into closer relations with India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and are trying to find a formula for peaceful co-existence in this part of our world. We do not want to do anything that will provoke China but if she does invade, I am confident that the national spirit of our people will stand firm against her .......Being a small nation, we must find ways and means of avoiding embroilment in power blocs."

When China under the control of nationalist government had to trade space for time vis-a-vis powerful Japanese invaders in the late 1930, the building of the 'Burma Road' almost inevitably led to a common defence of the two neighbours in later stages of the Second World War. At the time of Second World War, the Nationalist Chinese troops were

4. Ibid., p. 240.
in and out of Burmese territory, and Burmese freedom fighters and independence leaders likewise used China as their shelter and planning head-quarter. The Chinese Nationalist Government showed its promptness to exchange ambassadors with Burma in September 1947, when the later had hardly completed the formalities of its independence pact with Britain. But no sooner had the Burmese envoy been appointed to Nanking than the later had to face the menace of the Chinese Communists, whose leader Mao Ise Tung, had himself supported Burmese independence. Maoist observer, Ch'en Yuan, declared that "in 1948-49 Burma was hardly out of the state of a 'miserable colony' and a national liberation movement in Burma must therefore still 'make a hard long struggle."

Burma's relations with Communist China have been consistently correct and cordial since the time of the founding of the Communist state in China, inspite of the Communist rebellion at home which is capable of creating mischief between the two countries. When the Communist China established the government of the People's Republic of China in Peking, Burma took the initiative of recognising the Communist regime and to agree on an exchange of embassies.

because Burma realised that there could not be two China's and that the Communist Government represented the will of the mass of the Chinese people on the main land. Really, Burma was the first non-Communist country to recognise new China. When the international circle of non-Communist countries made military moves to establish basis in Asia for the purpose of attacking China, Burma resolutely refused to take part in it and also took energetic military action in dislodging foreign forces opposed to Communist China from Burmese territories.

At the beginning of 1948, "New Democratic Front", reflecting Maoist mentality was said to have been formed under the 'White Flag Communists' in Burma. After some time it was rumoured that Chinese and Burmese Communists had joined hands in a mutual aid pact and unorthodoxly the local authorities of Yunnan reportedly undertook to attempt a counter measure in conjunction with the Burmese Government. When the Communist government came in power in Peking, immediately, thousands of overseas Chinese in Burma were prompted in mass rallies in Rangoon to shout their approval and support of Peking and over twenty Leftist organisations also celebrated the founding of the Chinese People's Republic in Prome

(north West of Rangoon) whether the Union Government of Burma liked it or not.

Till 1952-53, they supported vocally the efforts of the Burmese Communists to seize control of the Government by force. But at the time when it became clear that the underground Communists in Burma had neither the strength nor the skill at organisation to accomplish this and when the efforts of Communist groups in the same direction in Indonesia and Malaya were equally unavailing, the Chinese communists changed their approach to that of developing "friendly relations" with the nations in South and Southeast Asia.

At the time of the Korean War in mid-1950, Peking gave warning to Burma that she would not tolerate any Western power to build airfields in her territory. But Burma's voting with the U.N. majority, and condemning North Korea thereafter, proved an inadvertent affront to Peking at the time. Although Burma's relations with Chinese Nationalist Government were not good, a Burmese envoy had gone to Peking for preliminary talks and Ambassadors had already been exchanged between the two countries by September, Peking somehow still found it necessary to accuse Burma's leader

UNU, in the words of the tS'oo Fhan of retaining British advisers to dominate his Government and admitting American Capital to control his economy. This, together with Burma's UN vote on Korea and rumours of foreign attempts to build airfields in Burma, made Burma in Peking's view "a springboard of aggression against the People's Republic of China."

In December 1950, certain, "major overseas Chinese organisations in Rangoon, including the China Democratic League and the Chinese Students Association had initiated their own "oppose - American and aid Korea", campaign to support the counterpart in the mainland of China."

The earliest opportunity for Burma to ingratiate herself with Peking was provided by a second U.N. resolution branding communist China as an "aggressor" in the Korean war, with an embargo as punishment which Burma chose to vote against on February 1, 1951. Burma also rejected an immediate peace treaty with Japan at the San Francisco Conference in late August, in this conference neither Peking nor Taipei was represented. In September, a new Burmese Ambassador UMaung was sent to Peking to profess Burma's full realisation of China's importance and her potential role in the political

obtain all the economic help from outside that they wanted but they did not have to go about begging. UNU described Burma's foreign policy as one of "dynamic neutrality". In his National Day speech the Prime Minister UNU referred to Burma's foreign policy as follows: "Due to our neutral policy, we do not align ourselves with any, power bloc. For this non-alignment, both blocs would of course view us a favourable as they would their own close colleagues. But, one fact is certain, both these power blocs know fully well we are not playing second fiddle to any bloc. Because of our neutral stand, we are in a position to be on friendly terms with all countries of both blocs. It may perhaps be difficult to understand that our friendly dealings with all countries are important for the stability of our independence. But, a perusal of the world map and the geographical position occupied by our country and close-study of various countries will convince,us, beyond a shadow of a doubt, how far our friendly relations with all countries based on our neutral foreign policy have contributed towards the stability of our independence ....... we have been able to be on the friend­liest terms with both power blocs because of our correct foreign policy. I have not the slightest doubt about it."

8. Ibid., p. 100.
concepts and trend of events in the East. The Peking Press duly praised Burma’s good sense.

UNU, then Prime Minister of Burma also expressed his desire to ask both Peking and Moscow for economic aid if no strings were attached. In January-February 1953 he and his colleagues at the Burma sponsored Asian Socialist Conference in Rangoon further carefully spared Peking while attacking totalitarianism in the Soviet Union and its satellites.

In January 1953, Burma celebrated its first Burma-China friendship week calling for cultural exchange. In the next month China offered to help Burma for solving his "koumintang troops" problem by sending in forces of its own, although this caused apprehension and reserve rather than gratitude on Burma's part. A rumour spread about the entry of Communist Chinese troops into Burma, which however, was promptly denied by Peking's Embassy in Rangoon.

The Burma-China friendship has been expanded in the autumn of 1953. Burma-China friendship Association symbolised the beginning of new developments in Sino-Burmese relations. On April 22, 1954, representatives of both the countries in Rangoon concluded their first major Bilateral Trade Agreement with Burma's rice, minerals and rubber to be
exchanged for mainland China's coal, silk, farming tools and light industrial products during the following three years.

The beginning of a new era of closely and friendly relations between Burma and her big neighbours as China and India, symbolized first by the agreement on a set of guiding "principles" which Burma henceforth accepted as a basis for its own China policy. Because the Chinese Premier Chou En Lai visited Prime Minister Mr. Nehru in the month of June 1954 and they jointly announced their adherence to the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence". From Delhi, Chou came to Rangoon for his first meeting with Prime Minister UNU, and at the end of his visit, UNU, too, joined with Chou in declaring adherence to the "Five Principles."

The friendly visit of Mr. Chou to India and Burma had also given rise to the speculation that China was planning a new "peace offensive". This seems to be giving an unfortunate and unwarranted interpretation to a gesture of goodwill from the People's Republic.

Just before the departure, Chou En Lai and UNU issued the customary joint statement, affirming support for the "Five Principles" they also expressed hopes for a peaceful

10. Ibid., pp. 134-135.
solution of international disputes. The most significant point in this joint communique was that, "the Prime Ministers affirmed that the people of each nation should have the right to choose their own state system and way of life without interference from other nations. Revolution cannot be exported, at the same time outside interference with the common will expressed by the people of any nation should not be permitted." A Burmese trade mission was sent to Peking in September, where Trade Protocols were signed in November on the actual exchange of commodities, specifying that Communist China would purchase 150,000 tons of rice from Burma yearly until 1957. UNU also paid a return visit to Peking at the end of November and issued another joint communique declaring an accord to tackle a wider range of Sino-Burmese issues from consular establishments, transport and postal services to economic aid and a border settlement.

In 1954-1955 a second major cultural delegation was dispatched by Peking to Burma and India. In March, more trade contracts were signed by which Peking began to export industrial installations and equipment to Burma. Burma's relations

with China were always guided by the five principles of "peaceful co-existence" which are intended to increase good relations between states with differing political and social systems on the basis of mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs and settlement of disputes between nations by peaceful means. Scrupulous observance of these principles has enabled Burma and China to conclude a permanent boundary settlement and promotion of friendly relations.

At the Bandung Conference Mr. Chou En Lai assured that Peking would never violate Burma's frontiers since the spirit of peaceful co-existence was to prevail in Asia and Africa. Border trouble, however, finally flared-up in late July 1956, when a large number of Chinese Communist troops penetrated into an extensive area inside Burma. In the duration of few weeks the whole world seemed to be talking about Peking's during "incursions" into Burmese territory to "preserve peace" in the "wa district."

The problem of Sino-Burmese border settlement had admitted by a long standing and complicated one from

the time when Great Britain had acquired sovereign rights over Burma in 1886, three major agreements had been concluded in 1884, 1897 and 1941 — after long-drawn out negotiations and manoeuvers. But these agreements had left two of the four sections of the Sino-Burmese border-line undefined, one being the 'wa district' where the current dispute took place and the other a part of the eastern frontier of the Kachin state, both in Upper Burma. "Kuomintang troops" in Burma had been a recent complication vis-a-vis the Peking regime.

In November 1956, the principle issues on border settlement were discussed in presence of UNU at Peking. At this time, he was not there as Prime Minister but as a president of the AFPFL. At Peking he was treated as a state guest, not a high government official. UNU discussed the Sino-Burmese border problem which resulted in his "Package deal" announced in Burma at a later date after his return. It is quite clear that the AFPFL leaders had become gravely concerned over the implications of the border issue and of what seemed to be an increasing amount of Chinese Communist infiltration over the border, because of his non-alignment position at the time, UNU apparently felt that he could

speak more frankly than as a Prime Minister.

During the period of the military caretaker government, between September and April 1960, Burmese Government continued to pursue UNU's policy of "close and friendly relations" with Communist China. The final conclusion on the issues of border-settlement and further development of economic and cultural relations took place after UNU's return to power in April, 1960.

In facing the problem of Communist subversion and infiltration, the Burma government is not alone. It remains a major unsolved problem for many states of Southeast Asia and of real concern to the United States and its SEATO allies. "Still another aspect of the general problem of subversion and infiltration has been the border crossings of whole groups of tribal people who apparently have been able to leave Yunnan as refugees and settle in with their compatriots on the Burma side." It is not easy for Burma as well as for China to fully guard all possible transborder routes along the 900 mile frontier, at the same time it is very difficult to determine the numbers of persons entering Burma or to estimate the extent to which the Chinese Communist

16. Ibid., p. 177.
17. Ibid., p. 184.
authorities have been lenient in permitting this flow. Some Burmese officials and military personnel have showed anxiety over this "refugee" problem as marking the beginning of a larger migration, not only of transborder tribal groups, but also of Chinese, which could have serious political and economic implications for Burma. It is suspected that the Chinese communists may be sending agents with these groups of refugees who will establish themselves on the Burma side and can be used later to stir up trouble and disaffection.

During the 1957 and 1959, there were constant reports of border crossing by groups numbering anywhere between 50 to 500 and over 1000 respectively. On November, it was estimated that there were more than 10,000 illegal immigrants from Yunnan in the area of the "Wa State" and the northern "Shan States." These numbers, mostly members of transborder tribal groups, were reported to include many hundred of persons of Chinese stock who were alleged to have fled to Burma to escape the harsh restrictions of the Chinese commune system.

In the beginning of 1959, three events occurred which opened the eyes of Burmans to the evils of communism as seen by the West. The first event was the brutal supression of

18. Ibid., p. 184.
the Tibetan revolt by the Chinese Communists and the effect of this, the flight of the Dalai Lama and thousands of Tibetans to India as refugees.

The other two events took place inside Burma. "In April and again in June, there were two defections of officers of the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon, the first unsuccessful and the second successful. Both served to demonstrate the nature of communist regimes and provide evidence on the problem of subversion." On April 28, 1969, an officer of the Soviet Embassy was brought to the Rangoon General Hospital, suffering from what the press described as "hypnotic poisoning" where he voiced "invectives" against the Soviet Union and was reported to have jumped from the hospital window to avoid arrest. He was over powered by fellow officers of the Soviet Embassy, and according to the press he was taken to home and was given strong sedatives.

These incidents involved basic issues in Cold-War politics as well as providing one more instance of the essential struggle between the two power blocs for exerting influence over the unaligned nations. The border problem which the Burma government inherited from British rule was due

19. Ibid., p. 185.
20. Ibid., p. 185.
to undefined northern frontier by British rulers.

From the beginning, the Burmese government thought that the problem of their inherited, undemarcated frontier with China was wholly bilateral. It was a problem which was to be settled between the two parties concerned. The border problem provided an example of how the Burma government applied its principles of neutralism in cases clearly affecting its vital interests. The disclosure of this dispute also provides some side lights on Chinese communist policy towards Burma and the rest of Asia. There are so many officials concerned about the Sino-Burmese frontier area. The problems to prevent infiltration of persons from communist China and to control smuggling as well as the variety of problems presented by the existence of transborder tribal minority groups have been mentioned. "All Burmans in the government or in the Burma army who had any responsibility for the northern border areas were also aware that until a demarcated boundary had been agreed to with the Chinese communist regime, their difficulties would not lessen and 21 might, at any time, grow worse." The real problems is that of some Chinese troops which have entered Burmese territory and established outposts on the union soil in the 'Wa State'.

21. Ibid., pp. 188-189.
in close proximity to the Burma-China border.

UNU also proclaimed that there was sufficient goodwill between the two countries to solve this problem in an amicable way. He further said, "proper atmosphere must be created for mutual trust and goodwill conducive to fair settlement of outstanding issues."

U Ba Swe said that, "Burma would never tolerate aggression on her 'rightful soil', but we cannot say that the presence of Red Chinese troops on our side of the border is an aggression."

The Burmese Government described a sketchy glimpse of the state of negotiations. U Ba Swe told the press that China had agreed to withdraw her troops from the 1941 line and had accepted the 1941 line as the basis for negotiations. UNU preferred the setting up international boundary Commission to settle the Sino-Burmese boundary. The leaders of Burma, "which hardly had sufficient armed forces to protect even one-tenth of the territory," are also trying their best to save the country with the available resources. Apart from reinforcing the border troops, the Government had plans

23. Ibid., p. 31.
for an extensive network of roads to link the borderlands more firmly with the interior.

"During the active phase of the Sino-Burmese border dispute, the Burmese government suggested that both sides should withdraw to an agreed distance on either side of the Iselin Line, and in order to minimize the chance of military clashes a joint boundary commission should demarcate the undefined parts of the Sino-Burmese border."

Premier Chou En Lai, while repeating his previous position said, "that his government could not accept the Iselin Line, in order to create an atmosphere favourable to peaceful settlement of the dispute, he was prepared to withdraw his troops to his side of the Iselin Line in 'Wa State', provided the Burmese troops did not move into the area abandoned by the Chinese troops."

A fourteen member delegation led by the General Ne Win left for Peking at the invitation of the Chinese Premier Mr. Chou En Lai to thrash out outstanding problems between the two countries.

Among the outstanding border problems to be settled with China were in respect of China's claim for the three

24. Ibid., p. 31.
25. Ibid., p. 31.
border villages of Phimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang Northeast of Myitkyina and China's demand for the return of 80 square miles of border land east of Bahmo known as Namwan assigned tract which had been leased to the then British government by China since 1897, at a rent of Rs. 1000 per year. China refused to accept the rent after the Second World War.

When UNU arrived at Peking for settling the Sino-Burmese border dispute, he was given a warm welcome. In all the meetings both the leaders tried to lessen their differences.

At the time of negotiations between Burmese and Chinese governments, the Chinese government had protested that the Iseline Line was "unfair" as China had accepted the British demands when they were under attack from the Japanese and had sorely needed British help. In spite of this, Chinese government agreed to accept the Iselin Line and also the border between Diphuk Pass and Izurazi Pass, the Mac Mohan Line, provided there was an "over all settlement" of the entire Sino-Burmese border, although the Chinese in 1914 had not ratified the tripartite convention. Regarding the Namwan Assigned Tract, the Chinese said that, "the existence of a leased territory between two sovereign and

26. The Hindu, 23rd January, 1960
equal in nations was not fair and that the lease should be abrogated." Concerning the border between the High Conical Peak and Izurazi Pass, Chou En Lai said that, "although in the past China had claimed the areas West of the river N'Mai Kha, including the territory known as the Triangle, he would not reassert those claims and wanted this section of the boundary to be delineated in such a way that the border should lie somewhere east of N'Mai Kha, ensuring that Hpimaw, Kangfang, and Gawlum fall on the Chinese side of the border."

When UNU, the former Prime Minister of Burma returned from Peking with the "Package Deal" proposals, he told the Burmese people that it was his understanding that if Hpimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang were surrendered to the Chinese, Burma would receive in exchange the Namwan Assigned tract and a settlement of the whole S boundary on the basis of the British-defined lines.

The Chinese were surprised to hear this and they stated that they had never offered to exchange the Namwan Tract for the three Kachin villages, since both areas belonged to China and this type of exchange was impossible. They

27. N.M. Chatate, *op. cit.*, p.32.
proposed that the Namwan Tract be exchanged for another area in the 'Wa State' adjacent to the 1941 Line. Secondly they claimed that the territory of three villages should be 186 sq. miles rather than 56 miles. Third, they showed that their idea of the traditional customary line which was significantly different from the Mac Mohan Line. The Chinese at first said that, "they could not accept this until a new survey had determined where the watershed lay, and later modified this to an acceptance of the watershed principle provided that in certain places. The Burmese continued to press for the watershed line without reservations and in addition stated that they could not cede any territory in the 'Wa State' as an exchange for the Namwan Tract. The question of settlement about the three villages and the Namwan Assigned tract were administered by the Kachin State."

If any changes, taken place then approval of the union and the Kachin State governments would be needed.

The Government also informed Mr. UNU that "it was inclined to give-up claims to Hpimaw, Kangfang and Gawlum if they could retain the Namwan Assigned Tract, but they could not be able to convince the Kachin leaders to agree

to such a compromise."

As a result, UNU tried his best to persuade the Kachin leaders to agree to cede the three villages but failed to get their consent. Few days later, on 4th November Chou En Lai placed his new proposal before the entire Burmese mission. In the proposal, China insisted on the return of the Hpinaw area, but it accepted the Burmese proposal that the border should run along the watershed between N'Mai Kha and Salween rivers. UNU tried her best to get the Kachin leaders to accept the Chinese proposal and told them in the presence of Chou En Lai that he would persuade the Chinese to allow them to keep the Namwan Assigned Tract "as a gesture of friendship."

The solution of the entire Sino-Burmese boundary settlement delayed because of the deadlock over Hpinaw area and although the Burmese Government was willing to cede this area to China, the public opinion in Burma, specially in the Kachin State, was very much against it. The Du raised historical facts and said to the Burmese Government that the

30. Du, means Tribal Chiefs of this area.
three villages "never belonged to the Chinese in the history." In spite of the such criticism, the Burmese leaders accepted the Chinese proposal because they had no alternative except to accept the Chinese military superiority. U Kyaw Nein then the Deputy Prime Minister stated that it was "wise to give away the Hpimaw area in order to get the entire Sino-Burmese border settlement once and for all."

When General Ne Win came in power as the head of the caretaker government in Burma, he started negotiation with the Chinese government. The proposal made by him in his letter of 4th June 1959 was the same as decided by the Cabinet sub-committee on 14th October, 1957, except that it offered the Chinese about sixty two sq. miles in the Panghung and Pangloo areas.

Ne Win also dispatched another letter stating that he had considered "the Chinese proposals of 30th July 1958, that he was able to make the "maximum offer" and that he had obtained the support of various political leaders, only because of his non-partisan position." He also emphasized that Burma had made more compromises than before and that

31. Ibid., p. 106.
the Chinese government, instead of suggesting "further negotiations" should take speedy steps to eliminate minor differences.

In reply of this letter Mr. Chou En Lai invited General Ne Win to visit Peking so on 23rd January 1960, General Ne Win left Rangoon as the head of high powered delegation. After five days serious negotiations Sino-Burmese Boundary Agreement was concluded. The Namwan assigned tract of 70 square miles was to become a part of Burma, in exchange for the transfer of Panghung and Pangloo to China.

At the signing ceremony UNU said, "This boundary settlement was not an easy achievement. There were many difficulties to be overcome on both sides, some of them inherent to the problem and others carried over from history. No progress could therefore have been made without a strong desire on both sides to reach a settlement. The friendship, understanding and spirit of mutual accommodation displayed by both sides have contributed to the present happy outcome."

Thus on October 1, 1960 the Sino-Burmese boundary Treaty was signed. The documents opens with the preamble,

33. Sein, Win, op.cit., p. 106.
"The president of the union of Burma and the government of the People's Republic China, noting with satisfaction that the successive governments of the Union of Burma and the Government of the People's Republic of China, conducting friendly consultation and showing mutual understanding and mutual accommodation in accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence have overcome various difficulties and eventually achieved successfully an overall settlement of the question of the boundary between the two countries. .......appoint Prime Minister UNU and Premier Chou En Lai as their respective plenipotentiaries to sign the Boundary Treaty."

Thus we see that Burmese government as well as Chinese government made compromises and both agreed to the Burmese view regarding the watershed principle in delimiting the border east of Izurazri pass, before the area was surveyed, the Burmese government withdrew from their previous position that they can not offer more than 56 sq.miles in Hmimaw area.

When the question of nationality problem of the people of these areas came both the countries agreed that the inhabitants of the area should declare the choice of their

34. Ibid., p. 107.
nationality within twelve months and in case they lived in
the other country, should move into the country of their
choice of nationality within two years.

A century old dispute between China and Burma came to
a happy end, when signing of the Sino-Burmese Boundary
Treaty in Peking, UNU said, "The Treaty which the two govern-
ments were about to conclude, would for the first time in
history, bring into existence, a completely delimited and
demarcated boundary between our two countries, a boundary
drawn-up with the agreement of both sides, and therefore a
boundary of peace and friendship. In the circumstances of
today, when distance and barriers no longer make for in
accessibility, it is of utmost importance that even the best
of neighbours, whose relationship is firmly based on the Five
Principles of peaceful co-existence, should, know exactly
where the territory of one ends and the territory of the
other begins."

UNU said, about the Chinese attitude with regard to the
boundary dispute, "The whole history of the boundary question
shows that the Chinese do not allow things to be imposed on
them."

35. N.M. Chatete, op.cit., pp. 42-44.
37. Ibid., p. 29.
At the time of boundary settlement both Premier Chou En Lai and Prime Minister UNU said that they would review the relations of friendship between the People's Republic of China and the Union of Burma. After this agreement, the fixing of boundary pillars along the watershed between the Salween and the N, Mai Kha was expected to give Burma the first fixed boundary it has ever had with its Chinese territory on official maps and in school books of geography.

Both the countries, Burma and China, were satisfied with this agreement because not only the boundary was fixed and their prestige enhanced, but they also have a non-aggression pact signed. Without any doubts, the Boundary Treaty represented a forwards step for Burma's security. The long last problem of disputed border of 1,500 miles was peacefully demarcated and agreed upon, the danger to Burma from the north is not yet removed. "A swing in Peking's policy, a pretext based on the illegal immigration or on Burma's treatment of the non-citizen "overseas Chinese" or on some presumed violation of the Friendship treaty, certainly an inhibiting factor in the free exercise of Burma's foreign policy decision-making, might activate the danger?"

After this both the leaders agreed to expand Sino-Burmese trade and decided to urge the world leaders to adopt a spirit of compromise at the forthcoming summit Conference at Paris in May. "Peking also confirmed its political reconciliation with the Burmese through economic and trade agreements designed both to provide assistance to that country and to spread China's influence there." A trade agreement in October 1960 sanctioned that China would purchase from Burma 3000,000 to 4000,000 tons of rice of the 1961 crop for shipment in the same year and that Burma would import from China commodities which Burma required and China might be able to supply in order to balance the trade between the two. The import of rice not only assisted Burma in disposing of her produce but was clearly utilized to relieve China's critical shortage of foodgrains in 1960.

The trade agreement was soon followed by a bigger assistance programme by China. When Chou En Lai visited Burma in January 1961, at this occasion the Agreement on Economic and Technical cooperation was signed with Burma by which China undertook to extend to Burma long-term (ten year)  

41. The Guardian, (Rangoon, April 19, 1960)
loan of thirty million pounds sterling. "Without interest and without any political condition and privileges attached." The loan was in the shape of providing complete sets of equipment, sending technical experts and helping Burma to train technical personal. A second trade agreement was signed in Peking on 13 December 1961, provided for China purchase of 200,000 tons of rice in 1962.

When Chinese Premier Mr. Chou En Lai reached Burma at that time Premier UNU of Burma, welcoming him and said, "We are overjoyed by this profound demonstration of friendship and affection of the Chinese people for the Burmese people, we welcome you as a great statesman and well wisher of Burma whose monumental contribution to the achievement of enduring friendship between our two countries is now a matter of history. The present visit would go a long way towards cementing and further strengthening the bonds of friendship, understanding and cooperation between the two countries."

Both the countries desired to maintain everlasting peace and cordial friendship between the two countries. These

43. Ibid., pp. 172-174.
44. The Hindu, (Madras, January 3, 1961).
countries were convinced that the strengthening of good neighbourly relations and friendly cooperation between them, on account of the vital interests of both countries depends on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, jointly initiated by the two countries and have agreed as follows:—

**Article I:**

"The contracting parties recognise and respect the independence, sovereign rights and territorial integrity of each other."

**Article II:**

"There shall be everlasting and cordial friendship between the contracting parties who undertake to settle all disputes between them by means of peaceful negotiation without resorting to force."

**Article III:**

"Each contracting party undertakes not to carry out acts of aggression against the other and not to take part in any military alliance directed against the other contracting party."

**Article IV:**

"The contracting parties declare that they will develop and strengthen the economic and cultural ties
between the two states in a spirit of friendship and cooperation, in accordance with the principles of equality and mutual benefit and of mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs."

Article V:

"Any difference or dispute arising out of the interpretation of application of the present treaty or one or more of its Articles shall be settled by negotiations through the ordinary diplomatic channels."

Article VI:

(1) "The present treaty is subjected to ratification and the instruments of ratification will be exchanged in Rangoon as soon as possible. (2) The present treaty will come into force immediately on the exchange of the instruments of ratification and will remain in force for a period of ten years. (3) It will remain in force without any specified time limit, subject to the right of either of the contracting parties to terminate it by giving to the other in writing a year's notice of its intention to do so." It was in fact a re-affirmation of Panch Sheel.

Concerning the important article III, William C. Johnstone has written, "by agreeing to this treaty the Burma

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Government has formally limited its freedom of action in respect to its self-defence. In effect, the treaty gives to the Peking regime a veto power over Burma's future foreign relations in respect to its self-defence....

The treaty did not, however, restrict Burma's sovereignty in the area of self-defence, in a big sense, China did not establish a position of dominance over Burma's foreign relations. But there was a provision in this treaty that Burma is restricted from receiving military aid from western nations, this did not deter the Burmese from doing so. The New York Times reported in 1963: "General Ne Win is buying jet trainers, trucks and infantry weapons from the U.S. on the assistance of the General, the programme is a secret one to avoid provocation of Communist China."

The same dispatch also reported that West Germany was supplying weapons as well as advisers to Burma's small arms industry and that Burma's weaponry was being converted to the standard caliber of NATO weapons. China also showed friendly understanding in July 1964, when Premier Chou En Lai visited Burma and asked Ne Win to reaffirm his understanding


47. Ibid., p. 241.
of Article III. Their joint communique stated that the two nations "reaffirmed their understanding of Article III," but there was no clear conception as to what their ideas were.

The second major clause in the treaty IV stating "The contracting parties declare, they will develop and strengthen the economic and cultural ties between the two states in a spirit of friendship and cooperation in accordance with the principles of equality and mutual benefit and of mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs." After signing this treaty China granted a $84 million loan to Burma, the value of trade between the two countries expanded and there was an increase in contacts between Burma and China at the government and People's diplomacy levels. Concerning the Article IV for this Treaty Johnstone wrote, "when two countries expand their official and trade relations across a common border, there is always a net residue of greater understanding and accommodation toward each other. When one country is a big power and its neighbour is small and weak, however, the net result is to increase associate."

On January 4, 1961, the 13th anniversary of her independence, Burma received a formal guarantee of her territorial

49. Ibid., pp. 241-242.
integrity from her powerful neighbour, the People's Republic of China. After this ceremony, Burmese Government will confer top level honours to 19 Chinese officials including Premier Chou En Lai. Chou En Lai was decorated with the order of 'Agga Maha Matta' 'Thiri Dara', which had been created specially for him. It is the highest award of its kind ever conferred on any foreign leader.

Prime Minister UNU said in October 1960 that, "To build friendship, the Burmese people should visit the Chinese People's Republic and the Chinese people should visit Burma. This exchange of visits should be done frequently, not only between leaders of our two countries, but also between literary, finance and trade workers, between military officers of different ranks, and between the mass of the people of various strata. Only in this way we further consolidate our friendship."

When the General Ne Win took over power in Burma after his coup d'état, on March 2, 1962, China recognized the new regime two days later but there were no important state-level visits until April 1963. On this occasion

Chairman Liu Shao Chi and Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi visited Burma. Vice Premier Marshal Ho Lung went to Rangoon and had discussions with General Ne Win in November 1963. In the same month, Chou En Lai and Ch'en Yi stayed briefly in Rangoon en-route to Africa and also on their return from that continent.

The Chinese Premier and Foreign Minister again visited Burma in February 1964. The New York Times reported that, "the purpose of this trip was to seek Ne Win's support and endorsement of China's call for convening another Afro-Asian Conference to discuss, among other things, the Sino-Indian border dispute." Before a week, when Chou visited Rangoon, Ne Win had visited New Delhi where Mr. Nehru wanted his support to India's call for a conference of non-aligned nations in Cairo, excluding China. But Ne Win refused to support either the Chinese or Indian proposals. Ne Win urged the two nations to accept the Colombo powers recommendations as a basis for settlement of their boundary position. In July Chou En Lai and Ch'en Yie paid a surprise visit to Burma.

In April 1966, Mr. Ch'en Yi and Chou En Lai passed three days in Burma when they returned to attend the tenth

53. Ibid., p. 244.
anniversary celebration of the Bandung Conference in Djakarta. P'eng Cheu, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, headed a delegation or a brief visit to Burma in June 1965. Mr. Ne Win went to China in July and talked with Chou En Lai and issued a joint communique stating: "The two sides were of the opinion that imperialism and colonialism constitute obstacles to national independence and world peace and that these obstacles must be completely eradicated in the interest of mankind. They reaffirmed their support for all people in their struggle against imperialism and colonialism to win a safeguard national independence, to defend world peace and to promote world progress. They expressed their conviction that this struggle would finally emerge victoriously despite attempts by imperialist and colonial powers to preserve their colonial interests by political, military and economic means. They deplored and opposed flagrant outside intervention in the internal affairs of newly independent, developing states on one pretext or the other because such intervention violates the sovereignty of these countries and their right to self-determination."

Mr. Chou En Lai with Liu Shao Chi again visited Burma in April 1966. In his speech at various banquets and

54. Ibid., pp. 244-245.
receptions Liu emphasized anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism concerning Vietnam and said, "we Afro-Asian countries must heighten our vigilance, unite even more closely, and preserve in the struggle." This speech clearly showed exhortation to Burma to demonstrate greater "anti-imperialist zeal," by condemning the U.S. policy in Vietnam. The communique was published after the two days of talks between Liu and Ne Win which avoided the question of Vietnam. China was frustrated over its failure to get Burma's help and support to Chinese foreign policy, the major cause of Chinese frustration was the cultural Revolution.

In 1966, the Revolutionary council suspended the publication of all private owned foreign language newspapers which had the largest circulation in Burma. This nationalization policy affected Chinese influence. The Burmese Government nationalized so many foreign banks, among them she nationalized the two branches of the Chinese-state owned Bank of China. This meant that pro-Peking Chinese in Burma could no longer depend on loans from these banks. Before that these loans had been channeled so as to expand China's influence among the overseas Chinese community and

55. Ibid., pp. 244-245.
in the Burmese economy. This new government in Burma also controlled the Chinese run schools and stopped the course in Marxism and Lenninism and the teaching of Mao Tse Tung. All private schools were taken over by Burmese education departments in 1966.

When the Chinese Embassy personnel were returning from consultations in Peking in May 1967, they encouraged the overseas Chinese community to participate in cultural Revolution type activities in Burma. The Chinese Embassy also distributed Maoist propaganda to encourage Chinese student to form groups and wanted to defy the government ban on the wearing of political insignia is that the "Mao Badges" to Red guards. On effect of this, the bloody clashes spread between Burmese and Chinese students. After that the bloody clashes spread throughout Rangoon and destroyed Chinese owned shops and homes as well as attacked Chinese Embassy. A Government Radio broadcast said, "The people should avoid acts which will harm friendship between the countries and create hatred between one people and other. Even when any unavoidable issue arises, use of force and taking the law into one's own hands should be avoided ..... the government shall stop the bullying the minority by the majority .... The

56. Ibid., p. 248.
people ..... and asked to stop their demonstrations."

The Government was trying her best for the people to remain calm. In spite of government's efforts, the violence occurred, one of which involved the stabbing of two members, one of them the Chinese Embassy staff. Bitter racial clashes issued which resulted in the death of dozens of overseas Chinese.

These events were followed by an abrupt shift in Chinese policy toward the Ne Win Regime as Peking unleashed a verbal attack on the government and openly entered Burma's civil war by endorsing the communist party of Burma's armed struggle to overthrow the Rangoon government. The Chinese Government News Agency (NCNA) accused Ne Win of instigating and organizing the Rangoon riots.

At this time, the Sino-Burmese relations sank to the lowest point at the middle of last year over the riotous behaviour of the core of pro-Peking Chinese living in Burma and the stern measures which the Burmese Government took to deal with the situation. For some months after that, relations between the two countries, "continued at a very

58. Ibid., p. 686.
A rift in Burma-China relations precipitated by the Chinese in 1967 was perhaps a manifestation of Peking's frustration over failing to become politically or economically dominant in Burma." Burmese government signed the Test Ban Treaty of 1963, Peking opposed it, Burma has recognized as Indian territory land claimed by China in the Sino-Indian border dispute Burma was in favour of the formation of Malaysia while China attacked it as a neo-colonialist plot and also favoured Indonesia's "confrontation policy." In Vietnam War, Burma was neutral, where China was anti-U.S. and Pro-NLF and North Vietnam, Rangoon maintains cordial relations with Moscow with which Peking is engaged in a bitter ideological dispute, at last, Burma has maintained neutrality on the Laotian issue, while China supported the Pathetlao.

Before Chinese cultural Revolution, her foreign policy had stressed the preservation of normal relations with the Burmese Government. But, after emergence of cultural Revolution Diplomacy in 1967, "Sino-Burmese government to

59. The Hindu, (Madras , April 17, 1968).
60. Robert, A.Holmes, op.cit., p. 249.
61. Ibid., p. 249.
government relations disintegrated the armed struggle of the CPB and the dissident minorities."

It is quite difficult to explain Peking's aim to start cultural Revolution activities in Burma. "Its "Red Guard" diplomacy may have been an unintended aspect of its own chaotic internal revolutionary situation." But, it seems, Peking wanted to force Ne Win to accept communist participation in a United Front Government. It may be the reason (that) China thinks, that Burma was so weakened economically and divided politically that the government could easily be toppled.

Speaking at the Peasant's Seminar in 1968, General Ne Win reported large scale fighting along the China border and said that, "many guerrillas had crossed into Burma. Chinese assistance to the rebels had been widely suspected before that time, but was the most forthright official statement linking insurgent activity with external support."

64. Ibid., p. 251.
65. Ibid., p. 680.
A London source reported in 1969 that PLA forces had established a major military base in Burma's frontier region near the tri-border junction of China, Burma and India. General Ne Win told in the first annual conference of the Burma Socialist Program Party, concerning these developments: "The most serious situation has been the fighting in the frontier areas where we share borders with China. It has been the heaviest, we have experienced. From 1 January 1969 to the end of August, there were eight major engagements and ten minor ones. We have never suffered so many casualties before."

"Ne Win also warned against a repetition of the 1967 anti-China demonstrations and appealed to the Burmese people to restrain themselves: The people who are against us have openly declared they are getting external aid. We on our part do not wish to enrage others. I ask the people not be provoked to anger to use harsh words, or to take actions because of the clashes in frontier area."

When General Newin paid a visit to India and had talks with the Prime Minister Mrs. Indra Gandhi, it was characterised by China as "Carrying out conspiratory activities

66. Ibid., p. 689.
and plotting with the Indian Premier for a joint Anti-China campaign and for joint suppression of the armed struggle of the minority nationalities along the Indian - Burmese border (means the Naga-Mizo underground activities). The relations between China and Burma became worsed in 1967 over the riotous behaviour of Pro-Peking Chinese living in Burma and the stern measures which the Burmese Government took to deal with the situation. But at the end of 1967, it seemed that the Chinese Foreign Ministry, had gained control over its own affairs and to normalize relations with Burma.

There are four major factors which are responsible to change this attitude of China towards Burma. First the Communist Party of Burma has been severely weakened by purges and dissension within its ranks. The other reason is that the "Peking returnees" gained control of the party apparatus. They also started a rectification campaign and in 1967 launched a purge of the old time leadership. Three out of the eight members of the Politburo (Yeban Htay, Than Myaing and Ba Tin-alias Goshal) were executed after being

68. Ibid., col., 6335.
69. (Leaders who returned from Peking for amnesty talks in 1963, including Bo Thein Tin, Aung Gyi, Zeya, Yebaw tun Sein, Aung Nyein and Tin Pe).
accused of "revisionism", a fourth politburo member Z Bozeya, the ranking CPB military commander, was killed by Government troops in 1968, and Thakin Than Tun, the leader of the "White Flag" was assassinated in September 1968 by a follower. A Central Committee member Aye San, was stabbed to death by one of his own troops. In 1969, Thakin Zin, who succeeded Than Tun as Chairman of the CPB, executed another Central Committee, other member of central committee, Than Aung, was killed by government forces.

Secondly, the Communist Party of Burma CPB was unable to unite the major ethnic rebel forces under its leadership seriously weakened prospects for overthrowing the Revolutionary Council. The efforts of Communists failed to organize and dominate an alliance with Karen’s, Mons, Chins and Kayaks.

Thirdly, the Burmese government was successful in showing the communists as "puppets" of an outside power. The official government publication such as 'Botatung' and The 'New Light of Burma' have frequently referred to the guerrillas as national traitors whose allegiance is to foreigners.

Fourth, the Burmese Communists made the tactical error of unleashing a "reign of terror" upon villages in central and Southern Burma and instituted a policy of "Red Authority" as part of a 1967 plan for the establishment of "Red Power" in two years. "The insurgents desecrated Buddhist shrines, maltreated monks, tortured and murdered BSPP Cadres, members of village land committees and cooperatives as well as ordinary farmers and peasants. These atrocities aroused the people who formed village militia and assisted army against the Communists. The result was that government forces staged numerous surprise attacks on CPB bases and forced the insurgents to make a "Long March" to northern Burma."

The most significant aspect of the Burmese situation was that Rangoon showed no inclination to alter its policy of "rigid neutralism" and "isolationism" in international affairs. It is said about the Burmese neutrality, "it has no close friends and wants none." Burma's leaders pride themselves on the fact that Burma does not belong to any group of so-called non-aligned states, but makes up its own mind on specific issues in world affairs. One aspect of

Burma's policy is that it respect China's strategic interests but not permitting any use of Burmese Territory that could be conceived of as a threat to China.

About the government's efforts against the CPB insurgency, General Ne Win clearly said that Burma was not going to abandon its neutrality by seeking massive American or Soviet military assistance. Burma's search for neutrality that would save it from China without embracing China too closely, caused it to adjure any massive Soviet or American economic or military aid. May be it was an attempt to show China that it was not going to "tilt" in the direction of the U.S., even in the face of the China-CPB threat, Burma terminated the American military aid programme that has been in operation since 1968. This $88 million programme went unpublicized largely because of Ne Win's desire to avoid provocation of China. This programme, known as the "multi year token-pay credit scales program" in U.S. official communications, was believed to have been the only one of its kind. "It was run by a so-called military equipment delivery team which operated out of an unmarked villa on the outskirts of Rangoon. The aid mostly jet Trainers, helicopters, trucks, an infantry weapons were delivered in six instalments and repayment was made in local non-controvertible currency (the Kyat), under this secret programme, West Germany was
also supplying weapons as well as advisers to Burma's small arms industry and Burmese weaponry which indicated Burma apparently planned to continue receiving Western arms."

The U.S.A. sent in substantial quantities of arms and equipment under a new agreement that replaced the ten year agreement between the two nations. General Ne Win turned down a U.S. offer to sell surplus military equipment recently. The Burmese leader thought that more American aid were undesirable, perhaps in order not to provoke Peking.

Early in 1968, Chinese policy toward Burma differed somewhat from that before and during 1967. The relations between Burma and China did not really improve, but the degree of hostility toward the Rangoon government appreciably declined and public support for the people's war never again reached the high level as that for those in Vietnam, Thailand, Laos and Malaysia. In January 1969, Ne Win flew to Pakistan reportedly to discuss the possibilities for improving relations between the two states with Chinese officials in Rawalpindi. Then in November the Burmese leader asserted, "I wish to stress that we want friendly relations with our neighbour......with regard to China,

73. Ibid., pp. 691-692.
we would like to restore the cordial and friendly relations that previously existed. This will require efforts by both sides. For our part, we only wish to heal the wound of the 1967 incidents. Despite the clashes at the borders and the present situation, we shall do whatever we can on our part to restore the old friendship and keep the situation from getting worse. 74

After 1967, the relations between the two countries start to normalcy. Burmese Premier General Ne Win paid a visit to China from 6 - 12 August 1971, at the invitation of Chou En Lai. At Peking, he was welcomed by Chairman Mao and was given all the courtesies normal to a Head of State including being accompanied on a visit to Canton by Chou En Lai. The trade relations between Burma and China also improved to help Burma's troubled economy. Ne Win accepted aid for unfinished projects. Chou En Lai said, "overseas Chinese should be either citizens of China or their own country of domicile, not both, and that mixed and pure Chinese of the second generation should be offered Burmese citizenship. This was agreed." So it is more significant and has enabled Burma to avoid the agony of a Vietnam type

74. Ibid., pp. 803-804.
"war of national liberation." There has also been a phenomenal increase in contacts between China and Burma at the political-diplomatic as well as the "people's diplomacy" levels. Both the countries had agreed in 1970 to return their ambassadors to their posts. Burma had sent U Thein Maung as her ambassador to Peking in November 1970. He met with Premier Chou and Tung Pi Wu (acting Chief of State) within three weeks of his arrival on the 23rd anniversary of Burma's independence (January 4, 1971), Ambassador Maung gave a reception to him. The Chinese ambassador Chen Chao Yuan joined his new post in Rangoon in March 1971.

Burma has a great desire to improve its trade and financial situation by acquiring abundant supplies of cheap Chinese goods. Premier Chou En Lai said at a reception in honour of his Burmese guest that he looked forward to increase Sino-Burmese trade. At the meeting of the General Committee of the Burma Socialist Programme Party on September 24, 1971, Ne Win said Peking had agreed to resume economic assistance to Burma under the 1961 accord. Colonel Maung Lwin, the Burmese Minister of trade, led a purchase mission


to attend the 'Canton Trade Fair' and to discuss the expansion of Burma-China trade. Burma was authorised to utilize until September 30, 1975 the balance of the million interest-free loan. Better trade relations with China would help to solve the Burmese economy's major problem – a shortage of consumer goods. The Burmese chief of state's trip was followed by a strengthening of economic relations between the two States. On September 24, 1971, Ne Win made a report of his August visit to China to the Central Executive Committee of the BSPP. He said, "Premier Chou had assured him that China wished to provide more aid to Burma. The Burmese leader asked the Chinese Premier how Burma should make compensation for losses suffered by the local Chinese during the riots." Chou replied that "Burma is a sovereign state and can deal with the matter in any way it deemed fit." An agreement was signed in Rangoon by Colonel Maung Lwin, Deputy Minister for National Planning and Ambassador Cheu Chao Yuan on October 7, 1971.

Burma has no desire in return of this agreement to gain any special favour but it wants cordial relation and no interference in its internal affairs and wants to maintain

79. Ibid., p. 697.
peaceful common frontier by normalizing relations with China through promotion of trade.

Since the Burmese Government aimed to reconcile with Peking it proved receptive to the Chinese "peace offensive", Burma was one of the 75 member majority in the General Assembly that on October 25, 1971 voted in favour of PRC (People's Republic China) in and voted Taiwan out of the U.N.O. The working People's Daily also criticized the American attitude towards the admission of China to the U.N. It expressed the view that China "will behave responsibly," and that China's presence will "lead to the strengthening and betterment of the organization." To reveal its new friendly attitude towards Burma, delegation of forty member, headed by vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-huo stayed in Rangoon on way to New York.

Relations between Burma and China have been improving since 1972. Vice Premier Li Asian Nien attended a reception in Peking in January hosted by Ambassador Maung on the 24th anniversary of Burma's independence. Premier Chou En Lai sent Ne Win a congratulatory message on the twenty fourth

anniversary of Burma's independence which said in part.
"May the friendly relations and cooperation between China
and Burma develop continuously."

Rangoon policy makers cherish two notions in their minds, first, to avoid unpleasant relations to China and second its determination to protect its political, cultural and economic independence.

The Burmese delegation led by U Lwin Minister for Planning and Finance and Ucheln Hai, Director of the Ministry's Foreign Economic Relations Department, paid a visit to China in May and they also attended the Canton airports as they were greeted by Fang, Minister for Economic Relations with Foreign countries. Burma and China's flag hoisted side by side at the airport, the crowd hailed the friendship as they shouted, "long live the friendship between the Chinese and Burmese people."

In January the New China News Agency broadcast a message of condolence from the central committee on the death of Chen Xi. In April another message of condolence was publicized after the death of Hsieh Fi-Chin (a member of the

84. Ibid., p. 253.
powerful standing committee of the Politburo, Minister of Public Security, Vice Premier of the State Council, Chairman of the Peking Revolutionary Committee, and a member of the National Defence Council and the Military Commission).

Now, Peking follows its present policy of friendship with Burma, but it appears doubtful that Burma and China can return to the "whole hearted and trusting friendship of the past." Burma also follows neutral foreign policy and maintains excellent relations with such nations as Japan, India, the Soviet Union, East Germany, and numerous other nations in the Western, Communist and third world of neutral nations. Under a 1967 border agreement with India, Burma has prevented the Peking backed Naga tribe men from crossing into China via Burma to secure Chinese weapons, training and supplies the Burmese security forces claim to have killed about 200 Nagas since the Burma-India border demarcation in November 1968. Regarding the civil war in Pakistan, Burma recognized Bangla Desh as an independent state on January 13, 1972 and saying: "The Government of Burma does not accept as principle, the solution of a country's internal problems by direct help and intervention of a foreign country's armed organization. However, due to the existence of questions requiring immediate communications
and actions, and also due to desire to live fraternally as neighbours, the Government of Burma has recognized the state of Bangla Desh and its government."

China being the right hand of Pakistan in the civil war, condemned movement as an evil device, taken up by Indian reactionaries and Soviet revisionists. As it refused to recognize Bangla Desh.

Since China's foreign policy is not consistent, it makes the prediction of Sino-Burmese developments rather risky. It shows that the process of normalizing relations between the two nations is likely to stretch as long as Premier Chou En Lai remains China's chief foreign policy maker, and General Ne Win supervises the reins of Burmese government.

The Burmese government has been successful in reducing Chinese and other foreign influences in Burma and Burma has been handling skillfully its relations with China but whether it will continue to be so remains, the matter of doubt. The

ideological basis of China's foreign policy; its expansionist aims, its sensitivity to the developments in this part of hemisphere, and Burmas military vulnerability continue to introduce so many unpredictable factors that nothing can be forecast for future nature of relation between these two countries. The atmosphere is at the moment placid and calm. The trade agreements are manifesting stability and there are no pin pricks from either side. As the present prime ministers of these two countries are the real architects of Burma China concord, it remains to be seen if that relationship continues even after their absence from the scene.