CHAPTER V

BURMA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

William, C. Johnstone has rightly commented, "the record of any nation's participation in the United Nations is a good test of that nation's application of its foreign policy." When the different problems and issues come up before the General Assembly, each member nation has to take its own stand on them. "There is a sharp focus of public attention on positions taken on resolutions before the General Assembly or its Standing Committees which is found with respect to specific actions, taken by a nation outside of the United Nations." For the more powerful nations just like U.S.A., "the United Nations is at once a public forum, a locus of power politics and an instrument for the conduct of foreign policy." But for Burma, a small nation in the world, "the United Nations is a public forum, a convenient mechanism for conduct of diplomacy, a source of economic and other kinds of assistance and, only on occasion, an instrument of foreign policy."

In his opening speech UNU, Former Prime Minister of Union of Burma, at the Conference of the Heads of State and

Government of the non-aligned countries at Belgrade on 1st September 1961, said, "we believe that peaceful co-existence and successful U.N. go hand in hand. Burma has therefore been, and continues to be a staunch supporter of the United Nations. The ideals and principles of the United Nations represent mankind's best hope for the future. More than ever in its history, the world today needs an agency "to harmonise the actions of nations." And we believe that this need is greater for the smaller, weaker, countries than for the big, powerful ones. We think it would be a black day indeed for the world and particularly for the smaller countries than for the big, powerful ones, if the United Nations were to suffer the fate of the League of Nations. This being so, we cannot help but deplore and express our concern with the attitude adopted towards the United Nations by some of the great powers, since it goes without saying that the United Nations would be no United Nations without the participation of the great powers."

On February 27, 1948 U So Nyun, then Ambassador to the United States from the Union of Burma, submitted a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations applying for

membership. He said that, Burma firmly believes that she can most effectively work, towards this goal of world peace by participating in the deliberations and activities of the United Nations organisation, and she is both willing and able to carry out the obligations contained in the charter. Burma's application was quickly and unanimously approved on March 29, 1948, by the Security Council Committee on Admission of New Members. It is interesting to note that the friendly representative of the Republic of China, whose government was later accused by Burma of aggression, submitted the draft-resolution approving Burma's application. During the Security Council discussion on April 10th, there was general support for Burma's admission and the committee approved draft resolution was quickly adopted with the affirmative votes and one abstention.

On receipt of the Security Council's recommendation that Burma be admitted, the General Assembly, at its 131st Plenary Session April 19, 1948, decided to consider the question without reference to a Committee. The neighbours of Burma such as India, Thailand, Pakistan, spoke briefly and enthusiastically of their country's historic ties with Burma and expressed support for her admission. The General Assembly unanimously approved 55-0, the Security Council recommendation to admit the Union of Burma as a member of the United
Nations. USe Nyun commented, "It is most auspicious that Burma, so soon after re-emergence as an independent nation, should be given the opportunity to contribute its share to the cause of world peace." Thus Burma became the 58th member of the international Assembly of nations.

Burma has sent a delegation to New York to work for such a world, including many high ranking Burmese elected and appointed Government officials. The delegates have served regularly on the six subsidiary committee of the General Assembly— the first (Political), second (Economic), third (social), fourth (Trusteeship), fifth (Administration), and sixth (legal), and the Ad hoc political committee which deals with membership questions and other thorny East-West problems. Burma also joined eight of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations. Burma was one of the sponsors of the International Finance Corporation, and the Burma Government was an original party to the General Agreement on trade and tariffs.

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In 1950, Burma was elected to the Collective Measures Committee, established by the uniting for peace resolution at the fifth session of General Assembly to consider collective measures for peace and security, the Additional Measures Committee composed of members of the Collective Measures Committee, was to deal specifically with the problem of Korea, and met from February 16, 1951, however, at its first meeting Burma informed the Committee that she would not be able to participate due to her preoccupation with the security problem at home.

She was also admitted to the Food and Agricultural Organisation (F.A.O.) in 1947 and has participated actively in its commissions and sub-commissions, especially the International Rice Commission the committee on commodity problems, and the Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council. Burmese delegates have also taken active interest in the International Labour Organisation (ILO) from 1948, the World Health Organisation (WHO) of which Burma is an original member from 1948, and the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) to which Burma was admitted in June 1949. In January 1952, Burma joined the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Burma Government, generally followed the position taken by other neutralist members before 1954, but its voting was more often based on independent reasoning quite different from that of India. But after 1954, when closer relations had been established between U.S.S.R. and communist China, there was a tendency for the Burma delegation to join with India and not take a position contrary to that of the majority of the Afro-Asian bloc.

The neutralist policy of Burma and the hard realities of the domestic situation in Burma are reflected in the principles which guide her voting. There has consistently been (a) "desire to avoid involvement in power bloc politics, (b) disapproval of colonialism, and willingness to support peoples who are trying to cast-off its last remnants; (c) support for humanitarian measures, (d) Total rejection of war as a solution of international disputes and the creation and gradual expansion of a 'no war area' as a step towards a final and complete abolition of war."

The internal situation of Burma, made her anxious to take precautions against external aggression. As it is out


of question for a country of Burma's size and economy to build and maintain huge armed forces, Burma placed hope on the United Nations and on friendly relations with countries. Burma is a nation of only 17 million people, the nations across Burmese borders can boast of populations ranging from 40 to 400 million. To think of successfully stemming the aggression from such quarters is simply impossible.

The reason why Burma joined a world organisation was to avoid joining a power bloc since it was against policy and practically unwise, so the only course left was to enter the United Nations and place hope on it. Former Prime Minister UNU said, "when we joined that great organisation, we were not prompted by considerations of financial aid, medical aid, education missions to plan our educational programme and such other benefits likely to accrue from our membership. These things, however, desirable, are immaterial. What was foremost in our mind was the expectation of the United Nations assistance when our country is subjected to aggression by a stronger power."

Another advantage Burma has as a member of the United Nations is that when the representative of Burma speaks in

8. Ibid., p. 144.
the General Assembly or in its Committee, he has a much larger official and public audience. An illustration of this is found at the time of the Hungarian Crisis in the fall of 1956. The Burmese representative in the Assembly spoke in justification of Burma's strong stand condemning Soviet intervention in Hungary.

Burma is a small country and she has a limited number of diplomatic missions in other countries, and news reporting from Burma is spotty and in the hands of local representative of only a few international news services. For Burma, the General Assembly is, therefore, a distinct advantage as a means of publicizing Burma's policy on a given issue. Many issues have been discussed before the Assembly Committee on which the Burma Government did not wish to take stand, about which Burmese leaders knew very little and perhaps cared even less. During the Assembly sessions, Burma representatives vote, almost daily, during Assembly sessions on a whole host of problems and issues. Sometimes, Burma Government can instruct its delegation to abstain on question with it is not familiar.

Another advantage for Burma is the fact that the United Nations is one central, almost worldwide diplomatic mission. At United Nations head-quarters, "it is possible
for the Burma representatives to undertake official or semi-official business with representatives from all of the member nations. Foreign office officials in Rangoon have stated that "Burma can not afford too many diplomatic missions abroad and, at present does not need them because of the facilities afforded at the United Nations head-quarters in New York."

United Nations, not only provides a means of easy and inexpensive official contact with many nations but also enables the Burma representatives at the United Nations to become acquainted with the problems of other nations and learn much more about them than would otherwise be the case. Likewise, the facilities of the United Nations secretariat, as well as those of the United Nations specialized Agencies, provide the Burma Government with a vast amount of information that it would be difficult to obtain through bilateral means.

All of the United Nations agencies of which Burma is a member, are providing some kind of assistance to Burma. The United Nations specialists have to work closely with officials in the government, but as advisers and consultants. That Burma achieved benefits from the services of these technicians, there is no doubt but that lack of
coordination of their services and only partial utilization of their skills have reduced the benefits that might be expected. The Burman officials have complained privately that either they could not find time to use these specialists effectively or that time spent on helping the specialists do their job prevented them from carrying out their own assignments efficiently. It does not do to have a Burma representative to a United Nations meeting, ignorant of the subject under consideration, or lacking in instructions from the Burma Government on important questions that come-up for a vote.

Finally, for a small nation, just like Burma, the United Nations, may be utilized as an instrument for projecting its foreign policy. Using the United Nations for this purpose is something that has not been carefully considered by Burman officials as to how Burma can use its United Nations membership to advance its foreign policy objectives in general. This has been due to lack of able staff and scarcity of time for long-range policy planning.

Chairman General Newin stated that "in a world steeped in poverty, hunger, ignorance, disease and injustice, the

United Nations was attempting to harmonize the interests and actions of nations towards that long range attainment of the security and common weal of mankind." General Newin appealed to the Member-Nations to address themselves with faith and confidence to the two fold challenges of the United Nations upon entering the third decade of its life and strive for the United Nations to become a force for greater economic and social equality in the world as well as for peace.

Foreign minister of Burma U Thi Han, who presided over the celebrations, said that, the United Nations was creating to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war; the member states could by mutual cooperation and endeavour help towards the search for the betterment of human relationships. The United Nations had continued its peace-keeping activities in the past year with conscious effort, and its record was one of commendable accomplishment in stabilizing and maintaining peace. U Thai Han also appealed for humanity and showed his keen desire for peace in the hearts and minds of the peoples of the world and he expressed that United Nations developed into a really effective instrument for the performance of the functions in the charter, and urged the Member Nations to endeavour to be more
worthy of the principles and more loyal to the purpose of
the charter.

Burma's record in the United Nations on the Korean war
issue illustrates the problem of a neutral nation in the
arena of power politics. Burma also presented the KMT problems
before the United Nations and also illustrates the difficulties of cold-war politics for a small nation which takes the
charter at its face value.

KOREAN CRISIS:

The Korean Crisis was one of the many international
issues in which Burmese Government had taken some interest.
When the Korean Crisis broke out, the AFPFL leaders were
attempting to formulate their foreign policy concepts and
events within Burma were of overriding importance to them.
On December 8, 1948, in committee I (The Political and
Security Committee) Burma voted in favour of U.S.A. -
Australian - Chinese (Nationalist) sponsored resolution "to
regard the Seoul (Southern) Government as the only legal
government of the Republic of Korea." Burma opposed a
Soviet effort to challenge the legality of the Seoul Govern-
ment. The Burmese delegate said, "his government would not

recognize either government in Korea since it did not want to contribute to the division of a country." Since Burma's primary concern was unification of Korea. The Burmese delegate U Pe Kin expressed his nation's sympathy with the Korean people who were suffering as a result of a situation which was not of their own making. U Pe Kin said that his Government "was extremely perturbed at the tendency among certain powers to take the easiest course in solving a difficult situation like that in Korea, by proposing the partition of a country into separate zones."

The Burmese Government always opposed any measure which might create the differences and division between North and South Korea. The Burmese delegate U Pe Kin desired nothing more than to see Korea united. But he believed that the only solution which could bring about such unity was withdrawal, leaving the Korean people free to determine their own destiny.

In the 1949 session of the General Assembly, the report of the United Nations Commission for Korea was not


optimistic and was critical of the Republic of Korea as well as the North Korean regime. "Debates in Committee I were a clear reflection of the contest between the two power blocs and of the conditions which had caused the division of Korea into two zones. Committee I voted to continue and strengthen the United Nations Commission over stiff Soviet opposition. Burma supported this move. Burma also joined a large majority of committee I to defeat a Soviet proposal to abolish the United Nations Commission and brand its work illegal interference in Korean affairs."

The North Korean forces attack on the Republic of Korea, began on June 25, 1950 and was followed by the well-known immediate action of the United Nations Security Council. The Security Council requested all the United Nations member nations to render all assistance to the United Nations in repelling the North Korean attack. The Burma Government replied by a cable. "In acknowledging receipt of your cablegrams...... I have the honour to say that the government of the Union of Burma supports the stand taken by Security Council in regard to Korea at its meeting of 25 and 27 June 1950. My Government very much regrets, however, that it is

not in a position to render any effective assistance."

But later, Burma sent 400 tons of rice valued at £ 49,943 to Korea.

Again, Burma supported the U.S. sponsored proposal to establish a collective Measure Committee. At the fifth Session of General Assembly, Burma supported the resolution to continue the committee I, despite the strong opposition of the Soviet bloc and India abstained. Although Burma supported the original United Nations condemnation of North Korea "because it was clearly a case of aggression." She was unhappy over the crossing of the 38th parallel by United Nations troops, fearing this would make a negotiated settlement more difficult.

On October 4, 1950, Committee I adopted "by a thumping vote of 47 to 5" "a joint Western proposal which contained an "in direct but clear authorization for General Mac Arthur to move across the 28th parallel, in order to repeal North Korean forces. The same resolution established


a new United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK)." Burma was with the majority of Committee I to reject the first Soviet resolution, abstained on the vote which defeated the second, and joined the majority against defeat the third Soviet resolution. To take this step, Burma Government set an example for pursuing its policy concepts of "independence" and "non-alignment," and at the same time reflecting a certain suspicion of the Western nations, a natural attitude for any colonial country. U Tin, the Burmese delegate called upon the House to support the government's stand on Korea and said, "that foremost among the reasons for joining the United Nations was that Burma would receive assistance if subjected to aggression and that, therefore, it felt obliged to make some contribution when the United Nations opposed any aggression. Consequently, the Burmese delegation would support any measures designed to prevent threats to the peace or acts of aggression, which section C of the draft resolution, not so much from a legal point of view but rather as an instrument to make the United Nations effective in its primary function of preventing

threats to the peace in any part of the world." On account of some internal reasons Burma would be unable for some time to implement part C of the resolution. U Tin has rightly said that, "his government, therefore, for the present and foreseeable future, would be unable to take any action to implement that paragraph but it trusted that fact would not vitiate its acceptance of the principles embodied in the draft resolution." The Arab-Asian bloc, including Burma made efforts to ease tension and to work toward a peaceful settlement of the Korean war through compromise. On December 5th, the delegation of thirteen countries (including Burma), headed by Sir Bengal Rau of India, appealed to Communist China and North Korea immediately to declare that it is not their intention that any forces under their control should cross to the South of the 38th parallel.

India informed Committee I, on January 22nd that the Chinese communists had agreed to the possibility of a limited Korean cease-fire as a preliminary step in a Seven-power conference on the settlement of general political problems. "Over American opposition, Committee I adopted an Indian

17. United Nations General Assembly Committee I, fifth session, 367th meeting, (October 18, 1950)
motion for a forty-eight hour adjournment in view of the new development, and the Arab-Asian bloc went into action immediately."

The Burmese delegate Mr. Barrington said that, "the problem at hand, extended for beyond a mere finding of whether or not Communist China had committed an act of aggression, for this reason Burma and other Asian nations had not given up "attempts to seek a peaceful and honourable settlement of all existing issues in the Far East, through direct and free discussion between the governments most directly concerned."

There were too many representatives who participated in the debate of the Committee. Till 17 January 1961, at least fifty delegations had favoured negotiations which would not be confined to the Korean question but would extend to the question of Formosa. The delegation of Burma would be unable to vote in favour of the United States draft resolution and would support the Twelve-Power draft resolution.

According to the opposition of the United States draft resolution, the delegation of Burma stood its government's status with regard to its representation on the committee to be composed of the members of the Collective Measure Committee
under the eighth paragraph of that draft resolution, although Burma had been appointed a member of that Committee.

Burma is the staunch supporter of the policy of "non-alignment with power blocs" which often led its United Nations representatives into voting on both sides. This is found in the resolution presented in committee I on January 7, 1962. On January 6 the Soviet Union introduced a resolution calling for a "high-level meeting" of Security Council members in a special session with the objective of bringing an end to the Korean hostilities and promoting a settlement. In Committee I, the Burmese representative stated on January 8 that one reason why his delegation, which had taken part in the work of the Collective Measure Committee, had not been a sponsor of the eleven-nation resolution was that it wished to hear the views of the delegations which had not been represented on that committee. According to Burmese Government, the collective measures were necessary and would support the eleven-nation draft resolution. The Burmese delegate said that "he qualified this support, however, by stating that Burma would find it necessary to abstain on some parts, such as paragraph I and II of the operative part,

but it particularly welcomed paragraph 10. In giving support to this eleven-nation draft resolution, however, the Burma delegate stated that "he wished to make it clear that Burma was not aligning itself with any "bloc" but was only interested in the promotion of collective Security."

When the final vote came in Committee I on the eleven-nation resolution, calling for members of the United Nations to take preliminary steps, Burma voted with the Western powers, while only Argentina, India and Indonesia abstained. In the voting on each part of the resolution, Burma abstained on the "Second operative" part of the resolution, calling on United Nations members to have armed forces units available for service as United Nations units. A Soviet proposal for a Special Security Council session in committee I approved on January 9th, but the Western powers imposed some definite restrictions. Burma voted in favour of the resolution as finally amended but abstained from voting on the Western amendment when it was offered.

During the latter part of January, when the discussions started on the Korean armistice problem in Committee I, Burma took the stand as a small nation because Burma did not want to get involved in the two big power blocs. On February 2, a Joint Session of Committee I, II and III met on Korean
problems, and Burma, along with almost all of the Arab-Asian nations, voted in favour of Western-sponsored resolutions postponing Security Council discussion while armistice negotiations were in progress and against Soviet-sponsored resolutions on the same subject. In the same meeting of the Assembly, the Burma delegate joined the American delegate in urging the Soviet Union not to make a political propaganda forum out of the ECAFE meeting then in session; and when the Soviet delegate accused the United States of America of economic aggression in Asia, the Burmese delegate acting, as Chairman, ruled him out of order.

The voting record of Burma shows that Burma still did not follow India on all questions, because Burma was more aware of its position as the small neighbour of a large Communist China. Burmese Government was also afraid of the hostilities in Indo-China, which could affect their country. The speeches made, as well as evidence collected in this study, indicate that Burma tended to abstain on votes where Communist pressure was exerted and on resolutions sponsored by the U.S.S.R. or Communist bloc states. Burma always supported for a peaceful settlement of the Korean affair.

"On 28 resolutions in committee I between February 1, 1951 and December 8, 1954:
Burma voted with the U.S. ..... 12 Times
India voted with U.S. ..... 4 Times
Burma abstained ..... 10 Times
Burma voted with U.S.S.R. ..... 6 Times
India voted with the U.S.S.R. ..... 5 Times."

"Afterwards, Burma was also elected to the collective Measure Committee but did not participate in this committee after the cease-fire in Korea. On subsequent resolutions regarding Korea, the Burma voting pattern was maintained with constant justification statements by Burma delegates that their votes demonstrated "non-alignment" and "independence of action."

**THE ISSUE OF KUOMINTANG TROOPS IN BURMA:**

After the establishment of Communist China regime, the Kuomintang (KMT) debacle took place, because KMT troops, which were led by Republic China, had fled towards the South-west and Indo-China. Early in 1950 some 1700 crossed the border into the Kantung state of Burma. They also demanded food, transport and services from the inhabitants of the locality. The Burmese Army demanded that these troops should

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either leave Burmese territory or submit to disarmament and internment in accordance with international law. Accordingly, the KMT troops were withdrawn westward and established new headquarters at Monghsat as the base of KMT troops, under the Command of K.M.T. General Li Mi.

Until about the end of 1962, the KMT troops had limited their activities to the areas East of the Salween River. In the latter part of 1952, the freshly trained and re-equipped KMT troops began to extend their activities to areas south of it and they had also established contact with elements who were engaged in active rebellion against the Government of the union of Burma. At the same time, a unit of KMT troops moved Northwest ward crossing the Salween and attacking isolated Government outpost on their way. Another unit of KMT troops crossed the Salween River to attack Monghsu State from which they are now being driven out by the units of the Burmese Army.

At the Seventh General Assembly Session of 1962-1963, Burma submitted a complaint against the Nationalist Chinese Government, charging that her troops were committing

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aggression against Burmese territory.

"Having considered the complaint submitted to it by the Delegation of Burma Concerning the presence and hostile activities of the armed troops of the KMT Government of Formosa within the territories of the Union of Burma, their failure to submit to disarmament and internment as required by international law, their acts of hostility against the armed forces of the Union of Burma and their depredations against the civilian population therein the armed troops of the KMT Government of Formosa have committed acts of infringement against the territorial integrity of the Union of Burma and acts of violation of its frontiers."

The resolution also appealed to the Assembly to respect the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Union of Burma and to be guided by the principles of the charter in their relations with Burma. The complaint also charged that 12000 KMT troops "were now on Burmese territory. It is clear that in engaging in these illegal activities the KMT troops are being directed and supported by the Government of Formosa." It declared, "Nationalist troops were accused

of carrying on a veritable reign of terror, looting, pellag-
ring, raping and murdering."

The General Assembly, at its 420th Plenary Meeting on March 31, 1953 agreed to include Burma’s complaint as item 77 on its agenda. The request was approved. In any case, Justice U Myint Thein, Chairman of the Burma United Nations delegation, presented Burma’s complaint against the Chinese Nationalist Government before the United Nations Political Committee on April 17th. The Burmans also introduced a resolution calling for the condemnation of Nationalist China as an aggressor nation and also appealed to the United Nations to take appropriate action to bring about the disarming and internment or withdrawal of Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma.

Replying to Burma’s charges the Chinese Nationalist representatives, Dr. Tsiang Ting-Fu, stated "My government has no control over the Yunnan Anti-Communist and National Salvation Army." Admitting paradoxically that "we do have some influence over General Li Mi," Dr. Tsiang promised in conclusion that his government would exercise its "moral

influence" to bring about a solution to the problem, but opposed the Burma draft resolution and rejected Burma's monstrous charge of Nationalist-aggression."

Many compromise resolutions were subsequently discussed, and on April 22 and amended Mexican proposal was adopted by a vote of 58-0 with Nationalist China abstaining. Burma decided to vote for it in recognition of "the solid moral backing of the United Nations given her complaint."

It also provided that the United Nations should:
(1) "deplore and condemn the presence of foreign forces in Burma,
(2) declare that these foreign forces must be disarmed and either agree to internment or have the union of Burma forthwith.
(3) Request all states to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of the Union of Burma.
(4) Urge all states, on the request of Burma, to assist in the peaceful evacuation of these
(5) refrain from furnishing any assistance to these forces which may enable them to remain in the territory of the union of Burma."

But the resolution failed totally to name the Chinese Nationalist Government as aggressor as Burma wanted. The Burmese delegate also voted for the Mexican resolution when it came up before the General Assembly after having abstained in the Political Committee vote.

After this, an Argentine resolution was introduced but did not take Burma's side so strongly as did Mexican resolution. By this resolution the General Assembly would call upon all states to respect the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Union of Burma. General Assembly also requested "the Government of the Union of Burma and Government of the Republic of China and the other parties directly concerned to enter into negotiations with a view to bringing about the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the territory of Burma."

The United States also proposed a four-power (Burma, Republic China, Thailand and the U.S.) Conference to discuss means of solving the guerrilla problem on May 8th. In response to this, the Four-Nations United Nations Commission

met in Bangkok on May 22, 1963. At first, the Burmese delegate refused to sit with their Chinese Nationalist counterparts. By the middle of June, however, the Burmans were reported to have been impressed by the sincerity of American efforts to bring about the evacuation of Li Mi's forces. Representatives of all four-powers began meeting as a committee of the whole, and declared full accord on evacuation procedure.

The evacuation of KMT troops started very slowly amid Chinese protestations that they had no control over the forces in Burma and washed their hands of the "irregulars" who refused evacuation. The Premier of Nationalist China Dr. T.F.Tsiang said that "the troops — the original units retreated into Burma after the Communist victory in China — were not under the command of the Formosa Government the Chinese troops in Burma commanded by General Li Mi were fighting for home and family for their national liberation. The idea of aggression against Burma never entered our mind. The Li Mi Army — known as the National Anti-Communist Salvation Army — was not apart of the regular Chinese Nationalist forces."

30. Frank N. Trager, Patricia Whlgemuth, Lu Yu Kiang, op.cit., p. 12.
At eighth and ninth General Assembly Session, Burma brought the subject again and again. The General Assembly resolution merely called for continuation of the good offices of the United States and Thailand. The United States and Thailand continued their negotiations.

Evacuation negotiations continued throughout the summer as did sporadic fighting between Burman and KMT troops. On September 16, 1963 Burma's Ambassador to Thailand, U Pe Khin finally submitted a demand to the Chinese representatives on the Joint Military Commission that "Nationalist China agree to the evacuation of 5,000 of the 12,000 Nationalist troops in Burma within three weeks and the remainder within three months. The demand was designed to counter the possibility of a "token withdrawal stretched" out during the coming General Assembly Session. But the representative of Chinese Nationalist refused to accept both the Burman demand and the compromise proposal which was put up by the United States. The American Chairman, "severely censured" this attitude while the Burmese delegate walked out of the Conference.

Myint Thein, the Burmese delegate told the political and Security Committee of the General Assembly that "12000

Chinese troops commanded by the Nationalists and supplied from Formosa, had been terrorizing Eastern Burma and trying to overthrow the Burmese Government. Burma also accused Nationalist China of "dishonesty and insincerity" in four nations negotiations for the evacuation of an estimated 12,000 Nationalist Guerrilla troops from Burmese soil. Defence Minister U Baswe said that all the participants except Nationalist China, had agreed on an evacuation plan, but that it became "more and more apparent" that the Nationalist sought only "token" evacuation. On October 31, U Myint Thein outlined his government's attitude towards the proceedings. Speaking before the United Nations Political Committee, the Burma delegate acknowledged with "deep gratitude" American efforts towards a solution, but said, "without meaning to be ungrateful, I venture to state that in dealing with the authorities on Formosa, moral pressure is not enough..... If the United States would go a step further and threaten to suspend aid, I assure you the Kuomintang army will disappear over night." On November 5th, he stated before the same Committee that "the evacuation of only 2,000 men and disavowal by FormosaX of the remainder was no consolation and not the semblance of a solution."

34. New York Times, (October 6, 1953),
The evacuation proceeded in a manner hardly satisfactory to the Burma Government. It is openly revealed that American supplied arms and ammunition to these Chinese Nationalist troops. General Li Mi, head of these troops, has openly travelled by air between Formosa and Bangkok and then on to the head quarters in Burma. It is a well established fact that no sovereign nation can tolerate foreign troops on its soil. So Burma took a firm decision to terminate all United States assistance. It is due to the fact that they are irritated at the United States because of continued American support for the Chinese Nationalist on Formosa.

Now, Burma does not bother whether the United States stops or increases its aid, military or economic to the Chinese Nationalist in Formosa. But Burmese Government hoped that "the United States Government should use its good offices to stop killing, raping, arson and destruction of the Burmese people and Burmese territory by Chinese Nationalist troops now in Burma."

Observers interpreted Burma's move to drop United States aid as an effort to assure an independent position in the "cold war" especially since Communist China is Burma's next door neighbour. The United States Government is trying best to work out a settlement of Burma's complaint against Nationalist China that would involve the transfer to Formosa of thousands of Nationalist troops now on Burmese territory. The United States' Ambassador Mr. William J. Sebald had approached Prime Minister UNU with a proposal that the Burmese Army halt its campaign against the Chinese Nationalist guerrillas in northeast Burma. The American envoy also promised that "his Government would exert its influence with the Chinese Nationalist Government on Formosa to have the Guerrillas withdrawn. The guerrillas fled into the rugged frontier region of Burma to escape the Chinese Communist armies during the civil war in China."

Eight countries joint Commission questioned the United States to work for the evacuation of all pro-nationalist Chinese troops on Burmese soil. The aim of this meeting was to put before the political and Security Committee of the General Assembly the Burmese complaint that the recent

agreement to remove 2000 & troops to Formosa would still leave about 18000 Chinese jungle fighters on Burmese soil.

The six-powers resolution expresses concern that "few arms have been surrendered so far, it thanks the United States and Thailand for their efforts and urges them to continue striving for," "evacuation or internment of these foreign forces." Burmese delegate James Barrington told the General Assembly's Special Political Committee that Burma was gratified that about 5,600 Chinese troops already had been removed but that situation was intolerable, he also declared the remaining troops, still have a peaceful alternative to get-out "under their own steam" or submit to disarmament and interment."

The discussion before the Political Committee centered around an eight-nation draft resolution which had been presented on the same day. The resolution expressed concern over the failure of the evacuees to surrender their arms and requested the United States to work for the evacuation of the estimated 10,000 Nationalist troops still in Burma. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 51-0 with 6 abstentions.

Burma agreed to extend cease-fire and the issue was dropped from the United Nations agenda. General Li Mi, the former commander of Chinese Nationalist Guerrilla's came back in Burma and dissolved his "Yunnan Province Anti-Communist National Salvation Army." The Four-Nations Joint Military Commission had announced on July 30, that the programme had been completed with the evacuation of 7,000 men and their dependents. In view of the difficulties encountered in the evacuation of those troops, even the partial results obtained through the good offices of the Joint Military Committee and the effective cooperation of the Government of the Union of Burma with that Committee were a source of gratification. Within fifteen months, 7,000, foreign troops had been evacuated from Burmese territory, and large amounts of arms and ammunition had been handed over to the Joint Military Committee to be destroyed or later shipped to Formosa. In spite of all economic, political and geographical difficulties, the members of the Committee, particularly Thailand and the United States, should be congratulated on having achieved success on evacuation problems.

A third United Nations resolution revealed the fact that numerous foreign forces remained in Burma and that they were better armed and equipped than when the evacuation began. But the Burmese representative acknowledged that the evacuation which had already been carried out "represented the limit of what could be accomplished by international action," and that the disposition of the remaining Nationalist troops was their own responsibility. The Burmese Government requested that no further action took place and on October 15, 1954, the issue was discussed for the last time in the United Nations.

The Burmese Government could hardly regard that United Nations action had taken a satisfactory step. According to the Burmese point of view, the case was clear. There was a body of foreign troops on Burmese soil acting as insurgents against the government and openly being supplied arms from a nation (Taiwan) with which Burma had no formal diplomatic or other relations.

Hence, most Burman leaders have started to feel that their original hopes that "membership in the United Nations offered a small nation like theirs protection and success

Such resolutions by insistence that recommendations should involve an orderly process and be designed to relieve tensions rather than provoke further trouble. Burma always favours self government for non-self governing territories. This is particularly true of the question of independence for Morocco and Tunisia, when Burma in concert with the other Arab-Asian countries, had taken the lead in requesting General Assembly discussion of these items.

While most of the countries have rejected, the South African apartheid policy, it is the Afro-Asian blocs (including Burma) which has fought most strongly and consistently for United Nations condemnation of it. Since the Sixth Session, Burma has been associated with this bloc and "a sprinkling of Latin American Nations in sponsoring resolution calling for the establishment and continuation of the United Nations good offices commission on the treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa and on the racial situation in that country."

Burma has continuously taken the part of the indigenous inhabitants as associate members in the trusteeship

46. Frank, N. Trager, Patricia Wohlgemuth, Lu, Yu Kiang *op. cit.*, p. 15.
against outside interference were misplaced." The Burman leaders have often asserted that "reliance on the United Nations for protection of their sovereignty and security is a dubious foundation and that Burma does not want to become another Korea or a Congo."

Burma's participation as a member of the United Nations has been closely allied to that of other Arab-Asian nations. Like many other nations, she has achieved independence after a great struggle and also has a bitter experience of colonial period, so her sympathy lies for those nations who are now trying to reach the same goal. On colonial questions, however, she is thoroughly committed and never neutral. Her representatives have stated that "we consider it a great duty to fight for freedom, for our freedom as well as for the freedom of all those peoples who are less fortunate there as we are." So Burma supported the Indonesian Government's case against the Nether lands on West Irian. This general position on colonial questions often resulted in the Burma delegation "voting affirmatively for Soviet bloc resolutions, but even here the Burma delegation often qualified its support for

44. Frank, N. Trager, Patricia Wohlgemuth, Lu, Yu, Kiang, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
Council. Burma is a member of the trusteeship council and she will take even more of a leadership position in the Eleventh General Assembly debates on colonial matters. Burma takes part seriously and matters relating to the non-self governing peoples.

On the question of disarmament and control of nuclear weapons, the Burman stand has been consistently that of a small nation, having no responsibility in this field of international relations and therefore able to express freely whatever viewpoints appeal to it. Burma always welcomes all initiative towards disarmament, but as long as nations can not dispel their sense of mutual distrust, fear and suspicion and so long as the balance of terror is the order of the day, general and complete disarmament is a far-off dream.

There is no alternative to general and complete disarmament under effective international control which presupposes an effective system of Universal Collective Security and would necessarily take time. The prompt efforts should be directed towards agreement on collateral or partial

47. Ibid., p. 17.
measures of disarmament, those on weapons of mass destruction should be given first priority. Burma also urges a can on underground nuclear tests to compliment the partial test ban Treaty. Burma urges that the concerted efforts of the all member nations must be to stop the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons. Burma has been "particularly encouraged by the fact that the presentation by the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. before the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, represents a welcome departure in procedure from the previous partial Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty in that a wider cooperation and consensus is being sought. The opinion of Burma is that the element of balanced mutual responsibilities and obligations as between the nuclear powers and non-nuclear nations has been omitted. But this omission, the absence of a comprehensive nuclear Test ban Treaty, and with increased nuclear testing by two major nuclear powers, raises some doubt as to whether the forward step of the two-power agreement might not, in fact have been counteracted by several retrograde steps in other directions.


Burma's status on the problem of peace and security has been "uncommitted" it has also been clear and constructive. Burma has always supported collective action, advocated negotiation of differences, and opposed military force.

Comparison of Burma's votes on selected major questions of this type with those of the United States, U.S.S.R. and other Asian countries indicates a voting pattern similar to that of India and uncommitted nations. When Burma's votes in the United Nations differ from those of India, then she reflects her desire to prolong negotiations if there is the least likelihood that she might succeed. It should be noted, too, that "Burma has voted with the U.S. somewhat more than has India, which may reflect a greater Burmese awareness of the realities of communism learned in the long struggle to put-down the internal insurrection of the Burmese Communist Party." Burma strongly believes that the Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security, should the council be unable to initiate, a peace keeping operation in face of a veto, then the General Assembly has no other alternative than to take effective collective measures. The view of Burmese delegate is that where

51. Frank, N. Trager, Patricia Wohlgemuth, Lu Yu Kiang, _cit_, p. 6.

the Security Council is unable or unwilling to initiate peace keeping operations, then General Assembly has the duty and responsibility to seek alternative ways and means to keep the peace and repress aggression. Peace-keeping costs should be the responsibility of all Member States, including the permanent members of the Security Council which have substantial private or public interests in the area concerned, should assume correspondingly higher responsibility in the financing of peace keeping operations. U Thai Han, Foreign Affairs Minister of Burma said, "Peace is maintained not through collective action but through mutual terror. Mankind has arrived at a cross-roads and it must choose between drifting along the same old path and a new direction towards a more orderly world."

Establishing the peace requires that means must be found to strengthen the ground-rules of peaceful co-existence, this includes the recognition of the right of all nations freely to choose their own social systems without external interference. In seeking the strengthen the United Nations, the lack of universality of membership must be recognized as one of its shortcomings. The main purpose for peace

call for collective action to raise living standards throughout the world. Wholesale poverty, want and disease continue to scourges more than two thirds of the human race, while the remainder enjoy unprecedented affluence.

It is a well-known factor that the Burmese Government continuously supported membership for Communist China in the United Nations. So Burma did welcome the membership of Communist China recently, because, according to the Burmese Government, Communist China is legally entitled to the position. On the issues of membership for Communist bloc nations, however, the Burmese Government has taken a more "neutral" stand or followed the lead of the "neutralist" majority. They have refused to endorse membership for either the North Vietnam or South Vietnam or North Korean regimes.

After the Second World War, the world was virtually divided into two camps. "Bipolarization went on at an accelerated pace and small states found themsevles at the mercy of Super-Powers. The non-aligned policy, once held to be synonymous with immorality, has proved to be correct. Super powers, in spite of their immense strength and power,

find themselves helpless in solving problems in which they are directly or indirectly involved."

Burma, like India, refuses to join either side in the cold war. This does not mean that Burma is uninterested in political questions. But she realizes that her greatest contribution can be by staying "neutral." Mr. Barrington explains Burma's position that, "the emergence in the United Nations of two antagonistic blocs has, in our views, seriously undermined the system of collective Security ..... some members of the organization have joined neither of these antagonistic blocs ..... we think ..... that we serve best the cause of world peace by adhering to this attitude ..... those who accuse us of timidity little know how much moral courage it requires for us to remain uncommitted.

Burma also very much interested in programmes of the United Nations and its Specialized agencies, dealing with technical assistance, development financing and world trade. Burma has voted affirmatively on all measures which promised expansion of the United Nations technical assistance programme. Burmese delegate to the Seventh General Assembly

57. Frank, N. Trager, Patricia Wohlgemuth, Lu Yu Kiang, op.cit., p.6.
summed up Burma's attitude: "My delegation sincerely believes that the expanded programme of technical assistance has demonstrated, is still demonstrating, and will continue to demonstrate its value as an effective international means of activity in economic development of under developed countries, and my delegation is fully convinced that the continuation and expansion of this programme can make an important contribution to the achievement of higher standards of living for the peoples of the under developed areas."

A "Resident Representative of the Technical Assistance Board" has been in Burma since 1951, to coordinate the programmes of the various agencies involved and to act as the channel through which Burmese requests for assistance are sent. United Nations and its specialized agency experts have made important contribution for the development of Burma in various spheres. They have made basic surveys and prepared recommendations for such broad development fields as education, social services, industrial development, public health and forestry. Recommendations of a 1952, United Nations Social Services Mission, including experts from several agencies under Dr. Bulsara, formed the basis of Burma's official plans in the field and led to establishment of a separate Department of Social Welfare within the
Government of Burma to implement the programme.

It is quite wrong to say that Burma's relations with United Nations and specialized agencies have been in trouble, even in the sphere of technical assistance. The United Nations specialized Agencies do not always give sufficient importance to Southeast Asia in general and Burma in particular.

Burma's relations with the United Nations and its specialized Agencies are not, however, restricted to the receiving of aid. The Burmese were also hosts in 1950 for the meetings of the F.A.O. International Rice Commission and the Nutrition Committee for South and Southeast Asia. It is quite clear that Burma has supported those actions in the U.N.O. which might help her interests as an exporter of rice. So Burma is also related with several important F.A.O. projects of rice production and distribution. In 1955 a rice milling expert advised the Burmese technical means for improving rice processing to help bring Burmese rice consistently to the standards of the world market.

Burma's interest in the United Nations in economic matters has been typically that of an underdeveloped primarily

58. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
agricultural country embarked on an important programme of agricultural, industrial and social development. While the Burmese see in the U.N. a source of aid and encouragement, they recognize that United Nations facilities at present are far from adequate to the vast needs.

The General Assembly session of 1960 and 1961 may well go down in history as the turning point for the United Nations. At the 1960 Session, there were more heads of state and prime ministers present than ever before. "Even more important was the vigorous attempt of the U.S.S.R. to gain control of the organization with its "troika" proposals." Although non-aligned nations refused to accede to the Russian proposals, the Soviet Veto on the Goa resolution in the Security Council and their general silence and inaction on India's invasion of Goa showed clearly some importance for the future of the United Nations as an organ designed to maintain international peace and security.

Burma welcomed the acceptance of the stand-still ceasefire agreement in Middle East. This appears to reinforce the will for a political settlement on the basis of

59. Ibid., pp. 21-24.
the 1967 Security Council resolution. Burma is also aware of the grave situation, now imperilling the peace of Middle East or of the difficulties inherent in the situation, expresses its confidence that a just solution can be formulated under the term of that resolution. Burma has a faith that the United Nations and the powers concerned with the Arab-Israel conflict will continue their efforts to avoid the eruption of another devastating conflict.

U. Soe Tin, the permanent representative of United Nations from Burma said, "the delegation of Burma is concerned that the development in Vietnam may involve risks of a wider conflict and hopes that greater efforts will be made towards finding just solution enabling the Vietnamese people to determine their own future, free from all outside interference and pressure."

Burma appreciates the current peace-talks over Vietnam, and Burma is optimistic that they will pave the way to a future of their own choosing for the Vietnamese people free from all external interference. It is immoral to cling to adamant positions while innocent citizens are being subjected to indiscriminate bombing and brutal shelling.

U.Lwin, Chairman of Burma's delegation in United Nations, said, "A new era in the international order is taking shape, the meetings between the U.S. president and the leaders of China and the U.S.S.R. were of major political significance. The recent Simla Agreement has contributed considerably to peace in Asia as a whole."

The manner in which U Thant, the former United Nations General Secretary, had successfully handled the Dutch-Indonesian conflict over West Guinea Commands our respect and admiration. By his bold and diplomatic step, he was successful in bringing together the two bitter opponents and persuaded them to sit round a table with a third party acting as a friendly umpire. Always, he and his secretariat rendered such help and guidance to the parties to the conflict whenever required.

U Thant was also able to solve with the help of Security Council so many problems such as, the Cubian crisis, the Civil War in Congo, the claim of Indonesia to New Guinea, the disputed territory of North Borneo between Malaysia and Indonesia and the cease-fire between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.

U Thant also had expressed his deepest concern as to the possible implications of the alarming developments in the Middle East in 1967. U Thant said that "for more than ten years UNEF, acting as a buffer between the opposing forces of Israel and the U.A.R. on the Armistice Demarcation Line in Gaza and the International Frontier in Sinai, has been the principal means of maintaining quiet in the area. Its removal inevitably restores the armed confrontation of the U.A.R. and Israel and removes the stabilizing influence of an international force operating along the boundaries between the two nations."

After submitting his report, U Thant then flew to Cairo and conferred with Major General Indar Jit Rikhye Commander of UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force). U Thant, like his predecessor, Mr. Hammarskjold has followed the policy of "Preventive Diplomacy."

It is to state that in the "Sensitive areas" around the world, U Thant's unfailing efforts at maintaining international peace and security have been fully appreciated.

Some times, he felt frustrated and disappointed in failing to make many Member Nations, especially the great powers, fulfil their obligations under the Charter. This will require all the diplomatic acumen and positive efforts of the Secretary General, so that, with the help of the Security Council and the General Assembly, international peace and security may be maintained.

65. Ibid., p. 48.