CHAPTER - II

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“The Atom bomb is too dangerous to be loose in a lawless world............ We must constitute ourselves trustee of this force............It is an awful responsibility which has come to us instead of our enemies and we pray that He may guide us to use it in His way for His purpose.”

Harry Truman

These words of President Truman show, how willingly the US is accepting the responsibility to save the world from nuclear annihilation. And, of course, it must be. Because US is responsible for manufacturing and using these weapons for the first time in the history of the world. On watching the first ever nuclear test conducted by the United States at New Mexico, Robert Oppenheimer along with other Manhattam scientists shouted, “We all are sons of the bitches now”.

Since then, this American scientist lobbied to play a central role in mitigating what he saw as impending crisis. Bird and Sherwin in their American Prometheus made Oppenheimer responsible for drafting a report for the UN commission—The Acheson-Lilienthal report—that promoted

Scientific transparency and cooperative disarmament. According to Bird and Sherwin the report was “a singular model for rationality in the nuclear age”, also reflected a keen awareness
that the budding conflict with the Soviet Union could best be defused by pledging to rid the US of atomic weapons as a means of stopping the Soviet weapons program.

In January 1946, existence of even a few Atomic bombs so alarmed the United Nations General Assembly that it ordered the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which it had just established, to "make specific proposals", for the elimination from national armaments of Atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

In June 1946 the United States representative to the AEC, Bernard Baruch, presented an American plan on nuclear weapons to the commission. "We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead. Science has torn from nature a secret so vast in its potentialities that our minds cover from the terror it creates. Yet terror is not enough to inhibit the use of the Atomic bomb. We must provide the mechanism to assure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes and preclude its use in war."

The Baruch plan proposed the creation of an International Atomic and Development Authority that would be entrusted with all phases of the development and use of Atomic energy. Baruch urged that this authority alone possess the knowledge and control of all atomic energy activities. "Potentially dangerous to world security," And the power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities. Once this regime was in place he said the United states "then the sole producer" would stop the
manufacture of atomic bomb, and all existing bombs in the American arsenal would be eliminated.

Cold War suspicions and ambitions stalled any action on the proposal, but its concerns and proposed solution reappeared in modified form in later plans. By the time President Eisenhower stepped up to the UN podium on December 8, 1953, the United States had conducted 42 tests explosion and had developed Hydrogen bombs with an explosive power in the range of millions to tons of TNT (Compared to the 12000 to 20000 tons of TNT the bomb dropped on Hiroshima equaled).

The dangers of this vertical proliferation or growth in one state’s nuclear arsenal, were matched by the dangers of horizontal proliferation. Once the Soviet Union and Great Britain acquired their own nuclear weapons. This meant, two things Eisenhower feared. “First, the knowledge now possessed by several nations will eventually be shared by others—possibly all others. Second, even a vast superiority in numbers of weapons...is no prevention, of itself, against the fearful material damage and toll of human lives that would be inflicted by surprise aggression”.

Nations naturally had begun building warning and defensive systems against nuclear air attacks. But, he warned, “Let no one think that the expenditure of vast sums for weapons and systems of defense can guarantee absolute safety for the cities and citizens of any nation. The awful arithmetic of the atomic bomb does not permit of any such easy solution”.6

As part of his solution, Eisenhower proposed the creation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which would
promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy while the world’s nuclear powers “began to diminish the potential destructive power of the world’s atomic stockpiles”.

By the time the IAEA became open for membership in 1956, the disarmament components of the original vision were gone. The agency retained dual—some would say contradictory objectives. The IAEA was directed to “accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace”, and to ensure that its assistance “is not used in such a way to further any military purpose.”

John Kennedy tried to revive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. On September 25, 1961, he presented to the UN a “Program for General and Complete Disarmament”, “The weapons of war must be abolished”, he said, “before they abolish us”. His ambitious plan included all the elements that negotiators still pursue today: a comprehensive nuclear test ban; a ban on the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons (plutonium and highly enriched uranium); the placement of all weapons materials under international safeguards; a ban on the transfer of nuclear weapons, their materials or their technology; and deep reductions in existing nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, with the goal of eventually eliminating them.7

Kennedy undoubtedly recognized the practical national and international political obstacles to such a plan. Nevertheless, the President presented a vision—part propaganda—of the world he and his country sought. “The mere existence of modern
weapons—10 million times more powerful than anything the world has ever seen and only minutes away from any target on earth—is a source of horror and discord and distrust”, he said “Men may no longer pretend that the quest for disarmament is a sign of weakness, for in a spiraling arms race a nation’s security may well be shrinking even as its arms increase”.

In 1961, Kennedy established the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) to coordinate the government’s pursuit of these goals. One of the agency’s first tasks was to begin negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. According to George Bunn, the first ACDA general counsel and a principal member of the NPT negotiating team, “The basic purpose of the NPT was to provide another choice—to establish a common nonproliferation norm that would assure cooperating nuclear weapon ‘have-not’ countries that if, they did not acquire nuclear weapons, their neighbors and rivals would not do so either.”

There was much confusion in the early years of the cold wars, about what constituted “Mutual Deterrence”. Some confused it with the possession of nuclear capability by both sides. Others believed it arose when both sides had roughly the same number of nuclear weapons. However, strategists were quick to point out that there is a big difference between a balance of terror in which each side has the capacity to obliterate the other, and one in which both sides have that capacity, no matter who strikes first. In other words, it is not the ‘balance’ of an arms race that constitutes mutual deterrence; it is the stability of the balance. A
stable balance only exists when neither side is striking first can destroy the other's ability to strike back merely equaling or matching the weapon system of the enemy misconstrues the nature of the problem. To deter an attack means being able to strike back in spite of it. It means being able to strike second with 'assured destruction' capability.

But even this is not quite true. Deterrence does not mean that both sides must have efficient retaliatory system; it only means that each side must think the other had. This is so because deterrence is primarily a psychological phenomenon. If both sides have invulnerable deterrent forces, but neither side believes that the other has, then the situation is one of extreme instability, because each side will believe it could launch a successful attack. And if neither side has deterrent capacity, but both sides believe that the other side has it, then the situation is one of mutual deterrence even if all the objective requirements are missing. In other words, whether or not a situation of mutual deterrence exists depends on the state of mind or the mental image which one side has of the other, and it is not automatically connected with real-world objective military capabilities.

Whatever might be the definition or purpose of nuclear deterrence in the eyes of the analysts, the practical experience of the US Secretary of State Hennery Kissenger provides more authentic and reliable conclusion.

In a nuclear age the basic problem of strategy is in establishing a relationship between a policy of deterrence and a strategy
for fighting a war in case deterrence fails. From the point of view of its impact on the aggressor’s actions, maximum deterrence can be equated with the threat of maximum destructiveness. From the point of view of a power’s readiness to resist aggression, the optimum strategy is one which is able to achieve its goals at maximum cost.¹⁰

The horror and the power of modern weapons tend to paralyze action. Horror will make few issues seem worth contending for, the power causes may dispute to seem irrelevant to the over-all strategic equation. The psychological equations, therefore, will almost inevitably operate against the side which can extricate itself from the situation only by the threat of all-out war. As the power of modern weapons grows, the threat of all-out wars loses its credibility and therefore its political effectiveness. Our (U.S.A’s) capacity for massive retaliation did not avert the Korean war, the loss of northern Indochina, the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal, or the Suez crisis.

The power of modern weapons force our statesmanship to cope with the fact that absolute security is no longer possible. Whatever the validity of identifying deterrence with maximum retaliatory power, we will have to sacrifice a measure of destructiveness to gain the possibility of fighting wars that will not amount to national catastrophe. Policy, it has been said, is the science of the relative. The same is true of strategy, and to understand this fact, so foreign of our national experience, is the task history has set our generation.¹¹
During the 1980s and early 1990s the Regan administration developed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) which was an Anti Ballistic Missile System. The concept was to form a defensive shield against the nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. The popular press designated the program as “Star Wars” and was often critical of its extreme cost. The initial focus of the SDI was a nuclear explosion powered X-Ray laser designed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory by a young scientist named Peter Hagelstein who worked with a team called O Group, doing much of the work in the late seventies and early eighties. O Group was headed by physicist Lowell Wood, a friend of Edward Teller, the “father of the Hydrogen bomb”. In 1983 President Reagan was told of Hagelstein’s breakthrough by Teller, which prompted Reagan’s ‘Star War’ speech on March 8, 1983.

Though the program initially focused on large scale systems designed to defeat a Soviet offensive strike. However, as the threat diminished, the program shifted towards smaller systems designed to defeat limited or accidental launches. By 1987 the SDIO developed a national missile defense concept called the Strategic Defense System Phase-1 Architecture. This concept consisted of ground and space based sensors and weapons, as well as central battle management system. The ground based systems operational today trace their roots back to this concept.

In his 1991 State of the Union address George H. W Bush shifted the focus of SDI from defence of North America against large scale strikes to a system focusing on theatre missile
defense called Global Protection Against Limited Strike (GPALS)

In a televised speech of March 23rd, 1983, President Reagan asked the American Public for its support of the defence budget he had submitted to Congress. To gain this, he explained the key principle of military strategy in the nuclear age (‘deterrence of aggression through the promise of retaliation’) and highlighted the dramatically increased military power of the Soviet Union. This power, he claimed, undermined the ability of the US to guarantee retaliation and thus to maintain deterrence.

The Soviet have enough accurate and powerful nuclear weapons to destroy virtually all of our missiles on the ground.

In response to this threat, Reagan called for a continuation of the ‘major modernization program’ of conventional and nuclear forces which he had initiated after taking office in January 1981.

The President framed the main body of his speech with a futuristic vision. At the beginning he promised to reveal, ‘a decision which offers a new hope for our children in the twenty-first century’, and at the end he outlined ‘a mission to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive’. He asked:

What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest on the threat of instant US retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?
Reagan acknowledged that ‘this is a formidable technical task’, but he was confident that ‘the scientific community who gave us nuclear weapons’ could now ‘turn their great talents to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete’. As an important first step, the President initiated

A long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles.

Reagan’s vision of missile defense turned this address into one of the most controversial and influential presidential speeches of the 1980s. Some political analysts argue that by dramatically raising the stakes in the military competition between the US and the Soviet Union, Reagan’s missile defense program paved the way for the success of later arms reduction talks. However, when Senator Edward Kennedy first attached the ‘Star Wars’ label to Reagan’s vision in comments made on the floor of the Senate the day after the speech, it was to accuse the President of ‘misleading Red Scare tactics and reckless Star Wars schemes’. Kennedy’s comments were meant to point out the fantastic nature of Reagan’s missile defense program and the real dangers of his escalation of the arms race into space. Yet, despite these critical intentions, the ‘Star Wars’ label was so evocative and ambivalent that it was immediately embraced by some of Reagan’s supporters, and henceforth the program, which did not acquire its official—and rather uninspiring—title Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) until the spring of 1984, was universally known as ‘Star Wars’.
In subsequent decades, the notion of effective missile defence was gradually displaced by the principle of nuclear deterrence (appropriately known as MAD, for Mutually Assured Destruction). However, in the late 1970s, interest in strategic defence systems re-emerged in certain scientific, military and political circles which exerted a strong influence on Reagan, who was already opposed to the concept of offence-based nuclear deterrence and genuinely concerned about the vulnerability of the US in the event of a nuclear attack.

Since the end of the Cold War, a number of arms control advocates, politicians, and military officers have argued that the United States should substantially reduce its reliance upon nuclear weapons. Taking that argument to an extreme, a loosely knit group of retired military officers, scientists, and defense intellectuals maintains that the elimination of nuclear weapons should be an explicit goal of the United States. The abolitionists contend that the only plausible use of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack and that getting rid of nuclear weapons would eliminate this rationale. Although those holding more moderate views find this argument impractical, they too are ambivalent about nuclear deterrence, claiming that the risk of accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons outweighs any conceivable benefit. Some abolitionists and many military officers maintain that conventional precision-guided munitions (PGMs) offer an effective alternative to nuclear weapons.

While the abolitionists and their less extreme brethren perform a valuable service by subjecting nuclear weapons to critical
scrutiny, they overstate both the level of public support for their case and the viability of conventional alternatives. A careful assessment of public attitudes toward nuclear weapons reveals considerable skepticism toward nuclear disarmament. Nor can PGMs take the place of weapons. The U.S. armed forces must overcome daunting technological and organizational barriers before PGMs are truly capable of deterring and defending against weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Without a candid discussion of what conventional weapons can and cannot do, the United States risks a dangerous erosion of its nuclear deterrent before laying the groundwork for an alternative defense posture.¹⁴

While nuclear weapons played an important role in U.S. strategy during the Cold War, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union have triggered a reassessment of nuclear weapons policy within the defense community. The first call to reconsider the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy came from an unlikely source. In an article written in January 1994, Paul H. Nitze argued that it was time for the United States to reexamine its reliance upon nuclear deterrence. He reasoned that the threat of nuclear retaliation would be unlikely to deter aggression by regional powers, and that the U.S. government would be unwilling to use nuclear weapons to punish such a move. As a result, he recommended converting the principal U.S. strategic deterrence from nuclear weapons to PGMs. Nitze believed that such a force would give the United States of more credible and flexible deterrence. He argued that “It may well be that conventional strategic weapons will one day
perform their primary mission of deterrence immeasurable better than nuclear weapons if only because we can, and will, use them. 15

Whereas Nitze sought to enhance deterrence, those who have dominated the ensuing debate have sought to abolish it. In late 1995 the Australian government formed the Canberra Commission for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, a group comprising such experienced policymakers as former secretary of defense Robert McNamara and former French prime minister Michel Rocard. The commission’s report, issued in August 1996, called on the United States, Russia, China, Britain, and France to commit themselves to the elimination of all nuclear weapons. The commission’s members rejected the argument that the possession of nuclear weapons deters war. To them, the notion that nuclear states would be able to retain their arsenals indefinitely without the possibility of nuclear weapons’ being used lacked credibility. They argued that the only way to eliminate the threat of nuclear war would be to abolish nuclear weapons. To achieve this goal, the commission recommended that the nuclear states should reduce the readiness of their strategic nuclear forces, eliminate their tactical nuclear arsenals, end nuclear testing, and initiate negotiations to reduce further, the size of the American and Russian nuclear stockpiles. They also called upon the nuclear powers to agree unanimously not to be the first to use nuclear weapons nor to use them against non-nuclear states.

For him, nuclear deterrence represented not a force for stability, but rather a catalyst for conflict. As he put it, deterrence rests
upon an “embedded assumption of hostility and associated preference for forces in high states of alert,” a posture that could lead to war through accident or miscalculation. He was dubious of the ability of nuclear weapons to deter the use of chemical or biological weapons by rogue states. He claimed, in short, that a world free from the threat of nuclear was had to be devoid of nuclear weapons.

Given Butler’s intimate contact with nuclear doctrine and weapons throughout his military career, his conversion to abolitionism was certainly striking. It was not, however, unique. In the wake of Butler’s speech, sixty-one retired generals and admirals from seventeen countries, including Charles Horner, William Odom, John Galvin, and Andrew Goodpaster of the United States, Lord Carver and Sir Huge Beach of Great Britain, and Boris Gromov and Alexander Lebed of Russia, joined the chorus calling for nuclear abolition. In February 1998, 120 former civilian leaders from forty-six countries, including Jimmy Carter, Lord Callaghan, Mikhail Gorbachev, Helmut Schmidt, and Pierre Trudeau, released a statement supporting the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Goodpaster went on to lead a study group under the sponsorship of the Henry L. Stimson Center. The group’s March 1997 report, An American Legacy: Building a Nuclear Weapon Free World, argued that the president should commit the United States unequivocally to the elimination of WMD and advance the cause by seeking ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and by negotiation a third Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. It also called for a blank-sheet
review of U.S. nuclear weapons policy, a cutoff in the production of fissile material, and an invitation to others to participate in nuclear threat reduction activities.

Although the abolitionists are a loosely knit group, they share a number of core beliefs. The first is that the only rational purpose for nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack, a possibility that would disappear if nuclear weapons were eliminated. In addition, the abolitionists argue that nuclear weapons cannot deter attempts by regional powers to coerce or invade their neighbors, protect U.S. troops from attack, or deter or respond to the use of chemical or biological weapons. Hence, the costs and risks associated with nuclear weapons outweigh the benefits of possessing them. General Butler has portrayed deterrence as “a formula for unmitigated catastrophe... premised on a litany of unwarranted assumptions, improbable assertions and logical contradiction.” In his eyes, “the threat to use nuclear weapons is indefensible.”

A second assumption, which flows from the first, is that the elimination of nuclear weapons will produce a safer world. As the members of the Canberra Commission put it, “a central reality.” Left out of the abolitionist abolitionist argument is the relationship between nuclear deterrence and the outbreak of conventional war. In fact, many people have argued that nuclear deterrence helped to prevent war between the United States and Soviet Union. While the abolition of nuclear weapons would, by definition, eliminate the possibility of nuclear war, it could increase the potential of conventional war.
A final, often implicit, assumption is that non-nuclear munitions offer a viable alternative to nuclear weapons Nitze has made the case most explicitly, but the assumption clearly figures in other arguments as well The National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control, for example, argues that the United States’ conventional superiority over potential adversaries will allow it to restrict its nuclear arsenal to the deterrence of nuclear attack or coercion Andrew Krepinevich and Steven Kosiak, while not abolitionists, nonetheless agree that PGMs will permit the United States to make deep reductions in its nuclear arsenal The central question is whether non-nuclear PGMs will be able to deter aggression and-failing that-whether they can carry out the same missions as nuclear weapons

The overriding interest of the United States in South Asia lies in the establishment of positive and constructive relations with India, a rising power with one sixth of the world’s population India is growing economically at an average annual rate of 7%, and is developing significant military power projection capabilities that will make it an increasingly important factor in the Asia balance of power and in global councils

The key to a constructive American relationship with India and with neighboring Pakistan is to avoid embroilment in their struggle over the terms of their power relationship Yet during the cold war the United States became enmeshed in this struggle American policy assigned a clear priority to relations with Pakistan by providing a total of $3 8 billion in military aid to Pakistani military rulers that was nominally directed against the
communist powers but was in practice used to strengthen Pakistan relative to India.

The psychological and political legacy of this cold war American tilt continues to trouble United States relations with India despite the steady growth in economic and cultural ties. Shortly after Prime Minister of India I K. Gujral assumed office in May 1997, The New York Times, in a profile of the new Indian leader, recalled the strained atmosphere that had marked a recent meeting between Gujral and a prominent American senator. Gujral “maintained an air of studied distance,” and aide to the senator told the Times “There was a kind of bristling feeling, as though there were bad memories that had not been fully laid to rest.”

In Pakistan the cold war years have also left painful memories that impede constructive relations with the United States.

The most sensitive issue in American relations with the South Asian countries especially India and Pakistan is the issue of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear arms control. Since the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union, American self-image as the “only super power” has reinforced the American assumption that the nuclear club should be restricted to its five present members and that the United States is entitled to have the biggest— and best— nuclear arsenal in order to preserve international stability. In pressing India and Pakistan to sign the NPT, the United States has presented its position in benign, altruistic terms, emphasizing its desire to help prevent a nuclear war in South Asia. The implication is that South Asian
are irrational fanatics who cannot be trusted with the bomb and that deterrence, which was the basis of the United States strategic doctrine during the cold war, will not work in the non-Western world. Since the United States is the only country that has ever used nuclear weapons, this American emphasis on the nuclear danger in South Asia is viewed in India and Pakistan as at best patronizing and at worst racist.

Many Indians have what might be called a "post-dated" self-image, they are confident that India is on the way to great power status and want others to treat them as if it has already arrived. By the same token, to many Americans India's ambitions are pretentious nonsense, given its widespread poverty, and New Delhi should be prepared to deal with the United States on the basis of the actual power relationship between the two countries. This is the normal attitude for a powerful state to adopt in relations with a less powerful state, but its practical effect, in the case of India, is to reinforce nationalist feeling, including support for nuclear weapons.

India's space program also acquires growing sophistication. It is developing technical capabilities that could be used to make intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States possibly within 10 years. Meanwhile, by marking clear that it is capable of rapidly assembling and delivering short-range and intermediate range nuclear weapons through its Prithvi and Agni missile programs, India is attempting to assert major power status without incurring the economic and diplomatic costs that overt weaponization would involve.
U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry announced a basic reversal of American nuclear policy in South Asia and said on Jan. 31, 1995, in a talk before the New York based Foreign Policy Association “I recognize that the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan flow from a dynamic that we are unlikely to be able to influence in the near term. Rather then seeking to roll back – which we have concluded is unattainable in these two countries we have decided, instead to seek to cap their nuclear capabilities.”

Despite this pronouncement, the United States has failed to give India and Pakistan concrete incentives to cap their nuclear weapons potential at present levels. Yet the Perry declaration has opened up the possibility of a pragmatic bargain between India and the United States that could achieve the capping objective and, more broadly, reduce tensions over nonproliferation that could threaten the stability of the Indo-American relationship.

In such a bargain, India would retain its nuclear weapons option but would agree to a series of concessions that would make its commitment to capping unambiguous and also provide political cover for the Clinton administration to make parallel American concessions. An accommodation between India and the United States on nonproliferation and nuclear arms control issues is a prerequisite for a parallel accommodation with Pakistan.

First, India would seek a compromise with the United States in their current dispute over India’s refusal to sign the test ban treaty. One approach would be to sign the treaty while reserving
the right to conduct further tests (as China has done) until the treaty goes into force. Another approach would be to stop testing without signing the treaty, either immediately or after further tests. The Indian government could make a declaration, endorsed by parliament, citing the key clauses of the treaty and explicitly pledging that India will unilaterally comply with these provisions.

Second, India would agree to extend the application of international Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, now limited to its Tarapur nuclear reactor, to all of its existing and future civilian nuclear reactors, and would sign the fissile material cutoff convention now being negotiated, which would require similar safeguards to confirm that fissile material is not being diverted from power reactors for military use. (This would not constitute the “full-scope” safeguards hitherto demanded by the United States because inspections of research reactors and reprocessing facilities would still be barred.

Third, India would make a binding commitment not to export nuclear technology, formalizing its present de facto policy. This would place New Delhi in accord with a key provision of the NPT.

The United States for its part, would have to make clear that it is reconciled to India’s acquisition of the nuclear weapons option and avoid policies suggesting that it still harbors the “rollback” objective. In particular, the United States would have to end its ban on the sale of nuclear reactors to India and other restrictions on United States cooperation with India’s civilian nuclear power
program, starting with restrictions on United States cooperation on nuclear safety. This would require amendment of the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act to allow exports of Nuclear technology under specified conditions.\footnote{20}

The United States is now without doubt the dominant military power in the world. With twelve-battle-carrier groups and hundreds of military bases spread around the world, the US spent $455 billion on its armed forces in 2005, with another $82 billion marked for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This is more than the total sum spent by the next thirty-two countries down the list, and is close to 50\% of total world military spending. The quadrennial defense review released by the Pentagon on 3 February 2006 and the federal budget for fiscal year 2007 released on 6 February schedule further increases both of military spending and of the range of operational program.

‘Open Democracy’s’ global security correspondent Paul Rogers points out: “As these budgets increase, almost every other area of federal spending is reduced—clear evidence of the overarching priority of fighting the war...This is clearly a global war, and the world as a whole is involved, whether or not it wants to be”

Moreover, the United States shows every sign of determination to use as well as expand this military power. US military doctrines have shifted away from deterrence to preemption, unilateral military intervention, and simultaneously fighting several local wars overseas. The US military has put in place a 2004”...
global strike alert order” from Donald Rumsfeld that requires it to be ready to attack hostile countries that are developing weapons of mass destruction, specifically Iran and North-Korea. The military claims to be able to carry out such attacks within “half a day or less” and to use nuclear weapons in such an attack."}^{21}
References


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