Conclusion
CONCLUSION

“We live in an age of nuclear giants and ethical infants. We lie in a world that has achieved brilliance without wisdom, power without conscience. We’ve unlocked the mysteries of the atom and forgotten the lessons of the Sermon on the Mount. We know more about war than we know about peace, more about killing than we know about living.”

Omar Bradley

Nuclear deterrence overwhelmingly dominated the Cold War calculus of international security. Nuclear weapons dictated a requirement for instant readiness for war fighting that continues to this day. Even though Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, thousands of nuclear weapons remain on hair-trigger alert.

Despite their best efforts the supporters of the concept of nuclear deterrence cannot prove that nuclear weapons preserved the peace in Europe or elsewhere in the world. What can be claimed though is that they played a supporting role in preserving the peace. Nor can supporters of deterrence prove that the many crises during the Cold War were resolved or contained primarily by the threat of nuclear war. The history of the Cold War is replete with compelling evidence of the pernicious effects of the open-ended quest for nuclear
deterrence, as shown by Professors Janice Stein and Richard Ned Lebow in a study entitled We All Lost the Cold War

In today’s post-Cold War World, defining national security merely, or primarily, in military terms conveys a false sense of reality. Nearly half a century of Cold War fashioned the issue of security into powerful conventional simplifications that are no longer valid. Unfortunately, many of these traditional and outmoded concepts retain great currency amongst certain security analysts and defense planners, and the dominance of military and strategic considerations in the conduct of international relations endures as a legacy of the Cold War. While stability was and continues correctly to be of prime strategic importance in a transforming world its pursuit by some influential countries places exaggerated emphasis upon nuclear weapons and military concepts that are presumed still to lie at its core.

In a post-Cold War world, the political value of nuclear weapons has declined markedly rendering them, more a liability than an asset. Despite the changed political climate and the window of opportunity to restructure international relations away from reliance on nuclear weapons, many influential thinkers and military planners in the United States, NATO, the Russian Federation and in some other countries still believe in the integrity of nuclear deterrence- i.e. that stability and security would necessarily be jeopardized in the absence of nuclear deterrence. Such deeply embedded beliefs are extraordinary resistant to new thinking or to change. They also reflect the reluctance of national security planners in the NWS to conceive of a security architecture that does not rely on nuclear arms.¹
Nuclear weapons are held by a handful of states which insist that these weapons provide unique security benefits, and yet reserve uniquely to themselves the right to own them. This situation is highly discriminatory and thus unstable, it cannot be sustained. The possession of nuclear weapons by some states is a constant stimulus to other states to acquire them… a central reality is that nuclear weapons diminish the security of all states.


But in the aftermath of the Cold War several factors intervened to dampen hopes and bring into question the resolve to achieve
nuclear reductions and to implement fully a number of negotiated arms control agreements. The bilateral START I process has been at a standstill, entry into force of the CTBT remains at best a remote possibility, testing and deployment of missile defence systems threaten the integrity of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.²

Attempts have been made to make peaceful uses of atomic and nuclear energy. For this purpose Nuclear materials declared surplus to military requirements by the USA and Russia are now being converted into fuel for commercial nuclear reactors. The main material is highly enriched uranium (HEU), containing at least 20% uranium-235 (U-235) and usually about 90% U-235. HEU can be blended down with uranium containing low levels of U-235 to produce low enriched uranium (LEU), typically less than 5% U-235, fuel for power reactors. It is blended with depleted uranium (mostly U-238), natural uranium (0.7% U-235), or partially-enriched uranium.

Highly-enriched uranium in US and Russian weapons and other military stockpiles amounts to about 2000 tonnes, equivalent to about twelve times annual world mine production.

World stockpiles of weapons-grade plutonium are reported to be some 260 tonnes, which if used in mixed oxide fuel in conventional reactors would be equivalent to a little over one year’s world uranium production. Military plutonium can blended with uranium oxide to form mixed oxide (MOX) fuel.

After LEU or MOX is burned in power reactors, the spent fuel is not suitable for weapons manufacture.
Commitments by the US and Russia to convert nuclear weapons into fuel for electricity production is known as the Megatons to Megawatts program.

Surplus weapons-grade HEU resulting from the various disarmament agreements led in 1993 to an agreement between the US and Russia governments. Under this Russia is to convert 500 tonnes of HEU from warheads and military stockpiles (equivalent to around 20,000 bombs) to LEU to be brought by the USA for use in civil nuclear reactors.

In the short term most US military HEU is likely to be blended down to 20% U-235, then stored. In this form it is not usable for weapons.³

Disarmament will also give rise to some 150-200 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium (Pu). Weapons-grade plutonium has over 93% of the fissile isotope, Pu-239, and can be used, like reactor-grade Pu, in fuel for electricity production. Options for its disposal include:

- Immobilization with high-level waste-treating plutonium as waste,
- Fabrication with uranium oxide as MOX fuel for burning in existing reactors,
- Fuelling fast-neutron reactors.

At the NPTREC, Vice-President Al Gore, and later at the September 1996 signing of the CTBT, President Bill Clinton committed the United States to promote non-proliferation and disarmament ensures leading to the eventual prohibition of all
nuclear weapons. The leaders of the other NWS made similar promises. On living up to these commitments, however, the record is mixed and there is a crying need for political leadership.

Rational humans recognize that nuclear weapons are not sensible as they have no utility although they have the capacity to destroy civilization. Recognizing this, the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, founded in 1957 by scientists who sought to build bridges between East and West and eventually to outlaw nuclear weapons, believe that if humankind acts rationally, sooner or later it will abolish nuclear weapons.\(^5\) Professor Jozef Rotblant, 1995, noble prize winner and President of Pugwash, is one of the distinguished scientist who believed that because of proliferation risks, mankind should give up nuclear power altogether.

The evils of nuclear proliferation were visible in Europe, besides the two super powers. That’s why Europe was the center of world politics through out the cold war period. The post cold war period witnessed the shift of world politics from Europe to Asia, specially South Asia. Because the Asia-Pacific is a region where increase in defense spending in real terms and the number and quality of the weapons being acquired have made it the fastest growing arms market in the world. It is also a region where security analysts have fundamental disagreements over the implications of the arms build up, where the level of transparency in military expenditures is so low that it is often impossible to relate the procurement process to a perceived set of military needs, and where all of this is taking place
against a backdrop of uncertainty, vastly increased geo-strategic complexity and simmering disputes over sovereignty, territory and control of off shore resources. At the same time, it is also a period of relative calm and of increasing national and regional confidence. In short, it is hard to imagine how the circumstances could be more propitious for the introduction of a little substantive “bite” into official efforts to strengthen peace and stability in the region.

In the wake of the short-lived burst of multilateral mania that marked the end of the cold war, completely unrealistic demands were made of the United Nations by an international community unprepared to provide the material and political support necessary to sustain far more modest objectives. Now that the rose coloured glasses are gone, and with them the illusion that the United Nations can do everything there is a tendency to conclude that the United Nations can do nothing. A more measured analyses suggests a trend towards a new kind of burden sharing in which regional organization increasingly seek to equip themselves to find practical, workable solutions to regional problems which might become crisis requiring broader involvement if left unaddressed.6

The may 1998 South Asian explosions marked the shift of world attention to this region, which comprises mostly, the states who had newly gained independence from the colonial power.

The nuclear weapons states believe that they have a very great stake in the world nuclear order that they have built after more than half a century of determined efforts. They have
accomplished this task on the one hand by developing new nuclear weapon systems, by building up massive arsenals of such weapons and by devising doctrines to justify their retention and use, and, on the other hand, by trying to convince the rest of the world that these weapons are safe in their hand but highly dangerous in the hand of other countries. They have coined and given wide currency to such phrases as “rogue” countries and “delinquent” nations to characterize those countries which aspire or attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction.⁷

For the first time since the end of the cold war, the war against Iraq, fought at least officially over the possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); the standoff between India and Pakistan over Kashmir; the unresolved showdown on the Korean peninsula; and the efforts of transnational terrorist networks to manufacture or acquire such weapons – together, these dangerous crises mark the new nuclear age that has succeeded the US-Soviet Union confrontation of the post 1945 era.

The response of the United States to the new strategic environment has been formulated in two recent White House papers. The first paper, concerning the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002), marked the adoption of the pre-emptive strike doctrine: ‘While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting pre-emptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country.
The second paper, the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002), referred to the eventual recourse to a nuclear strategy: 'The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force- including through resort to all our options – to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies'. The same report makes clear that pre-emption does not replace deterrence. The question is, whether recourse to nuclear strategy would be lawful under these circumstances?

In 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) responded to two requests for advisory opinions, the first by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the second by the UN General Assembly, concerning the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The Court decided that it had no jurisdiction to answer the first request and gave an ambiguous answer to the second.

The Court’s opinion to the UN General Assembly stressed that there existed no universal rule of international law specifically authorizing or prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. It further stated that use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons that contravenes the prohibition of the use of force and fails to meet all requirements of the right of self-defence is unlawful. The opinion also underlined that use of nuclear weapons should be compatible with international humanitarian law. So far, so predictable. The further conclusions were wholly unexpected.

In the last and fairly obscure part of the operative part of opinion, the Court stated that the threat or use of nuclear weapons
‘would generally be contrary’ to international humanitarian law; but ‘in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a state would be at stake. ‘After 104 paragraphs of detailed technical legal analysis, the cardinal standpoint of the ICJ is that international law cannot guide the states’ conduct during a nuclear crisis.8

President Bush himself has admitted publicly that he doubts nuclear deterrence would work against what he rightly sees as the greatest threat to Americans: extremists armed with weapons of mass destruction.

That is why his administration has adopted a policy of “preventive counter-proliferation” by all military means, including nuclear weapons. The drawback is that, in addition to being a contradiction in terms, it greatly increases the risk of nuclear weapons use, because the most likely proliferators are least likely to be deterred.

For the foreseeable future, the type of pre-emptive war now entered into by the US and the UK deprives all forms of global arms control of credibility..

Once the Cold War nuclear confrontation between the USA and the Soviet Union was over, three major international treaties offered the promise of an end to nuclear arms proliferation – and even their eventual abolition. Two bilateral Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) of 1992-93 were followed by the
extension of the multi-lateral Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 (the latter still has to enter into force). Almost overnight, nuclear weapons lost their looming importance in the public eye. Consequently, a public debate on the role of nuclear weapons in foreign and security policy simply failed to occur.

The NPT entered into force in 1970, and remains the cornerstone of global control over the proliferation of nuclear weapons. All but three member countries of the United Nations have not signed it (Israel), India and Pakistan). But many are uncomfortable with the treaty’s ‘two class’ character, allowing some countries to keep their nuclear weapons while forbidding others to develop them. Perhaps we were lulled into a false sense of security when the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was extended in 1995.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then UN-General Secretary, spoke of his hopes for a more just and sensible way to control nuclear weapons, not only with regard to the actual warheads but also to their delivery systems, and dual-use technology. To be fully effective such controls, he said, would have to be balanced and fair; should not hinder the peaceful use of science and technology; and should not split the world into ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’.

Controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction is clearly dependent on designing and enforcing effective verification procedures for each of these treaties. If disarmament is to be taken seriously, effective monitoring and verification is essential.
This is as true for verification of post Cold War arms reductions as for ceasefire agreements.

For historic reasons, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections have traditionally concentrated on the amount of materials available to build nuclear weapons rather than an evaluation of the danger of proliferation from each country. This system used to mean that over the years more than half of the IAEA’s annual budget for routine inspections was spent in Germany, Japan and Canada, While countries in the Middle East or South Asia, for example, were less intensively inspected. However, this is changing. Since Iraq was found in violation of its NPT obligations, a strengthened system of safeguards has been progressively instituted, incorporating a new Additional Protocol to safeguard agreements. This will intensify verification. A program of integrated safeguards will attempt to rationalize them and put resources into the appropriate activities.

Before we rush too quickly to accuse so-called ‘rogue states’ we need to consider that numerous states have been involved in trading material as well as know-how with counties like Iraq, enabling Saddam Hussein to develop his nuclear, chemical and biological capabilities. The main exporters were not North Korea, Iran, Syria, Libya or Cuba but Germany, France, Russia, the UK and the US, Spain, South Africa, Brazil and China. As there was no monitoring of this trade, Iraq’s WMD program went unnoticed by the international community. The Nuclear Suppliers Group have long attempted to restrict the export of materials and technology to potential proliferators. But companies often
circumvent these attempts. Equipment is often genuinely dual use.

However, if the IAEA and the conventions, or any other organization on their behalf, were to register the trade in arms and weapons-related materials (UNMOVIC could surely supply a list of what should be categorized as such), similar program elsewhere in the world could be detected much earlier.

It is often argued that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is essentially a political problem. It is true that the struggle for power often drives proliferation, and that there is no reliable technical solution which ensures the total detection of weapon usable materials. It is also true that only measures in the political arena can end proliferation. But the scientific-technological nature of the root of the problem should not be overlooked. Only too often, scientific-technological developments influence the possibilities of political power, mostly irreversibly. In the long term, deciding what to do about WMD proliferation also necessitate decisions about path of scientific-technological advance.

The WMD proliferation problem will not be solved by short-term solutions. What is obvious is the need for a re-orientation of the technological determinants of our industrialized global culture. The civil-military ambivalence of many advanced research and development program needs to be addressed, and proposals for radically new research policies outlined which will safeguard against the commercial exploitation of weapons relevant technologies.
It seems this would only be workable if the current security paradigm of the western hemisphere was changed and deterrence replaced by cooperation. Only then is a long-term solution imaginable. Bearing in mind the political arena, with its many different players, their various ambitions, and the ongoing struggle for western domination.

The case of biological weapons is probably the most difficult arms control verification challenge of all. This is one reason why the ban on biological weapons contained in the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) does not have a verification system. Normally a total ban on a weapons is cast in terms of the spectrum of banned activities, ranging from research and development through to deployment and use. In the case of biological weapons, several of the stages in the life cycle of the banned weapon are difficult to discern and therefore verity. The scientific data are often ambiguous. Attempts to verify the illicit research, development, production and stockpiling of biological weapon in the past have failed, in part because of these considerations.

These difficulties were among those that led the United States to conclude that it could not support any form of verification system for the BWC and that it should therefore block agreement on the draft protocol to the treaty that was due to be agreed in 2001. The US claimed that it feared that intrusive verification would lead to a loss of commercial propriety information by its highly competitive and lucrative biotechnology industry, and that its bio-defence program would be exposed to foreign espionage via
international on-site inspections and other monitoring and verification activities.

Among the South Asian countries, there are ‘good’ as well as ‘bad’ nukes. After the 1998 South Asian nuclear explosions, the official Indian nuclear dogma has maintained that India’s nuclear weapons are ‘good’ nukes, the welcome fruit of decade of self reliant labor by Indian scientists and engineers and a symbol of India’s scientific and technological strength. Nuclear weaponization is presented as necessity for the protection of the geo-political interests of a great nation that has finally found the will to become a world class power.

On the other hand, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were always ‘bad’, a technologically weak ‘nations’ upstart reaction to the legitimate ambitions of the regional super power. Worse still, Pakistan’s bomb were, technologically speaking, mostly stolen goods and, politically, the product of an undemocratic, military – ruled and theocratic state. Besides, Pakistan was recently under severe international pressure as the hidden story of Pakistan’s nuclear exports to Libya, Iran and North Korea has slowly emerged, and the father of Pakistani bomb was forced to confess to the illegal marketing of nuclear technology.

US approach in nuclear policy vis-a-vis India, from the days of the Strobe Talbott- Jaswant Singh talks to the present, little progress has been made in US approach towards India’s nuclear policy. For both India and Pakistan, sanctions for withdrawn for reasons relating to the post 9/11 ‘war on terror’ rather than any shift in the US nuclear policy.
Actually the demands on India for cooperation on the non-proliferation front should cause even more concern than they did earlier. In the post 9/11, after the announcement of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in mid-2003 by the US, cooperation in non-proliferation has an entirely new meaning. The Bush-Vajpayee statement describing India and the US as ‘partners in controlling the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them’ needs to be parsed in the light of this new moves.

Pakistan also acquires a significant place in US policy of South Asia the US needs Gen. Musharraf for a variety of purposes including the pursuit of its objectives in Afghanistan. While offering an exit from the corner that Gen. Musharraf finds himself in, Washington would like to extract as much as possible from the Pakistani leader on the nuclear question. That was the bargaining between Washington and Islamabad. It has been assumed that the US would want a full disclosure on the past proliferation activity of Dr Abdul Qadir Khan and the Pakistani establishment. That will be crucial in understanding the extent of the damage done by the onward proliferation from Pakistan.

It may be also possible that the US would also like a credible set of actions from Gen. Musharraf that no future proliferation would take place from Pakistan. The out come of the US – Pakistan bargain would be determine by variety of political factors. But whatever may be the result of this deal-making, it would have important implications for India.
India, on the other hand, strictly adhere to and cooperate with the non-proliferation initiatives. India shares the objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons despite the fact that it has state outside the MPT.

India’s record on non-proliferation has been a responsible one and its nuclear policies and programs can not be equated with those of irresponsible states. That would one of the reasons that USA and India reached on an agreement on July 18, 2005 on nuclear matters. The agreement recognizes the India is a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology and that it should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states. India has, in turn, agreed as a reciprocal measures to identify and separate Civilian and Military nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner and file a declaration regarding the civilian facilities with the IAEA and placed them voluntarily under its safeguards. The Indian government has the right to decide which facilities and programs it would like to identify as ‘civilian’ for the purpose of this agreement and therefore place under safeguards.

The US President Bush has agreed to work with the US congress to adjust the US laws and policies to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India, and to work with its friends and allies in the Nuclear Supplier Group to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India.

Besides, the Indo-US nuclear deal, the new post cold war US foreign policy owes much to “The Perfect for the New American Century” (PNAC), a Washington-based neo-conservative think
tank founded in 1997. PNAC was clear that the US must rule the world: “[the new world order] must have a secure foundation on unquestioned US military pre-eminence... The process of transformation is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event like a new Pearl Harbor”. That Pearl Harbor like event came on 11 September 2001. After 9/11 there was no lack of spokesman for the American Empire. In unabashedly imperial language, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who initiated the anti-soviet jihad in Afghanistan, writes in his book The Grand Chessboard that the US should seek to “prevent collusion and maintain dependence among the vassals, keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming together”.

Ralph Peters, an officer responsible for conceptualizing future welfare in the office of the deputy chief of staff for intelligence, in his book New Glory made it clear that for Expanding America’s Global Supremacy, his country needs to fight:

“We have entered an age of constant conflict.

“We are entering a new American century, in which we will become still wealthier, culturally, more lethal, and increasingly powerful. We will excite hatreds without precedent.

“There will be no peace. At any given moment for the rest of our life times, there will be multiple conflicts in mutating forms around the globe. The de-facto role of the US armed forces will be to keep the world safe for our economy and open to our cultural assault. To those ends, we will do a fair amount of killing.”