CHAPTER - IV

WEST ASIAN ISSUE IN THE UNO

PALESTINE:

The United Nations is directly concerned in the West Asian Issue (or as it is now known since 1967 Middle East Problem), the origin of which goes back to the General Assembly resolution of 29 November, 1947, which created Israel. While the Arabs opposed that resolution and made it clear they would resist from the start the establishment of the Zionist sovereignty in any part of Palestine, the world Zionism hailed it and considered it a historic event that links the State of Israel with the United Nations as it illustrated in the words of Mrs Golda Meir, the former Prime Minister of Israel in her speech in the commemorative Session, Twenty Fifth Anniversary of the United Nations on 21 October, 1970, "The United Nations will always be linked in the mind of our people with its role in the emergence of Israel. Israel cannot forget that the

Organisation put the seal of international recognition upon
its historical process of return, in gathering, liberation and
development. 2

The United Nations should feel regretful by
creating the State of Israel which becomes the main cause
of violence and instability in the region and a menace to world
peace and tranquility. The United Nations made its greatest
mistake thirty years ago. If certain examples of fait accompli
have been accepted, the artificial creation of Israel in
Palestine will never be agreed to. No international problem is
more symptomatic of the crisis of the United Nations than the
situation in the Middle East. The failure of the United Nations
to apply the provisions of the Charter against Israel is one of
the factors which has encouraged Israel to continue its
occupation, its policy of territorial expansion and to defy
United Nations resolutions.

Israel existence depends as it is expressed in
the words of the Jewish writer Alfred Lilienthal:

"Above all, Israel must achieve complete
national normalcy by ceasing to be the Jewish
and becoming the Israeli state. The state of

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2. See the text of the Speech on page 49 in the
UN Monthly Chronicle Vol. VII Number 10, November
1973 (United Nations Office of Public Information
New York).
Israel, to be normal, must solemnly withdraw all claims to the reality of anybody but its own citizens. For unless a state's sovereignty ends at its borders, it is an abnormal fraud and a dangerous freak. Unless the state of Israel severes its umbilical ties with private political and propaganda organisations outside its borders, it deserves neither the recognition of the civilized world nor the cooperation of its Arab neighbours.3

The expulsion of the Palestinians from their homeland and the establishment of the Zionist State was a human disaster for the Palestinians.4 Specifically, Israel must from the outset at least implement the various decrees of the United Nations which created it. These resolutions stipulated an economic union of Palestine, an international rule over the city of Jerusalem which is the holy home of three world religions, and a just solution of the Arab refugee problem. But Israel defied and continues to defy the United Nations resolutions. It embarked on terrorising and displacing the indigenous Palestinians and


importing in their place alien of Jewish faith from all over the world. Thus, it was with the United Nations resolutions calling for the partition of Palestine, the establishment of Arab and Jewish States and an international status for Jerusalem that the recurring conflicts between the Arabs and Israel began. The Arab nations refused to accept the resolutions and afterward none of the States involved, Arab or Jewish, respected the provisions.

The historical events which revealed the British imperialistic rule in Palestine that paved the way for the Zionists with the help of the United States of America to create the state of Israel, are well known and need not be repeated in detail.


details. The growth of the Zionist movement, the Balfour Declaration of November 2nd, 1917, the intervention of the League of Nations, the mandatory period, all these factors traced the way for the General Assembly and the Security Council in the United Nations to endorse the basic Zionist demand to create the State of Israel on 15th May, 1948.  


The diplomatic manoeuvres culminating in the Balfour Declaration were of crucial importance in establishing a framework in which Zionism could extend itself far beyond its own natural limits. Couched in vague language and short of any direct commitment, the Declaration implicitly recognized the existence of a special Jewish connection with Palestine and the right of the Zionists to represent the Jewish people in this regard. Realizing that they did not in fact possess the credentials to speak or act on behalf of world Jewry, the Zionists simply assumed the role of a Jewish Parliament sanctioned by the world community. Of particular importance in this general plan was the extension of the Jewish Agency to include non-Zionist participation. Chaim Weizmann conceived the idea as a way of "drawing into the work of Palestine those Jews who are not...

(Footnote continued from previous page)

See Albert Hayman, British Projects for the Restoration of the Jews to Palestine (London, American Jewish Historical Society, 1918) passim.
See Note 6 for United Nations Resolutions.


prepared to call themselves Zionists."\textsuperscript{11}

The matter of Jewish identity, which the Zionists were at odds to define in the context of their own political perspective, ultimately became an issue in the State. The Law of Return did not establish criteria of Jewishness though in practice there was initially a strong tendency to defer to the orthodox view, linking nationality to religious affiliation. This has gradually been modified so that now the state's position is visibly closer to the original Zionist doctrine, which stressed race and peoplehood over religious commitment and Jewish tradition. This may not be trouble-some to many Jews in the light of the contemporary world's secular orientation, but it does underline the increasing separation of the Jewish State from the Jewish past and raises intricate questions of values and identity for the modern Jew.\textsuperscript{12}

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\textsuperscript{12} The Thirtieth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution considering Zionism as a sort of racial discriminations. Resolution 3379 (XXX) of 13 Nov. 1975.

Thus, historically speaking, the situation in Palestine does not stem from the 1967 war. There was no state of Israel in 1945 when the Charter was drawn up; there was a Zionist movement, dating from the nineteenth century, which was a political movement using Judaism for political and economic ends. Originally, the Zionists in Germany asked the Kaiser during the alliance with Ottoman Empire to persuade the Sultan to permit an enclave in Palestine. The Sultan refused, saying the Holy Land was a trust. The Zionists began to work with British. Chaim Weizmann worked with his British fellow Zionists to bring the United States into the First World War in exchange for Palestine after victory. Weizmann himself describes an interview with Lord Robert (Later Viscount) Cecil of Chelwood, the Assistant Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs, in which the Zionist pleader stressed the point that a "Jewish Palestine would be a safeguard to England, in particular in respect to the Suez Canal." In July 1937 Winston Churchill, speaking of the Balfour Declaration in the House of Commons, said: "It is a delusion to suppose this was a mere act of crusading enthusiasm or quixotic philanthropy. On the contrary, it was a measure taken ... in due need of the war with the object of promoting the general victory of the Allies, for which we expected and received valuable and important assistance."13

There is much evidence that the British Government issued the Balfour Declaration for more practical reasons than a mere belief in the justice of "Jewish rights." The Suez Canal needed a protective base in a nearby territory where as Professor Temperley states in his History of the Peace Conference "important elements would not only bound to (Britain) by every interest, but would commend the support of world Jewry." C.P. Scott, the editor of the Manchester Guardian, who became a pillar of strength to Zionist cause, spoke of the "national home" as a security measure for British Suez. Churchill, in the 1922 White Paper, also talked of the "further development of the existing Jewish community" of Palestine "to become a centre." As Colonial Secretary, he assured a deputation of Arabs that a Jewish national home did not mean a "Jewish Government to dominate Arabs. We cannot tolerate the expropriation of one set of people by another."


18. Albert M. Hyman, op. cit., p. 112. See also Earl Balfour's defence of the Mandate in the House of Lords, June 1922, reported on page 95 of Hayman.
In 1945, the British were bankrupt and could not sustain the Mandate, so they threw it to the United Nations, as they threw the Mandate of South West Africa (Namibia) to South Africa. By early 1947, events in Palestine clearly demanded international intervention. Zionists were more than ever insisting on a Jewish majority in Palestine in order to secure a Jewish commonwealth. The British were resisting to respond. The Arabs, fighting both the British and the Jews, were demanding an independent Palestinian State. Britain felt that there was nothing left but to place the controversy before the United Nations. A special meeting of the General Assembly was called by the United Nations Secretary General Trygve Lie. Submitting the dispute to international adjudication Mr Ernest Bevin, Britain's Foreign Minister accused American politicians of wrecking any chance for an amicable solution of the Palestine problem. 19

The Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations which convened on April 28, 1947 decided to appoint a Committee to investigate the situation in Palestine and report to the second Regular Session of the General Assembly in September, 1947. The Soviet Union proposed to seat the Big Five.

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on this "Fact Finding United Nations Special Committee on Palestine" (UNSCUP), but the suggestion was rejected. The United States contended that the presence of the largest powers on the initial committee of inquiry would raise an obstacle to a fair, impartial report. So the Committee was constituted of eleven smaller nations, Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia, with justice Emile Sandstrom of Sweden as Chairman. The Committee was unable to present unanimous findings. A majority, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay proposed partition of Palestine. A minority, India, Yugoslavia and Iran proposed a single state with a federal structure. Australia supported neither plan; her representative on the committee, John D.L. Wood, contended that a committee of inquiry ought to present any suggestions in form which did not prejudice judgement by the General Assembly, and this principle, he felt it had been violated by both sides in the Committee. On September 3, 1947, the General Assembly designated an Ad Hoc Committee to consider the two suggestions. All Member States of the United Nations were represented on this Committee which elected the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Herbert V. Evatt, its Chairman. The new committee held thirty-four meetings between September 25 and November 1947. The Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee were given an additional opportunity to be heard.

20. See: Dr M.S. Agwani, op. cit., Al-Arab.
The Majority (Partition) Report was mainly defended by Garcia Granados of Guatemala and Rodriguez Fabregat of Uruguay, whose arguments were astonishingly replete with Zionist philosophy. The United Kingdom representative, Arthur Greenwood Jones, clarified at the outset that his Government had no intention of implementing any U.N. plan with British forces unless both sides to the contention accepted the plan. Sir Mohd. Zafrullah Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, bore the brunt of the Arab fight against Partition. He emphasized that the right of Palestinians, 1,200,000 Arabs to choose the form of government under which they wished to live was guaranteed by the Charter of the United Nations. The United Nations could effectively prescribe, Sir Khan pointed out, the conditions which would secure for the country's 625,000 Jews complete religious, linguistic, educational and social freedom within the independent State of Palestine.21

In November 1947, the Ad Hoc Committee started voting. It first turned to the resolutions of the Sub-committee. Two which contained the Arab viewpoint. By a vote of 25 to 18, with 11 abstentions, the full committee rejected the proposal that the six questions concerning the Balfour Declaration and the

Mandate be submitted to the International Court of Justice. By the even closer vote of 21 to 20 the Ad Hoc Committee dismissed the question for competency of the United Nations to enforce, or recommend the enforcement of partition without the consent of the majority of the people of Palestine. On both these issues Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, El-Salvador, Greece, Haiti, Liberia and India supported the Arab States.

The committee then adopted resolutions which requested all members of the United Nations to take back those Jewish refugees and displaced persons who belonged to them and desire repatriation, and to absorb others in proportions to the area and economic resources of each country. These were only recommendations, but they advocated absorption of refugees in countries other than in Palestine. But the United States voted against these resolutions. The idea was defeated by 18 to 15. The establishment of a unitary Palestine was voted down 29 to 12 with 14 abstentions. The partition plan itself easily passed by a vote of 25 to 13 with 17 abstentions. On every single resolution considered by the committee, the United States and the Soviet Union had voted together. But despite that suspect harm the partition plan going before the General Assembly was actually a minority proposal. A majority of 32 had either voted nay or abstained, or were absent including three of the Big Five, France, China and the United Kingdom. The delegate from Sweden, the country which had headed the Special Committee of Inquiry admitt
that the plan "has its weak sides and some dangerous commission." 22
The Canadian delegate supported the partition plan on the ground
that it was the "best of four unattractive and difficult
alternatives." 23 New Zealand's ambassador talked of the "grave
inadequacies of the present proposal," 24 while Belgium's Foreign
Minister Van Langenhorne said this of the partition Plan. "We are
not certain that it is completely just; we doubt whether it is
practical; and we are afraid that it involves great risk ....
But what is the alternative? The solution proposed or no solution
at all, that is to say, still more serious troubles, if not utter
chaos. We do not want to assume the responsibility for that,
either by a negative vote or even by an abstention. That is why
we are resigned to voting with the majority." 25 Of all delegates
heard in this discussion, the Belgian alone hit at the very idea
of Zionist Segregation: "The Palestinian Question is particular
disturbing for the Belgians. They have to make an effort to
understand Zionism. The national home of our Jewish patriots
in Belgium. No one has treated them in such a way as to make I
want to find another home in Palestine." 26 But still, Belgu

22. Ibid., p. 1312.
23. Ibid., pp. 1317-1319.
24. Ibid., p. 1357.
25. Ibid., p. 1365.
26. Ibid., p. 1364.
voted for partition. Herschel Johnson for the United States tried to contend that this was not partition in reality, because of the provisions for economic union and for the internationalization of Jerusalem. He naively envisaged that the boundary between the two new states "will be as friendly as the boundary which runs for three thousands miles between Canada and the United States." 27

On the morning of November 29, Dr. Oswaldo Aranha of Brazil, General Assembly President told reporters he was optimistic that two-thirds majority vote would be obtained for the Majority Report. As the Session opened, the Zionists confidently announced partition was the absolute irreducible minimum, while the Arabs meekly pointed out they might accept a Cantonal State such as the Minority UN Scop-Report had recommended. However, the vote was taken and partition was decreed by 33 to 13 with 10 abstentions and one absent. The shifted position of Liberia was astonishing enough; but truly sensational were the affirmative votes of Haiti and the Philippines, who only twenty four hours ago had been fiercely attacking the majority proposal. In the tumult moment, the declaration of the Arab States that they would be not bound by the decision of the United Nations was scarcely noticed. But the breach between the West and the Arab-Muslim world had started. It repercussion was to be turmoil in the Middle East, and American prestige, together with that of her Allies, has sunk to its lower ebb in history.

27. Ibid., p. 1327.
The partitioning of Palestine was the first and only major issue on which the U.S. and the USSR had worked together in harmony since the inception of the United Nations. The Soviet Union had pressed the United Nations for the earliest possible withdrawal of the Mandatory Power, and for obvious reasons: the earlier the evacuation, the sooner the collapse of law and authority and the greater the chaos in the interim period between the two administrations, the better the chances for communist scheming in the area. The Soviet Union made January 1, 1948 the date for the British departure. But the later was finally satisfied with May 15.28

One cannot help saying that the United Nations dealt a severe blow to the prestige of the Charter by its hasty, frivolous and arrogant treatment of the Palestine issue. The General Assembly turned down the only two reasonable suggestions - a referendum in Palestine and submission of the legal problems to the International Court of Justice. The Displaced Persons Problem was handled with outrageous thoughtlessness. The nearly unanimous recommendation of the

28. The General Assembly stipulated a date "not later than August 1" for the termination of the Mandate, but the Mandatory Power, anxious to relieve itself of the burden-some responsibility, withdrew even earlier.
United Nations Special Committee, that no settlement of the Palestine problem could be considered a solution of the Jewish problem, was completely neglected. The United Nations flouted the protective injunction of the Balfour Declaration, the Mandate and the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, that Jewish statehood was not to be granted so long as hostility existed between Jews and Arabs. The United Nations connected the formation of the Jewish and Arab States to the acceptance of an economic Union and the internationalisation of Jerusalem. But six years after the fateful decision, there is no Arab Palestinian State, there is no economic Union, there is no international city of Jerusalem; there are no boundaries, there is no peace and stability in the whole area. There are now almost more than one and half million so-called 'Arab refugees' and the United Nations later on (22 November, 1974) expressed "its grave concern that the Palestinian people has been prevented from enjoying their inalienable rights, in particular the right to self determination." 29 The United Nations further corrected its grave error when in 1974 recognised the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the legitimate and sole organisation representing the Palestinian

people, and invited the Palestine Liberation Organisation to participate in the session and the work of the General Assembly in the capacity of an observer.30


For more information concerning the role of the Palestinian Arab Resistance Movement, see the following articles published by Al-Sayyed, Jalal, 'Al-Thaur al-filastiniya al-Musallah.' (The Palestinian Armed Revolution), Al-Katib, X, III (Cairo, 1979), pp. 54-61.


Sha'ath, Nabil, 'Filastin al-Chad’ (The Palestine of Tomorrow) Shu’un Filastiniya, 1, 2 (Beirut, 1971), pp. 5-23.


Thus, all the accumulation of disputes and conflicts stems from the partition of Palestine and the methods of its realisation from the 1948 war. The partition and the emergence of the Jewish State exerted a significant negative influence over the subsequent policies of the Arab States and on their international conduct, which was often guided strong reason that injustice has been done against them. Peace with justice is the cardinal demand of all the Arabs.31


Razzuq, Asad, 'Al-Aqida al-Sehyiniya Fi Zil al-Salam' - Zionist Ideology and Peace - Shu'un Filastiniya, 1, 3 (Beirut, 1971), pp. 35-47.
The basic feature of the conflict between the Arabs and Zionists is the colonisation of Palestine by the Zionists and the subsequent occupation of the surrounding Arab territories, leaving the Arabs with the problem of liberating their occupied land. The fact is that the Arab people were dispossessed of their land by force and turned loose as refugees. Israeli occupationists pursue a policy of plunder, terror and deportation. Hundred thousands people have been driven from house and home, whole villages have been razed to the ground since Israeli annexed Palestine in 1948. The new 1967 refugees spill over, and although the United States of America early recognised the possibility that disaster here would provide an opening for Soviet influence, Israel's unpressured response to facilitating the refugees' return is "little better


than a fiasco."33


See also General Assembly Res. 194 (III) paragraph 11 of 11 December 1948 concerning the repatriation or compensation of Palestine refugees.


See: Secretary-General report (A/9740) submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2089C (XXVIII) and the 'Commissioner General' report for the period 1 July 1974 to 30 June 1975 Doc. (A/10013) supp. No. 13.


See other pertinent General Assembly resolutions:

212 (III) of 19 Nov. 1948.
302 (IV) of 8 Dec. 1949.
393 (V) of 2 Dec. 1950.
513 (VI) of 26 Jan. 1952.
720 (VIII) of 27 Nov. 1963.
818 (IX) of 4 Dec. 1954.
916 (X) of 3 Dec. 1955.
1018 (XI) of 28 Feb. 1957.
1456 (XIV) of 9 Dec. 1959.
1604 (XV) of 21 April 1961.
1856 (XVII) of 20 Dec. 1962.
2145 (XXI) of 17 Nov. 1966.
2452 (XXIII) of 19 Dec. 1968.
2656 (XXV) of 7 Dec. 1970.
As on previous occasions, the extension of the mandate by the General Assembly was decided "without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of the General Assembly resolution 194 (111)", a reminder that in more than 25 years no progress has been made in implementation of the resolution "that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the governments or authorities responsible."34

The Palestine refugees were bound to be affected by the debate on the question of Palestine that took place in the General Assembly at the Twenty-ninth session with the participation, at the invitation of the General Assembly, of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as representative of the Palestinian People,35 and it was the occasion for widespread


demonstrations in which the refugees were prominent. The Assembly's request to the Secretary General to establish contact with the PLO on all matters relating to the question of Palestine, preceded by a decision of States of the Arab League, accepted by all the Arab host Governments, that the PLO should be regarded as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, were of significance to the United Nations which reaffirms the "inalienable rights of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return."36 The United Nations recognition that no just solution to the problem of the Middle East without the Palestinians is a radical matter caused by the October war of 1973. The refusal of Israel to recognize the legitimate rights of the People of Palestine and its continuous stubbornness to defy to implement the United Nations resolutions since 1948 have already led to three wars in the region. The 1956 war known the Suez Crisis when the French-British and Israeli invasion failed to overthrow the progressive Egyptian regime headed by the late President Gamal Abdul Nasser, the result of this war brought the United Nations forces in the area when arrangement for the installation of United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) were made between the Secretary-General

and the Egyptian Government. The withdrawal of Anglo-French troops was completed by 22nd December. Israel forces, which had occupied the entire Sinai Peninsula, withdrew later in March 1957. But 11 years later Israel once again raised the torch of war. In the early morning hours of 5 June 1967, it attacked Egypt, Syria and Jordan and exploiting the advantages of surprise, seized large territories. The main aim of Israel backed by the United States of America is to overthrow the national revolutionary Arab regimes in order to pave the way for itself to fulfill its expansionist policy in the Middle East.

In a letter dated 13 June 1967, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union called for the immediate convening of an Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly. He stated that despite the Security Council's demands for a cease-fire, Israel had seized further territories belonging to the Arab States, accordingly the Assembly should act under Article 11 of the Charter of the United Nations to consider the situation and take a decision to liquidate the consequences of aggression and secure the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces behind the armistice lines.


The General Assembly began its Fifth Emergency Special Session on 17 June 1967 and included the USSR letter in its agenda. Between 17 June and the adjournment of the session on 18 September, it held a total of thirty-five meetings. In the debate, strongly divergent views were expressed on the origin and development of the situation and on the attitude and measures the General Assembly should adopt in dealing with it. 39

The Soviet Union representative stated that Israel's ruling circles had unfortunately conducted a policy of conquest and territorial expansion in the lands of neighbouring Arab States, as the records of the Security Council since 1948 is shown, and had enjoyed outside support from certain imperialist circles. He stated that the United States and United Kingdom had been building up their fleets in the Mediterranean and Red Sea areas before Israel's attack. The United States and United Kingdom representatives declared in their turn that charges of direct participation were false and untrue. 40

In describing the cause of events, the representative of Israel insisted that the Arab Governments, led and directed by President Nasser, had between 14 May and 1967.


40. Ibid.
5 June, methodically prepared and mounted an aggressive assault designed to bring about Israel's immediate and total destruction. Egyptian forces had begun on 14 May to move in strength into Sinai, and two days later the Egyptian command had ordered the United Nations Emergency Force to leave the border. On 18 May Egypt had asked for the total removal of UNIF, and the Secretary-General U Thant, had accepted to that request without reference to either the Security Council or the General Assembly. The Israeli's further stated that under such events, a sudden disruption of the local security balance occurred especially when President Nasser blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran to Israeli ships which was by definition an act of war.

Representatives of the Arab States generally emphasised that the aggression by Israel, supported by imperialist powers, was but the latest in a long list scarcely interrupted since 1948. The earlier events had been followed in May and at the beginning of June by military threats and provocations by Israel. The Arab countries, while trying to take the necessary precautions, had exerted themselves to keep matters under control, taking in Sinai and elsewhere a posture


of defence and not of attack. On his visit to Cairo, the
Secretary General had been assured that the Arab States firm
policy not to take the offensive. They had spared no effort to
avoid any eruption of the situation and had been in continuous
consultations with many capitals in the world, including
Washington. But during that time, Israel had let loose its
treachery and had launched its careful planned aggression. The
claim that the blockade itself constituted an act of war and
called for Israel's massive assault was false because Israel
had already started its war on Syria on 7 April. The action
taken by Israel was not legitimate self-defence within the
meaning of Article 51 of the Charter because no arm attack on
her territory had in fact occurred.

However, the debate in the General Assembly
was so sharp especially between the two super powers which
resulted with no decision taken in order to solve the matter.
The seventeen-power draft resolution sponsored by some Non-
aligned States calls upon Israel immediately to withdraw
all its forces behind the armistice lines established by the
General Armistice Agreements between Israel and the Arab
countries. On a roll-call vote received 53 votes in favour,

42. The sponsors are: Afghanistan, Burundi, Ceylon,
the Congo (Brazzaville) Cyprus, Guinea, India,
Indonesia, Mali, Pakistan, Somalia, the United
Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Malaysia, Yugoslavia,
Senegal, Cambodia.
36 against with 20 abstentions and was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required two thirds majority. The USSR draft resolution which vigorously condemn Israel aggressive activities and demanding Israel to immediate and unconditional withdrawal all its forces from the territory of those States to positions behind the armistice demarcation lines, the draft was rejected in parts by roll-call vote. Since all the operative part had been rejected no vote was taken on the draft resolution as a whole. The Albanian draft resolution condemning Israel aggression was also rejected by a roll-call vote of 71 to 22, with 27 abstentions. The six-power draft resolution concerning measures taken by Israel to change the status of the city of Jerusalem was adopted by a roll-call vote of 99 to none, with 20 abstentions, as a resolution 2253 (ES-V). This resolution is the only one the General Assembly in its Special Session adopted otherwise, no fruitful results were gained. The General Assembly failed completely to adopt a resolution that make Israel to stop its aggression and withdraw from the occupied territories. The Assembly could not take action similar of Korean issue.

43. The sponsors are: Pakistan, Guinea, Iran, Mali, Niger and Turkey. The draft resolution considers that those measures taken by Israel in the city of Jerusalem were invalid and calls upon Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem.
At the closing of the Session, the President of the General Assembly stated there had been agreement that the time had come when peace in the Middle East must be made, finally and for all time, and that the long deferred problem of the refugees must be solved. He further said that there had also been a broad consensus that the United Nations could play a significant role to establish final peace in the area. He also said that there was virtual unanimity in upholding the principle that conquest of territory by war is inadmissible in our time and under the Charter. Virtually all statements had affirmed that principle, and virtually all had laid down the corollary that withdrawal of forces to their original position was expected. In addition there was a broad consensus that the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of States allows them a rightful freedom from threat of belligerency, what had not been agreed upon was a procedure and sequence by which the principle should be implemented. 44

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242:

During the period from the middle of June to October 1967, the Security Council received a series of further communications from Arab countries and from Israel

concerning violation of the ceasefire, treatment of civilian populations and prisoners of war. The Security Council in its terms passed several resolutions which have regulated the situation in all the sectors. But these resolutions were only of temporary basis because they were the result of yet another aggression. And these temporary arrangements were in turn based on the Armistice Agreements of 1949, themselves of contested validity.

45. Security Council Resolutions:

(233) 6 June, 1967.
(234) 7 June, 1967.
(235) 9 June, 1967.
(236) 12 June, 1967.
(237) 14 June, 1967.

See also communications:


Letter dated 8 June 1967 from the Representative of the United States of America to the President of the Security Council S/7950.


In a letter dated 7 November 1967, the United Arab Republic requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the dangerous situation prevailing in the Middle East as a result of the persistence of Israel not to withdraw its armed forces from all the territories which it had occupied as a result of its aggression committed on 5 June, 1967 against the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria. The Security Council considered the United Arab Republic complaint at seventh meeting between 9 and 22 November 1967.46

Before the Council were two draft resolutions, under the first submitted by India, Mali and Nigeria on 7 November. It said, the Security Council would (1) affirm that a first and lasting peace in the Middle East must be achieved within the frame work of the United Nations Charter and more particularly of the following principles (a) occupation or acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible under the Charter and consequently Israel's armed forces should withdraw from all the territories occupied as a result of the recent conflict; (b) every state has the right to live in

46. See Security Council Debates (Provisional Records) 1967:
S/PV/1341, S/PV/1343, S/PV/1344,
S/PV/1345, S/PV/1346, S/PV/1348,
S/PV/1351, S/PV/1352, S/PV/1354,
S/PV/1356, S/PV/1358, S/PV/1353,
S/PV/1357, S/PV/1360, S/PV/1359,
peace and complete security, free from threats or acts of war and consequently all states in the area should terminate the state or claim of belligerency and settle their international disputes by peaceful means, (c) it is obligatory on all Member States of the area to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of one another; (2) affirm that (a) there should be a just settlement of the question of Palestine refugees; (b) there should be a guarantee of freedom of navigation in accordance with international law through international water ways in the area, and (3) request the Secretary General to despatch a special representative to the area who would conduct the States concerned in order to coordinate efforts to achieve the purposes of this resolution and to submit a report to the council within thirty days.

Under the second draft resolution, submitted on the same day by the United States, the Security Council would (1) affirm that the fulfilment of Charter principles required the achievement of state of just and lasting peace in the Middle East, embracing withdrawal of armed forces from occupied territories, the termination of claims or states of belligerence and mutual recognition and respect for the right of every State in the area to sovereign existence, territorial integrity, political independence, secure and recognised boundaries and freedom from the threat or use of force; (2) affirm for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and
political independence of every state in the area through measures including the establishment of demilitarised zones, for achieving just settlement of the refugee problem (3) request the Secretary General to designate a special representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned (4) request the Secretary General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the special representative as soon as possible.

On 16 November, 1967 the representative of the United Kingdom introduced a draft resolution under which the Security Council (1) affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles required the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: (a) withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (b) termination of all claims or states of belligerence and respect for, and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force. (2) affirms further the necessity (a) for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international water ways in the area; (b) for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; and (c) for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, through
measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones; (3) requests the Secretary General to designate a special representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in the resolution; (4) requests the Secretary General to report to the Security Council on the progress of efforts of the Special representative as soon as possible.

The representative of the United Kingdom Lord Caradon, introducing the draft resolution, said that, while he could not guarantee that it would be accepted in full by either side, he trusted that it would be regarded as a balanced and just text. 47

On 20 November, the representative of the USSR submitted a draft resolution under which the Security Council would (1) declare that peace and final solution to the Middle East problem could be achieved within the frame work of the

47. For relevant documents, see:

Official Records of the Security Council Twenty-Second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967; Ibid., Supplement for October, November and December, 1967; Ibid., Twenty-third year, Supplement for January, February and March 1968; and Ibid., Supplement for April, May and June 1968

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Charter of the United Nations (2) urged that the following steps should be taken: (a) the parties to the conflict should immediately withdraw their forces to the position they had held before 5 June, 1967 in accordance with the principle that the seizure of territories as a result of war was inadmissible; and (b) all States Members of the United Nations in the area should immediately recognize that each of them had the right to exist as an independent national State and to live in peace and security, and should renounce all claims and assist from all acts in consistent with the foregoing. (3) deem it necessary in this connection to continue its consideration of the situation in the Middle East, collaborating directly with the parties concerned and making use of the presence of the United Nations, with a view to achieve an appropriate and just solution of all aspects of the problem on the basis of the following principles: (a) the use of threat or force in relations between states is incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations; (b) every state must respect the political independence and territorial integrity of all other states in the area; (c) there must be a just settlement of the question of the Palestine refugees; and (d) innocent passage through international water ways in the area in accordance with international agreements; and (4) consider that, in harmony with the steps to be taken along the lines indicated above, all states in the area should put an end to the state of belligerency, take measures to limit the useless ...
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The representatives of the United Arab Republic and Jordan reaffirmed that the essential step towards peace was the full withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the territories occupied in June conflict.

The representative of Syria stated that his delegation could not accept the United Kingdom draft resolution because, among other things, the central issue of withdrawal was made subject to concessions to be imposed on the Arab countries, because it was silent on the systematic violation of the cease-fire resolutions and the rejection by Israel of resolutions concerning the status of Jerusalem and the return of the new refugees since 5 June, and also it ignored the various resolutions on the Palestine question and the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.

The representative of Israel stated that Israel's position remained unchanged. The central affirmation of the adopted resolution was the need for such a peace based on the secured and recognised boundaries. For Israel, the resolution said what it said. It did not say what it had specifically and consciously avoided saying.

The representative of USA said that the resolution is entirely consistent with his Government's policy on the Middle East, the five principles of President Johnson and his own statements before the Council.
The representative of USSR said that his delegation fully shared the interpretation of the representative of India that the provision regarding withdrawal meant withdrawal of Israel forces from all conquered territories of Arab States. That was confirmed by the fact that the resolution's preamble emphasised the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.

The representative of France stated that the resolution should leave no room for ambiguity and that the Special Representative must be given very precise principle of which to act. However, on the essential question of the withdrawal of the forces of occupation, the French text of paragraph 1 of the adopted resolution, which was identical with the English text, left no room for ambiguity since it spoke of withdrawal "des territories occupées", thus giving a precise interpretation of the expression "territories occupied." He had heard with satisfaction of the representative of the United Kingdom stressing the link between that provision and the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force.48 (For Text of the resolution 242 see Appendix D).

48. Ibid.

See Official Records of the Security Council Twenty-Second Year, 1341st to 1361st, 1365th, 1366th, 1369th to 1371st, 1373rd, 1375th, 1379th to 1382nd, 1401st to 1407th, 1409th to 1412th, 1416th to 1426th, 1429th meetings.

In reports dated 23 November and 22 December, the Secretary General informed the Council that Ambassador Gunnar Jarring of Sweden had accepted designation as his Special Representative to the Middle East, in accordance with paragraph 3 of the Council's resolution 242 (1967). After consultation with the parties, the Special Representative had set up the headquarters of his mission in Cyprus in 10 December and by 20 December had completed a first round of visits to the Governments concerned. As Mr. Mitchell Sharp, the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada said in his speech in the General Assembly on 24 September 1970, "The United Nations is on trial in the Middle East. The Member nations must support the efforts of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring and others to bring peace to that troubled area." Dr. Jarring had a number of exchanges with the parties but his mission was obstructed completely when Israel refused to reply on his memorandum of 8 February, 1971. The key question of a settlement had always been and continued to be the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories, and resolving that important

question on the basis of respect for territorial integrity and the guaranteeing of the legitimate rights and the interests of all states, of peoples of the area, including the Arab people of Palestine.

The changes of a demographic, economic and other character carried out by Israel in the occupied territories in contradiction of all the principles of international law, not only were liable to prejudice or at least render more difficult a definitive solution, but actually endangering the fundamental rights of the inhabitants of those regions, in some cases amounting to systematic colonisation of occupied areas. 50

Developments not only had confirmed the existence of the Palestinian factor, but also revealed the utter failure of all attempts to destroy it or to conceal it under the cloak of anonymity by means of force or manoeuvring. The Palestinian political movement, as an expression of the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people had imposed itself as an active factor in the Middle East without which no definitive solution of the problem was possible. 5

50. On 26th May, 1976 the Security Council issued a statement reaffirming the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in their lands. The Security Council for the first time issued such a statement in order to avoid the veto power of United States which frequently casted to defeat resolutions of this type.

See: Colonel Merrill A. McPeak, 'Israel Borders and Security in Foreign Affairs', Vol. 54 No. 3 (USA, April 1976), pp.426
possible. 51

The Security Council when adopted its resolution 242 found itself confronted with a double problem: first, the problem of the direct results of military action, in itself a flagrant violation of the peace that had become a military occupation of Arab territory and so posed the threat of continuing armed conflict; 52 second, the problem of the continually abnormal state of relations between the Arab States and Israel which constitutes the permanent cause of instability in the Middle East and which needs a peaceful settlement. These two problems, by their nature, their political implications, their international nature, and the procedure they call for, cannot be treated by the same means.

51. See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-Ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 2282nd meeting paras 3-83. The Special Committee on the legitimate rights of the Palestinian report stated on 9 June, 1976 to the Security Council that Israel has to give the Western Bank and Gaza territories to the United Nations by June 1977 in order to establish a State of Palestine. The resolution of the Security Council for PLO to participate in its discussions was passed by majority. The United State voted against and Britain, France, Italy were absent. Israel boycotted the meeting.


To settle a dispute between states by negotiation or other peaceful means requiring agreements among the parties concerned must not be confused with action taken to undo the military occupation of territory which is a fact of war. In a wider sense, occupation is an extension of military action, a continued violation of the peace, the outcome of which must not be contingent on the goodwill of the occupier, and against which the Security Council is not only authorised by virtue of Article 39 to undertake whatever direct action it deems fit in the circumstances, as long as it is consistent with the terms of Article 40 of the Charter. But the Security Council does not consider the situation anticipated in Chapter VII - yet in terms and method it corresponds to non-binding recommendations provide for in Article 36 and 37 of Chapter VI. This peculiarity stems from the special nature of the circumstances.

The Security Council, however, put forward "withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied during the recent conflict" as a principle to be applied towards "the establishment of a just and lasting peace", along with other recommendations which were to furnish matter for negotiation under the aegis of the Secretary General Special Representative. In this manner, the "spoils of war" become matter for negotiation by parties to a dispute, in contravention of international law and the United Nations Charter.

The Security Council in this manner erred in not distinguishing between measures intended to lead to the "establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East", and the "withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied during the recent conflict" since the former measures were meant to eliminate the sources of conflict and so bring about a situation favourable to effecting real peace in the area, the subject of Chapter VI of the Charter, whereas troop withdrawal is an emergency measure to correct a Charter violation an to avert an immediate risk of renewed or continued war - the kind of situation dealt with in Chapter VII.

As already pointed out, the phrase "secure and recognised boundaries" lends itself to conflicting interpretations, though this is not the only ambiguity which hinders the application of the resolution's chief recommendations. Explaining his government attitude, the Israeli representative declared that Israel accepted as valid only the original English text of the resolution, thus indicating that the English and French wordings of the provision for the evacuation of occupied territories permitted varying readings. Interpreting this

54. The difficulty arises on the absence of the definite article in the English text, which refers to "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied...", rather than to "withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories occupied...". Unlike the more specific reference in the French text to withdrawal "desterritoires occupés..."
recommendation with the "secure and recognised boundaries" of the following paragraph, the English text could be read as meaning a partial evacuation.

It has become obvious that the Council's approach of treating the Arab nations as though they were united vis-a-vis Israel was inadequate and unrealistic. The resolution stands as a whole and its provisions are conditional upon each other. Any accord between Israel and the Arabs, then, depends upon a prior accord among the Arab States which would give them collectively to assume responsibility, the condition for reciprocal undertakings on the part of Israel. This is another illustration of the Security Council's mistake in having treated with one instrument the direct consequences of the war and the conditions for peace in the Middle East differ.

In this resolution, the Security Council still refers to the problem of the Palestinians as a "refugee problem". But the problem of the Arab people of Palestine has gone far beyond the bounds of a question merely of refugees. In the course of events, the Palestinians have established organisations dedicated to the liberation of Palestine which engage in military action against Israel independent of the Arab States, and which put forward political programmes

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advocating the creation of an independent state of their own in Palestine. 56 The Palestinian resistance organisations neither recognise the cease-fire nor accept the Security Council resolution. Regardless of the internal conflicts which rend it, and the hardships it suffered at the hands of the Government of Jordan, Government of Syria, the Palestinian Liberation Movement is a new factor whose unexpected emergence after the Security Council resolution has radically altered the essence and the appearance of the Palestine problem and so invalidated many of the assumptions, as to borders, the refugees, etc., which lie behind the resolution. 57

Originally, the Middle East conflict was limited to Palestine. The Arab states become involved in the name of Arab unity and Arab security, when they


intervened against partition and the establishment of a Jewish State. The plight of the Palestinians stems from three causes: the Arab defeat in 1948-49 war; the occupation of the remainder of Arab Palestine by Jordan and in part by Egypt, and the absence of any effective Palestinian military structure, a deficiency which allowed the Arab countries to determine the fate of the Palestinians. But the June war of 1967 reviewed the idea of an Arab State of Palestine. This idea drew strength from the development of the Palestine Liberation Movement and also from the political and moral authority it possesses by virtue of the principles of human rights and the self-determination of peoples. All Arabs recognise the legitimacy of the Palestinian cause and struggle, and have committed themselves, at least for this phase of the struggle against Israel, to the idea of Palestinian self-determination. This concept of Palestinian self-determination is increasingly the central problem of Middle East peace efforts and inter-Arab relations, it can invalidate efforts to establish a stable and lasting peace on the territorial status quo. The Security Council resolution 242 ignores it completely. The refusal of Israel to implement the resolution is complicating the situation. Israel, the victor in June war, is incapable of making good its victory and cannot on its own, even by force, impose viable an lasting peace, it cannot do this for two reasons: it lacks sufficient troops and other means to insure the security of
permanent presence in the occupied territories, and there are international factors that will not allow the indefinite continuation of such a potentially dangerous situation. The October War of 1973 had changed all hopes and plans of Israel. The result of the war illustrated the Arab capability to defeat Israel. The idea which Israel insisted to keep the occupied territories to maintain its security proved a failure. Since October War, the Palestinian cause gained much in the world specially in Western Europe and the United States. In the United Nations, the Palestinians for the first time in its history got justice when the general Assembly passed by majority vote on 22 November 1974 two resolutions reaffirming the inalienable rights of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property, and invites the Palestine Liberation Organisation to participate in the session and work of all international conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer.


59. U.N. Res. 3236 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX).
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat was received warmly by the United Nations members when he was invited to address the Twenty Ninth General Assembly Session. He was treated as Head of State. The United States of America in its turn took the situation very serious for the first time as a result of October War which caused the fuel crisis in the world. The United States Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Dr Kissenger, played a good role in his "step by step" policy which proved to some extent a success when inter-Agreements were signed between Israel and Egypt and also between Israel and Syria in which a partial withdrawal of Israeli troops was made in Sinai and Golan Heights. The new Interim Agreement between Egypt and Israel on 18 January 1975 within the frame work of the Geneva Peace Conference constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of the Security Council resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October, 1973. The October War


created a new situation that forced the two super powers, the USA and USSR to exert more diplomatic efforts to bring the parties in conflict into a round table in Geneva under the auspices of the United Nations. The two powers also shared the chairmanship of the meetings. But the final settlement seems still far. This is because both Israel and the United States are still refusing to recognise the Palestine Liberation Organisation to attend the Geneva Conference. Persistence on the part of Israel in maintaining its aggression would render peace more and more remote from realisation. Immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories was the first and the only step that could pave the way to a political solution. For achieving a real, just and lasting peace, the Palestinians must obtain their inalienable rights.  

The United Nations withstanding its recognition that no peace in West Asia be established without recognising the legitimate rights of the Palestinians to determine their future and to establish their own State in the West Bank and Gaza, its Security Council had failed on 29th June, 1976 to ta

action in order to approve the recommendations of the 20
Member Committee which recommended such rights for the people
of Palestine and urges Israel to withdraw from the territories
occupied in June War 1967 within a defined period not later than
June, 1977. The Committee also recommended that the territories
which Israel withdraws from, should be handed to the United
Nations which then be given to the Palestine Liberation
Organisation to establish a Palestinian State. But, unfortunately
the draft resolution failed despite the support of ten members
in the Security Council due to the veto power used by the United
States of America. Four Western countries abstained. They were
Britain, France, Italy and Sweden. The United States by using
always its veto power is trying to ignore the fact that the
Palestinians are constituting the core of the West Asia problem
No peace in the area, and no justified solution can be made
without them. This fact will remain eternal and the United
States of America will realise one day this fact as it did in
the case of Communist China and South Vietnam.63

Undoubtedly, the peace keeping operations of
the United Nations play an essential role both in maintaining

63. For more information see, the Egyptian daily news-
paper Al-Ahram issue No. 32704 (25 June 1976), p.3.
'Israel and the UN', pp. 11-13. See also PLO
Statement in the Security Council in UN Monthly
tranquility in the area and in creating an atmosphere conducive to useful negotiations. But their future effectiveness can easily be put in question by a failure to maintain the momentum of negotiations. There is an increasing danger that, in the absence of progress, pressures will mount for more drastic causes of action and the opportunity for achieving a settlement will once again be lost. It is expected that the United Nations shall face new crises unless negotiations for Geneva Peace Conference be brought through the will and spirit of accommodations of the parties concerned, a successful conclusion which should open the way to the next steps forward to a comprehensive settlement including a satisfactory resolution of the Palestinian question. The United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim stated in the introduction to the Report on the work of the Organisation for the period 16 June 1974 to 15 June 1975:

"I am deeply concerned that this vital area of the world shall not once again become a theatre of war, with unforeseeable and widespread consequences, and that the United Nations will be able to continue with increasing effectiveness the constructive role which it has played in the Middle East for so long."
TOWARDS FINAL SETTLEMENT:

Certainly, the achievement of a Middle East settlement is a difficult task, but quite an attainable one. A realistic basis which can ensure solution consists of three closely connected propositions: First, withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied during the 1967 war. Second: satisfaction of the legitimate rights of the Arab People of Palestine, including their inalienable right to form its own state. Third: the assurance of the security and inviolability of the frontiers of all Middle East countries and their right to exist and develop under international guarantees. The solution of the stated three cardinal problems in their interconnection is the sole and the only factor to open the road to a just and lasting peace in West Asia.

A settlement achieved on the above stated basis certainly would ensure the return of the occupied lands to the Arab States. An equitable settlement of the territorial aspect of the Middle East issue would remove a serious issue from the Arab Israeli conflict. Such a settlement would avert the threat of a fresh aggression hanging over the Arab States, and leaves their governments to concentrate their efforts and resources on economic and social tasks. It would enable the Arab people of Palestine on the other hand, to exercise their right to build their own sovereign State, fully in conformity with international law, and take their rightful place among the other peoples in the region.
As regards Israel, a settlement would ensure her existence in status of peace and security and within her recognised borders. No more to remain a garrison state opposing the Arab neighbours. It is also very important for Israel in case a settlement is achieved to normalise relations with other countries and strengthen her positions among the countries in the world. International guarantees to ensure the security and inviolability of the borders of all Middle East countries should complete the settlement agreement.

The resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference with the participation of all the sides directly involved including the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the representative of the Arab People of Palestine is the sole international mechanism to work in this respect. The agreement to convene the Geneva Peace Conference reached at the end of 1973 was based on the belief that it would be an effective instrument for ensuring Peace in the Middle East. Although one fact is there, that is for the Geneva Conference has not been reconvened after suspending its work more than three years ago. The attitude to the conference particularly on the part of the USA and Israel is certainly of time serving nature. The Soviet Union consistently calls for the resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference. The UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim in his paper emphasised that he would be in conformity with the United Nations General Assembly resolution No. 3375 of November 13,
1975, stating that Palestine Liberation Organisation representatives are to be invited to participate on an equal footing with other parties in all efforts for reaching a settlement for Middle East disputes. The efforts to solve the Middle East issue away from the original road of solving main problems through crooked lanes of back-stage intrigues will always bring fruitless results.

Israel frequently speaks about its security but at the same time continues launching war against the Arab States, it rejects to withdraw its military forces from the occupied territories, it ignores the presence of the Palestinians and their legitimate right for self-determination. But such a policy which Israel insists to adopt proved a failure when the Arab states launched the October war of 1973 against it.

Thus, Israel's security depends on the return of all the occupied territories captured in June war of 1967.


65. Ibid., pp. 6-7 (The brief speech of Qadoni, the Chairman of PLO delegation to the Security Council)
Israel's main problem in this respect may gradually subside as the Palestinians come to accept whatever political arrangements are worked out in their behalf. Strong government in the returned territories also means that Israel must accept the presence of Arab forces, regular Jordanian forces, and also Egyptian forces in Gaza strip if control reverts to former Arab authorities, regular Palestinian forces if a separate Palestinian entity is formed has also to be there. But such forces need not threatening Israel if they are limited in size and in equipment. Here lies the security matter focuses not on the extent of territory returned but the nature and degree of demilitarisation. Israel in this respect does not possess strong case concerning its own physical security needs for retaining any of the occupied territories. Indeed, the return of all occupied territories by Israel to the Arab countries will undoubtedy open the prospect of peace, Israel security interest broadly defined, would need this step.

But, Israel's approach towards peace is illogic and unrealistic; it maintains a policy of military supremacy, expansionist aims and non-recognition to the Arabs of Palestine. Such a policy failed to deter the Arabs. The question of how to defeat the Arabs has been answered four times, the question of

It is obvious that deterrence need not rely solely on military strength, nuclear or conventional. For the Middle East, the best deterrent measure at hand is the establishment of demilitarized zones, manned by neutral observers, through which either side would be extremely reluctant to attack. The United Nations Security Council resolution 242 acknowledged the requirement for demilitarisation. Moreover, there is wide spread agreement that demilitarisation provisions might endure if be placed in an international peace keeping context and supported by appropriate guarantees. Such detailed matters can be discussed in Geneva Peace Conference if Israel and the United States are sincere for peaceful settlement of the Middle East issue. But the stubborness of Israel not to withdraw from the occupied territories or not to recognise the Palestine Liberation Organisation is an obstacle for reconvening the Geneva Peace Conference. By doing so, it leads the issue up a blind alley. "Israel vowed", expressed Merrill Mopeak,

67. Ibid., p. 435.


"never to leave any of these places and it is by no means certain that it can be induced to forsake this vow." He continues saying, "For it to do so would require at a minimum both great statesmanship in Israel and considerable pressure from the United States."69

The United States of America certainly can play a good role if it wishes to solve the West Asia issue peacefully. The United States supplies Israeli army with sophisticated weapons, including missiles capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear war heads. The United States supplies Israel with all necessary requirements including food stuff. It is in the ability of the United States to exert strong pressure on Israel if peace and security has to be established in the region. President Carter last statement that the Palestinians must have a home, is a new American approach which certainly will lead towards peace with justice. The thing which all Arabs wish. But it depends on President Carter's ways and methods to make his suggestion truly be fulfilled at a time when the rightist Likud Party emerged as the country's leading force in the recent general elections.

Mr Rikhi Jaipal, India's Permanent Representative at the Security Council meeting on June 19, 1975 stated:

"Nothing could be more damaging than silent indifference to the rights of the people of Palestine by the only Organization which could deliver the goods." Jaipal recalled the Palestine question which arose in 1947 and had since remained unsolved and said "it was the responsibility of the Council and the General Assembly to solve." 70

The United Nations role in this respect will continue to remain as it is limited unless a drastic turn of policy be done by the United States which continues to render full political and military support to Israel. Such continuous policy from the United States undoubtedly obstructs any idea for final settlement. Mr Fred H. Richards once stated:

"A history of the Arab World and of Zionism and its results, leading to the conclusion that the moral and political heart of the Arab-Israeli problem rests in satisfying the legitimate grievances and aspirations of (the) dispossesses Arabs .... The interest of the United States will be served no:

by espousing Zionism but by serving the needs of all the people of the region: through a political system granting equal rights to all inhabitants regardless of religion." 71

The fact is that one of the fundamental difficulties has always been the substance of history and the character of the issue, to say nothing of the requisite of a solution. But there is one point on which agreement appears from all research studies, however, it is that the West Asian conflict has now reached a stage of unprecedented danger, and that a settlement has become very much prompt than to be ignored for more longer time. The creation of an independent Palestinian State as envisioned in the original United Nations partition plan of 1947 is very much significant for cooling down the long historical conflict and it is very urgent to be fulfilled if the world should live in peace and tranquility. 72 But it seems final solution is still remote because of Israel's continuous arrogance and defiance of the United Nations resolutions.


72 Baldwin, Roger, "What is Wrong time?" The Humanist (N.P. July/Aug. 1975), pp. 11-13. President Bourguiba of Tunisia pointed out this point in 196 He reiterated recently during the Arab Heads and Kings Summit Conference held in Cairo on 25th October, 1976.
Avineri pointed out that "The real issue for Israel is not security, but legitimacy." He charges that Israel is expected to make all the concessions without the Arab States making any. Breznevski agrees, but whereas Avineri would have security come first, he thinks the settlement must come first and this will yield security. Duchene sees no conflict in their views, but agrees with Breznevski about timing. Perlmutter in his turn rejects Ullman's view that providing U.S. troops as back up support of Israel is essential. Perlmutter also questioned Ullman's view that none of the Arab States want war. Return of the occupied territories means destruction of Israel. The United States; he stated cannot be counted on the protect Israel's interests. The United States should apply pressure on the Arabs to bring about peace. Ullman in his reply states that, because there is no settlement, therefore, he feels the United States should explicit guarantees to Israel. Ullman thinks that a clear American commitment would cool the Arab nations. 73

Whatever the views of popular writers and scholars are fruitful to find a solution to the problem of the Middle East, the truth is there that Israel for more than ten years occupies Arab territories of sovereign Member-States of the United Nations. The Israelis are systematically colonising these territories in order to intergret them economically so that they would gradually become a part of Israel. Oppression of the Arab population of the occupied territories, racial discrimination and repression have become a norm of Israeli conduct in these occupied lands. Such a state of affairs certainly intolerable. This was pointed out in several resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights which emphasises that Israeli military occupation of the territories of the Arab States is a serious threat to world peace and security and a complete violation of the United Nations Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights. Israel continues stubbornly to prevent the Palestinians to exercise their legitimate right to self-determination and the creation of their own state. This right which the United Nations was acknowledged as far back as 1947. The international recognition of the rights of the Palestinians to national independence and sovereignty were reaffirmed in resolutions adopted by a majority vote at the last two sessions of the United Nations General Assembly.74 The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) has

74. Session Twenty-Nine and Thirtieth, See footnote No. 59.
See Prof. S.A.H. Haqqi, Inc. cit., pp. 87-88.
won considerable political prestige, it culminated in Arafat's appearance at the United Nations in November, 1974. It is widely recognised as the legitimate representative of the Palestine-Arabs and enjoying full support of the masses in the occupied territories. But in spite of all these radical changes, Israel continues to adhere to obviously irrational position of refusing to recognise the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) hoping of obstructing its participation in the Geneva Peace Conference. It is this fact that classified the lack of desire to set the Geneva Peace Conference in motion. The problem will remain as it is, threatening world peace and security till Israel and the United States show sincerity for settlement. The Geneva Peace Conference at this stage will be hopeful for reaching final solution in accordance to all United Nations resolutions and recommendations.

The "step by step" approach policy initiated by Dr Kissenger in the aftermath of the October war of 1973 is now no more workable. Israel has therefore, two options to do if she wants to see her security in the region really exists.


The first one is to attempt to reach a comprehensive settlement involving withdrawal to the pre-5 June 1967 borders and the second is to facilitate the creation in parts of evacuated territory of an independent Palestinian State. In case Israel is still arrogantly refusing to accept such options then "she must gird herself for a fifth round of full scale hostilities—a round that may infinitely complicate the entire conflict, conceivably making it entirely insolvable." 77

Israel's delay and postponement are obstructing comprehensive settlement to the long issue of Palestine and it is tantamount to national suicide. Piece meal arrangements without solving the original issue are only waste of time. For nearly thirty years the policy of "reconciliation through superior strength" adopted by Israel proves it is fruitless and Israel's security becomes more insecure. The October War of 1973 destroyed such a theory which Israel remains long time to cherish. Israel in fact as Dan Gilon stated "required to day is not an 'act of expiation' but an act of 'expediency' for without such an act its day as a sovereign state must surely be


See also: Inder Malhotra, 'Towards Peace in West Asia' in Times of India of December, 9, 76, p. 8.
78. Dan Gilon, op. cit., p. 155. (Mr Dan Gilon is an Israeli journalist and a former editor of the New Middle East. He has made a special study of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Palestine-Arab Nationalism. He is now working as a free journalist and a broadcaster specialising in Middle Eastern affairs).