chapter - i

united states foreign policy in west asia: a historical perspective

prior to the world war i, the united states was primarily concerned with academic, philanthropic, cultural and missionary works in west asia. in 1820, america entered the region and the american board of commissioners for foreign mission established their first religious missionary. as a result, the institutions like the robert college of istanbul in 1863, the istanbul women's college in 1871, the american university of beirut (syrian protestant college) in 1866, and the american university of cairo in 1919 were established with a view to bridge the cultural and educational gap between the new world and the middle east. though, the muslims of the region initially did not come under the influence of christianity but availed the educational and medical services rendered to them by the missionaries. the american government in the initial stages did not involve in any controversy rather

   and also see for further details harry n. howard, "the united states and the middle east" in tareq y. ismael (edited), the middle east in world politics: a study in contemporary international relations (new york: syracuse university press, 1974), p. 117.

2. robert h. ferrell, american diplomacy: a history (new york: w.w. norton & company, 1975), p. 736.
contributed substantially towards the educational needs of the millions of Muslims, Christians and Jews alike in the region.

**US Political and Economic Thrust**

The American interests, however, gradually changed and she indirectly expressed the sympathetic attitude towards the Zionist cause in Palestine. Consequently, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Arthur Balfour, was encouraged to issue the Balfour Declaration in 1917, promising a national home for the Jews in Palestine. He issued the declaration on November 2, 1917, to Lord Rothschild, the representative of the Zionists, in the form of a letter which read as follows:

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or their rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." 5


President Woodrow Wilson of the United States showed keen interest in Zionism which was fostered by the men who surrounded him. It was, particularly, his long and deep friendship with Louis Brandeis, an ardent Zionist, that most influenced him towards this stand. Historians gave credit to President Wilson for encouraging Balfour to issue his famous declaration.


At the same time, President Wilson expounded his famous fourteen points which ensured the right of national self-determination to all people and the establishment of League of Nations. Point twelve was directly related with the Arabs and the other minorities in the Ottoman empire as it emphasised that:

"The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development." 7

In the Conference of Versailles from 1919-1920, it was realised that the right of self-determination proposed by President Wilson would, however, hinder the Zionist cause in Palestine and also thwart the ambitions of imperial powers in the Middle East. In order to avoid the chaos and deadlock between the American and French delegation in the Conference, President Wilson proposed a King-Crane Commission to know the desire of the inhabitants of the region who were directly

7. Paiz S. Abu-Jaber, n. 4, p. 4.
8. Ibid.
concerned with their area. On August 28, 1919, the Commission revealed that both the Arabs of Syria and Palestine desired an independent United Arab State. In case, Arabs failed to achieve the complete independence, they were ready to accept the United States or Britain as their mandatory powers. The recommendations of the Commission were kept secret for a long time in the archives and made public only in 1922. The Commission recommended Faisal bin Hussein as the head of United Syrian State, while favouring the constitutional Arab monarchies. Further, it opposed the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. The United States abandoned its Middle East policies, particularly, after the rejection of Wilson's proposal to take the United States to League of Nations and thus paved the way for the British authorities to dominate in the Middle

9. France refused to participate in this Commission and Britain, after brief hesitation, also decided to remain aloof from it. Notwithstanding this boycott and despite intense Zionist objections, Wilson appointed a purely American Commission composed of Henry C. King, President of Oberlin College, and Charles Crane, a prominent businessman and student of International Affairs.

George Lenczowski, n. 1, p. 88.


10. Ibid., pp. 88-89.
11. Ibid., p. 90
12. Ibid., p. 89.
13 East politics. Once again America confined herself to the missionary activities in the region and at the same time it cultivated friendship with the Arab countries as to import oil, needed for its industries and this gradually strengthened its economic and commercial relations. American companies on several occasions appealed to the US Government to acquire free access to the new and promising oil fields of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia as these areas were in the hands of the British, French and Dutch competitors. The US Government sought for an open-door policy which would not discriminate the private American business and also appealed to the Dutch, French and British concern to promote private


In a conference held at San Remo in April, 1920, Britain obtained the consent of the Allies for the mandate which came into force on September 29, 1923.


14. The American Government helped its companies to obtain 23.75 per cent share in the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Ibid.

entrepreneurship in the region. With the issuance of the British White Paper in 1939, the Jewish immigration to Palestine was restricted. In fact, until 1939, American avoidance of actual involvement in Palestine problem bore certain factors. Firstly, the world Zionism was in the hands of Britain and, secondly, Britain, until 1939, had not restricted the Jewish immigration to Palestine.

American Role in the Middle East during World War II

During the Second World War Americans further developed their interest in the Middle East for two obvious reasons as the entire region was strategically significant and it

16. In this connection the United States concluded the Anglo-American Treaty of 1924 which regulated relations between the two countries in connection with Palestine mandate and secured the protection of business and missionary interests of Americans in Palestine. Incidentally, the preamble of this treaty included a reference to the Balfour Declaration inserted at the insistence of the British negotiators, which was to be interpreted later by various parties as giving the United States the right to have a say in any changes in the mandate.


18. George Lenczowski, n. 1, p. 531.
American troops deployed in Iran to handle the lend-lease supply line to Russia and they also supplied arms and ammunition to Egypt and Palestine to strengthen the supply center. Apart from this, the United States also concluded lend-lease agreements with the West Asian countries like Iran, Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia in order to establish a chain of bases linking North Africa and Far East.

On the other hand, the Palestine problem was raised through the Baltimore Program on May 11, 1942, by the Zionists, moulding the American public opinion and seeking the United States' support to the Zionist cause. Several pro-Zionist resolutions were passed by the state legislatures in America and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt also endorsed the Zionist aspirations. It was on January 27, 1944, that

19. Ahmad R. Elkashef, n. 15, p. 11.
20. Lend-lease supply was the arrangement announced (1941) by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in which the United States undertook to supply weapons and equipment to countries fighting the Axis. In return, the U.S. obtained the right to use certain Allied bases.

Congress passed the resolution which said:

"... the Sixty-Seventh Congress of the US on June 30, 1922, unanimously resolved that the United States favours the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people..." 24

President Roosevelt pledged during the 1944 election campaign that he would favour the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine. However, he made ambiguous promise in a letter to King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia that he would do nothing which might prove contrary to the Arabs' wish without the prior consultation with the Arabs and Jews. In the meantime, the War Department expressed pessimism over the Congressional and Presidential support to the Jewish cause as it would endanger the war efforts of Allies and at the same time the State Department pointed out that Britain was solely responsible for Palestine and the American Government main concern was to alleviate the sufferings of the European Jewry. 25


US Post-War Attitude

It appeared after the World War that the United States would leave the Middle East considering the area as British responsibility. But Britain was exhausted as a result of the War and there was a sharp decline in its control over the Middle East affairs. The United States, however, renewed and framed its policies in the Middle East in order to protect the Western interests and to counter the Russian expansionist policy. At the first instance, Russians abruptly attempted to subjugate Iran through stimulating and supporting the Azerbaijan rebellion and securing oil concession by coercive measures in 1945-1946. The United States responded by encouraging Iran to resist the Soviet pressures. Meanwhile, Washington felt a new Communist threat in Greece and Turkey. It was on March 12, 1947, President Harry Truman declared:

"One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion... We shall not realise our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples... against aggressive movements that seek to impose on them totalitarian regimes..."


29. Ibid.

President Truman further appealed to the Congress for granting $400 million to Greece and Turkey to meet the Communist challenge both financially and militarily.

The rising persecution of Jews in Europe prompted the Zionists to spread the movement in the United States and their perpetual pressure on Congress and the President led the United States to frame a clear-cut policy in Palestine.

The Zionists tried to secure the American support on two pretexts. Firstly, they quoted the Biblical promises which were made to the descendants of Abraham, as if the Jews were his only descendants. Secondly, they expressed their pathetic and tragic conditions owing to the Nazi persecution of the Jews during the World War II. Thus, the Americans became the Jewish sympathisers and favoured the Jews at the cost of the Palestinians who were quite unattached with the Zionist catastrophe in Europe. The Zionists further constituted a force to be reckoned with in the United States as the "Jewish Vote".

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31. The Truman Doctrine proved to be a success; aided and financed by the Americans, the Greek Government wiped out the Communist guerillas and, thus, saved itself from sharing the fate of its less fortunate Balkan neighbours. Similarly, strengthened in her economy and her military posture, Turkey successfully resisted Soviet pressure for the control of the Straits and the annexation of her eastern provinces. Consequently, the Northern Tier was saved.

George Lenczowski, n. 28, p. 795.

became a decisive factor in US polls.

The United States pressure on the British Government to secure a large measure of Jewish immigration to Palestine had created a tension between British and American Governments and ultimately the Anglo-American Committee was set up in 1946 to find out a solution.  

The British Government did not want to go ahead with the Jewish immigration, which was contrary to the wishes of Palestinians. Further, the persistent pressure from the United States and a series of Zionist violence led the British Government in 1947 to refer the Palestine problem to the United Nations. The General Assembly of the United Nations appointed the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) which provided two plans in its final report in September, 1947. In fact,  

34. The Committee found that hostility between Jews and Arabs made the establishment of an independent Palestine impossible at the moment and, therefore, advised that the British Government retain the mandate until a trusteeship agreement under the United Nations could be arranged. Meanwhile, the Committee recommended the admission to Palestine to 100,000 European Jews as requested by President Truman.  
   Ibid., p. 24.  
35. Ibid.  
36. The eleven member UNSCOP was comprised of Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.  
they were regarded as majority plan and minority plan.\textsuperscript{37} The majority report provided that Palestine should be partitioned into three parts - an Arab State and a Jewish State and the City of Jerusalem should be kept under the international regime of the United Nations. The minority Plan provided for a federal State consisting of the Arab and Jewish units.\textsuperscript{38} The Arabs opposed the partition plan and condemned it as unlawful, unjust and undemocratic attitude towards the majority of the inhabitants. They challenged the legal competency of the UN recommendation of partition of the their ancestral homeland. However, their efforts to take the help of International Court of Justice went in vain.\textsuperscript{39}

On October 11, 1947, United States Deputy Representative to the United Nations, Hershal V. Johnson, emphasised in his statement that:

\textsuperscript{37} The majority plan was signed by the Netherlands, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Peru, Guatemala and Uruguay; whereas the minority report was signed by India, Iran and Yugoslavia.

\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Ibid.}

And also see for further details Michael E. Jansen, \textit{The United States and the Palestinian People} (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970), pp. 18-19.

\textsuperscript{39} Henry Cattan, n. 33, p. 25.
"The United States delegation supports the basic principles of the unanimous recommendations and the majority plan which provide for partition and immigration. It is of the opinion, however, that certain amendments and modifications would have to be made in the majority plan in order more accurately to give to the principles on which that plan is based. My delegation believes that certain geographical modifications must be made. For example - Jaffa should be included in the Arab State because it is predominantly an Arab city ... Any solution which this Committee recommends should not only be just, but also workable and of a nature to command the approval of world opinion." 40

Notwithstanding the Arab opposition, the General Assembly passed its majority plan with certain modifications on November 29, 1947, by a vote of 33 in favour, 13 against with 10 abstentions.41

40. A Decade of American Foreign Policy; Basic Documents, 1941-42 (Washington: Prepared by the Staff of the Committee and the Department of State, 1950), p. 819.

41. In favour - Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Liberia, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, USSR, USA, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Against - Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey and Yemen.

Abstained - Argentina, Chile, China, Columbia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Honduras, Mexico, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia.


And also see for further details Official Records of the General Assembly (GAOR), Second Session, September-November, 1947, pp. 131-151.
The partition plan divided Palestine into six principal parts of which the three parts constituted the Jewish State and the rest three with the enclave of Jaffa were given to the Arab State. The City of Jerusalem and its adjoining area, including Bethlehem were declared as an international zone under the banner of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{42} When the Palestine was divided in 1947, the Jewish population had risen mainly through immigration to about 650,000, whereas the population of the Arabs increased via natural growth to about 1,350,000. Thus, 67.5\% of population were of the Arabs while the Jews constituted 32.5\% only.\textsuperscript{43} It may be noted that partition resolution divided the country discriminately. In fact, the United States played the most important role in influencing the voting pattern in the General Assembly in favour of partition. Stephen B.L. Penrose, ibid., p. 35.

\textsuperscript{42} An important aspect of this unnatural division was to include within the Jewish State all areas owned and inhabited by Jews, even though this meant the inclusion of large areas owned and inhabited by Arabs. The Arab State, on the other hand, was to include the least possible number of Jews and the smaller amount of Jewish property.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., p. 36.

\textsuperscript{44} (a) To the Jewish State it gave more than 56\% of the total area i.e. more than ten times what the Jews owned in land property;

(b) To the Arab States was given only 42\% of the whole country, although the Arabs constituted 67.5\% of the population, and owned more than 94\% of the total area;

(c) 497,000 Arabs, who represented 37\% of the total Arab population, were placed under the domination of the Jewish State.

\textit{Ibid.}
president of the American University of Beirut, criticised the American policy and commented that:

"The political manoeuvring which led to the final acceptance of the United Nations General Assembly of the majority report of UNSCOP provides one of the blacker pages in the history of American international politics. There can be no question but that it was American pressure for partition of Palestine with Economic Union voted by the General Assembly on November 29, 1947. It was this American pressure for partition which is largely responsible for the terrific drop which American prestige took in all parts of the Arab and Muslim world." 45

Partition plan evoked considerable protest from the Palestinians followed by demonstrations and violence. The whole Arabs opposed the partition of their country, the Jews, on the other hand, were determined irrespective of the consequences to establish a Jewish State. 46

Strangely enough, in the early part of 1948, the US intelligence estimates showed a deep concern of Zionism, which of course, dragging the United States into a dangerous programme of territorial conflict in the Middle East. 47

45. Quoted in Henry Cattan, n. 33, p. 27.
46. Ibid., p. 31.
47. In March, 1948, a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Paper on "Force requirements for Palestine", anticipating the termination of the British Mandate, predicted that the Zionist strategy will seek to involve (the United States) in a continuously widening and deepening series of operations intended to secure maximum Jewish objectives. The JCS listed the objectives as: "a) initial Jewish sovereignty over a portion of Palestine, (b) acceptance contd... 16
In the meantime, the State and Defense Departments realised that its economic and strategic interests would be jeopardised in case the United States went ahead to approve the partition plan. The United States wanted to impress the Arabs that it was a blunder on the part of Americans to pursue the partition plan. In pursuance of this policy, on March 19, 1948, Warren R. Austin, the US representative to the United Nations, asked the Security Council to establish a temporary UN Trusteeship over Palestine in view of the non-implementation of plan. The change in American policy was criticised by the American Zionists, politicians and other important citizens. But when the Trusteeship matter was being discussed in the United Nations, the Jews in Palestine were provided with the shipment of Russian arms. And on May 14, 1948, as soon as the British forces withdrew from Palestine, the Jews launched an attack on Palestinians and occupied most of the areas allotted by the great powers of the right to unlimited immigration, (c) the extension of Jewish sovereignty over all of Palestine, (d) the expansion of "Eretz Israel" in Trans-Jordan and into portions of Lebanon and Syria and (e) the establishment of a Jewish military and economic hegemony over the entire Middle East.


to them under the plan and then on the very day they proclaimed the Jewish State calling it as Israel. On the same day a letter was received by President Truman from the Agent of the Provisional Government of Israel, which stated that:

"DEAR PRESIDENT. I have the honor to notify you that the State of Israel has been proclaimed as an independent republic within frontiers approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution of November 29, 1947 ... The act of independence will become effective at one minute after six o'clock on the evening of 14 May 1948 Washington time.

With full knowledge of deep bond of sympathy which has existed and has been strengthened over the past thirty years between the government of the United States and the Jewish people of Palestine. I have been authorized by the provincial government of the new state to tender this message and to express the hope that your government will recognize and will welcome Israel into the community.

Very respectfully yours,

ELIAHU EPSTEIN
Agent, Provisional Government of Israel"

The United States was the first country to recognize Israel. Recognition of Israel by the Truman Administration contradicted the earlier statement of president wherein he had

51. Ibid.
expressed that partition was not taking place in exactly the peaceful manner "as he had hoped." His memoirs indicated the fear of some of the State Department experts who would try to block the recognition of Israel." In order to avoid any such hindrance, eleven minutes after the proclamation of Israel, Charlie Ross, the President's Press Secretary, intimated the correspondents of the de facto recognition. The establishment of State was followed by the hostilities which broke out between Israel and its neighbouring Arab States, namely, Trans-Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. The Arab armies could not face the strong Israeli army as it was fully equipped with sophisticated weapons supplied by the Western countries and at the same time Count Bernadotte, the appointed UN mediator, made his efforts and arranged the truce from June 11 to July 7, 1948. But after the expiry of the truce the hostilities were revived with the Israeli seizure of the whole of Western Galilee as well as Lydda, Ramleh and a larger part of central Palestine evacuated by the Arab legion of Trans-Jordan. This seizure of Arab land was beyond the territory originally allotted to Jews according to the partition plan.

55. Henry Cattan, n. 33, p. 34.
After a series of truce conclusion and their subsequent violation, the Palestine War ended with the conclusion of four Armistice Agreements, which was signed by Israel with Egypt on February 24, 1949, with Lebanon on March 23, 1949, with Jordan on April 3, 1949, and with Syria on July 20, 1949.⁵⁷

The total area which was occupied by the Israelis amounted to almost 30 per cent of the territory of the country.⁵⁸ Before the creation of Israel, the United States involvement in the region bore the strategic and economic interests but as soon as the State of Israel was established, USA became the guardian of the new Jewish State.⁵⁹ In early 1950, Israel sought arms from the United States to match the British shipments made to some of the Arab states in accordance with the outstanding treaties. Although America was sympathised to the Israeli needs yet, it foresaw the threat of renewed war due to the arms race development in the Middle East.⁶⁰ Immediately, the United States consulted the United Kingdom and France and afterwards a Tripartite Declaration was issued on May 25, 1950, which stated that:

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"The three Governments recognize that the Arab States and Israel all need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for ... their internal security and their legitimate self-defense and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole. All applications for arms or war material for these countries will be considered in the light of these principles ... The three Governments take this opportunity to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area ... should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would ... immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation."  

The signing of the Declaration implicitly made the three powers the guardians of the State of Israel and oblige to do their best to maintain the status quo in the Middle East. But the declaration was violated as a result of 1954 secret Franco-Israeli arms arrangement. This had almost become null and void for both Britain and France after the Suez War in 1956.  

United States and the Suez Imbroglio  

The Soviet entrance in the Middle East and Egypt's growing contacts with the Soviet Union perturbed the United States. In  


And also see Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXV, No. 570, June 5, 1956, p. 886.  

62. Leila S. Kadi, n. 60, p. 50.  

order to combat the Soviet influence and to pursue its national interests in the Middle East, the United States assured the Egyptian authorities to extend financial help to construct the Aswan High Dam in Egypt. The financial assistance was to be shared by the World Bank and the United States.

The US constraints and its intentions of withdrawing the aid was however, indicated by Henry Cabot Lodge, the American Ambassador to the United Nations, who told Anthony Nutting, British Minister of State of the foreign office in July, 1956 that:

64. A.G. Naidu, n. 32, p. 10.

65. Negotiations with the Bank President Eugene Black were hard but from Nasser's perspective, successful. Egypt agreed to allow the Bank to supervise its foreign currency needed for the project, at the then current market rate of 5.5 per cent interest. The United States also had conditions and these were even harder to meet. Egypt would make no more arms purchases from the Soviets, would accept the US and British monetary conditions for the loans as they were presented, and would conclude a peace agreement with the Israelis. Taken together, the various World Bank and US conditions for Aswan Dam financing, amounted to a surrender of a considerable amount of national sovereignty of control over Egyptian economic and foreign policy.

Stephen Green, n. 47, p. 131.
"Dulles in all probability shortly renege on the Aswan Dam loan. This was largely to internal political problems ... Although, the government had tried hard to get back on terms with Arab World the damage done by President Truman's pro-Israeli policies, there were powerful anti-Arab, and more particularly anti-Egyptian voices in Congress. Zionist influences were very strong ... for letting Nasser get away with his blockade of the Suez Canal against Israeli shipping ... Now the Zionist lobby in opposing aid to Egypt, and with the presidential election coming alone in less than four months, it just was not practical politics for the administration to go ahead and ask Congress to approve so large a loan to Egypt." 66

The American Government pleaded that the United States did not find any feasibility in that circumstances to engage in the Aswan project. The Administration further said that the Nile riprian States did not accept the project and Egypt was unable to spend the financial resources as she had already exhausted its financial resources owing to the arms deal with the Soviet Union. In July, 1956, American Government owing to the above-said reasons, withdrew the Aswan Dam aid.67 It was already presumed by the Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser that the aid to Egypt was being opposed in the Congress and the United States as a whole. Notwithstanding that Nasser was


67. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXV, No. 892, July 30, 1956, p. 188.
determined to go ahead with the construction of Aswan Dam, and made the historical announcement on July 26, 1956 that:

"The Universal Suez Maritime Canal Company S.A.E. is hereby nationalised. All funds and rights and obligations connected therewith are transferred to the State. All bodies and committees at present existing for its administration are dissolved..."69

The nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company took Britain and France with surprise. The Congress members and the diplomatic observers viewed it as the alarming situation, but they did not declare it illegal. The 1956, being the presidential election year, Suez crisis was the focal point and both the Democratic and Republican parties knew the importance of the crucial 'Jewish Vote' and thus Israel's friendship was favoured by the US Administration.70

68. Nasser thought that if he wished to proceed with construction: accept Soviet aid and the inevitable Soviet conditions, or find a way to finance the dam with Egyptian funds. At the time, Egypt had two major sources of foreign currency earnings: cotton exports, and the small stipend provided by the largely British and French owned Suez Canal Company as a tip of the hat to Egyptian sovereignty. Cotton earnings alone would not finance the project, and were in any event partially mortgaged to pay for Soviet arms. Nasser's choice of nationalisation of the Suez Canal - the Aswan High Dam would be built with revenues from the passage way - through which was carried the majority of Europe's fuel supplies.

Stephen Green, n. 47, p. 132.

69. Ibid.

70. Alfred M. Lilienthal, n. 52, pp. 181-182.
Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, was adamant to use force, although full compensation to the share and bond holders of the Suez Canal Company was assured by Nasser and no single attempt was made to restrict the vessels passage through the Suez Canal. The British Prime Minister expressed his view that "a man with Nasser's record could not be allowed to have his thumb on our windpipe." 71

The Egyptian President, Nasser, had played a vital role to weaken the British empire in the Middle East as the Britishers had lost their grip in Jordan and other Arab principalities and also in the African continent. This had indeed provoked both the British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, and the French Premier, Guy Mollet, to wage a war against Nasser's regime. 72 The French were further angered with the Egyptians because of their support to Algerian Revolution in 1954. 73

Despite Eden's contention to use force, the United States was opposed to such resort, although, on August 1, 1956, in London meeting, the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had declared that they should use such force as a last resort. However, Britain and France indirectly sought backing of the United States and they hoped that the United States would take care of the "Bear". In the real sense, he meant that America

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would impede Russia if it came to Egypt's rescue. Prime Minister Eden presumed that he succeeded in persuading the US authorities to come to their rescue in the event of a war. But there were three vital reasons which led the US Administration to deny the use of force to settle the Suez crisis. Firstly, due to the presidential election year America wanted to solve the Suez crisis peacefully. Secondly, in no way the US interests were jeopardised in the region as there was a continuous flow of oil to its industries and Western nations were also equally provided the needed four per cent crude oil by the Middle East. Lastly, the United States was suspicious of age old European phenomena - the European "colonialism". Sherman Adams, one of President Eisenhower's closest advisers, indicated such reason in his statement that:

"Our firm opposition to colonialism made as sympathetic to the struggle which Egypt and other Arab States were making to free themselves of the political and economic control that the British felt they had to maintain in the Middle East in their own self-interest." 75

It was on September 23, 1956, that Britain and France brought this matter to the Security Council for the settlement which ensured the effective control of the Canal by the

74. Ibid.

Egyptian authority through the six principles. This was, however, resented by the British and French leaders and both the countries decided to use force. The planning of invasion had already been done and French Defense Ministry had sought the clarification of Israeli Military Attache regarding the willingness of indulging with the Joint Anglo-French military action. By mid-August British and French Defense Ministries fully prepared the "operation Musketeer" Plan, which aimed at the seizure and holding of the Suez Canal Zone. After the contact of the French Defense Ministry with Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) on September 1, 1956, regarding the participation in the "operation Musketeer", a detailed discussion was held between the host French General Staff from September 29 to October 1, in Sevres, near Paris to sort out the mode of "Operation Musketeer". After returning from Sevres, Moshe Dayan, the

76. The six principles were:

(a) Passage and shipping through the canal should be free and open, subject to no political or technical discrimination;

(b) Egypt's sovereignty should be respected;

(c) The operation of the canal should be insulated from the politics of all countries;

(d) Egypt and the users were to fix tolls and charges by agreement;

(e) A fair proportion of the dues was to be set aside for canal development;

(f) Disputes between the old Suez Canal Company and Egypt should be settled by negotiations or arbitration.


77. Stephen Green, n. 47, p. 135.
IDF Chief of Staff, informed the General Staff of IDF in a meeting that Israel would join the Anglo-French military action against the Arabs. John Foster Dulles felt that Britain and France were determined to wage a war with Egypt. Further, the Department of State was also apprised by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that Israel and France had concluded an agreement for the supply of French arms to Israel. During the last week of October, the Military Intelligence informed the US Government that Israeli troops had started mobilisation. It was on October 25, 1956, the same day when Israeli forces mobilised Abba Eban, the Israeli Ambassador to the United States, while speaking before the United Nations Security Council proclaimed:

"The Government of Israel will faithfully observe the cease-fire so long as the cease-fire is observed by the other side. It will initiate no violence."  

Abba Eban while officially visited Dulles in his office on Sunday, the 28th of October, 1956, and informed that the report gathered by the Israeli Intelligence showed an Egyptian intention.

78. Ibid., p. 136.
79. Leila S. Kadi, n. 60, p. 92.
to attack Israel. But Dulles was aware of the Israeli intention and told Abba Eban that the Eisenhower Administration would try to prevent the outbreak of hostilities irrespective of the Jewish influence on the presidential election.\textsuperscript{82} Though the Pentagon did not get any information of Anglo-French-Israeli secret talks for a joint attack at the first moment, yet it apprised the occurrence of a war consequence in the Middle East. In fact, the Pentagon's Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) informed the office of the Secretary of Defense that "in the short term" there might be a brief war "initiated by Israel against Egypt to overthrow Nasser's Government, to cripple his army, and to gain territorial objectives." It was also informed that Israel might mobilise its forces before November, 1956.\textsuperscript{83} On October 29, 1956, Sinai was invaded by the Israeli troops and it proceeded rapidly both to Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal.\textsuperscript{84} This was followed by the Joint Anglo-French ultimatum on October 30, 1956, given both to Egypt and Israel. This ultimatum called for the cessation of military action by both Israel and Egypt and withdrawal of their forces to a distance of ten miles from the Canal. Egyptian Government was also asked to accept the temporary Anglo-French forces' deployment on the key position at Port Said, Ismailia and Suez so that the free passage of ships of all countries through the Canal could be ensured. This ultimatum was to be

\textsuperscript{82} E.B. Childres, n. 80, p. 246.

\textsuperscript{83} Stephen Green, n. 47, p. 134.

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{The New York Times} (New York), October 30, 1956.
responded within twelve hours by the two governments. If they failed to accept the ultimatum, the Anglo-French troops would intervene "in whatever strength may be necessary to secure compliance." As it was already planned, the Israeli troops remained ten miles away from the Canal as a follower of the ultimatum whereas the Egyptian Government refused to accept the ultimatum which gave the Anglo-French aircrafts the opportunity to operate from Malta and Cyprus and bombarded the Egyptian airfields in the Delta and in the Canal Zone resulting in sinking of an Egyptian frigate in the Gulf of Suez. In order to materialise a complete Egyptian blockade of the Canal, President Nasser ordered the sinking of 47 ships filled with concrete.

On the 30th of October, 1956, when Anglo-French ultimatum was given to Egypt and Israel, a resolution was sponsored by the United States in the Security Council urging Israel to cease-fire and withdraw her forces immediately behind the armistice lines. In an address to the nation through Radio and Television on October 31, 1956, President Dwight D. Eisenhower regarded the


86. Yaacov Shimoni and Evyatar Levine (Edited), n. 6, p. 371.

invading actions as incompatible with the principles and purposes of the United Nations. It was on November 4, 1956, that Canada sponsored a resolution in the General Assembly, emphasising that Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, would chalk out a plan to set up an emergency international United Nations force, to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, abiding the November 2, 1956 resolution terms, sponsored by the United States. The next night Hammarskjöld proposed the establishment of a United Nations Force under General E.L.M. Burns, who was already as the Chief of Staff of the United

88. The president added that: "... beyond this, we are forced to doubt even if resort to war will for long serve the permanent interests of the attacking nations ... There can be no peace—without law. And there can be no law - if we were to invoke once code of international conduct for those who oppose us and another for our friends."


The resolution had urged that (a) all parties in hostilities in the area should agree to an immediate cease-fire, (b) the parties to the armistice agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice line, (c) all member states should abstain from any act that might delay or prevent the implementation of the resolution, (d) upon the cease-fire of being effective, steps should be taken to reopen the Suez Canal, (e) requested the Secretary-General to observe the report compliance promptly to the Security Council and to the General Assembly.

Nations Truce Supervision Organisation in Palestine. On November 5, 1956, when the voting was being carried out in the General Assembly, the same day Anglo-French paratroops were landing at the north end of the Suez Canal, though fighting was ceased by both Egypt and Israel. Meanwhile, Premier Nikolai Bulganin of the Soviet Union sent a strongly worded message to the British Prime Minister Eden, Guy Mollet, the French Premier and David Ben Gurion of Israel. In his message, Bulganin expressed Russian determination to resort to force in order to crush the aggressors and restore peace in the East.

In the meantime, the United States Government refused to provide the further financial assistance to both Britain and France and also prevented the supply of oil in order to pressurise the Anglo-French forces. On November 6, 1956, Britain and France accepted the cease-fire and the UN force supervision in the war torn. It was a common belief that Anglo-French hostilities was ceased due to the sincere endeavours of President Eisenhower. Some scholars, however, also gave credit to Soviet Premier Bulganin's warning, which worked as a deterrence to war.

91. Leila S. Kadi, n. 60, p. 100.
hysteria in the region.  

English Prime Minister Anthony Eden's falling health, domestic economic conditions, and political pressures also paved the way for the cessation of hostilities. 

The State Department officials indirectly pleaded for a sanction on Israel through stopping the American aid. Three days earlier, on November 5, Premier Bulganin had also sent a letter to Ben Gurion accusing the Israeli Government of "criminally and irresponsibly toying with the fate of the world and its own people" and of "inculcating such hatred as bring into question the actual existence of Israel as a State." The American pressure and the Soviet threat led Prime Minister Ben Gurion of Israel to announce Israel's readiness to withdraw from Egyptian territory. The withdrawal of British and French forces was completed on December 23, 1956, which was supervised by the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). 


95. Ibid.


However, Israelis did not materialise the declaration of withdrawal of its troops from Egypt. On November 5, 1956, Dulles, the US Secretary of State, in a press Conference declared that the United States would seriously consider the economic sanctions against Israel provided General Assembly would so desire. But this move was criticised by some senators. In a meeting on February 20, 1957, President Eisenhower, while explaining the reasons for the American pressure on Israel for the acceptance of UN resolution for an unconditional withdrawal of troops, pointed out that if the Export Import (EXIM) Bank did not support Israel it would soon face the financial crisis. It should avoid such an event. President Eisenhower cautioned the Congressmen of the Arabs possible inclination towards the Soviets as a result of Israel's non-compliance to the UN order. He admitted that he was aware of the Congressmen opposition to the sanctions against Israel but he did not find any way to protect American interests. He stated that the principles of world peace organisation would be jeopardised in case US fail to support its resolutions on Israel.

It was on May 1, 1957, UN resolution of economic sanctions on Israel was moved in the General Assembly. But immediately the

100. Leila S. Kadi, n. 60, p. 105.
101. Ibid.
Israeli authorities announced the withdrawal of forces from Egypt before the resolution was approved in the General Assembly. In fact, it was principally the Americans efforts and their firm stand against Britain, France and Israel which resulted in end of war crisis in the Suez. The United States wanted to avoid the world's opinion of its being connived with the three powers and she was antagonised with the Allies secret plan which was not revealed to her and even the American warnings were ignored by the Israelis. These events eventually paved the way for American inclination towards Arabs.

**Eisenhower Doctrine**

It was after the two months long span of hearings that the US Congress ultimately adopted a joint resolution on March 9, 1957, better known as Eisenhower Doctrine which emphasised to contain the Soviet influence in the entire Middle East and to establish the US supremacy in the region. The Eisenhower Doctrine was framed to "promote peace and stability in the Middle East". And the President was further conferred on with the authority by

102. Ibid., p. 110
105. Ibid.
106. Tarun Chandra Bose, n. 75, pp. 46-47.
the Congress to "co-operate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East desiring such assistance in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence, undertake military assistance programs with such nations, and use of some $200 million for implementing the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954."

The United States regarded the doctrine as vital to the national interest and world peace, the preservation of independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. It was provided that if the president so determined, the United States was prepared to use its armed forces to assist any nation or group of nations "requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international Communism, consonant with its treaty obligations and with the US constitution."

This doctrine, however, received a poor response abroad, and at the same time divided the Arab world into two camps. Though, the British Government did not foresee any danger of Soviet armed attack, it mainly foresaw the threat of Middle East arms race due to the Eisenhower Doctrine and its intentions to drive undue advantages of power vacuum and protecting its oil


interests in the region were further intensified in the name of doctrine.

When the US Ambassador, P. Richards was sent to the Middle East to secure adherence to the doctrine, all the Arab countries except Lebanon, Greece, Turkey and Iran, opposed the policy. The Eisenhower Doctrine was first applied in Jordan in April, 1957, when Jordanian monarchy was jolted by an attempt at a coup staged by the pro-Nasser faction in the army and supported by a civilian coalition comprising the Baathists and the Communists. Washington reacted by sending the US Sixth-Fleet to eastern Mediterranean waters and Dulles declared "the independence and integrity of Jordan as vital" to its national interests. Fortunately, King Hussein Ibn Talal of Jordan was able to defeat his enemies and retain control over his Kingdom by dissolving the parliament and political parties, arresting the dismissed Prime Minister, Suleiman Nebulsi, and imposing martial law. This was followed by the United States announcement of an emergency grant of $10 million to the Jordanian Government.

During the summer of 1957, pro-Nasser and pro-Soviet groups in the army controlled the Syrian Government followed by

110. Tarun Chandra Bose, n. 75, p. 47.
111. Harry N. Howard, n. 63, p. 126.
112. George Lenczowski, n. 28, p. 798.
considerable Soviet military and economic aid to Syria. In view of this new development, the United States speculated that the Soviet Union might stimulate Syria against Turkey and warned the Soviet Union to desist herself from intervention in the Middle East and reiterated its stand to defend Turkey. Fortunately, the threat of war soon disappeared and Egypt and Syria formally joined together and formed the United Arab Republic (UAR) which was hailed as a prelude to Arab unity. This was a great blow to the US influence in the region and soon the authorities in the White House realised that the pro-Nasser groups and Egyptian Agents were creating hindrances for the US policy in the Middle East.

In May, 1958, an armed rebellion broke out in Lebanon following President Camille Chamoun's pro-Western policies and his support to Eisenhower Doctrine. President Chamoun alleged that the foreign agents were responsible for the revolt and he sought the United States assistance to overcome the crisis in Lebanon. Once again, the US Sixth Fleet was sent to Mediterranean and Lebanon was provided with US military aid to suppress the revolt. Lebanon and Jordan became more apprehensive when the Iraqi Government was overthrown on July 14, 1958, by the pro-Nasser faction under the leadership of General Abdul Karim Qasim and they immediately sought the US help.

114. Tarun Chandra Bose, n. 75, p. 51.
In fact, on July 15, 1958, 14,000 marines were ordered to put ashore in Lebanon by President Eisenhower ignoring all the Congressmen's contention of the inapplicability of Eisenhower Doctrine and the opposition from Pentagon. On July 17, the British paratroops and the American land forces were sent to Jordan and this act of the United States and Britain was condemned by the Soviet Union as an "aggression" and their withdrawal was demanded. In October, 1958, the US forces were withdrawn from Lebanon followed by the British withdrawal of its forces from Jordan a month later. This intervention was brought discredit to the US policies and adversely affected its goodwill earned in the Middle East during the Suez crisis.\footnote{Robert E. Hunter, "The Dilemma in the Middle East, Part I: Problems of Commitment", \textit{Adelphi Papers}, No. 59, September, 1969, p. 7.}

This, of course, paved the way for Russian entry in the region and at the same time they felt that some of the Arab countries were interested in sharing the Soviet technology particularly, in the military affairs.

Assumption of the office of the presidency in 1961 by John F. Kennedy brought considerable changes both in thinking and policy posture which, however, inclined favourably to those progressive states like Egypt, Syria, Iraq etc. as these states had a decisive role in the Middle East policies, apart from

\footnote{Ibid, pp. 349-350.}
their broader approach in the international affairs. Soon this policy was encountered with a number of problems like the civil war in Yemen and followed by massive intervention by the Egyptian forces with the supply of military aid etc. Though the United States intended to cultivate good relations with Egypt yet the US Administration could not ignore Nasser’s aggressive posture towards Saudi Arabia which had friendly relations with the Americans. The new policy initiatives spelt out by the Kennedy Administration for the Arabs remained far from implementation because of the untimely death of President in November, 1963.

US and the War of 1967

A relative peace was apparently witnessed between the Arabs and Israelis for almost a decade after the Suez Crisis. But internally the massive war preparations were on both sides. President Lyndon B. Johnson Administration did not formulate any new policies for the Arabs but perpetuated the previous foreign policy programmes of Kennedy Administration ensuring economic and military supplies regularly to Israel and to keep working relations with revolutionary states like Egypt, Iraq and Syria. The friendly relations with Saudi Arabia and Sultanate of Oman

118. George Lenczowski, n. 28, p. 803.

119. The Arabs, particularly the UAR, had received considerable amount of economic and military aid from the Soviet Union which had greatly undermined US influence in the Arab countries. The Israelis had, on the other hand, received a much larger amount of aid and military equipment from the United States.

M.L. Gujral, n. 115, p. 351.
also continued undisturbed.

Due to the past conflicts the problem of displaced Palestinian Arabs became intractable and this led to the emergence of a number of militant movements like Al-Fatah and Palestine Liberation Army apart from the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) to counter the Israeli aggression in the region. Both the Palestinians and Israelis involved in attacking each other and the Palestinians faced a number of casualties, particularly of those residing in the Arab territories. The border incidents and clashes frequently occurred between the Arabs and Israelis.

120. George Lenczowski, n. 28, pp. 803-804.

121. In early sixties, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was established with the active support of Egypt. It was headed by Ahmad Shukairy, a barrister from Cambridge, who was a Palestinian refugee himself. Simultaneously, a front organisation named the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) was formed to free the Holyland from the "Zionist occupation". About the same time, Al-Fatah, another liberation movement, came into limelight. This organisation was founded in late sixtees by Yasser Arafat, an Arab refugee, with the aim of liberating Palestine from the Jewish usurpers. Arab refugees were recruited to the PLA and Al-Fatah, and they carried guerrilla raids inside Israel.

A.G. Naidu, n. 32, p. 20.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid.
It was in May, 1967, that Soviet Union informed Syria of heavy deployment of Israeli forces at its border and Syria communicated this information to Egypt. Initially, President Nasser thought that the massing of the Israeli troops was simply a deterrence to the fedayeen (Palestinian guerrillas) border raids. But he later believed the Syrians about the possible Israeli attack on their territory. As Nasser got the message from Colonel Anwar al-Sadat who headed a parliamentary delegation to North Korea via Moscow from April 27 to May, 1967, and was told by Podgorny about the Israeli plan to attack on Syria.

This was marked by the proclamation of State of emergency in Egypt and the mobilisation of Egyptian forces into Sinai followed by President Nasser's request on May 18, to the UN Secretary-General U Thant to withdraw the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) which was duly complied. On May 22, 1967, President Nasser, while announcing the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, stated:

"... Under no circumstances can we permit the Israeli flag to pass through the Gulf of Aqaba. The Jews threaten war. We say they are welcome to war, ... but under no circumstances shall we abandon any of our rights. These are our waters."


Reacting to the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, on May 23, 1967, prime Minister Levi Eshkol of Israel stated in the Knesset that:

"An interference with and in the Straits (of Tiran) constitutes a gross violation of international law, a blow at the sovereign rights of other nations and an act of aggression against Israel". 127

On the same day, in a broadcast to the nation the US President Lyndon B. Johnson regarded it as the "grave demonstrations to the crisis". He declared that the United States considered the Gulf as an "international waterway" and felt the blockade of Israeli shipping "illegal and potentially disastrous to the cause of peace." He further committed to the "political independence and territorial integrity" of all the nations in the region and pledged that he would support the UN efforts to diffuse the tension in the area. 128 The Soviet Union felt the gravity of the situation and anticipated that it might result into direct conflict. Nasser was advised to avoid over-reaction and keep restraint. But he was annoyed with the Soviet suggestion as the Soviet Union herself gave information about the massing of Israeli troops on the Syrian and Egyptian borders. 129

However, on May 30, 1967, in a spectacular move a Joint Defense Agreement was signed between President Nasser of UAR and

King Hussein of Jordan. On June 4, 1967, Iraq also joined the Defence Pact originally signed between the UAR and Jordan. These developments paved the way for a direct conflict between the Arabs and Israelis. It was on June 5, 1967, that Israel launched a major attack on Egypt, Syria and Jordan leading to the destruction of air forces of these countries. It took Nasser and other Arab leaders by surprise. President Nasser requested the Soviet Union to intervene but due to the fear of superpower confrontation in the conflict, the Soviet Union went only to the extent of condemning the Israeli Government and demanding the Israeli withdrawal and cessation of conflict. This was followed by the Soviet and American efforts in UN to pass a resolution for the cease-fire. The war was stopped with the conclusion of cease-fire agreement on June 10, 1967. But Israel occupied Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, West Bank of Jordan and Golan Heights of Syria after defeating the three countries in the six-day war. The war no doubt, gave a jolt and shock to the Arabs in general and Nasser in particular. Mohamed Heikal pointed out that three fundamental facts had contributed to the swift and massive Israeli victories—Firstly, the Arabs were facing an enemy in receipt of massive aid. Secondly, Israel

130. Al-Ahram (Cairo), May 31, 1967.
133. Aftab Kamal Pasha, n. 124, pp. 41-42.
134. Ibid., p. 43.
had utilised the resources she received, with exceptional skill. Thirdly, in tackling Israel with the resources - which were not inconsiderable, the Arabs acted with exceptional inaptitude.

No doubt, the Arabs were quite unhappy with the Russians for their inability to render military assistance during war. Yet the Arab dependence on the Soviet Union was increased as president Nasser had expressed faith in the Soviet authorities to receive military assistance and to stimulate his own socialist policies at the home front. On the other hand, the United States equally extended the massive military assistance to Israel.

The Arab Summit which was commenced on August 29, 1967, in Khartoum, Sudan, approved unanimously that Israelis should withdraw to the existing line before June 5, 1967. On June 19, 1967, addressing at the Department of State Foreign Policy Conference for Educators, President Johnson gave the five great principles for peace settlement in the Middle East. The first principle was the recognition of the right of national life; second, justice for all the refugees; third, opening of innocent maritime passage to all nations; fourth, limits on the wasteful


137. Fuad A. Jaber (Edited), n. 126, pp. 655-656.
and destructive arms race and fifth, political independence and territorial integrity for all.

The grave concern was expressed about the Middle East in the Summit meeting which was held between President Johnson and Soviet Premier Alexie Kosygin on June 23, 1967, at Glassboro, New Jersey, and approved that both the powers would cooperate to ensure peace in the region. This, however, gave a new impetus to the policy perception of both the powers in the region because of their own interests and this gradually laid foundation for rapprochement.

It was on November 22, 1967, that the United Kingdom sponsored Security Council Resolution 242, for peaceful solution of the Middle East conflict which was unanimously approved. In fact, this outlined the principles and measures given by President Johnson on June 19 and also during the talks with Premier Kosygin on June 23, 1967, at Glassboro Summit.


140. Fuad A. Jaber (Edited), n. 126, p. 268.

The resolution 242 urged:

"I Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.

II Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secured and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force."

After the passage of resolution 242, the UN Secretary-General U Thant, appointed Gunnar Jarring, the Swedish Ambassador, to Soviet Union as Special Representative to bring about agreement between the Arabs and the Israelis. Though, he shuttled between the Arab States and Israel for more than two years but all efforts went in vain due to the conflicting interests of the super powers and to the conflicting views expressed by both the Arabs and Israelis.

As a result of the Egyptian defeat in 1967 war, Nasser launched a "War of Attrition" against the Israelis.

142. It further affirmed the necessity "(a) for granting freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; (b) for achieving a just settlement of the refugees problem; (c) for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones."


near the frontier along the Suez Canal in March, 1969, in order to achieve three aims:

"(a) To enable the Egyptian army to confront the Israeli Defense forces in a limited war under favourable conditions.

(b) To diminish the Israeli forces and erode Israel's staying power, and

(c) To get the Americans to pressurize Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories without any meaningful change in the military balance." 144

In the beginning of the "War of Attrition", the Egyptian forces inflicted heavy casualties on the Israelis. At this juncture, the US Secretary of State, William Rogers, on December 9, 1969, came forward with a set of proposals known as "Rogers Plan" which aimed at the cessation of hostilities between Egyptian and Israeli forces. The plan, however, did not draw any


The Rogers Plan provided Israel to withdraw to the international boundary with Egypt (that of the mandate period), Gaza Strip and Sharm al-Sheikh, to remain subjects for negotiation, on the assumption that they will not remain under Israeli control, Israel to withdraw to the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan with slight revisions, the Arab refugees to be accorded a status equal to that of Israel in the religious, economic and civil spheres.

Yaacov Shimoni and Evyatar Levine (Edited), n. 6, p. 329.
favourable response from Egypt and Israel.

Meanwhile, the war took a new turn due to the Israel's success and its massive air raids against Egypt involving heavy civilian casualties. This paved the way for the Russians to come closer to Egypt with further military assistance to its army. It worked as a deterrent to the Israelis whereas the United States got alarmed by a new form of Soviet presence in the region. On June 19, 1970, in a renewed diplomatic initiative the revised Rogers plan for cessation of hostilities was launched by the United States. President Nasser, on July 23, 1970, accepted the US proposal. This was followed by the Israeli

147. Ibid., p. 37.
150. Ibid., p. 397.
approval of the Rogers Plan on July 30, 1970, and ultimately a cease-fire was declared. The 90 days cease-fire agreement became effective on August 7, 1970, which was renewed on November 6, 1970, and again in February, 1971. Though, the cease-fire was allowed to expire on March 7, 1971, the de facto cease-fire was continued until October, 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

153. Yair Evron, n. 151, p. 120.