West Asia has been economically and strategically important region for the United States and its policy was marked by its determination to safeguard and promote political, economic and strategic interests in the region. The containment of the Soviet influence, the rivalries of the two superpowers and the thrust of their respective policies conducted in their own interests contributed to instability in the region. Further, the persistent hostility between the Arabs and the Jews and their intransigent attitudes made the region in perpetual crises. This paved the way for the superpowers rivalry which further impeded the process of normalisation of relations between the Arabs and the Jews.

The beginning of 1970, however, witnessed a tremendous change in the United States' policy perceptions and approaches towards the Palestinian issue and gradually the State Department favourably inclined to find an amicable solution to the Middle East crisis. At the same time, the Soviet Union which had been playing a significant role in the Egyptian affairs, failed to influence President Anwar Al-Sadat and expressed reluctance to supply sophisticated arms to counter the Israeli threats. This ultimately resulted in expulsion of Soviet technicians from Egypt. Equally, Sadat expressed his desire to invite the American officials to rescue the dwindling economy of Egypt. After the 1973 war, the officials in the State Department responded positively to assist Egypt both militarily and economically.
Intransigent attitudes of Israelis to vacate the occupied territories of Arabs and non-implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, setback to Egyptian and Syrian forces in wars against Israel led to the imposition of oil embargo in 1973. The world economy in general and in particular economies of the United States, Western Europe and Japan were adversely affected by the oil embargo.

After assuming the office of the Presidency, by Jimmy Carter, there was a serious and sincere thinking in the White House to solve the Middle East crisis amicably which eventually led to the conclusion of American sponsored Camp David Accords between President Sadat and the Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin. This, however, proved to be a partial peace and the subsequent Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979 fully isolated Egypt from the Arab world. Both Egypt and Israel were mutually benefitted by the treaty. On the other hand, the Camp David Accords and the subsequent Peace treaty drew strong Arab reaction. The accords further alienated the Palestinians whose right to self-determination was ignored by the signatories. Although, the Camp David Accords were an instant American success yet, the US had to lose its credibility among its traditional Arab friends.

An attempt is made in this thesis to trace out the pros and cons of American Policy towards West Asia, particularly the

Chapter I discusses chronologically the historical events which laid the basic foundation initially for strengthening the friendship and to the further reciprocal policies between the Arabs and Americans. In Chapter II the reasons and consequences of the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 are explored. Chapter III covers the events leading to the American sponsored Camp David Accords of 1978 between Egypt and Israel which brought a drastic change in the Middle East Politics. The signing of the first peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is dealt in Chapter IV. The rapprochement between Egypt and Israel following the Peace treaty and Egypt-Israeli policies towards the autonomy for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza strip is delineated in Chapter V. The conclusive part is mainly concerned with the analytical assessment of the Camp David Accords which is the focal point of study.