CONCLUSION
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In recent years there has been a noticeable trend towards increasing co-operation and reciprocal assistance in the matter of suppression of criminal activities and this is evident by the conclusion of large number of bilateral and multilateral conventions. Laws relating to extradition have been discussed above in the broader perspective. In the process one may have noticed that extradition is not an easy exercise as one may have imagined or desired. It is packed with many complications and pitfalls.

No state may exercise physical control over an individual within the territory of another state. On the other hand a state may admit an alien to reside within its territory at discretion. It is thus possible for a law breaker to escape justice by simply crossing the frontier, having committed no crime on the state of refuge, the choice of that state having no valid cause to arrest him and hand him over. It is this situation that extradition treaties are designed to meet. The problem arises in several combinations of circumstances depending on the location of the offence, the nationality of the accused and the place of apprehension. These three considerations are reflected in three competitive principles for determining jurisdiction over individuals in criminal cases.

One of the most serious defects of the present system of
International extradition is the inadequate range of offences covered by many existing treaties. Three factors contribute towards this situation.

(a) Many existing treaties are old and have not been amended or replaced so as to keep pace with the increasing range of offences committed by fugitives or with novel offences arising out of scientific discoveries or changed social conditions. Offences connected with aircraft hijacking and traffic in narcotic drugs are particularly noteworthy examples which have given cause for concern.

(b) The practice of specifying extraditable offences by name in the treaties has resulted in many chance omissions. Offences which are seriously criminal, where, as is the case with many countries, extradition may not take place in the absence of a duty to surrender imposed by strict terms of a treaty, the criminal may escape punishment.

(c) Some municipal courts restrictively interpreted the enumerated offences in treaties so as to require in each case that the offence actually charged should correspond not merely with an offence by law of the requested state which is within the treaty but with the offence of the same name as defined by law of the requested state.

Thus to determine the offence for which extradition may be granted is a problem that faces in the first instance the negotiators of the treaty, and then subsequently the courts of the requested state, which may enquire in every case whether the stipulations of the treaty have been fulfilled.
In order to make the process of extradition less cumbersome and time consuming, one should see that the liberty of an individual is not bargained on the international chessboard. Few points are to be kept in mind, for instance:

(a) In case of border states where there is more likelihood of fugitive flight, fugitives should be extradited without proof of prima facie evidence but on production of an authenticated warrant.

(b) While it is desirable to incorporate the rule of speciality in extradition treaties a fugitive may nevertheless be extradited even in the absence of such a provision in treaty or national legislation provided there is adhoc assurance in writing given by the requesting state to the effect that the rule of speciality will be scrupulously observed.

(c) Extradition offences should be determined on the basis of the term of sentence provided, of course, the rule of double criminality is not violated.

(d) Nationals who are not extradited must be tried by their own states. This principle need be accepted by all concern states.

(e) With respect to convicted fugitives, evidence as to their conviction and identity should, be required unless he has been convicted in abstentia in which case prima facie evidence may also be required. Rule of time bar should not be applied to convicted fugitives.

(f) The rights of the individual in extradition
proceedings must be upheld. Terrorism must be considered a common crime for the purpose of extradition, so that the general rule against the extradition of political offenders will be unapplicable.

Extradition therefore is a necessity. No fugitive should be given the impression that he can commit the offence and flee from justice by taking shelter in a foreign territory. Care should, however, be taken his trial meets the ends of justice and is not subject to unnecessary political harassment. Libya's refusal to handover the Lockerbie case accused to USA or UK can be sighted as a case of such an apprehension.

Some writers are of the view that extradition is of declining importance throughout the world. Many extradition treaties were terminated by the outbreak of the first and second world wars and have not been renewed subsequently, it is uncertain whether extradition treaties made by colonial powers remain binding on their former colonies, surviving extradition treaties are often out of date, or they do not contain a list of crimes which do not include new offences, for instance, the economic offences, which have increased manifold in recent years. Acts or omissions in contravention of the customs, foreign exchange and company regulation committed by multinational corporations, cartels, as also organised groups of individuals, which have serious repercussions on the economic well-being of Nations have given serious doubts on the prevailing doctrine of non-extradition
for offences of a fiscal nature. Though a number of steps have been taken up by the multinational conventions to widen the scope of extradition to embrace new offences of general International concern.

Very few new extradition treaties have been made in recent years. At the beginning of this century the United Kingdom extradited dozens of people every year under the extradition act of 1870, now United Kingdom extradite only two or three people a year. On the other hand twenty eight people are surrendered every year to the Republic of Ireland under the backing of warrants Act 1965. This demonstrates another feature of extradition that, it is used principally between countries of common land boundaries, for example, France extradited about 150 people a year, 90% of them to adjacent countries.

The well established principle against the surrender of political offenders has also been watered down to some extent by providing extradition of persons accused of acts of terrorism such as kidnapping or violence against the persons of a diplomatic agent or hijacking of aircraft under various conventions.

A problem connected with both the process of extradition and the granting of asylum is posed by what could be termed as informal extradition. This refers to any of a great variety of devices and practices utilised by states to secure the apprehension of civil, criminal and political offenders who have managed to escape beyond the frontiers of the seeking
state, all without the formality of the procedural details characteristics of normal state practice under the terms of and extradition treaty. Modern history is replete with examples of informal extradition and it is regrettable that the scope of a general text precludes a details presentation of a most interesting subject.

Kidnapping from a foreign country is one process of getting the custody of the desired fugitive. There is also the procedure of expulsion or deportation of the required fugitive if he is wanted in the state of his nationalily. In this way the safeguards created for the individual in legislation and treaties relating to extradition are evaded, SOBLEN case 1963 being in sight. It is probably this use of deportation which explains why there are now fewer extradition treaties and fewer extradition cases than there used to be.

Almost all states have continued to recognise in their treaties as also in municipal legislations the principle of non-extradition of political offenders but there is little guidance in the practice of states as to what would constitute a political offence. In GARCIA GUILLERSON V. U.S. 1989 it was observed that a political offence must involve an uprising or some other voilent political disturbance.

Existing diversities in International rules and practice under the hundred of bilateral extradition treaties now in force have encouraged jurists to advocate a single multilateral treaty, but the movement has made little progress. The divergency in practices with respect to
surrender of nationals are deeply rooted. Differences in procedure are not well defined. It would be difficult to secure agreement on a list of extradition crimes. Since a general convention at the present time would probably be incomplete or would incorporate a number of optional clauses, it has been doubted whether it would achieve the end desire.

Thus it can be suggested that in the absence of an universal convention the best way would be to have bilateral cooperation in the administration of criminal justice, as they have proved to be more flexible in nature. This is evident by the manifold increase in the number of bipartide extradition agreements in the recent years.