Ayatollah Rohollah Mousavi Khomeini was born on 24 September 1902, A.D. (i.e. 20 Jamad al-Thani 1320 A.H.). He belonged to a well-to-do clerical family. Several of his close relatives were renowned mujtahids. Khomeini's grand father Sayyed Ahmad Mou'savi who was a mujtahid settled in Khomeini, a village over hundred kilometers south-west of Tehran where Khomeini was born. His father Sayyed Mostafa Mou'savi was also a mujtahid. But his brother


A few biographies mention 1379 A.H. (Solar) as the year in which Khomeini was born, which correspond to 1900 A.D. For example Anonymous A Biography of Imam Khomeini, p.3.


3 Several biographies, e.g. Shaul Bakhsh, op. cit., Aqiqi Bakhshayeshi, op. cit., p.195; Anonymous A Biography of Imam Khomeini, p.13, say he was a local mujtahid while Hamid Algar mentioned him as an Ayatollah. See Hamid Algar, "Introduction by the Translator" in Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, p.13.
Sayyed Allama Mortoza Mousavi Pasadida - another mujtahid and his mother who herself belonged to a clerical family were mainly responsible for his upbringing as his father was killed for unknown reasons when Khomeini was only five months old.

Khomeini acquired religious education at Khomeini. In early 1921 he came to Arak for higher studies and joined the madrasa run

---

4 Anon., A Biography of Imam Khomeini, p.3. She was the daughter of a theologian Ayatollah Mirza Ahmad.

5 The biographers of Khomeini are not unanimous as to why and by whom he was killed. Some e.g. Anon., Zendaginama-ye Imam Khomeini, p. 36, and Sahaul Bakhash, loc. cit., believe that he was killed by someone over a land dispute. Others e.g. Hamid Algar, loc. cit., and Anon., Buyugrafi-ye Pishva, p.29, believe that he was killed by some bandits. However, some later biographers say that he was killed by the agents of the regime. See "Zendagani-ye Imam Khomeini", Rah-e Islam, No.47, (Jamadi al-Thani, 1408 A.H.), p.16.

by Shaykh Abdol Karim Ha'ari-Yezdi. The following year, the latter was invited to Qomm to take charge of ma'drasa-ye Fayziya. Khomeini followed him and came to Qomm in 1922. He completed his education by 1927 and started teaching in the same ma'drasa.

Besides the traditional religious sciences, one of the main subjects of interest for Khomeini was the study of ethics and 'irfan (tasawwuf, mysticism). When he started teaching, his major interest was 'irfan. He also taught philosophy which was

7 Ayatollah Abdol Karim Ha'eri-yezdi (d, 1937) served as the sole marja'-e taqlid during the late 1920s and 1930s. During his period the ma'drasa at Qomm, became the most important religious centre in Iran. It became not only the Centre of learning but also a source of religious and political guidance because of ulama's concentration here. On the life and achievements of Ayatollah Shaykh Abdol Karim Ha'eri-Yezdi, see Aqiqi Bakhshayshi, op. cit., pp. 157-68; idem, Fugaha-ye Namdar-e Shi'a; Sharough Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy State Relations the Pahalvi Period, pp. 15-39 Abdul Hadi Ha'iri, Shi'ism and Constitutionalism in Iran, pp. 135-39.

8 Anon., A Biography of Imam Khomeini, p. 4.

considered as a less orthodox subject by the orthodox clergy. This was also the reason why he was regarded as following less orthodox line. A number of his disciples narrate that his lectures on ethics and 'irfan attracted a greater number of pupils. Keeping in view the political activism of Khomeini in the later part of his life it is strange, as pointed out by several biographers, that the centre of his early interest was non-political and devotional subjects. But as his students narrate his lectures on spiritual topics had undertones of social and political responsibility.


11 A disciple and a lieutenant of Khomeini during and after the Revolution, Mohammad Javed Bahonar, narrates these classes in the following words: 'The two issues he emphasized were the necessity for Islam and Iran to be independent of both Eastern and Western colonialism and the need to get the clergy out of the mould of an academic straitjacket. He said the clergy had a responsibility for humanity not only in Iran but wherever people were hungry and oppressed. In this way Khomeini trained 1,200 religious leaders who are the elite of the country today'. Cited in "The unknown Ayatollah Khomeini", Times, 16 July 1979, p. 27. Ayatollah Motahhari, another close associate of Khomeini recalls that 'they were first attracted to him by his proficiency in ethics and philosophy and that the classes were frequently attended by hundreds of people. Cited in Hamid Algar, op.cit., p. 14.
Khomeini's life, in so many respects, can broadly be divided into two distinct phases. The first starts with his stay at Qomm upto the early 1960s; the second dates from early 1960s upto the present time. In his first phase of his life he looks like a scholarly person while in the second phase he emerged as an active political leader. None of the biographies of Khomeini speak of any pronounced activism in him in his early phase of life, though there had been a number of occasions when the clergy had adopted violent path and opposed the regime. Nevertheless, he must have inculcated opposition to and hatred for the regime in his early life. A number of facts point to this direction. Being a member of a clerical family, he must have heard and seen the great confrontation between the clergy and the regime during the Constitutional movement (1906-1909) and in its aftermath when he was still a child. Then his stay at Qomm coincided with the rise of Reza Khan to the power who was not liked by the clergy. Reza Khan was viewed by the clergy as an enemy who wanted to curb the power and prestige of the clergy. His secular and modernist politics were disliked by the 'ulama'. Khomeini's family belonged to that section of the clergy who did not like the modernization of Reza Khan. Among his patrons at Khomeini and Arak was one Shaykh

Mohsin Iraqi who was a close associate of Shaykh Fazlollah Nuri who was hanged in 1909. It was he who led a politically active life and demanded a constitution based on shari'a (mashru'ta-ye mashru'). Some biographers claim that Khomeini took part in anti-Reza Khan demonstrations led by Hajj Aqa Norollah Isfahani and Mirza Sadiq Aqa in Isfahan and Tabriz respectively around the mid 1920s. The anti-clergy measures of Reza Shah further aggravated the grievances of the clerical class during the 1930s. A number of incidents took place including the famous incident of Gouharshad Mosque in 1935, in which the clergy were humiliated by the regime. All these happenings during this period put a deep impression upon Khomeini which is reflected in his later writings and speeches. However, Khomeini followed politically a quietist life and associated himself with Shaykh Abdol Karim Ha'eri-Yezdi who disapproved 'ulama's active participation in political life and emphasized the need of clerical involvement in educational and religion reforms. When Ha'eri-Yezdi who died in 1937, Khomeini came close to Ayatollah Boroujerdi who succeeded Ha'eri-Yezdi after a brief period of three maraja'-e taqlid - Ayatollah Hujjat, Sadruddin Sa'd and Khwansari. It is said that Khomeini

13 Anon., *A Biography of Imam Khomeini*, p.3; mentions that Khomeini's family had a tradition of militancy.

14 See above.


campaigned for the candidacy of Ayatollah Boroujerdi for the post of marja'-e taqlid. During this period Khomeini wrote a book entitled Kashf-e Asrar which first appeared in 1941. This book gives a clear picture of Khomeini's thoughts during this period. In this book he condemned clericalism and attacked both the monarch and the modernist in strong terms.

From the time of the ascension over the position of sole marja'-e taqlid of Ayatollah Hossein Boroujerdi during early 1940s upto his death in 1961 Khomeini remained under his shadow of leadership. Ayatollah Boroujerdi disapproved the involvement of clergy in the politics. He followed traditional quietist line. Despite the fact that Khomeini had spoken in very strong terms against the Shah in his book Kashf-e Asrar, he shunned any political activity. During the Nationalist Movement of 1951-53 Khomeini remained silent and it was so during the happenings of the aftermath of the Nationalist Movement and the reinstatement of Mohammad Reza Shah.

Yann Richard, however, tries to prove that Khomeini had close relation with Ayatollah Kashani on the basis of personal

---

17 Hamid Algar, Introduction by the Translator, p.15.
18 On Khomeini's relations with Boroujerdi see Anonymous, Farrasi va Tahlili Nehzat-e Imam Khomeini, pp. 97 ff.
19 For a discussion on Ayatollah Boroujerdi see chapter 3.
investigation. He says that there had been good relations between Khomeini's family and Ayatollah Kashani so much so that the latter was responsible for Khomeini's marriage with the daughter of Ayatollah Saqafi around A.D. 1930. On the testimony of a few eyewitnesses he further says that Khomeini frequently visited the house of Ayatollah Kashani and that he was present at the house of the latter on 31 July 1953 when it was stormed and surrounded by the supporters of Mossadegh. However, most interestingly, Ayatollah Kashani once said that Rohollah was not made for politics.20

One of the earliest expressions of Khomeini's antagonism towards the regime came in the form of a declaration issued in 1962 in view of a proposed bill moved by the then Prime Minister 'Alam according to which the elected members of Parliament were free to take oath on any scripture, not necessarily the Qur'an. Khomeini opposed it and the bill was withdrawn.21 But the beginning

---


21 See Anon., Zendaginama-ye Imam Khomeini, vol.1, pp. 6-7; Anon., A Biography of Imam Khomeini, p.6. But it must be noted that even at this stage Khomeini did not attack the government outright. He criticizes only the bill. His declarations show soft tone towards the Prime Minister Alam (he did not criticize Shah directly in these declarations). Although he warned that "such things should not happen again", his contempt was directed towards the Zionists and Baha'is. He says: (the law) was perhaps drawn up by the spies of the Jews and the Zionist .... The Qur'an and Islam are in danger .... The Zionists ... have appeared in the guise of Bahai's. Anon., Zendaginama-ye Imam Khomeini, vol.1, pp. 81-82.
of 1963 marked a new chapter in the political career of Khomeini. A number of incidents took place that helped him become the leader of the clergy. In 1963 the Shah pressed through with what he called the White Revolution. He called for a nationwide referendum on 26 January 1963. Khomeini opposed it. The following month he issued a strong anti-government declaration from the pulpit of ma'arsa-ye Fayziyeh: 'Stand firm against the illegal measures of the regime. Never fear any showdown. If government resorts to force, never yield to it'. He continued to make such declarations until he was for the first time arrested on 22 March 1963 following his call for not celebrating the New Year (of Solar Hijra) which coincided with the martyrdom of Imam Ja'afar Sadiq. We was released after a short period of detention. The confrontation reached to its climax in June. On 3 June widespread disturbances took place when a copy of Khomeini's proclamation was being removed from Gouharshad Mosque of Mashhad. On the following day Khomeini made a particularly violent speech against the Shah.

---

22 For an early and authentic account of what happened during the 1963, in relation to Khomeini and his opposition to the government see Algar, The oppositioned Role of 'ulama' in the Twentieth century Iran, p. 245 ff. See also Anon., Zendaginama-ye Imam Khomeini, vol. 1, p. 65 ff.


25 Hamid Algar, The Oppositional Role of Ulama in the Twentieth Century, Iran, p. 245.

26 For this speech see Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, pp. 177-180.
This was the month of Muharram in which the martyrdom of Imam Husayn is commemorated. Khomeini was arrested on 5 June 1963 (15 Khordad 1341 A.H. (Solar)). This led to the most violent confrontation between the regime and the people. This is regarded as the turning point and the foundationstone of the revolution of 1978-79. Khomeini was released on 6 April 1964 after much public pressure and requests of the leading mujtahids including Ayatollah Sayyed Kazim Shariatmadari and Ayatollah Hadi Milani. He was again arrested on 4 November 1964 and exiled in Turkey. Khomeini spent about a year in Turkey at Ankara and Bursa.

27 A number of leading mujtahids were arrested along with Khomeini including Ayatollah Bahouddin Mahallati; Ayatollah Hasan Tabataba'i-Qommi etc.


29 Shaul Bakhash, *Iran*, p.31, says that the Prime-Minister 'Ala'i was in favour of executing Khomeini.

30 A signature campaign was launched by the middle ranking mujtahids in support of Khomeini's release. They included Ayatollahs Ho. in Ali Montazeri; Mohammad Sadeghi; Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani; Ali Godduzi; Ahmad Azeri-Qommi; Mohammad Ali Ardebili; Abol Ramin Rabbani Shirazi; Mohammad Yazdi etc. see Anon., *Zendagi nama-yi Imam Khomeini*, vol.1, pp. 71-72, 95-96 and 98-99.

He came to Najaf in October 1965 from Bursa where he stayed up to October 1978. Khomeini continued his violent opposition to the Shah from Najaf. His followers who were now many and were mostly middle ranking 'ulama', carried out his instructions in Iran. They also collected religious taxes for him. During this period he came to be known as a leading marja'-e taqlid. He published his treatise on practical laws of Islam Tawdhih al-Masa'il - a necessary requirement to be a top rank marja'-e taqlid. It was here also that he gave the lectures of highest level, known as "dars-e Khariji" during the early 1969 and 1970. These lectures constitute his most important work which were published under the title of Hukumat-e Islami or "Velayat-e Faqih". The book

32 For these declarations see Khomeini; Islam and Revolution, pp. 139-233.
33 For the leading mujtahids who worked for Khomeini in Iran during this period see Shaul Bakhsh, op. cit., pp. 40-44.
34 Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, for example, was appointed to collect these taxes on behalf of Khomeini in Tehran. Khomeini had issued a fatwa to this effect. See Mostafa Saeed Najafabadi, Ayatollah al-Uzma Montazeri: Asar va Akhar, Urdu trans. by S. Hassan Abbas Fitrat, pp. 33-44.
received widespread circulation in Iran under various disguising titles such as Kitab-al-Bay'35 Nama-ye az Imam Mousavi Khashif al-Ghita36 etc. Khomeini's popularity grew as his opposition of the Shah increased.37 By 1976 when the situation became explosive in Iran, the Iraqi regime was pressured by the Shah to deport Khomeini. The Iraqi regime forced him to leave the country. Khomeini wanted to go to some Islamic country, like Syria or Algeria.38 But as none of these countries responded to his request,39


37 Almost all the biographies suggest that Khomeini enhanced his position of marja'-e taqlid due to his outspoken criticism of the Shah more than his knowledge and spirituality.

38 Hamid Algar, op. cit., p. 20.

39 Shortly before leaving Najaf for Paris in a message to Pilgrims he said: 'I have not been permitted to continue my activities in any Islamic country .... Because I must at all events fulfil my religious and ethical duty, I have been obliged to leave the Islamic world .... I shall continue to live abroad until I have the opportunity to continue my work in one of the Muslim countries'—Khomeini, op. cit., p. 238.
he came to Paris in October 1978 where he stayed till his triumphant return to Iran on 1 February 1979 to establish the first "government of God on Earth".

Ayatollah Khomeini's political ideas were based on rigorous political theorization of the doctrine of \textit{imamat}. His ideas have shown a marked difference from the thoughts of the Shi'i political theorists of the past as well as present. In so many respects, they have challenged many of the old-established beliefs of Ithna 'Ashari Shi'ism. Most of his political arguments are found in his book \textit{Hukumat-e Islami} and his speeches and declarations of post-1963 phase of his life. However, his ideas regarding government and politics have undergone considerable changes and modifications since he started his career as a teacher at Qom.

The aim of Ayatollah Khomeini was to overthrow the monarchical regime of the Shah and establish what he called an "Islamic government" ruled by 'ulama' and based on shari'ah laws. Keeping in view the impossibility of a legitimate government during the Greater Occultation period as propounded and established

by the Twelver Shi'i jurists of past, it was a hard and difficult task for him to prove the possibility of existence of an Islamic government. A major part of his book Hukumat-e Islami is devoted to prove that such a government is not only possible during the period of the absence of the Hidden Imam, but it is also incumbent upon the believers and their leaders, i.e. the 'ulama', to establish it. In this regard the whole argument of Khomeini proceeds broadly speaking in three parts. In the first place he shows that the whole of the shari'a is obligatory and no part of it is suspended during the occultation. Secondly, he tries to prove that a government is not only possible, but also necessary, and finally, he describes the form of the government and its leadership. For this purpose, Khomeini brings both kinds of arguments: the ma'qulat, i.e. the rational arguments, and the manqulat, i.e. the arguments from Quran and the tradition of the Prophet and imams.

One of the main characteristics of post-ghaybat theory of imamat is that it was perceived as a spiritual office. More and more emphasis was laid on the spiritual aspects of the imamat. The implementation of whole of the Divine Command, i.e. shari'a, was neither possible nor necessary. Thus the whole shari'a was divided into two parts: one concerning the government and rule, and the other concerning the religious life of the ummah. The
attention was concentrated upon the latter. The 'ulama' took up the task of interpreting the shari'a law that pertained to the religious as well as day to day social affairs. It was thought that the ordinances of the shari'a (ahkam) that pertained to politics and government were not binding (taklif), for these were impossible to be implemented due to adverse circumstances. These ordinances were therefore considered as suspended. These will be invoked and implemented only when the Lord of the Age (Imam-e Zaman), i.e. the Hidden Imam will reappear and "fill the earth with justice". This came to be known as the notion of sugut (suspension of the ordinances of shari'a pertaining to the government and rule). 41

Khomeini sets forth a number of arguments in a logical and syllogistic pattern, in order to draw a conclusion that the whole of the shari'a and the implementation of it was as binding upon the believer as it was during the period of the Prophet and his successors (i.e. imams). He strongly rejects the theory of

sugut as incorrect and of fatal consequences for the believers and community. In a statement of much significance he says:

'From the time of the lesser occultation (gheybat-e sughara) down to the present time a thousand and a few hundred years have already passed; It is quite possible that this situation continues and another hundred of thousand years are passed and the hidden imam did not appear ... During this period do you think that the ordinances of Islamic shari'a will remain suspended and unexecuted? Everybody is free to do whatever he likes? Do you think that the laws of Islam for which the Prophet fought for a period of twenty three years were merely for a limited period of time. And God had restricted execution of the ordinances of the shari'a laws for only two hundred year e.g. the historical period of imamat. Had Islam abandoned every thing after the lesser occultation. Such an idea or demonstration of such beliefs are worse than the idea of the cancellation (mansukh) of Islam'.

He further says that the necessity of the execution of the ordinances of shari'a necessitated the formation of a government by the Prophet. But it was not restricted to the period of the Prophet. It continued even after the death of the Prophet. The wur'anic laws are not limited in time and space (matruk).... Their implementation or execution was compulsory (lazim al-ijra). 'The belief that the laws of Islam (or a few of them) can be suspended (ta'ttul pazir) or dependent upon particular time and space is against the tenets of Islam'.

42 Khomeini, Hukumat-e Islami, pp. 30-31.
43 Cf., Ibid., p.29.
early 1940s when he wrote his book *Kasnf-e Asrar*, he strongly rejected the notion of suspension or cancellation (mansukh) of some of the ordinances of shari'a. Quoting from Qur'an and Traditions, he asserted that the laws of Islam are not to be changed, amended or to be abandoned; they are eternal and applicable without the restriction of time and space. He, moreover, made a comparison between the God-given laws and the laws made by man in order to show sharp contrast between the two. The latter in his opinion, is insufficient as they cover neither the material nor the spiritual aspects of human life and therefore they are vulnerable to change, alteration or suspension. The former i.e. the God-given laws, on the other hand, cover both spiritual and material lives of man in unique balance so they are unchangeable, eternal and perfect. Khomeini even rejected the doctrine of nasikh wa mansukh ("canceller" and "cancelled") of some of the verses of the Qur'an. He says that one cannot show a single verse in the Qur'an which is cancelled by the author. However, if there are any they are not fundamental laws. For example, economic judicial administrative laws of Islam or like are never to be changed. If there is some minor changes somewhere or some

44 Khomeini *Kashfa-e Asrar*, pp. 387-94.

In brief Khomeini proceeds from the implementation of whole of the shari'a to the necessity of a government based upon shari'a:

1. No part of shari'a are suspended; the whole of it is obligatory to be observed and implemented.

2. shari'a includes laws pertaining to government; so they should also be implemented.

3. Their implementation is impossible without an executive authority (Quvvat-e mujriyya) i.e. government.

4. Therefore the formation of a government is necessary.

The notion of necessity of an Islamic government which functions as executive authority is substantiated by rational arguments as well as traditional. According to him a body of laws alone is not sufficient for reform of a society. They need an enforcement authority and an executor. Because of this reason God,

46 Ibid., p. 398.
apart from sending the ordinances of shari'a, also laid down the principles of government and administration. 47

The nature and structure of the Islamic laws are also shown as proof for the necessity of establishment of a government. 48 He further argues that the practical attitude of the Prophet also proves the necessity of establishment of a government. Firstly, he established a government and executed the laws, appointed governors, promulgated judgements, appointed judges and executed the laws of war. Secondly, he appointed a ruler after him. It evidently means that a government is but all necessity. 49 Moreover, he says, nobody disagreed upon the necessity of establishment of government after the death of the Prophet, although they disagreed as to who will be the Caliph. 50 He quotes a tradition from Imam Rida which states:

"The Imam said: ... If some one asks why God has appointed 'Uli-'l-amr whose obedience is obligatory. It should be replied that God appointed the 'Uli-'l-amr for a variety of reasons. For example, man has been restricted to a particular and fixed way of life and he has been told not to violate those restrictions and laws. Because their violation would lead to anarchy and disorder. This cannot be realized ... until and unless there is a man or a

47 Khomeini, Hukumat-e Islami, pp. 26-27. See also idem, Kashf-e-Asrar, Passim, esp. 279 ff; and 290. 'One of the clearest dictates of reason which no one can deny is that [a body of] law and (establishment of a ] government are essential for man. The human race need a government and administrative institutions ...' ibid., p. 229.
48 Khomeini, Hukumat-e Islami, p. 32 ff.
49 Ibid., p. 46.
50 Ibid., p. 18.
power (goddar) over the people who supervise over them and let them not go beyond their limits ....
There is another argument: We do not find any group, nation or religion without a supervisor (neqehdar) or a leader .... Because such a leader is indispensable .... Therefore, it is inconceivable that God would leave His creature without a leader.51

Khomeini believes that there are three aspects of shari'ah which cannot be implemented without an Islamic government. They are: (1) the ordinances pertaining to the finance and economies (malijat), (2) the ordinances pertaining to the defense of the Islamic territory (difā') and (3) statutory and discretionary laws (hudud va ta'zirat).52 He argues that the financial system of Islam based on zakāt, khums, kharaj, and jaziya etc. cannot be realized without an Islamic government, because these taxations are not meant for just 'to be collected from the rich and distributed among the poor; but they are meant to fulfill the

51 Ibid., pp. 46-48.
52 Ibid., pp. 32-34.
requirements of the government. These incomes are to fulfill the general public requirements (khidmat-e 'umumi). The income from jaziya and kharaj are public property, and not the property of king and rulers as they are collected from God's property (mal al-Allah). Similarly khums is also not meant to be utilized by a "handful of sayyids" as practiced today. According to him the income from khums should only partly go to the 'ulama', most of them should be spent for the well being of people.

Khomeini criticizes the whole history of Islam except the early years and says that true Islam lasted only few years since its inception. First the Umayyads and then the Abbasids did great harm to Islam. Later, the monarchs who ruled Iran followed the same path. They completely distorted Islam and established something quite different in its place. The process started by the Umayyads, 'who changed the nature of government from divine

53 It is interesting to note that in Tawdih al-Mas'\'il, he did not mention that khums or any such religious taxes to be utilized for the purpose of government. Enumerating the use of khums he says: 'Khums should be divided into two: one is share of the descendents of the imams i.e. to be given to poor Sayyeds or orphaned Sayyeds .... The second is the share of the Imam which is to be given to the mujtahid or to whom he (the mujtahid) permits.... Tawdih al-Mas'\'il, No. 1831. For details on the use of khums see Nos. 1331-1849. For the use of zakat also the traditional views are expressed. That is, the heads as mentioned in the Qur'an, see ibid., Nos. 1922-1938. However, by the head of the "collectors of zakat" he clearly mentions the mujtahids who would distribute it amongst the 'ulama'. By the general category of the "way of Allah" too he does not mean governmental expenditure. He mentions construction of mosques or works of the welfare of religion and community.

54 Khomeini Hukumat-e Islami, p. 33.
55 Ibid., p. 34.
and spiritual to worldly'. Their rule was based on the revival of Arabism of the Jahiliyya period which was 'an aim fundamentally opposed to Islam.' The same aim is still pursued by the leaders of certain Arab countries, who declare openly their desire to revive the Arabism of the Umayyads. Thus 'throughout Islamic history, as a result of various kinds of distortion, Islam remained unknown among men'.

Khomeini sought to realize the ideal society, the utopia, which according to him, was established by the Prophet and for a brief period by Imam 'Ali and which has since then thought to be unachievable during the period of occultation of the Hidden Imam. He expresses surprise as well as regret as to why there has been no attempt to establish an Islamic government or the 'ode' of the Prophet and Imam 'Ali. He criticizes the ulama of the past who never strived form the establishment of an Islamic Government' and 'destruction of the tyrant rulers': instead, a few of them had shown carelessness. They not only avoid discussing and propagating the Islamic precepts and its system, on the contrary, they prayed for the tyrant rulers. hence such a situation came into being: the influence of Islam in society decreased; the Islamic community was exposed to decadance; the Islamic ordinances

56 Cf., Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, pr. 332-3.
remained unexecuted and they have been changed and altered. 57

Khomeini proves the necessity of establishment of a government based on snari'ā with a number of arguments. They are as follows:

1. Islam is not composed merely of moral teachings. The existence of economic, social and political laws as well as laws relating to legislation and human rights prove that Islam is a complete (jāme') system of life (nezām-e zendagi). 58

2. Even the purely religious and moral precepts of Islam such as namaz (prayer) and hajj (pilgrim) have social and political

57 Khomeini, Hukumat-e Islami, pp. 50-51.

58 Cf. ibid., pp. 7-8. He says: 'God, the Almighty has sent, through the Messenger (SA) such laws that astound the human being. There are laws and regulations for all affairs. Islam has laid down the laws for man from even when the embryo is formed until after he is buried into grave. In the same way as it has laid down the laws relating to the worship, it has the laws relating to the social and governmental affairs. Islamic laws are progressive and comprehensive (nātahrāg, mokāmmel va jāme'). There is not a single human subject on which Islam has not a law. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
relevance. They are ingredients of social set up of Islam. 59

3. The alien forces have always worked to destroy the foundation of Islam as a political force—not as a religion. While they felt immense danger from political and revolutionary precepts of Islam, they seldom objected, rather allowed, the existence of the religion of Islam "because they thought the latter as useful for their exploitative designs." 60.

4. In the beginning, it were the Jews who inflicted harm upon the Muslims. They are now replaced by the imperialists who are worse than the Jews. Although they are Christians by religion but they do not want to propagate Christianity; they want to establish political and cultural sovereignty over the Muslim world in order to fulfill their material gains. 61.

5. The intellectuals, the missionaries, orientalists or even the spiritual leaders (ruhaniyyun) have distorted the Islamic beliefs and the political spectrum of Islam. A collecter of speeches is: 

See especially his messages to the hajj. A collection of speeches is: Messages of Imam Khomenei to Hajj Pilgrims (comm. n.d.). See also Hukumat-e Islami, pp. 179-80. "A number of Islamic ordinances pertaining to worship and prayer (jumaa and 'ibadi) have social and political dimension as well as religious. They are fundamentally related with politics (especially political society). For example, prayer (namaz) and the assembly of hajj and Friday prayer have doctrinal as well as political influences and implications, in addition to their ethical and spiritual dimensions. Islam has provided these occasions for religious benefit (so that) brotherhood and fraternity might strengthen, intellectual development might increase, solution to the political problem might be sorted out and to achieve these goals a collective effort might come into existence."

60 Cf. Khomenei, Hukumat-e Islami, pp. 24-25.

61 Cf. Ibid., p. 7.
directly or indirectly influenced by the imperialist forces.  

3. The perception of Islam as an apolitical religion is incorrect and misleading, which is deliberately propagated by the West in order to strip Islam of its dynamic and revolutionary characteristics.

7. The conception of Islam as found in the religious seminaries (hawza-ha-yeye'Ilimiya) is different from that of the Qur'an and sunnah. There is no compatibility between the teachings of the Qur'an and sunnah and the teachings of the treatises of the spiritual seminaries from the point of view of the comprehensiveness (jame'iyyat) and effectiveness of Islamic teachings in the society.

8. The Islamic laws, particularly statutory and discretionary laws (hudud va ta'zirat) which are described as barbaric and inhuman are less barbaric and inhuman as compared to the actions of imperialist forces and their military designs.

9. There are a number of misconceptions prevalent among the Muslim

62 Cf. Ibid., p. 3.
63 Cf., Ibid.,
64 Cf., Ibid., pp. 16-17.
65 Cf., Ibid., pp. 16-17.
which are the main cause of their decline. For example they wrongly think that we cannot progress in science and technology unless we give up our faith and adopt Western culture.

Most of these arguments are similar to that of Islamic revivalists of the 20th century. The pattern of these arguments show a compound attitude of the nineteenth century apologism and the twentieth century revivalism.

Having established the necessity of a shari'a government, Khomenei proceeds to the form of government. According to him, the government of God, or the ideal shari'a state is the only valid and legitimate authority over the human being:

The government of only that person is legal, and its obedience is obligatory upon man who is the master of everything of man. This is God ... If God gives authority (of rule) to some one and makes his obedience obligatory upon man through the command of the Prophet; it is incumbent upon man to obey him. He should obey nothing other than the command of God and (the command of the ruler) whom he has appointed. The rulers (jukumat guzaran) are human beings; they possess greed and anger. They are vulnerable to a number of negative factors. One cannot expect public welfare (mamleket-e-milli) from such a man .... Besides, whatever loss they would make, would end in disadvantage for people and against the welfare of the country as they cannot possess universal characteristic and would not be protected from mistakes and blunder.

66 Cf. Ibid., p. 20.
The objective of shari'á government can only be realized by direct rule of the fugahā' of Islam. As to the question of the form of government, Khomeini uses the term Hukumat-e Islami; Deliberately differentiating it from all other forms of government prevalent today, namely, monarchy, democratic republicanism and constitutionalism. For him, the ideal Islamic state is neither democratic republicanism, constitutional monarchy nor absolute monarchy as advocated by his predecessors during and after the Constitutional revolution. He terms each and every government other than Islamic government as taghut (stanic). He especially condemns monarchy for there is no monarchy in Islam; monarchy and Islam are two contradictory propositions. The monarchy was one of those institutions which Islam destroyed during the early phase of its development'. It was the monarchical system of government 'against which Imam Husayn fought at Karbala'. It is the 'greatest disaster befell Islam', even 'worse than the tragedy of Karbala'.

According to him the Islamic government is neither authoritarian (istebdadi) nor absolute (motlama), it is rather

68 For this discussion see the following chapter.
constitutional (mashru’ta). But it is not constitutional in the prevalent sense of the world according to which the laws are dependent upon the opinion of majority of the people. It is constitutional in the sense that the holders of power are restricted within the set of laws, laid down by the Qur’an and the Prophet. In this way, Islamic government is the government of divine laws (qanun-e ileahi). In constitutional governments the representatives of people themselves make laws while in the Islamic government legislature power belongs only to God. Nobody else has right to lay down the laws and no laws except the laws if God can be implemented.71

Khomeini’s pre-1963 ideas are similar to those adopted by the ‘ulama’ of the constitutional period. Although in *Kashf-e-Asrar* he expressed strong anti-Shah views,72 he was not against the monarchy as such. He denounced the government on account of (a) its absolutist, tyrannical and despotic methods, (b) its anti-clerical policies (c) its policy of Westernization and increasing influence of the imperialist powers in the governmental affairs and (d) Un-Islamic legislations.73 Khomeini

71 Ibid., pp. 52-53.

72 Khomeini expressed his contempt and hatred for Reza Shah in undisguised terms. He condemned him by name. See *Kashf-e-Asrar, passim*, esp. pp. 307-08 ‘We cannot expect anything from Reza Khan (It is to be noted that Khomeini never used “Shah” for the monarch). He has got perfection in tyranny. His blood and bone have been grown in these dirty atrocities. He can not understand what is righteousness, honesty ...’

asserts again and again that only God's laws are valid and only He alone reserves the right of legislation. Yet he accepts the traditional division between the local government of the Imam (or God) and the existing government. He argued that since the former does not exist, the latter should be as nearest as possible to the former in the sense that it should execute shari'a and should frame the constitution according to the laws of shari'a. He said:

'Although the government based on the laws of God and divine justice is the best form of government, but if there is a government which acts in accordance with the well-being of the country (masaleh-e Kashwar), every wise one would endorse and appreciate it.'

Although he opposed that the government should directly be in the hands of the fuguha, yet he necessitated the former's approval by the 'ulama' for the de facto legitimacy of the government. Following his predecessors he proposed an assembly of 'ulama' and a supervisory committee of 'ulam' to see the

74 Ibid., p. 23.

75 Ibid., p. 236.

76 For this discussion see the following chapter.
The mujtahids never opposed the governments or the integration of Islamic countries. In fact, they found that the laws of a government were against the injunction of the Sharia; they regarded it as illegal (ja'a'iz) but at the same time they did not oppose it. Because in their view, the existence of these governments was better than their non-existence. Therefore, they restricted their jurisdiction of rulership and guardianship (hukurat va velayat) to a few matters such as the issuing of religious decrees (fatwa), executing the judgement (gazavat) and interference for the protection of properties of minors and disabled. They never interfered in the governmental matters, because they considered all the governments, except the government of God, unjust. Except the laws of God, all the worldly laws are absurd and invalid (bihuda va batil). But they acknowledged invalid and absurd laws and did not oppose the government till a better government was established.

He made it clear that whenever mujtahids opposed the establishment they opposed it because of its anti-people policies and not the government as such. He seemed to be prepared to

---

77 Ibid., pp. 232-33; pp. 239-40.
78 Ibid., p. 235.
79 Ibid., p. 236.
gives some recognition to the 'invalid government' as he says that till the absolute just government (dawlet-e hay) comes into being there may exist an illegal but just government (hukumat-e adilana). He pointed out to the well-known fact that some of the imams and their family had close relationship with the Umayyad or Abbasid rulers. He especially mentioned the precedence of Imam Ali b. al-Husayn (the Fourth Imam) and quoted a tradition from the Sahifa al-Sajjadiyya which supports it.

Khomeini also believed that jihād (holy war) along with the armies of the illegal government was permissible. According to him the jihād can be of two kinds: the one for conquering countries (keshvernari) and the other for the freedom of the country and its defense from the foreigners (isteghale koshvar va defa'-e ajanib). The former is conditioned permissible only under the commandership of the Hidden Imam. This kind of war is not permissible without an Imam. The latter kind of jihād is permissible and is not conditioned with the presence of Imam. He mentioned that if the government fulfills its duties (vadila shenas) and works according to well-being of the community, it is not unjust (zalim). Even up to 1961, Khomeini tried to give

80 See ibid., pp. 235-59.
81 See ibid., pp. 285-96.
82 Ibid., pp. 239-91.
83 Ibid., pp. 302-03.
some recognition to the existing government. He says that 'even the term 'unjust' (zālim, ja'ēr) is ambiguous and must be clarified before judgement can be passed on those described as such. Four groups of people, he says, can be regarded as unjust: (a) ordinary criminals, such as thieves and bandits; (b) kings and rulers violating the norms of justice (c) those claiming to be the successors to the Prophet, and (d) usurpers of the rule of the righteous Imam. As far as the categories (a), (b) and (d) are concerned he has no doubt that working with them is prohibited. However, regarding the category (c) he maintained that one should take account of the possibility that the rulers are Shi'is. 34

By 1970 he repudiated many of these ideas and declared that each and every government is illegal and unjust (ja'ēr, zālim) except the Islamic government, ruled by a faqih-'adil. He, moreover, called upon the 'ulama' to declare a total jihad against the Pahlavi state and establish a government of God. He also set forth a programme of establishing such a government. He takes pride to say that unlike the sunni theologians, shi'i 'ulama' never tried to justify the existing governments; on the contrary they opposed them and declared them illegal. He explains the

concept of *uli al-amr* (holders of authority) in Twelver Shi'ism in these words:

A certain akhund wrote to me a few years ago to ask me, "why do you oppose the government? Do you not know that 'God gives rule to whomever He wishes'? I didn't even answer him; he wasn't worth answering. But his question involved a clear denial of the Qur'an. In a certain sense, God gave kingship to the Pharaoh, but did not Moses oppose him? .... bu'awiyah also represented the "holders of authority", so why did, first, the commander of the Faithful and later, Imam Hasan (peace be upon them) oppose him? And then Imam Husayn ... rose up in revolt against another "holder of authority", Yazid.

Those "holders of authority" who are mentioned right after God and the Messenger in the Qur'anic verse "obey God and obey the Messenger and the holders of authority from among you" (4:59) must also be close to God and the Messenger in their practice. They must be shadow of God and the Messenger. Yes, the Islamic ruler is the shadow of God, but what is meant by shadow is something that has no motion of itself .... Islam recognizes a person as the "shadow of God" who abandons all individual volition in the sense that he acts only in accordance with the ordinances of Islam, so that his motion is dependent, not independent. The Messenger of God (peace and blessings be upon him) was indeed a true shadow of God; but is this vile Shih a shadow of God? Yes a few thoughtless people among us say so, but that would mean that Yazid was also a "holder of authority".85

There was a time during his stay in Paris when Khomeini seemed to accept the idea of constitutional monarchy. In an interview with Radio Paris on 21 September 1978 he said 'Our intention is not that the religious leaders should themselves

administer the state but that they should guide the people
determining what the demands of Islam are'. In an interview
with Said Amir Arjomand on 2 January 1979 regarding the Funda-
mental Law and the Supplementary Fundamental Law he said:

'The Fundamental Law will have to be studied; whenever
it is in the interest of the nation, it will be accepted
by us. Incidentally, the Supplementary Fundamental Law does
state that (constitutional arrangements) should not be
contrary to the principle of Islam. It is possible that
some of the items of Fundamental Law which will be found
contrary to (national) interest will be abrogated.'

The statements and declarations of Khomeini during this
period have shown considerable ambiguity regarding this
a rather unusual thing for Khomeini. Some scholars point out
that his constitutional rhetoric during this period was a
tactical move to win over and engage in an alliance with the
leaders of the liberal opposition parties and intellectual groups
who were mainly based in Europe in exile. It should be noted
that a number of leaders of the liberal opposition representing
the various political as well as intellectual groups had developed
close relationship with Khomeini during the latter's stay at Paris.

---

86 Cited in James A. Bill, "Power and Religion in
Revolutionary Iran" Middle East Journal, vol. XXVI, No. 1 (1982),
p. 31.

87 Arjomand, "The State and Khomeini's Islamic Order",
Iranian Studies, special issue Iranian Revolution in Perspective,
vol. XXII, No. 1-4, pp. 155-55.


89 E.g. M.J. Fischer, "Imam Khomeini: Four Levels of
Understanding", in John Esposito (ed.), The Voices of Resurgent
Islam, p. 163; James A. Bill, op. cit., p. 30 ff; Arjomand,
op. cit., p. 154 ff.
M.J. Fischer observes that such a manipulation was possible on the part of Khomeini as several other acts of him show similar attitude. But this puzzle on his part did not last long. He clarified his position in his speech on the occasion of the formation of the council of the Islamic Revolution:

'... The demands of the oppressed people of Iran are not restricted to the departure of the Shah and the abolition of the monarchy. Their struggle will continue until the establishment of an Islamic Republic .... It is only through the departure of the Shah and the transfer of power to the people that tranquility will return to our beloved country, and it is only through the establishment of a government of Islamic justice, confirmed and supported by the people and functioning with their full and active participation, that the vast cultural, economic and agricultural damage inflicted by the corrupt regime of the Shah can be repaired and the reconstruction of the country for the benefit of the working and oppressed classes can begin.'

---

90 In the opinion of Fischer one cannot say how much of this 'shedding was calculated deceit on his part' and how much was 'self-delusion on the part of his allies'. He mentions an anecdote of the same period when Khomeini first led prayers in Paris. The prayers were held in a tent, and several women complained about having to remain outside while the men disappeared inside. Khomeini said that prayers should be done as the Prophet did early in his career, with men and women intermingled. The women were impressed; they took 'this as a sign of Khomeini's relative liberality'. Cf. M.J. Fischer, op. cit., p. 163.

Arjomand points out that it is very important to note that Khomeini never used "Islamic Republic" in his book Hukumat-e Islami, a persistent rhetoric found in his works of late 1970s. Therefore, he says, that "there is every reason to believe that Khomeini considered the "Islamic Republic" to be the appropriate form of government only for the period of transition to the truly Islamic government." In the late 1979 when the draft of the new constitution was being prepared he refused to include the term "democratic" in the title of the state.

According to Khomeini, in his Islamic government the parliament will function as a consultative council in accordance with the Qur'anic injunction of amr shura baynahun. Following Kuri he asserts that the parliament will not have legislative power; It will be an agenda making body. It seems therefore, that Khomeini thinks of the shari'a as a complete system ready for immediate implementation. For him the shari'a is a blue print for action, however, this is not a unique interpretation of shari'a but, as it has been pointed out it does little justice

---

92 Arjomand, op. cit., p. 156.
93 On this see Chapter 4
94 See Arjomand, op. cit., p. 156.
either to the general elaboration of that notion in juristic literature or to the political function of the sharia in relation to judicial administrative practice.  

Khomeini tries to prove the preference of divine law over the man-made laws or a divine government over the man-made government:

"There is a great difference between all the various manmade forms of government in the world, on the one hand - whatever their precise nature - and a divine government, on the other hand, which follows divine law. Governments that do not base themselves on divine law conceive of justice only in the natural realism; you will find them concerned only with the prevention of disorder and not with the moral refinement of the people. Whatever a person does in his own home is of no importance, so long as he causes no disorder in the street. In other words, people are free to do as they please at home. Divine governments, however, set themselves the task of making man into what he should be."

Khomeini has not produced any systematic treatise of the main features of Divine and man-made laws. His argument contains more a revolutionary impulse than a theoretical discussion. We can draw the following distinctions in Khomeini's writings regarding divine laws and 'secular' laws which appear to be arbitrary:

96 See Arjomand, op. cit., p. 156.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Shari'a Law</strong></th>
<th><strong>Secular Law</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divine law</td>
<td>Human law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural</td>
<td>Artificial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Based on reason</td>
<td>Based on opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Based on revelation</td>
<td>Based on limited human mental capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immutable</td>
<td>Changeable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creates justice</td>
<td>Creates injustice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creates stability and order</td>
<td>Creates instability and disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>According to the natural requirements of the people specially Muslims and Iranians</td>
<td>Opposed to the requirements of the Muslims and Iranian people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensures sense of identity among believers</td>
<td>Creates alienation among the believers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Khomeini presents the political order established by the Prophet and the government established by the First Imam 'Ali as the model for his proposed Islamic government. He looks almost naive when he says that his government will be as simple as that as there will be no formal official procedure which 'consumes a lot of public time and money'.

---


however, is not a goal in itself, rather a means to achieve certain higher objectives.\(^9\) There are specifically two main objectives of the Islamic government: (1) deliverance of the oppressed people and (2) unity of the Muslim country. The deliverance of the oppressed people is a permanent theme in Khomeini's speeches and declarations. The two terms *mostakberin* ("oppressors") and *mostaz'efin* ("oppressed") occur very often in his writings and speeches. He leaves no chance to express his support for the cause of downtrodden and weaker sects of the population and the workers. For example on the workers' day speech (1 May 1978) he said: Blessed be labor day for the nation and for our respected workers. To glorify ... who constitute the back-bone of the country's independence is a task simultaneously Islamic and national ... our noble workers ... dear brother workers are devotedly striving to bring our nation to self sufficiency ...\(^1\) Khomeini always tried to talk in populist language in order to win over the people. Once he said: 'What I do is guide the population ... by writing and talking to the people ... the symbol of struggle is the one who talks with the people ... that is why the Iranian people consider me a symbol


(or their struggle against the regime). I talk their language, I listen to their needs. I cry for them. However, as pointed out, such populist slogans were meant to "debilitate" and "discredit" the radical left as he 'sought to co-opt their ideas and programme'.

As far as the question of unity of ummat is concerned, certainly Khomeini does not mean unity among the people. His interpretation of unity which he often explains as "unity of view" (yek kalam) is quite interesting. The phrase yek kalam has been particularly used by Khomeini in his speeches during post-revolution period mainly to keep the opposition in control, keeping in view the existence of diverse opinions and political as well as ideological groups during and after the revolution, a few of whom had already begun to show dissatisfaction over the manner in which Khomeini had been working. Although he had been reluctant to define explicitly what he means by yek kalam but he suggests that 'it connotes a rigid ideological uniformity, characterized by belief and action and at reproducing the prophetic-imamomic archetype of revolutionary struggle.'

---


According to Rouhollah Ramza'ni it means a "Unitized community". The concept involves not only 'achieving the goal of a unified or unitary community but also the shaping of the community through ideological indoctrination'. According to him once the divinely based unitized community is created, all inequalities and injustices at the national or international levels will disappear. This is what he calls Islamic democracy". "Only a divinely based unitized community can be truly democratic. Elimination of all foreign influences from every aspect of life, therefore, is regarded as essential to the development of an independent Islamic Community".

There is no doubt that Khomeini's assertion on compulsory formation of a legitimate government based on shari'a is completely new thing in shi'i political thought. Besides this, Khomeini has shown distinct departure from many of the well-established twelve Shii concepts. For example intezar or taqiyya. The above mentioned quotation on page 208 leaves no doubt about his disapproval of the notion of intezar. H.J. Fischer and Mangol Bayat have pointed out that this brings Khomeini closer

104 Rouhollah K. Ramazani, "The Islamic Cultural Revolution" in Philip H. Sbeddword and others (eds.) change in the Muslim World, p. 41.
105 Ibid., p. 42.
to the Isma'ili who also believed in the presence of a
living imam in every age. 107

He also rejected the use of taqiyya for the justification
of political passivism. He restricted the permissibility of the
use of taqiyya to the religious matters — not in political matters. 108

107 Langol Boyat, et al., p. 53; J. Fischer,
"Repetitions in the Iranian Revolution" in Martin Kramer (ed.),
ši'a, Resistance and Revolution (Boulder, 1987).

108 He defended taqiyya in Kashf-e Asrar in the following
words: 'From the point of view of reason, taqiyya is not only
permissible, its practice is obligatory (wašd). Taqiyya means
what a man says against the fact, or he acts against the dictates
of shari'a, in order to protect his or other's blood,
(or property. For example ablution (wudu). In case a shi'i
feels that by performing wudu according to shi'i rites in a
suni country his or other Muslim's life is in danger, he should
perform wudu according to their rites and should not put himself
into danger. This is in accordance with the definite rule of
shari'a. The practice of the Shi'a during the period of imams
is clear from history. This was the period when imams and their
followers were under coercion and taqiyya. If sultans and
caliphs of that period would find the for imams of their
followers they would destroy their life and properties. Imams
were appointed (mamur) by the Prophet who was appointed by God
to protect the life and honour of their followers. They could issue
a command by practising taqiyya which was against the commitment
of God in order to create differences among their followers
themselves so that the opponent should not understand that their
commendments come from a single source and could not persecute
the Muslims. This is in accordance with the dictates of reason
and social rules of the messenger of Islam,' Khorcini,
Kashf-e Asrar, pp. 141-43.
His attitude towards the *shaykhān* (the first two Caliphs of Islam, Abu Bakr and 'Umar) has also undergone substantial change. While in *Kashf-e Asrar*, he remembered them as usurpers and disbelievers;\(^\text{109}\) in *Hukumat-e Islami* he, in a way, praises them for following the footsteps of the Prophet: 'The first two Caliphs adopted the life style of the Prophet in their personal and external life, although they disobeyed him in many other matters, the consequences of which appeared during the period of Uthman'.\(^\text{110}\) This change in Khomeini's view, as pointed out by Mangol Bayat, was the result of his anxiousness to provide historical legitimacy to his theory of necessity of government. He found himself forced to accept the Sunni caliphate as evidence of continued existence of government after the death of the Prophet. In fact the early Sunni state provided Khomeini with a more acceptable, or at least less objectionable, historical frame of reference than the Safavid or Qajar states which he dismisses as un-Islamic.\(^\text{111}\)

Khomeini is a strong critic of medieval as well as modern clerical attitude of passivity and abstinence from politics.

---


\(^\text{110}\) Khomeini, *Hukumat-e Islami*, p.16.

to praise those 'leaders' of the past who led a politically active life, such as al-'imam the 'philosopher-theologian who was formally trained in the Isma'ilis and later joined the Mongol court. He paved the way for the victory of the Mongols over the 'Abbasids. He praised 'Amir al-Mu'minin and 'Abdallah bin Al-'Abbas as one of the leaders of the constitutional revolution who truly understood what it meant to be a Muslim'.

Obviously, contrary to the fact, he says that all imams were killed fighting the 'taghut'. He further describes the imams as "warriors" and "soldiers" in a bid to give a militant look to his ideology while it is a well-known fact that only a few imams had shown any political motivation and activism. It is worth noting that he makes frequent references to the Prophet, 'Ali and Hussayn than

---

112 Khomeini, 'Akūlat-e Islami, p. 131.
113 Geography Kose, op. cit., p. 133.
114 See Khomeini, op. cit., p. 134 f.
other quietist and apolitical imams. In Hukumat-e Islami itself this trend is clearly visible; while reference to the Prophet Muhammad have been made eighty times, Ali's 42, Husayn's twelve times, the total number of references made to other Imams together are only 25 times out of which 11 references are made of Imam Ja'afar al-Sadiq. It must be kept, however, in mind that eleven references to Imam al-Sadiq are due to a few Traditions to prove the velayat of the 'ulama' narrated through him.

116 The break-up of references made to the Prophet and the Imams in Hukumat-e Islami in its four sections is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Prophet Muhammad</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam 'Ali</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam Hasan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam Husayn</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam Muhammad al-Baqir</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam Musa al-Kazim</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam 'Ali al-Rida</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam Muhammad al-Mahdi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Geogery Rose, op. cit., p.181 f.n. (note: other Imams are not mentioned at all).