The death of Ayatollah Boroujerdi in 1961 marked a turning point in the attitude and thought of Shi'i 'ulama' in Iran. The subdued criticism of Boroujerdi's passive attitude came into open soon after his death. Even, many of the orthodox sections of clergy who up to now remained under the leadership of the Ayatollah showed no hesitation in expressing dissatisfaction over his cooperation and subservience to the Shah and his regime. The whole class of clergy of the period between 1961-1970 can be divided into four categories according to the level of their oppositional attitude towards the government. The radical group consisted of Ayatollah Taleqani and Ayatollah Khomeini joined by some other marja'-e taglid of Qom and Tehran, like Ayatollah Mahallati Shirazi and Ayatollah Sadiq Rouhani. There was a group of 'ulama' who were although strongly opposed to the regime but who directed their activities towards religious and educational reforms. Ayatollah Mohammad Mortoza Motahhari undoubtedly was the most prominent amongst this group of reformist clergy; others were

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Ayatollah Sayyed Mohammad Behishti, Ayatollah Ibrahim Ayati, Ayatollah Hossein Mazinani and Ayatollah Sayyed Mortoza Shabistari etc. A third group consisted of those who strictly followed the line of Boroujerdi and Behbehani. Prominent marja' of this group were, Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Golpaygani, Ayatollah Shahaboddin Mar'ashi-Najafi; Ayatollah Ahmed Khuvansari, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, Ayatollah Kafa'i Khorasani and Ayatollah Hadi Milani. The marja'yyat of Najaf and 'atabad also supported this group. This group still had its grip strong on the lower ranks of clergy, that is the preachers and Imams of Friday prayer. There were some divines who could not be put into these categories for their individual distinction. For example, Ayatollah Sayyed Kazem Shariatmadari. Shariatmadari was a strong critic of some of the policies of the regime but he did not oppose the government as such. He also supported the reformist activities of Motahhari and others. Another distinguished personality was Ayatollah Sayyed Mohammad Hossein Tabataba'i of Qom, who was revered for his piety and learning in every section of the clergy. But he showed no interest towards politics, passive or otherwise. The fourth group consisted of conservative clergy who supported and cooperated with the Shah. This group included Ayatollah Mahdavi, Allama Vahidi, Mohammad Taqi Qommi, Abbas Mohajirani, Mohammad Reza Behbehani and others. The 'ulama's reactions ranged from violent and direct
confrontation with the government to the support of the government. 1

As mentioned above 'ulama's dissatisfaction towards the government started with the feeling of what they thought increasing unnecessary interference of the latter into the affairs of religion as well as socio-educational matters of the community. It was expressed in the opposition of land reform law of 1959-60. However, the 'ulama's opposition increased when the government pressed on its reformist measures during the 1962-63 under the six point programme of the Shah termed as White Revolution. 3 The clergy's opposition was based on three important considerations: (1) autocracy and tyranny of the regime, (2) anti-imperialist sentiments in view of growing influence of the foreign powers particularly of U.S.A. into the affairs of the country and (3) spread of western culture in the country. This is reflected


3 The six point programme of the Shah included land reform, women enfranchizement, nationalization of the forest resources, etc. See Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, Chap. III, pp. 76-91.
into the speeches and declaration of these 'ulama' during this period.

The reformist clergy during this period were preoccupied with the questions of social, religious and educational reforms. The reformists led by Ayatollah Motahheri formed a society of 'ulama' and intellectuals, called "Anjuman-e Māhāna-ye Dini" (the Monthly Religious Society) in Tehran. This organization used to hold one mahfil (session) each month. The society was able to hold thirty sessions between 1961-1963 before it was banned by the regime. These thirty lectures were later published in three volumes under the title of Goftar-e Māh. The Society also invited special papers on the topic of the role of religious class in society. These papers were collected and published under the title "Bahsi Darbara-ye Marja'iyyat va Ruhaniyyat." These lectures dealt with a wide range of ideas such as imamate, ghaybat, veļayat and rahbari (leadership); marja'iyyat and a'lamiyyat; ijtihad and jihad and amr bi'l-ma'ruf wa nahi'an al-munkar. Those


5 Ayatollah Mortoza Motahheri and others (eds.), Goftār-e Māh, 3 vols.

6 See Allama Tabataba'i and others (eds.), Bahsi Darbara-ye Marja'iyyat va Ruhaniyyat (n.p., n.d.).
who delivered lectures belonged to clergy as well as lay intellectual classes. 7 'There is little doubt writes Akhavi, 'that the thought of these individuals had a profound impact on the 'ulama' in Iran. Their ideas provided a ground for vigorous debate on the part of the religious studies students, too, at the very last, in consequence, even the conservative clergy was touched by the movement. These conservatives were apprehensive at the scope of changes desired by the reformists and probably instinctively resisted their suggestion'. 8

Ayatollah Sayyed Mortoza Motahheri was one of the most active and the most prolific writers amongst the reformist clergy. He was considered as the leader and brain behind the reformist activities. He was born in 1920 and belonged to Khorasan province.9

7 There are sixteen authors who contributed one or more papers in the volumes. They are: Ayatollah Mortoza Motahheri, Sayyed Mohammad Ibrahim Ayati, Mirza Khalil Kamarah'i, Sayyed Ali Ghafuri, Sayyed Mortoza Jaza'eri, Sayyed Moussa Sadr, Sayyed Mahmoud Telegani, Sayyed Mohammad Beheshti, Sayyed Mohammad Baqir Sabzvari, Sayyed Mortoza Shabistari, Sayyed Mohammad Hossein Ja'fari, Mohammad Hossein Mazini, Sayyed Mohammad Hossein Tabatana'i, Sayyed Abol Fazl Zanjani, Sayyed Mohammad Farzan and Mohandis Mehdi Bezanga.

8 Akhavi, op. cit., p.118.

He first studied at Mashhad then came to Qom in late 1930s. Here he attended the classes of great theological teachers. He also met Khomeini whom he latter described as the "person he was looking for". He was particularly influenced by Khomeini's lessons on ethics. During the 1940s and early 1950s he was close to the conservative clergy. He then came to Tehran and began his reformist work by establishing various literary, educational and religious societies.

The main area of Motahhari's interest, besides religion and theology, was philosophy, western thought, history and Iranian nationalism. He contributed a vast literature through his writings and lectures which cover a variety of subjects. He joined the revolutionary movement led by Khomeini during 1970s.

Ijtihād:

According to Motahhari the reconstruction of religious thought (Ihyā'-e fikr-e dini) is a continuous process; it neither depends upon a single individual revivalist (Mujtahid) nor it is true to say that there will be a revivalist at the head of each

10 M. Hodā, In Memory of Martyr Mutahhari, p.17.
11 The main works of Motaahhari are given in the bibliography.
12 See Motahhari, "Ihya'-e fikr-e dini", Dah Goftar, pp. 113 ff.
century as believed by the Sunni theologians. The process of reconstruction of religious ideas was possible through *ijtihad*. It was through *ijtihad* that the religious doctrines can be re-interpreted and adopted to the new situation and circumstances (*al-hadith al-waqia*). Motahheri broadened the scope of *ijtihad* and conceded more extended role for it in the interpretation of religious doctrines. Although *ijtihad bi'l-ra'y* (*ijtihad by opinion*) was criticized by him as *ijtihad-e mamnu* as practiced in Hanafi jurisprudence, he accepted Ghazali's definition of *ijtihad* as a source of jurisprudence to derive legal inferences (*hukm-e shari'i*). *Ijtihad* says Motahheri, 'is utmost endeavour', 'to deduce (*hukm-e shari'i*) through authentic legal argumentation (*adla-ye motebbar-e shari'iyya*). He advocated extensive utilization of insight (*tadabbor*) and intellect (*ta'ggol*) and criticized the *akhbāri* position of rigidity in religious matters. The *taqlid* of dead mujtahids (*taqlid-e mayyat*) is strongly rejected by him in religious matters. He

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13 Ibid., pp. 114-120; See also Motahheri, *Islamic Movements in Twentieth Century*, p.3.

14 See Motahheri, "ijtihad az nazr-e dini", *Dah Goftar*, pp. 76-105.

15 Ibid., pp. 77-80.

16 Ibid., p.80.

17 Ibid., p. 81; Else where he defines the *ijtihad* as 'the explanation (*Kashf*) and application (*tatbiq*)of fundamental principles to the subsidiary and changing matters' Motahheri, *Moqaddma-ye bar Jahanbini-ye Islami: Wahy va Nubuwwat*, p.150.


19 See ibid., pp. 83-90.
writes: 'the idea of following of dead mujtahid is illegal. The institution of marja'yyat is a means of the survival of religious institution and Islamic sciences. It is a source through which the Islamic sciences... progress and solve the unsolved problems.'

He explains the Shi'i notion of al-hawādith al-waqi'a and the role of ītihād in the following words:

The Muslims come across to a number of new problems in their life. They do not know how to cope with them. Therefore, live fuqaha and a live theology is but indispensable ... Havades-e Vage'a (i.e. al-hawādith al-Waqi'a) are the new problems which occur in each age and time. A study of the development of figh of different centuries shows that the jurisprudential endeavours developed gradually according to the needs of the people in new problems ... Fundamentally ītihād is (an effort) to adapt the fundamental principles (of faith) to the new problems of changing circumstances. The true mujtahid is one who knows the sects of how the circumstances have been changing and, therefore, brings about change in the doctrines (ahkām) accordingly.

Motahheri, like a reformist, laments the state of affairs of the Muslims in general and Iranian people in particular. According to him, the incorrect conception of religion was the

20 Ibid., p. 97.
21 Ibid., p. 99.
22 Motahheri, "Ihya'-e Fikr-e Dini", pp. 121-22.
main cause of the degeneration of the Muslim society. He, therefore, stressed the need of reforming the religious doctrines which had gone wrong, so that religion could play a vital role in creating a sense of responsibility towards the society. He felt that the growing alienation of the people as well as the elites from religion was one of the most serious problems. He said that the ideology of nationalism was mainly responsible for alienation among the people from Islam. In order to check such an alienation he wrote a book entitled **Khedmat-e Motagabel-e Islam va Iran**. The theme of the book is to describe services done by Islam to Iranian people and in turn the services done by Iranian people in the development of Islamic learning. He thus intended to show that Islam and Iranian nationalism are not two opposit poles; they are rather complimentary to each other. He strongly refutes the contention of some of the

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23 Ibid., p. 124.

24 Motahheri, "Rahbari-ye Nasl-e Javan" Dah Goftar, pp. 163-64.

25 Motahheri, Khedmat-e Motagabel-e Islam va Iran, 2 vols. The first volume describes the services of Islam to Iran while the second volume describes the services of Iranian people in the promotion of Islam.
nationalists and Iranologists that Islam was an alien culture for Iranian nation. He says that the interaction of Islam and Iran was a natural phenomenon. For the Iranians Islam was "a natural food which they swallowed through their hungry throat or it was like a fresh water which quenched the thirst of the Iranians. The Iranian nature, particularly due to the social conditions of pre-Islamic Iran digested this natural food and gained strength and energy from it; while they devoted this energy (in turn) in service of Islam". 26 He points out that Islam may not be called an alien ideology for the Iranians simply because of the fact that Islam originated on the Arab soil. 27 Furthermore, the Islam is not an ethnic or racial ideology; it is rather universal (jahani) and humanist (insani), it teaches equality of all races. It was this attraction that brought the Iranians to embrace Islam. 28

He further refutes the view that the conquest of Iran by the Arab armies was synonymous with the Islamization of Iran. 29

27 See Ibid., vol. I, pp. 72-76.
28 Ibid., p. 77.
Similarly he refutes the view that the Iranians embraced Shi'ism because of the marriage of the daughter of the last Sassanid king, Shaharbanoo with the third Imam, Husayn. He first of all questions the validity of the relation and then argues that if the embracing of Shi'ism by the Iranians was anything to do with the racial consideration, it should have accepted Umayyads as there are more blood relation between Umayyads and the Sassanids. He says that Iranians embraced Shi'ism because they found the House of the Prophet more close to the teaching of Islam. He described the western concept of nationalism (milliat parasti) as the greatest cause of disintegration of the Islamic ummat. He described it as against the world view of Tawhid (monotheism). He wrote a number of books against Marxism. Comparing the

30 Motahhari, Khedmat-e Motaqabel Islam va Iran, Vol. I, p. 120.

31 See ibid., p. 122 ff.

32 Ibid., passim

33 Ibid., p. 50.

34 For his concept of Tawhid as a world-view see Mogaddema-ye bar Jahan bini-ye Islami; Jahanbini-ye Tawhidi.

35 For his criticism of Marxism see Alal-e Gerayash be Maddigiri; Qayam va Ingelab-e Mehdi; Usul-e Falsafa va Ravish-e Rifaism, 4 volums; Imad-haye Ghalbi der Zendagi-ye Bezar; Mogaddema-ye bar Jahanbini-ye Islami; Jamā'ā va Tarikh.
world view of tawhid (jahanbini-ye tawhidi) with other world-views he describes the characteristics of a monotheistic society as a 'classless society, without discrimination, deprivation, and oppression—a society full of justice'. As a the differences among the Islamic society 'they have given variety, beauty progress and perfection to the society. It is a society of brotherhood and equality in which there are differences but there is no discrimination.

The reformists believed in a gradual but continuous process of reforming the society. They even did not believe that once the Hidden Imam appears the whole world will become paradise at once. Ayatollah Motahheri, therefore, criticized the traditional belief that the Hidden Imam will appear when the evil will be there hundred per cent and righteousness zero per cent in the world. He also opines against the revolutionary view "because partial reforms subside the social evils for a time being and therefore they work as drugs and create obstacles in

37 Ibid., pp. 112-13.
38 Motahheri, Qayam va Ingelab-e Mehdi, p. 80 ff.
natural evolution". According to him such a view is a mechanical interpretation of history and evolution. He says that partial reforms are in no way condemnable; because they also work as a motivating force in evolution and history, and because 'they are not ends in themselves, there is always a possibility of better reforms than the previous ones'.

The ultimate aim of the Muslim society is the "universal revolution of the Imam of the Age" when the Islamic utopia will be established. In a philosophical discussion of the notion of awaiting of the Hidden Imam, he explained two kinds of "awaiting" (intezār): the positive awaiting and the negative awaiting.

The former is constructive awaiting while the latter is destructive

39 Cf., ibid., pp. 43-65.
40 Ibid., p.58.
41 Ibid., p.74; He says: seeking the reform is the very spirit of Islam. A Muslim is a reformist and atleast a protagonist of reformation for the bare fact that he is a Musalman. Reform seeking has come down in the Qur'an as an attribute of Prophethood. It occupies the same significance in Islamic social teachings as the things lawful and unlawful.... Thus we find that a duty-bound Muslim, conscious of doing what is forbidden, is very sensitive towards social reform. Motahhesi, Islamic Movement in Twentieth Century, p.6
42 Motahheri, Qayam va Ingelab-e Mehdī, p.79 ff and pp.6-7.
awaiting. The constructive awaiting made men active (fa'al), responsible and sensitive. The destructive awaiting, on the other hand, created rigidity, stagnation and passivity. The positive awaiting lead man to the "great hope" (omni-de 'azim) of the appearance of the Imam.

Social Responsibility:

One of the fundamental themes of the reformists was social responsibility, perhaps only next to the urge of religious and ethical reforms. Most of these lecturers have made their theme to create social awareness among both the masses and the elite which they thought one of the means in getting the society out of passivity and stagnation. Social awareness and realization of one's social responsibilities towards his people can make him an active member of the society. The 'ulama' interpreted such precepts of Islam as tagwa (piety) as socially dynamic concepts. Motahheri explains the meaning of tagwa in two lectures under the little "Tagwa". He says that tagwa is not a limited concept, nor it advocates passivity and indifference towards life. He says

43 Ibid., pp. 80-81.
44 Ibid., p. 79.
46 Ibid., p. 15.
that there are two types of 'aql (reason, intellect): 'aql-e nazri and 'aql-e'amali (roughly corresponding to esoteric and practical intellect). Taqwa has direct effect upon esoteric intellect as well as practical intellect in two different ways. However, in its effect of 'aql-e nazri, taqwa expresses itself into creating social awareness in man. Social responsibility can make him an active member of society. This was also the reason why the notion of amr be ma'rouf va nahy az monkar has been a permanent subject of discussion of these lectures. Many of these reformists, for example Dr. Mohammad Ibrahim Ayati, takes it as a religious and social duty in contrast to the previous conception that reduced it to a moral precept. According to Motahheri amr be ma'rouf va nahy az monkar is one of the practical principles (asl-e'amali) of Islam. It is not limited to speech and action (goftar va'amal). It rather encompasses a wider

47 Ibid., pp. 30-32.

48 Mohammad Ibrahim Ayati, "Amr be Ma'rouf va Nahy az Monkar, Gof tariff-e Mâh, vol.I, p.52; Even a more dynamic interpretation is given to taqwa by Mohandis Mehdi Bazargan. He also defines taqwa to be a concept that leads to activity and dynamism, not passivity and indifference, Muhandis Mehdi Bazargam, Work and Islam, Eng. trans. by M. Yusuf Ali and others (n.p., n.d.), p.44.

49 Motahheri, Asl-e Amr be Ma'rouf va Nahy az Monkar" Dah Gof tar, p.48.

50 Ibid., p. 63.
responsibility. It should lead to a collective effort to reform the society. 51

Most of these 'ulama' expressed dissatisfaction over the indifference of the top ranking clergy towards social matters. They opposed the belief that religion should be kept away from social and political realms. For example, Ayatollah Mohammad Behishti and Sayyed Mortoza Jaza'eri asserted again and again that Islam had direct relation with the social problem. 52 Engineer Mehdi Bazargan believed that degeneration of a society was not due to religion itself, but, rather due to man's idleness and "inactivity" 53 as a result of incorrect perception of religious doctrines. Quoting a number of verses from the Quran, he emphasized the importance that Islam was given to action and activity. By righteous action ('aml-e saleh) he means productive

51 Ibid., p. 68.
action. In a mathematical study of the Quran he said that Islam had set three pre-conditions for the deliverance of the humanity. They are faith, piety and righteousness. All three are necessary for the attainment of the Heaven, therefore faith will not do any good without productive action. In other words all the three were necessary for the Muslim society to progress. A major cause for the degeneration of the Muslim societies in general and shi'i society in particular had been ineffective and misinterpreted expression of religious actions. He writes:

Apart from natural religious sentiment - especially within the Shi'ite sect - and the original and undeniable spurt of progression that Islam's acceptance triggered off, it is obvious that the growth and expansion of Islam in Iran has been more or less confined to the basically abstract and emotional aspects (ritual prayer and worship, pilgrimage, mourning etc.) or the comparatively negative characteristics of religious piety (abstention from alcohol, fornication, theft, ritual impurity etc.) When it comes to "deeds of righteousness" and positive productive activity the consideration and inclination of the Iranian individual has been exceedingly weak, indeed, the only real positive and appreciable show of initiative has been in the custom of religious alms-giving and donations.

54 The word 'aml-i saleh is defined by Bazargan thus: 'The word "salih" is derived from the word islah which means amendments or rectification and salehiyyat which means fitness translated in Persian as "Sha'ista" or praiseworthy or decent, is also used here in general sense. (Salih ? This means correct and proper; 'aml-e Salih ? describes any deed or act which is morally correct or righteous based on pure and definite policy and the performance of which can be guaranteed to have an effective and useful result', ibid., p. 43.

55 Ibid., pp. 41-48; For his view on the role of work on Islam, see pp. 49-62.
Even then, the real intention of the donator must be examined before any true merit can be attributed to his generosity. In fact, out of what were stated to be the three basic keys to prosperity, and eventually to heaven only faith and piety have been touched upon — the former, in its abstract sense and the latter in its negative sense. The third key, work and deeds of righteousness seems to have been lost or forgotten.\(^{56}\)

According to Motahhari, too, even purely religious actions underline the notion of social responsibility. In his usual philosophical fashion Mohathheri expresses the same views regarding the relationship between religious and social responsibility: 'The religious responsibility consisted of two things: One is the responsibility which has a definite shape and form; it is a fixed act ... the result of which we are not concerned with ... The second kind of responsibility can be called as the responsibility about the result of which we are concerned (mas'uliyat-e natija .... In Islam both kinds of responsibilities exist. Prayer, fasting and all the rituals (ta'bidat) come into the first category, while jihād comes into the second category ....\(^{57}\)

A major thrust of the reformists was the improvement in the function and organization of religious educational institutions.

\(^{56}\) Ibid., p. 49.

They advocated re-orientation of the studies and curriculum of the madarsas. Motahheri, for instance, held that the predominance of study of fiqh in the madrasa had negative results. He suggested more emphasis on \textit{tafsir} and \textit{hadith}^{58}. They also called for complete independence of the madrasas from the state.\textsuperscript{59}

The majority of these reformers pretended to keep themselves away from practical politics and restricted themselves, in the words of Akhavi, to evolve a fresh version of Shi'i Islam.\textsuperscript{60} But they could not escape completely from the political implications of their chosen subject matters, especially \textit{jihad}, \textit{amr be ma'rouf va nahi an mankar}, social responsibility etc. Even the educational reforms suggested by them had indirect bearing on the political set up of the country. The government saw the educational reforms and the suggestion of independent financial system of \textit{marja'iyyat} as a parallel body. The conservative clergy who

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{58} Akhavi, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 122.
  \item \textsuperscript{59} See, for example, Motahheri, "Moshkel-e Asasi dar Sazman-e Ruhaniyyat", Allama Tabataba'i and others (eds.), \textit{Bahsi Darbara-ye Marja'iyyat va Ruhaniyyat}, pp. 145-98.
  \item \textsuperscript{60} Rescuing Islam in Iran from centuries of stagnation had to happen in time and space. It could not simply be wished, as though somehow it could occur in vacuo. The reformers felt that a new breed of Iranian shi'a had been born. With representatives in the key cities of the land, this element would fulfil the dream of Ayatollah Na'ini. It would shake the 'ulama' awake from 19 centuries of slumber', Akhavi, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 121.
\end{itemize}
were cooperating with the government and that participated in the referendum of 1963, itself were not happy with the reformist. They were not only angered by the criticism of passivity made upon them by the reformists, but they were also annoyed by a government crack down upon the clergy in general, not to speak of the reformists. They were also suspicious of any change in the status quo of the religious and educational institution. However, most of these reformers shut their mouth against any outspoken criticism of the regime. They talked only in terms of metaphor and analogy. They wanted to keep a safe distance from the practical politics and active opposition of the government. This is reflected in the fact that they did not invite Khomeini or Mahallati to their sessions. This is also true when we see that some of these 'ulama' who participated in what is called the second reform movement of 1960s i.e. the Hosseinyeh Irshad, withdrew from it when they found that it was gradually becoming more and more political.

Marja'iyyat:

The dissatisfaction of these reformist clergy with the mode of function of Ayatollah Boroujerdi as the highest marja'e taqlid during the earlier decades, led them to reconsider
the position and function of marja'at-taqlid. Therefore, soon after the death of the grand Ayatollah Boroujerdi, they arrange a seminar in which papers were invited from the leading 'ulama' in connection with the position and function of the marja'iyyat. Although the idea of a seminar was not materialized, a collection of a few papers on the subject was published under the title of "Bahsi Darbara-ye Marja'iyyat va Ruhaniyyat". The book was highly acclaimed and widely read. The authors of the articles

61 One of the causes that led to call such a conference by the reformists would have been the suspicion of the 'ulama' that the government will influence and interfere into the choice of the most learned marja'at-taqlid. See A.K.S Lembon, "A Reconsideration of the Position of Marja'at-Taqlid and the Religious Institution", Studia Islamica, vol. XX (1969), p. 113. The organizer, however, claimed that the conference was invited to fill the vacuum created by the death of the grand Ayatollah Boroujerdi as the most learned marja'at-taqlid. See "Moqaddema" to Tabataba'i and others (eds.), Bahsi Darbara-ye Marja'iyyat va Ruhaniyyat, pp. 1-2.

62 The first edition of the book appeared in 1962. This comprised eight articles in all written by seven authors, the six of which belonged to clergy while one was a lay intellectual and leader of the Freedom Movement of Iran, Engineer Mehdi Bazargan. The second edition of the book included two more articles making the number of articles ten in all.

63 Allama Tabataba'i and others (eds.) Bahsi Darbara-ye Marja'iyyat va Ruhaniyyat, "Preface to the Second Edition", pp. VI-VII.
published in this volume sought reorientation of the institution of marja' e taqlid in the light of theoretical development of the concept and the practice in the past. Most of the authors consider the institution of marja' e taqlid not only a matter of religious importance rather a matter that has social and political implications. In addition to this the notions of ijtihād and taqlid and velayat and imamat were also discussed. Almost all the contributors of the volume agreed upon the view that the present nature as well as the function of the institution were not beneficial for the ummat. The majority of the authors believed that the notion of one marja' e taqlid as the most learned person (a'lam) should no more continue because of many reasons. For example, there may be more than one person who can equally share the position of the most learned 'alim, (a'lam), or the most learned 'alim may not necessary be the most learned 'alim in each and every branch of knowledge, so on and so forth. Therefore, it is more convenient that the community should have a body of the learned marja'i- e taqlid (shoura- ye fatwa-ye') each of whom should have specialized in various branches of knowledge.

Sayyed Hajj Abol-Fazl Moussavi Mujtahid Zanjani in his article "Shara'et va Vaza'ef-e Marja" (pre-requisites and functions of the religious leader) first of all emphasised the need of deriving new problem (ahkâm) of shari'a by using reason and ijtihad. He also emphasised the function of the mujtahids as jurists as well as the leaders of the ummat. He then points out that in case of consensus (regarding a juridical problem) there is no problem for the follower (moqalled). In case of differences of opinion among the jurists one should follow (rujû') the more learned of the mujtahids. But contrary to the general practice and view, Zanjani held that while returning to the mujtahid for a juridical opinion in case of difference of opinion among the jurists regarding the same, one should take care to chose that mujtahid who is more learned and specialized in the matter about which opinion is sought. Similarly, expertise and specialization of the mujtahid should be taken into consideration as a principle of preference over his justice and piety ('adl va tagwa).


66 Ibid., p. 27.

67 Ibid., p. 28.
Because according to Zanjani more knowledgeability (alamiyyat) and expertise is more important than piety.  

Ayatollah Taleqani in his article "Tamarkoz va' Adm-e tamarkoz-e Marja'iyyat va Fatwa" (centralization and decentralization of the institution of marja'iyyat) emphasizes to look into the problem from the point of view of what is more beneficial to the ummat and which is near to the general spirit of the shari'a. He describes three possible situations regarding the centralization or decentralization of the marja'iyyat: (1) Absolute centralization of juridical opinion and organizational matters in the hands of one or a few individuals (2) No centralization whatsoever and (3) centralization of juridical opinion and organizational matters in a body or a consultative committee of 'ulama'. Regarding the first situation which was prevalent at that time he says that centralization of juridical opinion and organizational matter into the hands of one 'alim or a few 'ulama' practically confiscates not only the right of the followers of independent choice but also the cooperation of other 'ulama' in different matters. Taleqani then proceeds to contradict the

68 Ibid.
69 Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleqani, "Tamarkoz va' Adm-e Tamarkoz-e Marja'iyyat va Fatwa" in Tabataba'i and others (eds.) Bahsi Darbara-ye Marja'iyyat va Ruhaniyyat, pp. 202-203.
70 See ibid., p. 203.
71 Ibid.
arguments put forward in favour of one marja' as the most learned 'alim for ummat saying that they are not only against tradition but also they did not sufficiently prove the legitimacy of absolute imitation of the most learned faqih. Secondly and most importantly centralization leads to religious despotism (istebdad-e dini). Moreover, it makes the institution of marja'iyyat stagnant and vulnerable to decadence. Therefore, centralization is neither suitable for the benefit of ummat nor it is in accordance with the spirit of the religion and jurisprudence.

Similarly absolute decentralization ('adm-e tamarkoz) would lead to chaos and difference in the society. The third situation i.e. a body of fugahā or a consultative committee of 'ulama' to take up the religious leadership as well as the religious and educational institutions is the most suitable alternative. Taleqani says such a body of 'ulama' is not only according to the spirit of Islam but also most beneficial thing for the society. He points out to practice of the begging of

72 See, ibid., pp. 203-05.
73 Ibid., p. 267.
74 Ibid.
the period of Greater Occultation whence the legal experts used to consult their teachers/colleagues and even pupils while deriving juristic verdicts. Moreover, the Qur'anic injunction of "Wa amr shura'Baynahum" is not only for political matters, it is rather, a general ruling. 75

Like Taleqani, Sayyed Mortoza Jaza'eri also advocates a body of fuqahā' to replace the contemporary practice of single marja'. In his article "Taqlid-e A'lam ya Shoura-ye Fatwa-ye", he strongly pleads for a drastic change in the orientation and conception of the institution of marja'-'e taqlid. He first of all points out that it has mistakenly been conceived by people that the purpose of the traditional ruling that in case of difference of opinion the believer should follow the more learned faqih was to follow the same in each and every case. 76 On the contrary the notion of following the more learned mujtahid itself points out to the multiplicity of marja'iyat and therefore, "shoura-ye fatwa-ye". 77 According to him shoura-ye fatwa-ye means

75 Ibid., p. 208.
that 'in place of one fixed person as a source of imitation ... there should be a council comprising a number of fuqaha who can take up the problems together ... and because it is not possible to have a consensus on every problem the body of 'ulama' should give verdict on the basis of majority so that instead of following one mujtahid people will follow the opinion of the majority of the marja'iyyat'. He maintains that people should not think that such a body of 'ulama would be against the laws of shari'a because the conception of alamiyyat (most learned mujtahid) is itself a new phenomenon which has its own gradual development of about four centuries. He also points out that it is not necessary that the most learned marja'-e-taglid is most learned in all respects. Furthermore, there may be more than one person who can be regarded most learned at the same time. Not only this it is most difficult practically to find out who is the most learned faqih; on the contrary it is relatively easy to single out a certain number of 'ulama' who can be regarded as more learned than the others.

78 Ibid., pp. 271-81.
79 Ibid., pp. 222-24.
80 Ibid., pp. 216-17.
81 Ibid., p. 227.
Although Ayatollah Motahheri did not express his view in categorical terms but he also expressed the need of decentralizing the religious opinion. He emphasises that the fugahā' should not be confined to the traditional juridical problems. They rather should acquire knowledge and expertise in all branches of knowledge including science and technology and modern philosophy. If a certain number of 'ulama' would have acquired specialization in various branches of knowledge they would be able to guide the people in all matters of life. He also points out that only one faqih cannot acquire specialization in all branches of knowledge. Similarly, people should return to that marja' who has got specialization in that particular branch of knowledge with which the problem is related. The second article of Motahheri deals with the basic problems of the spiritual institution such as financial, ethical and curricular.

A fundamental aim of these reformists was to bring the ruhaniyyat out of stagnation and to bring them closer to the people, society and social problems. The articles by Ayatollah

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82 Cf., Lambton, op. cit., p.222.

83 Motahheri, Asl-e Ijtihad dar Islam.

Beheshti and Mohandis Mehdi Bazargan describe the function and role of clergy in the present circumstances. They expressed the need of the use of *ijtiḥād* and a better involvement in social matters. Mehdi Bazargan like, Motahheri, believed that 'ulama' should acquire specialization in all branches of knowledge including science and technology. He also emphasised the distribution of work according to the expertise and specialization.

Ayatollah Behishti describes the position of the spiritual institution (*ruhaniyyat*) in Shi'ism in a defensive and apologetic manner. He also compares the concepts and function of *ruhaniyat* in Shi'ism as against the concept and practices of spiritual institution of other religions. He says that in Shi'ism *ruhaniyat* is not a class; it is rather leadership of the community. He also expresses the need to expand religious education on mass-level and that religious education should not be the monopoly of a few persons. The ideas of these theologians can be regarded as first attempts to re-evaluate the institution of *marja'iyyat* in modern times. One can find in these works

85 Mehdi Bazargan, "Intezar-e Mardom az Maraje'," Allama Tabataba'i and others (eds.), *Bahsi Darbara-ye Marja'iyyat va Ruhaniyyat*, p. 112.


87 Ibid., pp. 153.
a tendency to free the ruhaniyyat from the clutches of the state and develop its own independent means and resources to perpetuate its influence among the masses. They also regarded the reform as the first step to gain more freedom and more power. The reformists unanimously call for a strong and powerful clerical institution. 88

Throughout the 1960s the reformist clergy strove, on the one hand, to revitalize the institution of ruhaniyyat by bringing them closer to the people and society and on the other hand,

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88 Lambton, op. cit., p. 135
89 One can also find, says Lambton, 'the tendency to look for the establishment of the Kingdom of God upon earth, which, if pressed to its conclusion, is likely to lead either to political quietism or violent revolution. On the whole, however, there is a tendency to turn away from the ideal of "the perfect man" and to propose that a solution of the problems raised be sought rather in consultation and organization, to emphasize the need for continued growth in the religious institution and to press the responsibility of the individual ..., (but) no effective answer had yet been found to the question of "quis custodiet custodes," Lambton, op. cit., p. 135.
'to combine their reformism with the formulation and dissemination of an "Islamic traditionalist ideology" for the intelligentsia and youth. The net result of their efforts was increasing Shi'i traditionalism in the masses. An empirical study in this regard has been done by Said Amir Arjomand. He gives us a detailed account of the publication of religious books, periodicals and journals, traffic to the pilgrimages to Mecca and other religious shrines and the construction of mosques which show multiple increase. He also points out to the increase in religious societies and centers. Arjomand observes that a number of indicators attest to the increased vitality of traditional religious sentiments during the period. The role of mosques as

89 S.A. Arjomand, "Traditionalism in Twentieth Century Iran", in S.A. Arjomand (ed.), From Nationalism to Revolution, p. 221.

90 See ibid., pp. 213-17. The statistics show 'forty-eight publishers of religious literature in Tehran of whom twenty-six had begun their activities ... during the decade 1965-75....' While during the 1954-64 the average of religious titles published was 56.7 per year, it increased to an average of 153 titles per year during 1964-67. The average of the titles shot up to 251.7 per year during 1969-71. In 1972, it was 578 while in 1973 and 1974 it was 576 and 541 respectively. Similarly during the decade of 1954-64 the percentage of religious titles of total publication was 10.1 which shot up yo 33.5 in year 1974. The cash donations to the religious shrines also indicate multiple increase (see, p.215). Similarly the number of pilgrims to Mecca were 27,000 in 1970 which increased gradually every year to go up to 71,851 in 1975 (see p. 216). In 1962 the number of mosques in Iran was 3653 which rose to 5,389 in 1973. In 1972 there were 700 mosques in Tehran alone which increased to 1,140 in 1975.

91 Ibid., pp. 214-16.
the centres of political and social activities continued to grow. There was a spurt in religious practices and rituals among the masses. The reformists efforts to explain an "Islamic ideology" to the people indirectly led to the politicization of Shi'ism.

The 'Ulama' and the Monarchy

By 1970s 'ulama's grievances reached to the extent of confrontation. We find an equal degree of increase in all the four categories of 'ulama' mentioned above. Even those 'ulama' who followed the attitude of Boroujerdi began to express their feelings of uneasiness towards the government. A representative case may be of Ayatollah Hadi Milani, a marja' of Mashhad. Milani was among those few 'ulama' who avoided any criticism of the government. Although his name does not figure in the referendum of 1963, he was one of those who called for restoration of normalcy without qualification during the disturbances of June 1963 - a sign of dislike for confrontation between the 'ulama' and state and supposedly an indirect support to the government vis a vis the radical. By 1971 Milani changed his position and criticized the government in unqualified terms. The 'ulama's criticism

92 See M.J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution.

93 Arjomand, op. cit., p. 212.

94 Akhavi, op. cit., p. 102.
particularly increased after the alleged torture and death of Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Sa'idi of Tehran in prison. A series of demonstrations took place, by the students of hawza ye Ilmiyya, joined by opposition groups particularly in Qom and Tehran.

In fact, there were two reasons of 'ulama's increasing unhappiness: (1) the government's increasing interference into the affairs of hawza-ye ilmiyya, thereby reducing the influence and power of the clergy and (2) the government's insistence upon its programme of modernization, thereby increasing the influence of western civilization. Ayatollah Sa'idi was arrested on the charge of openly denouncing the government's policy of giving concession to the foreign companies. This denunciation came when a consortium of thirty five American (the U.S.A.'s) investors was discussing further investment in the Iranian market in May 1970. Ayatollah Sa'idi denounced this as "a catastrophe and an annihilating blow to the people of Iran" and described the regime as a "tyrannical agent of Imperialism". He described it 'the duty of the 'ulama' to initiate their forebearers like Mirza Hasan Shirazi by rising up

in protest against the usurpation of economic resources of the country'.

Meanwhile certain steps of the government further aggravated the hostility of the 'ulama'. For instance, the government attempted to reduce the pilgrimage traffic to Iraq. A number of 'ulama' were arrested while crossing the border on the charges of having collaborated with Khomeini. The Shah announced formation of Religious Corps in an attempt to curb the influence of the religious class in rural areas. This was seen by the 'ulama' as a means of reducing the power and influence of the religious opposition. The paratroops' intervention in the meetings and gathering of hawza-ye 'Ilmiyya increased. In 1971, the military surrounded the madrasa faiziyya and other hawza-ye 'ilmiyyas in view of the fresh demonstration. A number of 'ulama' who were arrested including Ayatollah Montazeri who had joined the radical group by

96 Hamid Algar, op. cit., p. 251. Khomeini denounced the consortium in the following words: 'Any agreement that is concluded with the American capitalists and other Imperialists is contrary to the will of the people and the ordinances of Islam. Since the members of the Majlis are not elected by the people, their discussions are illegal and contrary to the constitution and the will of the people'.

now and was supposed to be acting on behalf of Khomeini. Montazeri was exiled in Najaf. Among those 'ulama' who joined the opposition to openly denounce the government one was Ayatollah Mohammad Hasan Tabatababi who attacked the government for 'muzzling' of preachers and the despatch of the Sipah-e Din (Religious Corpe) and muravvezin to wreak havoc on the rural population's conception of the 'ulama's role in society.

But the strongest opposition came when the Shah announced to celebrate the 2500 anniversary of monarchical rule in Iran. This led to the multifaceted consequences. It was at this stage that Khomeini denounced monarchy as incompatible, rather contrary to the teachings of Islam - an unprecedented standpoint in the history of Shi'i theology. In a statement issued from Najaf Khomeini declared the incompatibility of monarchy with Islam. Khomeini also called for a total annihilation of old system and establishment of an Islamic government ruled by faqih-e 'adil. For this declaration see Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, p. 163. For his ideas regarding Islamic government and velaye-e faqih, see chapter 6 - 7.
earned great support from the secular parties and even leftist segments of the opposition in so far as the first part of Khomeini's programme was concerned, i.e. his denunciation of monarchy and overthrow of the regime. It was because of this that they did not hesitate to describe him as the marja' of Iranian people in their propaganda publication during this period. Khomeini in turn took an accommodative position towards the secular as well as leftist opposition. For example, he condemned the arrest and torture of the activists of the Mojahedin-Khalq. This organization had close contacts with Ayatollah Taleqani. Furthermore, such references by Khomeini as concern for "mostaz'e fin" (oppressed), "economic deprivation of the rural peasants and poor class", the "extravaganza of the government", and repeated anti-imperialist and anti-US statements appealed the leftist forces to a great extent.

Khomeini's growing popularity was rapidly enhancing his status to the position of sole marja'-e taqlid during the period, despite the fact that Ayatollah Muhsin Hakim was recognized for the post by the government after the death of Boroujerdi. On the

death of Ayatollah Hakim, the Shah tried to nominate Ayatollah Kho'i of Najaf for the post. He sent a telegram to him to this effect which the latter politely refused. The Shah apparently sought to keep the central figure of religious influence physically away from Iran as he has done earlier in 1961. Kho'i was a man of learning and piety. He had kept himself away from politics and was devoted to teaching jurisprudence. The Shah, then, sent a telegram to Ayatollah Shari'atmadari for the same purpose who had also shown accommodative attitude on several occasions.  102

Being an Azeri, Ayatollah Sayyed Mohammad Kazem Shari'atmadari enjoyed commanding influence in Azerbaijan. 103 Besides, he also wielded considerable influence in the Bazaar and the hawza-ye ilmiyya of Qom. 104 He was born in AD 1905 thus being slightly younger than Khomeini. He was regarded as the most learned theologian within Iran. He taught jurisprudence in the Qom seminary for a long time. Besides he established a publication cell and a press

102 E.g., he did not close his classes during a general call of strike in 1970-71 which was strongly criticized by the radical 'ulama' and more importantly he was supposedly a competent competitor of Khomeini. See David Menshari, Shi'ite leadership in the Shadow of Conflicting Ideologies" Iranian Studies, vol. XIII, Nos. 1-4 (1980), p.121.


which contributed a large part of religious literature during the
1970s. The Shah found in him a suitable candidate for the
position of marja'-e taqlid who can also curb the influence of
Khomeini. Sharia'atmadari himself is reported to have responded
in "affusive" and "loyalist tone".  

Ayatollah Shari'atmadari is regarded as the "liberal
traditionalist, modernist, traditionalist" or "progressive
traditionalist". Although he opposed the regime for its various
policies, he kept himself at a safe distance from the mainstream
of the radical clergy. Moreover, though he preferred to oppose and
criticize the regime on a number of issues on several occasions he
adopted unorthodox views. For example he had no objection to the
principle of land reform. He even had liberal view regarding Islamic
punishments for various crimes. Asked "Did Islam say that thieves
must be punished by amputation of the hand"? he replied: 'In
principles that is the law. The application of law will depend

105 Arjomand, op. cit., p. 213.
106 Hamid Algar, The Oppositional Role of Ulama in the
Twentieth century Iran, p. 252. 'This led to a big demonstration
in front of his residence. The demonstrators affirmed their
recognition of Khomeini as the highest marja'-e taqlid. Moreover a
telegram was sent by forty-five mujtahids of Qom to Khomeini
affirming their loyalty and support to him. In Tehran, Shiraz
and Ahwaz, too, meetings were held to pledge their support to
Khomeini'.
107 Akhavi, op. cit., p.
109 David Menshari, op. cit., p. 509; and Shi'ite
Leadership: In the Shadow of Conflict of Ideologies, p. 122 ff.
on the circumstance'. Similarly to the question of stoning of women for adultery he said: 'that is prescribed by the law. But remember that you need four witness to the act of penetration'.

However, he opposed the laws permitting abortion or governments decision to introduce Iranian calender instead of the Islamic Hijra calender. His views regarding constitution and the future of monarchy were traditional. He was not that much outspoken against western Imperialism as he was against the Russians. Similarly, like the orthodox traditionalists he was a bitter critic of Maxism. According to him "Islam and Marxism had nothing in common" - as Maxism was a kind of atheism.

Shari'atmadari, along with few top ranking 'ulama, re-iterated the position of Constitutionalist movement regarding religion-state problem. He considered constitutional monarchy as one of the best forms of government as the interpreters of the law were guaranteed. He did not oppose

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112 Edward Mortimer, op. cit., p. 33.
113 David Menshari, op. cit., p. 473.
114 According to Akhavi, op. cit., pp. 176-77, they included: Ayatollah Taleqani, Sayyed Abol-Fazl Moussavi Zanjani and Sayyed Abol Qasim Dinouri.
monarchy in principle but only on account of its tyrannical
methods. He therefore advocated for the restoration of the
constitution of 1906 with some modification after the revolution.
He says: 'After the victory of revolution and at the time when the
Iranian people voted almost unanimously for the Islamic Republic
there were discussions about a new constitution. At that time we
gave our view to the effect that it would be better to retain
the Persian constitution and just omit the articles relating to the
monarchical regime replacing them with articles relating to the
Islamic Republic. That would naturally render the work less difficult

116 The abolition of monarchy did not appear in the
charter of demands presented by the high ranking clergy to the
state in 1976. The demands included the following items:
1. The abolition of laws contrary to Islam.
2. Freedom of expression for the clergy and other social
forces.
3. Cancellation of the prohibition against clergy
involvement in politics.
5. Invitation to exiles - especially Ayatollah Khumayni -
to return Iran.
6. Prohibition of wasteful spending of natural resources
and the national income.
7. Punishment of those responsible for the deaths of
demonstration throughout the 1978 period.
8. Elimination of casinos, gambling clubs, cinemas etc.
9. Reconciliation or Iranian culture with the traditions
of Islam, prescriptions of the Qur'an and ordinances of
the imams.
10. Replacing "secular universal history" with Islamic
history.
11. 'Ulama's and lay supervision of parliamentary elections.
12. Requiring cabinet ministers to be of the Ja'fari Shi'i
faith.
13. Elimination of Baha'is and Baha'ism from official posi-
tion.
14. Nullification of all parliamentary legislation conflicting
with the tenets of Ja'fari Shi'ism. Akhavi, op. cit.,
p. 169.
and as at this time there is a great need for preservation of general unity and monolithic solidarity, that would be a way to avoid complaints, tension and pretect seeking.\textsuperscript{117} He thought nothing wrong in giving a further three months extension to Sharif Emami's Ministry\textsuperscript{118} at a time when Khomeini had already given the call of total revolution. He was also ready to go along with Bakhtiyar's government who advocated for retaining the same constitution but limiting the monarch's power to mere ceremonial authority.\textsuperscript{119} He thought that 'the main goal of the opposition movement against the Shah was to end dictatorial rule and to establish a democracy based on the will of the people in the light of the Islamic law'.\textsuperscript{120}

Shari'atmadari's conception of Islamic government was based on the pragmatic approach. He thought the revivalist dream of establishing an ideal Islamic state identical to the state of Imam 'Ali as impractical. Although he did not deny the desirability

\textsuperscript{1} 117 Pars Interview with Shari'atmadari, BBC, SWB, part 4, Middle East and Africa, 1 August 1979, p.A/5.

\textsuperscript{118} Keddie, loc cit., M.J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution, p. 201.

\textsuperscript{119} David Menashri, Shi'ite leadership: In shadow of Conflicting Ideologies, p.12.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.
of that earliest Islamic society, he thought it almost impossible under the changed circumstances. He believed that the ideal state of Medina was still worthy of imitation in many respects, but this did not mean that we should ignore all the innovations that have taken place during the 1400 years since the advent of Islam. Thus, by emphasizing the necessity of practical consideration, he brought himself close to the liberal modernist thinkers.

Shari'atmadari did not use the term "Islamic state". He rather preferred "a modern Islamic state". Furthermore, in the Islamic government as conceived by him, the Islamic laws will not be implemented in its rigid form. He advocated the interpretation and implementation of the shari'a in a "correct" (saleh) and "progressive" (motaraghi) mode. According to him, in the Islamic government, new legislations were possible and it was not necessary to adopt the criminal and civil laws of Islam or the shari'a in toto. In his view there may be laws other than shari'a if they do not contradict the shari'a laws. The Islamic government should have an Islamic orientation (jahatgiri). It may be like any other

121 Ibid.

republican government, but the desirable is the one in which Islamic principles are respected.\footnote{123}

Shari'atmadari further states that the law-making is the prerogative of Allah, like Khomeini and others, and interpretation of these laws are the prerogatives of the religious scholars. He further added that the Islamic government was a democratic government based on the peoples' will. It is the government of the people, for the people and against the dictatorship and despotism.\footnote{124} Elsewhere he says: 'Islamic Republic mean that there should be no dictatorship and no despotism, the people themselves will have the sovereignty to decide their path.'\footnote{125} According to him the leader of Islamic government may be an ordinary man, not necessarily grand 'alim, as conceived by Khomeini, he might be selected and dismissed by the people.\footnote{126}

Thus Shari'atmadari's arguments are also based on the traditional principle of what was good for the people. He advocated

\footnote{123 Idem, Shi'ite leadership: In Shadow of Conflicting Ideologies, p. 124.}
\footnote{124 Idem., p. 125}
\footnote{125 Idem.}
\footnote{126 Idem., p. 124; He further pointed out that there is a basic difference between the imams and the 'ulama' or those in authority because the former were appointed by God whereas the latter are ordinary men who can be elected and dismissed by people. Cf. idem, 'Iran' in Colin Legum and others (ed.), Middle East-Contemporary Survey, vol. III (1978-79), p. 509.}
democratic republicanism on the basis of the same principle. For him, it does not matter what form of government there is: whether it is democracy or monarchy or any other type; what is important for him is how the government "behaves." He said that the country should be a republic and it makes no great difference whether you call it Islamic. If the Iranians are good Muslims it will be Islamic any way. Even under the existing constitution the laws are supposed to be approved by a committee of five mujtahids.  

These ideas were in sharp contradistinction to the ideas of Khomeini who considered monarchy as well as democratic republicanism as against the principles of Islam. The difference of ideas led both the Ayatollahs to direct political confrontation throughout 1979 especially after the constitutional controversy and the rise of the Kurdish uprising during 1979-80. Shari'atmadari fully supported the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK) while Khomeini accused and described it as traitor and stooge of foreign powers.

127 Ibid.
128 Edward Mortiner, op. cit., p. 331.
129 See chapter 6.
After the success of the revolution when the draft constitution of the new state was being written Shari'atmadari supported the demand of the secular as well as nationalist parties that the title of the country should be "Democratic Republic of Iran" or "Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran". Khomeini strongly rejected this demand and declared that he will not accept less than and more than "Islamic Republic of Iran" as the title of the new state. What he implied by "Islamic Republic" was the Islamic government of his own type.

Motahheri approved the term jamhuriat-e Islami (Islamic Republic) as the correct denoter of the Islamic government. For him, the two terms - Islamic and Republic - refer to the type of government and its ideological content respectively. The adjective Islamic signifies the nature and the content of a

131 See Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, p. 337.


133 Motahheri, op. cit., p. 11
government. It suggests that the government should be one based on Islamic principles and regulations (ahkam); the government function, too, revolves round the Islamic principles .... Accordingly, Islamic republic means a form of government the president of which is elected by popular vote for a temporary period, and the ideological content of which is Islamic. He asserts that the Islamic republic will be a democratic government. But, according to him, there is a particular connotation of democracy in Islam. This conception of democracy is slightly different from European conception of democracy. He asserts that the term democratic need not be included in the title of the republic, because the term "Islamic" itself suffices the desired purpose:

In the phrase: "Islamic Democratic Republic", the word: 'Democratic' is redundant. Moreover, in a hypothetical Islamic Democratic Republic, freedom and democratic norms obtained by people may be wrongly attributed to the Democratic component. In other words, the aforesaid nomenclature is suggestive of two bases of the Republic: Islamic and Democratic. One may assume further that matters pertaining to individual rights and democratic freedoms arise by virtue of democracy alone, or the democratic part of the nomenclature. Then, the "Islamic" part is taken to mean just a series of religious convictions, or traditional practices in terms of prayers and similar other religious rites.

134 Ibid., p. 12.
We should emphasize the fact that Islam incorporates individual rights and democratic freedoms, and such as, any indiscriminate use of both the terms (Islamic and Democratic) will be misleading. In fact, an Islamic society does not brook of any ill-conceived differentiation .... (As the saying in Persian goes: "when you have the hundred, (it means) you already have the ninety")

According to him, if the constitution is made to be based on the principles of Islam, it does not violate the democratic rights or the sovereignty of the people at all. Because, at first, no democratic principle denounces the adherence to a particular ideology. Secondly, Islam is the faith of the majority of the people of Iran who have expressed their choice in "Islamic Republic." However, Notahhri has shown some points of difference from Khomeini. Although he does not deny, for example, the sovereignty of Allah and the legislative, executive and judiciary powers as the prerogatives of the Prophets and imams, he does admit a certain degree of peoples participation in these jurisdictions. Khomeini seems to be heading towards a theocracy by approving the three aspects of the government, judiciary, legislation and executive

\[135\text{Ibid., p. 16.}\]
\[136\text{Ibid., p. 25.}\]
\[137\text{See ibid., p. 25 ff.}\]
authorities only the pre-rogatives of the 'ulama' on behalf of the Imam and the Prophet; nobody could share these jurisdiction of the clergy. On the other hand, Motahheri advocates people's participation though in a limited way. He does not approve of theocracy; nor he accepts the rule of a class of the society. Regarding the role of 'ulama' in the government, he says that 'the role of the faqih in an Islamic country is that of an ideologue and not that of a ruler'.

138 Ibid., p. 27.