Chapter II

Review of Literature On Internationalism

Concept of Internationalism in Anglo-Saxon World

A very good book which surveys the history of internationalist idea and also of organization (with which we are not concerned) is by F.H.Hinsley titled 'Power and Pursuit of Peace'. According to Hinsley, the European thinkers were not always concerned with the problem of peace. He notes, 'from Dante at least to Leibniz plans which seem at first sight to have been aimed at perpetual peace were in reality attempts to solve problems that were more immediate than the problem of war, one of this was the political organization of a Europe.... The other was a problem of Europe's relations with the outside world'. Dante favoured an emperor. In his scheme of things order resulted in peace but peace came after justice. In Pierre Dubois' scheme of things peace even ranked lower as an aim than did the wish to revitalise the crusades. He was concerned with aim of renunciation of war

26 Ibid., p.15.
between Christian and Christian. Unlike Dante who was interested in restoration of the Roman Empire, Dubois believed in separate authorities for secular and religious members with the political control of Common Council headed by a French King. It was not peace but Dubois' objects which continued to inspire most solutions for the international problem. Pacifists like Erasmus in early 16th century and like Quakers in the 17th century were untypical of the age in abandoning the medieval distinction between just and unjust wars (one covered with international issues and solutions) on the ground that all war was incompatible with reason and morality. Even the doctrine that war was sometimes justifiable morally was giving way to the doctrine that it was justifiable politically. Even the peace plans of the period took war for granted. It was not the main reason why peace was not their main object. This is to be found in the fact that their primary concern remained that of reducing the rapidly developing states system to some shape or order; one of the reasons for this was that the older programs for reviving the crusade were replaced by the rapidly growing problem of defense against the Turk. .... that Europe's, unity not peace was the urgent need.

---------------------

27 Ibid., p.16.
28 Ibid., p.16.
29 Ibid., p.16.
30 Ibid., p.16-17.
31 Ibid., p.17.
32 Ibid., p.18.
But the unity sought by the international plans of the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries generally was the unity sought by Dante, under the aegis of an emperor even though the existence and rise of independent states made that unity increasingly impracticable. It was not for nothing that pacifists and Quakers who almost alone denounced war were also alone in their indifference to international organization as a way to peace or at least in regarding it as of minor importance.

Erasmus questioned the purposes of these favoured international organization. 'A unified empire would be best, if we could have a sovereign made in the image of God, but men being what they are, there is more safety in kingdoms of moderate power united in a Christian League.' It was Emeric Cruce in his book 'Nouveau Cynee' (two editions published in 1623 and 1624) who first talked of a new forum of international organization. It was not only to consist of monarchs and republics but also of all nations of known world: Persia, China, Ethiopia, The East and West Indies and the Turks as well as European states. He gave Turks first rank under the purely formal Chairmanship of Pope on account of historical claims of Constantinople in relation to Rome. For Cruce, the notion of equality of sovereign states did not exist. Another novelty of Cruce was that that his proposal for

33 Ibid., p.18.
34 Ibid., p.18.
an international organization was also a proposal for maintaining peace. Peace, he said, is only half searched for. Some exhort the Christian princes to it... against their common enemy.... Others think only of themselves sowing dissension among their neighbours to get peace for themselves. But I am of a very different opinion.... When you see the house of your neighbour burning or falling, you have a cause for fear as much as compassion, since human society is one body.38 Another important point, he brought out was the relationship between international peace and domestic peace. Peace being established between all the princes.... all the sovereigns...would not have much difficulty to make themselves obeyed by their people.39 As far as means to strengthen the peace are concerned, he advocated not the suppression but the strengthening of the individual states. He proposed a League of states. Internationalists have also hailed him as first to propose international arbitration. Although Hinsley feels that such a notion escaped writers before 18th century, in proportion as they felt the importance of creating a European or wider international association. The principle underlying arbitration between states and one underlying idea of an association or a republic are different. The second presupposes such a unity that war between states becomes a civil war, which can be suppressed by sovereign authority of association. In first a procedure for settling of disputes between sovereign states is established.40 The principle feature

37 Ibid., p. 20.
38 Ibid., p. 21.
39 Ibid., p. 21.
40 Ibid., p. 22.
of Grace's work is that it did not advocate peace solely or primarily as a by-product of solution to some political problem, the launching of a crusade, the defense of Europe against Turk, the reconstruction of a medieval European order that was in decline, the creation of a new Empire. It conceived of political advantages it had in mind were, the growth of religious toleration, the freedom and expansion of world trade, the abatement of poverty, the reduction of taxation as well as the consolidation of the power of the prince and by peace it meant universal peace. But not many put faith in the international organisation. Sully, for example emphasised political methods for establishing peace. He had a plan to divide Europe equally among a certain number of powers in such a manner that none of them might have cause either of envy or fear from possessions or powers of others. Because of impact of past he even saw establishment of an equilibrium between states as best means of uniting them under a single body politic. Further, as we may note for Leibniz as for Dante or Dubois, peace remained a less important goal than justice and order. Schemes after middle of 17th century were even less concerned with peace and even with action against Turks. They were concerned with power and organisation of European states, specially of France. However, wars produced by France's abuse of leadership produced a reaction in the thought of Penn, Bellers and Saint-Pierre. These three

\[41\] Ibid., p. 23.
\[42\] Ibid., p. 27.
\[43\] Ibid., p. 28.
\[44\] Ibid., p. 31.
\[45\] Ibid., p. 32.
\[46\] Ibid., p. 32.
\[47\] Ibid., p. 32.
apart from Cruce were the authors of first proposals of modern times for establishing an international organisation whose primary object was the maintenance of peace. What else it could be? However, their international organization would be confined to Europe. Penn like Sully hesitated about including Russia and was inclined to exclude Turkey as well. However, the infidels were excluded for defensive purposes. Saint-Pierre included Russia and Turkey but in a later edition of his work (1713, 1717) he excluded Turkey because he feared that inclusion of the Whole World would cast an air of impossibility upon the whole project. He substituted for original inclusion of Turkey, the argument that European Union shall endeavour to obtain in Asia, a permanent society like that of Europe, especially that it may have no cause to fear any Asiatic sovereign. Hinsley feels that a greater sense of what might be practicable—perhaps also a sense of distinctiveness of Europe—was making it impossible to follow Cruce in suggesting a world organization. These three were interested in peace on a wider scale. However, one may note that the European tradition does not look like a Universalitic. Mark the attempt to exclude even Russia, even if we grant that internationalist idea may take time in developing.

From Penn to Saint Pierre, there is not only, no search for pre-eminence in Europe, but an attempt is made to prevent that. In a European parliament, Saint-Pierre even went to the extent of saying that all states would have one deputy and one vote. According to Hinsley, this could be related to the actual

---

48 Ibid., p. 34.
political condition of Europe. Circumstances which have favoured the predominance of one power in Europe were changing. A transition was taking place in the direction of near equality between several states. These writers although reached consensus on peace as the major objective, but all of them faced the dilemma involved in the need to base peace on the ultimate sanction of force. Empire, Justice or order are not incompatible with the use of force. They could solve the dilemma only by assuming that force, though provided for, would not have to be used. Even for the purpose of creating a European Union, it would not be needed. Penn's reply to the objection that richest sovereignty will never agree to it was that 'he is not stronger than all the rest'. Although they were neither averse to using force for creating a Union nor to redistribution of territories, and they were equally emphatic about the need to base league on force after it was created, they felt that with the establishment of procedure for settlement of international disputes peace would result. Although, they did specify as to what action to take if this procedure was not adopted, they assumed that the threat to use force would prevent the non-use of procedure. On the whole, peace would result from the mere establishment of Union. It was as Hinsley has described it as 'rationalism in the sense of superficial optimism'. This has been the weakness of rationalist approach. It justifies its

49 Ibid., p.37.
50 Ibid., p.37.
51 Ibid., p.37.
52 Ibid., p.38.
53 Ibid., p.38.
54 Ibid., p.38.
55 Ibid., p.40.
solutions with a belief in the unworthiness and unreliability of human nature of such proportions as to create the suspicion that the solutions will never be effective in this world  

But another reason for this mistake was that they did not envisage their organisation as organization of separate states. They assumed that sovereignties existed in a single community or had been until recently. They said that union would provide an increase in each prince’s sovereignty and power. In relation with each other, Pen said they would gain in security what they lost in freedom of action. Union would prevent a civil war, for how would the rebels succeed against the forces of whole of Europe? Saint-Pierre carried this notion, so far as to end up with a political system that is incompatible with the notion of separate states on its own behalf (emphasis on internal status Quo as prominent as on internal peace).

The need to create a particular type of union along with need to prepare Princes for it led to confusion in the language. Penn referred to ‘several sovereign countries’ but he called his Diet, ‘The Sovereign Dyet’. They recognised that separate sovereignties were the cause of war, a cause introduced in Europe before hundred years. They perhaps believed, nearer as they were to Middle Ages that it would be practicable to obliterate sovereignties. At the same time they know that their project required collaboration of sovereignties. That is why Saint-

56 Ibid., p.41.
57 Ibid., p.41.
58 Ibid., p.42.
59 Ibid., p.42.
60 Ibid., p.43.
61 Ibid., p.45.
Pierre's project and his five articles were regarded as impracticable. Voltaire on the contrary put more faith on balance of power or prayer and charity in personal relation as way to peace.

Rousseau's two treaties on perpetual peace as well as other works explain his philosophy. As per his philosophy, nothing less than most rigid and unbreakable of confederations could solve the problem of which Saint-Pierre had set out to solve but it was perfectly utopian to expect such a confederation to be established. However, even if European Commonwealth was realised for a single day, the experience would be enough to make it last for ever. Reason way the confederation remains Utopia is that there is distinction between real and apparent interests. Rousseau regarded the folly and avarice of governments as the main obstacle to the execution of the federal plan but not as the only obstacle. According to him, international struggle was the automatic consequence of the international system. War presupposes the existence of organised communities. Between man and man, there can be only violence and murder. War is born of peace or at least of the precautions which men have taken for the purpose of achieving durable peace. Of course, the sole end of war is to preserve the existence and equality of state against state. No other end of war can be justified. Because of above nothing less than a federation of states would eliminate war. Rousseau was interested in the problem of establishing a form of federal association which would give it permanence and also in

62 Ibid., p.49.
63 Ibid., p.52.
the question of extending the rights of federation without trenching on those of sovereignty. On closer examination he would have found it difficult as it would have run up against his conviction of superiority of small state\textsuperscript{64}. After all, 'social contract' was a key document in the transition of European thought from acceptance of natural law to the idealisation of national state. He was already regretting in his day that patriotism was being lost in the welter of sub-national and trans-national interests to such an extent that 'there are today no longer Frenchmen, Germans, Spaniards, Englishmen.... there are only Europeans. Rousseau was apostle not only of small states but of modern nationalism. There never was an internationalist who was a more fervent nationalist\textsuperscript{65}. If he had found a solution it would have been the breakdown of Europe's existing states into federal sub-states on the basis of local rule before re-association of sub-states into Confederation of Europe on the model of Switzerland\textsuperscript{66}.

Rousseau's initial assumption was that international state of nature was comparable to state of nature that preceded the civil state. Nothing but the international government, the federal bond could do for states what the contract had done for the individual. From this position he never wavered. Yet he himself confuted it. In the first place, he asserted that the behaviour of the state in the state of nature was not the same as the behaviour of the individual. The state was already an

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., p.54.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., p.55.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., p.55.
artificial creation. In the second place, in his later works he added that relation between states was a product of history not to be influenced or perfected by artificial means like contract. Similarly, regarding Europe, he regarded it as a product of history. At other times he talked about its weaknesses and need for improvement. The difficulty with Rousseau was that he tried to combine both contract and historical growth. If he had avoided contract, at international level he would have avoided inconsistencies, of advocating and discussing federal solution, of advocating international government against which all his principles rebelled. Ultimately, moral position and historical approach, instead of being integrated cancelled each other out. That is where Kant advanced ahead of Rousseau. He did not think behaviour of individual and state in the state of nature was similar. Individual did not need a second artificial state. Therefore solution to international problem need not be same and that international system could evolve, improve by further unrest. Kant in his two works, 'Idea for a Universal History' (1784) and in his 'Thoughts on Perpetual Peace' (1795) explored his views on perpetual peace. His solution was 'Union of Nations' but not a 'State of Nations'. A State of Nation' was a contradiction in terms.... many nations in a single state would constitute only one nation'. World government according to Kant is impracticable because states don't want to renounce their freedom and sovereignty. He added that independence of states was morally right. This emphasis was clear in preliminary articles.

------------------------
67 Ibid., p. 60.
68 Ibid., pp. 50-61.
'Since, like a tree, each state has its own roots, to incorporate as a graft into another state is to take away its existence as a moral person and to make of it as a thing'. Kant was even in favour of gradual disappearance of standing army. He even demanded that states which had lost its independence should have it restored. In article III he stated 'The Cosmopolitan or World law shall be limited to conditions of Universal hospitality', but a foreigner has no right to be a permanent inhabitant (Perish colonialism!). He asserts the right of men to seek freedom in separate state and especially in backward areas where the state had not yet developed. Kant's solution to international problem was, as we have seen, a union of nations. The need was for 'a counter balance to intrinsically healthy resistance of many states against each other resulting from their freedom'. The solution must be 'to introduce a united power which will give support to this balance'. It would not be, 'without danger, for we must see to it that neither the vitality of mankind goes to sleep nor those states destroy each other as they might without a principle of balance of equality in their mutual effects and counter effects'. These remarks constitute a departure from organizational proposals of Saint-Pierre and Rousseau. In Kant's view federation in the unavoidable absence of international authority would mean improved law of nations. He judged the problem insoluble by other means. The republican civil constitution was treated as a necessary condition of international peace because under

---

69 Ibid., p.65.
70 Ibid., p.68.
71 Ibid., p.70.
such a constitution the consent of citizen would be required for starting a war and they would not like to undergo privations of war. However, the republican constitution was not a guarantee or sufficient cause of international peace. His views on perpetual peace sprang from a political philosophy which combined the historical sense, the moral element in politics and the irrational element in a new and powerful way. How does Kant develop his argument? Men don't act like animals or even as rational citizens. Therefore it might be impossible to find any plan or purpose in history. What would be the end of nature? Nature as such is mechanical design but man is not. All natural faculties of a creature are destined to unfold themselves. e.g. morality, reason. Nature by its designs creates obstacles in the progress of men. This stimulates reason and leads to progress of men. Nature sets man against man and forces them to create a state. Similarly, it sets state against state. However, this does not lead to merger of states. Nature's purpose in international field is rather to preserve the separate states and to utilise their conflicts. It is the desire of every state to enter into a permanent state of peace by ruling if possible the entire world. But nature has decreed otherwise. Nature differentiates people in terms of language and religion, sets different people against each other. As culture increases men come closer together and have greater agreement with each other on peace.

---------------------
72 Ibid., p.71.
73 Ibid., p.72.
74 Ibid., p.72.
75 Ibid., p.78.
76 Ibid., p.78.
77 Ibid., p.78.
is one factor which creates common interest in favour of peace 78. 'It is as if the states were constantly leagued for this purpose.' 79. Moreover, Community of nations on earth has progressed so far that a violation of law and right in one place is felt in all others 80. A world law will develop as a corrective to continuing rivalry 81. It is true that Kant talked of peace but he also said that it would be a long time before peace was established. He said the problem of 'a lawful external relationship' was 'the most difficult and at the same time the one which mankind solves the last'. 82 Small progress was made in this direction and a feeling for it rising in states. Nature, he said guarantees lasting peace. Mark, the concluding words of his essay, 'If it is a duty and at the same time there is a well founded hope that we may make a real state of public law, even if only in an indefinitely gradual approximation, then the eternal peace which will take the place of peace-makings—falsely so called because they are really just truces—is no empty idea, but a task which gradually solved, steadily approaches its end, since it is to be hoped that the periods in which equal progress is achieved will become shorter and shorter.' 83.

Bentham like Rousseau and Kant broke with the traditional theory even more decisively that had come to a head in the arguments of Penn and Saint-Pierre. Rousseau and Kant had

78 Ibid., p.78.
79 Ibid., p.78.
80 Ibid., p.78.
81 Ibid., p.79.
82 Ibid., p.79.
considered international political union, unattainable and undesirable but Bentham considered it utterly unnecessary.\textsuperscript{34} He even thought it unnecessary to say why this was so. He considered things from their point of utility. War could be judged from that point of view. Therefore considered it stupid. He believed that genuine causes of war had disappeared.\textsuperscript{35} In so far as action was needed, it was action to reduce power of government within states and not action to increase government on the international plane. In holding this belief, Bentham was wholly representative of the prevailing attitude to international relations in the second half of the 18th century. Beginning with Rousseau, the philosophies turned, indeed against statesman and their practices. They contrasted 'true policy' or 'economic policy' - its emphasis being on free trade and community of interests between states with 'false policy' or 'power politics' which led to frustration and war. They argued that the true purpose of the science called politics is to perfect the interior of the state\textsuperscript{36}. They denounced conquests, alliances and balance of power. They did not show interest in internationalist proposals. For them, enlightened nations of the day already belonged to one society and could get on peaceably together if governments let them do so. What was required was that governments were exposed to enlightened public opinion\textsuperscript{37}. It was from them that Bentham acquired not only his hatred of colonies and his enthusiasm for free trade. According to Bentham, there was no conflict of

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., p.81.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., p.82.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p.82.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p.33.
interests between nations and that in so far as a state of peace did not prevail, the solution to these problems lay in appeal to reason, to law and public opinion against machinations of governments.\(^88\) Wars of various types were coming to an end, at any rate in England and France.\(^89\) As for these two countries, colonies and ways of foreign offices were the only two factors which stood in the way of reconciliation. The removal of these two causes was important for perpetual peace. Other measures such as disarmament were subsidiary. A peace tribunal was to be established when pacification was achieved. He did not favour 'a community of nations to give assistance to each others political laws would be a most dangerous alliance.'\(^90\)

'It was apt to become a combination of monarchs for support of despotism'.\(^91\) As far as fear of local despotism was concerned liberty of press would be a sufficient guarantee.\(^92\) He was the first internationalist to rely on public opinion and solely on public opinion.\(^93\) 'There are properly no other criminals than the heads of nations; the subjects are always honest'.\(^94\) He believed that there should be as little government as possible, so there should be as little international government as possible.\(^95\)

\(^{88}\) Ibid. , p.33.  
\(^{89}\) Ibid. , p.83.  
\(^{90}\) Ibid. , p.86.  
\(^{91}\) Ibid. , p.86.  
\(^{92}\) Ibid. , p.86.  
\(^{93}\) Ibid. , p.86.  
\(^{94}\) Ibid. , p.86.  
\(^{95}\) Ibid. , p.87.
James Mill considered international government as impractical. Reason given is, a nation is too easily stimulated to make war for injury done to itself. But, it looks with coldness upon injuries done to others. The only power which can operate to sanction the law of nation is approbation or disapprobation of mankind. Among countries with various types of government only in democratic countries, the sanctions can be expected to operate. Determination of a code and a tribunal were other two things needed. However, the decision of a court or a tribunal must not be enforced by force or arms. It was bound to end in failure or in war or in both. The first half of 19th century was dominated by the attitude of Bentham and Mill, the attitude that between the interest of the nations, there was no real conflict and that international law could at once be set up and worked successfully. This and not Rousseau's ultimate conviction that international conflict made progress impossible nor Kant's conclusion that only by means of international conflict could progress be achieved, dominated man's mind in first half of 19th century. The constitutional state regarded by Kant as a necessary condition was considered sufficient guarantee of it. Wars resulted from stupidity and criminality of governments. International organization as a safeguard against war was undesirable because existing governments could not be...

---

96 Ibid., p.38.
97 Ibid., p.88.
98 Ibid., p.33.
99 Ibid., p.89.
100 Ibid., pp.89-90.
101 Ibid., p.90.
trusted. It was also unnecessary because reform of governments would ensure peace\textsuperscript{102}. These opinions were welcomed by those who welcomed the French Revolution. Tom Paine said that as in France, if monarchical sovereignty was abolished elsewhere in Europe, it could achieve peace. These ideas survived the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars. Not until the failure of 1848 revolutions and outbreak of further wars with the Crimean war were they finally and reluctantly discarded.

In Anglo-Saxon world, the dominance of these views could be explained by the material prosperity of U.K. and U.S.A. and their isolationist stance and their lack of interest in international question. They felt that there was no problem that their countries could not solve by resources of traditional diplomacy\textsuperscript{103}. Even the Quakers had gone back on Penn's advocacy of international organization and now relied on religious, moral and pacifists appeal to the goodness of human nature.

Bentham's influence was an important reason for predominance of these views. American Peace Society's constitution drawn up by William Ladd in 1826 was directly inspired by Mill. It expressed the belief that once healthy public opinion was established, disputes could be referred to congress of nations whose decisions will be enforced by public opinion. More items in Program could be added only after collaboration developed between Peace Societies and Free Trade movement. The congress meant

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., p.92.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., p.93.
nothing permanent but periodic meetings to settle few genuine disputes 104

One reason for this was that the only men in England and America who surmounted the prevailing indifference or nationalism of the age began by holding Quaker views. Richard Cobden was one such example. He advocated free trade solely as a means to peace 105. If free trade conflicted with peace as in case of loans for armaments to foreign governments, he opposed free trade 106. This peace was to be achieved by public opinion and not by international political integration or by international enforcement procedures. The Alliance between pacifists and free traders, however led to series of peace congresses after 1843. However, the prevailing national sentiment came in the way. 108 When the congress system collapsed Canning cried in relief—'each nation for itself and God for all of us'. Further the congress had to modify their programmes in order to satisfy public opinion. This did not succeed in creating a favourable public opinion but divided the Anglo-Saxon world. Hereafter 1843 the pacifists side of the movement was on the wane and Free Trade and Internationalism, disarmament and arbitration were becoming its major themes. 109 A larger gulf opened up between the Anglo-Saxon world and Europe. Continental opinion diverged from Anglo-Saxon opinion for two reasons. 110 The

104 Ibid. , p. 94.
105 Ibid. , p. 95.
106 Ibid. , p. 96.
107 Ibid. , p. 97.
108 Ibid. , p. 98.
109 Ibid. , p. 100.
110 Ibid. , p. 100.
European thinkers regarded the programme of the Anglo-Saxon movement as too limited. They sought the union of Europe as much, as if not more than, peace. Although, on account of immediate political situation in Europe, they thought time was not ripe even for limited collaboration. The difference between framework of aspirations is easy to understand. From the beginning of the 19th century, the problem of peace began to involve more than relations between the states of Europe and Anglo-Saxon thinking regarded peace in wider than European terms. But international history and structure of Europe ensured that European thinking gave priority to organization of Europe. The difference registered itself from the movement of Napoleon's collapse. In England and America, peace societies had very little of political programme. On the other hand, in Europe, Henri de Saint Simon was talking of a single parliament and a single king for the whole of Europe. It was justified by arguments like 'Europe once had formed a confederal society united by common institutions subjected to a general government' and Henry IV and Saint Pierre were not visionary in seeking to bind all the European people in a single political organisation since for six centuries such a system existed.111 Mazzini had the same goal, the free and spontaneous unity and complete equality. Bastiat and Vesinet, the free traders envisaged a United states of Europe. Victor Hugo looked forward to the day when the two communities, the United States of Europe and United States of America joined hands. The emphasis on federation and importance attached to democratic regimes that Britain would belong to a new Europe. Some considered Anglo-

111 Ibid., p.102.
French entente as a first step. Of course U.S.A. could not be included but Hugo’s aspiration has been noted. Need of liberty with in a state meant that Russia would be excluded. Ladd and Buritt would include Christian but autocratic states but were not sure whether non-Christian states would be included. There was little hope that Russia would cease to be autocratic. Mazzini even included non-Russian Slavs in his federation, but excluded Russians. After 1848, Michael Chevalier excluded Russia on the ground that ‘Russian Empire was destined to form indefinitely a unity of its own.’ Others excluded her more permanently still by basing their European Federation on historical and ethical rather than political uniformity.

The European tendency to think in federal terms and yet in a framework limited to western Europe was not the only indicator that union of Europe was given precedence over peace. More serious was refusal of Europeans to work for peace at all. The Saint-Simonians, the socialist economists and the Mazzinis all held aloof from the congress trusting the internationalist wing as well as the pacifist wing. They rejected idea of congress of nations as a Free Traders’ plot to unite Europe before it was reformed and republicanised. Their views reflected all the circumstances as a result of which even Western Europe lagged behind Anglo-Saxon world in social and political development. In Great Britain and United States liberalism and nationalism were being satisfied. In Europe these were the periods of absolutism, dissatisfied nationalism and frustrated liberalism. They were so

112 Ibid., p. 104.
113 Ibid., p. 105.
114 Ibid., p. 105.
to such an extent, that men in Europe abandoned the effort for peace altogether as an immediate goal. The existing government must be overthrown before peace could be established. August Comte had said in his criticism of Saint-Pierre that 'he had proposed a coalition of Kings'. Saint-Simon had also said European Federation would never be practicable until 'it could be a League of People rather than of governments'.

They looked to England and America. However, it would be a long time before they could travel through that road. More often they argued that one of the European states should reform Europe by force in much the same way as earlier sovereigns and more recently, the French Revolution and Napoleon had aspired to control and reform it.

This was one of the objectives of the men of 1848 in Paris. Gioberti argued that Italy alone was worthy to lead United Europe. Mazzini called for war as the means of bringing the millennium about. He argued that there could not be a holy Alliance of people till Holy Alliance of rulers was destroyed. Therefore war can not be avoided. Nationality must be established. Italian soil must be made free, if necessary by sword. 'Is it enough he demanded in 1847, to preach peace and non-intervention and leave Force unchallenged ruler over three fourths of Europe, to intervene for its unhallowed ends, when and where, how it thinks fit?' In 1853, he tried to convince England that her present duty was war.

115 Ibid., p.106.
116 Ibid., p.107.
117 Ibid., p.108.
118 Ibid., p.108.
119 Ibid., p.108.
Marx, too maintained in the Communist Manifesto that war was the only road to peace. Only end of class conflict within nations can lead to peace between nations. For him, as for Hagel and Clausewitz, 'war was only a continuation of policy by other means' and that priority was reform of social and political order. 120

Therefore lack of interest of Europeans in peace can be explained by circumstances. In similar circumstances Anglo-Saxons would have taken up similar positions. This can be seen in an undercurrent of distrust even in English and American liberal views. 121 Its attitude to its own governments could afford to be more tolerant. It was not lacking in distrust. A more significant pointer was seen in Anglo-Saxon liberals' adoption of European liberals' justification of war. Thoreau was ready to condone war to destroy the class of slave owners in the south. William Lloyd Garrison, a pacifist too advocated war to abolish slavery. They justified war to save federation of U.S.A. much the same way as it was justified in Europe as a means of bringing federation about. 122 In addition to the circumstances, these views also arose from the Anglo-Saxon's conception of society and state. This was based on the belief that though individual behaviour was selfish, there was a natural harmony between individuals, if government intervention was minimum. The same view applied to relations between states. What shaped the attitude of England and America to the problem of peace and war from Bentham's day was the rise of emphasis on material and economic as opposed to

120 Ibid., p. 109.
121 Ibid., p. 109.
122 Ibid., p. 110. 
political ends; the rise of conceptions of nation and society in anti-thesis to conceptions of government and state, and the rise of conviction that there was a natural disharmony between governments and states, there was a natural harmony between nations and societies.\textsuperscript{123} This same belief registered in Europe, more widely and more forcibly because governments were more entrenched and millenium further away. If Europeans felt that peace must be deferred, it was Bentham's conviction that it need to be deferred only until these hated governments had been removed, not from Kant's belief that it could only be the product of further international struggle.\textsuperscript{124} If they equated the establishment of peace with the federation of Europe, it was not solely because of historical conditions. It was because in contrast to Kant's conclusion that peace could only be the product of an arrangement between states, they believed that peace would be the automatic consequence of the replacement of relations between states by relations between nations and societies.\textsuperscript{125} They could not share in Anglo-Saxon interest in immediate peace or lack of interest in federal forms but their conclusions were made in the same mould.

Saint Simon like Bentham believed in Anglo-French entente as a first step to single European state. For him and for Comte, public opinion would give power to federal government. Marx did not say, how perpetual peace would be achieved. Mazzini did not say what form European federation would take. This was

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., p.111.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., p.111.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., pp.111-112.
partly because the pre-conditions were never achieved. But it was also due to the fact that they thought like Bentham and Cobden.

Marx believed that perpetual peace would be automatically established once state had withered away. Mazzini believed in Federation of equal states and felt that federation would follow automatically from nationality. By 1849, he was writing of European federation in terms which were indistinguishable from the outlook of Bentham and Cobden, in terms which made federation unnecessary and fraternal spirit sufficient in its place.\textsuperscript{126} Nationality should be to humanity, what the division of labour is in the workshop.\textsuperscript{127} The indisputable tendency of the epoch is towards a reconstruction of Europe in accordance with different national vocations into a certain number of states as equal as possible.\textsuperscript{128} 'The states became more and more associated through the medium of democracy;' 'The Europe of future will be one avoiding anarchy of absolute independence and centralization of conquest'.\textsuperscript{129} If unsatisfied nationality rendered international organization unacceptable to him, satisfied nationality would of itself produce such organization if any were required.\textsuperscript{130} From the middle of the 19th century these beliefs were forced to the side. A complex process totally altered the total context in which they operated.\textsuperscript{131} Avoidance of war became a matter of more widespread concern. A belief in conflict between society and state, between

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p.112.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p.113.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p.113.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p.113.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p.113.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p.113.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p.114.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
nation and its government gave way to a different conception of political community.

Widening of interest in peace was purely due to influence of peace movement, but it was also due to vast technological changes leading to increased destructiveness in war in a world which was getting integrated more closely. As society was being more industrialized and complex, governments were forced to become more representative. Nationalism was becoming concentrated on organs and symbols of state. Socialism was becoming logical successor to liberalism. Even peace movement was getting institutionalized at international level. New kinds of publicists emerged which began to contemplate the problem. Governments for the first time began to consider these blueprints. The key to the phase which stretches from the middle of the 19th century to the first world war lies in the struggle of the conception of an organization for purposes strictly limited to the peaceful settlement of international problems between separate and vastly more powerful and more integrated states to free itself from and rise above, both the goal of avoiding war by means of a comprehensive federal merger of separate states and the belief that maintenance of peace in a world of separate state required no international organization at all. The middle way, the con federal approach had emerged before. But they were isolated voices.

----------------------
132 Ibid., p.116.
133 Ibid., p.116.
The rise of new approach was not all rapid. In the Anglo-Saxon background men could reach it by concluding that improvement of international relations and avoidance of war required an international organization, with some of the attributes of government as they had to discover that stronger and active government was guarantee of internal progress. In Europe, they had to reach it by concluding that, since international organization would be shaped by existence of powerful separate governments, the hope of automatic and total merger of reformed societies and even the localised goal of an exclusive European federation must be abandoned in favour of a more limited arrangement between states. Against these two approaches, shift to new approach was slow. The rise of modern state which was not easily understood and the increased powers of independent governments were responsible for it. Only the first world war forced the states towards this goal. The new approach had to constantly battle with old ideas. The old ideas were never wholly abandoned. From another point of view, it can be attributed to a basic tendency of oversimplification in some men. In the 17th and 18th centuries, some men believed that uniform achievement of enlightened despotism would guarantee international peace. Then there was the liberal version that uniform achievement of democracy would guarantee international peace. This was followed by a Marxist version that war would be unthinkable between socialist states.
Therefore after Crimean war, one reaction was the criticism of governments. Similarly with Franco-Prussian war, 'persuasion, encouragement and reasoning' were advocated to establish peace. Other measures recommended were international army and the United States of Europe. Michael Chevalier in 1866 was perhaps the first to urge the unification of Europe as a necessary counterweight to American 'political colossus' that was emerging on the other side of Atlantic. In 1883, J.B. Andre Godin, an industrialist proposed a European Federation, with an international army as well as a permanent international arbitration congress. The time never came, when these attitudes and this goal were wholly abandoned. Cobden's insistence that there was no difference in the relations between states, continued to be the basis of peace propaganda in the 1890s' (A state has no right to declare war). Similarly, European federation, democratic control of foreign policy, the socialism of all countries continued to move advocates. However a change of tactics did take place in Peace Movement after 1850s'. Earlier appeal to public opinion and parliament was made to limit machinations of government. Now an attempt was made to change the attitude of government. An alteration in attitude to public opinion also took place. In 1864, British Peace Society denounced nationalism as 'a poor, low, selfish, unchristian idea' - fatal not only to peace but to all progress in liberty and good government'.

139 Ibid., p.122.
140 Ibid., p.122.
141 Ibid., p.123.
142 Ibid., p.123.
non-intervention, preferred the maintenance of Russian authority
to the establishment of Polish independence - on the side of
Palmerston against Cobden and Bright. As far as programme was
concerned, an attempt was made to limit the programme to
arbitration process and tribunal. This could not be done that
easily in Europe. Another development, the growing interest of
professional men in international problems (Mps, jurists,
political scientists) also helped in the process.\textsuperscript{143} The peace
societies now tempered their idealism with a new argument.\textsuperscript{144} In
1893, Darby, Secretary to British Peace Society said, 'our work is
to provide principles and not policies for governments'. Even
hope of persuading governments later gave way to the view that
'parliaments and governments were themselves the best judges of
what was feasible'.\textsuperscript{144} Some of the peace plans prepared by
professional men advocated confederal approach.\textsuperscript{145}
Molinari, Lorimer and Bluntschli's ideas contained such blue
prints. Bluntschli said that previous plans for an international
organization had been impracticable because they sought the
establishment of either a monarch or a Universal republic.\textsuperscript{146}
He also emphasised the role of Great Powers for enforcement
action (but supported by majority of legislature). Lorimer accused
Bluntschli of abandoning the international factor and bringing in
concert idea.\textsuperscript{147} He went on to describe features of what he
called international government, distinguished between national

\textsuperscript{143} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 127.
\textsuperscript{144} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 132.
\textsuperscript{145} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 133.
\textsuperscript{146} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 135.
\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 135.
and international questions, confined jurisdiction of international government to later questions, but excluded colonial and extra-European disputes from its purview. The impact of growing power of sovereign cities served to destroy the concert idea completely in 1830s' and 1890s'. Confederal ideas became anathema to governments.

However as the century drew to close, with increasing tension between great powers, restraints other than moral force and public opinion were sought. Governments themselves began to contemplate joint action. Hague conferences of 1899, 1907 resulted from this. Others felt that arbitration was not enough. Early 20th century marked the revival of federalist ideas. More interesting was the fact that U.K. provided leadership in this, where project for unification of Europe had not advanced since the days of Bellers, Penn. Now when the British Societies were embracing the idea of United Europe, European opinion was turning against it. There were two reasons for change on European front, apart from the deepening of enmities of some European nations. In 1900, a French rapporteur general concluded that 'Russia could not have a place in a true United States of Europe because of her regime and her lack of common culture with the rest'. On the contrary, if Europe ever federated it would be chiefly to avoid the domination of Russia. With this view, how could federation seem practicable to Frenchman who now needed the alliance of Russia.

148 Ibid., p.136.
149 Ibid., p.137.
150 Ibid., p.138.
151 Ibid., p.141.
against German danger? Another problem was the mounting impossibility of regarding Europe as isolated from the rest of the world. Norman Angel in his 'Great Mission' (1909) and Kropotkin in his 'Mutual Aid' (1902) had this message to give, war had ceased to 'pay', it was the interdependence of society of states that was wider than Europe. In 1899 Hague conference, five of the twenty-six states were non-European and in 1909 twenty-four out of forty-four states who attended the Hague conference, were non-European. As early as 1900, the rapporteur-general above quoted doubted whether Great Britain because of her Empire could ever be integrated in Europe. In 1912 the German jurist Schucking was perhaps the first to emphasize that European powers had extra-European interests that were too important, to permit them to establish a union that was limited to Europe. After the outbreak of war in 1914, the chief internationalist groups, all agreed that League must include non-European states, though they disagreed as to who should be included. However the main concern of the internationalist idea remained that of arbitration system of greater efficiency. The outstanding feature of war years was the complete, if not permanent defeat of conception of United Europe, before the need for a wider organization, and in relation to that wider organization, the final victory of confederal ideas.

152 Ibid., p.141.
153 Ibid., p.141.
154 Ibid., p.142.
155 Ibid., p.142.
156 Ibid., p.142.
157 Ibid., p.143.
could be content to leave unchanged an international system that had resulted in so great a disaster, but fewer could still bring themselves to accept the practicability of a federal state for all the states.\textsuperscript{158} There was a renewed demand for federal solution specially in Great Britain. But this ardour soon cooled. A league was the choice of many. It meant all things to all men. However, it envisaged the league of states not a Union of nations. Discussion was about how far should sovereign states accept restrictions. There were other controversies like; who should be excluded; relative weight to Great Powers. Eight of the ten war time plans for a post-war international organization made alterations of territorial states QUO and right of self-determination inherent in every group.\textsuperscript{159}

The conviction of governments that they must go beyond attitude of Hague conferences, made it certain that a League of 1919 would be more extensive in functions. But the new instrument was to rely on moral force of public opinion. That is why the importance given to Assembly, although it was an Assembly of Governments. However, as it was an organization of governments, in assumed confederal form.\textsuperscript{160} Therefore the chief characteristic and its weakness became a conflict between ambitious functions and a weak structure.\textsuperscript{161} According to Hinsley, a new European state emerged only in 18th century. It was during the 18th century that the actuality and Collection of Great Powers in Europe finally replaced an earlier framework of an existing fact

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., p.143.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., p.145.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., p.149.
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., p.149.
and inherited thought in which, while more than one state had always existed, it had been natural for one power to be rated above the rest and impossible for that power's pretensions to stop short of control and protection of Christendom. This had been Charles V's, Philip II's and Louis XIV's conception, as well as that of Napoleon. He undertook the domination of the continent.

Until not long before Napoleon's days, there had hardly be a time in Europe when the collective memory had not been stirred by the remembrance of Rome or medieval Empire. But Napoleon's conception was not as widely shared as that of Charles, Philip and Louis, with the exception of French Public opinion. He ran foul of it because of the acceptance of idea of a Europe consisting of several Great Powers. Napoleon was brought down by a coalition of Great Powers, who assumed that status and started governing Europe by a congress. Nor is this all. Whereas Napoleon's thought ran back to charlemagne and Rome, no succeeding conquerer of continent thought in this way. Napoleon III sought not to emulate Napoleon I in this role but to avoid what he thought had been his uncle's mistake in assuming it. Later aspirants to control of Europe, have rationalised their drives by appealing to racial purity or superiority of their ideology or world balance of power or need for Lebensraum - by everything but an appeal to Europe's past.

162 Ibid., p.153.
163 Ibid., p.154.
164 Ibid., p.155.
165 Ibid., p.155.
During the middle ages, the notion of Europe was confined to strictly geographical contexts. Christianity could not achieve geographical significance because it was thought to be a body of believers of the whole world, or it was equated with Roman Empire under headship of Pope. From 13th and in 14th and 15th centuries, the notion of Europe returned and identification of Europe with Christendom established. This was due to consolidation of Christianity in Europe and defeat of its pretensions outside. The reappearance of the idea of Europe as an alternative to christendom was a natural consequence of rise of opposition to Pope and Emperor to Universal rule within continent. For even while it was becoming more of a unit culturally and economically, Europe was losing its political unity. The stage was set for eviction of notion of a united christendom and even replacement of a geographical conception. A new conception of Europe was developing but it took time to develop. It took place in two stages. In the first stage, there was the recognition that Europe was a collectivity of states and emphasis was not on independence of parts. In the second stage, Europe was treated as an aggregate of states. Machiavelli, contrasted Europe with Asia and Africa in this regard. The transition was not easy. For a long time, the earlier conception held sway. Until the end of 17th century, even Balance of Power was advocated to maintain the stability of whole and not for advancing interest of each member. Only after the war of

166 Ibid., p.156.
167 Ibid., p.156.
168 Ibid., p.160.
Spanish succession that an advance took place. Jean Rousseau in 1730s expressed conception of balance of power as something that was maintained by a co-operation of several independent powers for the sake of expediency. He emphasised 'true interests of states' as one safe guide and balance of power as one stabilising factor. Boling broke in U.K. also belonged to this tradition. In the interim period, another conception of Europe developed in which there existed a limited number of rival political systems, each grouped around a Great Power. It was by way of reaction to this attitude that men evolved a new conception of Europe after 1730's. In the second stage, the emphasis was on the autonomy of states. After that autonomy was moderated by renewed sense of Europe's unity but the content and significance was changed. It can be seen with Montesquieu, Voltaire, Hume and Rousseau. For them Europe was a diversity and unity and unity because of its diversity. Diversities were there but there was unity of religion and more important there was a conviction that balance of power helped in preserving in each state's identity. This was not the acceptance of European people as 'politically one'. Emphasis was on 'politically several' after middle of 18th century.

More important, the transition from Europe's conception as a religious entity to a political one took a long time. It was because of continuing menace of Turkish advance. Secondly men have usually regarded their own political hegemony

169 Ibid., p.161.
170 Ibid., p.161.
171 Ibid., p.163.
over their various worlds as rational and logical solution of the international problem. Those periods are rare in which they consciously accepted co-existence or a balance of power between separate states. Only special circumstances could change this. From the beginning of 18th century, Europe was attaining a condition in which there was a greater degree of near equality between a large number of leading states. Of course it increased egotism and insecurity. At first it increased acquisitiveness. Yet, it also set up in due course, a tendency to restraint. This international situation led to greater emphasis on internal power and consolidation of state. As Kant observed, the states are on such artificial terms towards each other that not one of them can relax its efforts at internal development without losing in comparison with others....civic freedom can not now be interfered with, without the states feeling the disadvantage .... in all its trades... and a result, a decline of the power of state in its foreign relations. Therefore this freedom is being gradually extended.

One reason why restraint was observed was that state interest was more consciously and sharply separated from dynastic interest in the 18th century than ever before and was seen as existing for itself. The other explanation was that the objectives of war and decisions regarding war and peace were

172 Ibid., p. 175.
173 Ibid., p. 176.
174 Ibid., p. 176.
175 Ibid., pp. 176-177.
177 Ibid., p. 178.
coming increasingly under governmental control and the very weakness of this state exerted a moderating influence.\textsuperscript{178}

But the basic change which had conditioned developments in Europe was the recognition that great powers were achieving near equality. As a result British policy changed. Now the balance of power in Europe was something that existed, not something that had to be reared up, the use of balance by Great Britain for the first time as a means of keeping Europe divided, not as a means of inviting Europe to save England and itself by uniting against a predominant power.\textsuperscript{179} We have seen how the new conception of Europe was developing by the middle of the 18th century. However, there was a divergence in international practice. In practice till the end of Napoleon, attempts at empire building or at establishing Universal monarchy were made. Its replacement was a poor approximation to conception of Europe. The conception of Europe could be found in the writings of Montesquieu and vattel. According to these, although Europe was divided into separate states, the relations were moderated by a common civilization, no less than by expediency and the wise policy of equal balance of power.\textsuperscript{180} But the development of near equality accentuated the egotism of individual state.\textsuperscript{181} Mere egotism was limited only by egotism of others.\textsuperscript{182} As for this divergence governments came in for criticism. But the view of Europe as a unity was not rejected. There was one exception.

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid. , p. 179.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid. , pp. 184-185.
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid. , p. 187.
\textsuperscript{181} Ibid. , p. 187.
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid. , p. 188.

52
Tom Faine considered Europe too corrupt to become an ideal single republic. It was American’s duty to establish a New World order! The significance of the American revolution for internationalist theory was that if combined the pent up resentment of French nation with disappointment at betrayal by ancient regime of the newer vision of a happy family of independent states - into an attempt to set up in Europe the ideal single state which had held little attraction for Europe since the early 18th century but which had now been achieved in America.

The French Revolution produced on the one hand an attempt by Hauterive to produce an ideology of and need for French dominance, and a report that 'the true principles of Europe's political and federal principles were neglected and forgotten'. On the other hand, it produced a contention by Gentz that Europe never had a political and federal constitution. Such a constitution would always be impracticable. Revolution and French power were the destabilising agencies. Restoration of previous balance would produce a healthy international system. French Revolution had come as an obstacle to progress but accidently it revealed the weakness of the 18th century international system.

183 Ibid., p.189.
184 Ibid., p.189.
185 Ibid., p.190.
186 Ibid., p.186.
187 Ibid., p.190.
188 Ibid., p.190.
189 Ibid., p.193.
The French Revolution produced the congress of Vienna. The motives of those who met there have been discussed and criticised. Search for balance of power, common interest against internal revolution, legitimising pure self interest have been mentioned. As far as balance of power is concerned, there have been two meanings. In earlier times it had come to mean, need to combine against hegemony. In 18th century, it came to mean roughly equal and acquisitive states and guided by expediency and egotism, balancing each other.  

The key to congress settlement was that those who made it were reeling under the impact of Napoleon, and were obsessed by need for a balance in the earlier sense but revolted by the thought of returning to balance of power politics as between themselves. Holy Alliance was itself an attempt to escape from international politics of force and materialism. Congress system came as close to adopting the federalist ideas of peace plans of the early eighteenth century as was consistent with their existence.

It does not mean that the states were not pursuing their separate interests. The impressive thing about 1815 is that statesmen were prepared for the first time to waive their individual interests. They found it to be in their individual interests to do so. The political system of 1815 replaced the earlier system of particular alliances that troubled Europe for 3 centuries by a principle of general union, uniting all states by

190 Ibid., p.195.
191 Ibid., p.196.
192 Ibid., p.196.
193 Ibid., p.196.
194 Ibid., p.197.
a federative bond under the direction of 5 principal powers.\textsuperscript{195}

But Gentz was even speculating on the duration of the Union because of separate interests of members. He considered France as too weak and Russia as financially weak and unable to destory the concert.\textsuperscript{196}

However, the congress system came to be used for suppression of all and every disturbance in Europe. It came to be used for the purposes of Holy Alliance.\textsuperscript{197} Though England considered its main object as 'Conservation of Europe against the power of France'.\textsuperscript{198} Of course because of interests of Great Britain as a Great Power, Britain could not adopt a consistent attitude. Of course, Castelereagh's opposition to Holy Alliance was also based on limits of practicable in international collaboration.\textsuperscript{199} Further, he felt such foreign interventions in the internal affairs of another nation was likely to encourage that spirit of military energy which was characteristic of French Revolution.\textsuperscript{200} 'The partners of Quadruple Alliance could not expect to feel alike on all subjects'. Their interest were not the same, they had not the same means or freedom of action, there was even a difference of outlook and method between autocratic and constitutional powers.' It was not this however which would destory their collaboration but insistence of one power, in defiance of their differences on collective action on

\textsuperscript{195} Ibid., p.197.
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid., p.199.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., p.202.
\textsuperscript{198} Ibid., p.204.
\textsuperscript{199} Ibid., p.206.
\textsuperscript{200} Ibid., p.208.
such matters'. His principle was that 'Allies should act jointly whenever their interests permitted and act circumspectly with a regard for maintenance of their alliance and thus with tolerance towards each other'. He tried hard to combat the notion that 'whenever any great political event shall occur...it should be regarded as a matter of course that it belongs to Allies and charge themselves collectively with the responsibility of exercising some jurisdiction'. The gap between Castlereagh and continental states was thus a gap between two interpretations of the congress system—between the Holy Alliance and his Concert. After Castlereagh, Canning made the British policy aim at destruction of Holy Alliance. Even when Holy Alliance collapsed, Castlereagh's principles survived. It is one of the ironies of international history— that the failure of the congress system marked not the end but the beginning of an age of collaboration between Great Powers because they then fell back on the congress system as it had been interpreted by Castlereagh. A looser organization, confined to international questions resulted. Even that looser system was found difficult to operate on account of rivalries between Democratic and autocratic states. Conferences could not be convened. Even when conferences of concret powers met, on various occasions to discuss various issues, they could impose settlement on others but not on one of

201 Ibid., p.209.
204 Ibid., p.212.
205 Ibid., p.213.
206 Ibid., p.218.

56
the Great Powers. The important question raised by Hinsley is why did the loose organization did not disintegrate further and return to anarchy of 13th century. He himself offers the answer: 'Each was too divided from all the rest, by interest or ideology or both, to permit them to form alliances; yet each was deterred from too much risk alone by lack of preponderent power.' In addition, the first half of 19th century was a period of continuous upheaval in Europe. Before 1830, attempts were made to use congress system for suppression of disturbances. But from 1830 they were restrained in their foreign policies by common peril at home. They remained restrained until they realised that revolutions of 1848 had been 'the turning point at which history failed to turn'. If they could rarely act together against revolution because of their rivalries, they would never act against each other for fear of encouraging revolution.

It was during this period that Great Powers developed the system of conferences. The main principle was the principle of balance of power. Palmerston considered it as essential for maintaining European Social order. In his mind it performed this function not merely as a safeguard against Napoleon, but as a guide to be followed when changes were unavoidable in Europe's status quo. This theory was shared by all. That is why refusal to attend a conference was considered as evidence of aggressive attitude. One could say, what else could Great Powers have

\[\text{\cite{207} \cite{208} \cite{209} \cite{210} \cite{211} \cite{212}}\]
done, if they wanted to avoid war? However, the application of these principles was not easy and would have been very difficult had these principles had not been a part of conception of international order accepted by states.²¹³

There came a time when man's attachment to this conception conflicted with and proved to be stronger than their restraint. Far from being able to prevent Crimean war, the notion of Europe that underlay the concert was that largely responsible for the fact that war broke out.²¹⁴ There was a war in 1354 as opposed to an international crisis, because Russia's demands on Turkey raised the question, how far public law of Europe, the principles underlying the concert of Europe, should apply to Ottoman Empire.²¹⁵ But the negative and hesitant conduct of war was because of mutual regret that the concert, to which both sides belonged, had failed to avert it.²¹⁶ The war was prolonged by considerations of prestige and was settled by superior force. However, the conditions imposed on Russia became controversial. It is said that allies would not have presented such terms to any power as truly 'European'.²¹⁷ This is not true as similar terms were imposed on France in 1315. Further as Hinsley points out, it was done in the interest of Europe e.g. neutralization of Black Sea.²¹⁸

It is true that after the congress of 1856 in Paris, England and France sought to use the concert system as Holy

²¹³ Ibid., p.226.
²¹⁴ Ibid., p.226.
²¹⁵ Ibid., p.227.
²¹⁶ Ibid., p.228.
²¹⁷ Ibid., p.230.
²¹⁸ Ibid., p.231.

58
Alliance in reverse. Had they persisted, they would have destroyed the system. These efforts were not pressed because they conflicted with the principle of concert, the sovereignty of state, especially of global powers. Each state had rights and responsibilities, although they tended to emphasize their rights more and wanted to restrict responsibilities. That is why Great Powers continued to limit the direct international role of Concert. Of course, with this type of structure, there was a scope for confusion and contradiction. Under treaties in relation to Turkey, Turkey was given a special status but not Prussia. The structure being what it was, the rights and rivalries of states were indispensable for development of their responsibilities as well as being an obstacle to it. But these rights and especially the right to war could be destructive of system, if exercised without restraint. The question after 1856 was whether the Concert, which had been preserved for thirty years, could survive a revision of map of Europe, demanded by a generation of slow change in political outlook and the distribution of power. In October 1857 James Anthony Froude suggested that the best way of avoiding conflicts like the Crimean one would be for four empires—Great Britain, France, Austria and Russia to discuss and settle all territorial disputes. He forgot Prussia. He did not foresee the extent to which order was about to be challenged by nationalist sympathies and aspirations no less than by rivalries between

219 Ibid., p.234.
220 Ibid., p.237.
221 Ibid., p.237.
222 Ibid., p.237.
The main sources of unrest in years since 1856 were, slow changes in distribution of power and the alliance the governments were concluding with popular force of nationalism and also withdrawal of Russia and England from European affairs.

Up to Crimean war, all governments have been restrained by fear of revolution. After 1856, France changed her policy as a means of advancing her interest against other nations. In addition she was interested in revision of 1815 treaties. 224 Like Napoleon III, the Bismark was also interested in revision. Russia's aversion to nationalism was counterbalanced by her interest in weakening Austria. Britain's difficulty lay in a public opinion favourable to nationalist cause and her interest in extra-European matters. All these were the factors which made these powers less supportive of concord system in the second half of the 19th century. 225

Prussia's defeat of France in 1870, destroyed the myth of la grande nation dominating Europe. 226 However this did not destroy the system of balance of power. It incorporated now Powerful Germany and a United Italy. Balance of power was preserved because the distribution of power remained steady. The expanding states, further regarded themselves as 'historical states'. 227 Bismark's actions display concern for Europe and his wars were conducted for reasons of state and not on nationalist grounds. 228

223 Ibid., p.237.
224 Ibid., p.245.
225 Ibid., pp.244-248.
226 Ibid., p.249.
227 Ibid., p.251.
228 Ibid., p.252.
The Franco-Prussian war, completing this period of unrest and revision, finally dispelled mid-19th century dreams of a voluntary federation of Europe's nations to be realised by withering away of old style European Governments. The reality which survived was the old style system of Sovereign Great Powers, controlled by powerful governments but all restrained by traditions and physical checks. It survived for another generation. Even outside Europe, balance of power operated, although a lot of changes took place there and new powers like Japan and U.S.A. became important there. However, events there did not lead to a major, all embracing war. This was partly due to the acceptance of principles of concert.

International relations after 1873 however differed from the period after 1815 in a way because it marked the eclipse of the conference method. This method was giving way to a universal feeling that each Great Power must stand on its feet and reserve its efforts for its own immediate interests. A network of alliances became typical diplomatic means. Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 was the beginning of a new phase in international relations, an intimation that search for power and equilibrium was becoming world wide and extending beyond narrow circle of European Powers. Further these alliances were defensive, for peace time and operative for limited periods, dealt with contingencies. Every power was reluctant to give up its freedom of action although autonomy was not easy to secure.

229 Ibid., p.253.
230 Ibid., p.256.
231 Ibid., p.257.
232 Ibid., p.257.
233 Ibid., p.258.
The difficulty was inherent in the existence of several states, as developments in weapons and techniques of war increased the difficulty. Military preparedness increasingly involved the need of an ally. The application of science, technology and industry to the means of war and of increasing efficiency and bureaucracy of a state to a military organization was making continuous readiness, rapid mobilisation, large forces and universal conscription essential for success in resisting an attack with modern transport and modern weapons. All the leading states became nations in arms. Weapon ranges increased and its efficiency shot forward. However its mobility and flexibility on the battlefield was reduced because of larger weapons till the introduction of petrol engine to warfare in 1914. Success in attack required increasing ratio of superiority by attack. When all the powers were prepared, when technical developments were constantly increasing the expense and rate of obsolescence of weapons, when increasingly complex and efficient General Staffs planned — as was their habit and in view of lack of tactical mobility, to some extent a continuing need for frontal assaults and as was their function — for victory and not merely for successful defence, and at a time when governments were also spending increasing amounts on education, welfare and other social measures, the burden became so great, both financially and psychologically that the powers felt forced to contract alliances. If these all dealt with precise contingencies it was in details of mutual military aid that they reached the

234 Ibid., p.261.

62
greatest precision. However this presented before the Great Powers of only a general war or general peace.\textsuperscript{235} However, as the alliances dealt only with military contingencies, this did nothing to offset the central characteristics of its international dealings — the political and diplomatic self-reliance of each power\textsuperscript{236} (not formed on ideological grounds also to ensure its permanence). Nor was this reduced by huge proliferation of international legislation and administration.\textsuperscript{237} It also meant that political harmony, let alone political integration was not their necessary result; that 'world as a---- homogenous scene does not mean the same thing as the world as one state'.\textsuperscript{238} The accentuation of each state led to a symptomatic change of decline of monarchical solidarity in Europe.\textsuperscript{239} Loyalty to nation was transferred to state. Governments became nationalistic within borders and anti-nationalist beyond them.\textsuperscript{240} Beyond them the principle of nationality was ignored by congress of Berlin, even more than by congress of Vienna.\textsuperscript{241} Governments were reluctant to solve common problems, but at the same time increasing number of international political problems were not of common or of equal concern to European Powers.\textsuperscript{242} Some of these problems became the concern of new powers, the old and purely European habit of collaboration proved impossible to uphold.\textsuperscript{243} In addition to last 15 to 20 years of 19th century were days of imperialism and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{235} Ibid., p.261.
\item \textsuperscript{236} Ibid., p.261.
\item \textsuperscript{237} Ibid., p.261.
\item \textsuperscript{238} Ibid., p.262.
\item \textsuperscript{239} Ibid., p.262.
\item \textsuperscript{240} Ibid., p.263.
\item \textsuperscript{241} Ibid., p.263.
\item \textsuperscript{242} Ibid., p.264.
\item \textsuperscript{243} Ibid., p.265.
\end{itemize}
rivalries between Great Powers. This increased the suspicion between them. \(^{244}\) New methods were developed to deal with international problems e.g. purely legal instrument of arbitration. \(^{245}\) This was helped by the rise of modern state. Partly, the growing armament burden also contributed to search for new procedures for settlement of disputes. However, the reluctant states to cover areas comprehensively under arbitration procedures showed how much was independence and discretion in international politics valued by states. Despite subsequent experiments with international organizations the sense of collectivity has not been revived. \(^{246}\)

One of the outstanding features of the period between two wars was that distribution of effective power was more unstable and more rapidly changing, another was that the states involved became both more pre-occupied with relative power and less confident in their ability to assess it. \(^{247}\) However states faced unprecedented restraints in the form of public opinion, technical deterrents. \(^{248}\) In addition to cost of weapons, their greater complexity, the more rapid rate of obsolescence, there was the paucity of weapons. \(^{249}\) The change in the basis of government and in its relations to society -its increasingly necessary regard for needs of masses of men and for public opinion made governments more cautious. \(^{250}\) States as organizations, as

\(^{244}\) Ibid., p.266.  
\(^{245}\) Ibid., p.266.  
\(^{246}\) Ibid., p.271.  
\(^{247}\) Ibid., pp.282-283.  
\(^{248}\) Ibid., pp.285-286.  
\(^{249}\) Ibid., p.286.  
\(^{250}\) Ibid., p.287.
cabinets, as civil services were becoming less inclined to wars even though they were becoming more capable of fighting wars.\textsuperscript{251} However, in the end of the deterrents proved inadequate although they were to resurface again during the inter-war period and after the second world war. When the peace broke down, however other aspects became more prominent.

Wars are big events. They produce search for causes, alternative theories of its explanation. Causes are divided into two parts, the impersonal and man-made. The existence of capitalist states or of mere independent sovereign states is blamed, as if existence of world state would prevent wars or as if there had been no civil wars. Nationalism has been described as one of the fundamental causes. Similarly, colonial issues are referred as causes. Question is these causes were there. Why did they become important after 1900? Other developments must be responsible for it. The change in distribution of power and loss of equality was one such development. The growth of centralized, highly competent state machines with increased efficiency in tapping resources and with more cohesive bonds between themselves and their populations was another such development. The responsibility for war has been placed on Germany. Was she aiming at becoming a world power through her mastery of Europe or was she just aiming at becoming a world power without destroying others? Was war accidental? These are all controversial questions. Was Germany's behaviour as supreme power unconventional? or was it that the conduct was considered as

\textsuperscript{251} Ibid., p.233.
departure from normal international behaviour and at that time considered unacceptable? 252
League of Nations: True it was brought in to existence in unusual circumstances of instability. On can't wait for the proper circumstances. More important question is why it was not made far reaching and why it was not upheld. There was not a world community not to talk of a united Europe. There was no unity of race, language and culture. There for only a loose confederal structure could be established.

Further, in continuation of the prevailing ideas of time, only legal disputes were to be subjected to League. League's experience indicates the extreme difficulty in dealing with serious political disputes without more authority than the League possessed. All thought and effort along this approach must either deny that the merging, even partially, of separate Sovereignities presents any serious difficulty, in which case it makes no headway against these stubborn initial obstacles or it must recognise these obstacles and compromise with them, in which case it necessarily falls short from the outset of achieving the minimum of central authority that is indispensible for success. 253 Second difficulty was that from the beginning the League was divided into two groups. One group felt League was founded to preserve peace. The other group said that League could only be upheld if it was prepared to resort to war against unjust war. 254 When League was required to use force and it was not

252 Ibid., pp.289-308.
253 Ibid., p.315.
254 Ibid., p.317.
prepared it was doomed. The main difficulty was in regarding the League as an enforcement machine. It is worth remembering that men who came nearest to success in establishing international order have been men like Alexander, Caesar, Charlemagne, Napoleon and Hitler. Member had more success in scaling down their obligations. For their security problems, members came to rely more on treaties and alliances. It is true that League was unfortunate in time but this is not to admit that it collapsed from the misfortune. It failed for the deeper reason that its basic conception is impracticable at any time. It is practicable no doubt to fight a war, once it has broken out, with the object of teaching the lesson that no state may with impunity attack each other. In conditions of peace when states will compromise to avoid war, it is impracticable to organize a world on such a principle for long. However, logical and impressive it may seem in theory, it can not stand the strain of peace-time relationships.

U.N.O. The U.N.O., unlike the League was set up as an organization that was more than its members. It was to have an identity of its own. The League was a league.

The U.N.O. the whole of it however was not conceived as an instrument of collective security. Only the security council and that also the five permanent members were considered as guardians of World Security. The world security meant involvement

255 Ibid., p.318.
256 Ibid., p.318.
257 Ibid., p.321.
258 Ibid., p.335.
of council in case of threat from states other than Great Powers. When a threat from a great power emerged, it could be settled only by war. It was never conceived as a world government. It was never so constructed and unlikely to become so. The U.N. is already fully fledged in the only role in which it can be useful and that it has great possibilities in that role in proportion as it accepts its limitations. Although men would like it to become more than this, it would be wise to recognise that its only practicable role - both when disagreements between great powers have diminished and while the great powers remain seriously divided - is that of an accessory to their diplomacy, a moral check upon its excesses and a physical and procedural assistant to its processes.

The post-second war situation has neither produced a World government nor destruction of state system in spite of closer integration and interdependence of states. The period after 1947 produced cold war but not war. It was marked by more stable distribution of power, an increase in the absolute power of the state and the rise of technical deterrent. The cold war was accompanied by end of colonialism. The period was marked by attempt of west to implant its concerns in the developing world and attempt by latter to insulate it from West. The shrinking of technical distances made it difficult. Now the cold war has ended. The growing technological and economic interdependence, the increasing indebtedness of third world, failure in bringing

---

259 Ibid. p.340.
260 Ibid. p.345.
261 Ibid. p.357.
New World Economic Order brings the danger of a new imposition of west, specially of U.S. in developing world. The problem of conflict between the new national states aggravates the problem. The major problems the world is facing are now two: How can the West help the developing countries in overcoming their economic backwardness and how the struggle for the New International Economic Order limits the bitterness of the struggle between the developed and the developing world and secondly, how can political peace within and between countries which became independent after the second war be ensured.
The irrationality and anarchy of relations between states has attracted the attention of modern western thinkers. Some of them were concerned with its morality. They offered their own solutions also. These thinkers applied their minds to modern problems like the cold war. Some of them were Christian thinkers but theologians like Niebuhr even espoused Marxism. Others like Butterfield did extract certain insights on conflict in history and the importance of economic and social factors in history.

For Herbert Butterfield, historical studies and theology cohere and reinforce each other. A Christian historian is prepared by his faith for accidents and surprises in history. By his worship of God, he is rescued from such distorting influences as a fanatical worship of the state, the idea of progress or an abstract political ideology. According to Butterfield God is not a tyrannical ruler. Even the clash of wills can serve God's will and bring good out of evil. Although, there are dangers in interpreting history as God's will. But Butterfield was talking about the eventual outcome of a conflict and not about this or that phase, this or that episode. He asked his people not to be over anxious.

Butterfield was concerned with the problem of cold war. Though, a Christian historian, he considered cold war as too complex to define as a clash between absolute right and wrong. He

262 Thompson K.W.: Masters of International Thought
263 Ibid., p. 12.
was, however, more worried about insecurity and distrust prevailing among U.S.A and U.S.S.R. and attempts made by them to overcome this insecurity through increased power. The only solution was that one or the other Super-power risk something in the name of peace.\(^{264}\) The only way out of deadlock was some kind of marginal experiment.\(^{265}\)

For Butterfield, the contribution of Christianity to the requirements of international relations lies not so much in actual policies but in providing a background of ideas or a more critical spirit with which man can work.\(^{266}\) Christianity can help clarify ideas on sin but recognizing that, although extraordinarily evil men do exist, the most difficult problem in international politics is the cupidity of the large number of men who hope to realise through their nation their society denies them as individuals.\(^{267}\) Such men, by exercising pressures on their states, make normalization of relations between states difficult. Religion's responsibility is to check too great an exercise of power.\(^{268}\) In application of this principle, he asked American leaders to recognize their limits and exercise prudence.\(^{269}\) Butterfield, writing at the height of cold war to a citizenry over anxious about Soviet threat and imperilled by the risk of a thermonuclear holocaust, may have made his lasting contribution in this way.\(^{270}\)

\(^{264}\) Ibid., p.15.
\(^{265}\) Ibid., p.15.
\(^{266}\) Ibid., p.16.
\(^{267}\) Ibid., p.16.
\(^{268}\) Ibid., p.16.
\(^{269}\) Ibid., p.16.
\(^{270}\) Ibid., p.16.
Reinhold Niebuhr’s view of inter-state relations is conditioned by his conception of human nature.

From 1915 to 1932, Niebuhr accepted liberal tenets such as support for League of Nations as well as philosophical assumptions behind liberalism. Later on however, he questioned these assumptions. He suggested that liberalism espouses the following assumptions: (1) the injustices is caused by ignorance and will yield to education and greater intelligence, (2) civilization is gradually becoming moral, (3) the character of individuals and not social system will guarantee justice, (4) appeals to brotherhood and good will are bound to be effective in the end, (5) goodness makes for happiness and increased goodness will overcome human selfishness, and (6) war is stupid and will yield to reason. He said that all these tenets were open to question and doubts. The failure of liberalism results from its blindness to perennial difference between human actions and aspirations, the perennial source of conflict between life and life, the inevitable tragedy of human existence, the irreducible irrationality of human behaviour and the tortuous character of human history. 271 Liberalism had had failed to relate individual to the society. It is assumed that maximization of self-interest would mean serving the interests of all. Marxists proclaimed that injustice was inevitable as long as economic inequality prevailed. According to Niebuhr ‘Marxism made no mistake in stating the rational goal toward which society must move, the goal of equal justice or in understanding the economic

271 Ibid., p.22.
foundations of justice. Liberalism concealed conflict of interests. It believed that justice could be attained through true economic system. Marxism, on the other hand, insisted that justice can not be attained without a struggle. However, it erred in believing that such conflicts would end with the end of capitalism. Niebuhr conceived of struggle for endless power elaborated itself as an expression of human finitude and sin. He expressed a view that Marx who had got a glimpse, had confused the issue by attributing fundamental problems to special causes. The failure of Marxism was a natural cause of Marxist illusions and not a corruption of Marxism by Stalinism. It resulted from describing all human virtue to a single class and all human evil to a single institution, private property. The messianic character of Soviet communism and its absolute totalitarianism are there for not accidental but follow inevitably from its premises. According to Niebuhr, community and the nation state are social organisms that have developed over time.

Man is an animal with contradictory qualities. He is rational, good and dreams of God and thinks of making himself god-like. He is also greedy, has a lust for power and has brutish nature. If a student of history, attributes only goodness to man and explains away the evil to concrete historical and social causes merely begs the question; for these causes are consequence of evil inherent in man.

272 Ibid.; p.22.
273 Ibid.; p.25.
274 Ibid.; p.25.
276 Ibid.; p.23.
Man has both qualities but due to finiteness and his limitations, he is not able to realise his own possibilities. (Aurbindo) So he seeks security through domination of others, out of anxiety, fear of domination by others. The struggle for power (out of anxiety) reveals itself at every level of human life including in relations between states.

In the field of collective behaviour the force of egoistic passion is so strong that the only harmonies possible are those that manage to neutralise a vital force through balances of power, through mutual defenses against its inordinate expression and through techniques for harnessing its energy to social ends. Social unity is built on the virtues as well as selfish side of man’s nature, the twin elements of collective strength for a nation become self-sacrificial loyalty and frustrated aggression of masses. From this it follows that, politics whether in organized political groups or in large organizations, is the more contentious and ruthless because of unselfish loyalty and commitments of group members. Therefore within an international society even a nation composed of men of character will be less than loving towards other nations. Niebuhr observed, 'society . . . .merely cumulates the egoism of individuals and transmutes their individual altruism into collective egoism so that egoism of the group has a double force.

277 Ibid. p.28.
278 Ibid. p.29.
279 Ibid. p.29.
280 Ibid. p.29.
281 Ibid. p.29.
282 Ibid. p.29.
283 Ibid. p.29.
For this reason no group acts from purely unselfish or even mutual interest, and politics is therefore bound to be a contest of power.\textsuperscript{284}

However, Niebuhr was persuaded that men and states cannot follow their self-interest without claiming to do so in obedience to some general scheme of values.\textsuperscript{285} National interest is imperiled by hazard of moral cynicism on the one hand and by moral pretension, hypocrisy and ideological justification or the other. He said they are parts of a single problem—a continuing ambivalence towards the responsibility of nations seen at one movement as having no obligations beyond their own interests and at the next at engaging in a high moral crusade without regard for selfish concerns.\textsuperscript{286} As far as conduct of state is concerned, 'prudence' was the word Niebuhr would choose.\textsuperscript{287} He however, said that his pragmatism was limited and instrumental although he agreed that he stood on the abyss of cynicism. Niebuhr was right many a times in political judgments e.g. in predicting a lessening of communist threat with the new generation of leaders and was critical of American role in Vietnam. But he is remembered more for his contribution to political theory.

Martin Wight was a Christian pacifist and initially a supporter of the League of Nations but was disappointed later. Wight saw pacifism as requiring one nation to make some sacrifice of security in the long range for the cause of peace.\textsuperscript{286} Wight could not resolve the interplay of two

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{284} \textit{Ibid.}, p.29.
  \item \textsuperscript{285} \textit{Ibid.}, p.30.
  \item \textsuperscript{286} \textit{Ibid.}, p.30.
  \item \textsuperscript{287} \textit{Ibid.}, p.31.
  \item \textsuperscript{288} \textit{Ibid.}, p.46.
\end{itemize}
contradicting convictions. He was without illusions about realities of international politics and yet he expressed open moral revulsion at necessities of world politics. With the passage of time his pacifism receded. His book 'Power Politics' was a result of this. Another important contribution from our point of view was a paper entitled 'Western Values in International Relations' which became a chapter in the book 'Diplomatic Investigations' (1966). In his lectures also he discussed three major traditions, namely, the realist or Machiavellian, the rationalist or Brocian and revolutionist or Kantian.

Wight's realism was grounded in William Stubb's concept that modern history is distinguished from medieval history by primacy of the idea of power over the idea of right. The great powers like gas expanding to fill a vacuum are checked not by the laws or the will of God but by other powers. He was pessimistic. He did not agree that world was moving from power politics to a new and better international order. International politics is the realm of recurrence and repetition, it is the field in which political action is most necessitous. 'Powers will continue to seek security without reference to justice and to pursue their vital interests irrespective of common interests, but in fraction that they may be deflected lies the difference

-----------------------------------------------
289 Ibid., p.46.
290 Ibid., p.49.
291 Ibid., p.50.
292 Ibid., p.50.
between the jungle and the traditions of Europe'. In his latter writings Wight directed attention to common interests and obligations.

"Power Politics" he wrote 'means relationship between independent powers'. Great power status is won by violence and war and is lost in a similar fashion. The test of great power is its potential ability to stand alone. Small powers can defend limited interests. Those who pursue these interests negatively through policies of neutrality are in effect powers by courtesy. In a system of power politics, the duty of a state is to preserve its independence and defend its vital interests as defined by her only. Each power wants to expand until the equilibrium is reached which is the product of two factors: external pressure and internal organization'. Politics is not a science but balance of power is as nearly a law as possible to find. There was a religious dimension to Wight's thought. He however wavered in his commitment to traditional Christianity. He however, substituted practical morality and prudence for Christian perfectionism and continued to search for international morality based on the wisdom of the past.

Before 20th century, speculation on the society of states was derived from the international law and following sources (1)Writers who foreshadowed the League of Nations such as Erasmus, Penn, Abbe St. Pierre, (2) Machiavellians such as Friedrich

--------------------------------------------------------
295 Ibid. p. 7.
Meinecke, Philosophers and historians such as Hume, Rousseau, Bentham and Burke. (Only Burke turned exclusively to international theory). The third body of literature was likely to be a source of international theory.

Taken together, these sources are fragmentary and scattered. They stand in opposition to belief in progress and political ideas about the state, individual, virtue and good life. The progressivist tendency believes that history has to take a particular direction, otherwise there would be despair. According to him two other tendencies corrupt international theory. One is the belief that nuclear weapons have transformed international politics and made war impossible, comparable to the 19th century view that public opinion made war impossible.

Wight’s concern with ethical and religious question was recurrent through his writings. In one of his papers he explored the role of the western values in international relations, exemplified in writings of various writers. He identified four themes. First, is international society; second, is maintenance of international order. Third, is the doctrine of intervention. Finally, international morality introduces place of individual conscience in international politics and ethical limits to political action. Prudence is a moral virtue and he advocated practical morality. Wight had hoped that power politics might yield to new structures such as the League of Nations, but finally returned to principles of international history.

298 Ibid. p.56.
299 Ibid. pp.56-57.
300 Ibid. p.59.
Wight devoted much of his energies to a search for a normative foundation of politics (like Butterfield and Niebuhr) and ended with practical morality and prudence. They differed from Murray who subscribed to the natural viewpoint. E. H. Carr in his works, specially in 'The Twenty Years' Crises' tried to counteract, thinking both academic and popular about international politics. Carr felt that thinking between 1919-1939 was dominated by Utopianism. Its main weakness lay in proponents' attempts to carry over principle of 19th century liberal rationalist thought from homogenous national societies to current heterogeneous and half anarchical international order. This belief was the natural harmony of interests among nations. However, it was translated into a world of satisfied and unsatisfied nations. The various incompatible goals and aspirations, Carr, said could be accommodated not by a priori rational principles but by compromise and diplomacy. International politics lacks objective and disinterested moral or legal standards for resolving conflicts. However, realism was not enough. Utopian and realistic thinking, both were needed throughout history. Although the need for one or the other would be greater in a particular period.

Consistent realism excludes four things which appear to be essential ingredients of all political thinking: a finite goal, "-----

301 Ibid. p.60.
302 Ibid. p.71.
303 Ibid. p.72.
304 Ibid. p.72.
305 Ibid. p.72.
an emotional appeal, a right of moral judgment and a ground for action. Carr's vision for the period included need for peaceful change based on what was just and reasonable and which took into account shifts in international power relationships. He approved of the Munich settlement of 1938.

In 'Conditions of Peace' (1942) he warned that democracies were endeavouring to meet the world crises with 19th century ideas and institutions. The Nazis and the Soviets made giant strides toward recovery through economic planning but the victors remained spectators and prisoners to 19th century thinking. The co-operation between western people and Soviet Russia in the war should help to resolve the antithesis incidental rather than fundamental between the secular ideals of Christianity and Communism.

In 'Nationalism and After' (1945) Carr examined the changes between the 19th and 20th century nationalism, principally the extension of political participation within nations to include new social groups, the visible reunior of economic and political power and beginning of a vast proliferation of nation-states following second World War. He warned of the bankruptcy of nationalism resulting from two world wars. The nation-state was an example of an obsolescent institution as it failed to provide either security of economic well-being. A new international order was necessary. It must rest on common

306 Ibid., p.72.
307 Ibid., p.73.
310 Ibid, p.74.
effort for social justice, freedom from want and full employment.  

In his 'The Soviet Impact on the Western World' (1947) and 'A History of Soviet Russia' (1950-1978) Carr studied the Soviet challenge to the West. Apart from a favourable impact on the West by creating a concern for the common man there, it posed a challenge by declaring the ideals of western democracy to be a reflection of a privileged class. The Soviet challenge was moral and not military. Nothing in Russian tradition supports a policy of military action in Europe beyond the eastern zone.

Apart from philosophical thought many judgments of Carr proved to be wrong. This according to Thompson was due to fundamental weaknesses in political philosophy. Four explanations are possible. Firstly, his Marxist orientation drove him to search for values within and not outside historical process. Secondly, he equated superior morality with superior power. Thirdly, he had little to say about proximate morality. Fourthly, he developed no transcendent point of view from which to appraise the phenomenon of power and felt that there was no possibility of discovering an objective standard outside history. To this, Carr replied that absolutes do exist such as liberty and equality, justice and democracy. As broad categories they were devoid of content unless given specific meaning. The values of 19th century were undermined in war I. After that two responses were possible—establishment of socialism or establishment of capitalism. He

311 Ibid. p. 74.
312 Ibid. p. 75.
opted for socialism because it represented the optimism of change. 313

Talking of realists, Morgenthau was another, talked of power politics at a time and in Chicago, where it was considered to be evil that world government and public administration were to eradicate, so that people could live in a civilised government. It is true that in 'Politics Among Nations' he described power as perpetual aim of states in time and place as always the immediate aim. However, critics overlooked his early emphasis on the limitations and proper use of power and overlooked his extended analysis of international morality and ethics. The main functions of this normative system has been to keep aspirations for power within normal limits. In 'Defense of National Interest' (1951) he expressed the view that morality and national interest were not opposed to each other. 314 The conflict was only based on moral principles based on reality and not based on reality. In 'The Purpose of American Politics' (1960) he expressed the view that military and economic power were not to be employed to serve diverse, universal, human missions but must be measured against imperatives of national interest. His criticism of Vietnam war partly followed from this. His impact on America was in that he brought to America - a European understanding of the problems of power and foreign policy. This European tradition was derived from various sources. Mainly the tradition conceived of primacy of existence of state, close relationship between power and diplomacy and primacy of foreign policy tempered by

313 Ibid. p.78.
314 Ibid. p.85.
restraint. He told Americans that not international law or morality but power preserved international stability. Of course moral restraints were there. Morality was influenced by time and culture and technology. He conceived of America as an example but did not ask the U.S. to impose its concept of human rights on others. The Wilsonian or Carterian concepts of human rights was impossible to enforce and impracticable to enforce as America had manifold interests throughout the world. Spykman was another realist. 'Power' he said, 'has a bad name. There is a tendency among liberals and idealists to believe that the subject of power should not be spoken of except in terms of moral disapproval'. He concluded: 'Political ideals and visions unsupported by force appear to have little survival value'.

His major work 'America's strategy in World Politics' treats arguments about isolationism and internationalism very rigourously. Isolationism had its emotional as well as strategic aspects. Emotionally it appealed to immigrants who had turned their backs on Europe, even when conflict had reached their new homeland. Strategically it referred to the controversy whether order and equilibrium of Europe constituted a vital American interest. Spykman, however, said that intellectual foundations of internationalist thought were also not adequate. He argued that in successive crises the staunchest internationalists have been

315 Ibid., p.88.
316 Ibid., p.88.
317 Ibid., p.89.
318 Ibid., p.89.
319 Ibid., p.92.
321 Ibid., p.94.

83
those who were inspired by idealist considerations. Some asked for participation because they were pro-British. Others believed that they had a moral obligation to support those whose social and political structure resembled our's. Only a few were explicit that first line of defense for U.S.A. lies in preservation of balance of power in Europe and Asia.

In 1942 he said that the new order will not be different from the old. 'It will be a world of power politics.' An equilibrium of forces inherently unstable, always shifting, is certainly not an ideal power pattern...... but it is an indispensable element for an international order based on independent states. As far as America is concerned, he recommends, 'not specifically selected instances in history of U.S.A. but the general experience of states should be made the guide for a programme of action'. His approach to political realities had a solid European base and uses that background to Americans understand their national responsibility.

Arnold Wolfers was another realist. According to him second world war resulted not from failure of the League of Nations or from the American rejection of the League but from conflicting policies of Great Britain and France. The basic question was - Germany (he thought it would be after the second world war). 'It was to hold Germany's power - its territory, armaments and economic influence - below the maximum level that would make it a threat to other European countries but above the minimum level necessary to prevent German resentment and revolt'. Only if U.K.

322 Ibid., p.94.
323 Ibid., p.95.
324 Ibid., p.101.
France and Germany agreed that level, a lasting settlement would be arrived at. 'As long as there are many great sovereign powers in Europe, a balance of power is the available alternative to domination of one nation over others.' \(^{325}\)

U.S.A., according to Dr. Wolfers had a special responsibility for 'conflicts that arise on the periphery and move to the centre'. \(^ {326}\) The complications arising out of America's role as world policeman were not seen by Dr. Wolfers. He too tried to combine the European and American perspectives. He asserted the reality of national interest (European writings) and questioned its identification with interest and power and felt that national interest could be anything and its interpretation could be a contentious issue. \(^ {327}\) The Europeans concentrated on states and American view emphasized human beings whose reaction constitutes the behaviour of the state. \(^ {328}\)

John H. Herz was another realist who tried to combine realism with idealism. It was expressed in his work 'Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realism (1951). His second work 'International Politics in the Atomic Age' took a better account of post-11nd war realities and introduced some new concepts.

Herz began with the problem of security in the nuclear age as it affects the rise and demise of territorial state. Later on he shifted his attention to problems of food and population, environment and resource deflation and 'survival

---

\(^{325}\) Ibid., p.101.
\(^{326}\) Ibid., p.105.
\(^{327}\) Ibid., p.106.
\(^{328}\) Ibid., p.106.
ethics' (overlooked by many a realist). A minimum ethic of survival 'must supersede past reflections on individual or group ethical standards from historic international politics. Yet he despairs over malfunctioning of nation state's future and obstacles to implementing survival ethics in most foreign policy decisions specially in U.S.A. 329 He is concerned with 'power-surplus of great powers, their shortsighted compromises with popular demands for nuclear and industrial supremacy and mankind's unwillingness to contemplate without mincing the possibility of the end of civilization (he calls for reflection on "ethics of a decent demise" or preparing for an exit from survival). Thus he broadened the agenda of political realism in later works. 331 One may even accuse Herz of having abandoned the essence of political realism.

Karl Deutsch in his 'Nationalism and Social Communication' (1953) posed the question: 'why nationalist ideas met with wide response to certain times and place and with almost no response at others'. He also asked why economic growth at times led to unification but at other times to diversity. Deutsch examined the impact of ethnic nationalities on governments, he posed the question: 'Have the events of the last few decades tended to unify the world or split it more deeply than before? Have internationalism or nationalism, constitutionalism or revolution, tolerance or repression, peace or war been the dominant forces in the first half of 20th century'? 332 His view was that no

329 Ibid., p.112.
330 Ibid., p.112.
single answer was possible.

When one talks of power, the definition should not be too narrow. Factors that legitimise power should not be ignored. Why has power remained limited to ethnic, regional or national units? Deutsch gives two reasons: "first an assembly of an effective inner structure, an effective past, within the individual or group; and second, the assembly of means to carry into effect, the implications of this inner structure, to impose them on institutions in the outside world." The inner source of political power in society depends on facilities for social communications — facilities for strong and disseminating memories and values. These facilities help people to constitute people as a community of social communications. Nationalism which has been strengthened by Industrial Revolution has tended to separate people, but at the same time it has prepared them for a more thoroughgoing world-wide unity than any known in human history. A major barrier to such unity is unevenness in social communications and national wealth. "Not before the bottom of the barrel of world's large peoples has been reached, not before inequality and insecurity have become less extreme, not before vast poverty of Asia and Africa will have been reduced substantially by industrialization and gains in living standards in education — not before then will the age of nationalism and national diversity see the beginning of end." In his other

333 Ibid., p.117.
334 Ibid., p.117.
335 Ibid., p.117.
336 Ibid., p.117.
works he tried to examine whether North Atlantic and Western Europe were integrated communities and to what extent comparably. 'Nationalism and Its Alternatives' is his book in which he examined the growth of nationalism in various areas and contended that its development was similar. Nationalism has its paradoxes such as heightened power of the state and loss of judgment on both local and world problems. In Eastern Europe and developing countries national assimilation has never quite worked. Nationalism in eastern Europe has not been the only alternative. 338 In the inter-war period, it became a creed of monopoly and privilege for few and it was embellished with a fantastic fear of poor! East European resentment against social injustice and desire for self determination found an outlet in communist movements. Nationalism and communism reinforced one another, yet communism has not abolished the nation-state. 339 Both the communist and the non-communist worlds have been struggling to resolve to persistent and world wide problems: the problem of poverty and ignorance and the rise of nation-states with consequent alienation, fear and suspicion and imminent danger of war. 340 Deutsch is also afraid that communist and nationalist forces may combine to create a torrent of popular hatred against the west.

An area of interest and concern for some of the western thinkers has been the area of cold war. What is the nature of cold war? How it can be prevented from exploding into a world

339 Ibid., p.121.
340 Ibid., p.121.
war? During the cold war how can the rivalry between two superpowers be managed? Under what circumstances would the cold war end? What would be the role of normative elements in a world dominated by cold war ethos?

Walter Lippman was a rationalist. He was with President Woodrow Wilson in recommending to give up isolationism but wanted to know what would be put into its place. He would not agree with Wilson who said, 'we can not turn back we can only go forward with lifted eyes and freshened spirit, to follow the vision'. He believed in change and continuity.

He was convinced that throughout 20th century the U.S.A. lacked a settled and general philosophy (since war with Spain in 1898). Lacking this, America had been unable to prepare for war or to safeguard the peace. A big problem of U.S. foreign policy was failure to balance objectives and power. Defence of 'vital interest' of U.S. must be the main and primary objectives of U.S.A. Vital interests are those that people agree must be defended at the risk of their lives. He defined U.S. vital interests as 'defuse of air, land and water from Alaska to Philippines and Australia and from Greenland to Brazil and Patagonia. Because the combined forces of the old world would be overwhelmingly superior to those of the Western Hemisphere to fall under the domination of any major outside power, America can never allow significant regions of this hemisphere to fall under the domination of a major controlling power. In order to protect the Western hemisphere, it must help preserve the balance of

341 Ibid., p.133.
342 Ibid., p.135.
343 Ibid., p.135.
power elsewhere in the world. Changing technology of warfare and realignment of major powers may change the alliances it seeks for its security.

Peace depended on firm relations between allies and recognizing the two emerging aggregates of power, the Atlantic community and the Russian orbit. Russia was as invulnerable in her land and mass as the United States was at the core of the community. Between Russia and the west, there was deep distrust. He was critical of peace after first world war as it was general and not specific. Similarly, after second world war he favoured the solution of German problem, Atlantic defence community and the Marshal plan but was critical of the Truman Doctrine as 'strategic monstrosity'.

George Kennan

He was persuaded that two super powers could not be enemies but could not be friends either. His 'telegram of eight thousand words from Moscow' (February 22, 1946) and "Mr. X" article provided theoretical ground and justification for containment policy of Truman, although he later on clarified that he did not favour containment everywhere and that he favoured political and not military containment of U.S.S.R. Like Lippman he said, "I have been struck by congenital aversion of Americans to taking specific decisions on specific problems, and by their persistent urge to seek universal formulae and doctrines'. His criticism of U.S. not supporting China's admission into the U.N., his criticism of Dr. Kissinger's attempt

344 Ibid., p.138.
345 Ibid., p.138.
346 Ibid., p.150.
to extend containment policy to Angola (because of increased Soviet capability and range) was based on specific actions. 347 America's failure in the first half of 20th century in the area of foreign policy was due to its legalistic, moralistic approach. 348 Yet law was not abstract and rigid to accommodate conflicting interests. It was of little value in protecting East Europe or controlling civil wars. Yet law prevailed in U.S. foreign policy because of American success in establishing the rule of law within the boundaries of U.S.A. and also because lawyers were a dominant group. Moralism was a more serious deficiency. Those who are for law feel a superiority against its breakers and want to punish them like hell. But, a war fought in the name of high moral principles intensifies violence and is more destructive of political stability than war based on national interest. 349. If purposes at home are decent ones, unsullied by arrogance or hostility toward other people or delusions of superiority, this contributes more to a better and more peaceful world than claims of universal law or absolute moral principles. 350 In 'Realities of American Policy' he criticised the replacement of early American foreign policy with limited aims by a dream-like foreign policy. If there is one lesson, Americans must learn is that "we must be gardeners and not mechanics in our approach to foreign affairs. we must think of development of international life as an organic and not a

347 Ibid, 'Criticism of extension of containment to Angola it detail, pp.151-152.
348 Ibid., p.152.
349 Ibid., p.153.
mechanical process." Some assume that Americans influence Russians by acting. The Russians watch and are influenced by what Americans do at home and by what Americans do more than by what they say. In 'Russia, the Atom and the West' (1957) he said that atom could provide shield behind which western societies would develop a new sense of direction and purpose. Like Lippman, he called for settlement of the German problem. He called for U.S. and Russian withdrawal of troops from the heart of Europe. In 'Cloud of Danger: Current Realities of American Foreign Policy' (1977) he called for every possible advance toward disarmament. He considers military-industrial complex as an enemy of a prudent foreign policy.

Louis J. Halle was a historian of the cold war. Tracing the origins of the cold war, he differs from those who view cold war as Armageddon for America and also with those who believe that there was nothing at stake. He traces roots of Soviet policy back to historic Russian attitudes and indicates that American behaviour was an outgrowth of historic experience that was the direct opposite of the Russians. (No enemy had swept across American borders generation after generation, Americans have resisted centralization and repression rather than giving passive approval to its establishment out of fear and custom.) The story of cold war, was not one of virtue struggling to overcome evil but instead one of irony, tragedy, and apparently inevitable.

353 Ibid., p.154.
354 Ibid., p.164.
conflict. Both sides are caught up in a condition of absolute predicament or irreducible dilemma; the proper attitude for the observer, is sympathy for both the parties." Louis J. Halle's 'Out of Chaos' (1977) is a work of epic proportion and on human history. His major thesis is that men in historic civilizations over the past 6000 years have brought order out of chaos through application of mind and spirit and establishment of a normative order and it breaks down when that order breaks down. Then next two or centuries for the west will be a period of chaos and disorder, more damaging because of nuclear weapons. About ultimate outcome of a western civilization in decline, like Toynbee, Halle suspends a judgment unlike the pessimistic Spengler. Halle sees possibility of a realistic political settlement between the East and the West but no chance for world government. He agrees with Toynbee about birth, death and birth of civilization but puts faith in one sublime order that awaits full realization.

Raymond Aron. In his 'Century of Total War' (1954) examined the transformation of warfare from Sarajevo to Hiroshima. He asked how men were to control forces let loose by a century of war. As to the causes of war, he did not consider economic causes as being responsible, political and diplomatic interest come first. 'Modern economy creates solidarity among nations. The idea of sharing spoils, of seizing treasures belongs to another age. In the century of industry and trade, war would deal a fatal blow to everyone'.

355 Ibid., p.164.
356 Ibid., p.166.
357 Ibid., p.169.
In cold war, war and peace are not two distinct and separate conditions; has condemned democracies to permanent mobilization. In these circumstances he called for 'faith without illusions'. Although American and Russian systems were opposed to each other, their struggle in Africa and Asia can be viewed in similar terms. Difference between developed and developing countries will last for centuries. Developing world can have material progress. Spiritual progress does not automatically follow material progress. Aron rules out establishment of universal empire including a communist empire because cultures of the world are too diverse and nationalism too strong a force. The state of nature is the distinguishing feature of international relations and a rational theory must take that into account. In addition force is legitimised in international relations. However, war is a social and not natural phenomena. The statesman's aim must be to moderate and not eliminate war. His aim must be to do the most good in peace time and least harm in war. International relations thus has a social as well as anti-social character. Prudence in foreign policy represents a synthesis of social and anti-social requirements of normative theory. The goal of normative theory in practice is the establishment of concrete and accessible moral objectives, not the search for limitless moral objectives. Normatively, Aron rejects the ethics of correction as immediate guide to action and chooses instead the ethics of

360 Ibid. , p.174.
361 Ibid. , p.175.
362 Ibid. , p.176.
363 Ibid. , p.176.
responsibility.\textsuperscript{364} In cold war it demands preparedness and deterrent strength but not recklessness.\textsuperscript{365} Historically, regimes claiming absolute truth end up in repression and totalitarianism. U.S.S.R. is no exception.\textsuperscript{366}

Aron is skeptical about prospects of universal peace, a moral human and moral course for national leaders is to strive for moderation, look for reasonable choices and follow the path of prudence.\textsuperscript{367}

World Order Theories: The world scene invites study and analysis of forces of nationalism and internationalism. The majority of earlier thinkers have emphasized forces of national sovereignty, although not to the exclusion of common international interests. Other thinkers consider now emerging world wide interests and have endeavored to create theories of world order.

Quincy Wright: He belonged to Chicago university where there was a school of institutionalists. Hutchins argued that although world community necessary for the world government did not exist, world government interacting with community could bring it into being. Wright was an institutionalist, though he was not a narrow institutionalist. He was however endlessly intrigued by the question of how much community was necessary for what kind of institutions in the society.\textsuperscript{368}

\textsuperscript{364} Ibid., p.176.
\textsuperscript{365} Ibid., p.177.
\textsuperscript{366} Ibid., p.177.
\textsuperscript{367} Ibid., p.177.
\textsuperscript{368} Ibid., p.183.
He put faith in international institutions but he was attempting to determine conditions of peace through a deepening understanding of causes of war. His study of war was based on actual evidences but his ideas about warfare and control of warfare represent a limited philosophy of history. War according to him has roots in "the struggle for natural resources, the persistence of insecurity in the personal and international relationships and the inadequacies of law and order in the international scene."\(^369\) This was prophetic even for 1980s and may be even for 1990s. Although colonialism ended, he prophesied that new forms of dependency would emerge and create tensions.\(^370\) A major criticism against Wright was that in order to be a reformer and his emphasis on law made him misjudge perennial problems of international politics. As a result, he got too much attached to transient reformist causes.\(^371\)

**David Mitrany**

Mitrany was an internationalist who wanted to promote internationalism not through a political or direct or comprehensive approach. He believed that it could be promoted through a sectoral approach e.g. in education he believed that an international community of educators or scientist was emerging. He believed that a functional interest in education promotes a spirit of internationalism. The key question was whether internationalism in education would create it in actions and programmes and whether would promote internationalism in

politics. Mitrany believed it would. On the other hand, an argument can be made that education itself is influenced by national culture and national politics. Functionalism has been criticized as non-institutional non-political and Utopian. Yet functionalism involves a diagnosis of problems or disorder in the international society. It is not bound to an ideology but to living realities of world order of public welfare and international service. Functionalism assumed that just as material self-sufficiency had brought peace and tranquility nationally, it could bring peace internationally if the size of units evolved was commensurate with mankind's social and economic needs.

Yet functionalism has not overcome the national loyalties; the more fundamental the areas of co-operation, the greater the impact of nationalism. World order evolves slowly and persistent national interests and attitude remain a part of international landscape.

Charles de Visscher: An expert on international law, he said it depended on moral foundations of humanity. A retrograde development was replacement of natural law by positivism. It excluded from law, the higher considerations of reason, justice and common utility which are the necessary foundations. It led to the idea of state as a source of law, state sovereignty and common utility. With this absolute notion of state

---

372 Ibid., p.207.
373 Ibid., pp.212-213.
374 Ibid., p.203.
375 Ibid., p.213.
376 Ibid., p.219.
sovereignty came the idea of balance of power. This was 'indelibly useful in promoting moderation but could not set up a true world order'. For balance is like all concepts that rely on force. Not necessarily false, they are always inadequate, since force is good or bad according to the use made of it'. 377

Visscher's contribution to international relations lies in two areas: he proposed a teleological view of international law.378 It was not divorced from power. He insisted on it being granted in reality but that power was also not to be divorced from moral ends. 379 This was the weakness of positivism although positivism itself was an improvement over the deformed and sterile law of nature. In short for Visscher, international law was not a fixed, static idea determined by one period of history but a dynamic changing evolutionary idea capable of growth towards ordering power to serve human ends'.380 "It is pure illusion to expect from the mere arrangement of inter-state relations the establishment of a community order. This can find a solution in the development of true international spirit in men...... What is decisive is the disposition within the states to keep its actions within limits assigned to it by a functional conception which order power to human ends instead of dedicating it to its own indefinite extension." 381 The development of international spirit would not occur by systematically

377 Ibid., p.219.  
378 Ibid., p.220.  
379 Ibid., p.220.  
380 Ibid., p.220.  
381 Ibid., p.220.  

58
undermining state sovereignty. "The transition from state to international morality will not take place by way of a mere spatial broadening of present moral attitudes of men". Perception of a common good, consciousness of a destiny common to all is essential. What de Visscher asserted was the power of idea, which most realist undervalued. "The international community is a potential order in the minds of men; it does not correspond to an effectively established order. It falls short of a legal community in that it lacks legal control of the use of force. The human ends of power alone can provide a moral basis for action." Yet to pretend that men confined within closely-knit national communities were likely to take a universal moral outlook was wrong. Visscher's solution for creating an international spirit was a network of international institutions. This was because of his profound commitment to world order serving humanity, although a realist would have preferred to promote nations' observance of legal undertakings through examination of political and social situation.

A.J. Toynbee: For Toynbee, history was a consequence of man's relation to his geographical environment as well as men. It was a result of struggle between good and evil in men, where the ultimate victory must be that of good.

382 Ibid., p.221.
383 Ibid., p.221.
384 Ibid., p.221.
385 Ibid., p.223.
386 Ibid., p.223.
In his first publication, Toynbee was of the view that 'not civilizations but nations were the intelligible units of history and he was most optimistic about national units. The European national state was the norm of a civilized society and had so far revolved a 'facility of indefinite organic growth'. World war I was only an accident which had temporarily disturbed Europe's progress towards warless internationalism. However war I created in his mind misgivings about the nation state as a measure of things.

In the second stage of his writings which began in 1922, he wrote, "Western society is a closer and more permanent unity than...... the independent states that form and dissolve within its boundaries." Civilization for Toynbee became more a fundamental unit than nations. There was no permanent growth as far as civilizations were concerned. They develop and decay. New civilizations develop out of contact of civilizations. Sometimes the more aggressive civilizations are successful in introducing trivial elements like technology into other civilizations. He described this as diffraction of culture. An institution or a social phenomena that is an organic part of a total culture when separated from the whole in the form of a cultural ray may threaten or undermine the assaulted society. Thus the nation-state in Europe, where it has been founded on common linguistic groups has not been explosive but in the East, it has

387 Ibid., p.235.
388 Ibid., p.235.
389 Ibid., p.235.
390 Ibid., p.234.
391 Ibid., p.238.
392 Ibid., p.238.
been. In the 1920s, he believed that impact of Westernization would arrest trends towards fragmentation of states and provide foundations for world unity.

In the third period of historical method, in 1939 Toynbee shifted the approach from civilizations to higher religions. His approach to world order reflected a fervent belief in unity of life and thought. In 1964, he defined his vision of future as 'not between a whole world and shredded up world but between one world and no world’. He prophesied that unity would emerge in 21st century. He based his hope on his concepts about man and history. For him spiritual forces controlled history and the end of history was the kingdom of God.

Although he had faith in western civilization as it had survived 12 or 13 centuries, despite temporary setbacks, he knew it could decline like 25 other civilizations. Nationalism intensified by factors of war and class were its weakness. Immediate political solution was a settlement between U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. based on division of world into spheres of influence. Ultimate political solution was world government. The immediate political settlement would provide time and create environment for world government. An interesting study of views of thinkers (1516 to 1919) of Anglo-Saxon world on international relations is by Dr. Arnold Wolfers. In a

393 Ibid., p.238.
394 Ibid., p.239.
395 Ibid., p.240.
396 Ibid., p.241.
397 Ibid., p.241.
398 Ibid., p.243.
beautiful introduction to book, Wolfers mentions the moral preferences and broad assumptions about man and his motives are inescapable starting point for even the most strictly empirical enterprise in matters of national behaviour. In this all students in the field, consciously or unconsciously belong to schools of moral and philosophical thought. An important concern of Wolfers in the book is to explain the separation of theory or theories about international relations theory in Anglo-Saxon world from political theory in general. He mentions three factors. The first factor is the strategic insularity of both the British isles and the American continent. Where propinquity rather than isolation was characteristic of relations between states as on the continent of Europe, domestic affairs could not be conceived of except in interdependence with foreign affairs. In fact the main emphasis was on so-called primacy of foreign policy. The second factor is that in countries like U.K. and U.S.A. domestic political conditions stood in sharp contrast to external conditions. Domestic factors in these countries were characterized by order, lawfulness and peace arising from consensus on principles. External relations continue to be full of bitter struggle, violence and prompted by Machiavellian principles. Therefore, separate theories about domestic and international politics. Wolfers however doubts whether this distinction is worth maintaining now because difference between domestic politics and international politics is reduced now and

400 Ibid., 'Introduction', p.XIV.
401 Ibid., 'Introduction', pp. XV to XVII.
the former is not complete order nor is later complete disorder. The third factor is that of 'moral opportunity'. In England and U.S.A. the national sovereignty was put to good use internally for development of institutions of lawful government and civil liberty. On the other hand externally it produced a multi-state system with conflicts, struggle and war. This made the domestic scene interesting for philosophers, specially those with normative concern. Here too, Wolfers feels that domestic scene does not in practice reveal a united mind and that moral opportunity is not lacking in external field. Wolfers takes great pain to justify the selection of particular thinkers of a particular period. All of them belong to European age and were living in the age of nation-state system with multiple sovereignties. He feels that response of thinkers of Anglo-Saxon age differs from response of continentals. Continental theory centered around the idea of 'necessity of the state'. They believed that they were constantly exposed to forces beyond their control. Some even felt that nations were puppets in the hands of demonic forces with little leeway, if any, to rescue moral values from a sea of tragic necessity. Thus on the whole continental thought can be described as Machiavellian. As far as Anglo-Saxon tradition is concerned, even the concept of necessity of state or reason of state remained foreign to political philosophers. They were concerned here with the best way of applying accepted principles of morality to the field of foreign policy. The

402 Ibid., 'Introduction', p.XVI.
403 Ibid., 'Introduction', p.XVI.
404 Ibid., 'Introduction', p.XX.
assumption was that they had the freedom to choose the right path as in internal field. This was a philosophy of choice then which was bound to be ethical over a philosophy of necessity. Thus from More to Wilson, they were concerned with right of self-defence and its limits, duty or not to intervene in affairs of others, extent to which colonial rule was justified under given circumstances. Whereas the philosophy of necessity tends to lead to resignation, irresponsibility or amorality, philosophy of choice may lead to excessive moralism or self-righteousness, if leeway for choice was unlimited. But the Anglo-Saxon thinkers did not suffer from this limitations as they accepted limitations put by necessity of self-preservation or duty of self-defence put on them. "Nations were not being advised to sacrifice themselves on the altar of humanity or human liberty or to set the general interest above the national interest of self-preservation".

There was reliance on rules of prudence. Of course this could lead to hypocrisy, as any action in foreign affairs could be justified as a measure of self-defence. However Wolfers put it "the moral philosophers in question, rather than posing as apologists of their nation, placed themselves in the creditable role of serving as conscience of nation reminding statesman of dictates of justice and reason." In addition, the Anglo-Saxon thinkers were aware of the exceptional freedom of choice which insularity gave to their countries. They knew their countries could remain aloof, keep their hands clean of "obnoxious vicissitudes of power

405 Ibid., 'Introduction', p.XXI.
406 Ibid., 'Introduction', p.XXI.
407 Ibid., 'Introduction', p.XXI to XXII.
politics' to which others were subjected and yet maintain their national security. 408

A doubt may be raised as to whether a Locke, Jefferson, Godwin, Wilson and Hobbes, Mahan, or Hamilton can be described as belonging to same school. However, all of them have common approach too. They all emphasise moral aspects of political choice. Nowhere do they suggest that competition for power, conflict, struggle or war could be regarded as signs of national health or heroism. 409 In case of conflict between self-preservation and moral choice, they point to the case of individual who is morally justified in protecting himself against external attack. 'It fails into account how far more extensive and arbitrary than in case of individuals are the claims that nations can label as self-defence'. 410 The emphasis placed on moderation and self-restraint indicates some awareness of this moral pitfall. In actual practice, insularity assured self-preservation to such an extent that the dilemma hardly arose for them. In addition an abiding confidence in reasonableness and commonsense took much of the sting out of it.

Wolfers raises a pertinent question. With the end of insular security, is modification of traditional philosophy not required? Anglo-Saxon world has become 'continental' in terms of dangers and compulsions pressing upon them from outside. It could result in adoption of continental philosophy of necessity. The other departure could take place by closing one's eyes to diminution of leeway and pretend that what was evil when done by

408 Ibid., 'Introduction', p.XXII.
409 Ibid., 'Introduction', p.XXIII.
410 Ibid., 'Introduction', p.XXIII.
others was no longer evil when done by oneself.\textsuperscript{411} The Anglo-Saxon tradition neither encouraged such cynicism or hypocrisy. It had always indicated self-preservation with moderation. 'Even now survival is not always at stake. Even now there is a freedom of choice between more or less of a sense of responsibility for the whole of mankind'.\textsuperscript{412}

Main and significant ideas of these thinkers treated by Wolfers are as described as below:

\textbf{Sir Thomas More:} In his Utopian More is critical of European politics characterised by wars for the glory of kings. The Utopians do not enter alliances based on assumption that nations would attack each other unless restrained by treaties. Treaties are not observed anyway. Utopians detest war and justify only a few though they remain prepared. Utopians favour war with as little destruction as possible.

\textbf{Francis Bacon:} He too was full of scorn for treaties unless based on power relationships. General peace could only be preserved by balance of power 'as men are savage by nature'. State should pursue its interests and war was a normal instrument. But not all wars were justifiable and Bacon pleaded for restraints.

\textbf{Thomas Hobbes:} Without the state, the condition of human beings would be what it is in inter-state relations. In this conditions states are justified in using whatever means for self-preservation. Alliances are justifiable but leagues bring only temporary benefit.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{411} \textit{Ibid.}, 'Introduction', p.XXVI.
\item \textsuperscript{412} \textit{Ibid.}, 'Introduction', p.XXVII.
\end{itemize}
Locke: - Like Hobbes, he was not concerned with a theory of international politics but with wise ordering of civil government. However while talking of the state of nature without a state, he said it was identical to relationship of rulers of 'independent governments' with each other. The princes are subject to the law of nature in the state of nature which is not a state of war. If the state of nature is converted by any state into a state of war, others have right to resist it, punish the aggression not only for personal injury but for violating rules of conduct. Aggression is not justified as government is based on consent of government.

Bolingbroke: A Tory and a patriot but did not have a feeling of hostility toward foreigners. He was in favour of balance of power but cautioned against putting too much reliance on it. Islandic nations could afford to abstain from international conflicts with the exception of exceptional circumstances.

David Hume: International relations are like society without civil government. Balance of power was normal and helped promote moderation.

According to him, promotion of trade and commerce will help increase politeness and peace between nations.

Adam Smith: He was aware of the balance of power but felt that nations should not envy each other. An enlightened patriotism was needed. The progress of civilization would reduce wars. "Love of our country is not derived from the love of mankind. The former may even induce us to act inconsistently with the latter."

"National prejudices and hatred extend seldom beyond neighbouring
nations. Similarly good will toward distant countries could also not be extended with much effect. 413

Smith declared the belief that prosperity of other nations conflicted with England's welfare. With the exception of strategic industries he advocates free trade. Protectionism benefited only some groups. Free trade benefited whole nations. 414

Unfortunately, commerce which ought to be among nations as among individuals, a bound of friendship, has become the most fertile source of discord. Even the colonial trade should not be monopolized. 415

Adam Ferguson: Men according to Ferguson have both benevolence and rivalry. Nations are formed on the basis of expediency but they get attachment of people. Competition and struggle for resources result in conflict between nations. There being no common judge, it results in wars. Nations have right to defend but the right must be exercised in moderation. Welfare of humanity would be served in a world composed of balance of power between independent states. In its absence an empire may come into being.

Edmund Burke: Basic unit in his discussion was nation. It was a creation of ages and generations. It was an instrument of human happiness. Of course a man has an obligation not only to nation but to mankind. European community has achieved similarity of habits and standards beyond anything achieved elsewhere. A

413 Ibid., p.81.
414 Ibid., p.87.
415 Ibid., p.88.
community create more amity than treaties. Nations’ first duty was to take care of themselves. Revolutions are special events. ‘Men are never in a state of independence of each other. It is not the condition of our nature’. 416 ‘Neighbours are presumed to take cognizance of each other’s acts... This is as true of nations’. 417 He was critical of Jacobin revolution because it hurt the French people and neighbouring countries. A strong nation must have power, which is equal to that of its neighbour. War is violence but it is the sole means of justice. It should not be taken up or abandoned lightly. He scorned ‘a false reptile prudence, the result not of caution but of fear.’ The need to preserve balance of power is a reason for moderate peace. ‘It is necessary to restrain one’s own ambition as well as that of others.’ 418

Rights of other countries should be reconciled with happiness of colonies. Respect for rights of subjects was important. English Americans were to be allowed a generous measure of control. Indians should be given as much liberty as they are capable of enjoying. 419 Right to rule of Great Britain is derived from proper use of authority, and not abuse. 420 A great empire and little minds go ill together. 421

Thomas Paine: Paine believed that moral goodness of man consists in imitating moral goodness and beneficence of God manifested in creation towards all creatures. Initially he thought that

---

416 Ibid., p.113.
417 Ibid., p.113.
418 Ibid., p.121.
419 Ibid., pp.123-124.
420 Ibid., p.125.
421 Ibid., p.124.
institutions spoil or corrupt men. Later on he added 'a deep and universal change of mind' was also necessary.

His observation of the world led him to believe that whereas individuals had become civilized and ordered, nations retained "all the original rudeness of nature". Wars took place either for glory or for material reward. This hope was illusory. Monarchical system was the main culprit. European system was monarchical. Any state which cut itself from European politics would be well advised to do so. In Europe, the alliances do not survive because they do not take care of national interest but only of monarchical interest. "Democracy would serve national interest and would bring universal peace." 422 He was also prepared to visualize a confederation of Europe.

Paine was so much in favour of international co-operation that he would advocate abandonment of U.S. isolationism. He favoured a league of neutrals with power of economic and financial sanctions.

Alexander Hamilton: Men were 'ambitious, vindictive and rapacious'. Sovereign states shared these characteristics. In addition they did not have any collective conscience.

Wars resulted from many causes. commerce was the prime motive. 423 Thus he did not share the views that commerce made peaceful relations between states. Republics were as warlike as monarchies. Wars result from passions. All law and order resulted from some form of coercion. Wars are encouraged by lack of common authority. In international politics, nations seize

422 Ibid., p.133.
423 Ibid., p.140.
opportunities to extend their power. A nation has a right to oppose if its vital interests are threatened. Moral principles had a limited application. One has to rely on one's strength to protect one's rights. As the spirit of moderation in a state of overbearing power is a phenomena which has not yet appeared and which no wise men will expect ever to see. 424 "A nation despicable by its weakness, forfeits even privilege of being neutral". A nation can not be obliged to act against its own interest. Thus there is room for discretion within the bounds of international morality. Statesmen were duty-bound to act in national interest. National interest did not mean most immediately selfish policy. 425

For America he advised self-sufficiency in economy and isolationism. His ambition was to see U.S. dominate Western hemisphere.

Thomas Jefferson: Nations, not the government were the truly responsible actors in international politics. They had equal rights and were subject to a moral code, similar to that of individuals. 426 Only in case of challenge to its existence, a nation was justified in breaking it. True self-interest coincided with morality. A just foreign policy did not mean that power was not required.

The European system produced perpetual wars. American geography would help her. Balance of power in Europe helped

424 Ibid., p.145.
425 Ibid., p.147.
426 Ibid., p.156.
America. Peace is desirable but perpetual peace is difficult to maintain.

In case of injury, economic relation or war might become necessary. Even in war he favoured use of means which kept hostilities as far away as possible. For the U.S. he advocated a small and sufficient naval force.

William Godwin: His major work 'Enquiry Concerning Political Justice' was one of the earliest expositions of anarchism. Men were susceptible of 'perpetual improvement' through education etc. His distaste for state pervaded his views on international relations. National interest, national honour, trade ambitions, trade rivalries were all illusions. Such concepts served only the interest of privileged groups.

Desire for arms is based on prejudice and error. Security and peace are desirable. We should desire our security as well as of others. The love for our country has often been found to be a deceitful principle, as its direct tendency is to set the interest of one division of mankind in opposition to another and to establish a preference built upon accidental relations and not upon reason.425 'A wise and well informed man will not fail to be the votary of liberty and justice....But his attachment will be to the cause, as the cause of the man and not to the country. Wherever there are individuals, who understand the value of political justice and are prepared to assert it, that is his country. Wherever he can most contribute to the diffusion of these principles and real happiness of mankind, that is his

427 Ibid., pp.162-163.
428 Ibid., p.169.
country. Nor does he desire for any country, and other benefit than justice. 429

Godwin's emphasis on individuals rather than nations led him to place domestic affairs above foreign affairs. But he realized that men had not become perfect. They had not discarded allegiance to state. 430 Even the best behaved might be attacked. In this case armed defence might be approved. He was not prepared to denote much attention to defence as it was easier and that free men would fight better. 431 Elaborate preparations for war or alliances were unnecessary.

The balance of power was the means by which people were lured into war. 432 War was justifiable against oppressive use of power but not against its mere accumulation. 433

In war he urged restraint, moderation and benevolence. Desire for a world composed of small autonomous communities impelled Godwin to condemn colonialism. Colonialism was a source of war which did not confer any advantages on colonists or the other country. 434

'The mode in which these dependencies are acquired must be conquest, cession or colonization...Neither the first nor the second, a moralist or a politician to defend themselves....or to look for confederation with their neighbours... The support of a mother country to...colonies is much oftener a means of involving them in danger than of contributing to their security...

429 Ibid., p.169.
430 Ibid., p.170.
431 Ibid., p.170.
432 Ibid., p.175.
433 Ibid., p.175.
434 Ibid., p.179.
If they must sink into a degrading state of dependence, how will they be worse in belonging to one state rather than another. Perhaps the first step towards putting a stop to this fruitful source of war would be to annihilate that monopoly of trade'. 435

Jeremy Bentham: It was Bentham who coined the word 'international' and applied the principle of greatest happiness of the greatest number to foreign affairs. Nations should not only restrain from injury to others, but should do positive good to others.

In the existing state of international relations, wars were inevitable though distasteful. He justified only a defensive war. Even in a defensive war, costs should be calculated. Bentham saw no reason why a state should fight when defence seemed dearer than submission. 436

He drew up a 'plan for universal and perpetual peace'. It rested on emancipation of all colonies, disarmament, an international court and open diplomacy. Court would be backed by authority of public opinion. Free press and education were essential. Colonies were a source of wars, economically not beneficial. It did not benefit people of colonies. Under colonialism the real interest of colonists are sacrificed to the imaginary interest, of the mother country. 437

Richard Cobden: The best way to protect commerce is laissez-faire at home and free trade abroad. Therefore he rejected both protectionism and imperialism. Free trade would minimize risk of war as most wars were fought for mercantilist ends. Furthermore...

435 Ibid., p.179.
436 Ibid., p.183.
437 Ibid., pp.188-189.
flourishing international trade would prove a deterrent ever to those wars which were not a result of commercial rivalry.

He abominated war on humanitarian as well as economic grounds. One necessary cause of war was military establishment. Spread of democracy and rising influence of middle class would bring peace. Disarmament and arbitration were other means of solving disputes.

Balance of power was a 'chimera', a useless game as power was increasingly being determined by developments in industry and commerce. Constantly changing balance at the cost of so much blood and more wars for balance. He felt that Britain should have followed the policy laid down by Washington in his farewell address. He was against intervention in Europe to free oppressed nationalities. Injustice itself will weaken the oppressor.

John Stuart Mill: International affairs were governed by states interested in self-preservation. Therefore wars were not absolute evil. They could be used to secure justice. Law of nations were merely a set of rules. Law of nations could not be changed like other laws. With change of circumstances it should change. Unfortunately, the law of nations favours status quo. Mill even favoured intervention to help suppressed nationality achieve self-government. He was not however in favour of indiscriminate intervention. He took considerable pain to define conditions under which intervention could be justified. "To suppose that the same international customs and the same rules of international morality between civilized nations, and between

438 Ibid., p.211.
civilized nations and barbarians is a grave error..... the
reasons... rules of ordinary international morality imply
reciprocity... barbarians have not got beyond the period during
which it is to be for their benefit to be held in subjection by
foreigners". 439 Not all groups were eligible to be self-
governing. Dominion however should not be permanent and be
exercised with a view to development of the governed.

Mill did not object to colonies remaining in permanent
voluntary association with former rulers, as this would reduce
international friction and war. 440

He discussed in detail the conditions under which various
nationalities could blend. Mill was in favour of federal
government as an instrument to achieve unity with diversity, but
under certain conditions.

Herbert Spencer: For Spencer beginning of international relations
coincides with beginning of organized society. 439

Spencer, society evolved like an individual organism and evolution
meant progress. His sociology was thus progressive. International
society of future might be progressive but he felt in his days it
was full of conflict and violence. In social evolution there
emerges a transient stage in social history. In its place an
'industrial society' was developing. Ultimately a world society
may emerge. The speed of this progress would depend on decline in
warfare. Emergence of industrial society and extension of peace
thus appear reciprocal. As long as there was warfare societies

439 Ibid., p.213.
440 Ibid., p.216.
were forced to be self-sufficient. With peace interdependence will grow.  

The spread of industrialism was breaking down divisions between nationalities. Prospects for a common organization even if federal in form were brightening. Imperialism and colonialism were a bar to progress and did not benefit anybody. If colonialism was to take place it be left to individuals rather than to governments. 

A.T. Mahan : International relations consisted of contentions between independent nations. Common traditions and concept of balance provided some sense of community between nations of European origin. The community of course was tenuous and balance sometimes proved to be an attempt at preponderance. National interest was the main concern of the statesman. Self-interest alone does not impel the force behind it is passions and enthusiasms of people. Arbitration was a means of solving disputes would not be effective. War was a necessary means, although he occasionally deplored war. He had faith in coincidence of victory and justice. This led him very close to the idea that might is right. There was also the unusual argument that a larger nation in world politics was equivalent to a democratic majority in domestic politics to which a small nation (minority) must yield. Armament did not increase the chances of war, it decreased it. Adequate force as per needs (decision

441 Ibid., pp.221 -233.  
442 Ibid., p.235.  
443 Ibid., p.237.  
444 Ibid., p.241.  
445 Ibid., p.242.
must be political in character) must be created and not in absolute terms. Political states of world and temper of nationalities must be considered. 446

Domination of civilized over backward was justified. Imperial nations had a sacred duty. Colonialism was a means of gaining time for white people to educate coloured for admission to world community, before the impending struggle between Asia and West. 447 In the contact between these civilizations he feared the material benefit of west will be used up first but spiritual will take a long time to be accepted. 448

Colonialism for Mahan is the spread of western culture and institutions and England and America must co-operate and U.S.A. must give up its policy of rejecting any advance beyond our shorelines. 449

John Atkinson Hobson: The dominant characteristics of contemporary international relations was the existence of several competing imperialisms resulting in arms races and war. The imperialism was the result of chronic underconsumption in industrial economies. The major motive of course was economic. Protectionism is also for economic reasons but it is undertaken under the guide of nationalist government. However some assert that political sentiments of nationalism are the real source of economic policy. However according to Hobson imperialism was motivated by economic motives and supported by nationalism. 450 As far as economic costs of imperialism are

446 Ibid., p.244.
447 Ibid., p.245.
448 Ibid., p.245.
449 Ibid., p.247.
450 Ibid., p.253.
concerned, they are borne by nations but return are enjoyed by few. Imperialist wars are fought for the interest of few. The interests of the people of the worlds are compatible. The expansionist urge could be checked internally by reforming economic system which endowed class with an international fraction. (Military - industrial complex theory)

Hobson did not agree that international war served a useful and indispensable function in the progress of mankind. Competition though useful need not be violent. In such a world common interest of mankind might be reflected in international political organization. Direct intercommunication of persons, goods and information is creating the common experience necessary to found a common life beyond the area of nationality. 'There is, explained Hobson, 'a third alternative to the policy of national independence on one hand and the right of conquest on the other, - the alternative of experimental and progressive federation'. His idea does not conflict with preservation of what is valuable in nationalism or imply suspension of struggle in industry, politics, art or literature.

Hobson did not believe that civilized nations should be restrained in utilizing resources in tropical areas or from introducing modern techniques. He proposed a trusteeship of colonial areas (1902) for benefit of civilized world and for the

---

451 Ibid., p.253.
452 Ibid., p.255.
453 Ibid., p.255.
454 Ibid., p.255.
455 Ibid., p.259.
benefit of natives. He did not believe in colonization by individuals.

Hobson's main emphasis was on ending economic monopolies and preferences in colonies. If such a thing happens, political imperialism becomes an empty shell, an illusion of quantitative power conceived in idle terms of area and population. To summarise Hobson's ideas: 'once convert the open Door into a genuinely constructive policy of international co-operation for the peaceful development of under-developed resources of the world, administered by impartially internationally minded men in the interest of society of nations and with proper regard to the claims of inhabitants of backward countries, a political support will have been found for that great and complex but hitherto "ungoverned" system of economic internationalism which has come into being during recent generations. The dangerous collisions between forces of political nationalism and of economic internationalism would thus be obviated not by denials of claims of the former but by the political control of the latter'.

Woodrow Wilson

In domestic as well as in international arena his name has become a symbol of certain idealistic attitude. Among the important tenets of his thoughts was the need for Christian conduct and faith in considered judgment of people through democratic process.

456 Ibid., p.258.
457 Ibid., p.261.
458 Ibid., pp.261-262.
459 Ibid., p.264.

120
As far as relations between states are concerned, the standards applied in relations between individuals should be applied to states.” We wish nothing” he asserted “that can be had only at the expense of other people”.\textsuperscript{460} He believed that America cosmopolitan in population and yet free from trial of European politics had a particularly favourable opportunity to offer a salutary example of honourable and peaceful behaviour toward other nations.

If we had aggressive purposes and covetous ambitions they were the fruits of our thoughtless youth as a nation and we have put them aside. He asserted, “we shall never take another foot of territory by conquest”.\textsuperscript{461}

“We are the mediating nation of the world. I do not mean that we undertake not to mind our own business... I mean the word in a broader sense of the world. We are compounded of nations of the world... we are therefore able to understand all nations... America is ready to turn, free to turn in any direction... America is particularly free... that she has no hampering ambitions as world power”.\textsuperscript{462}

Wilson conceded that a policy of peaceful and aloof example was not always feasible. A capability for stout defence was necessary. Force could not itself promote values. It served merely to arrest threats to such values.\textsuperscript{463}

There is something that American people love better than they love peace. They love the principles upon which their

\textsuperscript{460} Ibid., p.264.
\textsuperscript{461} Ibid., p.265.
\textsuperscript{462} Ibid., p.266.
\textsuperscript{463} Ibid., p.267.
political life is founded... It would rather surrender territory than surrender these ideals'.

'And', he added, 'because we hold certain ideals we have thought it was right that we should hold them for others as well. America has been willing to fight for liberty of another people as well'.

However, when America fights for its principles, the choice must be made with 'moderation of counsel and temperateness of judgment' and 'our motive will not be revenge or victorious assertion of physical might of the nation'.

Force will not accomplish anything that is permanent... the only thing that will hold the world steady is silent insistent, all powerful opinion of mankind. Peace would have to be reached by force of reasons of justice after the trial at arms is found futile. For every territorial settlement welfare of populations concerned must be the sole criteria. Populations can not be traded like property. Self determination is not a catch-phrase but an imperative principle of reasons which statesman can ignore at their peril.

Peace can be established only on the basis of agreement of mankind about common interest and method of achieving it. A League of democratic states would establish peace. At Versailles, President Wilson made it clear, we are not representatives of governments, but representatives of

464 Ibid., p.267.
465 Ibid., p.268.
466 Ibid., p.269.
467 Ibid., p.271.
468 Ibid., p.271.
469 Ibid., p.273.
470 Ibid., p.275.
471 Ibid., p.276.
people', Settlements may be temporary', he added, 'we can set up permanent processes'. We have talked about Wilson's conception of America's world role. It was idealistic and universalistic. It can best be understood by comparing his conception of world role with that of his opponents. No doubt there were isolationists. But there were limited internationalists too. The leader of that group Senator Henry Cabot Lodge believed that America had evolved a special, historical individuality and a unique system of values which were the product of circumstance. Though he was prepared to go to great lengths to defend and preserve that individuality he did not like Wilson seek its preservation in an attempt to secure its universal acceptance. The United States, at least toward Europe served best as an example; it would have served as an example only as long as it did not destroy itself by becoming involved in every broil on earth. Lodge felt that post-war settlement must solve only problem of Germany. On the other hand Wilson claimed that U.S.A. had gone to war to establish a League of nations, but that "the opinion of the whole world swung to our support and the support of these nations associated with us in the great struggle" because of that great advocacy. Wilson felt that League would correct anomalies in the Treaty of Versailles with the passage of time. A report prepared by a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and first

472 Ibid., p.279.
473 Ibid., p.279.
475 Ibid., p.101.
published in 1939, titled 'Nationalism' also examines the question of methods by which erosion of nation state is taking place or may take place and how the cult of internationalism may develop. The assumption here is that erosion of nationalism means promotion of internationalism.

Contemporary writers on political and economic questions frequently assert that creation of an international division of labour and exchange has rendered the absolute sovereign state out of date. All the protectionist devices only result in impoverishment and war, because the apparatus by which national governments hope to maintain standard of living and employment are national but difficulties which they intended to meet are international. Therefore material interest must lead men to oppose nationalist policies.

It is undoubtedly true that one of the chief causes why nationalism was welcomed was the belief that it was likely to bring peace and prosperity. Therefore the report accepts a possibility that men all over the world may become vividly conscious of the interest which they share in common that differences of history, outlook, language and culture will be unable to keep them apart, and they will rush to form an international super state. However, the group notes 'it seems extremely improbable that common material interest would ever be strong enough to produce a spontaneous popular movement to set up a world wide state above existing sovereign states'.

---

477 Ibid., p.296.
478 Ibid., p.297.
further notes 'disillusionment as to the capacity of national states to secure peace and prosperity may lead to a revulsion of feeling against states, but it is more likely to cause adoption inside each existing state of some policy with no traditional national associations, such as communism than to produce the voluntary establishment of a super-state'. In short 'failure' of 'national state' may lead to succession of new policies. Further, in the opinion of the group 'it is rash to assume that failure to achieve peace and prosperity will be attributed to nationalism'. In some cases such as in war, a failure may make the nation, more nationalistic and not less. Men may admit in principle that greater measure of international co-operation would result in general material benefits. However, as the report observes 'Men may seem afraid lest any widening of political unit should result in abolition of state regulations...of benefit to them or reduce their power to influence the government in its choice of policy. Their vision is limited by emotional prestige with which the government has become invested... Habit, incapacity for analysis, the general obscurity of economic and political relations and often subconscious unwillingness to criticize institutions... There may be individual exceptions e.g. of capitalists—but they are too few or too weak...their opposition is too opportunist to be of real significance. This may help to explain why...the numerous international organizations and conferences...have done little to diminish the strength of

479 Ibid., p.297.
480 Ibid., p.297.
481 Ibid., p.298.
national feeling. In many of these organizations, membership becomes advantageous to the states which belong and if any actual surrender of liberty of action is involved it is infinitesimal in comparison with benefits gained. These organizations may perform a useful function but do not arouse a loyalty strong enough to compete with nation. As professional contacts may generate a feeling which if interfered with on national grounds will result in making people hostile to nationalism. But most professional activities can be adequately pursued inside national frontiers. Moreover, as the report observes, 'the nation embraces a wider area of individual’s life than does his profession; it has exceedingly strong emotional associations and allegiance to it is reinforced by all the authority of state and all the pressure of social convention.' The most serious threat of opposition to nationalism comes not from professional associations,... but from organizations formed to propagate universal principles who claim that nation is less worthy than some other ideal. Even if there are no organizations for these causes, absolute values are likely to be recognized in more than one state. The group observes, 'our concern is not with organizations but with creeds.

Christianity : Christianity and nationalism at theoretical level are likely to come into conflict with each other. As it is defined in report (1935 Conference on Church Community and States): 'Duty to volk (national community) in the last

482 Ibid., p.298.
483 Ibid., pp.298-299.
484 Ibid., p.299.
485 Ibid., p.299.
486 Ibid., p.300.
analysis according to the view is duty to God; its claim upon persons is well-nigh absolute. To others it seems that semi-instantaneous and semi-rational emotions of volk loyalty come down from primitive and pre-civilized levels; they appeal to all that is parochial, bigoted, and fearful in man....Excessive deference to volk in the last analysis is apostacy to God who as the father of all mankind, intends every person to come into reality of universal brotherhood of his children.487 However, nationalism and Christianity in practice go hand in hand in many parts of the world. It is only when nationalism becomes exigent and intolerant at home presenting its gospel in an absolute and unqualified form, a point is likely to be reached when Christians may oppose its claims.488

Marxism: Conflicts between Marxism and nationalism is far more direct than that of nationalism and Christianity. A conflict between ideas of Marxism and those of nationalism follow from Marx's theory of national state. The state according to Marx was an instrument of class exploitation. Therefore it must be the aim of exploited class to overthrow that instrument. Since the proletariat unaided is not strong enough to carry revolution unaided in each state, it must unite in an internationalist movement for overthrow of bourgeoisie. The real social unit is not national state but class, which knows no national frontiers. Genuine Marxism is fundamentally internationalist and anti-national.489 The growth of social service state in the west and

487 Ibid., p.301.
488 Ibid., p.305.
489 Ibid., p.311.
failure of revolutions outside Russia however weakened the cause of communist internationalism. As the report observes, the process by which the most anti-nationalist of movements has come to identify its interests more and more with those of a national state and thus to lose much of its anti-national complexion is the natural result of failure of Russian Bolshevik's to gain control of the state outside Russia'. 490 It is significant in this respect that an equal and opposite process can be seen at work when an ideology, the whole raison d'etre of which is nationalistic begins to spread beyond the frontiers of the state in which it originates. 'Fascism' said Mussolini in 1925, 'is not an article for export'. Two years later he said as an idea or doctrine it was 'universal'. Since then the ideology has spread elsewhere. This has led its Italian exponents to distill from it universal elements, and elevate them into internationalist nationalism. 491 These totalitarian states have come to insist upon complete destruction of all Marxist organizations.

In these circumstances, even a temporary alliance between a democratic state and working class organizations to fight a common enemy cannot be ruled out. However extreme nationalist states would be tempted to supplant the existing working class organizations. Germany has proved that once certain Marxist ideas are overthrown, a version of socialism compatible with nationalism can be produced and probably a national communism would be possible. 492 This may however involve

490 Ibid., p.313.
491 Ibid., p.314.
492 Ibid., p.316.
abandonment of class-war and class solidarity. A smaller number of people are however likely to be scandalised than by a renunciation of Christianity.

The Public Conscience: Men can not pursue their ends without devotion unless they are able to attribute universal values to their objectives. The importance attached by governments to moral support pre-supposes a 'public conscience'.

Where morality is authoritatively enunciated or interpreted by the ecclesiastical power and is not regarded as dependent on individual judgment, the influence of morality in public affairs is indistinguishable from that of religion. The 'public conscience' in the sense in which term it is used in this section is mainly an emanation, first, of Protestantism which substituted individual conscience for the church as supreme arbiter of morality and secondly, of 'natural law' which, with the breakdown of ecclesiastical authority, developed into a form of secular morality and, like Protestantism, found its basis and its sanction in the individual conscience. Closely allied with the concept of 'natural law' was 18th century worship of reason, which issued in the belief that morality and reason were one and that honesty was the best policy. 'Protestanism', 'natural law' and 'reason' are the three main forces; they have created the 'public conscience'.

Public conscience is particularly associated with democratic nations. Though in some of the European countries, where democracy could not hold ground, a reaction came and state came to be regarded as a source of morality. It is

493 Ibid., p.317.
something assumed, where public conscience remains active, moral considerations have more influence in determining national policy. But is it not possible that public conscience may provide a basis for policies determined on purely national basis? This is true.

The explanation of this state of affairs is not to be found merely in the extent to which moral codes differ from country to country and still less in any deliberate hypocrisy. Although many individuals believe in theory that the standard of morality applicable to individuals is applicable to nation, few have faced the difficulties involved in this identification...For all these reasons the best intentioned of men would find it hard to decide exactly what would be the moral action for his country, even if it did not involve strong emotions because it was a national decision. The report adds, 'some measures of identification between national interest and morality is essential to national existence.' Moreover, a number of circumstances weaken the determination of men to apply private standards of morality to the state.

Another difficulty with the 'public conscience' has been that it has not created nor has been created by a specific institution and has no symbols to act as a reminder of its existence. So an individual does not get any guidance concerning morality of its policies.

494 Ibid., p.321.
495 Ibid., p.322.
It was one of the intentions of the founders of the League of Nations to create an instrument to pass judgments on morality of international actions. However the League was in fact an organ of sovereign governments. It could not act independently of them and lacking as it did any direct contact with private individuals, it could not make an appeal to public opinion. If any action of any government was criticized there, it was easy for that government to convince its public that the criticism emanated not from any impartial super-national authority but inspired from other governments, inspired by hostility towards itself. Moreover, the League was suspect in many quarters as standing for morality convenient to states dominating in it.

Therefore even aggressive wars may be represented as defensive. The view of morality of government policy is complicated by the fact that claims made by nation upon individual in themselves demand no small measure of altruism. Therefore men are willing to submit morality of government policy to further scrutiny. A less rigorous code of morality for nations is advocated as a result. These considerations explain why even in countries where the public conscience appears to be active, cases rarely occur in which one policy is advocated on purely national or purely on moral grounds. They are simultaneously advocated for and against the same policy. In democratic countries freedom of criticism may mitigate dangers of

496 Ibid., p.322.
497 Ibid., p.323.
498 Ibid., p.323.
499 Ibid., p.324.
500 Ibid., p.325.
nationalism. Members of a nation can feel greater conviction when there is a general consensus regarding morality of a policy. On the other hand, when there is a consensus to withhold certain matters from criticism, because they are too complicated, result may not be dangerous and criticism considered insufficient to provide check on government. On the other hand, when these conditions are not present, freedom of criticism may create rift in the nation. In these circumstances rigorous and intolerant movements may develop which destroy the opportunities for criticism to secure national unity. In autocratic regimes 'public conscience' is unlikely to offer any opposition to governmental policy. In period of crisis the tendency to criticize is in abeyance everywhere. The psychology of dictatorial states is a psychology of crisis induced by grievance against the rest of the world.

Indian Theory of Internationalism

Scholars agree about the existence of an early Hindu tradition of political thought from early Vedic times to the arrival of Muslims in 9th century A.D. This had its origin in relations to foreign invasions and several socio-economic political changes resulting from it. However it is not a body of political thought in the western sense as the sources of political thoughts are not only

501 Ibid., p.326.
502 Ibid., p.326.
503 Ibid., p.327.
504 Ibid., p.327.
505 Ibid., p.327-328.
506 Pantham Thomas and Deutch Kenneth (ed.): Political Thought in Modern India, Article by Parekh Bhikhu, "Some reflections on the Hindu Tradition of Political Thought", New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1985, p.17.
to be found in technical works on polity (Arthashastra tradition) but also in the ancient Hindu canons (Dharmashastra tradition) and from epics like Mahabharata and from classical sanskrit literature as well. These two traditions derived their importance from the emphasis on two central concepts, danda and dharma. Both were important according to writers of these two traditions for maintaining political order which was very necessary. The dharmashastras concentrated on maintaining dharma of individuals and social groups including government. The intention of the writers was to provide a code of conduct governing the entire human life. Political dharma was incidental and it did not form a distinct object of investigation. The Arthashastra writers were concerned with the most effective organization of government; the nature and the organization of the government; the nature and mechanics of power; the way power is acquired, and lost; sources of threat to government etc. Thus the dharmashastra writers were moralistic and the Arthashastra writers were realistic, though not exclusively. The dharmashastra writers acknowledged the need to disregard moral principles under certain circumstances, even as the Arthashastra writers insisted on the need to preserve dharma. Indian history is therefore almost without reference to a period of conflict between spiritual and temporal power, so prominent in the history of Europe.

For Hindu thinkers the universe was an ordered whole governed by fixed laws. Society replicates this order. Society is not a collection of individuals but a collection of communities. It consists of castes and individual's birth is determined by karma. Therefore he has to perform caste-dharma in addition to his dharma as a husband, father, son, as a subject or as a ruler. Even there is a dharma for each stage in individual's life (Ashrama). Hindu thinkers were most fearful of foreign intervention and resulting social disintegration. In order to preserve the dharma of a society, a king and a danda is necessary. Without that force, society would have Mutsyaryaya only. For some Hindu political thinkers such a situation did once prevail; for others it was a definite possibility haunting every society.

The post-Kautilyan canonical literature therefore come to approve exigencies of power, in its acquisition and use and therefore morality easily became its victim. The claims of political order and morality are poorly resolved e.g. in Mahabharata. Only through transcendentalism this dilemma is resolved in Sita.

In inter-state relations, the claims of political order particularly overcame those of morality. The theory of inter-state relations in ancient India was mainly a theory for the acquisition and enlargement of power at the expense of surrounding kingdoms. Of course, there were rules of chivalric

513 Ibid., p.151.
sort, but in ancient India the moral impulses and feelings of empathy were frozen into immobility by dread of anarchy. Ancient India, says Dr. Rana, produced a little more than a theory of aggrandisment in inter-state relations. The ancient thinkers never seem to have thought of a way by which moral restraints in interstate relations (inter-alien race or regional relations) could be compatible with maintenance of social arrangement they regarded as vital.

The Hindu writers even dealt with new situations in terms of the concept of dharma. Thus the communities of foreign settlers, corporations, religious communities, even atheists, villages, and districts, guilds and new castes were recognized as having distinct dharma, whose legitimacy was accepted by king.514 In case the customs and traditions were ambiguous or harm public interest or remain silent, in such case the king was to make appropriate laws.515 Inspite of this there was that compelling predisposition to mediate between exigencies of statecraft and human and moral values; the form which this mediation took - the induction to attain a state of transcendent detachment numbing human and moral susceptibilities so that statecraft should maintain an established order of life is remarkable. According to Rana it resulted in failure to evolve alternative political institutions, which while preserving order, would also distribute values more equitably.516 Given the range and quality of talents in Hindu genius, this seems inexplicable. May be Rana

---

515 Ibid., p.22.
feels the imagination of disorder haunted the Hindu mind so much, may be the attachment and susceptibility to phenomenal existence rigidified its handling of politics. 517

The straining away from phenomenal reality is true of any religious endeavor but its intensity and sharpness is remarkable in Hindu religion. Was it because there was too much attachment to phenomenal reality? 513 The straining away was not an ordinary thing; it was to proceed from a created to the creator. According to Rama the love of reality and straining away from it, represented contradictory impulses of attachment and detachment. It produced in the Hindus an ambiguity and a confusing co-existence of opposites. 516 Whether in political, social, religious ordering of life the effort was to arrive at a position which could secure the solace of both the worlds. 520 One circumstance baneful to an ordered resolution of opposite impulsion appears to be persistent dread of anarchy.

In addition to attachment-detachment dichotomy the Hindus arrived at other dichotomous orientations such as Puritanism and Artha, Political and Moral order, consensual and conflictive politics etc.

Similarly, according to Rana the mediation between life and moral norms has become an obsession of modern India's political leadership. British Imposition of a relatively stable and centralized rule may have contributed to the best in Hindu genius to attain its normative destiny. 521

517 Ibid., p.162.
518 Ibid., p.163.
519 Ibid., p.164.
520 Ibid., p.164.
521 Ibid., p.169.
The range of thought of modern Indian thinkers has been fascinating. As Dr. Pantham observes: They have offered theories for resolution not merely of some exclusive Indian predicaments or problems but of world historical problems, issues or isms such as feudalism, capitalism, imperialism, fascism, communism, utilitarianism, scientism and technocracy. They gave their interpretations of history, conceptions of men, visions of good life, views on freedom, state, democracy, violence, humanity and human unity, ecological problems, means-ends relationship and political morality."522

However according to Rana the modern Indian thought does not show any fundamental change in various dichotomous orientations he has discussed.523 To quote Rana fully, "It seems difficult to deny such conceptions as those of non-violence, with its attendant, varying connotations of satyagraha, civil disobedience and passive resistance; of conceptions of political reform by constitutional means and generally of constitutional liberalism; of the system of jurisprudence and its concomitant rule of law; of conceptions of social reform, and of particular views of socialism and of the mixed economy; of panchayati raj at the village level and finally at the level of global politics, the concept of non-alignment were not typical of leadership and of educated elite that had evolved at several stages since early days of East India Company." Indeed as Rana observes further, "such conceptions continue to constitute the framework within

which adaptations are worked out in contemporary politics of the country. Of course the views of modern Indian leadership were formulated as a result of changes introduced by the British but as Rana contends, there was a indigenous receptivity in the soil. But the leaders also made adaptations in the past. The reason as Rana rightly puts it, "the raised range of the British influence made it more possible than ever before, effectively to mediate between polarities of several dichotomous orientations; that is the impulse towards synthesis, hitherto frustrated, found more effective play."

Further, according to Rana 'since mediation between opposed polarities within these orientations was now possible, these orientations moved in the direction of 'ideal' polarity. For successful mediation meant not the abandonment of the 'non-ideal' polarity (of previously dichotomous orientation) but its mediated satisfaction. This being so, the movement in the direction of 'ideal' polarity was safe, practical, possible. Previously... movement there was, sometimes a seemingly absolute one... this did not prevent a strong movement towards the non-ideal polarity. The earlier flights to ideal polarity were strong relations against non-ideal reality. However, here mediated detachment, mediated puritanism, morally mediated political order and mediated consensual politics emerged.

524 Ibid., pp.196-197.
525 Ibid., p.194.
526 Ibid., p.201.
The most persistent orientation of the modern Indian political leadership concerned the moral shaping of political order, both in domestic and international fields. This is understandable as India suffered most from morally mediated order. When opportunity came Gandhi seized it in domestic field and he along with Nehru in the international field. They were not lonely however in this. They had predecessors as well as contemporaries. Elsewhere also, another scholar has observed in the same vain, "while western thought works in terms of antagonisms, dichotomies and antinomies between spirit and matter, the individual and society, bread and culture, necessity and freedom, Indian thought has always considered such dichotomies as artificial and unreal."528 The author further observes that western philosophies legitimize atomistic individualism, irreconcilable contradictions, mindless competition, amoral power politics, dichotomisation of ends and means, elite and mass, the chosen and damned, heaven and hell. A non-dualistic metaphysics and epistemology by contrasts tends to foster and sustain community, co-operation, world unity, communism and rupturing of dichotomies between elite and mass, subject and object, friend and enemy, ends and means. Such a philosophy sustains a conception of state not as a Leviathan or as the 'terminus and quern of man's whole development' but as a means to the attainment by man of his self-realization.529 The above typology of western and Indian

528 Mehta V.R.: Ideology, Modernisation and Politics in India, New Delhi, Manohar, p.70.
approach may appear exaggerated but it contains elements of truth. The main problem which the Indian thinkers had to face was to understand and explain India’s slavery and suggest means to overcome it. Colonialism during British period had become a fact. It could not be explained away without pointing defects in Indian culture, society and politics. However India could not regenerate itself and end its slavery without pointing to qualities of its people and society. Therefore none of the modern Indian thinkers from the days of Raja Ram Mohan Roy (born in 1772) considered British colonialism as the complete evil. This was partly due to the fact that as Ashish Nandi has pointed out, "colonialism minus a civilizational mission is no colonialism at all". A nationalist movement had to have faith in itself. An anti-colonial movement had needed an ideology. It could be merely an anti-thesis. However, thesis and anti-thesis exclude each other. The true enemy of thesis, as Ashish Nanda says, is synthesis because it includes the thesis and ends the latter’s reason for being. This is precisely what happened with Indian thinkers, although the degree of synthesis required and possible are not the same for all Indian thinkers.

After Ram Mohan Roy, other Indian thinkers who contributed to socio-political reforms were those who were active in the second half of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century like Kesnav Sen, Dayanand etc. The failure of Indian mutiny in India produced another bunch of men like Rabindranath Tagore (1861), Vivekananda (1863) and Gandhi (1869).

---

531 Ibid., p. 11.
All these thinkers presented philosophies based on Vedanta's metaphysical background. They accepted the ultimate reality of Brahman, its presence in all human beings and the principle of unity in diversity and the principle of swadharma. All these are mentioned as they have relationship with the idea of internationalism as far as Indian thinkers were concerned.

However, some of these thinkers are known as neo-Vedantists. In addition to the other elements which distinguish them from old Vedantists, the neo-Vedantists emphasise the reality of the world and an action-oriented approach rather than abstract metaphysics. Dr. R.N. Sharma tries to distinguish Neo-Vedantists from the old Vedantists for other reasons as well:

(a) Impact of Western Philosophy: In the thought process of these philosophers, we can discover the influences of Western philosophies like Existentialism, Pragmatism, Empiricism and neo-Hegelian idealism of Green, Bosanquet and Bradley.

(b) Impact of Western Science: Influence of Darwin's theory of evolution has been felt by Indian philosophers. However, they have regarded not reason but intuition as the best source of knowledge.

(c) Realist Course: The neo-Vedantists accept the reality of the world and its reform as its primary aim.

(d) Reformist Trend: These philosophers are not interested in self-improvement or improvement of a particular class but of the

whole society and of the world.

(e) **Political Consciousness**: In the contemporary Indian philosophy, socio-politico-religious philosophy takes precedence over spirituality. Even those who emphasize the importance of spirituality do not keep themselves away from politics in the ultimate sense.

(f) **Influence of Art and Literature**: The literary and artistic strain in these philosophers have disposed them towards humanist philosophy.

(g) **Humanism**: The emphasis of these philosophers is on improvement and development of man and that man is not to be sacrificed to any external power or a political or a social institution.

Dr. Ram Narayan Vyas finds an existence of universal thought from the time of Rigveda and in other Hindu books, present in Jainist and Buddhist scriptures and continuing up to present. He defines universalistic thought as "those ideas which cross frontiers of nations and creeds, transcend the limitations of sects and countries and try to identify themselves with entire human society". Actually universalism would and should include all living creatures, human and un-human, animals as well as trees, a concern for anything that has a life.

We have come to the end of review of literature on internationalism.

Let us take into account the various meanings and aspects of internationalism.

-------------------------
(1) *Internationalism: its Dictionary Meaning*

Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary, defines it as 'between or involving different countries'. Longman Dictionary defines it as 'having to do with more than one nation'.

Leonard Tivey defines it as 'relations of co-operation among nation-states'. Important point according to Tivey is terms like International, United Nations, Supranational, multinational, trans-national accept nations or idea of nationalism. 535

However according to Tivey, 'what is being integrated or linked are states or associations or enterprises that belong to nation'. However international need not mean 'of states' but may simply mean 'of nations'.

(2) Internationalism may mean something more benevolent, something less selfish than nationalism. The expression has thus been used in an abstract sense, without being defined or specified.

(3) Internationalism has also been considered as a step in the evolution of human societies, especially political. It may be the final step in the evolution or may be one step ahead which will be followed by other steps. In this teleological view of internationalism, it is considered to be better or more progressive than the previous step. In addition, thinkers ascribe a trait of inevitability in the direction of internationalism. Although this may not be substantiated by actual facts. What saves thinkers on internationalism is that they do not specify time-schedule of the development of

internationalism.

(4) Internationalism is also identified with international system or systems. It may mean feudal systems, balance of power between nation states, an empire, a world empire, world confederation, a world federation, a world society or regional systems.

(5) Internationalism may mean something which is opposed to nationalism. Nationalism is considered as an evil, a sickness and internationalism as a healthy tendency or sign of health.

(6) Internationalism may mean co-operation between nations or states.

(7) Internationalism may mean knowledge that co-operation between and inter-dependence between nations is increasing.

(8) Internationalism may mean concern about things beyond nation such as war, peace, armament, disarmament.

(9) Internationalism may mean that an internationalist considers co-operation between nations and interdependence as positive and good. Although one wonders why it should be considered that way. Ultimately every thing should depend on the objectives behind a policy or a tendency.

(10) Internationalism may mean cultural universalism or cultural synthesism.

(11) American thinkers and statesman have generally considered internationalism as something opposed to isolationism. Consequently, any role for America whether limited or a more ambitious one is considered as a sign of internationalism.

(12) Internationalism as some kind of modification of nationalism or of nation-state system.
Internationalism as international communism.

A few other things regarding internationalism are relevant.

(a) *What are the objectives behind advocacy of internationalism?*
It may be advocated as a remedy for domestic ills such as domestic instability, lack of economic development, poverty. Alternatively, lack of internationalism also at times has been considered as contributing to domestic peace. Internationalism has also been considered as contributing to solution of interstate or international problems. Here the objectives may be limited or unlimited. One can see in development of internationalism an opportunity for one's country to contribute towards it. Thus number of objectives can be visualized.

(b) *The shape of internationalism - Will it take concrete and institutional shape? What national policy changes are visualized?*

(c) *The process of development of internationalism:*
How will it come about? Will it come about automatically or will be devised by men? What will be the role of the state, statesmen, individual citizens in bringing it about? What will be the role of public opinion, press, arbitration procedures and international law in it?

(d) *What will internationalism involve? What are the implications of internationalism? What sacrifices would be involved?*

(e) *Time schedule and feasibility feature:* Here the views of thinkers regarding preparedness of nations for development of internationalism and the future of internationalism discussed, specially in terms of obstacles to internationalism.
The objectives of this dissertation is to examine the phenomena of internationalism as perceived in Jawaharlal Nehru, Rabindranath Tagore and Arbind Ghose (Sri Aurobindo)’s writings. A legitimate question may be why these three thinkers have been selected? It is true that of these three, only Sri Aurobindo can be considered as a philosopher. However, all of them are thinkers. They belong to the same age and period. They have thought and written about internationalism. They have worked in practice to promote the cause of internationalism in various fields. Jawaharlal Nehru worked to promote the cause of internationalism much before India became free. As the Prime Minister of India till his death he worked to promote internationalist causes in world politics. He tried to ceaselessly express his thoughts regarding internationalism in print, which gives us an opportunity to develop his profile as an internationalist. Sri Aurobindo was an active politician before he settled down at Pondicherry as a yogi. An ardent nationalist he settled down as a yogi and philosopher at Pondicherry and produced valuable literature part of which dealt with internationalism. Through his spiritual power, preaching, ideas and through an education system, he too tried to promote an internationalist cause. Rabindranath Tagore was basically a poet and educationalist. But issues of national and international politics always interested him. He was fearless in expressing views at national and international level. A constant traveler with an outlook of an internationalist, he actively promoted the cause of internationalism by establishing Shantiniketan.
It would be a fascinating study to compare the views of these three great Indians regarding internationalism. Their widely different professional background would be a plus factor for study. One may argue, why not Mahatma Gandhi? Yes, it would have been a good addition. Although Gandhiji did not work in practice for the cause of internationalism as much as Nehru did or wrote profusely on international politics, he certainly had a logical, consistent, alternative model of international politics, once you agreed with his premises. However, Gandhiji's main interest was in building an Indian nation of a particular variety. 'First thing first' was his advice. Further, like 'as his master so his pupil', we were bound to find the impact of Gandhiji on Nehru when we examine Nehru as an internationalist, although they would not agree on many things in their views on inter-state relations. Finally, practical considerations prevented inclusion of Gandhiji in this study.

One reason why these three thinkers were selected for study, was that all of them were nationalists but much before India became a nation-state, they were talking about internationalism and actually working for that cause. In Europe, as we have seen the concern of thinkers, not to talk of statesman, was always with the immediate present when they thought beyond the nation-state. Either there was a thought about containing Turkey or containing some European country or establishing an empire under the aegis of some European country for professed and practical reasons. The range of thought referred to above did not extend beyond this, even after the nation-state was established. Of course, there were exceptions. On the otherhand
the Indian thinkers were talking (and working) about internationalism before the Indian nation-state was established and to some extent even before thenation was established. This makes the study of these thinkers and their views on internationalism interesting and relevant. The dissertation is basically an exercise in the political thought of Nehru, Tagore and Sri Aurobindo on internationalism. Particularly for a man like Jawaharlal Nehru, with a long career before and after Independence, a comprehensive account of his deeds in internationalism would be possible and interesting. However, because of the different careers pursued by these three men, in different spheres and in different settings it was thought that comparability could not be ensured. Therefore, even in case of Nehru, this dissertation remains a study of his thoughts (deeds only to the extent if influences thought or is reflected in it) on internationalism. Another interesting area of study would be to what extent Nehru practiced what he preached? Did he talk of internationalism and work for it? or he only talked of internationalism and worked for pursuit of national interest? However, this is not the object of this work. Perhaps, a post-doctoral project on Nehru's profession and practice of internationalism at a later stage will be in order.

Method of study and sources:

In a study of this nature, the main reliance is bound to be placed on written sources, both original and interpretative. For this purpose the author visited Nehru Memorial and Museum Library, New Delhi. This library was utilized
for books, periodicals and doctoral manuscripts both written here and abroad. Discussions were held with a few scholars. Similarly I visited Pondicherry and studied books and articles from periodicals at main library of the Ashram and other libraries (there is a special library containing secondary sources on Sri Aurobindo). Discussions with scholars like Dr. Maheswari, Dr. Ghosh, Dr. Sethna, Sri Nirodbaran were most useful. Nehru Memorial library also was useful for books by and on Tagore. Discussions were held with scholars well versed in Tagore’s ideas both in Gujarat and in Delhi. One or two Bengali friends helped in getting books translated from Bengali into English. I also consulted Dr. Fred Haliday of the London School of Economics and Political Science regarding the sources on the concept of internationalism and various traditions on it, such as Anglo-Saxon and continental. Dr. A.P. Rana of the M.I. University of Baroda has always been ready to give guidance on this subject and has taken a special interest in the Department of Political Science at Baroda to see that a number of dissertations on Indian thought on relations between colonial powers and colonies are prepared. I had useful discussions with Dr. Rana on the modern Indian tradition of international thought. Dr. Thomas Pantham has also taken keen interest in my dissertation and has discussed with me the sources as far as Nehru, Tagore and Sri Aurobindo are concerned.

However I have put the main emphasis for development of my dissertation on following works, for each of these three thinkers, although many other books have been referred to.
Nehru: Three important sources for Nehru's views on internationalism are: 'The Discovery of India', 'Glimpses of World History' and 'An Autobiography'.

Dorothy Norman's (ed.), 'Nehru-the First Sixty Years' in two volumes, includes Nehru's writings, speeches, statements, press-conferences, conversations, interviews and according to author (and justifiably so,) includes development of his political thought from his youth to the founding of the Indian Republic in 1950.

Nehru's selected speeches (September 1946 to April 1961) and titled 'India's Foreign Policy' and published by the Publication Division, Government of India is a very useful source for Nehru's views on cold war, alliances, non-alignment, Common Wealth, U.N.O. and on India's relations with her neighbours.

Several biographies have been very useful for study of Nehru's views on internationalism. Dr.Sarvepalli Gopal's 'Jawaharlal Nehru-A Biography' in 3 volumes has been useful. B.N.Pandey's biography on 'Nehru' is another very useful work. Michael Brecher's 'Nehru - A Political Biography' contains useful chapters on India's relationship with world, specially Nehru's role on it.

Willard Range's 'Jawaharlal Nehru's World View' is a very significant attempt to construct a theory of international relations on the basis of Nehru's assumptions, goals and convictions. (It is an attempt to construct a theory of international relations on the basis of Nehru's assumptions, goals and convictions.) It is an attempt to study what he
described as 'intellectual under-currents in the minds of leaders' which helps us to learn what they do and why they do it. Tibor Mendel's 'Conversations with Nehru' proved to be most useful in constructing Nehru's approach in terms of Indian contribution to the cause of international. R.K. Karanjia's two books too proved useful in this count. Gost Martynshin's 'Jawaharlal Nehru and his Political Views' is a very useful study of foundations of Nehru's political views. His chapter on 'Nationalism and Socialism' and one on 'Nehru on International Relations' were most useful. Dr. A.F. Rana's thesis 'The Imperatives of Nonalignment' is informed by rigorous analysis of Nehru's foreign policy. Its two chapters on 'The International System and Nonalignment' establishes Nehru as an important thinker-reformer of the modern nation-state system. Werner Levi's book, 'Free India in Asia' is a critical study of India's professions and practice. Carlos Romulo's 'The Meaning of Bandung' is a critical study of Nehru's role at Bandung. Similarly Coker's biography of Nehru, is also a critical study of Nehru.

Aurobindo Ghose or Sri Aurobindo

"Life Divine" is the magnum opus of Sri Aurobindo and is most important for a thorough understanding of his vision. For the study of internationalism of Sri Aurobindo the most useful books are; 'The Human Cycle', 'The Ideal of Human Unity' and 'War and Self-determination'. Similarly his articles published in Bande Mataram and put together in the book 'On Nationalism' reveal his spiritual view of nationalism. 'Foundations of Indian
Culture is another useful book in this connection. Similarly, 'Supramental Manifestation Upon Earth' reveals the nature of supramental manifestation and its impact. 'The Hour Of God', 'Ideal and Progress', 'The Ideal of Karmayogin', 'The Riddle of this World', 'The Renaissance in India' are other relevant works of Sri Aurobindo on the subject.

Among interpretative works of Sri Aurobindo's philosophy, S.K. Maitra's 'The meeting of East and West in Sri Aurobindo's philosophy' looks at Sri Aurobindo's philosophy in comparison with Bergson, Plotinus, Hartman, Hagel, Plato, Goethe and Whitehead. His book, 'An Introduction to the Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo' is for the beginners. A comparative study of Heidegger and Sri Aurobindo is made in 'Radical Thinkers' by Rhoda P. Le Coco. Haridas Chaudhry's 'The Philosophy of Integralism' discusses as the title indicates, the metaphysical synthesis in Sri Aurobindo's philosophy. Samar Basu's 'Social and Political Evolution of Man' contains twelve articles written by the author on social and political thought of Sri Aurobindo with explanation and interpretation in simple language. Shyamsundar Jhunjhunwala's 'Human Unity and the Spiritual Age' is an abridged version of 'The Ideal of Human Unity' and 'The Human Cycle'. Similarly P.B. Saint Hilaire has published 'The Future Evolution of Mankind' by taking significance passages from 'The Life Divine', 'The Human Cycle' and 'The Synthesis of Yoga' with notes on it to induce readers to turn to original works.

There are two most important biographies of Sri Aurobindo: K.R. Brinivas Iyengar's 'Sri Aurobindo: A Biography and a History' is not merely a biography, it is a philosophical
and almost political interpretation of Sri Aurobindo's life and his work and of his 'works'. A.B. Purani's biography, 'The Life of Sri Aurobindo' is based on primary sources. In Nirodaran's 'Sri Aurobindo for all Ages', the author claims is written for young generation and by a writer who spent 12 years (1938-1950) with Sri Aurobindo in closer contact. Pandit claims to present the human side of Sri Aurobindo in his biography. Peter Heeh claims that none of these biographers have anything unflattering to say about Sri Aurobindo and he claims that his book, 'Sri Aurobindo - A Brief Biography' marks the beginning of a critical study of a remarkable life.

One of the most interesting and useful books I found was D.P. Chatopadhyaya's 'Sri Aurobindo and Karl Marx: Integral Sociology and Dialectical Sociology'. It is a critical-analytical exposition of sri Aurobindo's thought and a comparative study of two thinkers, which centers around two concepts 'autonomy of psychology' in case of sri Aurobindo and 'autonomy of sociology' in case of Marx.

V.R. Varma's excellent and scholarly work on 'Political Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo' is a critical study with constant reference to Dayanand, Vivekanand, Tilak, Pal, Gandhi, and Tagore but also to western thinkers like Plato, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Green, Bradley, Bosanquet and others and it contains useful chapters on nationalism and internationalism.

Ranjan and Gupta's 'Sri Aurobindo as a Political Thinker' claims to adopt interdisciplinary approach to the study of his political thought.
Rabindranath Tagore

Of the books written by Tagore and useful for this dissertation, the most important is 'Nationalism,' which discusses the nature of nationalism in the West, Japan, and India. It also discusses the future of nationalism. 'Towards Universal Man' is a collection of articles on Tagore's educational, social, economic, and political matters. It explains the foundations of Tagore's thought. 'Creative Unity' is a collection of Tagore's essays on nature of creative process and his own interpretation of Indian civilization. He explains the idea of unity of universe in the endless show of variety. It includes essays on 'East and West,' 'The Spirit of Freedom,' and 'The Nation.' 'Sadhana' too is a collection of papers which reveals Upanishad's deep influence on Tagore. 'Personality' is a collection of six lectures delivered by Tagore in America in 1920-21 on such varied subjects as the nature of art, scientific facts, creative personality, nature of extra-natural world around us, philosophy of Tagore's model school, mediation and women. His 'Lectures and Addresses' includes his speeches selected by Anthony Scares on diverse topics. Relevant for the purpose of dissertation are 'Civilization and Progress,' 'International Relations,' 'The Voice of Humanity,' and 'The Realization of the Infinite.' Stephen Hay's 'Asian Ideas of East and West: Tagore and His Critics in Japan, China, and India' is an account of Tagore's efforts to create Asian unity and obstacles in its way due to various reasons. 'Tagore's Asian Outlook' by Shakti Das Gupta is another such attempt. A.1. Snatyuk Danil Chuk's 'Tagore, India and Soviet Union' is very informative book of Tagore's
Russian connection and includes even passages not translated from 'Letters from Russia' as well as several other sources including several letters.

An interpretation of Tagore's philosophy approved by Tagore is to be found in Dr. S. Radhakrishnan's 'The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore'. Two useful chapters from this dissertation have been 'The Message of Rabindranath to India' and 'The Message of Rabindranath to the World'.

Among the biographies, one is autobiography of Tagore titled 'Reminiscence'. Krishna Kripalini's 'Tagore: A Life', both the longer and shorter version, is the best biography on Tagore, contains very useful chapters on Tagore's role and thinker as a nationalist as well as an internationalist. Niharajjan Ray's 'An Artist in Life' claims to be a biography on life and works of Tagore but contains useful chapters on 'The Poet's Vision of Indian History' and his 'Social Attitudes'. Edward Thompson's 'Rabindranath Tagore' is more an assessment of Tagore as a poet and dramatist. Biswakumar Ghose's 'Rabindranath Tagore' is an account of life and works of Tagore and claims to give a brief account of Tagore's views on a range of subjects like society, religion, education, rural welfare, nationalism and internationalism and not merely an account of Poet as a literary figure. 'To disenage the author says,' the person from the poet is not easy'.

Dr. K. Chandrasekharan's lecture published under the title 'World peace and Rabindranath Tagore' is self-explanatory regarding this theme. Among the books most useful is, Essays on
educational, social and political topics which brings out Tagore's world view. It is published by Sahitya Academy in 2 volumes. It includes essays on 'Ram Mohan Roy', 'nature of university', 'women', 'Swadeshi samaj', 'ends and means', 'political views', 'crisis of civilization' and also on his travels and literature. These have been translated in Gujarati by Shri Nagindas Parekh.

Nepal Majumdar's 'Bharate Jatiyata O Antarjatika', Ebang Rabindranath 'in Bengali in 2 volumes is a study of Tagore’s views on Indian nationalism and internationalism. Chinmohan Sehanavis 'Tagore and the World' too is a "remarkable essay on" internationalism of Tagore according to Sri Niren Mukherji who has written a preface to the book. A complete account of ‘Political Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore’ by Kedarnath Mukherji is based on original writings of Tagore in English and Bengali. Dennis Dalton’s ‘Political Thought of Vivekananda, Aurobindo Ghose, Rabindranath Tagore and Mahatma Gandhi’ discusses the relationship between individual freedom and nationalism. 'The Centenary Volume on Tagore' published by Sahitya Academy contains useful contributions of various writers like 'Tagore, Reconciler of East and West', 'The Universal Man', 'The Social and Political Ideas of Tagore', 'The Implications of Indian Ethics for International Relations' and several articles on Tagore's various visits to different countries.

Gandhi: Gandhi’s world view is contained in his ‘Hind Swaraj’. P.C. Roy Chandhury has compiled and edited in a single book Gandhi’s views on several topics in world politics, titled ‘Gandhi and International Politics’. Paul Power’s ‘Gandhi on World Affairs’ discusses Gandhi’s views on nationalism and
internationalism and the identity of and relations between the East and the West and is claimed by the author to be 'a survey of Gandhian Influence on International and Intellectual Relations'. A volume edited by Misra and Sangal on 'Sahib and the Contemporary World' has useful articles like 'Gandhi at the Converging Point of Cultures', 'Gandhian Analysis of the Causes of International Tension and War', 'Gandhian Approach to a New World Order', 'Gandhian Insights on World Order', 'Gandhi's Attitude to War', 'Gandhi and International Concern with Human Rights' and 'Gandhi and World Order'. Gopinath Dhavan's 'The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi', has a useful chapter on 'The Structure of Nonviolent State' including nationalism and foreign policy of this state. 'Collected works of Gandhi' provides useful insight on Gandhiji's views on internationalism.