There have been no major differences of bilateral nature-terriotorial, commercial, strategic - between India and the United States. The differences that have been there are purely on major world issues, that two due to their approaches, attitudes and perceptions. Hence a discuss of these issues - Arab - Israel problem Vietnam war, Disarma- ment and the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and Indo-US attitude towards them.

From the very beginning of the crisis in West Asia in 1948 the various powers have started taking keen interest in the West Asian affairs, and adopted policies and postures in keeping with their national interests. In the year 1948 when Israel proclaimed its independence the two Super powers i.e. U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. supported the General Assembly resolution recommending partition of Palestine into a Jewish State and Arab State.

But the state of Israel was created Jews and Arabs were denied the statehood. As a result, hostilities brokeout between Israel and Arab countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Jordan), Soviet Union used her influence through the UN to bring peace in the region. Likewise USA also

supported the peace efforts and offered to make available necessary help to the United Nations in the settlement of the Palestine refugees in the Arab countries. However, the Arabs felt greatly offended with the United States because of her support to Israel which resulted in loss of life and property of the Palestinians as well as her failure to get back their properties after the cessation of hostilities.

As the unsettled conditions in the region would have assisted the possible growth of communist influence in the region, three Western Powers—USA, France and Great Britain, made a declaration with a view to preserving the precarious balance of power in the area.\(^1\) They tried to promote peace along the armistice line to facilitate a final settlement of the problem, and proposed the creation of Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO) but the Arabs did not respond favourably to this move and the Soviet Union bitterly criticised this move and described it as a serious attempt by the Western powers to encircle her.

However, USA's continued efforts in this direction culminated in the signing of Baghdad pact consisting of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Great Britain. Though USA

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did not formally become member of the pact, she provided economic and military aid to the members. The pact generated much tension between the Arabs and the USA and other Western powers.\footnote{India also opposed the pact because Pakistan was a member of it and it might be a sort of interference in the affairs of the subcontinent.}

The growing antagonism of the Arabs towards USA was fully exploited by Soviet Union and she offered in 1955 to buy the Egyptian cotton which had been flushed out of the west European market due to dumping of cotton at very cheap rates by the United States.

Soviet Union also offered to provide military equipment to increase their bargaining powers. The strengthening of the Arabs led to counter demand from Isreal for U.S. armament. Though the U.S. government was reluctant to do so, it was compelled to supply arms to Israel in view of the growing public pressure at home. However, even after this USA and Britain continued efforts to wean Egypt away from the Soviet Union and offered to assist and finance the huge Aswan Dam.

\footnote{Rasheeduddin Khan (ed), \textit{Perspectives of Non-Alignment}, Kalamkar Prakashan (P) Ltd., New Delhi, 1981, p. 88.}
For sometime it appeared that cordial relations would be possible between the Arabs and Western powers. But following Egypt’s recognition of Red China, USA withdrew the offer of assistance regarding construction of Aswan Dam and the relations once again turned cold. Soviet Union took advantage of the situation and offered to assist in the completion of the Aswan Dam.

Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956. As this adversely affected the free flow of traffic through the Suez Canal and resulted in heavy financial losses to countries like Britain, France and Israel, they mounted a joint attack against Egypt on the plea of protecting the Suez Canal. India supported Egypt. Besides sympathy for their cause India had own strategic interests. Suez canal was crucial for the trade. Further India wanted to preempt Pakistan from rallying support by an appeal to Muslim solidarity.

The Soviet Union reacted sharply to the combined attack against Egypt. She not only offered to send


volunteers to fight along with the Arabs but also threatened
to use missiles.¹ As USA did not want to permit Soviet Union
to get very close to the Arabs, she decided to exert
pressure on London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and supported the UN
resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire and
withdrawal of forces from Egypt and for the despatch of UN
Emergency Forces to police the border between Egypt and
Israel.

With a view to checking the growing influence of
the Soviet Union in West Asia, Eisenhower Doctrine was
propounded which promised military and economic aid to the
countries which were threatened by the armed aggression of
international communism.

In view of the hardened attitude of the United
States, the Soviet Union sent a note to USA, Britain and
France inviting them to cooperate with her and guaranteed:
(a) Peaceful settlement of disputes in the region; (b) non-
interference in the internal affairs (c) abolition of
military alignments (d) withdrawal of foreign forces from
the region, (e) economic assistance without strings.² The
USA refused to accept this proposal.

However, USA simultaneously continued efforts to
win over Egypt and offered to resume food and technical

P. 429.

2. Ibid., p. 430.
assistance which had been suspended during the Suez crisis.\footnote{Shaved, Haim and Rabinovich, Itamar (ed.), The Middle East and United States, Perceptions and Policies, Transaction Inc, New Jersey, 1980, p. 76.} It also did not favourably respond to the Israeli demands for missiles and rockets because this would have upset US plans for improving relations with the Arabs.

However, with the assumption of power by Kennedy, the Government of the USA felt that the parity between Israel and Arabs had been greatly upset by constant military supplies to Arabs from the Soviet Union. Accordingly, it decided to sell to Israel a number of short-ground to air HAWK missiles\footnote{The Arms Trade with the Third World, SIPRI, Alamquist and Wicksell, Stockholm, 1971, pp.724-30.} in order to enable her to counter the UAR air threat. Kennedy also continued the policy of liberal aid to U.A.R. Thus, he tried to maintain cordial relations with the Arabs.

Another open confrontation between Israel and Arabs took place. On June 5, 1967, when the Israeli air force destroyed of the U.A.R. air crafts still on the ground. This was the decisive factor in Israel's victory in the June war. It took just six days to capture the Sinai desert, Shram-el-Sheikh, the Gaza Strip (U.A.R.), the Western bank of River Jordan, including Jerusalem (Jordan) and the Golan Heights (Syria).\footnote{Dr. Sultan, Tanvir, Indo-US Relations, Deep & Deep Publishers, New Delhi, 1982, p.132.} Israel's success was also due
to its well planned armed preparations meant for offensive action in the face of a disunited and weak enemy and swiftness and flexibility of their attacks while the Arabs were slow to move.

The six-day war created some new problems without solving the old ones. Israel had adopted an intransigent attitude. Having occupied an area of more than 20,000 square miles, it was not ready to revert to the position which existed before the hostilities unless its demands were fulfilled. Its conditions were recognition of Israel by Arab States, opening the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping under a legal guarantee, retention of the Gaza Strip, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights including adjustments along the frontiers, conversion of the Sinai desert and the West Bank of the Jordan river into demilitarized zones; and an end to Arab belligerency. While the Western countries wanted an over-all settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict through direct negotiations, others, including Soviet Union and India, argued, that first thing must come first, i.e. Israel must first vacate the territories it occupied during the war. The U.N. is still unable to resolve the deadlock.

1. Ibid., p.133.

Indo-US attitudes were identical towards the Arab-Israel problem because of their national interests. India supported Arabs on the following grounds: (a) The Middle-East is perhaps of greater strategic importance to India than South East Asia, because of its link with Indo-Pakistan politics, as a buffer against communism and as the main supplier of oil; (b) India's desire to prevent Pakistan from gaining sympathy and support of the Muslim countries of the Middle East on issues such as Kashmir and other Indo-Pak tensions. India is anxious to achieve this objective by maintaining friendly relations with the Arab states even at the cost of deflection from her foreign policy principles of seeking friendly relations with all nations and regarding each issue on its merits.¹ (c) the Arabs have a solid bloc of votes in the UN which India needs for her case on Kashmir. If India recognises Israel it will mean the support of only one state as against the hostility of about twenty-five Arab States in the U.N.² (d) India's economic interest in the area also have strategic implications. India lacks sufficiency in oil, which it badly needs for its industries. The refineries near Bombay and elsewhere in the country depend from sources

across the Arabian Sea.\(^1\) (e) As regards trade prospects, India has trade of a hundred crore rupees with the Middle East.\(^2\) India has one of the biggest markets in the Arab countries; and (f) as a close ally of the UAR in the Non-Aligned camp, India's interests in the Middle Eastern Affairs have always been very pronounced.\(^3\) Emphasizing the importance of Middle East to India, the Foreign Minister Chagla remarked: "It is most essential that the Suez Canal should be in friendly hands. Actually India is not hostile to the Israelis, as the opposition wrongly accused, but it is just a matter of choice between principle and expediency which confronted a Government in the pursuit of National interest".\(^4\) In short, India's interest in the Middle East demand that there should be a friendly Middle East enjoying peace and stability.

On the otherhand, Israel has a special position in the U.S. Middle East Policy unmatched by that of any other state and going beyond the role it plays in the Arab-Israel Conflict. The American interest and commitment to the


survival and security of Israel and termination of the Arab-Israeli conflict is deeply rooted in history and has been reaffirmed by every administration since Truman.\(^1\) A multitude of actors, including political, economic and cultural-religious (or 'ideological') considerations underlie this interest.

There is a more direct American concern with the Arab-Israeli conflict and Israel's survival. Israel's fall would most likely increase Soviet prestige and influence. It would further weaken those moderate Arab states, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, whose overthrow has been a stated goal of various opposition groups within the Arab world and who would no longer be diverted from their aim by preoccupation with Israel.\(^2\) The U.S. felt that Israel's existence, as a democratic, energetic and progressive force, thus tends to strengthen other states and regimes whose survival is important to the U.S. For this purpose it has been suggested that Israel should be provided with U.S. arms supply and financial assistance. In short, the interest in Israel revolves around two distinct, though related, factors of an ideological and political strategic nature.

When the crisis first erupted in May, 1967 over the strait of Tiran, the U.S. urged restraining on all

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parties and tried hard to achieve some sort of collective action by the Great Powers. On the one hand, it sought to involve the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 which pledged the U.S., Great Britain and France to collective opposition to the use of threat of force in the Middle East and prevention of violation of frontiers and armistice lines.¹ At the same time, an attempt was made to cooperate with premier Kosygin in cooling down the Arab States.

However, the United States was rather more concerned over Israel's navigational rights than with the legalities of the situation or with the basic cause of Arab-Israeli conflict. President Nasser's declaration regarding the Gulf of Aqaba was felt as a direct rebuff and one which called for a public reply. The first American reply came on May 23, 1967 when president Johnson made a statement reaffirming the U.S. basic commitment to oppose aggression and support the political independence and territorial integrity of all nations in the area. He deplore that the General Armistice Agreements had "failed to prevent warlike acts" against one another. Commenting on the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force, he said that the U.S. was "dismayed at the hurried withdrawal of the UNEF from Gaza and Sinai after more than ten years of steadfast and effective service in keeping the peace, without action by

¹. The Times, May 20, 1967.
either the General Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations. We continue to regard the presence of the United Nations in the area as a matter of fundamental importance.¹ Indeed, the State Department opposed the Egyptian move by saying that the role of the force should be increased, not diminished.² In its view it was the removal of the UNEF which perpetuated the crisis.

On the Egypt's right blockade of Israeli ships through the Gulf of Aqaba, the United States positon was that it "considers the Gulf to be an international waterway and feels that a blockade of Israeli shipping is illegal and potentially disastrous to the cause of peace. The right of free, innocent passage of the international waterway is a vital interest of the international community."³ Free passages through the strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba form the bedrock of U.S. policy. That is why it considered the blockade of Israeli shipping illegal.

The United States justified its stand on the following grounds: (1) It is pointed out that the 1958 Law of the Sea Treaty states, "There shall be no suspension of


the innocent passage of foreign ships through the straits which are used for international navigation". This Dutch proposal was intended to apply to the Strait of Tiran. And (2) the U.A.R. agreed to the stationing of a U.N. Force at Sharmel-Sheitech, the point which overlooks the strait of Tiran. The U.N.-U.A.R. agreement meant that the U.A.R. accepted the agreement which has since permitted passage to the Gulf to ships of all nations even if specific on free passage.¹

In the case of the Arab-Israeli dispute India has always stood for the Arab cause even in the post-Nehru period. On May 22, 1967, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reiterating India's support to the Arabs stated that, "we should like our Arab friends to know that Indo-U.A.R. friendship is firm and abiding"². In a statement to the Lok Sabha regarding the situation in West-Asia, Foreign Minister Chagla declared that "the creation of Israel has given rise to tension between Israel and the Arab countries"³.

Regarding the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in response to a request by Egypt on May 18, 1967, to the Secretary General, the Indian position

was in complete agreement with the Secretary-General. The Indian Minister for External Affairs stated clearly in parliament, that "India appreciate the reasons which have impelled the U.A.R., to ask for the withdrawal of the UNEF. When the UNEF was stationed in the U.A.R., it was with the consent of the U.A.R. Government and the UNEF could not continue to remain in U.A.R. territory without that Government's continuing consent. India could not be a party to any procedure which would make UNEF into an occupation force, nor could the Government of India agree to UNEF's continued presence in U.A.R. in the absence of the latter's consent and in any case Indian troops could not remain part of UNEF without the U.A.R.'s approval."  

He further stated in the Lok Sabha on May 25, 1967 that "so far as the Government of India is concerned, we have taken the position as far back as 1957 that the Gulf of Aqaba is an inland Sea and that the entry to the Gulf ties within the territorial waters of U.A.R. and Saudi Arabia. India adheres to this view." Reiterating India's stand, the Indian representative, G. Parthasarathi, told the Security Council that "no state or group of states should attempt by force to challenge the sovereignty of the U.A.R. over the strait of Tiran." In considering this the Indian Foreign

1. Ibid., Col. 872-3.
Minister made the following points at the special session of the United Nations General Assembly:

(i) U.A.R. is not a party to any agreement recognising the Gulf of Aqaba as an international waterway or guaranteeing freedom of passage to Israeli ships.

(ii) There is no universally recognised rule of international law on freedom of navigation applicable to such bodies of water as the Gulf of Aqaba.

(iii) The state of this body of water is still a matter of controversy, and referred to a publications of the Department of State containing a letter from the secretary of state dated January 15, 1963, to the Attorney General, setting forth the views of the Department regarding the extent of territorial waters and closing width of Bays. On Aqaba, the letter stated as follows, and he quoted, "the Gulf of Aqaba, the exact state of this body of water is still a matter open to controversy".

(iv) Even under Geneva convention which is often quoted, the innocent passage of foreign ships through the territorial water of another state, is not an absolute right, but remaining subject to the security requirements of that state.¹

Hence, under the international law the right of free passage through the strait of Tiran is not recognised. And therefore, this right cannot be enforced through the use of arms.

After the outbreak of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Indian representative at the United Nations, made references to U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967 calling for vacation of occupied lands by Israel, and a peaceful settlement which respected the rights of the Palestine refugees as well as the security of "all states" in the region. Despite an active Israeli consulate in Bombay and an anti-Muslim lobby, India identified more and more with the Arab stand on Palestine. It encouraged the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in international negotiations over West Asia eventhough the PLO lacked the territorial base and legal trappings of a government.

The security council's Resolution of 242 affirms that (1) "the fulfilment of charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: (a) withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the territories occupied in the recent conflict; (b) termination

of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity
and political independence of every state in the area and
their right to live in peace within secure and recognised
boundaries free from threats or acts of force. (2) "Affirms
further the necessity for (a) guaranteeing freedom of
navigation through international waterways in the area; (b)
achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; (c)
guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political
independence of every state in the area, through measures
including the establishment of demilitarised zones; (3)
"request the secretary-General to designate a special
representative to proceed to the Middle-East to establish
and maintain contacts with the states concerned in order to
promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful
and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions
and principles in this resolution; (4) "requests the
Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the
Progress of the efforts of the special representative as
soon as Possible". This resolution became one of the main
stumbling blocks in the way of progress because of its
misinterpretation. The 1967 June war which resulted in
victory for Israel brought unhappy consequences for the U.S.
In the aftermath of the crisis the American position in the
Arab world reached its lowest point.

1. Ibid.
In the face of the failure to find a negotiated settlement of the problem, the Arabs decided to make another bid to recover their areas from Israel through armed action. On 6th October 1973, when the Jews were busy celebrating their festival of "Yom Kippur", the Arabs launched a surprise attack on Israel and penetrated a number of miles into-Sinai desert. Israel retaliated and pushed back the Egypt troops.¹

The Government of India on October 7, 1973, blamed Israel for the outbreak of hostilities in West Asia. An External Affairs Ministry spokesman said, Israel's "intransigence is clearly the basic cause leading to the present break of the hostilities". Expressing its "deep concern at the eruption of fighting, the Government of India said that the Arab's cause was based on justice and demanded forthwith the attention of the international community" to the situation.²

The spokesman pointed out that India had consistently declared that the cause of the tension in the area was due to Israel's aggression and refusal to vacate territories occupied by armed forces. He said India's sympathies were entirely with the Arabs "whose sufferings

have long reached a point of explosion."¹ Their Case, he said was based on justice. The immediate implementation by Israel of the U.N. Resolution No. 242 of 1967 constituted a solution which could arrest the tragic march of events threatening the peace in the region and world at large.

Again Israel has been supported by the U.S.A. and the Arabs have been supported by the USSR. The pro-Israeli stance of the United States was also very clear during the Arab-Israeli war of October, 1973. The United States not only vetoed the Soviet resolution of 9 October, 1973, but also supplied Israel with weapons which helped it to smash through the Egyptian defences in the Suez Zone. The two super-powers almost came to a clash on 25-26 October, 1973, when the Soviet Union threatened to send military observers to supervise the cease-fire and the president of the United States ordered a partial alert.² This world-wide precautionary alert of American military forces was an indication to the Soviet Union that the USA could not accept any unilateral move on their part to move military forces into the Middle-East. It shows that USA was very much interested in the Middle East in support of Israel.

The main reasons for president Nixon's decision to order a precautionary alert were: (1) the alerting the

Soviet Paratroops in Eastern Europe; (2) the doubling in size of the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean and (3) the apparent preparation of Soviet aircraft, including large transport planes, for troop transport.¹

A special session of the UN security council on the West Asia war was adjourned without any decision on October 9, 1973 as the US did not agree with the Soviet Union and China on how to stop the fighting. While the US Ambassador, Mr. John Scali asked Israel, Egypt, and Syria to halt military operations and return to the positions before hostilities broke out, the Soviet Union threatened a possible veto. The Soviet Ambassador Mr. Jacob Malik, said "without a clear-cut statement on the part of Israel of its readiness to withdraw all its troops from occupied territories, the Security Council cannot take any decision in the present circumstances".² Unless the issue of Israel occupation of Arab lands in the 1967 West Asia war was resolved, Mr. Malik said, any security council resolution "would be exploited by the aggressor to continue its occupation and appropriation of the lands of others". But China, one of the five members of the council with the right of veto, said: "If the council is to adopt any resolution at all, it must condemn

¹. Ibid.
². Ibid., p.11745.
all acts of aggression by the Israeli Zionists and demand the immediate withdrawal by the Israeli Zionists from all the Arab territories they occupied.¹

The Indian delegate Mr. Samar Sen spoke at the council and insisted that if peace was to return to West Asia, Israel must first withdraw from the territories it had occupied by force during the 1967 war. He also said "that unless this basic principle is accepted as a whole, it would be both unfair and unjust for the security council to ask for a ceasefire which would leave vast territories of Egypt, Syria and Jordan is illegal Israeli occupation".²

Israel and Egypt agreed on October 21, 1973 to a standstill cease-fire proposed by the Soviet Union and the United States in the Security Council and finally the guns seemed at last to have a fallen silent on both fronts in the West Asia War on October 27, 1973.

The USA felt that India did not understand the vital involvement of the United States in the future of West Asia, an area geographically closer to the Soviet Union. They argued that though India did not have similar interest in West Asia, her interest lay in creating a

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., p. 11746.
balance of power between the Arabs and Israelis. They also pointed out that the Arabs have remained neutral or supported Pakistan whenever Indo-Pak issues came up in the Security Council in the past and they may not behave differently in the future. Thus the American's regarded India's West Asia policy, particularly in the security council, as a familiar aspect of anti-Americanism.\textsuperscript{1} However, the U.S.A. continued to seek India's co-operation in resolving the crisis, because of her position as a leading Non-Aligned nation, having considerable influence on the Arab World.

India, on the other hand, believes that it is the U.S. policy of appeasement of Israel by advancing huge war supplies and funds which has sustained Israeli expansionist ambitions and encouraged its intransigence against her Arab neighbours, in defiance of world opinion, international law and mortality.

A by-product of the Arab-Israel war was the diplomatic wedge between India and U.S.A. Throughout the crisis India and the U.S. worked at cross-purposes, (eg. on issues like the withdrawal of UNEF, the blockade of Gulf of Agaba, and the withdrawal of Israel to the pre-war frontiers), instead of cooperating and coordinating their efforts for peace.

\textsuperscript{1} Indian Express. November 30, 1967.
Subsequently, many changes took place in the West Asia policies. But still the Arab-Israel problem has continued. During the Gorbachev regime, the USSR and Israel resumed diplomatic relations in order to restore peace in West Asia. But in the absence of the Soviet Union, the USA has been playing a monopolistic role in the West Asian policies to bring Israel and the Arabs together to establish peace.

Hence, the solution of the West Asian problem, Indian believes, depends mainly on the U.S.A. If the U.S.A. exerts pressure on its clients there would be some chance of settlement.

The next world major issue is disarmament. The word 'disarmament' is used in an extremely general sense and is such, it connotes the idea of the limitation, or control, or reduction of armaments. The term disarmament does not cover control of the weapons of the future. This control is designated by the expression arms control. As such, disarmament refers to the control of existing weapons and arms control to that of future weapons¹. So far, many conferences were held on this issue. President Johnson of the USA presented a seven point plan at the Geneva conference in February, 1966. This plan called for a treaty

to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries and demanded international safeguards over peaceful nuclear activities. It also suggested the strengthening of the international security organisation and the establishment of a systems of inspection. The outer space treaty of 1967 laid down the principles governing peaceful activities of the state in outer space and prohibited nuclear weapons and their landing on the moon and other celestial bodies for military bases.

The United States contended that the number of countries having independent sources of nuclear weapons ought to be limited as their proliferation would create an amount of irresponsibility and uncertainty in international conduct. As evident from several policy pronouncements. India thought that the primary task before mankind was to bring some sense of responsibility to those who had engendered the nuclear weapons and were still going on proliferating them among themselves on an even higher scale unmindful of the consequences and of their own responsibility.¹ Such an ideological differences as witnessed between the U.S.A. and India on the control of nuclear energy continued to persist and even enlarge.

They came out in clear terms over the question of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India did not

subscribe to the U.S. view that some countries could be more responsible than others.¹ Any rational and tangible treaty on non-proliferation, India believed, should emphasize the need for tangible progress towards disarmament, a comprehensive test-ban treaty, a complete freeze on the proliferation of nuclear weapons and means of delivery and a substantial reduction in the existing stocks.

It may as well be pointed out that underlying the differing views regarding nuclear technology, there were certain national interests of the U.S.A. and India which were diametrically opposite to each other. Ideologically India has resented American pressures by advocating universal obligations for all countries without discrimination.

Along with the political considerations security aspect also played an important position in the calculation of interests. A nuclear explosion by China conducted on 16 October, 1964 brought forth different reactions in New Delhi and Washington. The U.S. began to press with greater vigour for an international non-proliferation of nuclear weapons treaty. It did not come as a surprise that India dissented from the approach of the US in sponsoring this treaty. India no doubt was obviously disturbed about its own security on account of the nuclear explosion by China,

¹. Indian Express, June 13, 1968.
while the U.S. wished to utilise this opportunity to impress upon the world. The frightening prospect of a multi-nuclear world and through it induce countries like India into signing the NPT on the lines suggested by the U.S.A. and USSR. Speaking before the disarmament Commission in May, 1965, India's Ambassador to the U.N. observed: "It is no use telling countries some of which may be even more advanced in nuclear technology than China that they should enter into a treaty which would stipulate only that they must not acquire or produce their weapons. Again, it is no use telling them that their security will be safeguarded by one or the other of the existing nuclear powers. Such assurance has to be really dependable unless the nuclear powers undertake from now not to produce any nuclear weapons or vehicles for weapons' delivery and in addition agree to reduce their existing stockpile of nuclear weapons there is no way of doing away with proliferation."¹

In ideological terms, one may infer that the discussions on the NPT highlighted the different roles of India and the US as protagonists of the "nuclear have-nots" and "nuclear haves" respectively. India proposed to the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Commission (ENDC) the need to incorporate a separate Article in the treaty affirming the solemn resolve of the nuclear weapons powers to undertake

¹ Epstein William, "The proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" Scientific American, 8 April, 1975, p.190.
meaningful measures of disarmament particularly of nuclear disarmament.\(^1\) India maintained that an international treaty preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons could be a purposeful instrument only if the measure was conceived in an overall universal concept of disarmament and not as a simple exercise in imposing un-armament of unarmed countries.\(^2\) India wanted a treaty adhering to the principles of equality and mutual benefits. To quote Mr. V.C.Trivedi, India's representative to the ENDC:

"A Non-proliferation Treaty must accordingly embody an article of solemn under which the states possessing nuclear weapons would negotiate a meaningful programme of reduction of existing stockpiles of weapons and their delivery systems. This provision can not be merely a pious preamble or platitude like the unfulfilled determination in the four year old partial test ban treaty".\(^3\)

India also asserted its right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Commenting on the US and the USSR draft treaty on 22 September, 1967, Mr. V.C.Trivedi said

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"India is doubtfully infavour of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons but it is equally in favour of proliferation of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes....India has long maintained that there should be no fetters of any kind on the development of atomic energy for the purpose of economic and non-military development. At the same time India is willing to agree to international regulations under a non-discriminatory and universal system of safeguards to ensure that no country manufactures or stockpiles nuclear weapons while undertaking research and development for peaceful nuclear explosives."

The General Assembly of the United Nations has endorsed on June 12, 1968 with an overwhelming majority the U.S.-Soviet draft treaty to ban the spread of nuclear weapons, which is popularly known as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Ninety-five nations voted for, four against and twenty-one abstained, India was one of the countries who abstained. The UN endorsement was only recommendatory and formal adherence to the Treaty was required by willing nations affixing their signatures and later getting it ratified through their respective constitutional processes. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was open for signature in Washington, London and Moscow. The treaty came into force when the U.S., the Soviet Union,

1. Ibid., P.V. 334, 28 September, 1967, p.12.
Britain and 40 non-nuclear weapon signatories have ratified. The treaty is of 25 years duration.1

The provisions of the treaty may be summarised as follows:

1) States possessing nuclear weapons cannot transfer nuclear arms or other nuclear devices to non-nuclear weapon states.

2) Non-nuclear weapon states cannot receive such weapons.

3) The non-nuclear weapon states agree to accept an inspection system to be worked out with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

4) Research production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, except for the development of nuclear explosive devices is guaranteed to all non-nuclear weapon states and;

5) The possession and application of nuclear explosives will be made available to non-nuclear weapon states through an international body.2

The implication of the treaty in a nut-shell is that with the exception of the USA, the USSR, the UK, France

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2. Ibid., pp.172-173.
and Red China, no new state would be permitted to 'go nuclear'. Thus the Big Five wanted to continue to enjoy nuclear monopoly. It was exactly this doubt which was reflected in India's opposition to this treaty which created another area of friction in Indo-US relations.

Furthermore, the treaty prohibited non-nuclear countries from developing explosive devices for peaceful purposes. The sponsors of the treaty contended that a nuclear explosive device was indistinguishable from a nuclear weapon. India felt, however, the distinction could and should be made between explosive devices that were used only for peaceful purposes and others that were used for testing weapons.

India's opposition to the treaty was that the treaty did not specify any guarantee for India's security against China, which had already become a nuclear power, secondly, it would prevent India from developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes for which it was sufficiently equipped because of its being in an advanced state of nuclear research. The significance of at least the second reason came to light on 18 May, 1974, when India successfully exploded a nuclear device for peaceful purposes.¹

Non-nuclear states like India were rather annoyed that the United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement about the terms of the NPT largely without meeting the demand of the non-nuclear weapon and developing countries. The simultaneous permission of both the vertical and horizontal proliferation has been central to India's concept of a non-proliferation treaty.

India's objection to NPT is that the treaty has not contributed to disarmament. Article VI of the Treaty stresses that each of the parties undertake, "to pursue negotiations in good faith" for the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and for eventually nuclear disarmament and the conclusion of treaty on general and complete disarmament.1 However, the Treaty does not provide specific steps obliging the nuclear weapon powers to reduce their nuclear arsenals. Perhaps the obsession of the super powers mystique of horizontal proliferation seems to be a camouflaging to direct attention from the quantitative as well as qualitative arms race going on between themselves.

India has pointed out that since the launching of the NPT the arsenals of the super powers have increased and not at all decreased. The official Indian position has been that all nuclear weapons should be abolished and that until

they are so done the NPT is a discriminatory document that legitimizes the current invidious hierarchy of international power perpetuates the second-class status of non-nuclear weapon states. Talking to newsmen on 15 June, 1974 in New Delhi, Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi made an emphatic observation:

"We are against the NPT merely because we thought that it is discriminatory and unequal. Now, if there is an agreement which applies to everybody equally, then naturally we have to think about it, but here what is happening that a few nations are exempted from non-application and they are allowed to stock-pile nuclear weapons, whereas other nations who do not want to make war, are not even allowed experiments for practical purpose."

India feels that neither China nor Pakistan, which poses a major threat to its security has accepted the NPT. Moreover, the NPT would hamper its programme for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for basic development purposes and would make it dependent for many years to come on the nuclear weapon states for its nuclear technology, thus interfering with its policy of increasing its


indigenous technological capabilities and of becoming more self-reliant in the nuclear field.¹

Even with a change in the government in 1977, India's stand on NPT remained unchanged. India's Ambassador to the United States, N.A. Palkhiwala, observed almost similarly that the greatest weakness of the non-proliferation effort was its almost total preoccupation with the countries which did not possess the nuclear weapons and did not want them. He terms it a vigorous policy of trying to "disarm the unarmed".²

Two actions by the U.S. congress made it difficult for the United States to deal with other countries on nuclear matters and created a virtual impasse in Indo-American nuclear relations, with adverse spillover effects on these relations generally.³ In 1977, an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (the Glenn - Symington Amendment) was required to cut off economic assistance to any country that did not accept internationally approved safeguards for its nuclear facilities or that embarked on programmes that seemed to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.

capabilities. In 1978, the congress enacted the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act (NNPA), which had far-reaching effects on executive-legislative responsibilities and controls over the export of nuclear technology and materials and on the relations of the United States with those countries to which it was providing assistance in the nuclear field.

India's "peaceful nuclear explosion" (PNE) of 1974 and the passage by the American Congress in 1978 of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act (NNPA) so widened the gulf between the two countries that these was an impasse about the supply of enriched uranium by the United States to Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS). An ingenious way out was found by resorting to the French solution; but the larger impasse over non-proliferation and safeguards remains, in addition to continuing disagreements over the reprocessing of spent fuel from TAPS and supply of spare parts.

The Indo-American nuclear divide has been widened by the impact of a larger number of events such as China's entry into the nuclear club, the international Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of 1968, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979, India's explosion of a nuclear device in May 1974, the emergency in India in 1975-77, and Pakistan's nuclear programme and events in the United States like the evolution of U.S. defuse and security policies and programmes (Particularly the nuclear arms
buildup in recent years and largescale arms transfers), the priority given to nuclear non-proliferation treaty of 1968 (especially of the horizontal type), and the NNPA of 1978.¹

As has been pointed out, both the United States and the Soviet Union are strong supporters of the NPT of 1968, and both have tried to influence India to adhere to this treaty. But India has resisted the pressures of both the superpowers.² This is a rare case in contemporary international relations where the super-powers have joined in support of a major international agreement, especially in the nuclear field, have made special efforts to persuade India which is heavily dependent on both in many ways and have been unable to influence India to change its basic policy.

Simultaneously attention was also paid to the limitation of the strategic arms with a view to achieving disarmament. The two super-powers—the USA and the USSR held prolonged negotiations at Geneva and finally agreed to meet at Helsinki. This was indeed a significant step as the two super powers agreed in principle to restrain and put a stop to the fierce competition for the acquisition of sophisticated weapons. The negotiations continued for nearly


four years before the conclusion of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty of 1972. In fact, the agreement broadly consisted of two separate treaties, viz., Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile system and the Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of the strategic offensive Arms. While the former was concluded for an unlimited period, the latter was of five year duration. The Anti-Ballistic Missile systems Treaty permitted the two super-powers to have only two sides for ballistic missile defences, one for the protection of their national capital area and the other for the protection of the field of ICBMs.

In May 1977 a convention was signed at Geneva with a view to strengthening world peace and bringing about complete disarmament through prohibition of military or other hostile use of environment modification techniques. They were not to assist, encourage or induce any state, group of states or international organization to engage in activities contrary to the provisions of the treaty. However, the efforts towards disarmament have been going on for ever with ups and downs between the super powers as well as the developed and Third World Countries. For example, on 28 January 1985 Six Nation Summit was held at New Delhi

1. Ibid.,
which was attended by President Raul Alfansin of Argentina, Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou of Greece, Prime Minister Late Olof Palme of Sweden, President Miguel De La Madrid of Mexico, President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Prime Minister Late Rajiv Gandhi of India.

The summit appealed to the nuclear weapon powers to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race. It urged them to immediately halt the testing of all kinds of nuclear weapons and to conclude a treaty on a nuclear weapon test ban at an early date. It called for prohibition of the development, testing, production, deployment and use of all space weapons. It warned that an arms race in the space would be enormously costly and have grave destabilising effect. The other points emphasised by the summit were the need for strengthening the UN system and diversion of expenditure from arms to development. The six leaders also agreed to visit nuclear powers and other capitals and impress on them the urgent need to put the arms race into reverse gear. This summit owed a lot to late Mr. Rajiv Gandhi who renewed and revived the efforts made by Mrs. Gandhi in this direction.

Regarding Indo-US attitude towards disarmament the NPT occupies a very important place. The USA wants that the nuclear arms should be limited only to nuclear weapon countries in order to have a nuclear monopoly and it tries to restrict the transfer of nuclear technology to the non-
nuclear countries in the name of NPT. But India opposes the US sponsored NPT on the ground that it is a discriminatory one and it is an obstacle to the peaceful nuclear research development in the non-nuclear countries. Therefore, they differ with each other in the context of NPT. However, both want to have disarmament, i.e. India wants to achieve disarmament by the elimination of all types of weapons, which was evident in the Six Nation Disarmament Conference, where as the USA wants to have disarmament by partial reduction of the nuclear weapons which is evident in almost all disarmament negotiations.

Another major world issue was Vietnam war. Before the Indo-China question assumed global proportions in which the two power blocs became involved, India viewed it as a struggle for independence by the oppressed people against imperialism and colonialism eventhough it was not oblivious of the fact that the indigeneous communists were spearheading the movement organised by a national coalition. Having itself been freed from colonial domination India naturally extended its sympathies to the freedom struggle in Indo-China.¹ However, the Government of India did not like to interfere in Indo-China in anyway as it would not be advantageous either to India or to world peace. On the contrary, it could be construed a "foreign interference"

¹ Jawaharlal Nehru's speech at Asian Relations Conference: New Delhi, 1947.
which in its turn would have evoked great deal of resentment in the area concerned.\textsuperscript{1} This policy, more or less, continued till the situation in Indo-China deteriorated rapidly early in 1954.

In the intervening period (i.e. 1950-53), both sides, i.e. the Bao Dai Government and the Viet Minhs started receiving "material aid and equipment" from the United States and military supplies from Red China respectively. India on the other hand, was preoccupied with domestic problems, such as Kashmir, Hyderabad, and refugee rehabilitation.\textsuperscript{2} Yet India, worried about the continued warfare there made an appeal to the belligerent powers in Indo-China to agree to some kind of a cease-fire before the Geneva Conference meet.

The Conference on Indo-China opened in Geneva on April 26, 1954. The conference had been called by the American, British and Soviet Foreign Ministers after a meeting in Berlin. Delegates from nine countries participated in the conference. These were Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, France, Laos, PRC, State of Vietnam, The Soviet Union, the U.K. and the U.S.A. India did


\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Selected Speeches of Nehru September 1946-April, 1961}, New Delhi, 1961, p.395.
not participate in the conference. The conference resulted in three cease-fire agreements relating to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. They provided for an International Supervisory Commission to control and supervise the armistice in the three states of Indo-China. The Commission was composed of Canada, India and Poland. India was the Chairman.

The statement made by the U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on 29 March, 1954 advocating a collective action on Indo-China by Western Powers, aroused deep suspicions in the minds of influential Indians. It has been even interpreted as "an extension of the Monroe Doctrine to Asia".¹ Although the Indian mind has been free from considerations that could possibly be termed as pro-communist, its reaction to Dulles proposal has been in the background of Western dominance in an area fighting for its liberation. Past history, out of which India has recently emerged, made her consider it as "a disguised attempt to reimpose foreign influence on newly free countries".²

Moreover, Nehru felt that the statements made by Dulles might not be useful for a successful outcome of the Geneva Conference.³ For the Government of India always held the view that "negotiations under threat or by military

3. The Hindu, 10 April, 1954.
activities being stepped up preceding negotiations...are not helpful".¹ In a statement Nehru laid the blame both at the doors of the Western powers and Viet Minh. By "threats" Nehru is said to have referred to the call given for United action by the US secretary of state and by "military activities" to the intensified attacks by the Viet Minh on Dien Bien Phu.²

During Vietnam War, the Super powers openly participated in Indo-China to strengthen their own position vis-a-vis South-East Asia. Soviet Union and Communist China backed North Vietnam and provided her the necessary materials.³ South Vietnam had the unequivocal support the USA.⁴ The stage was ready for the final showdown. The International Control Commission was asked by the both parties to investigate into the matters of continuous infiltration. The I.C.C. released its report and observed that North Vietnam had violated the Geneva Agreement by initiating infiltration and that South Vietnam was responsible for the flouting of the Geneva Agreement by

1. Lok Sabha Debates, 4, 1954, Col. 4922.
concluding a military pact with the USA. The report failed
to make any dent and the situation remained as usual.

The situation in Vietnam was slipping out of hands
every day and South Vietnam was under massive pressure from
Viet-Cong forces. This necessitated some immediate action by
the U.S.A.

The U.S.A. decided to directly intervene in
Vietnam on August 5, 1964 on the pretext of safeguarding her
bases, ships and cruisers at the Bay of Tonkin.¹ She
bombed the North Vietnamese submarine positions for
five hours. This excited violent reaction in communist camp
which pledged to supply unlimited quantity of arms and
ammunity to her ally in that area. The Viet-Cong guerillas
intensified their subvertive activities and succeeded in
inflicting terrible toll among Americans in Viet Hoihow
airbase. The USA intensified air raids in retaliation.

On the other hand, in 1965, China repeated its
assurances of support to the Vietnamese people against the
U.S. imperialists "until final victory". There were fears
that with the escalation of the war in Vietnam by the
Americans, China might get involved in war, leading even to
a major world conflagration. And, hence, the Government of

India pleaded for the convening of a Geneva type of Conference. Replying to a question in Parliament, the Indian Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, said in February, 1965, that "the parties concerned should get together in a conference and try to solve the problem peacefully". He further stated that "India was trying to create an atmosphere for holding a Geneva type conference to resolve the present crisis". Referring to the charge that India did not condemn the US induction of military personnel in Vietnam, Swaran Singh pointed out that "India, by virtue of its being on the International Truce Supervisory Commission, had to show a great deal of restraint in making statements".¹

India was a consistent critic of U.S. activity in Vietnam. When the US used lethal gas against the Viet-Cong and the civilian population, India denounced it. India's Minister for External Affairs, Swaran Singh, stated that "the use of weapons like lethal gas was against the conscience of humanity and hoped that it would not be repeated".² Besides, India played an active role in initiating discussions at the Belgrade conference which led to the issuing of a joint appeal by 17 Non-Aligned nations with the object of getting negotiations started without any preconditions and as soon as possible, so that a political solution of the problems could be achieved. While

2. India, Lok Sabha Debates, 26 March, 1965, Col. 6247.
the United States welcomed the appeal, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam rejected it.

The new Prime Minister of India Mrs. Gandhi made a major seven point proposal on July 7, 1966, on the eve of her departure for a state visit to Russia¹ for ending the Vietnam war. The points were:

1. A Geneva type of Conference to be convened by the co-chairman, Britain and the Soviet Union.
2. Immediate end to bombing in North Vietnam, to be followed by cessation of hostilities as well as of hostile movements and actions on all sides throughout Vietnam;
3. The ICSC to safeguard the standstill agreements;
4. India, as a member and Chairman of the Commission would accept whatever additional responsibility this might entail;
5. Withdrawal of all foreign forces from Vietnam;
6. The Geneva Conference to guarantee the integrity and independence of a neutral Vietnam and of Laos and Cambodia as envisaged by the 1954 Geneva Agreements; and
7. The Geneva Powers to underwrite a rehabilitation and development plan for the three Indo-China states to repair the ravages of war.¹

¹ The Hindu, July 8, 1966.
Presenting these points she observed, "I offer these proposals as no more than an idea. India is committed to a peaceful solution and not any particular solution. We would be willing to support any alternative proposal that offers hope of success. But one thing I am certain there must be an early turning away from war in Vietnam". The tenor of this statement itself makes it clear that India was not very sure about the acceptability of the proposals by the parties to the dispute, though India had demonstrated, through the various pronouncements of its spokesman from time to time, a considerate attitude towards North Vietnam and had also consistently demanded the stoppage of bombing of North Vietnam. But China and later the North Vietnam, summarily rejected the proposals. They were not prepared to accept anything less than an American withdrawal from Vietnam. Chou-En-lai characterized the proposal as "designed only to sap the fighting will of the Vietnamese and to help the United States". He categorically stated, "unless United States troops are withdrawn, the reconvening of the Geneva Conference is entirely out of the question." Indian proposals, therefore made no headway because neither the United States nor the North Vietnam was interested in any turning away from war in Vietnam. During

1. Times of India, 8 July, 1966.
2. Times of India, 10 July, 1966.
3. Ibid.
this period, India was facing food crisis and approached USA for help. But USA did not supply food to India to keep India away from Vietnam Crisis.

Despite its peace efforts, India refused to participate in the All-Asian Peace Conference on Vietnam Convened by U.S.A. and its allies at Manila in October 1966 on the ground that "a gathering of a group of specific nations would increase rather than decrease tension". India viewed the Manila meeting as essentially a war conference between the United States and its allies to reassess their political and military tactics and confront the Hanoi Government and the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam with a dramatic peace appeal backed by a new threat of overwhelming military action if they persisted in their refusal to enter into negotiations except on their own terms. But India wisely refrained from denying this peace bid by the U.S.A. and its allies as a diplomatic stunt to mislead world opinion which opposed the continuance of American bombing of North Vietnam. It was in the fall of 1966 that India for the first time joined hands with other states (Egypt and Yugoslavia) to demand withdrawal of "all foreign forces" without a time limit.

2. Ibid., September 29, 1966.
While India was recovering from the shocks and pressures of the U.S. Government during the Sino-Indian border dispute, Pakistan invaded India in 1965. A legitimate expectation in India was the aggressor and the victim of aggression could not be equated, but the US Government did not see any lack of logic in its response to the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965.\textsuperscript{1} The cumulative effect of the war of 1962 with China and 1965 war with Pakistan, and of the serious drought in 1965-67 was felt on the Indian economy, especially on the food front.\textsuperscript{2} India had been receiving food aid from the US under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, but during the drought of 1965-67, the US Government used food aid as pressure to influence India's foreign policy. US President L.B. Johnson clearly stated that the shipment of food aid should be linked with Indian statements on US actions in Vietnam. The Government of India was extremely critical of the US war in Vietnam, and President Johnson wanted to restrain India in return for food aid.

The Government of India resisted President Johnson's attempt to dictate India's Vietnam policy inspire


of its need for US aid for food in 1966 and 1967. India looked to the Soviet Union for genuine peace initiatives in Indo-China because it was a co-sponsor of the 1954 Geneva agreements in that area.

Compelled by the external and internal pressures, president Johnson announced the cessation of armed conflict and the third round of Paris talks started on February 6, 1969. The talks observed continuous deadlock as both sides repeatedly alleged sabotage of peace efforts. On May 8, 1969, the NLF representative presented a ten-point formula to resolved the issue. It provided that the foreign troops should be withdrawn and a provisional joint government be established in South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese Government agreed to cooperate in the peace talks in future but rejected the idea of provisional joint government. In May, 1969, the USA withdrew 50,000 of her soldiers and presented a seven-point formula for peace.¹ Meanwhile a new development of Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) in the liberated areas of South Vietnam and recognition by the Communist countries which further complicated the issue.

In the meantime, on September 3, 1969, Dr. Ho Chi Minh the father of modern Vietnam died. It was hoped that the death of the moving spirit of Vietnam would soften the

attitude of his successors in the peace talks. But the contents of his deathwill - "fight unto last against imperialism and colonialism" belied the expectations. During this war, a great massacre occurred at "My Lai". My Lai is a small village situated 335 km. away from Saigon. This town was a stronghold of Viet-cong guerillas who had routed one American battalion after capturing Kheh Sanh. To avenge the defeat, one American helicopter landed at My Lai on March 16, 1968 and ruthlessly murdered the innocent inhabitants, mostly women and children. The My Lai story rocked the world as well as the American public which demanded immediate action against the guilty officials of the My Lai episode.

Later on in 1971 president Nixon decided to visit communist China to normalise the relations. Before his visit he ordered the massive bombardment on North Vietnam. The automatic mines with electronic devices were laid in Haiphong harbour in order to strike a better deal vis-a-vis to Vietnam. As communist China was determined to improve her relations with the USA, she did not condemn the latter's actions in the light of Sino-Soviet rift. The Soviet Union took full advantage of the situation and thwarted the US success in Vietnam.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., May 27-June 3, 1972, p. 25279.
Mrs. Gandhi strongly criticised the US bombardment on North Vietnam. A little later she said "would the sort of war or the savage for ending which has taken place in Vietnam have been tolerated for so long, had the people been European?"

On January 25, 1972 Nixon made a concerted attempt to break the impasse. He along with president Thieu of South Vietnam offered a new eight point peace proposal, at the Paris Peace talks two days later. The points were:

i) A complete withdrawal of all the U.S. and allied forces from South Vietnam;

ii) an exchange of all prisoners throughout Indo-China;

iii) a cease-fire throughout Indo-China;

iv) a new presidential election in South Vietnam;

v) respect for the Geneva Accords of 1954 and the Laos Agreement of 1962;

vi) settlement by the Indo-Chinese parties themselves of problems existing between them, including the role of North Vietnamese forces;

vii) international Supervision, as necessary of the agreement; and

viii) in international guarantee which could involve an international Conference.


After his eight point proposal, president Nixon's visit to China in February, 1972, has been the first big step towards peace in Indo-China. On January 8, 1973 the Paris peace talks again started. On January 24, 1973 president Nixon announced that the war in Vietnam was to come to a close very soon. On January 27, 1973, the foreign ministers of the USA, South Vietnam, North Vietnam and Provisional Revolutionary Government signed the armistice agreement at Paris which provided that within sixty days after the implementation of armistice the American troops would be withdrawn, civil and military POWs (prisoners of War) would be released and a list of lost personnel would be announced.

It also said that the infiltration in South Vietnam would be immediately stopped, the foreign troops from Laos and Cambodia would be withdrawn and the future of Vietnam would be decided through bilateral conferences. It further reaffirmed the faith of contending parties in the right of self-determination of South Vietnamese people. The contending parties agreed to respect the demilitarized Zone and to establish an International Commission of 1160 soldiers to supervise and control armistice.

1. Das Kumar, Parimal, India and the Vietnam War, Young Asia Publications, New Delhi, 1972, p.102.

Besides the provisions the agreement established four commissions namely - International Commission, International Control and Supervision Commission, Four member joint Commission and Two party joint commission. The war in Vietnam thus came to an end after nearly eleven years. The USA suffered the heaviest consualities and lost a huge amount of money.\(^1\) She spent Rs. 98.550 crores and lost 56,000 soldiers. Besides this 54,246 soldiers were wounded, 1276 were lost and 589 were imprisoned. The civilian population was the worst hit in the war. The US Senate's Sub-Committee on Refugees estimated, the death of 1,88,000 in South Vietnam alone and in North Vietnam it was a confounding number of 9,28,000.\(^2\) The failure to win in Vietnam despite vast expenditure of men and resources and the disintegration of social myths that had no choice but no respond to a massive demand from US citizens i.e. to stop the war in Vietnam.

The result of Vietnam problem and its success was not only a military victory, but also a tiumph of Asian Nationalism. The episode also characterised the defeat of imperialism and colonialism before the forces of nationalism. India supported the North Vietnam because she fought against imperialism and colonialism.

India's Vietnam policy was based on a solid assessment of the history, traditions, geopolitics and the rapidly developing situation in the peninsula. A firm conclusion was drawn that Vietnam was poised to play an independent role, that Vietnam was no more a stooge of China than China was of the Soviet Union, that Vietnam was actually wary of Chinese intentions and would not brook any foreign influence there, that the struggle against foreign dominance, eventhough confined with fundamental total transformation and that Ho Chi Minh's forces were destined to triumph.¹

India's highest interest in Vietnam was to encourage independence to push the withdrawal of colonialism and neo-colonialism, to strive for early peace and normalcy there and to assist in the establishment of a healthier balance of forces in the region.² Mrs. Gandhi described the Vietnam conflict as the most pointless conflict of modern times and paid tribute to the "heroic resistance" of the Vietnamese people. "A small nation has been to withstand the world's mightiest power", she said could there be a more glorious example of the immortality of the human spirit?" she asked.³

1. Dutt, V.P. India's Foreign Policy, Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1987, p.391.
2. Ibid., pp. 391-392.
The liberation of Vietnam has influenced the South-East Asian Politics immensely. It was thought that the communist China due to her proximity might extend her hold, but contrary to expectations, the Soviet Union has succeeded in this attempt. With Communist China's rapprochement with the USA, the region again got exposed to "cold war" rivalry.

The Vietnamese National Assembly declared in 1976 the unification of the both Vietnams and the establishment of Vietnam Socialist Democratic Republic. Saigon (the South Vietnamese) Capital was changed into Ho Chi Minh City, and thus the dream of Vietnamese people was fulfilled.

India supported North Vietnam and opposed the USA to protected North Vietnam against imperialism under which India once suffered. On the other hand the USA supported South Vietnam because it wanted to curb communism in that region and also to have a control over that region against the USSR and the Communist China.

The last major world issue is the Indian Ocean as a Zone of peace. The Indian Ocean, which was once considered as a 'neglected Ocean' has of late become the hub of political and military activities and an arena of acute tension due to the pressure of conventional and nuclear naval vessels of the major powers in the area. This poses a serious threat to world peace and naturally the powers of the world in general and India in particular have expressed
concern over these developments, and demanded that the Indian Ocean should be kept as a zone of peace.

The issue of U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean, although it does not concern India alone, has far-reaching implications for India, as it is linked with India's future role in the region. India cannot remain indifferent to a naval competition between the two super powers in an area which is so close to it.¹

The US presence in the Indian Ocean began in December 1963, when the USA decided to send a part of its seventh fleet operating in the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. The US task force was supposed to enter into these waters in March 1964, the avowed aim being to confront China. The decision to form separate Indian Ocean command was taken around November, 1963 following the successful tests of the long-range Polaris A-3 missiles in October, 1963. General Maxwell Taylor (the Chairman of the US Joint Chief of the Staff), who was visiting India, told newsmen at the Palam air port, New Delhi, on 19 December, 1963, that "the US task force might comprise of one air craft carrier, two or three desotryers and one oil tanker. He also told them that the task force would be independent, and would not need any port facilities."²

1. Ibid., 25.
During this period, the British influence in Australia declined as Australia and New Zealand came closer to another Pacific power, the USA leading to the creation of the ANZUS group. This new found friendship was part of the American global strategy by virtue of the unique position of Australia as the connecting link between the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Besides, the construction of an American radio communication station, costing $75 million, in North-Western Australia, at a point 700 miles North of Perth, began in 1963 and it was ready by 1966.¹ This American base is useful to the US submarines operating in the Eastern Indian Ocean.

The Diego Garcia base was the hub of the US presence in the Indian Ocean area. The island, a part of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) is based 400 nautical miles south of the Maldives, about 1200 miles south of India, and about 1240 miles North of Mauritius. Since the island formally belonged to Great Britain the USA entered into a fifty year agreement with it in December 1966 for the joint construction of the base there. In due course, Diego Garcia was developed into a full-fledged American base, with a nominal British legal presence there. The base heralded a greater American presence in the Indian Ocean.

The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the east of the Suez, beginning in 1968, intensified the U.S. concern,

and a similar weakening of the strategic power of both the U.K. and Portugal in Southern Africa, dramatized by the Coup in Portugal in 1974, added to the growing U.S. involvement.¹

Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), a concept in US military strategy, was originally evolved by professor Henry Kissinger of Harward University in 1958 but remained for long an academic concept. The basic idea of Kissinger was to add considerable mobility to U.S. forces for their deployment in far away theatres of war by means of augmenting airlift and sea-lift capabilities. It was only after the fall of Shah of Iran in 1979 that the US finally decided to put into action the RDF Plan². The RDF intensified its activity, in the Indian Ocean after the Soviet intervention in Afganistan. All these developments have made for the U.S. interventionist capability in the Indian Ocean.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union has been maintaining naval presence in the Indian Ocean since 1968 in the context of the cumulative result of the growing US interests in the Third World, and the evolution of the cold war strategy, in the light of the newly emerging weapon


systems.¹ The Soviet Union did not have much of a political and economic presence in the Indian Ocean littoral states before 1955. But since then the USSR has been able to make its influence felt in this area for several reasons. The change in the Soviet policy towards Non-Aligned states since 1955 enabled it to develop friendly ties with countries like India, Burma, Indonesia, and Egypt; the growing Sino-Soviet rift also prompted the USSR to compete with China for influence among the Afro-Asian States; the phased withdrawal of the Western military presence from the CENTO, when it gave up the previous policy of maintaining a strategic deterrence based upon land confrontation, enabled the USSR to normalise its ties with the northern-tier states like Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.² The cumulative effect of all these factors led to the growing Soviet involvement in the Indian Ocean area after 1955.

Under these circumstances, India, as a littoral state was worried about presence of the Super Powers (especially the United States) in the Indian Ocean. Its opposition to Diego Garcia and related aspects of America's Indian Ocean strategy is based on these grounds: firstly, the U.S. policy will trigger a competitive Super Powers arms race in an otherwise peaceful ocean. Secondly, the Soviet naval presence is "reactive" and, because of various

² Ibid., p.63.
geographic and military constraints, does not pose any threat to American interests. Thirdly, the naval competition among super powers is likely to fuel regional conflicts and might result in local wars by proxy. Fourthly the U.S. decision on Diego Garcia is a violation of the UN resolution declaring the Indian Ocean a "zone of peace" and finally, the U.S. move is part of the detente philosophy of the super powers.¹

While opposing the U.S. Indian Ocean strategy, India seems to give the impression that it is soft on the Soviet presence. However, the Indian argument is that it is the U.S. that triggered a competitive race as far back as the mid-1960s while commissioning the North-West Cape very Low Frequency communication station in Australia, possibly as a prelude to the deployment of nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean.² It is thus argued that the Soviet naval presence is "reactive" and "defensive" and does not present any strategic threat to the U.S. interests and power. This line of argument found confirmation in the initial UN report on the subject by a panel of three experts.


India also rejected the off-repeated western reports alleging that the Soviet navy enjoys base facilities in Indian ports. According to the Indian Foreign Minister, the question was not of the existence of "imaginary Soviet bases" but of the real establishment of one at Diego Garcia.\(^1\) Similarly, Western reports regarding the existence of Soviet bases elsewhere in the Indian Ocean are discounted by the Indian Government. The existence of Soviet bases in Madagascar, Mauritius, Socotra or Iraq was "not borne out by facts" as these could not have remained undetected.\(^2\)

The reactions of the Indian Ocean States to the growing Super Power rivalry in the area, right from the 1960s, was in keeping with their traditional policies. The littoral states of the Indian Ocean favoured the establishment of peace Zone idea. This idea was first taken by Mrs. Bandaranaike, the then Prime Minister of Sri Lanka. In her speech on 8 October 1964 at the Second Non-Aligned Nations Conference in Cairo, she forcefully argued that the concept of nuclear - free zone should be applied to the Oceans also, especially the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic.\(^3\) Her suggestions were subsequently incorporated in the declaration of the Cairo Conference, which is also known

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as the programme for peace and International cooperation. Part VII of the programme dealt with disarmament, denuclearisation and the establishment of nuclear-free-zones. Part VIII of the programme condemned the expressed intention of the big powers to establish bases in the Indian Ocean.

In keeping with their earlier stand, the Non-Aligned countries criticised the plan to construct Anglo-American bases in the Indian Ocean islands, especially in Diego Garcia. Mr. Dinesh Singh, the then Deputy Minister for External Affairs, said, as early as 18 November, 1965, that "the Indian government strongly opposed the construction of foreign bases in the Indian Ocean and that India would do everything possible to resist the establishment of an Anglo-American base in the Chagos archipelago. Several other states in the Indian Ocean area were also critical of such arrangements."¹ Further, the Indian government strongly objected to the so-called vacuum theory, which was created by the withdrawal of Britain from the Indian Ocean. Mrs. Gandhi emphasized that point in her press conference during the tour of South-East Asian countries capitals in Singapore, Canberra, Wellington and Kuala Lumpur in May 1966, that the withdrawal of the British Forces from the area would not create any vacuum, and, if any vacuum was created, it ought to be filled by the local powers.

¹ Ibid., p.218.
themselves and not by outside powers. She pointed out that the entry of outside forces would not only create more tensions but also accentuate those which already prevailed in the area.

Further the peace-zone proposal was discussed in September 1970, at Lusaka Non-Aligned Summit Conference and a declaration was adopted calling upon all states:

"to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a Zone of peace from which great power rivalries and competition as well as bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and competition - either army, navy or air force bases - are excluded. The area should also be free of nuclear weapons".

In September 1971, fifty-four members of the Non-Aligned group met at the UNO, and decided on concrete steps that should be taken to implement the Lusaka Declaration relating to the creation of peace-zone in the Indian Ocean. The first formal shot was fired by Sri Lanka's permanent Representative in the United Nations, Shirely Amarasinge, when he addressed a letter to the UN Secretary-General, suggesting that the "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a

1. Ibid., p.219.
Zone of peace" be included in the agenda of the twenty-sixth session (1971). ¹ In the succeeding five sessions, the subject has been placed with unfailing regularity on the agenda, and resolutions thereon adopted each time.

On 16 December, 1971, the UN General Assembly, by a vote of 61-0 with 55 abstentions declared the Indian Ocean, together with the air-space above it and ocean floor adjacent there to as a zone of peace for all time [Res. A/2832 (XXVI)]. A year later, on 15 December, 1972, the General Assembly passed a stronger (by a majority of 95-0 with 33 abstentions) resolution [Res.2992 (XXVII)] reaffirming the idea of Peace Zone and establishing Ad-Hoc Committee of 15 nations,² to study the implications of proposal. India also favoured the resolution.

The Ad-Hoc Committee suggested a three-point proposal regarding the peace zone problem. First as far as the countries of the region were concerned, they had to commit themselves to a policy of denuclearization, secondly it would entail the permanent renunciation by them of an obligation to deny the use of territory, territorial waters,

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1. UN Doc. A/8492 and Add. 1, On 6th October 1971, the United Republic of Tanzania became a sponsor of the latter.

2. The Ad-Hoc committee consists of the following 15 nations: Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia.
and air space to nuclear weapons belonging to other states. Thirdly, the nuclear powers had to undertake an obligation not to deploy nuclear weapons in the peace zone area.\(^1\)

International support for the idea of converting the Indian Ocean into peace zone got a boost after 1973. The joint communique signed on 6 June 1973, following the visit of Mr. Whitlam the Prime Minister of Australia to India, urged for the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. Again, on 30 November, 1973, in a joint declaration, Mrs. Gandhi and Mr. Brezhnev reaffirmed their readiness to participate together with other states concerned on an equal basis in finding a fair solution to the question of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. The Prime Minister of Maldives, while visiting India in March 1974, expressed his full support for the concept of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of peace. The concept was also reiterated during Mrs. Gandhi's Iran visit in May, 1974.\(^2\)

In 1979, a meeting of the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean was held as a preparatory process where seven principles were accepted for the implementation of 1971 declaration. These seven principles related to the limits of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of peace, elimination

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of military presence of the Great powers in the Ocean; elimination of military bases and other installations of Great powers; denuclearization of the Ocean; non-use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes; regional and other cooperation; and free and uninterrupted use of the ocean by vessels of all nations.¹

This meeting adopted a final document which upon the littoral and hinterland states to agree not to acquire or introduce nuclear weapons or to allow their introduction by an external power. The declaration called for a system of universal, collective security without military alliances and called for demilitarization in the context of great power rivalry. This final draft was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly in its 39th session.

In 1979 the UN General Assembly decided to convene a conference to be held at Colombo in 1981 to consider the ways for the implementation of the declaration regarding the Indian Ocean.² However, on account of differences amongst members of the Ad Hoc Committee the conference could not be held. It has been argued that the United States and other Western powers were using Afganistan crisis as an excuse to

¹ News Review on Countries Bordering India, IDSA, New Delhi, Refreeary, 1971, pp. 43-44.
delay the holding of the conference in Colombo because they were not willing to accept the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

If one analyses the whole issue of the Indian Ocean is the light of the discussions on it both within and outside the United Nations, one may come to the following conclusion. The UN resolutions have gained sufficient majority in the General Assembly but most of the great powers and major maritime powers have abstained from voting on the resolution and have shown a marked reluctance to attend the conference on the Indian Ocean.

Thus, despite the overwhelming majority in the General Assembly, the resolutions are in fact, ineffective. Secondly there are marked differences even among the Indian ocean states on the ways and means to bring about a peace zone in the area. Some states have already introduced new elements which have no direct bearing upon the basic question of elimination of the foreign presence from the Indian Ocean.

In 1974 and 1975, the question of creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia was projected as a major issue which overshadowed the question of creating a peace zone in the Indian Ocean. In 1975, new ideas about forms of political regime and a regional arms limitation were projected as a precondition to the creation of a peace
zone in the area. Others have even projected the idea of a mutual balance between the great powers as the best way of preserving peace in the area. Undoubtedly, such diversionary tactics not only detracted the attention from the main issue, but also enabled the interested foreign powers to pursue their policy of divide and rule and ultimately settle the major issue—the elimination of great power presence from the Indian Ocean.

It is true that the Indian Ocean region is not a political unit. There are 44 countries with different history, culture, political background and economic development. Many of these countries are least developed and need huge economic aid and other cooperation of Big powers for their economic development. Similarly, the Big powers also need access to the resources, oil, safe transport and communication facilities in the Indian ocean for their economic development. So, in making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, care should be taken to safeguard the interests of all the countries, including Big powers, so that the concept of a zone of peace may be treated as a practical proposition. The Non-Aligned countries in general and India in particular and the UN Ad-Hoc Committee are still making sincere efforts at different international gatherings to achieve their goals of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. But it seems that they are not likely to achieve
their goal in the near future unless they modify their stand and strategy.

The following reasons are responsible for India's support of the "peace-zone" concept and its consequent opposition to the US presence in the Indian ocean area: first a competitive super power naval race in the Indian Ocean will reduce India's role partly circumscribed by big-power politics. Secondly, it will create serious problems for Indian diplomacy to maintain an independent Non-Aligned role in World politics because India views the U.S. Indian Ocean strategy and its arms aid to regional countries as an integrated policy, this inevitably makes the U.S. an ally of some of India's regional neighbours who are not well-disposed towards New Delhi. It is probably feared that America's strategic dependence on its regional partners might involve it in local conflict-situations affecting India's security and political interests. And thirdly, there is the fear of an eventual Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean unless the super powers declare some sort of moratorium on their rival presences.¹

On the other hand; the US Indian Ocean policy is based on two factors, one is her cold war strategy i.e. to check the growing influence of the Soviet Union in the

region. During the cold war era, the USA intensified its interference in this region, whenever the Soviet Union interfered in the affairs of the Indian Ocean states. This was evident in the Afganistan crisis. When the Soviet Union interfered in Afganistan, the USA gave a massive military assistance to the Pakistan, the latter is not only an Indian ocean littoral state but also an immediate neighbour to both Afganistan and India. So, it its quite evident that the US Indian Ocean policy is mainly based on its cold war strategy. The second factor is to control the growing regional powers of the Indian Ocean region. This has become evident during the recent Gulf war, the USA wanted to liberate Kuwait from Iraq and to reduce Iraq's regional power status through its Indian Ocean strategy. So, the US continues this policy in the post-cold war era in order to control the regional powers of the Indian Ocean region.

As a Non-Aligned country, India has followed the policy of Non-Alignment in the context of the major world issues discussed. In the Arab-Israel problem India always stood for the Arab cause where justice was denied by Israel in the form of occupying the Arab territories. But the USA supported Israel an aggressor and provided massive aid to maintain a balance of power in the West Asia region. The USA wanted to control the Arab countries by making Israel a strong country in that region.
On the Issue of disarmament, India and the USA have different perceptions and approaches. India has criticised the US sponsored Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) on the ground that it is a discriminatory one and an obstacle to achieve the goal of total disarmament. India believes that unless the NPT is indiscriminate it is not possible to achieve the goal of disarmament. On the other hand, the US wants to have disarmament but at the same time it wants that the nuclear arms should be limited only to nuclear countries. In this way the USA supported NPT. Hence, India and the USA differed in the way through which disarmament is to be achieved.

In the Vietnam war also, the two countries had their own differences. India bitterly criticised the US imperialism over Vietnam because of its experience with colonialism and imperialism and supported North Vietnam, which fought against the US intervention in Vietnam. On the other hand the US interference in Vietnam was mainly to curb the communist expansion and to protect its interests in South-East Asia.

Regarding the Indian Ocean problem, the views of the two countries have not coincided. One of the major littor states of the Indian Ocean, India wanted to protect her regional interests and it condemned all sorts of major powers interference in the Indian Ocean. But the USA through
its military bases in the Indian Ocean wanted to control the Soviet influence and to dominate over the states of this Ocean.

Therefore, the policies adopted by India and the USA regarding the major world issues discussed were based on the basic principles of their respective foreign policies. Though these issues were not bilateral they differed from each other and their impact cast a shadow on the overall bilateral relations between the two countries. However, India and the USA want to maintain close and cordial relations in the context of the changing world order which is discussed in the following chapter.