CHAPTER - IV

NON-ALIGNMENT AND INDO-US RELATIONS
Non-Alignment was born in the context of the cold war, and the disintegration of the traditional colonial system.\(^1\) It can be traced in the outlook and foreign policy orientation of the newly independent Afro-Asian states, which in the post-second world war era, decided to steer clear of the cold war and retain their hard-won freedom by upholding an active and independent foreign policy. It was the victory of the October Revolution in Russia and the establishment of socialism in India, which created conditions for the emergence of the concept of a common struggle of the colonial peoples for liberation against the common enemy, imperialism.

India was one of the first countries to gain independence after the second world war, and Jawaharlal Nehru was the first important Asian leader to articulate the idea underlying Non-Alignment. Part of the rationale for India's foreign policy lay in its own historic experience—in its struggle against British colonialism, its sympathy for similar struggles elsewhere, its opposition to racialism and racial discrimination and its desire for world peace. Nehru believed that India could be true to its historical tradition and attain its policy objectives if it shunned "bloc politics". Just before independence Nehru declared:

"We propose as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups aligned against one another, which have led in the past to two world wars and which may again lead to disaster even on a vaster scale."¹

His government's declared refusal to attach itself to any particular group, he said at the end of 1947, "has nothing to do with neutrality or passivity or anything else." If world war came India would try to keepout of its, but if she could not keepout, "we are going to join the side which (it) is to our interest (to join) when the time comes to make the choice."²

In the formulation of the new concept, Non-Alignment, Nehru convened Asian Relations Conference in March 1947 in New Delhi five months before India achieved independence, inviting the newly liberated countries of Asia and Africa. Nehru stated in the Conference:

"For too long we, of Asia, have been petitioners in the Western courts and chancelleries. That story must now belong to the past. We propose to stand on our own feet and to cooperate with all others who are prepared


² Maxwell's Quotation is from a speech by Nehru made late in 1949.
with us. We do not intend to be the playthings of others.¹

The factors behind Nehru's adherence to policy of Non-Alignment were: i. Nehru did not want India to barter away its freedom in the field of foreign policy by aligning itself with a particular group of nations, headed by a super power, thereby committing itself to follow the lead of that power on every issue. It would amount a betrayal of the ideals nurtured by the struggle from freedom and affect India's dignity as an independent country. ii. his conviction that Non-Alignment would enable to play its due role in world affairs in the interest of world peace. If India became aligned with any bloc, it would, according to him, "lose that tremendous vantage ground that we have of using such influence as we possess in the cause of world peace."² iii. as a Non-Aligned country India would be able to secure assistance from both sides in the cold war and at the same time maintain its self-respect, which was vital for securing its long-term interests; and iv. the major field of India's interest in foreign policy has been Asia. Occupying a pivotal position in Asia, India has shown a readiness to involve herself in the affairs of Asia, not


with a view to dominating but with a view to promoting peace and freedom. In its general national objectives, India wanted the countries of South-East Asia to be independent, peaceful, and prosperous. In consequence, she opposed colonialism, favoured Non-Alignment as conducive to peace, and considered economic and social development essential for the well-being of the people.

The Asian Relations Conference was the first step in India's contribution in the formation of Non-Alingment. The second major step in the direction of formulating the basic principles of Non-Alingment was the India-China Joint Communiqué in 1954, enunciating the Panch Sheela or the five principles. They are:

1. mutual respect for each other's territorial sovereignty;
2. non-aggression;
3. non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
4. equality and mutual beneficial relations; and
5. peaceful co-existence.

Panch Sheela agreement a major step forward in India's persistent struggle in the UNO for the recognition of Communist China, was opposed by the USA, and during the

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Korean crisis, the views of the two countries-India and the USA- did not coincide with each other, and this divergence, led to the negative attitude of the US towards India's policy of Non-Alignment.

It was the hardening of the US attitude towards China, the establishment of military bases on the periphery of the communist world, and the extension of military alliances to Asia during the Eisenhower Administration that brought the United States in direct opposition to the Non-Aligned countries.¹ These measures were viewed by the Non-Aligned countries as an extension of the cold war to their very door-step endangering their security by enhancing the possibility of a wider war into which they would be drawn. They were alarmed by the prospect of the United States intervening in the Indo-China war in 1954-55. It was against this a threat of major conflagration in Asia that Colombo powers decided to convene an Asian-African Conference at Bandung.

The Bandung conference was not just a meeting of Non-Aligned countries; it was a conference of 29 countries of Asia and Africa, including China.² The Non-Aligned


countries-Burma, India and Indonesia-were expected to play an important role in it. However, what was significant, indeed sinister, from the US point of view, was the fact that communist China was also an invitee. The sponsors had invited people's Republic of China because they felt that the Asian countries should come to terms with the reality that the Beijing regime represented. The Non-Aligned countries perhaps hoped that with in increase in China's links with Asia and Africa there would be a corresponding decline in its links with international communism.

The initial response of the United States to the conference was to persuade its allies and friends in Asia and Africa to boycott it. But France and Britain were reported to have prevailed upon secretary J.F. Dulles not to boycott the conference and let it be used as a spring-board, for propaganda against the west. The US strategy then underwent a change. Possibly encourage by it, the Iraqi and Lebanese leaders held talks with the Turkish Prime Minister, Adan Menders, before the conference and agreed to coordinate their strategies against the communists and the Non-Aligned led by Nehru. At Bandung they were joined by countries like Pakistan, the philippines, and Thailand, which were already members of one or more of the military alliances led by the United States. Besides, there were countries which leaned to the west and took anti-communist postures.
When the doctrine of Non-Alignment emerged in the late 1940's the United States was quick to see the dangers inherent in it, which hampered the establishment of US domination over the Third World.¹ The US leadership was fairly sceptical about the power of the doctrine at first, because the newly liberated nations who were advocating it did not have much influence or authority on the world scene. But their scepticism was mixed with a good deal of apprehension, because this new foreign-policy principle did not fit in with the schemes of Pax Americana, in which newly liberated nations figured only as strong - holds in Washington's campaign for world domination.

Post-war developments in the Third World did not turn out as US politicians had anticipated during world war II, when they worked out a long-term programme of action in Afro-Asian and Latin-American countries, known as "Moderate and selective decolonisation" which had a two fold purpose.² Firstly, it was intended to weaken the major colonial powers, to redivide the world, and to expand the sphere of influence of US capital-in a situation where the correlation of strength in the capitalist world was changing in America's favour—and thereby to consolidate the United States' position as the leader of world capitalism.


Secondly, it was intended to make the nations that were to undergo moderate and selective decolonisation (India, Indonesia, Egypt, Indo-China, Korea etc.) even more dependent on the United States. Washington even planned to use the United Nations to achieve these aims, since it believed that the newly liberated Nations, dependent on its economic and military might, would automatically support any proposals that the Americans choose to put forward.

But Washington's plans were foiled, as many newly liberated nations proclaimed their adherence to Non-Alignment policy. Non-Alignment clearly did not correspond to the American notion of post-war international relations and was therefore described by state secretary John F. Dulles as "immoral".¹ The fact is that the notorious Truman-Dulles doctrine of "rolling back communism"², proclaimed in 1947, stated that colonies and dependent nations would continue to serve America's interests even after gaining independence and that included a contribution to the struggle against socialist nations. As a means of consolidating its own leadership in the world, Washington also built up a network of US-dominated military blocs and alliances in the 1940s - 1950s. The Non-Aligned nations rejected the bloc-building policy in principle and refused to join any military alliances.

This was proved in 1951, when India rejected the US invitation for signing the Japanese Peace Treaty.

Having fought long and bloody wars to gain political independence, the founders of the Non-Alignment took every precaution against getting involved in a new, modernised system of dependence. And any call to form various western dominated alliances was regarded by the newly-liberated states as part of the neocolonialist policy. So Washinton's persistant attempts to exert political and economic pressure on Non-Aligned states, to force them to join imperialist blocs, only served to complicate relations between them.

In 1950s, the ideas of Non-Alignment were very popular with Asian states; they believed that a policy of Non-Alignment was the best way to promote national liberation goals. Significantly, the First Non-Aligned Summit, held in Belgrade in 1961, was attended by 25 national delegations, and nearly half of them (12) represented Asian states. Asia was the epi-centre of national liberation at that time, in terms of both political experience and the intensity of anti-imperialist struggle.

In view of this, the US leadership paid close attention to India, which played a decisive role in the

development of the conceptual basis and the practical application of the Non-Alignment policy. The United States was well aware that India with its enormous manpower and mineral resources, had a considerable influence on the balance of power, not only in Asia, but also in the world arena. And also the U.S.A. thought that India would fill-up the power vacuum in South-Asia, which was created by the withdrawal of British from the subcontinent.

During his first official visit to the USA in 1949, Nehru declared that "India is far away from the power blocs and following the policy of Non-Alignment regarding her foreign policy".¹ This statement behind the hopes of the USA to wean away India from the Non-Aligned group and it started extending support to Pakistan in its disputes with India.

As a consequence on May 19, 1954 in Karachi, the USA and Pakistan signed an agreement under which the Americans were to provide military aid to Pakistan. US analyst Robert Trumbull said in Sep.1953 that the Washington-Karachi pact would put an end to Washington's tolerance of Asia's neutrality, which found the fullest expression in the policy of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India. "Diplomats believed" he said, "that Nehru's neutralist influence, which often put the United States and

its allies in a difficult position, would be weakened if Pakistan, which was openly opposed to communism, concluded a military agreement with the United States.  

India's Non-Alignment policy was branded as neutralism by the US public, press and the Government's attitude towards it was critical, Nehru's ambition was that as a Non-Aligned nation, India wanted to avoid coldwar and to act as it thinks best. It has been mistaken by western politician, as neutralism and neutrality.

The US Secretary John Foster Dulles was hostile towards the policy of Non-Alignment since he saw it through the prism of cold war and two power conflicts. He had "meditated so much about communism that he found it hard to change his main conclusions on U.S. foreign policy after Stalin died." In the context of communism he spelt that the only importance of the newly independent nations as future allies was that they should shoulder some of the responsibility of protecting peace.

On June 9, 1956, at Iowa, Dulles made a speech in which he declared that the US defensive alliance system had nullified the principle of neutrality which presumes that a

nation can best gain a safety for itself by being indifferent to the fate of others.\textsuperscript{1} He asserted that countries that denounced genuine collective security pacts, were seeking to promote rather a wrong view of neutrality.\textsuperscript{2}

He opened that the Non-Aligned policy was indifferent to the fate of others who believed that security could best be ensured by being a member of the U.N. which is committed to the principle of unity against aggression. This meant that practically there are no neutrals, since almost all countries who joined U.N. have done so.\textsuperscript{3} These statements amply demonstrated that the attitude of the U.S. towards Non-Alignment of Third World countries in the entire Dulles era was unethical and remained by and large.

The U.S. misinterpreted India's policy of Non-Alignment as neutrality. Neutrality has little meaning as a policy concept in times of war. Neutrality involves abstention from all conflicts, whereas Non-Alignment involves abstention only from the cold war.\textsuperscript{4} The term neutrality, however, connotes that the country which adopts

3. Ibid.
such a policy has no positive opinions on the issues which divide the blocs. This certainly is not true as far as India is concerned, and the term therefore, is inapplicable to India's Non-Alignment policy.

On significant world issues especially in so far as they relate to war and peace, India has spoken clearly and with conviction. The distinction between Non-Alignment and neutrality may be summed up by the differences between an activist and isolationist approach. India believes that at the international level Non-Alignment is an expression of an independent spirit and independent judgement of a nation. It reflects country's own perception of national and international interests and its own view of the world, looking at the world, as Jawaharlal Nehru used to say through "one's own eyes and not through the eyes of others."¹

The policy of Non-Alignment is a positive and dynamic policy and not a negative policy. To quote Jawaharlal Nehru:

"When we say our policy is one of Non-Alignment, obviously it means Non-Alignment with military blocs. You cannot have a negative policy. The policy is a positive one, a definite one, and I hope, a dynamic

¹ Misra, K.P., and Narayanan, K.R., (ed.) *Op. cit.*, p. 15. one, but in so far as the military blocs today and the
cold war are concerned. We do not, align ourselves with either bloc.  

Inspite of all clarifications given by India secretary Dulles considered that the policy of neutralism pursued by India was devoid of imagination and sight. He went to the extent of calling it 'fence sitter'. Nehru, on the other hand station that the traditional modes of military pacts jeopardised the efforts to treat international problems in a conciliatory environment free from fear one cannot ignore the fact that the masses of Asia, colonial powers were all western nations, who had ruled over them for three to four centuries, consequently the seeds of nationalism in the Third World countries were sown to oppose the dominant west.

The Eisenhower, administration did not foster much of cordial environment to promote smooth US India political relations. The election of John F. Kennedy in Nov. 1960 aroused great expectations among the Non-Aligned countries because of his liberal image. According to his biographer Arther M. Schlesinger, Jr., Kennedy was "entirely


unsentimental in his approach towards Non-Alignment. He did not like any Dulles-like inflexible attitude towards Non-Alignment but was quite pragmatic."¹ "He was quite prepared, when feasible, to build neutralism as an alternative to communist expansion."² He also realised the value of the support of the Non-Aligned on issues in dispute with the Soviet Union.

According to Senator Tydings, India's policy of Non-Alignment is of positive benefit to the United States.³ First, India demonstrates to the underdeveloped countries that it is feasible to be closely associated with the United States in achieving common development objectives without becoming its puppet. Secondly, India's independence of both the East and the West has created the very opportunity upon which the United States is making efforts to capitalize its assistance to India. Thirdly, the existence of Non-Aligned nations which represents half of the world's population negates China's theory of two world camps-western capitalism and world communism. Fourthly, India and other Non-Aligned nations exercise a restraining influence on the super powers in the cold war and Fifthly, strong free and Non-Aligned nations.

2. Ibid.,
India gives an opportunity for liaison between the communists and the west, and this is of immense value to the American efforts to maintain world peace.

The Chinese invasion of Indian territory in October 1962, brought India and the USA closer and the USA responded favourably to India's request for military and material aid on the following grounds: 1. to maintain balance of power in Asia against the communist powers. The Americans realised that "while world communism is the objectives of the Soviet Union, in the immediate future, the Soviet Union is interested in seeking Indian build-up as counterpoise China."\(^1\) Being convinced that India would not go to the communist way, the US evinced so much interest in India that it was ready to provide military equipment at low cost against China if a request was received. ii. The emergence of a dynamic and expansionist China as the most significant post-war development. The US thought, if China advanced towards South East Asia, it would come into direct conflict with the USA. Therefore, a counterbalance must be created. This could be achieved if India and Pakistan found an acceptable agreement on Kashmir. Then the defence against communist China would be a lot easier if those two countries would pull together.

India received military aid from the USA on condition that India should open negotiations with Pakistan

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on the Kashmir question. President Kennedy sent Averell Harriman to India for resuming talks between India and Pakistan on Kashmir issue.

Acceptance of US military aid with strings, and India's Non-Alignment policy became the subject of attack by various countries and by leaders inside India. The Christian science Monitor wrote: "It is this Chinese presence which has forced the new India-U.S. relationship. India will henceforth remain "unaligned" de jure but she has been forcibly aligned, "de facto" with the west."1

The Indian Express in its editorial reflected the general mood of the nation:

"War teaches a country many valuable lessons. One of the useful lessons which Chinese aggression has highlighted is to demonstrate to the Indian people who their real friends and foes are ... To pretend that our policy of Non-Alignment has not received a jolt by recent events and developments is to continue to live in what the Prime Minister Nehru has rightly labelled as "an artificial atmosphere of our own creation"...let the Prime Minister, therefore, give a lead to the country by implementing his own advice that the massive invasion of India by China should make us realize that we

are getting out of touch with reality in the modern world."\(^1\)

In fact India did not align with the west. India and United States merely shared a mutual defensive concern to thwart the designs of the Chinese against the Indian subcontinent. There was no formal alliance and none was even contemplated.

Non-Aligned India and Russia were also drawn towards each other partly because India needed security against threats from China and Pakistan, and their mutual economic and technical cooperation would be of benefit to both as they are near neighbours. They could either be friendly or hostile (as China was but not indifferent to each other).\(^2\)

The fact that India was able to receive military aid from both the blocs was an evidence of her ability to preserve Non-Alignment, without compromising the essentials of Non-Alignment India could win the support of both the big powers. Until 1962 India received only economic aid from the foreign countries. Since 1962 Chinese crisis India has received both economic and military aid.\(^3\)

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1. Indian Express, November 1, 1963.


Thus even while accepted military aid India would not think of permitting any foreign bases to be established or any foreign troops to be stationed on her territory. There was a time when critics were opposed to India taking economic aid for her planning because that, in their view, would amount to the violation of Non-Alignment.

But nothing like that happened and economic aid was accommodated in Non-Alignment. Foreign aid is after all foreign aid, be it military or economic. The acceptance of any of them does not necessarily imply a surrender of Non-Alignment unless it impairs the independence of foreign policy of the receiving country. As a matter of fact, the purpose for which India sought and accepted military aid was the preservation of national independence and territorial integrity and that itself is essential to Non-Alignment, for independence of foreign policy cannot be maintained without national independence and territorial integrity. Thus military aid, itself was accepted in the service of Non-Alignment.1 Hence the acceptance of military aid by India did not violate India's Non-Alignment.

The USA reacted with anger towards Non-Aligned countries in general and particularly India, when the Non-Aligned countries failed to support the US policies and positions. This was evident on two occasions in regard to

India's criticism of US policies in Vietnam. First, in the mid-April of 1965 the then U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson had decided to cancel the invitation of Lal Bahadur Shastri's visit to the USA following the Shastri's criticism of U.S. policy in Vietnam. Shastri "had made a mild suggestion that the bombing of North Vietnam (by the US SM) was unlikely to bring peace". ¹ The US State Department not only induced Johnson to withdraw the invitation to Shastri but also did not respond favourably to Bowles request for provision of U.S. food shipment to India.

The second reaction was to stop US food supplies to India in 1966 and 1967, when the country faced severe drought. Mrs. Gandhi's criticism of the U.S. policies in Vietnam. At the end of her state visit to the Soviet Union in July 16, 1966, Mrs. Gandhi observation that "the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam should be stopped immediately" and that "the mounting war danger which has occured lately as a result of the aggressive actions of imperialist and other reactionary forces" was taken a serious note of by the Americans. ² But India did not succumb to the U.S. pressure to change its policy of Non-Alignment.

After China's invasion in 1962, and its anti-Indian postures in the 1965 Indo-Pak conflict, the American

1. Bowles, Chester, Mission to India, A Search for Alternative in Asia, Bombay, B.I. Publishers, 1974. p. 120.

tilt towards Pakistan and against India in 1969-71 for the support given by the Soviet Union to India's stand on Kashmir, Goa and Sino-Indian conflict, it became clear as to who were India's real friends in the world. Bangladesh on the throes of a struggle for freedom from the Yoke of West Pakistan's military dictatorship.\(^1\) India was flooded with millions of refugees from Bangladesh, fleeing from the atrocities of Yahyakhan's soldiers.\(^2\)

India tried its best to impress upon Yahyakhan, through his western friends and allies, the need to reach a direct political settlement with the already elected leaders of East Pakistan, especially, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. But Yahyakhan did not agree. He expected that China and the USA would come to his rescue and he would be able to suppress the Bangladesis. This situation created the "proper time" for signing the Indo-Soviet Treaty for Peace, Friendship and Co-operation on 9 August, 1971.

Actually the treaty was proposed when Mr. Dinesh Singh's, the then Foreign Minister of India visited Moscow in June 1969 and was later endorsed by the former Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi.\(^3\) But Mrs. Gandhi delayed the


\(^3\) Chakravarti, Prithvis, "Why Treaty was Delayed", *Hindustan Times*, 15th August, 1971.
conclusion of the treaty due to unfavourable situations for India. On the basis of press reports it was gathered that the government of India was against this treaty for three reasons. First, the treaty could create misgivings about India's policy of Non-Alignment which by definition precluded a Non-Aligned nation from entering into any security arrangements with either of the two super powers, the USA and the Soviet Union. Secondly, it would put restraints on India's relations with the USA and the nations in West Europe, thus limiting its freedom of action. Lastly, there was the fear of strong opposition in the country itself particularly in the parliament. The Congress party was passing through a crisis in 1969 and was heading towards a split.

Even after the Feb. 1971 elections which returned the congress party to power with an overwhelming majority the government did not seem to be very much inclined towards having such a pact with the Soviet Union. But the following events led to the signing of the treaty.\(^1\) These were; first, the tragic happenings in Bangladesh and half-crazed assertions of Yahyakhan about total war against India. secondly, China's continuous assurance to Pakistan that in all eventualities it would help Pakistan against India;

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1. Russians felt that it is America's military diplomatic support for Yahyakhan which had 'emboldened him to issue threats of total war', Guardian, 9th August, 1971.
thirdly, Nixon's going back on his promise and resuming arms supplies to Pakistan and on top of it, declaring that if there was a war against it, India should not expect any assistance from America, and finally, the secret visit to Peking by Dr. Kissinger followed by the announcement of Nixon's visit to China before May 1972.

The whole Treaty contains about 1300 words and has 12 Articles. Among the twelve Articles, Article IV deals about the Soviet attitude towards India's policy of Non-Alignment. It stated, "The Republic of India respects the peace loving policy of the USSR aimed at strengthening friendship and cooperation with all nations. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects India's policy of Non-Alignment and reaffirms that this policy constitutes an important chapter in the maintenance of Universal peace and international security and in the lessioning of tensions in the world."\(^1\)

However, from the military angle article IX is the Kingpin with a double provision.\(^2\) First, each party undertakes to abstain from providing any assistance to any third country that engages in armed conflict with the other. This


ban is valid when "it engages in armed conflict" and not otherwise. In strict interpretation it may mean that there is nothing to stop the Soviet Union from helping Pakistan in what may be regarded as normal times. Secondly, it is only in the event of either party being subjected to an attack that both contracting parties would immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security of their countries. It was inferred that this provision was included in order to ensure the Soviet guarantee to safeguard India's security and territorial integrity in the event of a war.

Supporting this treaty, Mrs. Gandhi said that the signing of it was not only timely but necessary.¹ The treaty was timely in the sense that it came in the nick of time to prevent what had seemed imminent, an Indo-Pakistan war, the evidence of which was so obvious from the pressure that was being brought to bear upon the Pakistani military Junta to come out in a last desperate 'Jehad' for its very survival. A Pindi-Peking-Washington axis was in the process of formation and the government of India could not simply watch and wait to be finally caught napping. It was further timely in so far as India signed the treaty with the Soviet Union as equal partner. But if India was first involved in a war

¹. Motherland, 8 September, 1971.
and then made an approach to Moscow it would have been an applicant and not an equal partner. The terms and nature of help would have been negotiated on a different basis and India would have had to accept whatever conditions were offered; she would have no bargaining power in that situation. There is a precedent to support such thinking.

The USA bitterly criticised this treaty that India deviated from its policy of Non-Alignment. The USA alleged that it was a military pact and as such it made India a party to the alliance with the Soviet Union.

But India has never deviated from its policy of Non-Alignment because Article IV of the Treaty clearly says that India respects the peace loving nature of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union respects the Non-Alignment policy of India. In general, the main criterion of country's foreign policy is how far it serves the national interest. So Non-Alignment has always been regarded as a means to achieve that objective. It cannot be a sacrosanct concept and should be discarded if it ceases to serve India's national interest. In the given circumstances in which the treaty was signed Non-Alignment did not mean that India could afford to remain Non-Aligned against the interests of its own security. It could never mean that India should face aggression all alone. During the period of the Chinese

aggression in 1962, Nehru himself had sought and received military help and technical assistance from eleven countries, including America.

In all fairness it should be admitted that the Soviet Union, unlike the United States, has from the very outset appreciated and even encouraged India's policy of Non-Alignment.¹ Even at the time of signing of the treaty Mrs. Gandhi had made it clear to the Soviet Union that India wanted to keep away from bloc politics and that position had been accepted. In the treaty it was reaffirmed that the USSR respected the Indian policy of Non-Alignment and reiterated that this policy constituted an important factor in the maintenance of international security in the lessening of tension in the world.

On the other hand, the treaty is not a defence pact. The defence pact like NATO, envisages that during a crisis there is a clear understanding among the members of the pact that an attack on one would mean aggression on all. But there is no such clause in this treaty. The treaty says that in case of threat, the two parties would "enter into mutual consultation in order to remove such threat".²

¹ National Herald, 30 Aug. 1971. Prime Minister's Interview with the Secretary General of the World Peace Council.
² Straits Times, Singapore, 10th Aug. 1971. editorial: "Russia - India Axis"
both agree that certain steps are necessary they can arrive at a common understanding regarding what action should be taken by each. They may or may not agree. That means the treaty provides freedom to the contracting parties to consider the situation on its merits and act according to its national interests. This point was stressed by the then Foreign Minister Swaran Singh when he said in parliament that "there was no automatic drawal of one party if there is action by the other party of a particular nature. Nor is there any question of a joint military action or military grouping with the Soviet Union or the Soviet bloc.

There is another evidence to show that this treaty is not a defence pact.¹ Very frequently the critics felt tempted to compare this treaty with that signed between the Soviet Union and Egypt in May 1971. But they were told that except that they were treaties between two premier Non-Aligned countries and a communist super power there was nothing in common between them. The Indian treaty was an agreement for direct consultations in case of an attack; whereas in case of Egypt the Soviet Union had accepted all responsibilities for the country's defence.

Finally, usually the defence pacts are solely concerned with security matters, whereas in this treaty

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¹ Times of India, 10 Aug, 1971, for the statement of Swaran Singh in both the Houses of Parliament on 9th Aug. 1971; "It is, in true sense, a treaty of peace."
political contents, economic cooperation, technological and scientific collaboration all take a dominant form and it appears that this treaty, taken as a whole, presents a picture of mutual benefit and mutual advantage along with providing for security and maintenance of peace.\(^1\) Hence, the treaty is neither a defence pact nor a deviation from the policy of Non-Alignment followed by India.

In the US, the public and a few congressional persons criticised their government policy towards subcontinent during the Bangladesh crisis.\(^2\) They were shocked by the brutalities committed by the West Pakistani soldiers in East Bengal. Such elements in the American public were pressing for a change in American policy towards India. The House of Representatives had refused to vote aid to Pakistan; yet Indian diplomacy failed to turn this situation to its advantage. On the otherhand by signing this treaty India weakened the determination of these elements and served the Pakistani lobby within the US administration that freely said that India had become a camp-follower of the Soviet Union. This treaty, in their opinion, would be a threat to Pakistan and to the long term interests of the US in the subcontinent.

India appreciated the support of these well-meaning American friends of India but it was admitted that they had not been able to make much of a dent in the policy of the US government.\(^1\) In fact far from misunderstanding India's standpoint in entering into a treaty with the Soviet Union, India's friends in America should have realized that all this happened because of the shortsighted policy of their own government which they had been frankly criticising. The view in some quarters was that the architects of the treaty were not Kosygin and Gromyko but president Nixon and Dr. Kissinger.

The immediate consequence of the treaty was its damping effect on the war psychosis of the Pakistani military Junta. Speaking at a citizen's rally in Delhi in support of the Indo-Soviet treaty, Mrs. Gandhi said: "Those who had evil designs against India better read or re-read Article IX of the treaty. It has made India much stronger".\(^2\)

The Soviet Union had also obliquely hinted that India's unfriendly neighbours -Pakistan and China would, in future have to reckon with the Indo-Soviet Peace treaty with all implications. Secondly, the supply of Soviet arms to some countries hostile to us could not so far be prevented as a matter of right but now India could, after signing the

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treaty, tell the Soviet Union to stop such supplies.¹ The treaty may be regarded as an assurance of Soviet help to India and warning to those who wanted to pick up a quarrel with India.

The Soviet Union thought of India because it alone, in terms of its size, population and resources, could be a match to China. Moreover, it had always held that a stable and independent India, a traditional and natural deterrent to power politics in the region, is anathema both to the USA and China.² But the Soviet Union tried to give the impression that it was to relieve India that it had decided to sign a treaty with it. Earlier, Swaran Singh's statement in Parliament on the possible negative consequences of Sino-American rapprochement was received in Moscow with apparent sympathy. Pravda highlighted Singh's statement that India could not rest in peace if Sino-American detente meant an attempt on the part of these powers to dominate South East Asia.³ To the extent, therefore, that Moscow saw external threats to Indian stability it felt stability obliged from the standpoint of its own enlightened national interest and dictates of ideology to raise its stakes in India.

It was also suggested that in signing this treaty, the Soviet Union's main objective was to reduce the threat of war between India and Pakistan. If it was so, it was because, the Soviet Union wanted to prevent any conflict which might blow up into a big conflagration into which she herself could get involved. Thus in a way, the instinct of self-defence led Soviet Union to have a treaty with India. Another equally valid reason was Moscow's realization that a fresh war between India and Pakistan on Bangladesh would strengthen China's presence in Pakistan and that would be detrimental to Russian interests.

Moreover, had the Soviet Union not reciprocated adequately the Indian demands in those circumstances, Indo-Soviet relations would have got a severe jolt. The Russians had come to believe that the Non-Aligned nations had shifted towards a pro-western posture; so it was quite natural for them to make certain that India was not alienated by neglect during this crisis.

Similarly, the Soviet Union's desire to administer a riposte to Nixon's projected visit to Peking in the arrangement of which Pakistan played an important role could not be set aside as an insignificant issue in the face

of other serious considerations. It might have contributed its share to the deteriorating situation in the Indian Subcontinent. But the Soviet leaders were particularly irritated by President YahyaKhan's disregard of their appeals to modify his repressive policy in East Bengal and to come to terms with Sheikh Mujibur Rehman.

There was another reason for Moscow's displeasure. Pakistan played an important part in creating friendly relations between Iran and China.¹ This threatened vital soviet interests in West Asia. The immediate cause of Soviet concern lay in Teheran's control over the Persian Gulf States which occupy a highly strategic point in Russia's road to the Indian ocean. In brief the Soviet Union had abandoned all hopes of bringing Pakistan round and restraining it.²

There was yet another reason by which the Soviet leaders were annoyed with Yahya Khan. His predecessor Ayub had given word to support the Soviet proposal to have a regional economic cooperation scheme including India, Pakistan, Afganistan and the USSR. Through such a project the Soviet leaders wanted to stabilise the political situation in the region and their own influence also. Later when the proposal was given a practical form Yahya Khan did

not subscribe to it. The Soviet leaders were shocked to know that the head of a government could be so untrust-worthy. Perhaps for this reason the Soviet Union decided not to supply any arms to Pakistan in 1969 and even stalled a visit by Yahya Khan until July 1970.

Mrs. Gandhi's tour of Six Western Countries was planned initially as a balancing operation to put back India's Non-Alignment on an even level after signing the treaty with the Soviet Union.\(^1\) The visit to Moscow was intended to counter balance, this operation to avoid unnecessary misunderstanding with Moscow about the scope and purpose of Mrs. Gandhi's Western tour.

After the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty in August 1971, the Soviet Union came into the picture and the Chinese reaction to the Soviet Union and Indian involvement in the Bangladesh issue became sharper. The policy of China regarding Bangladesh was clearly stated when Bhutto visited Peking in the first week of November 1971. On 6 October 1971, the Chinese, Consul-General in Pakistan declared in Karachi: "Pakistan could rest assured that the Chinese people would remain their reliable friends for ever." On the eve of the Indo-Pakistan war in December 1971, Chou-En-Lai gave an interview to Nevile Mazwell of the Times of London in which he expressed his concern over India's sinister

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designs in giving shelter to refugees from Tibet and East Pakistan and renewed the support of China to Yahya Khan. ¹

Within three hours of the Pakistani air-attacks on India on 3 December 1971, Peking Radio denounced India as an aggressor.

After the out-break of war between India and Pakistan in 1971, the United States took the matter to the Security Council and asked for an immediate cease-fire. Such a resolution was brought thrice before the Security Council and the Chinese delegation voted for it on all occasions. ² But it was vetoed by the USSR. When the General Assembly passed a resolution seeking an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of troops, China supported this resolution also. Moscow was also condemned for trying to gain control over the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean.

The main object of China's policy towards Bangladesh was to prolong the struggle and gain time to review its policy in the light of the changed circumstances. However, the events developed very fast. India made a unilateral cease-fire after the fall of Dacca and China found no time to intervene when the Government of India recognised Bangladesh, Peking Radio characterised it as an

¹. The Times, 2 December, 1971.

Indian act of expansionism. The Chinese complicity in the Indo-Pak war was demonstrated by the use of Chinese tanks and other military equipment by the Pakistan army.

The relations between India and China show that China was never enthusiastic about friendship with India. Nehru believed in a policy of peaceful co-existence and consequently followed a policy of friendship with China. He did nothing to save Tibet when it was attacked by China in 1950 and later on recognised the Chinese conquest of Tibet. Even when there were slogans of Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai, the Chinese leaders had their own reservations. So long as it suited them, they maintained good relations with India. They accepted the services of Nehru with complete cynicism. When Nehru refused to oblige them, they condemned him bitterly and ultimately attacked India and humiliated her.

Between 1962 and 1968 relations between India and China remained bad. Both countries suspended diplomatic representation but it remained at charge d' affaires level. In the years 1969-72 India gave cautious hints to China for a possible rapprochement, fortified by its success in the 1971 war and by confidence that North India was now secure as far as Bangladesh was concerned. In 1976, however,

relations, were normalised after 14 years and ambassadors were exchanged.

On the occasion of the Bangladesh crisis in 1971, the attitude of the American Government was positively friendly towards Pakistan and hostile towards India. During this crisis the Sino-US alignment in the region came into existence.¹ Inspite of the atrocities committed by the Pakistani troops in East Pakistan, the American Government refused to put pressure on Pakistan to come to a political settlement with the people of East Pakistan. Even when lakhs of people left East Pakistan and the Government of India raised a lot of hue and cry, no action was taken by the American Government. Even when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi went to the United States in the beginning of November 1971 to impress upon the American Government the gravity of the situation and the necessity of interference, the American Government did not move in the matter.

On the other hand, when the war started between India and Pakistan in December 1971, the American Government stopped all economic assistance to India and also the supply of war materials. Not only that, President Nixon ordered the "Enterprise" to proceed to the Bay of Bengal to

¹ Bowman W. Larry and Clark Ian (ed.), The Indian Ocean in Global Politics, Young Asia Publications, New Delhi, 1983, p.113.
help the Pakistani forces.¹ Relations between the two countries have been extremely strained since 1971 when the US supported Pakistan in its war with India and suspended military and economic aid to India.

The victory of India in the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 and the emergence of Bangladesh were important events in South Asia. The United States had failed to help Pakistan retain its eastern wing. On the other hand Indo-Soviet friendship reached new heights in the esteem at least of the Asian countries. India was convinced that the crisis of 1971 was wholly due to the partisan policies and actions of the United States. Indo-American relations reached the lowest ebb. Naturally it was for the United States to take some positive steps to improve its relations with India.

The US, accordingly, started thinking in terms of evolving a new policy towards India, a policy which took due note of India's size and stature. The decline of Pakistan as a result of its defeat and reduction in size and the victory of India in the war had at last convinced the United States that India was bound to play a major role in the Asian region. President Nixon's policy report to Congress sufficiently spotlighted this change attitude. He stated:

"We are prepared now for a serious dialogue with India on the future of our relations. This will depend not on an identity of policies, but on respect for each other's views and concerns. This should go both ways." In yet another report he said: "The US respects India as a major country. We are prepared to treat India in accordance with its new stature and responsibilities, on the basis of reciprocity." The official visit of Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger to India from 27 to 30 October 1974 opened a new vistas of hope for better ties between two countries. The perception of Dr. Kissinger about India appeared somewhat different from his tough, offensive and obstinate attitude during the days of Bangladesh crisis in 1971. As a realist of 20th century, he was prepared to recognise the "preeminent" status of India in the sub-continent. He stressed the need for close cooperation and correct understanding between the two countries. He said, "We can now build our relationship free of past distortion and conscious of the interests and values we share." He further remarked that American objectives were consistent with those of India. "We are nations whose values and aspirations


3. Dr. Kissinger's address, ICWA, New Delhi, 28th October, 1974, Official Text, USIS, p.6.
are so similar that our disputes are often in a nature of a family quarrel."¹

Kissinger eulogised the role of Jawaharlal Nehru in world affairs and his concept of Non-Alignment. He stated that for a quarter of century, these relations "tended to oscillate between high expectation and deep suspicions."² But he assured that the size and position of India gave its special role of leadership in South Asia and world affairs. The non-chalant attitude of America towards India's policy of Non-Alignment also underwent a change. To quote Kissinger "The United States accepts Non-Alignment. In fact America sees a world of free, independent, sovereign states as being decidedly in our national interest. Support of national independence and of the diversity that goes with it has become a central theme of American foreign policy."³

With the beginning of the detente in the 1970s, the Super Powers started settling almost all matters between them through bilateral negotiations. The need for any mediation between them, therefore, disappeared.⁴

However, if the number of members attending the Non-Aligned

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., p.5.
3. Ibid., p.3.
conferences can be regarded as an indication of the importance of the Non-Aligned Movement, the detente did not lead to any reduction in its importance. In fact, more countries joined the Movement. The conference of the Non-Aligned countries held in Algiers in 1973 reflected a very important qualitative change in the Non-Aligned Movement.

During the days of 'detente', the Non-Aligned Movement was focusing its attention on economic problems. It was in the 1970s that the movement formulated a comprehensive programme of action for the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and launched a large scale campaign for its adoption at the 6th Special Session of UN General Assembly on May 1, 1974. It also got the world body to adopt a charter of Economic Rights and Duties in view of the growing inequalities between the industrialized countries and the Third World. It was an effort to change the international power structure in a manner which was more favourable to the development of the Third world countries.

The urge for economic emancipation and democratization of international economic relations also forms the core of the demand for the establishment of NIEO. The call for NIEO was not simply for "income redistribution from the rich to the poor". It was also a call for restructuring international economic relations on the basis of:

"Equality, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interests and cooperation among all states, irrespective of their economic and social systems... (the NIEO) shall correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the developed the developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic and social development and peace and justice for present and future generations."¹

The programme of action of NIEO highlighted the need for: (i) the equitable relationship between prices of raw material from the Third world countries and manufactured goods and capital equipment from developed countries; (ii) improved access to markets of developed countries; (iii) transfer of technology corresponding to the need of developing countries; (iv) regulation and control of the activities of MNCs; (v) efforts towards industrialization of the developing countries; (vi) collective self-reliance among the developing countries; and (vii) prominent sovereignty over natural resources.

But in the UN General Assembly, the NIEO was opposed by some developed countries. The USA was the first among the countries that opposed it. (Other countries which voted with the United States were Belgium, Denmark,

¹. Text of the UN Resolution on NIEO of May 1, 1974.
Luxemburg, West Germany and the UK). At the UN General Assembly Session of 1975 the United States showed some signs of mellowing. The US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger proposed a dialogue between the developing and the developed between the North and the South. However, 18 months of dialogue in Paris between the representatives of developed and developing countries could not bridge the gap between their divergent views. Here again the United States was among the hard-liners.

In an editorial commentary on the results of the Fifth Non-Aligned Summit in Colombo in 1976, the New York Times pointed out:

"It is clearly impossible to meet all of the demands of the developing countries. But neither can the richer countries, in light of their own long-run interests and their stake in international peace and stability, ignore those demands... The task for the United States and other industrialized nations is to help sort out what is reasonable and give it more serious attention than in the past."²

But even as they expressed their readiness to cooperate with Non-Aligned nations in restructuring inter-

1. Roger D. Hanson, Beyond the North-South Stalemate. New York, N.Y., 1979, p. 24.

national economic relations on an equitable and democratic basis, the attitude of the United States and other imperialist powers towards economic problems remained principally unchanged. Therefore, there has been so little progress in the practical implementation of the programme for the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and in the North-South talks concerning that programme.

The USA then used economic tools to enhance differences among Non-Aligned nations and to prevent the establishment of a United anti-American front. In a speech at the United Nations, Henry Kissinger made it plain that "the United States intended to deal with the strains within the Third World, and to encourage the centrifugal tendencies."\(^1\) Washington was also aware that "many in the Non-Aligned movement, however, much they yearn for independence, must still compromise to varying degrees with the powers of the industrial world whose wealth they need."\(^2\) Indian scientists have expressed concern, in this connection, over the emerging division of the Non-Aligned Movement into two groups of states: 1) those hoping to ensure economic development and effect social transformations leaning on imperialist aid; and 2) those pursuing anti-imperialist policies and promoting their economic

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1. Ibid., 4 September, 1976.
anti-imperialist policies and promoting their economic development using their own resources.¹ That division, Indian experts maintain, may weaken the efforts to restructure international economic relations.

In Feb. 1975, the United States lifted 10 years old arms embargo on both Pakistan and India. This was very much resented by the Government of India which considered it as new evidence of the 'tilt' towards Pakistan. Indian thought that the US lifting of the arms embargo was reaction to the India's first nuclear peaceful explosion, which was conducted on 18th May, 1974 at Pokharan in Rajasthan.

With the assumption of power by Jimmy Carter Administration, in 1976, the US government adopted a new policy called "selective favouritism" in view of its increasing popularity among the Non-Aligned countries. Under this policy, the Carter Administration maintained cordial relations with India and gave to India the status of favourite nation to the US. In 1977 the Janata Government came to power in India and maintained good relations with the USA.² Besides India, among Washington's "favourites" of other Non-Aligned countries were Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela in Latin America, Nigeria in Africa, Saudi Arabia


and Iran in the Middle East, Indonesia in South East Asia. Washington tried hard to establish close political and economic relations with all these nations.

But Non-Alignment came in the way as an obstacle for the growth of Indo-U.S. relations because of the misunderstanding of the concept of Non-Alignment by the United States under the following circumstances. They are:

As one of the founder countries of the Non-Alignment, India foiled the US' plan to bring the newly liberated countries within its fold.

As a Non-Aligned country, India criticised the US without any hesitation even at the cost of its national interest, whenever the US intervened in the affairs of the Third World Countries.

The US maintained strained relations with India throughout the cold-war era because of Soviet Union's friendly attitude towards the Non-Aligned countries. During that period, any Non-Aligned country which maintained cordial relations with the Soviet Union was treated as its enemy.

India played a decisive role in the Non-Aligned Movement and increased its popularity in the developing countries, because of its size, population, rich mineral resources and advancement of technology. As one
of the mighty powers in the world, the USA was not quite happy over India's popularity in the Third world countries and tried to reduce it by supporting Pakistan in its disputes with India.

As an ardent follower of Non-Alignment principles, India not only refused to join the US sponsored military alliances (such as NATO, SEATO, CENTO and Japanese Peace Treaty) but also bitterly criticised the alliance system. According to India, military alliance system is a menace to world peace. On the other hand, the US believed that peace can be possible only through the establishment of alliance system. Therefore, this ideological differences also added to the Indo-US strained relations.

In the way of achieving the goal of economic cooperation in the Third World countries and to avoid the economic exploitation by the developed countries, the Non-Aligned countries established New International Economic Order (NIEO) in 1974, in which India played a major role. Being a major country in the G-7 countries, the US opposed the NIEO's demands.

Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation of 1971 is the major factor for strained relations between the two countries. The US criticised India, because of this treaty, that it has deviated from the
policy of Non-Alignment and aligned itself with one of the Super Powers, the Soviet Union. This criticism reflected its tilt in favour of Pakistan at the time of Bangladesh crisis.

Throughout the cold-war era, India bitterly opposed the US military presence in the Indian Ocean. It raised the issue both at the UNO and at the various Non-Aligned forums. But at the same time India and other Non-Aligned countries kept quite about the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. The US criticised double standard of India's Indian Ocean policy.

Non-proliferaton Treaty is the another major obstacle for the promotions of Indo-US relations. India has rejected it on the ground that it is discrimination towards the non-nuclear countries. India believes that the treaty would restrict the development of nuclear research in the non-nuclear powers. Being the sole nuclear power in the Non-Aligned countries, India has been facing heavy pressure from the US and its Western allies. The US has been forcing India in this regard because India is the leader of Non-Aligned Countries. On the other hand, the US is keeping quite in the case of Israel and South Africa, which are also non-signatories of the NPT.
The Non-Aligned Movement in general and India in particular bitterly opposed colonialism. On the other hand, the USA supported the colonialism wherever its national interest was at stake. This was evident during the liberation of Goa where the US supported her NATO ally, Portugal.

In accordance with the Non-Aligned principle, India criticised the racial discrimination policy of South Africa, but the USA supported the South African policy indirectly. This was evident, when India raised the question of apartheid policy of South Africa in the UN General Assembly where the US supported South Africa, by demanding the matter should be referred to the International Court of Justice for a discussion whether the General Assembly was competent to deal with the question or not and.

Above all, Dulles, without understanding the meaning of Non-Alignment, strongly criticised India's policy of Non-Alignment by calling it as neutrality from time to time, which ultimately resulted in lack of encouragement in the Indo-US relations.

Though India wanted to maintain its policy of Non-Alignment on the one hand, and at the same time wanted to maintain good relations with the USA on the other hand, but
the strong criticism made by USA on Indian policy of Non-
Alignment forced India to be away from the USA during the
cold war period.

However, India and USA have been maintaining
economic relations with ups and downs which is discussed in
the next chapter.