CHAPTER II

SAMAVĀYA ITS PLACE IN VAIŚEṆIKA SYSTEM

THE NATURE OF INHERENCE (SAMAVĀYA)

As we have seen, the followers of Vaiśeṅika are committed to the view that reality is not one but many. It is of seven kinds, namely, substance (dravya), quality (guna), action (karma), universal (samānaya), particularity (vīseṣa) and inherence (samavāya) and non-existence (abhāva). Committed to pluralism they take all steps to avoid the merger of one category into the other and preserve their identity even when they are brought into relations. When two entities such as a table and cloth spread on it are brought into a relation, there is no scope for the merger of one into the other. The table and the table-cloth remain as they are both in the presence of their relation of conjunction and also in its absence. The Vaiśeṅika philosophers maintain that the relata, such as substance, quality, action, universal and particular, do not lose their identity both in the presence and the absence of the relation. The quality ‘red’ is related to the substance rose by the relation of inherence (samavāya). The universal ‘cowness’ is related to cow by inherence. When the red colour and rose substance are related by inherence; there is no absorption of one into the other. The rose substance

1. VS.I.1.4; PPBh.P.6; Nk.P.7; KV.P.6
remains as it is, and its colour red also remains as it is without any loss to their identity. Similarly the cow and its universal namely 'cowness' remain distinct in their relation of inherence. Categories related by inherence do not lose their identity. Samavāya is the peculiar relation accepted primarily to uphold the philosophy of pluralism. In Vaiśeṣika the purpose of inherence is not so much to unite the reals as to separate them. Samavāya keeps itself distinct by preventing merger of its relata.

It is for this reason that it has been rightly called as the corner-stone of the whole edifice of Vaiśeṣika system.

Samavāya definition

Kanāda defines samavāya as that which produces in respect of cause and effect the notion of this being contained in that. It appears that samavāya was accepted primarily to explain the relation between the inherent-cause (samavāyī-kāraṇa) and its effect. For example parts of wood is the inherent cause for the chair. The effect, chair,

1. Keith, Indian Logic and Atomism, p.196
2. Ghegar, iti yatad kalya kalanoyah sa Samkayathu
is supposed to reside in the wood by the relation of inherence, according to Nyāya Vaiśeṣika theory of causation.

Similarly threads are supposed to be inherent cause for the effect cloth. The effect cloth is believed to be residing in its inherent-cause (threads) by the relation of inherence. Although there is no specific mention by Kanada of the non-causal instances of Saṃvāya relation, such as universal and particular, it is not right to think that Kaṇāḍa was not aware of the non-causal instance of Saṃvāya relation. Kaṇāḍa, when he define Saṃvāya by instantiating causal phenomena, he was only doing it so, because it is easy to understand the Saṃvāya relation through them.

The explicit mention of extension of the concept of inherence to non-causal phenomena is found in the works of subsequent writers. It is in Prasastapāda that we find an explicit mention of the extension of the scope of inherence to the non-causal instances namely; the universal and particulars, eternal substances and their particularities and the like. Here Prasastapāda introduces a new concept of inseparabality into the definition of Saṃvāya. Saṃvāya is the relation between two objects which are inseparable and are related as the locus and the located which produces the
cognition of one being in the other.  

Sridhara the author of Nyāya-Kaṇḍali observes that 'Inherence is the relation between two inseparable entities, which are of the nature of a substrata and its content.'

Now the question is whether two objects different in ontological status can be inseparably related. Sridhara explains, in answer to this question, that it is a matter of experience that two objects known to be different become inseparable by being related by samavāya. Here Sridhara makes a clear distinction between the causal and non-causal phenomena that are in the relation of samavāya. Sridhara mentions parts and whole; effect substances and their qualities; eternal substances and their non-eternal qualities and movements and the substances that move under casual instances of samavaya. Under the non-causal phenomena he mentions, eternal substances and their eternal qualities, universal and the particular, eternal substances

1. प्रत्यायेनाभ्यासतासिद्धान्तम् अधिराज्यविधुतानम् या नानम्बन् बाघीप्य निःसांत्यायाः प्रत्यायेन पहिप्य पहिं 324.

2. प्रत्यायेनाभ्यासतासिद्धान्तम् अधिराज्यविधुतानम् या नानम्बन् बाघीप्य निःसांत्यायाः NY K. P. 15.

3. निःसांत्यायाः निःसांत्यायाः निःसांत्यायाः निःसांत्यायाः पतांभतिः NY K. P. 325.
and their particularities.

Vasconsati-Misra observes that, our experience discloses to us that parts and their whole, qualities and their substrata, movements and their substrata, universals and their individuals, are related to one another.

For otherwise we cannot meaningfully explain our cognitions and expressions like 'cloth in the threads', 'white cloth', 'cloth is moving' or 'cloth is a substance'. Although we do not see substance, and their qualities, universals and particularities, parts and their whole as distinct, Vasconsati-Misra observes that they must be regarded as separate entities on account of two separate cognitions and two separate expressions.

The syncretist school of Vaisesika enumerates five instances where entities are in the samavaya relation. They are:

1. Substance (dravya) and qualities (guna),
2. Parts (avayavas) and the whole (avayavin),

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1. W.K., P. 325
2. NVTT, PP. 195, 196
3. NVTT, PP. 195 - 96.
3. The substance (dravya) and its action (kriya),
4. The particular (vyakti) and the universal (jati) and,
5. The eternal substances (nithya - dravyas) and their
   particularities (visesa).

In order to have a clear perspective of samavaya, it is necessary to compare and contrast it with samyoga, another relation accepted by the Vaiseshika.

**SAMYOGA AND SAMAVAYA**

Samyoga is a relation that holds between substances only whereas samavaya holds not only between substances but also between substance and non-substance as shown above.

When the fruits are found in a basket, the relation between the fruits and the basket is samyoga. Objects in the relation of samyoga, remain unmodified both in the presence of samyoga and also in its absence. The relation of samyoga does not affect or make any difference to the relata. That is to say, when the fruits are placed on the basket, the basket is not transformed into a fruit.

1. **NSM on Karika, II.**

In the basket and these are brought into the relation of conjunction with the basket, the relata namely the fruits and basket do not undergo any change or modification. The fruits and the basket remain as they were prior to the relation of conjunction. Similarly when the fruits are removed from the basket, i.e., when the relation of conjunction is destroyed between the fruits and the basket, the fruits and the basket remain as they were. In other words, in as much as the relation of conjunction does not make any difference for its relata, it can be considered an external relation. In the western terminology, the relation which does not affect its relata is termed as an external relation.

On the other hand the relation when it affects the relata it is known as internal relation. The relation between the fruits and the basket which we have referred to above as example of samyoga is an instance of external relation. The relation between water and milk when they are brought together, it is known as internal relation, for although they remain unaffected in their independent existence, they get modified or changed when they are mixed i.e., when they are related.
There are three important points of difference between inherence and conjunction. First, conjunction obtains exclusively between two substances, as between a stick and a person, while inherence holds (1) between two substances as in the case of an effect cloth residing in its samayi-kārana namely threads (2) between a substance and a non-substance as in the case of qualities, movements, etc., residing in their respective substrata and (3) between two non-substances, as in the case of universals residing in qualities and actions. Second, conjunction exists between two substances which can be separated, whereas inherence subsists between two entities which can not be separated. A table and a table cloth which are in the relation of samyoga can be separated, but substance and its quality which are related by samavaya, cannot be separated. Third, entities in the relation of samavaya are always in the relation of the container and the contained (adhara-adheya-bhāva). The cloth is the contained (adheya) and threads are the container (adhara); the rose flower (substance) is the container and fragrance (quality) is the contained. The substance ball is the container and the action, its movement is the contained. The particular cow is the container and the universal cow-ness is the contained the ultimate substances such as atoms are the containers and their particularities (vāyusāra) are the
contained. But in the case of samyoga, the two substances connected by it are not necessarily in the relation of the container and the contained. In the instance of fruits in the basket which is a case of conjunction, there does exist the relation of the 'container and the contained', but when two moving balls meet, it is not a case of the relation of the contained and the contained.

We can state some more differences between samavāya and samyoga. In conjunction (sāmyoga) the relata exist as unrelated to each other before they are conjoined but in inherence (samavāya) the relata are always related to each other, as a substrata and its content.¹

Inherence is eternal, (nitya) and one (eka)² while conjunction is temporary. Śivāditya defines it as an eternal relation, though its relata are transient. Just as one being inheres in many existing entities, so one inherence subsists between innumerable pairs of relata. Just as being

¹ Pr Bh p. 324.
² Raghunadha accepts that there are as many samavayas, as there are instances of samavaya. . . . Sāmyoga is produced by the action of one or both of its relata or by another sāmyoga. But inherence is not produced by the action of one or both of its relata.
is eternal, so inherence (samavāya) is eternal. Samavāya is
different from conjunction, which is a temporary relation.¹

Samyoga is produced by the action of one or both
of its relata, or by another conjunction. But inherence is
not produced by the action of one or both of its relata.
Conjunction is caused, but inherence is uncaused.
Conjunction is destroyed by disjunction of its relata. But
inherence (samavāya) is indestructible.² Conjunction is a
relation between two independent substances. But inherence
is a relation between a substrate and its content. Inherence
is the cause of the notion 'this subsists in this abode'
with regard to the categories of substance, quality, action,
universality and particularity. But conjunction is not the
case of such a notion. It is a relation between two
substances, which may not be related to each other as the
container and the contained. Inherence is a natural and
inseparable relation (ayutasiddhi).³ Conjunction is an
adventitious and separable relation (Yuta-siddhi).

1. Pr Bh p. 328
2. Pr Bh p. 326.
Udayana defines inherence as an inseparable and intimate relation between two entities which can never be separated from each other.\(^1\) Samavāya is the relation that subsists between a substrate and its content, which is not adventitious, but natural.\(^2\) A natural relation is not produced. Conjunction is a contingent, temporary and accidental relation. But inherence (samavāya) is a necessary uncaused, and inseparable relation.\(^3\)

Inherence is one and is enough to relate all its relata, substances and their qualities, substances and their actions, wholes and parts, universals and particulars, eternal substances and their particularities. While inherence is one only, conjunctions (saṃyoga) are many. Inherence (samavāya) is imperceptible, while conjunction (saṃyoga) is perceptible. Inherence is different from conjunction, because it is not produced by the action of any of its relata; because it is not destroyed by disjunction of its relata; because its relata are incapable of independent existence, unrelated to each other; because it is inferred from the constant subsistence of a content in a substrate; because it is one, eternal, and imperceptible.

\(^1\) KV p. 26.
\(^2\) Ibid.,
\(^3\) KV p. 49.
Inheritance is different from substance, quality, action, universal, and particularity, because it is a relation between a substance and the other categories,\(^1\) It is also different from non-existence. So the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika treated it as a distinct category. But Samyoga is not a distinct category.

Sridhara answers an opponent who raises a question as to why a universal like cow-ness be held to be different from an individual cow, when the two are not cognized as two separate objects but as only one. He says as to the undivided cognition in the form 'this is a cow' (in which there is no distinction between the individual cow and its universal cow-ness, the cognition is due to the efficacy of samavāya. In samyoga, on the other hand there is the cognition of the relation between the two (and hence also a cognition of two) separate objects, but it is the magic power of samavāya that the two objects which are related by it appear as if they were blended together like an iron ball and fire.\(^2\)

\(^{1}\) Pr Bh 326

\(^{2}\) NK p. 326
What Śrīdhara brings out here is that in the case of samyoga, the two related objects distinctly appear to be two, but in the samavaya relation, although in reality they are two, they appear as one. It is the peculiarity of samavāya that unifies its relata in such a way, that we can not look at the relata as distinct and separable.

What we normally consider to be single object such as a table is not actually one but mosaic of many according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. A discerning intellect is alive to the existence of many reals. First we have the substance (dravya) table which provides the substratum for the qualities, actions and its universal to reside in. In other words the table is not really one, but a complex of many which consists of substance (dravya) qualities (guṇa) such as its colour, size, shape etc., actions (kriya) like that of its movement and its universal (samanyā), viz table-ness. What we therefore generally look upon as one entity, namely, table is really many. But when we look at the table we do not perceive the qualities, action and universal of the table as separate entities apart from the table.

Conjunctions needs inherence to connect it with its relata. For instance the relation of conjunction between
hand and the book needs to be related to the hand and the book by means of inherence. But the relation of inherence with its relata does not need any other relation. Inherence and non-existence are not inseparable related with anything. Conjunction is a separable relation (yutasiddhi) whereas inherence is an inseparable relation (ayutasiddhi).

SAMAVĀYA - AN EXTERNAL RELATION

In the light of above discussion let us now consider whether samavāya stands for an internal relation or an external relation. We have seen that samavāya holds between entities of same order (between substances) and also between entities of different orders (substances and non-substances). The relation between threads and cloth is considered as samavāya (instance of samavāya existing between substances only). Hence the cloth (substance) is supposed to reside in its inherent cause, namely, threads (substance) by the relation of inherence. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation, the samavāya-karana (threads), continues to exists even after the production of effect (cloth) without losing its identity. Similarly the effect, cloth, which is produced resides intact in its

2. Saptapādarthī, sec, 197.
samavāyī-kaṇa, namely, threads. In other words when an effect such as cloth is produced from cause, threads, we have two entities namely the samavāyī-kaṇa (threads) and the effect (cloth) residing in the former in the relation of to samavāya without any loss of their identity. In all cases of production of effects such as cloth, the cause and effects remain unaffected. Here, the effect, cloth, resides in the threads by the relation of samavāya and entities related by samavāya do not lose their identity according to vaiśeṣika. Since entities in the relation of samavāya remain unaffected and unmodified, samavāya satisfies the criterion of an external relation.

It is not only in respect of entities of same order that samavāya does not affect its relata, but also holds good in respect of entities of a different order. For example, the relation between rose (substance) and its fragrance, quality (non-substance) is considered as samavāya. The quality, fragrance, is supposed to reside in the rose, substance, by the relation of samavāya. The entities so related by samavāya, namely, the substance, rose and quality, fragrance, remain as they are without lose to their identity as in the case of entities in the samyoga. Then if samyoga were to be considered as an external relation, in so far as entities in the relation of samavāya
also remain unmodified as the entities in the relation of samyoga, it should also be considered as an external relation. We have shown above that entities in samavaya relation remain unmodified as in samyoga relation. Now we have to examine, whether the relata in samavaya also remain unmodified even after the cessation of samavaya relation between them. We have seen that the relation between cloth and the threads is one of samavaya and when they are in the samavaya relation they remain in tact without loss to their identity. But if we break the relation of samavaya between them, do they still remain in tact as in the case of entities in samyoga? In order to eliminate the relation of samavaya between the threads and cloth, we have to separate the threads woven into a cloth and keep them apart. We have to dissolve that peculiar relation between threads that caused the emergence or production of cloth in them. In other words we have to destroy the asamavayi-karaṇa, i.e., that peculiar arrangement between threads which originated the cloth in them. If once we do that the threads remain merely as threads in the form of a bundle of in the absence of that unique arrangement of threads that generated a cloth in them and it leads to the disappearance of the cloth (effect). For according to his theory of causation the destruction of asamavayi-karaṇa leads to the destruction of the effect.
produced. When anything is destroyed, according to Vaiśeṣika, it is destroyed totally without leaving any trace behind. In other words the destruction of asamavāyī-kāraṇa, that is, that particular arrangement between threads which give rise to the effect, cloth, leads to destruction of the effect produced and when it is destroyed, it is destroyed totally. Thus the idea of the absence of the samavāya relation between threads and cloth is possible only when the effect is destroyed totally.

One may contend that when the arrangement of threads that gave rise to a cloth is disturbed it does not involve the total destruction of the effect namely cloth, since the threads do remain even after the disappearance of the cloth. But according to the Vaiśeṣika theory of causation, the effect (cloth) being totally different from cause (threads), the existence of the threads does not imply the existence of the effect, cloth, any more than the existence of the bricks, after the demolition of the building would entail the existence of a building constructed out of them.

Thus change in the ordinary sense of appearance and disappearance of certain qualities, in or from an enduring substance is inconceivable in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Change is only total destruction. It does not involve any
modification or change of form, the substance remaining the same. Hence samavāya relation which involves total destruction of one of its relata when the relation is withdrawn, cannot be considered an internal relation. Total destruction cannot be considered 'change' in the usual sense of term. Relata in samavāya relation remain without any loss to their identity and similarly when the relation is withdrawn, one of the relata disappears totally. This situation does not permit any internal relation. Samavāya therefore like samyoga is an external relation. But the difference between them is that whereas the entities in samayoga remain unaffected both in the presence of samyoga and absence of samyoga, so far as entities in samavāya are concerned, as long as they are samavāya relation they remain as they are without any loss to their identity, but when the relation is withdrawn one of the entities disappears totally. But total disappearance cannot be construed as change in the sense of modification or change of form.

In the light of the analysis we have undertaken, it is not difficult to visualise how the inherent cause and the effect which are related by samavāya remain distinct and unmodified. Professor T.R.V. Murthy therefore observes that the relation of cause and effect according to Vaisesika
is a relation of two distincts juxtaposed\textsuperscript{1}.

The followers of Sāmkhya do not consider the qualities, the action and the universal of objects such as tables as essentially different from that of what we call table (substance). They are the different aspects of the table and being non-different from the table they do not need any principle of relation such as samavāya. This is in tune with their metaphysical presupposition that identity is more fundamental than difference.

But the followers of Vaśīṣṭha, committed to the philosophy of pluralism, cannot but discern different reals as warranted from our experience, discloses to us that there are enduring reals in the midst of evanescent. The enduring principle, they call it a substance (dravya). It is the container or the substratum of qualitative, action and universal.

The same experience discloses to us that among the evanescent, some of them are relatively stable and some unstable and momentary. The former belong to the category

\textsuperscript{1} T.R.V. Murthy "Types of Indian Realism", The Philosophical, quarterly, Vol XII No. 2, July 1934, p. 149.
of quality (guṇa) and the latter belong to the category of action (kriya). Certainly our cognition of qualities of a table such as its colour, size, shape, is different from our cognition of the substance of the table. Similarly our cognition of movement of a table is different both from cognition of qualities and the substance of the table. Differences in cognition is rooted in difference in reality. According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika unless the reals such as substance, qualities, action are distinct ontologically, our cognitions would not have been different.

We distinguish the table from non-table such as chairs etc., On what basis is the distinction of table from non-table made possible ? The followers of Vaiśeṣika believe that this is made possible because of the presence of the universal namely 'table-ness', in the table and its absence from non-tables. The reality called 'table-ness' is not the same as substance or qualities or action of the table. Our awareness and understanding of 'table-ness' is different from those of other categories. In the absence of such a reality 'table-ness' we would not have got knowledge of 'table-ness'.

Thus compelled by the factors of experience and differences of our cognition the followers of Vaiśeṣika
were constrained to multiply the reals. Having multiplied they have to explain their apparent unity or oneness in an object. Samavāya is the device that serves the purpose. It should be understood, that the relation of samavāya is also different from its relata. Sankara the great Advaita teacher found Achillea's heel in the samavāya category of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika. He rightly observes that if the relation samavāya is also different from its relata it leads to fallacy of infinite regress (Anavastā-Dosa).

Thus Samavāya plays a crucial role in the Vaiśeṣika pluralism. The Vaiśeṣika is convinced that it is only substances that differ from one another, but also substances and qualities, substances and action, universal and particulars, parts and wholes, existents and non-existents. But they do not manifest always as distinct and different. Sometimes they are related separably and some time inseparably. Two substances such as a table and a table cloth are related separably, the relation being conjunction (samyoga). But two reals such as a table and its colour are related inseparably by the relation of samavāya. Although the substance table and its quality such as its colour are indistinguishable or inseparably related, their separate being cannot be doubted. The point is that the samavāya relation is a unique one as to give rise to the impression
that there is not actually two or more entities but only one. But a discerning intellect will not lose sight of the distinct realities. The fact is that our knowledge of substance is different from our knowledge of quality. And similarly our knowledge of the relation between them remains distinct. Our cognition of table as a substance manifests itself as substratum for qualities, actions and universals to reside in. On the other hand our cognition of quality such as an brown colour residing in a table manifests itself as other than substratum, as that which cannot exist on its own, as that which needs the substratum to reside in. In a system committed to the pluralism where substance, quality, action, universal are distinct and disparate, we need the category of samāvāya. In the absence of it the pluralism of Vaiśeṣika collapses like a pack of cards.

**SAMĀVĀYA AND APRTHAK SIDDHI**

The vaiśeṣika category of samāvāya is sometimes equated with the aprthak-siddhi doctrine of Viśiṣṭādvaita, since in both the relatia are considered inseparable. However, a close scrutiny discloses to us that the apparent similarities of the two cannot be taken as the grounds for their equation.

Aprthak-siddhi is an important doctrine of Viśiṣṭādvaita which is intended to explain the organic
relationship between god, individual souls (cit) and matter (acit).

The Viśiṣṭādvaiteśa like Vaiśeṣika admits two types of entities – the separable (Yuta – siddha) and the inseparables (ayuta – siddha). The Viśiṣṭādvaiteśa however use the term ‘aprthak – siddhi’ in the place of ayuta – siddha. Thus it looks that the aprtham – siddhi of Viśiṣṭādvaiteśa and the samavaya of Vaiśeṣika are identical. But philosophically the two concepts are poleapart. Where as the followers of Vaiśeṣika look upon samavaya as a distinct category (padartha), the Viśiṣṭādvaiteśa does not treat aprthak-siddhi as a separate category. Aprthak – siddhi is a term used to describe the nature (svarupa) of the two terms which are related as substance (dhaṇa) and attribute (dharā). The relata which are by their very nature, inseparable are aprthak – siddhi. ‘Prthak’ means separate and ‘aprthak’ means non-separate. Siddhi has two meanings.

(a) existence (sthitī) and

(b) Cognition (pratiti).

Accordingly aprthak-sthitī means, that attribute and substance cannot exist as two separate entities unlike two physical objects. Aprthak-pratiti signifies that substance

and attribute cannot be comprehended separately. For example, in the blue lotus, blueness as an attribute does not exist by itself other than as an aspect of the lotus. They are also not cognised separately. On the other hand, they are always seen together. Thus, by virtue of their intrinsic character, substances (dharani) and the attribute (dharman) are inseparable (aprthak-siddhi). As they are organically related, there is no need to postulate a separate relation such as samavāya, to account for their relation. It is for this reason that Vedānta Desika, the greatest exponent of Viśiṣṭādvaśta metaphysics, observes that we do not need any separate relation other than the very nature (svāraṇa) of substance and attribute.1. If the aprthak-siddhi is admitted as a separate principle apart from its relata, it leads to the fallacy of infinite regress like samavāya.

Aprthak-siddhi is not a distinct category over and above the relata, it is simply a principle used to describe inseparable relation that exists between substance and attributes. It may be looked upon as a self-linking relation (svāraṇa-sambandha), that exists between two inseparable entities. It is either eternal (nitya) or non-

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1. "bandham na adyakasyamah samadhikam aprthak-siddhayathatsvarūpaṁ", Tattvamukta Kalāpa V - 126
eternal (anitya) depending on the nature of the relata. If the relata are non-eternal, as in the case of lotus and its blueness, the relation too is non-eternal (anitya).

The significance of the aprthak-siddhi in Viśiṣṭādvaita cannot be understood without reference to the relation that holds between Ṣevara, Jīvas and matter. It is central to their philosophy that God (Isvara) is supreme reality and there is no other reality which is equal to him or independent of him. The Viśiṣṭādvaitins accept souls (ātma) and matter (prakṛti), in addition to Isvara. In line with their presupposition that God is supreme and there is nothing independent of him, they have to account for the status of principles of souls and the matter. The souls and the matter cannot be endowed existence independent of Isvara. It is in this context that they consider that the souls and the matter are dependent on Isvara just as the quality is dependent on its substance, souls and matter would be the attributes. If God is the soul, souls and the matter would constitute his body. If God is the master, souls and the matter are his servants. It is therefore obvious that the souls and the matter are dependent on Isvara. This relation of dependence of souls and the matter on God or dependence of attributes on its substance is what
the Viśiṣṭādvaita characterizes as ‘inseparable relation’ (aprthak-siddhi).

The concept of aprthak-siddhi is therefore, an organic relation where as samavaya is a mechanical relation, wherein two independent reals co-exist inseparably. The purpose of aprthak-siddhi is to unify, harmonize, and relate things organically, whereas the purpose samavāya is to separate the reals preserving their identity. Thus there is an essential difference between the aprthak-siddhi of Viśiṣṭādvaita and samavaya of Vaiśeṣika.¹

Perception of Samavāya

The Vaiśeṣika differs from Nyāya in respect of our knowledge of samavāya. Whereas the Nyāya school holds that samavāya is perceptible, the Vaiśeṣika denies it.² The Nyaya holds that samavaya being an attribute of the object in which it resides by that relation, is perceived, like non-existence (Abhāva), by the sixth kind of contact namely

2. Samavāyāṣya Pratyakṣa - varñanaṁ nyāya - matena, vaiśeṣika mate tu samavāyo tindryaḥ T.K. P. B.
viśeṣana - bhāva. As against Nyāya the Vaiśeṣika is aware of the difficulty in establishing sense contact in samavāya and hence concludes that samavāya is not perceived but inferred. Praśastapāda observes that samavāya is imperceptible because it has no relation of subsistence; as is found in the universal existence (satta) which resides by samavāya relation in the objects that are perceptible.

Viśwanatha in his Mukṭāvali observes that the objects related by the samavāya such as jar and its colour are perceived but the inference between them is not perceived. Prof. D.N. Shastry observes since the Nyāya school was not fully conscious of the difficulties in respect of the perception of samavāya it holds that samavāya could be perceived through the sixth form of contact namely (Viśeṣana - Bhāva).

1. Evam Samavāyo pi, cakṣuh - Sambaddhasya tantor viśeṣana - bhūtaḥ patā - samavāyo grhyate iha tantusu pata - samavāya iti TB P. 36.
3. Mukṭāvali on Karika - P. I - II.
4. Critique of Indian Realism - P. 388. For discussion on Viśeṣana - bhāva, see pp.