PREFACE

The Vaishēśika philosophers are pluralists and realists. They are committed to the view that the reality is not one but many. Again, réals do not depend upon any mind-finite or not already existing réals, and it is those réals that make infinite for their existence. Mind merely enables us to our knowledge possible. But what is the basis for such a commitment on the part of philosophers of Vaishēśika. Do they reply on scriptures or any apriori reasoning or intuition or experience?

The followers of Vaishēśika rely on their experience to understand the world. The analysis of their experience disclosed to them that diversity and not unity is at the root of reality. They do not agree with those who aim at dispensing with diversity as mere appearance (Vivarta) of one fundamental spiritual principle viz., Brahman or an aspect or form (dharma) of a primordial material principle viz., prakṛti. They are réals and not appearances and they can not be derived from any primordial principle. Some of them are eternal and the non-éternals are the outcome of creation (arabhha) and not modification (parināma).

The objects we experience are of diverse kinds. They are of the nature of substance, qualities, actions, universals, relations and non-existent. In this
the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers are governed and guided by experience. Experience discloses to us that our cognition of 'substances', 'qualities', 'actions', 'relations', 'universals', 'non-existence', are different. One cannot be understood by the other. Our knowledge of substance of a table does not give us our knowledge of its qualities. Similarly our knowledge of actions does not lead to our knowledge of qualities, universals and other categories. Knowledge of one leading to our knowledge of all (Eka Vijnānam sarva Vijnānam), is inconceivable in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

The world is filled with many realis brought under the seven categories-substance, quality, action, universal, particularity, inherence and non-existence. They are ontologically different from one another. But sometimes they are related in such a subtle way that we fail to be aware of their difference as in the case of parts and wholes, substances and their qualities and so on. The followers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika want us to guard ourselves against such illusion. They show that it is the miracle of samvaya that keeps substances, qualities, actions, universals, parts and wholes, ontologically different and hence samavāya is the corner-stone of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism and pluralism.
Right from my student days, I was attracted by the peculiarities and uniqueness. Of the tenents of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy no other doctrine (category) is more peculiar and unique than that of samavāya in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Therefore I have chosen this topic for my research. Sometimes the philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is looked upon as a common sense philosophy—meaning that it is not sufficiently critical and deep. But I draw the attention of the scholars in philosophy to acquaint themselves with discussion that centres round the category of samavāya in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature. Common sense simply gets baffled at the subtleties of samavāya doctrine.

Although, I have named my thesis as STUDIES IN METAPHYSICS OF VAIŚEṢIKA SYSTEM WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SAMAVĀYA, I have not restricted my discussion to the Vaiśeṣika system alone. Samavāya is accepted by the founders of both the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya schools and by all the subsequent commentators of the respective schools. I have therefore, drawn my material from the literature available on both the schools starting from sutras, their respective commentators, the socratic schools of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and the school of Navya-Nyāya. I have also used the term Naiyāyikas, following Professor Karl Potter, to refer to the followers of both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools.
The thesis is in five chapters viz.

Chapter I, viz. "The Structure of Vaisēśika System", centres round the discussion of the seven categories and their similarities and dissimilarities.

Chapter II, viz, "Samavāya and its place in the Vaiśeṣika System", discusses the important role played by the category of samavāya to uphold the realism and pluralism of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Chapter III, viz, "Samavāya and The Vaiśeṣika Theory of Causation " brings out the role of samavaya in defence of their theory of causation that the material cause and effect are essentially different from each other (asat karya vāda).

Chapter IV, viz, "Criticism of Samavāya " by other Samavāya schools enquires into the criticism of the category of by other schools and the defence of it by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Chapter V viz, "Conclusion " presents a critical resume of the problems discussed in the thesis.