In this chapter before we take up the problem of validity or invalidity of knowledge, it is necessary to make it clear what the term 'prama' signifies. The Sanskrit word 'jñāna' is used to mean all kinds of cognition, cognition acquired through perception etc., as also memory, doubt, illusion etc. According to the Nyāya tradition, cognition is divided into two great heads of anubhava (presentation) and smṛti (memory). Anubhava is presentative knowledge of objects, whereas smṛti is a reproduction of previous experience and is knowledge produced from mental impression alone. Anubhava is further subdivided into yathārtha (valid cognition, prama) and ayathārtha (invalid cognition, aprama). Of these, yathārtha anubhava (prama) is of four kinds—perceptual cognition (pratyakṣa), inferential cognition (anumiti), analogical cognition (upamiti) and verbal testimony (Sāṁśaya). Aprama or ayathārtha anubhava is further generally classified into doubt (saṁśaya), error (viparyaya) and hypothetical reasoning (tarka).

1. See: सत्यवादार्थम्: प्रमाण: ज्ञानम्। सत्यिक्षा स्मृतिः बनुभवः।।
सत्योऽस्मात् सत्यिक्षा स्मृतिः। तत्तपिन्यां ज्ञानम् बनुभवः।।
- Tarkasamgraha (Athyale and Bodas), pp. 21-22
Also see: Avidyā— A Problem of Truth and Reality (E. A. Solomon), p. 401, Ahmedabad 1969
According to the Nyāya, dream-cognitions are memory-cognitions and are incorrect (ayathārtha). Similarly memory is subdivided into yathārtha (correct) and ayathārtha (incorrect). It may be noted that memory is not pramā, since it is not presentative in character. It is of two kinds, yathārtha (correct) and ayathārtha (incorrect) according as it agrees or does not agree with the real nature of the objects remembered (or is produced by valid cognition or by invalid cognition). Hence a cognition in order to be pramā must be yathārtha (true) and presentative in character. It is cognition which is free from uncertainty or doubt (asamidigdha), true or corresponding to its object (yathārtha) and presentative in character (anubha-vatmaka). Hence pramā excludes all kinds of non-valid cognition such as memory, error, doubt, hypothetical reasoning, because they are not presentative or not true or not certain.

There are different views even in regard to the exact meaning of pramāṇa. Some (i.e. Mīmāṃsakas) say that the

1. See: प्रमाणायं हि प्रमाणस्, न च स्मृति: प्रमा | लोकादिवाचारणः।

2. कैसिः (ध नीमाःः) वापः कनिष्ठार्थनु: प्रमाणस् श्लेषः। विज्ञानवेघः

- NVTT, NCG, p.35

- NVTT, NCG, p.34
means which enables us to cognise the object which is not yet
known is pramāṇa. Some others (i.e. Sautrāntikas) hold
that vijnāna endowed with form, while taking the shape of
object is pramāṇa. Some others (i.e. vaibhāṣikas and others)
claim that the capacity of vijnāna that is formless to reveal
itself or things other than itself is pramāṇa. Still others
(i.e. Naiyāyikas) accept that whatever is (the most effici-
ent) means of upalabdhi apprehension (i.e. pramāṇa, valid
cognition) is pramāṇa. It is necessary to keep in mind the
meaning of pramāṇa accepted by a particular school while we
discuss the problem of validity or invalidity with reference
to that particular school. The Nyāyasāra begins with the
general definition of pramāṇa. By this definition, viz. Samyak-
anubhava-sādhanam Pramāṇam—a means of right apprehension is
called pramāṇa; the means of right apprehension (pramāṇa) is
precisely separated or distinguished from the semblances of
pramāṇa (pramāṇabhāsa) which belong to the same class; i.e.
the class of pramāṇa; as well as from prameyas which
belong to a class other than that of pramāṇa. In the same
manner the definition of perception etc. should be interpreted
as distinguishing perception etc. from the categories of the
same class, viz. Inference etc.; as well as from those of a
different class; viz. Prameya etc.

1. एवं प्रत्येकादितन्त्रानांतथा समान-असमान-ज्ञातीय-ज्ञानेनभवत्तत्
व्याख्यातवम्य शति । -NyB, p. 12
Significance of the term 'Samyak' (Right) in the Definition: Bhasarvajña says that the word 'Samyak' is inserted in the general definition of pramāṇa, given in the Nyāyasāra, in order to exclude doubt and illusion from the range of pramāna (valid apprehension). That is to say, the means of right apprehension alone is called pramāṇa; while the means of wrong apprehension (- doubt or illusion-) is not pramāṇa. This statement is specifically directed against one who holds that there is nothing belonging to the same class, viz. the class of pramāṇa, which is required to be excluded by the definition. Here Bhasarvajña seems to be referring to the view held by the Prabhākara Mīmāṃsaka according to whom anubhūti or direct apprehension is synonymous with pramāṇa- that is to say all anubhūti is pramāṇa; while smṛti or memory, being different from pramāṇa, is non-valid. As for example, when we see silver in an oyster-shell, the direct apprehension in the form of 'this' and the memory of silver are both indiscriminately intermingled with each other. In fact, both of them viz.

1. सम्यक्कृतोऽनुमुद्यन्तां प्रमाणं । - NyS, NyB, p. 11.

2. प्रमाणस्य वनुमाति । सा स्थृते: बन्धारं । । । । न प्रमाणं स्वतिः
   पूर्वप्रतिपादित्यपेशेढनातुः । - Prakaranapancīka p. 42,
   (Salikanātha) ed. by Adakara Mukunda Sāstrī, Kāshi, 1904
direct apprehension (in the form of 'this') and memory (of silver) are in themselves right. The error is due to not discriminating between the elements of apprehension and remembrance. Thus according to the view held by the followers of the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā, no direct apprehension is in fact wrong.

Against this view Bhāsurvajña seems to establish that there are certain direct apprehensions which are not right and they could be classified under either Doubt or Illusion. Such wrong apprehensions do require to be excluded from the range of right apprehension. That is why the term 'Samyak' (right) has been introduced as the qualifier of 'anubhūti' in the general definition of pramāṇa. The statement in the Nyāyasāra, viz. Samyak-grahanam Samsaya-viparyaya-apohartham signifies that the inclusion of the term 'Samyak' (right) in the definition is meant to exclude doubt and illusion as the result of pramāṇa (means of valid knowledge), to deny them as such. Or it is meant to exclude doubt and illusion from the range of anubhava (apprehension). Similarly the means giving rise to doubt and illusion are also sought to be excluded from the range of the means of valid knowledge. The

1. रूपाणु हवम् शति न एक ज्ञानम् इतिविक्रियानि। द्वितीयरूपम् शतिः स्मरणाः। कुन्तु अश्वानुमुखविपरीताः। न प्रामाण्यप्रत्ययः। हवम् शति विज्ञानम्। अनुवादार्थम्। इत्यते एव। प्रानिवेशया चात्र रक्ताशः स्मरणांलप्पेदव ग्रहणाय व्यवहारप्रकरणाया। प्रयत्नार्थात्। स्वर्णार्थविकारः। -Prakaranapāñcikā p.43, Kāśi, 1904

2. प्रामाण्यम् सनातनानातीयानिन्ययध्ययनिन्यायं वेव शतिः इतिरूपः। मयेऽतं प्रतिवाह-संयथेश्व ग्रहणात्। साम्य-शक्तिकृत् अनुवादः। -NyB, p. 11.
rightness or wrongness of pramāṇa (means of right apprehension) or of Pramāṇabhāsa (semblance of pramāṇa) can be determined from the rightness or wrongness of the fruit (i.e. apprehension). That is to say, if the fruit, (i.e. apprehension) that is yielded by a pramāṇa is right, then the means that gives rise to such a right apprehension is regarded as true pramāṇa. But if the fruit or apprehension brought about by a means of apprehension, is wrong, then the generative means of such a wrong apprehension is a semblance of pramāṇa. Hence the term 'samyak' in the definition is explained as an epithet of the fruit, viz. anubhava - right apprehension.

Samyaktva or rightness consists in being of the nature of the ascertainment of a thing as it really is, and asamyaktva or wrongness consists in being of the nature of anubhava, which is the reverse of this, that is to say, is not the apprehension of the thing as it really is.

Bhāsarvajña says that this asamyaktva or wrongness belongs to Doubt and Illusion, since they are found to be spoken of as wrong apprehensions in Śāstras as well as in common parlance.

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1. तथापूतायानस्यक्षुभयस्यावत्वं सम्यक्क्ष्य, तद्विपरीतानुभयस्यावत्वं 
कश्चि काम्यक्क्ष्यम् । - Nyā, p.12

2. Doubt and Illusion ( – all knowledge other than valid knowledge) will be treated in a separate chapter. Here the topic of Pramāṇa, Pramāṇa and Pramāṇya is pursued straightaway.
Thus asamyak-anubhava or wrong apprehension is a-pramā-
(Doubt and Illusion); while samyak-anubhava or right
apprehension is pramā.

Purpose of the Term 'Anubhava' in the general Definition
of Pramāṇa: In the Nyāya-Bhāṣarva, Bhasarvajña says that in
order to exclude memory (smarana) and Non-knowledge (Ajñāna)
from the sphere of knowledge, the term 'anubhava,' has been
inserted in the definition. Commenting on this in the Nyāya-
ghūṣana, Bhasarvajña says that by including the term 'anubhava'
in the definition Remembrances (smarana) and Non-knowledge,
i.e., ritual performance of sacrifice, etc., are negatived as
fruit of pramāṇa. Indeed both of these are nowhere known to
be expressed by the word 'anubhava,' when their etymological
explanations as signifying the state (bhāva) expressed by

1. किषा च वैकमा च (सैजोपनिषद-१५) हत्यादिवपि वजानवदेन
यागादिकृम गुहायते । - The editor's foot-note(5), NyB, p.43
2. See चर: ३४१३१. द्वृपुरे-पवः: च forms masculine (more rarely
neuter) substantives which demote the action or state ex­
pressed by the verbal root- A Grammar by Kielhorn, p.242, Amīk
Bombay, 1912.

And त्युद्ध बालूक-करणेष्ठ, स्त्रृत-स्वरणेष्ठ,
Also see: अनुपवति हरित कृष्ण्युत्पत्त्या प्रमाणः, अनुस्मरते हरित कृष्ण्युत्पत्त्या प्रेरणेष्ठ,
अनुपवति: हरित मायायुत्पत्त्या प्रमाणः च प्रामाण्यं स्यात्, तथैव च
अनन्ते तैः प्रमाणादेशेन सर्वे, प्रसिद्धत्वादृः।-
Nyāyatātparyādīpikā (Jayasimhasūri), pp.68-69,
the verbal roots, (i.e. smṛ + āna = smaraṇa, (a)-jñā + āna = (a)ajñāna) are given. That is to say, what is directly apprehended or presented is called 'ānubhava'. Though Remembrance (smaraṇa) and Non-knowledge (ajñāna, sacrifice etc.) are types of knowledge, yet they are different from 'ānubhava'. Hence means of Remembrance and Non-knowledge cannot be called Pramāṇa, though they may be right. Only that means of knowledge which gives rise to right anubhava (presentative apprehension) is called pramāṇa. In fact Remembrance is a representative cognition, while Anubhava is a presentative cognition. Thus the term 'samyaṇ' is inserted to exclude Doubt and Illusion from the sphere of right apprehension while the term 'ānubhava' is included in the definition to deny Remembrance and Non-knowledge as fruits of pramāṇa, or as resulting from the means of right knowledge.

Here a question may arise as to whether the validity of such a pramāṇa (right apprehension) which we obtain through pramāṇa is intrinsic or is to be ascertained by some extraneous means. In this regard the Mīmāṃsakas believe that validity is established by virtue of the cognition itself, while invalidity is established by external causes, so that a cognition must be taken as true unless it is proved to be

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1. अत्यन्तवर्णोऽवशययेऽवस्त्राकाशं व स्मरित: | -V.S.,IX-11-6
   संस्कृतवर्णाभ्यां श्रेयं स्मरित: | तद्भवन्तः ज्ञातमकस्म: | -TS, p. 22
otherwise. We shall refer to this briefly later. Against this view, the Naiyāyika holds that validity and invalidity are established by something independent of the cognition itself. Here Bhāsarvajña puts forth the view held by kumārila Bhatta and his followers and then refutes it. Advocates of the Bhatta school of Mīmāṃsā say that the validity of cognition is certified by cognition itself, that is to say, a cognition is by itself valid, nothing else is sought to prove its validity. And so long as no defects or errors are found in the causes giving rise to the cognition the erroneousness or falsity automatically keeps away without any effort. The doctrine of svatah-pramāṇatva (validity being intrinsic) signifies the non-dependence of the pieces of valid knowledge (pramāṇānām) on anything else in respect of their origination (Utpatti), functioning (pravṛtti) and knowledge (vijnapti). On the other hand, the pieces of invalid knowledge are dependent on another in all these three respects, so invalidity is extrinsic. That is to say, false knowledge becomes invalid, being produced as dependent on the defect of the sense-organs etc. which is something additional to the aggregate of causal factors producing the knowledge (i.e. the invalidity in the

1. यदा स्थः प्रमाणात्वं तदान्यन्त्वं भूतते ।
निन्दकः कि मिथ्यात्वं वोषाञ्ज्ञानाद्विष्टः ॥
- Sloka-vārtika 2-52, Nyāya, p.38.

2. The word 'Pramāṇa' signifies a 'means of acquiring prama' or certain knowledge; and also 'valid knowledge'. Here the word is used in the latter sense. So 'Pramāṇya' means the character of being valid knowledge or validity.
false knowledge is produced by a cause different from those causes which produce the knowledge itself). On the other hand, valid knowledge or its validity does not depend for its being true on anything over and above the causal complex that produces the knowledge. It is not proper to say that purity of causes is necessary, for its causes are by their very nature free from impurity or defect. But as defects are adventitious (i.e., additional to the causes producing knowledge), their presence is required in respect of apramāṇya (invalidity). That is to say, invalidity of knowledge is dependent on the presence of defects. And it is because of this that the gunas (excellences of sense-organs etc.) operate in the direction of the getting rid of these defects, and not in respect of the origination of pramāṇya (validity) which arises immediately with the rise of knowledge. This will be still clearer if we take an example. It is not that in the case of a man whose eyes do not suffer from any defect like partial blindness etc. (timirādi), validity does not arise in the absence of some added excellence like collyrium etc. That is to say, if there exists any defect in eyes, etc.; some additional factor in the form of medicine is required to remove or cure it, but eyes etc. that are devoid of any defect do not require anything additional in bringing about valid knowledge. Also, that whose necessary connection has not been seen both positively and negatively cannot be regarded as a cause simply because it is present (as in the case of
eye-ointment which, though present, has not been determined as the cause of pramāṇya; as this would lead to absurd over-extension (disorder in respect of causality—anything present would have to regarded as the cause of just anything). On the strength of the illustration of collyrium etc. we should infer that the functioning of other excellences also such as 'being testified to by reliable persons' etc. is exclusively in regard to the removal of defects. Thus we see that valid cognition does not require in its production anything in addition to its own causes. This is what is said to be the self-validity (svatah-pramāṇya) of knowledge in its production (Utpatti). So also pramāṇa or valid knowledge while it proceeds to do its own work that is, the act of revealing an object as it really is, does not require another knowledge of itself or any excellences in the causes to help it. Thus valid knowledge is not only independent of anything else in its own origination, but also in its own functioning (Pravṛtti). Similarly, in respect of its own knowledge or revelation (jñāpti) also, the valid knowledge is not dependent on anything over and above its own nature of being consciousness. That is to say, a valid cognition does not require another cognition for its own revelation, just like a lamp. Otherwise it would lead to infinite series. The first cognition would require a second cognition for its own revelation and again the second would require a third one and so on. Thus valid knowledge does not depend on anything for its revelation.
This is what is said to be the self-validity (svatah-pramāṇya) of knowledge in all respects, viz. in its rise, action and revelation (Utpatti, pravṛtti and jñapti). On the other hand, invalid knowledge (illusion etc.) does require something like defect in the sense-organ etc. in respect of its origination, and functioning, as shown above. Even in respect of its revelation invalid knowledge requires another knowledge, that is, the knowledge of defects arising from some causes (timira etc.) or the knowledge of a thing as being otherwise. That is to say, knowledge attained is proved invalid when later on we come to know the defect arising from some specific causes like timira etc. or when we come to know that the thing is perceived as other than what it really is. Thus the invalidity of knowledge is to be ascertained by some other knowledge, while its validity is self-evident. This is the view held by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsāka.

Refutation of the Self-Validity of knowledge And Establishment of the Doctrine, that its validity also is Extrinsic:
As to what is said by the opponent that validity does not depend on anything in respect of its production, the answer is that it is not justifiable. For, validity certainly requires some specific causes like light, place, unseen

1. अप्रमाण्यु प्रदूषित सत्त्वानि वर्ग-वन्यप्रयत्नानि वा बहुते हृदि ! -
   -NGA, p. 39.
principle (adrsta) etc. for its production. It is not that specific causes like light etc. are required for the production of wrong knowledge in the same form as they are required for the production of right knowledge. It is also not true to say that these specific causes only remove the defects; they certainly give rise to true knowledge as well; for, in the absence of such specific cause, right knowledge does not arise at all. Moreover, for the rise of the cognition of something that is to be inferred, like fire etc.; antahkarana or the mind and the like do require the true knowledge of the linga (indicative sign) etc.; the efficacy of which has been ascertained both positively and negatively (i.e. by the test of positive and negative concomitance). Thus validity of knowledge does require some specific causes for its own production and so it is dependent on something else in respect of its origination. In spite of this fact how could one dare to say that pramāṇa or valid knowledge does not depend on anything in respect of its production? Besides, if one follows the Mīmāṃsaka's line of argument how could one say that wrong knowledge depends on some defect in the sense-organ etc., and so its invalidity is extrinsic? For, effects like kāca (cataract), kāmala (jaundice) etc. are nothing but a state of inequilibrium of the essential ingredients of the body (viz.

1. The text should be 'कयं तद्येंचय्य प्रति: प्रामाण्यम्?' instead of 'कयं तद्येंचय्य प्रति: प्रामाण्यम्?' NyB, p.39
See: कयं तद्येंचय्य प्रतिप्रामाण्यम् | — Photostat, p.16.
three humours: Vāta = wind, pitta = bile, kapha = phlegm), present in the eye-ball etc. If only such a non-equilibrium of dhātus (vāta etc.) gives rise to eye-disease like jaundice etc., one cannot say that invalidity of knowledge is dependent on extraneous factors in respect of its production etc. If it be admitted that as invalid knowledge is dependent on such a non-equilibrium of dhātus, its invalidity requires some extraneous factors for its own origination, then there would arise the contingency that even when there is an equilibrium of dhātus, the validity of knowledge would have to be said to be resulting from extraneous factors. For, so far as the rise of right or wrong knowledge is concerned, the state of inequilibrium of the dhātus and the state of equilibrium of the dhātus are equally extraneous conditions. If one condition could be said to produce invalidity in knowledge, then the other one could as well produce validity in knowledge. That is to say, if invalidity of knowledge is accepted as extrinsic then the validity of knowledge should as well be regarded as extrinsic. Moreover, just like the positive existence of something, its absence also can be established as a cause of something by means of positive and negative concomitance. As for example, until there is conjunction between a fruit and a branch of a tree, the act of falling down does not occur. But when there is absence of such a conjunction, the act of falling down does take place. So even the absence of conjunction proves to be the cause of the act of falling down. Similarly when eyes etc. bring about valid knowledge, they do require the absence
of defects - which is an extraneous cause. Hence the validity of knowledge is dependent on extraneous factors in respect of its origination. Here it should be borne in mind that according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, abhāva also is an altogether separate entity. Hence like the presence of defects, the absence of defects could as well be said to be an extraneous cause. So like invalidity of knowledge, validity also is extrinsic. It may be required any additional positive cause (bhāvatmaka kāraṇa) while producing a piece of valid knowledge, the validity of such a piece of valid knowledge is regarded as intrinsic. The answer is that it is not tenable. For this is just a conventional belief. And convention could have been formed otherwise also. So just this much cannot prove anything. Moreover, there is no proof for the validity of knowledge being intrinsic in respect of its production. On the other hand, in order to establish that the validity of knowledge is produced by extraneous causes we have an inference.- the validity of knowledge is produced by extraneous causes, because the validity not being in existence previously comes to exist, just like invalidity.

1. See: NyB, p. 536

2. प्रामाण्य प्रद: वभविष्यत्वाभिवत्वात् प्रामाण्यशः। - NyB, p. 39
   Compare: सम्पर्कान्तं वा धर्मस्वहस्तपरिदृश्यन्तिमयं स्वयम्भू
   कार्किष्णान्त्व: हृति सत्ये भव: कार्निवः निर्मित्यात्त्वेष।
So also in respect of its functioning pramāṇya is dependent on an extraneous cause. The eyes or the like are called pramāṇa (a means of valid knowledge) only when they are generative of a particular piece of knowledge. Unless they do this function, they (eyes etc.) could not have the character of being a means of right knowledge (pramāṇatva or pramāṇya). And it is already propounded that eyes etc. are

1. Here Bhāsarvajñāna seems to have taken 'pramāṇya' in the sense of 'being a means of valid knowledge-pramāṇa'. The function of eyes etc is to produce a particular piece of knowledge. So only when eyes etc. do this function, they can be called pramāṇa. And in the act of producing a particular knowledge, eyes etc. do require light and the like, as said above;

Compare: यदि व स्वकार्यकर्णो प्रमाणस्य परान्याचतवृत्ते तद्विष्णु व्याख्याय फित प्रमाणं स्वकार्यकृते निर्पेशाय, साम्पत्तिक व तद्विष्ण्वस्य वा तत्ज्ञाय वा सानमिति (Nyāyamanjari p. 158;

Also compare the Mīmāṃsāka view: "As soon as knowledge is produced, objects are revealed to us; there is no intermediate link between the rise of knowledge and the revelation of objects on which knowledge depends, for producing its action of revealing or illuminating them". - A History of Indian Philosophy (Dasgupta), Vol. I, p. 374

dependent on light and the like, while doing their function, i.e. the act of producing knowledge. Thus for being a means of right knowledge (pramāṇatva), the eyes or the like do require extraneous causes such as light etc. But if pramāṇa is taken in the sense of collocation or totality of causes (sāmagri), then functioning of this sāmagri would have to be accepted as being independent. For, eyes, light, time, place, adṛśa, etc. are all included in the totality of causes. If this be accepted, then just as the totality of causes does not depend on anything else in respect of its functioning, when it is a pramāṇa; so it (the totality of causes) does not depend on anything even when there is apramāṇya in it (i.e. when it is a means of invalid knowledge). For it is the totality of causes that produces the invalid knowledge. Thus there is no difference whatsoever in the two cases (of pramāṇya and apramāṇya). That is to say, if in view of the totality of causes, pramāṇya is admitted as independent, then apramāṇya also would have to be accepted as independent. The view that

1. This is sāmagri-kāraṇa-vāda. See: "Nyāya-Vaisēṣika regarded all effects as being due to the assemblage of certain collocations due to the assemblage of certain collocations which unconditionally, invariably and immediately preceded these effects" - A History of Indian Philosophy, p. 330
Also read: 'तत एव सामग्रिः प्रमाणात्वं युक्तः,... अनुक्रमितमन्यवीज्ञाने कायमः प्रत्ययः अन्तःतत्त्वमेव विवेक्तमानः' - Nyāyamañjarī, p.12
knowledge or awareness by itself if a pramāṇa will be refuted later (in the context of the Mīmāṃsā-views regarding karaṇa or special means of knowledge, NyB, p.44), so Bhāsarvajñā does not examine whether this pramāṇa functions independently or in dependence on something else. Thus even in the case of functioning prāmāṇya is dependent on some extraneous causes. Moreover, the analogy given by the opponent in respect of pramāṇa functioning independently is equally applicable in the case of aprāmāṇya also. The analogy is as follows: ¹

A pot does require a lamp of clay, wheel, stick, string etc. in respect of its origination. However, it does not require these things, while doing its function, viz. the fetching of water etc. what is meant is this: It is only for its origination that a positive entity requires a cause. But when it has originated, it is by itself efficient with regard to its effect. For example, in the Mīmāṃsākā's view, the action on the part of a knower is a means of right knowledge.² When this action is to be brought about, the functioning of sense-organs, etc. would be required, but when it has taken place, it would give rise to cognition, requiring nothing for its functioning. Thus in respect of functioning pramāṇa is not dependent on anything else; though it requires the visual organ etc. in order to establish itself as one. But as said above, this can be applicable in the case of apramāṇya as well. When a means of wrong knowledge has originated, it does its function without depending on anything else. Moreover,

¹. मृदुलसायनां निरापदी घटो जन्मन्यप्रेषचाते । 
उदाहरणोऽतस्य तदपेक्षा न विक्रते । । 
- NyB, p. 40

See स्वसार्थायुः स्वकायेऽवः स्मरयेश्व तु । - Ślokavārtika 2.48
Also see: Tattvasamgraha 2811.

². अत र्व शास्त्रायार्थस्य प्राप्न्यत्वमाहुः । । 
- NyB, p. 44
in the above analogy the pot also requires conjunction with some person, and the like for its functioning. So in fact even in respect of functioning valid knowledge requires the will to do activity etc. on the part of the person who has attained the knowledge.

Similarly we can say that not only for its origination and its functioning, but also for its revelation, valid knowledge is dependent on something else; since there is no proof showing that it is intrinsically known. That is to say, the very existence of any knowledge cannot certify its validity. In fact the validity of knowledge is ascertained by agreement with the objective facts of experience. As said above, there is no proof showing that validity is intrinsic. On the other hand, there is certainly an inference that proves the validity of knowledge as extrinsic.

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1. See: अनेकाने औपनिवेशिक व संसार: शास्त्रातील विवरणात, आदर्शात रुझानात अनुभूती, या प्रक्रियेत्वापि गूढता आवश्यकता दिव्य: ति: आवश्यक वार्तपीत: बहिः उद्दिश्यते, वाचार्यीप्रकटीविशेषः शिलांतः समारोपितः कुम्भः कन्धः लम्बायति।

2. See: ज्ञान फलमेव न प्रमाणमहुः इत्युक्तं, न व फलात्मचाः तत्त्वस्कारां विविधत्वं यत सामयिकं तत्प्रभावं वा कस्य शिलांतः, पुराणप्रवृत्त्वादां दुस तत्त्व-वाचार्यप्रकटिसह विचारते ज्ञातः यत्तिन्द्रितः।

3. प्रभृतिप्रवृत्त्वारिष्टप्रकटस्थित्वं तत्त्व-प्रकटिसह ध्वेषितां श्लेष्मश्रवण्यानि वतीक्ष्मिकां निषेधयुक्त शक्तेऽहति, कालान्तरे तत्त्व-प्राकृतिक निरोधाय तत्त्वमुक्ति न दूर तत्र नर्मेश्च प्रभृतिसारूपिश्चन्तितवां निरोधसह।

4. प्रामाण्यं परत्याचाचाराः संघ-शर्तादेव प्रामाण्यः।
Validity of knowledge requires some extraneous factor for its ascertainment; since it is knowable, just like invalidity of knowledge.

It may be urged that validity of knowledge can be established just on the ground that knowledge is itself of the nature of consciousness. That is to say, when knowledge first reveals itself to us it carries with it the conviction of certainty. Thus being of the nature of consciousness is itself a proof of its validity. So validity is not dependent on anything else. But according to Bhāṣarvajña, this is not tenable, since, as valid knowledge is of the nature of consciousness, so also the invalid knowledge is of the nature of consciousness. This is common to both. Hence if validity be admitted as intrinsic, then invalidity should as well be admitted as intrinsic—which the Mīmāṃsaka does not accept. Again, it may be argued that the doctrine that validity is known by itself, and invalidity by some other means, can be very well established by the maxim of Utsarga (a general rule) and apavāda (a specific rule, opposed to the general one). To this effect it is said—

1. तस्मादवौधात्मकचतुष्पत्र्याप्राप्तः प्रनापातः ।
   विधान्ययात्वब्यःतुष्णान्यायाद्यत्त्वः ।
   - Sūkha-vartika 2.53, quoted in the Nyāya, p. 41;
   Also see: सब शास्त्र उत्तसगतः प्रनापातः । यज्ञ बिधान्ययात्वत्वानुपातः =
   वाचनिर्णयसः, यथावतः हेतुवधात्यायानुपातः - कारणनिस्काशवानुपातः, तव
   प्राप्तार्थं बाध्यते हरि मायः । सदुद्धः शाश्वतः - यस्य च दुस्तः कारणः
   यत्र च नियमिति प्रत्ययः, च एवास्मीश्चैन्यं प्रत्ययो नान्यः ।
   Śabdarbhaśya, p. 28, ed. by Subbaśāstri, Poona, 1929
knowledge is known as pramāṇa (valid knowledge) by the very fact that it is of the nature of knowledge, but this validity (pramanata) of its is set aside or contradicted by the knowledge of the thing being different from what it was cognised as or by the knowledge of a defect in the cause (of that particular knowledge). Here the general rule is this: validity of knowledge is intrinsic; while the exception to this rule is this. Invalidity of knowledge is extrinsic.

But this view is not proper. For, if knowledge is admitted as valid only because it is of the nature of consciousness, then there would arise the contingency of even erroneous knowledge being valid, since it is also of the nature of knowledge before it is contradicted. Contradiction or sublation could not properly arise in respect of consciousness which is of the nature of valid knowledge, for if it were to arise, there would be the contingency of the rise of sublation in respect of all cases of knowledge. It is also not proper to say that one and the same knowledge is both, pramāṇa (valid knowledge) and apramāṇa (invalid knowledge), since two contradictory characteristics, viz. validity and invalidity cannot reside together in one and the same knowledge. It may be argued that the very same thing may sometimes be active, at another time inactive. Thus with the variance of the time factor, a thing can be both endowed with activity and not so. Similarly there is no contradiction if we say that both, validity and invalidity could, at different times, reside in one and the same knowledge. But this argument also is not tenable, says Bhāsarvajña.
For, knowledge is evanescent, not enduring. So it could not happen that a certain knowledge remains valid for some time and then it becomes invalid. It is quite obvious that when a substance which is a substratum of some attribute is destroyed, it cannot have another attribute afterwards. Hence validity and invalidity cannot reside in one and the same knowledge even at different times, as knowledge is not enduring.

Again, it may be urged that even in view of the contradiction that is yet to come, the validity of knowledge is sought to be denied. That is to say, a particular cognition may not be sublated at present, but there is a possibility of its being sublated in future. Unless one has a conviction that a certain cognition will never be subject to sublation, the validity of such a cognition remains doubtful. So in view of future sublation validity could be denied in respect of cognition even earlier. For, it is said - That knowledge alone is pramāṇa, which is not contradicted at any time, at any place,

1. बोधस्य बस्थितवाच तद्धोभावाः, न हि नस्तस्य चार्मिणः: पूजवधाय घर्मः

स्थलाशयं हति । – NyB, p. 41; Here it may be noted that according to the Nyāya school, knowledge is itself a quality of soul. So it cannot be a substratum of any quality. However, the genus like rightness or wrongness can certainly, reside in the quality i.e. in knowledge, and it is this that is referred to as 'dharma' (attribute) and knowledge is said to be 'dharma' in respect of it.
by any person and in any condition. In answer to this
Bhāsārvajña retorts that in that case the validity cannot
be said to be ascertained only on the ground that knowledge
is of the nature of consciousness. But that knowledge alone
can be said to be valid, which is characterised by the
absence of contradiction in all the three times, viz. past,
present and future. However it is not possible to ascertain
beforehand whether a certain knowledge would or would not be
contradicted in future. For, even the knowledge which has
been ascertained as valid at present is found to be contradicted
after an interval of time after a fortnight or a month or the like. Hence the contention of the opponent that as per
general rule knowledge being of the nature of consciousness
is valid, while validity of knowledge is set aside by the
knowledge of defect in the cause, etc. is not tenable. In
fact validity and invalidity of knowledge are equally dependent
on some extraneous factor. Besides, it is said by the
Mimāṃsaka "And in a case where there is no such cognition
of discrepancies, there is no reasonable ground for doubt"

1. यस्य देशान्तरे कालान्तरे पुरुषान्तरे अवस्थान्तरे व वाचः नौत्थते ।
   स बावः प्रमाणपुरुष हृदि । - NyB, p. 41;
   "यो हि जनित्वा प्रद्युङ्गते न दृढः एव दृढः हृदि स कृत्तवामित्यः, ।
   अस्मात् कृत्त्वामित्यः । न वै वै कालान्तरे पुरुषान्तरे ।
   अवस्थान्तरे देशान्तरे वा विवेकोऽस्मात्, Smārābhāṣya, p.15, Poona 1929."
(173)

(Gaṅgānātha Jhā). Explaining this Bhatta Umbeka says in his Tatparyatīkā on the Slokavartīkā that when the cognition arises as determining the true nature of a thing and in respect of which there does not arise the sublative cognition or the cognition of any discrepancy in the means of knowledge, a critical thinker should not arise a doubt in the form of 'This might be otherwise'; only because he has been discrepancy elsewhere. That is to say, when doubt does not by itself arise, it should not forcibly be raised only because the discrepancy is seen in a case of two elsewhere. For, it goes against our experience.

1. See दोषशाने त्वनुपन्ने नास्का विष्णितारित्वः।
   Slokavartīkā, 2-60, ed. by Gaṅgānātha Jhā, calcutta 1902;
   Also see: "The second half guards against the following argument: 'as the first conception is set aside by the second, and this by the third; so on and on we might go, and find every conception set aside by the one following it'. The sense of the Kārikā is that it is only the recognition of discrepancies in the means of the conception that sets aside the conception. Hence when we do not come across any such discrepancy we cannot reasonably doubt the correctness of the conception." Foot-note (Gaṅgānātha Jhā), Ibid, p. 30

2. See: यदृ पुनःयद्विद्वितीयं द्वितीयं बालिका न व बालक-प्रत्ययः कार्यादीयाश्च यदृ यदृ बालिका यदृ बालिका यदृ बालिका यदृ बालिका यदृ
   Tatparyatīkā pp.59-60, ed.by S.K.Ramanātha Sāstri, Nairas,
In answer to this Bhawarvajña says that this also does not stand to reason. For, as a matter of fact, validity of knowledge could be subjected to doubt only when the knowledge of defect in the causal apparatus has not arisen. To clarify the point he says further that indeed when the knowledge of defect has arisen, the invalidity of knowledge is just ascertained. There is no question of doubting the validity then for it is ascertained that the knowledge is not valid. Here what Bhasarvajña wants to emphasise is that the validity of knowledge is subjected to doubt only before we have ascertained the presence or absence of some defect in the causes that gave rise to that knowledge; for the invalidity of knowledge is ascertained when we know of the presence of some defect in the causes giving rise to knowledge.

1. दौष्णानेतु उत्पन्ने एव बांशकायाः सम्बन्धः ।
   उत्पन्ने हि दौष्णाने सति ब्राह्मणायनिर्वचयः एव स्याः ।

   NyB, p. 41; the text should be read as
   बांशकायाः सम्बन्धः instead of बांशकायाः सम्बन्धः ।

   See : Photostat, p. 17;

Still here the text even in the MS of the Nyāyabhuṣana seems to be corrupt. It should be -

"दौष्णानेतु उत्पन्ने एव बांशकायाः सम्बन्धः ।
   दौष्णानेतु उत्पन्ने एव बांशकायाः सम्बन्धः ।"
Anyhow, even in the Mimamsaka's view, there is possibility of doubt that the cognition one has may be invalid; though in fact it is valid, here one may ask a question to the Mimamsaka: if doubt be admitted to be arising even in respect of valid knowledge, then how could the Mimamsaka who asserts the self-validity of knowledge, dispel it? The Mimamsaka may reply that doubt that a certain cognition may be invalid can be dispelled by means of ascertaining that the cognition in question has been produced by causes that are not defiled or defective. Against this, Bhasarvajña says that this is not possible, because even that ascertaining that the cognition has been produced by non-defective causes is liable to be doubted, like the first definite cognition (i.e., just as the first cognition, though valid, is regarded as liable to be doubted). Again, the Mimamsaka may argue that even in that case, the ascertaining that the knowledge has been produced by non-defective causes would dispel that doubt. But, Bhasarvajña contends, this is not proper. For, the ascertaining that removes the doubt would also be liable to be doubted like the previous ascertaining. If again it is urged that this doubt also would be dispelled by the next ascertaining of the same nature; then there would certainly arise the fault of infinite series. The Mimamsaka may reply that this fault, of infinite series has been refuted by
Kumarila Bhatta himself. For, it is said -

Thus the rise of not more than three or four successive cognitions is required for the ascertainment of the absence of defect. As soon as the third or the fourth cognition arises, the validity of either the first or the second is proved to be self-evident.

That is to say, if there arises a doubt in regard to the cognition that seems to contradict the first, a third cognition or a fourth one would suffice to dispel the doubt. Hence there is no fault of infinite series; nor need the doctrine of self-validity of knowledge to be given up. In the series of three cognitions, if the third cognition arises

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1. एवं त्रिकुलूप्राणायुक्तमनं नाभिका मति ।
   प्रायोदि ताबदेक्क स्वतःप्राणायुक्तमनं ॥ -
   - Ślokavārtika 2.61;

   Compare: यत्रापि किचिरु वास्तविक्यमेव संय: जायते तत्तवमि
   तृतीयःप्राणायुक्तमात्र न वाचवति, न च स्वतःप्राणायुक्ताहि ।
   यत्र प्राणायुक्तमनं वादि तृतीयामुन्त्पत्ति तत्र प्रथमस्य प्राणायुक्तम्
   बौद्धार्थार्थस्य स्थितमेव, द्वितीयायामुन्त्पत्ति- अवतिक्ष-कालुत्थि
   शङ्काविद्यार्थिणी तु वाच्य तृतीयेन नवति, न तु वाच्य संवादात्म प्राणायुक्तम् ।
   यदि च द्वितीयायामुन्त्पत्ति तृतीयायामुन्त्पति तदा प्रथमस्य प्राणायुक्तम् तत्र च
   परत: इष्टपेय ॥ -

2. 'This is nacre' - first cognition
   'This is silver, not nacre'- Second cognition
   'This is nacre, not silver'- Third cognition
as agreeing with the first, then the validity of the first is automatically established. Here the third cognition enables us to dispel the doubt that may arise in respect of the first because of the second cognition. So it is not true to say that the validity of the first cognition is ascertained by correspondence. Now, if the third cognition arises as being in agreement with the second, then invalidity of the first cognition is ascertained by means of verification and so it becomes extrinsic - which is accepted by the Mīmāṃsāka.

One may ask the Mīmāṃsāka - How are we to know that the rise of not more than three or four cognitions is required? The Mīmāṃsāka may answer that doubt does not arise in all cases. And even rational persons are found to be performing their practical activities without requiring further cognitions to confirm their previous one.

In reply to this Bhāsarvajña says, "When we state this very solution to set aside the charge of infinite series, how is it that it becomes repulsive to you (the Mīmāṃsāka) ?" He says further that by means of that very pramāṇa through which doubt in respect of invalidity of knowledge is dispelled, the validity of the knowledge is as well ascertained: just as by virtue of the same means which removes the doubt as to whether it is a man or a post; the post is positively ascertained as well. Moreover, we do not experience the functioning of two pramāṇas. So it is not true to say that on the doubt being removed by one pramāṇa, the self-validity of
knowledge is ascertained on the strength of its being knowledge. The Mīmāṃsaka may contend that initially the validity of knowledge is ascertained on the strength of its being knowledge; and only the doubt is dispelled by some other means; that is to say, validity is intrinsic, while invalidity of knowledge is extrinsic. But this is not proper, says, Bhāsarvajñā. For 'Bodha' (knowledge) which is initially unqualified (- knowledge is initially known as just knowledge, not as right knowledge or wrong knowledge or the like) cannot properly serve to bring about determination (regarding Validity) -(for invalidity also can be concomitant with bodhatva- which is therefore an inconclusive reason). This is similar to tallness or the like being inconclusive (- being common to a man and a post) and so not helping us to definitely know that it is a man, and not a post or vice versa. And it is obvious that ascertainment of validity cannot be effected without any cause. Moreover the Mīmāṃsaka has accepted that all cognitions whatsoever are supersensuous and so can be known by inference. Now, if cognition in general is itself

1. "निराकारा तु नै बुद्धि: बामार्तां बाह्य: अव्यः...तत्तते तु
बोधाकालक्षणिति "
-Sabarabhaśya, p.32.

See: "The followers of Kumārila argue that if cognition be regarded as perceptible, it has to be viewed as an object which would require another cognition to apprehend it; and so on ad infinitum. So they regard cognitions as imperceptible, though capable of manifesting their objects of cognition"- Indian Philosophy Vol.II, p. 402.
Inferable, how could the validity of a particular cognition be ascertained intrinsically?

The Mīmāṃsaka may urge that pramāṇa or knowledge, though itself remaining unknown manifests an object, so the doctrine of self-validity (Svātāḥ-prāmāṇya) is upheld by the Mīmāṃsaka; otherwise if cognition be admitted as that is initially the object known and then as manifesting the object the fault of infinite series is bound to arise. It is said in the Slokavārtikā -

If it be admitted that though the cognition has arisen, the object of that cognition is not ascertained, until the

1. बातेसरि यदि विज्ञानेन तावन्याधिकवयिति ।
 बाबत्कारणासुसुत्थतं न प्रामाण्यान्तरायत्मु ॥
 तत्र जानत्तरोत्तरः प्रत्येकः कारणान्तरात ॥
 कृष्णदेवि न परिचित्त्वा तावचतुष्पत्समा ॥
 तत्त्वापि कारणो हुहते तज्ज्ञाने स्यातप्रमाणतः ॥
 तत्त्वाभ्यापितीथि च न कविकु व्यवतिष्ठते ॥ -
 - Slokavārtikā 2.49, 50, 51;

See: यदि उत्तप्तमाणि शान्तान्त तावक्त् स्वार्थं नावपार् ये यं अयेन स्वकारणासुमोक्षप्रकाशिःक्षण गुणावधारणः तत्प्रमाणान्तरात न मेकूरु । तदपि प्रमाणान्तरं स्वकारणाच्युतप्रकाशिः सदनुप्रामाणान्तरात् मेकूरु प्रमाणं प्रत्येकातः । तदपि अवधी तत्त्वं अनवस्था । -
- Editor's foot-note (2), Nyāya, p.42.
purity (i.e. non-defectiveness) of the causes giving rise to that cognition is definitely known by some other means of knowledge, then it would lead to the fault of infinite series.

Hence in order to ascertain the purity of the causes that gave rise to the first cognition; the rise of a second cognition would have to be awaited from some other causes; since the purity is as good as a non-entity; until it is itself precisely known by some means of knowledge.

And again the knowledge that ascertains the purity of the causes of the second cognition, could be regarded as valid only when the purity of the causes of that knowledge is definitely known. Thus an endless series of cognitions is bound to follow. As a result, no object could definitely be known by us.

Here the Mīmāṁsaka lays stress on the point that it must be accepted that though the cognition itself remains unknown, it certainly manifests an object. And if one would seek to ascertain the purity of the causes that give rise to the first cognition, before the cognition manifests an object, then the fault of infinite series of cognitions is, as shown above, bound to follow.

1. अथ प्रमाणाः ब्रजालमेव अर्थ प्रकृतिति तैन स्वतःप्रामाणयमुच्यते, 
   बन्ध्यम हि ज्ञातव्य अर्थप्रकृतिप्रमाणोन्मत्वं स्वाभव ॥ ॥ - 
   - NyB, p. 42
Now before we see how Bhāsarvajña refutes the Mīmāṃsaka's view, one point needs to be clarified. According to the Mīmāṃsaka, a pramāṇa or a means of knowledge signifies the action of knower (jñātṛ-vyāpāra) and that action, residing in the knower by the relation of essential identity, is of the nature of consciousness or knowledge. On the other hand, the Naiyāyika holds that a pramāṇa or a means of knowledge signifies sense-organs or the like that are not yet to be accomplished but are already accomplished and that are directly superintended by the agent. Hence owing to the difference in the concepts of pramāṇa, the concepts of pramāṇya also slightly differ; in the Mīmāṃsaka's view, pramāṇya signifies the character of being valid knowledge, while in Bhāsarvajña's view it signifies the character of being a means of right knowledge.

Now, we come back to the topic under discussion. Refuting the Mīmāṃsaka's view Bhāsarvajña says that the stand taken by the Mīmāṃsaka is in no way justifiable. In fact, the Naiyāyikas themselves do not accept that pramāṇa (i.e. Visual-organ etc.) must be ascertained before it manifests its object.

1. अत एव शास्त्रवेयारस्य प्रमाणात्त्वमाहुः। व च शाश्वक्यापारः
    चिन्तृमेः ज्ञातरी तादात्त्वः स्थित्तत्वातः बोधात्मक शक्ति
    – NyB, p. 44.

2. साधारण-अधिष्ठितस्य काॅषयस्य सतः क्ष्यासाधकस्यः।
    – NyB, p. 61
Had they so admitted, the criticism mentioned above would have been meaningful. The Naiyāyika admits that the giving rise to cognition by pramāṇa (a means of knowledge) amounts to the manifestation of object by that pramāṇa. That is to say, the production of cognition by pramāṇa actually implies the manifestation of the object by the same. And it is true to say that cognition arises from pramāṇa (means of valid knowledge) which is just not ascertained. This is true of a pramāṇa (a means of invalid knowledge) also. The cognition arises from a-pramāṇa (a means of invalid knowledge) even while it is not ascertained as such. To wit, even before pramāṇa and a-pramāṇa are definitely known as a means of valid knowledge and as a means of invalid knowledge respectively, they both can give rise to cognitions. This is what the Naiyāyikas have accepted. Even the activity of a person, prompted by desire etc., either to acquire or to get rid of the object known, does not mostly require the ascertainment in the form of discrimination between pramāṇa (a means of valid knowledge) and its semblance. However in certain cases pramāṇa requires to be ascertained as a means of valid knowledge by some extraneous causes. When a rational person who always acts after due thought is stimulated to activity by cognition he may entertain doubt as to whether he would be able to attain the

1. The term should be 'upālambha', not 'Upalambha' (NyB, p. 42).
desired object or not; and such a person would require the ascertainment of pramāṇa as a means of valid knowledge, in order to attain the desired thing infallibly. Therefore the ascertainment of pramāṇa as a means of valid knowledge or the ascertainment of validity of pramāṇa by some extraneous means becomes purposeful.

The Mīmāṃsaka may urge here that when we have some knowledge, we at once take it to be valid without waiting for further scrutiny. This shows that validity is intrinsic in knowledge. But we do not so readily admit invalidity in knowledge. So invalidity should be admitted as extrinsic in knowledge.

Rejecting this view Bhāsarvajña says that this is not justifiable for this is due to some other reason; Validity of pramāṇa requires as well to be ascertained by some extraneous means. Yet because of the deep-rooted impressions of

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1. See: "Every cognition due to one of the recognised modes of knowledge is to be regarded as valid so long as there are not any special reasons for doubt. The invalidity of a conception is never inherent, and is always arrived at by extraneous means." - Indian Philosphy, Vol.II, p. 404. Also See: तस्मात त्वः प्रामाण्याः प्राप्तत् अव्याप्तित्वकरणार्णादेशानाम् ध्याये अपोष्ट दशित वस्त्रयुक्त विकृतस्तुतियम्। - Sastradipika (Pārthasārathi), p. 79, Kashi, Vikramasamvat 1964
our mind generally we at once take any cognition to be valid and because of the absence of such impressions we do not readily admit the invalidity of cognition. But merely on this ground it is not true to say that validity of cognition is intrinsic and invalidity of cognition is extrinsic. For instance, a person who has seen good men in abundance, first arrives at the definite knowledge that men are good; on seeing a man he takes him to be good. But, the person ascertains that a particular person is not good, only when he comes to apprehend some additional cause as the ground to think so. However, a man is just man. His goodness or wickedness is due to different sets of causes and goodness or wickedness can be ascertained by different sets of causes. But because generally we see good men we are apt to take any man we see as a good man. This by no means imply that goodness in man is intrinsic and wickedness in man is extrinsic. Similarly because we find cognitions to be right in abundance, we at once tend to take cognitions as true, for there are deep-rooted impressions of our mind, caused by repeated experience of true knowledge. On the other hand, when we ascertain the falsity of cognition, we require the apprehension of some other factor that leads us to think that the cognition we have is false. In this case the apprehension of some factor is necessary, because there are not deep-rooted impressions of invalid knowledge in our mind. If only on this ground the Mīmāṃsaka has coined the expressions 'svatah-prāmāṇya' and 'paratah-prāmāṇya'; then
simply because of this the doctrine that he seeks to establish cannot be established. Hence the Mīmāṃsaka cannot claim that validity is intrinsic in knowledge and invalidity is extrinsic. Thus the rightness which is to be included and the falsity which is to be kept out can be established by means of pramāṇa. In other words, validity and invalidity of knowledge are ascertained with the help of the means of knowledge. And so only when the apprehension is ascertained as valid, the means that gives rise to such a knowledge can legitimately be called Pramāṇa. So all means of knowledge are not pramāṇa, but only that means which gives rise to right apprehension is entitled to be called pramāṇa. Hence the epithet 'samyak' (right) of anubhava 'apprehension' in the definition of pramāṇa is meaningful.

Now, we shall discuss how the erroneousness of knowledge can be known.

1. सम्भवं तदद्वेष्य अनुभवं-सावध्ये: सव्रापां-अनुभवं: प्रमाणविद्युत्तवाच अनुभवस्य सम्भवं देवति विन्दुनानां सार्थकमिति। NyB, p. 43.
   Compare: प्रमाणस्य समानवार्तियांनि अनुभवनि तें स्वत: देवति विनिन्यानाम हायपु:। - NyB, p. 11
2. सयाच-अनुभव-सावध्यमानः - Nys, NyB, p. 11.
   Compare: दलय वें सयाच-अनुभवम नस्तेतु निःस्तेतु शक्ये। तेन सयाचे हत्येतु दलविदेशियांचैव व्याख्याते -सयाच चालो अनुभवत्वं देवति। - NyB, p.12;
   Also see सस्माच शक्यप्राप्यानं प्रमाणविद्यवाचरणः।
   शक्य प्राप्तिनिमिति स्वतं सर्वभानविक्षु। - Nyavamuktavali (Aparākṛta-deva), p.89
3. ननु च सावध्य प्राप्ताचं कुलं: अस्त्रयेचले। - NyB, p.33.
Objection raised to the effect that there is no ground to ascertain that a particular knowledge is erroneous: As we have seen, in order to exclude asamyak (non-right) knowledge from the sphere of Pramāṇa, the term 'Samyak' is inserted in the definition of pramāṇa as an epithet of 'amuhāva' (apprehension). Hence only that means of knowledge is entitled to be called pramāṇa, which gives rise to right apprehension, while a means which gives rise to erroneous knowledge etc. cannot be called pramāṇa. We have discussed how validity of pramāṇa could be ascertained. Here we shall discuss whether the invalidity or validity of knowledge could be ascertained at all. In this context one may contend that there is nothing which could help us to ascertain that a particular knowledge is erroneous. A question may be raised: By what means are we to ascertain the erroneousness of knowledge? This cannot be known by perception, because in that case, the person having erroneous knowledge would not be prompted to activity, as he would be conscious of its being erroneous. Nor is it proper to say that at the time of the rise of sublation, the erroneous knowledge is apprehended by perception, because then it would have become a thing of
the past. A thing of the past cannot be apprehended by perception by people like us. And universal concomitance (vyāpti) cannot be established between a linga or reason in the form of the rise of sublation or any like mark and such an utterly imperceptible erroneousness. Vyāpti can be formed between smoke and fire because they are both capable of being perceived. And unless the vyāpti be established, inference cannot proceed to bring forth any conclusion. So erroneous knowledge cannot be known even by inference. Moreover, in this case, a vyāpti cannot be formed on the ground of inference which is based upon a general observation. Just as one formulate a vyāpti between effect and agent or the like on the basis of general observation. That is to say, we cannot formulate a vyāpti between the rise of sublation and erroneousness on the ground of inference based on general observation. For, if we formulate a vyāpti everywhere on the ground of inference, then there would arise the fault of infinite series. We seek to establish vyāpti between the rise of sublation and erroneousness

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1. See: The world must have a creator, because it is an effect. That which is an effect has an agent or does, e.g. jar; नेत्र - क्षणपूर्वस्थ सुकृत्य वस्तुतुद्वेग सृष्टिति, तथा व वादित्त्वः, तस्मात् बनित अप्रत्यथः अपि वादित्त्वः क्षणं हति। — NB on NS 1.1.5
so that erroneousness could be known by inference. But the
formulation of that vyāpti is based on another inference.
Again, this inference would require some other vyāpti; and
the formulation of this vyāpti would in turn call for another
inference. Thus there would be no end. Hence also the
apprehension of the non-illusoriness too of knowledge is
ruled out. That is to say, we have no means to ascertain
that a particular cognition is non-erroneous.

Moreover, one may ask - What is the linga or reason to
ascertain that a particular cognition is non-erroneous?

1. Compare: तथावत भावितवारित् फळक्कङ्क्कन्दोमत्तपत्तिनेन,
वाहोप्रभुव भाषागतत्त्वेन, प्रसूतिज्ञामत्त्वेन, वन्यत्वा वा ? ..... १४५
कारणानां बूढ़ता कैन क्षणयते ? न प्रत्ययोण, नयनकुशलादे : कीतित्रि-
यत्त्वम् । नापि नवमानेन सिंहत सिंह तदुच्च तस्य खः खः खः खः खः खः खः खः
वर्णिपति । यदि एवं ध्वनिरास्थत्व दुरुच्छर वर्णीपति । नु एवं वायुत्त्वपत्त्व वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा ।
वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा ।  नु एवं वायुत्त्वपत्त्व वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा ।
वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा ।  नु एवं वायुत्त्वपत्त्व वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा ।
वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा ।  नु एवं वायुत्त्वपत्त्व वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा ।
वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा ।  नु एवं वायुत्त्वपत्त्व वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा ।
वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा ।  नु एवं वायुत्त्वपत्त्व वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा ।
वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा ।  नु एवं वायुत्त्वपत्त्व वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा ।
वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा ।  नु एवं वायुत्त्वपत्त्व वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा ।
वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा ।  नु एवं वायुत्त्वपत्त्व वर्त्त्वमा ।
वर्त्त्वमा वर्त्त्वमा ।  नु एवं वायुत्त्वपत्त्व वर्त्त्वमा ।
वर्त्त्वमा ।  नु एवं वायुत्त्वपत्त्व वर्त्त्वमा ।
वर्त्त्वमा ।

- Tattvopaplavasinha of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa (8th
Century A.D.; See; Introduction p.x), ed. by Pandit
Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Prof. Rasiklal C. Parikh, Baroda
Oriental Institute, 1940
(i) Is the rise of that cognition from non-defective causes the linga?

(ii) Or is the non-rise of sublation in respect of that cognition the linga?

(iii) Or is the capacity of that cognition to prompt a person to activity the linga?

Now, let us examine these alternatives one by one:

(i) The rise of the cognition from non-defective causes cannot be the linga, because we have no means to determine that the causes such as visual organ, unseen principle (adrsta) etc. are non-defective, as they are super-sensuous. And the linga which is itself not established cannot help us to establish any probandum. Unless we definitely know that the causes, viz. visual organ etc. are non-defective, we cannot say that the cognition brought about by these causes is non-erroneous. It is also not true to say that the non-defectiveness of the causes (i.e. eyes etc.) can be ascertained just on the basis of the particular cognition that has arisen from these causes, because it will lead to the fault of mutual dependence. To wit, if a person says that the causes (i.e. eyes etc.) are non-defective inasmuch as the cognition that has arisen from those causes is non-erroneus, then this will lead to the fault of mutual dependence. That is to say, for the ascertainment of the non-erroneousness of cognition
one has to depend on the non-defectiveness of the causes (i.e. eyes etc.), and for the ascertainment of the non-defectiveness of the causes one has to depend upon the non-erroneousness of the cognition. This involves the fault of mutual dependence. (Icetaraśrāya). (ii) The non-rise of sublation in respect of a particular cognition also cannot be the linga that could help us to establish that a particular cognition is non-erroneous; since the non-rise of sublation in respect of a cognition is possible even on account of other causes. As for example, the person who has the cognition may not act in response to that cognition, and due to this also there could be the non-rise of sublation. Or the person may go to some other place or may die without examining his cognition, and because of this also there could be the non-rise of sublation. In short, the non-rise of sublation cannot invariably lead us to ascertain that a cognition is

1. Compare: अन्यत्र व बायाविळहः किं सक्षुर्ग्यापेऽत्रा, बायाविळहः प्रतिपुत्रापेऽत्रा ? तथा सक्षुर्ग्यापेऽत्रा..... (स)वैला: स्मः।

...... अथ प्रतिपुत्रापेऽत्रा बायाविळहः प्रतिपुत्रा: बायाविळहः चितानं नोत्पथ्यते तेन तद ब्युधिस्वरूपः तदन्तृत्तः प्रतिपुत्रा: बायाविळहः अन्तृपथ्यते अयस्मातः यथा नृपस्वरूपः परापदिवमयस्वरूपः महाममे ध्यातिक्षिप्रवेवनस्वरूपः दर्शनात। अथवा तदन्तृत्तः स्वविलिष्ठावतं तथाविलिष्ठावतं स्वविलिष्ठावतं तथाविलिष्ठावतं प्रवेशेत् यथाविलिष्ठावतं नोत्पथ्यते प्रतिपुत्रः तद्वशः अयस्मातः च व वर्त्त्तु मन्न्त्राश्च न।

- Tattvopaplava Simha, p.3, Baroda, 1940
non-erroneous. Moreover, non-rise of sublation in the case of all persons cannot be determined by persons who are not omniscient. Besides, the non-rise of sublation on the part of the knower is inconclusive, - it does not lead to a definite conclusion (that the person who has this cognition is not in the wrong); since even same persons, are found to remain under illusion for a stretch of time (anekakāla), during which the sublation does not arise, and they feel that they have had right knowledge, though in fact they really had wrong knowledge. It happens that after, some lapse of time the controdicting knowledge arises and the knower realises that he was under illusion. So non-rise of the sublation for some time cannot help us to ascertain that a particular cognition to was non-erroneous. Against this, one may argue that the sublation would never arise on the part of a knower in respect of a non-erroneous knowledge. But this is not tenable. For, the persons who are not omniscient cannot know that in respect of a particular cognition there would never arise the sublation. All this shows that even the non-rise of sublation cannot be a linga for ascertaining a cognition as non-erroneous. (iii) Now, let us examine the third alternative. The capacity of knowledge to prompt a man to successful activity also cannot be a linga that could help
us to infer that the knowledge is non-erroneous. And the capacity of knowledge to prompt a person to activity is characterised by the attainment of a desired thing and the avoidance of an undesired one. That capacity of knowledge is not known to us. And the linga or the reason which is itself not established, cannot lead us to any conclusion. And if the capacity of knowledge to stimulate a man to action be known to us, how could one know that the knowledge of that capacity is invariably non-erroneous? The same alternatives which cannot be evaded will present themselves endlessly. Moreover in the case of the objects moon and the like, the non-erroneousness of the knowledge would be established by this efficiency of knowledge, which is characterised by the attainment of the desired thing, etc; since a thing like the moon cannot be reached (—of course, now in the twentieth century the moon also can be reached by astronauts). As Bhāsarvajña says we cannot reach the moon and so would never definitely know that our cognition of the moon is non-erroneous. And even a thing like water which is cognised is not possible to attain; because it is being destroyed at every moment by the wind etc., as well as by aquatic creatures through the movement in water with their
limbs. That is to say, while aquatic creatures like a large fish etc. make movement in the water, the water is struck by this and hence the action of disjunction in the compounds ending with the binary compounds of water starts and water-whole is destroyed. It may be mentioned here that though Bhāsarvajñā has mentioned here the causes of destruction, such as the wind etc; in the case of water and the like, he seems to believe that the body perishes every moment.

1. See: न च उदकाश्चापि प्रयाणात्मक प्राप्तिः समबद्धिः, तत्स्व वाचु-आनिनिः: प्राणिकिर्णेः: च अक्षयस्वरूपत्वादनन्दनेऽपि प्रतिधानं विनाश्यमात्वात । - Nyāy, p. 34;
   Also see: उदकप्राप्त्या पूर्वस्तीवन्दनोदकविज्ञानस्य व्ययिनिषारिता अवस्थाप्यासे; किं तत्प्रतिमातोदकप्राप्त्या, अहोस्कतु, तस्मात्योदकप्राप्त्या, वाइयंजकप्राप्त्या वा? तत्च म प्रतिमातोदकप्राप्त्या; तदः% प्रतिातोदकप्राप्त्या कश्चास्बं नापूर्ति, च लक्षणोपिषुरिक्षाणारुपार्थांत्यविक्षयमथ्या-ः येन प्रत्याढर्तस्तम्मवात । - Tattvopapavāsaṁhā, p. 3

2. See: तस्मात शरीरस्यापि प्रतिधानं विनाशितवातु न हेच्छस्याश्च युक्तम् । - Nyāy, p. 493
   Also see: वैशेषिक: सत्य धृविनाशिका: । ते हि परमाणु-वाचार-दिव-कृत्यस्तित्व-काल-अवत-सरसा: च वाक्याविशेषाध्यायाः । पूर्वविक्षणमपि व नित्यवस्थू अथपूर्व, शैशायां निरन्त्यक्रियास्मृतिं तें अविनाशिका: । - Bhāmati on the Śāṅkarabhāṣya, BS, 2.2.18
Now, it is argued that the attainment of the thing of the same genus can be linga of the rightness of knowledge, to wit, we see water at a distance and reach the water which is not the same as we saw, but it is of the same genus as the water we have seen. And because we can attain water of the same genus, our cognition of water must be right. But this argument is not tenable, says the Tattvopaplavasinha. For, attainment of the thing of the same genus does not necessarily enable us to conclude that our cognition was right. This point, we find, has been elaborated in the Tattvopaplavasinha of Jayarādi Bhatta. There it is said that the genus of water may be present even in the cow or the like. And so even when we reach the cow after perceiving water at a distance, we would have to accept that our cognition of water was right. And as shown in the Tattvopaplavasinha, the absence of wateriness in a cow or the like cannot reasonably be proved. Thus the attainment of the thing of the same genus, being an inconclusive mark for it to be linga of the rightness of knowledge.

1. See: यदि च उदकातीयार्घार्थ्याका बह्यभिचारिता पूर्वार्थितवर्धिनस्य व्यस्थाप्यते; तदा उदकाते: गवादै बाधि वनमव: बहिर्गत्त गवादिप्राप्तया वेयभिचारिता उदकविज्ञानस्य स्थाय। अव उदकत्वस्य गवादै बमाव: बहि चैव; किम् दशरथकाम: , प्राणेण: प्रभृत्तंभावं, बल्मीकियापो वा ? ततु यदि लतरेतुकाम: , तदा उदकातै बाधि समानस्य उदकत्वस्य अमावस्या च। उदकप्रभाव: न उदकत्वस्य, उदकप्रभाव: च नोदक ...।

- Tattvopaplavasinha, pp.4-5; Baroda 1940
cannot serve as linga for the rightness of cognition. Further, one may urge that on seeing a thing, a man is prompted to action and he attains the thing which though not the same he has seen, is are born in the lineage of that thing. Thus the attainment of the thing produced in the lineage (vamsa) of the thing perceived can be the linga for the rightness of cognition. But this is not proper says the Tattvopaplava-vadin. For, in the continuum or lineage that which is the last member (i.e., the last individual water-substance) cannot become generative and so there is no possibility of a thing born in the lineage of that thing. And unless this is proved, we cannot infer that a certain thing is produced in a lineage. The fact that the water I reach is born in the lineage of the water I perceived cannot be proved by any inference. Thus there are a number of faults in the lingas suggested as establishing the non-illusoriness of knowledge. All the possible alternatives in regard to the linga have been refuted. Hence even inference based on a mark cannot help us to ascertain that a particular cognition is non-

1. तद्वस्वार्थप्रकाशित: गमिका छलि केः, न; बन्त्याध्ययनस्वाय क्षणक्षेत्र
tadvārthaprapakṣit: gaminaka churna ke, na; bantaadhyaayanavaya kshnakaetre
तदवेन्द्रासिंवास्र (१ - ) - NyB, p. 34
Compare: स्व द्रव्य स्तु ( क्ष क्रि त) ज्ञानप्रथ्यायत्व अध्ययितायत
swa dvraya styu (kri t) jnanaprayyayatanav adhyayata
तद् युक्तम्, बन्त्याध्ययनप्रचारणम् बन्त्याध्ययनप्रचारणम् ज्ञानक्षेत्रविविधेकारां ।
tadyuktam, bantaadhyaayanapraarchanam, bantaadhyaayanapraarchanam, jnanakshetrawividekaa ।
न च उद्वक्ष्यकलिणां नानात्स्यव बन्धित। -
- Tattvopapavasinha, p. 9
Bhāsarvajña's Answer: Bhāsarvajña answers the arguments of the Tattvopaplavavādin as follows: If the illusoriness etc. of knowledge could not be ascertained at all, then how does the practice prevail in śāstras as well as among people to say - 'It was rightly known by me'; 'it was wrongly known by you. Unless a person had the definite knowledge of the nature of a thing, he could not pass judgments such as: 'Your knowledge of it was wrong, mine was right'. It may be urged here that such a practice is based on the false ascertaining of things. That is to say, a person wrongly ascertains the nature of things and passes such judgments - 'Your knowledge was wrong' etc. But against this, a counter-question may be asked - If even the wrongness of this ascertaining were not known, how could we know that all our practical behaviour is based on wrong ascertaining? Whatever means of knowing this the Tattvopaplavavādin is prepared to name, that itself will determine the illusoriness of knowledge in respect of things, and also the non-illusoriness of knowledge elsewhere, this being the reverse of the former. This being the case, how could one say that we can never ascertain the illusoriness etc. of knowledge in any case?

It may be urged that the Tattvopaplavādin does not wish to point out any pramāṇa (source of valid knowledge) in respect of anything; he is interested only in showing that there is doubt everywhere. In reply to this Bhāsarvajña
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1 says that even doubt arises when both (post and man) have been seen; so like the ascertainment of the thing being a post or a man (elsewhere); there should be accepted the ascertainment somewhere of illusoriness etc. That is to say, at least one should have the awareness of what illusory knowledge is and what non-illusory knowledge is; otherwise even doubt would not be possible. Just as only one who knows what a post is like and what a man is like, can have a doubt as to whether a particular thing is a man or a post. Even the Tattvopapalavadin will have to think out a pramāṇa which could possibly establish such an illusoriness etc. of knowledge. For, all investigators are concerned with the something which is based on well-known sense and behaviour. Moreover, it is not proper even to point out or express doubt without some pramāṇa (proof) for it. The ground on which the doubt is shown is itself a pramāṇa. Then how could it be stated that there is no pramāṇa at all? It may be urged that the Tattvopapalavadin only creates doubt in the mind of the other party by putting forth number of alternatives; he does not hold that it is really doubt and he

1. The text should be read as उम्यथा द्विन सति instead of उम्याधिन सति -

- NyB, p. 34; See: Photostat, p.14
does not put it forth as such. But this is not proper, says Bhāsarvajña. For, unless one definitely knows the efficiency of alternatives to create doubt, one would not take them up while attempting to create doubt. Unless the efficiency of a particular cause is definitely known, indeed it would not be proper to take up that cause for a particular effect. If without definitely knowing the efficiency, one employs a cause; then there would arise the contingency of any cause being taken up for any effect. It may be argued that even though there is doubt in regard to the efficiency of threads etc., to produce cloth, a person is found to be taking up threads etc. for a particular effect (i.e. cloth). But this also cannot be maintained. For, the capacity of threads or the like to bring about a particular effect (cloth etc.) is definitely known. Besides, it is an ascertained fact that an effect like cloth cannot be brought about in the absence of a cause like threads. Therefore, it is but proper that some specific things are selected for the production of particular effects. But the Tattvopaplavavādin does

1. कथा कृतिकविकल्पः परस्य सन्देहः विभवे, न तु प्रदशतः हच्छितः। -
   - NyB, p. 35;
   
   See: न कथा सन्देहः प्रमाणपुप्पण्यायाम्। सम्पाद्यायां तु सन्देहः कृतिकविकल्पपर्याप्ते परिभाषा हृद्दति। -
   - Nyāyamuktāvalī (Aparārkaśe), p. 67
   
   Also See: यथ दिस्य सन्देहः प्रतिज्ञा स्वाभूमि में तत एव मोक्षदोषः।
   नास्ति व दिस्य प्रतिज्ञा तत्स्पर्खविक्ष्मा में दौष्टः। -
   - Vighrakavyāvartanī, p. 29
not recognise knowledge of the nature of ascertainment in any case, so there would be the contingency that in his case no activity would be possible or the activity would be just haphazard (—taking up sand, etc. for producing oil and so on). Hence he must point out some pramāṇa somewhere, at least to ward off the criticism that he himself is taking irrelevantly. And pramāṇa could not be said to be 'non-ascertained', and its ascertainment is not possible in the absence of the ascertainment of the distinction between illusoriness and non-illusoriness, so there is certainly the ascertainment of illusoriness, etc.

Here the Tattvopaplavavādin may ask—What is that pramāṇa on the basis of which this ascertainment of illusoriness etc. could be made? The reply is that this is the very point that both (the Naiyāyika and the Tattvopaplavavādin) should consider together. Here immediately after the rise of knowledge, it is nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa (non-determinate perception) that should be accepted as cognising or grasping the knowledge qualified by erroneousness, etc; otherwise the usage 'This knowledge is erroneous; this is non-erroneous' would be baseless. Bhāsarvajña seems to hold that the knowledge of erroneousness or of non-erroneousness is grasped by the nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa, otherwise the usage—'My knowledge of water is non-erroneous or it is erroneous'
would be baseless. Thus such a usage has its root right in the nirvikalpa pratyakṣa. Here one may contend that if the knowledge of erroneousness is grasped by the nirvikalpa pratyakṣa the person who wrongly perceives an object would not engage himself in activity inasmuch as he is conscious of the erroneousness of his knowledge. But this would not happen, says Bhāsarvajña. The person would certainly do the activity, as he does not become distinctly conscious of the erroneousness of his knowledge, just as a man who is running fast does not become distinctly conscious of the thorns that are lying on the way side (though he has known them indistinctly in his nirvikalpa pratyakṣa). That is to say, the grasping of erroneousness remains non-manifest in the nirvikalpa pratyakṣa and so even the person who has wrongly perceived an object engages himself in activity. Indeed it is distinct or manifested knowledge whether it be of the nature of memory (smarana) or apprehension (anubhava) that is seen to be instrumental in making us desist from a thing that is undesirable. Even though the knowledge be not distinct (vyakta) at the time of apprehension, the memory arising from such a knowledge may be distinct due to some specific instrumental factor. As for example, there is the indistinct apprehension of the nature of gotga (cowness) as persisting in some and absent in others, when we apprehend
the first individual cow. Then this indistinct apprehension results in distinct memory because of the perception of individuals belonging to the same genus and others belonging to different genera this memory being of the form 'I have seen something like this;' 'Something different from this has been seen by me', 'This is its similarity', 'This is its difference in character'. Thus after the nondistinct apprehension of erroneousness or non-erroneousness (of cognition), there arises distinct memory by virtue of the knowledge which sublates this or conforms with this. This distinct memory is of the form - 'That knowledge was wrong' or 'It was right'. That is to say, the erroneousness or non-erroneousness of knowledge, though indistinctly apprehended, cannot be determined until we have the knowledge that sublates our previous knowledge or conforms with it. Here Bhāsarvajña gives an alternative explanation. He says that just immediately after the rise of sublating or conforming knowledge, the erroneousness or non-erroneousness would become perceptual. Against this, it may be argued that it is not proper to say that the erroneousness or non-erroneousness is perceived after the

1. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika accepts jati (genus) as a distinct entity, so it should be known in its thoroughness in nirvikalpa pratyakṣa, though not manifestingly so.
rise of the sublatimg or conforming knowledge, because it would then be a thing of the past and hence it could not be the object of perception. But this is not proper, says Bhasarvajña. For, the mind can perceive objects relating to all the three times, past, present and future. Otherwise it would not be possible for a yogin to apprehend things of the past and of the future. It may be urged that this could be explained in the case of a yogin who can perceive things of the past etc. on the strength of his dharma (merit) produced by his yoga. But this is not likely to happen in the case of an ordinary person. Against this, Bhasarvajña asks—Is it not justifiably possible even in the case of persons like us to perceive some things of the past on the strength of adṛṣṭa, acquired previously, accompanied by some specific instrumental cause?—For, the power of adṛṣṭa can be inferred from the effect it brings forth.

1. See: "Even we ourselves may at some time have the notions of future events which come to be true, e.g. sometimes I may have the intuition that "To-morrow my brother will come", and this may happen to be true. This is called pratibhānajñāna, which is also to be regarded as a pratyakṣa directly by the mind." A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, pp. 342-43
Then Bhasarvajña gives a third alternative explanation for the ascertainment of erroneousness, etc. of knowledge. He says that the erroneousness of knowledge can be ascertained only by means of inference from the rise of sublating knowledge. Against this a question may be raised - By what means does one ascertain the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between the rise of sublating knowledge and erroneousness? The answer is that the invariable concomitance can be ascertained by another inference. On the strength of the fact that in certain cases the association between two things is observed, it is inferred that the same association would persist elsewhere also. Thus in fact vyāpti depends on inference. It may be urged that again this inference would in turn require another vyāpti, and that too another inference. And this would involve the fault of infinite series. In answer to this Bhasarvajña boldly asserts that there is nothing wrong, even though the alleged fault of infinite series be there. On the contrary it is welcome, since the samsāra (metempsychosis) is itself beginningless. Hence first the remembrance of vyāpti would

1. See: (i) एव प्रार्थनात्व-प्रार्थनात्वाद्यः: वस्त्र-प्रगाहिताः-प्राप्तिः बायकाङ्क्यवादकानान- निर्मिताः स्पष्टा स्त्रूति: भवति-निर्मिता सत्यम् का ज्ञान वदिःNyB, p.35; (ii) कथवा बायकाङ्क्यवादकानात्यंत्यं तथ्य: प्रत्ययात्तथ: NyB, p.35; (iii) कथवा बायकाङ्क्यवादकानात्यंत्यं तथ्य: प्रत्ययात्तथ: NyB, p.36; the text should be 'कथवा' and not 'कथवा'; photostat p. 15 (NyB, p.36, line 1)

2. This can be shown in the syllogistic form as follows: एव ज्ञात्व ज्ञात्वाः बायकाङ्क्यवाद यत्र बायकाङ्क्यस्य तत्र प्रार्थनात्वाः यथा(श्रीश्लाकायोः) रजस्याने बायकाङ्क्यां तद्धूर्त ज्ञात्वाः प्रार्थनात्वाः
arise from the impressions of another (previous) birth, accompanied by adṛṣṭa, just as a newly-born child remembers his meal. (The soul must be regarded as eternal because of the desire for milk from the mother's breast, which is evidenced on birth after death, and which can only be due to repeated feeding in the past). The opponent may contend here that even though the vyāpti is admitted to be this remembered, it would be exhausted since it would be necessary to establish a series of instances for the series of vyāptis. Consequently the inference based on such a weak vyāpti would not be capable of proving what is to be proved. But this contention cannot be maintained. For, the instance should be taken as already established earlier and hence it is not necessary to establish the instance at the time of the inference. Indeed no one has to know the relation between smoke and fire in places like kitchen (which serve as illustrations) at the time when fire is being inferred from smoke. It is true that at the time of inference instance is necessarily to be established keeping in view the other party. But if the opponent refuses to accept it at any stage and differs in all cases then the ascertainment of illusoriness or non-illusoriness would not be possible for him; as this ascertainment is based on the illustration. And in the absence of ascertainment expressions like 'erroneous knowledge' 'non-erroneous knowledge' which

1. See: प्रत्ययार्थायांकर्ता सत्वाभिलिङ्गात् । — NS 3.1.21
are well-known in daily life as also in the śāstras would no longer be possible - which is absurd. For one who denies even the cognition of the invariable concomitance between fire and smoke and the like stands refuted just by virtue of his contradicting worldly behaviour and usage; and not in any other way ( - no other argument is necessary). The fact of his contradicting worldly behaviour and usage is present in this case also ( when he denies the vyāpti - ' wherever there is sublation of knowledge, there is erroneousness'). So it has to be accepted that some illustration at some stage would be familiar and acceptable to the other party and on the strength of it another illustration also would be established.

Giving an alternative suggestion for the ascertainment of the vyāpti (concomitance) between the sublation of cognition and the erroneousness of the same, Bhaśarvajña says that the said vyāpti is first communicated to some persons who are not omniscient by someone who is able to visualise everything by perception. Thus from the instruction imparted by such a reliable person, ordinary men come to know the vyāpti that the knowledge which is sublated is illusory, and the knowledge which has another knowledge agreeing with it is non-illusory. Then in succession these men instruct other about the vyāpti and these again in turn do the same and so on and on. Thus by succession it reached persons like us. From the view-point of the reliability of vyāpti that has successively reached us,
the said vyāpti can be compared with the dhatādi-vyāpti that is divine in character. This dhatādi-vyāpti is related to an ordeal by the scale of a balance which according to Dharmasāstraśtras indicates the purity (innocence) or the impurity (guilt) of a man. The person, accused of some crime has to mount a scale and if it goes down on that side, then the person is declared to be guilty; otherwise he is declared to be innocent. In this case, the vyāpti between innocence and the rising of the scale must have been ascertained by some great sage. Then by line of tradition it came to be known to us and it is considered to be acceptable to all. The ascertainment of the vyāpti even between the effect and the cause by means of perception and inference should be justified by this very argument. Thus according to Bhāsarvajña, (i) the erroneousness or the like of cognition is grasped by nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa, though it may be indistinctly grasped, and then due to the presence of some

1. See: बटादधिव्याप्तिः - कर्मार्थाणु विपिनं पुनार शुद्धलघुवर्म- त्वसा सार्वकर्म: तुलाधिशृणाः। पुरुष मात्रिकेति हुलाकस्तके अवतै अशुद्ध: पुपाः अन्यष्टा शुद्धः। तत्र शुद्धत्वोननमवदे: व्याप्ति: कैन गृहीता हर्षिन्यूत्स्वेदवृषसे - अद्भूत वनपत्तिनात वर्षणम्- रैयेण गृहीतव्याप्तिकेन बयो श्राहिता:। तरापि बयो तारापि बयो ।
तादृशः कम: वाक्याधिकः हर्षि समासश्च।।

- Editor's Foot-Note(5), NyB, p.86
efficient cause, the non-manifest cognition of erroneousness or the like becomes manifest; or (ii) the erroneousness etc. of knowledge should be regarded as being perceived after the non-agreement etc. of the cognition with practical experience. Or (iii) the erroneousness of knowledge can be ascertained by inference, and the vyāpti that serves as the basis of this inference is ascertained either through the series of inference and vyāpti or through a reliable tradition. Like the vyāpti between the sublation of cognition and its erroneousness, the vyāpti between the cause and the effect also can be ascertained on the same ground.

Moreover the statement of the opponent that the fact of the knowledge having been generated by a non-defective causal complex, cannot become the liṅga of its non-erroneousness - is certainly acceptable to the Naiyāyika also. However the Naiyāyikas admit that sometimes the non-rise of sublatory cognition can certainly be the liṅga (probans) of the non-erroneousness of knowledge. That is to say, if a cognition is not sublated later on, then it is non-erroneous. In certain cases, the

1. See: तत्र शायायान्त्याः विनिक्षिप्तं प्रत्यक्षम् प्रान्तत्वाविविषष्ठेः
   शायाहथम् बयुपक्ष्यत्तयम्।।
   अथवा वाक्ष्यावधकशायात्वत्तन्त्याम्येव
   तत्त्व: प्रत्यक्षत्वम्।।
   अथ वा वाक्ष्यावधकशायामाध्यमवः प्रान्तत्वादि
   निर्हीतते।।

- NyB, pp. 35-36
non-rise of the sublatory cognition is the only linga to ascertain that the knowledge is non-erroneous. It is likely to happen in some cases that the non-rise of sublatory knowledge cannot be explained even by expert logicians in any way unless they accept that the object that is manifested in the cognition is not the reverse of it. That is to say, the object that is manifested in knowledge is really as it is apprehended. This alone can explain the non-rise of the sublatory knowledge. For example, a person who is circumstanced by a particular time, place, condition etc. perceives that the moon is only one. In whatever place, etc. he is, he sees one moon. In respect of such a perception it is ordinarily not possible to reach the moon and to enquire as to whether it is really one. But the perception of one moon is never contradicted by any contrary perception. Hence this non-rise of contradictory perception is the only linga to ascertain that the perception of one moon is non-erroneous.

Moreover, the argument of the Tattvopaplavavādīn, was that the erroneous knowledge arises by virtue of the force of its causes in such a way as to prevent the rise of the sublatory knowledge and its destruction also is such (that is to say, the sublatory cognition cannot arise even after the erroneous cognition ceases to exist), just as in the case of true knowledge accepted by the Naiyāyikas. What is meant by him is that if the non-rise of the sublatory cognition is accepted as the linga of the non-erroneousness, then there would arise the contingency of erroneous knowledge being
non-erroneous; for even the erroneous knowledge may arise in such a manner that it does not allow the sublatory cognition to arise. Thus the non-rise of the sublatory knowledge is possible even in the case of erroneous knowledge. Hence the non-rise of sublatory knowledge cannot be the linga of non-erroneousness alone. The true knowledge accepted by the Naiyāyikas arises in such a manner that it does not allow the sublatory cognition to arise. This is true of erroneous knowledge also. Hence the non-rise of sublatory cognition is common to both, true knowledge as also false knowledge. Hence it cannot be the linga of non-erroneousness. This argument of the Tattvopaplavādin also is not proper, says Bhāsarvajña. As a matter of fact, the Naiyāyika does not accept that true knowledge arises in such a manner as to prevent the sublatory cognition from arising. According to the Naiyāyika that is true knowledge, in which the object is manifest as it really is; or in the case of which the sublatory cognition does not arise. In fact, no rise whatsoever, accomplished or non-accomplished, could be prevented by anything. For one has already existence, and the other is not there at all. It is the cause that can be obstructed. If a cause, inspite of all the auxiliary causes being present, does not bring about the effect due to the presence of 'something' and brings about the effect in the absence of that 'something', it
can be said to be obstructed by that 'something'. As for example, gravity or heaviness (gurutva) is the cause of the falling down of an object. But when the object is conjoined with something, the gravity of the object cannot bring about the fall. Hence in this case, the cause, heaviness or the like is obstructed by conjunction or the like. But in the case of the rise of sublatory cognition, what is it that is obstructed? And by what is it obstructed? That is to say, there is nothing that could obstruct the rise of the sublatory cognition.

Moreover, it is also not true to say that if a certain thing obstructs a cause in bringing about the effect then its destruction also is obstructive of the same. In the above example, the conjunction of the heavy thing with something can obstruct the functioning of gravity, but the destruction of conjunction cannot become obstructive of the same; on the contrary it serves as an accessory to gravity or heaviness (gurutva) in bringing about the effect of falling down. Therefore it is not proper to say that the destruction of erroneous cognition also becomes obstructive of the sublatory cognition. Besides, the usage of 'sublatory cognition' and 'sublated cognition' is well established in the sūtras as well as among the people. For example, the knowledge - "This
is nacre, and not silver is considered to be sublative of the knowledge - 'This is silver' which arose previously.

The method of refutation adopted by the Tattvopaplavavādin by putting forth a number of alternatives - whether the object of the knowledge i.e. silver is sublated or the knowledge - 'This is silver' is sublated and so on, imposes the absurdity involved in the Gomaya-Pāyasīmyāya.

1. The text should be read as 'शुचिका श्यन रजतम्' instead of 'शुचिका श्यन रजतम्'.

   - Photostat p. 15

2. Colonel G. A. Jacob notes - "The maxim of cowdung and milk. Some stupid person is supposed to argue that cowdung is identical with milk, because it comes from the cow; hence it is used to denote an utterly absurd argument or statement. It occurs in Vyāsa's bhashya on Yogasūtra 1-32. He says - कालिन समाधीयमाणि अपि लतागौमयास्तीन्यायामाणिपति।। ' On which the yogavārtika remarks - गौमय पायसं ग्यात्वातु इत्यादिन्यायमाणां समाधीयमाणि अपि बाचिपति तिरस्करोति।।'

   - Laukikamāyaṁṛti - A Handful of Popular Maxium, Bombay, 1900.
(gomayam pāyasam gavyatvāt, the right knowledge is wrong knowledge; because both arise from a common source - the sense-organ etc.). The absurdity implied in the above criticism which repudiates even sublation (bādha) far surpasses the absurdity of the maxim of the cow-dung as a milky production.  

Moreover, even the scrutiny, viz. 'Is this sublation of knowledge of the nature of deprival of the object, or of the nature of deprival of the fruit? and so on' - is not useful anywhere. It is only the putting forth of the vyāpti, viz. 'Whatever knowledge is sublated is erroneous knowledge and whatever knowledge is not sublated is true knowledge, that is useful. Thus the non-erroneousness of knowledge can be sometimes ascertained by the linga in the form of the non-rise of sublatory cognition; whereas on other occasions it is ascertained by the power of that knowledge to prompt us to successful activity. For example, the knowledge of water that arose previously can be ascertained as non-erroneous on the strength of the attainment of object, viz. water ( - the knowledge that leads to successful activity is non-erroneous).

The opponent may argue that he has already said that the object which was manifested in perceptual knowledge can never

1. See: कत्चित्त समाजीयानांत्य लादू गौर्यपालानी न्यायम् वर्णितां।
   - Vyāsabhāsyā on Yogasūtra 1-32;
   Also see: स: कृं गोम्य्य वार्ता वाचिकृत्य प्रद्वे म
   न्याय: - "गौर्या पाषसं बचल्लान उपवस्थिताप्रवसत"।
   इति तक्तानिधि - न्यायवादस्तै तत: क्षतिकत्वाबू हीति।
   -Tattvavāsāradā (Vacaapatiśrī), Yogadarsana, p.95, Benares, 1935;
   Also see: तत्त्वायापेताथ्याय: कपेदः ज्ञातः अशकः धरणम् न्यायः आमाचीमृत इत्यथा।
   -Yogavartika Ibid, p. 95
   2. See: बाणाहुस्परिवृत: तु गंभिरा क्वतिः हस्ता रव। - NyB, p.36
be attained as things are evanescent. The answer is that the argument is not tenable. For, it is possible to attain certain things like stone etc. that are manifested in the cognition. On the other hand, though objects like water etc. are perishable, entities of the same continuum - the things of the same continuum (santāna) coming one after another can be attained. And such an attainment can be the linga of the non-erroneousness of knowledge. But what is meant by this continuum (santāna)? It signifies an uninterrupted production of similar things - a continuous successive production of objects similar to the previous ones that keep on perishing. This Santāna is the cause of worldly non-discrepant knowledge, 'This is the very same thing'. We, from the empirical point of view, regard it as the very same water that was cognised and this passes off as true knowledge as far as all practical behaviour is concerned. Now even this is due to the fact that this is the continuum in which one similar entity succeeds another and it is this continuum that is the cause of this worldly non-discrepant knowledge. Besides, the person who employs himself to attain the object that he ascertained by illusion, does not obtain even an entity produced in that continuum (santāna) in accordance with his perception - not to talk of the attainment of that self-same object. Therefore we can say that the non-erroneousness of the previous knowledge can be ascertained by the attainment of the object that
is perceived or by the attainment of an entity occurring in that very continuum. Before we proceed further we may clarify in what sense the Nyāya school could accept the concept of santāna (continuum), because it would not accept the Buddhist concept of momentariness and consequently santāna.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, the atoms of the Earth, water, Light and Air, and the substance of Ākāśa, Dik, Kāla, Atman and Manas; Śāmaya Viseṣa Samavaya as also the gunas in the eternal substance are eternal. The rest are

1. See: अपाक्रष्ठ-स्य-गत्व-स्य-परिमाण-स्फूर्तकृत्वांशिष्टिकृतवत्व-
गुरूत्व-स्तेषानं यावज्ज्वल्मात्वित्वम् | शेषाणां ब्र्यायद्र्यमात्वित्वं
(- सति एव बात्त्वे सत्यम्पूर्व हृत्यथ: - न्यायकल्ली - ) च हति। -

- Prāṣastapādabhāṣya with Nyāyakandalī
(Durgadhara Jha) p. 249, Varanasi, 1963;
Also See: ते ति परमाणु-वाकाणू-विवक-कालत्यमकादः च वामान्य-
विशेषसमपाताः च गुणानां च कृत्विविध मात्वित्वाः अभ्यषाला|
शेषाणां मात्बुष्यमात्वित्वम् उपयन्ति। -

- Bhāmāti on BS 2-2-13;
Also See: बैसेष्ठः देहादेह: विनासायत्वमाने बाकिता:।
तन्नैत्तिक तन्यात्मके ये: न यप्तम् तन्नैत्तिक प्रकृतिस्य न
अपेक्षितवम्। -

- Anandagiri (BS. 2-2-13)
non-eternal. However, it should be borne in mind that the durability of the non-eternal things varies from a long period to the period of only three moments. The non-eternal Earth is more durable than the non-eternal water-wholes. etc.

In them much durability is not possible for as soon as they clash with something having tangibility and momentum, the water-wholes are shattered. The gunas, e. g. sābda (the specific guna of ākāsa), jñāna (the specific guna of ātman) last only for three moments (of utpatti, sthiti and pralaya).

1. See: सत (पृथ्वी) तु द्विक्षित नित्य न बनित्य व च परमाणु-
लच्छ नित्य न कालस्तु तु बनित्य । सत च स्थैयोदिकयययय-
सन्न्यासविशिष्टखोपठवृहद्विवेचलितत्वकारकरूपीः ।
- Prasāstapadabhāṣya with Kiranāvalī (J.S. Jātly), pp. 34-35, Baroda, 1971;
Also See: स्थैये स्थिता निरक्षालक्षणप्रज्ञात् यद्य वाक्य स्थैयोदिकयनि
व बलवन्धनेनिशवाहवः ते: निरूपणः । न हि खल्द द्वयन्तरो संम्बन्धः
ज्ञानान्य विशेषज्ञः स्वभावक-अगुरुद्धव-उपर्युक्तावः
- Kiranāvalī (Ibid), p. 37

2. यथा चिदाद: वाकालक्ष्य चारणको निरूपं गुण: कृपः
व च वाकश्रीन्द्रादेयो द्विपूर्वश्च विकारान्तरुपयां तृतीयायणो विनिर्मयति...।।
विमुद्यास्य जीवाल्कम: चारणक: स्मार्य: चिरोश्चरणम: वपि सवः।।
- Darsanānākura (Sarvādarsānasamgraha),
Vāsudeva Śāstrī Abhyankar, p. 223
BORI, Poona, 1951
Except these, the other non-eternal things are destroyed only when there is some specific cause for their destruction.

To return to our point one can further argue against the Tattvopaplavādādīn that the knowledge which enables us to attain the water existing in the particular place and at the particular time where and when the water is perceived, is non-erroneous; whereas the knowledge that cannot help us to attain the water where and when it is perceived, is erroneous. Refuting this argument the Tattvopaplavādādīn may say that if this is admitted, then the knowledge produced by a thing that is about to perish should be regarded as vyabhicarin (discrepant or erroneous) because the knowledge will not enable the knower to reach the object which will perish immediately. And the knowledge of the moon, sun, planets, constellations, stars etc. would have to be regarded as erroneous, as the knower will never be able to reach them.

1. See: न च यदृ यस्य उत्तप्पिक्षये विनाशकारः च वनच्य-व्यविचारायुर अवाप्तं तयाः। भावेव तस्य उत्तप्पिक्षारकत्वद्युक्तं ।
   - Nyāyakanda p.186
   Also See: न मायक्ष्य चापा शास्त्राचेतन पश्चायुक्तिं तदपवस्य हेतवन्तराद्वेद- पैशाच्य भावान्त्यन्यनमावाय्य तथा च दुःस्य ग्रंथीयश उपन्यस्य चित्तेन न विनाशः मुद्गरामित्वात् ।
   - Ibid. p.190

2. See: यदृ यस्य तदैवत्स्राक्षालं पुरुषं न प्राप्यति निष्प्रावजातापि, समवज्ञानं तु तदुद्देशक्षालं प्राप्यति तेन तदेव विचारिः चति चेतु ।
   - Tattvopaplavasinha p.3

3. See: यदृ यस्य न प्राप्यति तदृ व्यविचारी तहि मुद्गरायद्वेदयो विचारिः च च च भावान्त्यन्यनमावायाः च व्यविचारिः प्राप्यति।
   - Ibid, p.4
Further he says that it is also not true to say that the knowledge enables us to attain the water at the very time and place when and where it is perceived; because even the place is perishable like water. Keeping in mind this argument of the Tattvopaplavādin Bhāsarvajñā says that like the issue of the time-factor, the point raised by the opponent in regard to the place should be taken as explained by the same argument based on the fact of the continuum of similar things.

It may be asked as to how one could ascertain that the water which is attained is produced in the continuum of the original water, when the original water remains itself unascertained. The answer to this is that this contention is not tenable. For, the water which is attained can be ascertained as produced in the continuum of the water that is perceived, on the strength of the non-incoherence (avisamatvādā). The knower having employed himself to attain the object he perceived, determines - 'This is the very same thing that I perceived.' Then he communicates this confirmed knowledge to a number of people. Yet no one contradicts him. But if the object that is manifested in cognition were not there, or were not there as it was perceived, it would not

1. See: न च तदविद्याकारसङ्गोद्वोक्प्राप्ति परस्परप्रकृतिः, देश्यापि उदककवः
   Tattvopaplavāśīka, विनाशकर्मवाद् । - p. 4
have happened that no one should contradict him. Thus it is ascertained on the strength of non-incoherence that the object is really so as it is perceived.

On the other hand, a person, though he may not indulge in activity, apprehends certain distinctive characteristics of the object that is manifested in the cognition and he remaining in the same place where he stands determines the object as being such on the ground of distinctive features that he marked and thus the person knows the non-erroneousness of the knowledge. For example, a man perceives a cow and then determines on the strength of the perception of the dew-lap etc. that it is certainly such, as it is perceived and thus the man knows that his previous perception of the cow was non-erroneous. Or the non-erroneousness of knowledge can be ascertained by its agreement with the statement of other men. The opponent had argued that the non-erroneousness of objects like the moon etc. could not be established in this manner. Bhāsarvajñā's answer to this is that it is not claimed by the Naiyāyika that the non-erroneousness of knowledge could be ascertained by the capacity of knowledge to lead to successful activity, alone. Just like the knowledge of fire from smoke, the non-erroneousness of knowledge, also can be inferred from various alternative lingas and it can be known by some other pramaṇa.
However, others are of the opinion that by the term 'pravṛtti-sāmarthya' is meant here the agreement (sāṃvāda) of the knowledge acquired through a certain pramāṇa with that acquired through other pramāṇas. And such an agreement in respect of the object that is manifested, irrespective of whether the object has perished or not can be said to be there because of the apprehension of some distinctive features of the object or because of the corresponding a statement of a number of esteemed persons. As for example, we infer the presence of fire from the perception of smoke. Then in order to ascertain whether our knowledge of fire acquired through inference agrees with the knowledge of fire by perception we reach the place of fire and perceive it. Or if some esteemed person says that our inferential knowledge of fire is non-erroneous, then also there occurs the agreement of our inferential knowledge of fire with the knowledge attained through verbal testimony. Therefore, there is nothing wrong if one says that in all cases without exception, in regard to the object of doubt, the ascertainment of non-discrepancy (i.e. of the truth of knowledge) is done through pravṛtti-sāmarthya. Thus, everywhere in the event of there being doubt one should try to establish the validity or truth of knowledge by virtue of itsa agreement with the knowledge attained through another pramāṇa.
The opponent had urged that the capacity of knowledge to lead to successful activity cannot be the linga of the non-erroneousness of knowledge. Unless the capacity of the knowledge to lead to successful activity is known, how could it be the linga? If it is known, then how could it be said that that knowledge is non-erroneous? This would go on endlessly and involve the fault of infinite series. This argument also is not tenable, says Bhāsarvajña. For the alleged fault of infinite series is contradicted by worldly usage and practical behaviour that are based on definite knowledge. If the knowledge were by no means ascertained, as true, then the popular usage and practical behaviour that depend on ascertainment would never have taken place. For, by the second or the third apprehension of some distinctive feature of the object, the persons who communicate their knowledge to others or who act according to their knowledge are found to be devoid of any expectancy in respect of further proof (= perception of distinctive features). That is to say, they are convinced of the validity of their knowledge. Or

1. See: नापि प्रत्यक्षानुमानम्, प्रत्यक्षानुमानम् हि वर्णात्मि-वर्णपरिहार-लक्षणात्, तत्किं अनकातं कथं तथेष्ठं गमनं मन्त्रत? वर्णात्मम् तत्किं तदोऽस्य अव्यभिचारितं कथकलम्।

- NyB, p. 34
the argument of anavasthā has already been refuted. Hence on account of the fear of the fault of infinite series, the view that the validity of knowledge is intrinsic also need not be accepted. We have already discussed that according to the Nyāya, both validity and invalidity of knowledge can be known by some extraneous means and hence are extrinsic.

1. See : NyB p. 36;
Also See: यदि प्रमाणार्थकार्यां प्रवृत्तिकार्यां जितना साधनाः, यदि वा अवस्था प्रवृत्तिकार्यां परमार्थकार्यां: क्षणिकानिष्ठाः, किं वृत्तक्या वा परसंचार 
क्षति वाच्यम: ।।।। तत्क्षण वृत्तक्या । कस्मार्थ ? किं भिन्नतिवाच्य ।।।।
आदिकाल व संसारे रण दोषः ।। - NV, MCG p. 7

Also read : "Uddyotakara urges that this question of the relative priority of activity and knowledge is meaningless in view of the beginninglessness of the world. Besides, knowledge of the object, and not of the validity of knowledge, is necessary for action....The Naiyāyika admits that there are cases where complete verification is not possible.... He that will act only when he can fully comprehend, must have either a very long head or a very short life." - Indian Philosophy, Vol.II, p.129

2. See: प्रमाणावलीप्रमाणावली रत्नः सांख्यः समाधिलिङ्गः ।
न्यायिकारस्त तथा: लोकस्वरूपम स्वतः ।।
प्रयथ्य परस्त्रां प्राप्त जनानं बाध्यादिति: ।
प्रमाणतः रत्नः प्राप्त: परस्स्वप्रमाणान्वति ।। -
Quoted in the Sarvadarsānasamgraha p.557
(Jaimini-dars'ana), Varanasi 1964

Cont...foot note page222
We can summarise this view as follows: (i) According to the Nyāya school of thought the validity or invalidity of cognition is brought about and known by extraneous conditions; (ii) according to the Pūrva-māṁśa school the knowledge of validity is intrinsic and of invalidity extrinsic; (iii) the Sāmkhya school does not specifically discuss the problem of validity or invalidity of cognition, but from a consideration of its theory of everything being inherent in the cause, it can be classified under intrinsic validity and intrinsic invalidity; (iv) the Buddhist accepts the intrinsic invalidity and the extrinsic validity of all knowledge; but according to kamalasāla the Buddhist does not accept any of the four alternatives pertaining to prāmaṇya, viz. both prāmaṇya and aprāmaṇya are intrinsic or extrinsic, or prāmaṇya is intrinsic and aprāmaṇya extrinsic, or prāmaṇya is extrinsic and aprāmaṇya intrinsic; there is a fifth alternative, viz. both are at times intrinsic and at others extrinsic; (v) in the Jaina view, Prāmaṇya or aprāmaṇya is produced due to extraneous conditions, but is known intrinsically or extrinsically.

2. cont...foot note (See page 221)

Also See: प्रमा बाविपीरीलौपलिहिंग अल्त: बाविपीरीतानुमवनस्वलेभाव्यब्याप्तिविरहितक्रिययस्य प्रामाण्यम स्वल्यथः । .... विशालस्य प्रमाणः ।