CHAPTER - III

Bhāsarvajñā's Introductory Remarks.

Maṅgala Verse In The Nyāyasāra: In the maṅgala verse of the Nyāyasāra Bhāsarvajñā bows down to Sambhu, the great lord of the world, who spontaneously knows the true nature of all the entities. He says that he proposes to describe in the Nyāyasāra the definitions of Pramāṇa (a means of right knowledge), of its varieties (Pratyakṣa etc.) as well as the definitions of categories other than Pramāṇa, viz. Prameya, Samsāya etc. in order to impart instruction to the beginners.

In the maṅgala verse of the Nyāyabhūṣana also, having first bowed down to Lord Śiva, the bestower of eternal bliss

1. प्रणामं समुद्भु जाते पति परं समस्ततत्त्वाधििविवं स्माकलं शिष्यमोहच्यः क्षातिस्वरूपेऽप्रमाणाविकतवद्वलचाभाय || न्यायसार, न्यायमू००१

2. उपाधिपरं सर्वत्रस्तरं सवं प्रणामं विनवारादसिद्धं परसं || गुलज्ञ सवंतं बुद्ध मोहासिद्धवे प्रवचयते न्यायस्वादसिद्धं: ||- NyB, p.1

Compare - प्रणामं हेतुमिविवरं पूर्णं क्षणादिव्यं || पदार्थविवरं प्रवचयं पहोऽद्य: ||

- Pras'astapādabhāṣya, p.1, edited by Durgādhara Jhā, Varanasi, 1963
and then (am) to all the teachers, Bhāsarvajña undertakes to
write a commentary on the Samgāṇaḥ, a gleaning of the real
categories of the Nyāya, that is to say, a survey of the Nyāya
philosophy (i.e. the Nyāyasāra), for attaining salvation (or
for establishing the true state of salvation).

1. See: पर्वात-साधृप्योऽनु(1) - Amarakoṣa

   Compare: कति ईश्वरप्राणांमात्र नानात्तलं नानात्वप्राणामात्र प्रामाणित,
   ईश्वरप्राणामात्र नानात्वप्राणामात्र कति करारं प्राणामात्र इत्यद्। | -
   Nyāyakandali(Srīdhara)PB,p.5;

   Also compare: कति ईश्वरप्राणामात्र अनु पर्वात कारात्तलामेव पुनर्प्राणामात्र
   व्रति कति भुविदेशी | -

2. पूर्ण प्रयोजनां व्यवहितं निःश्रेयसां सत्यं पुनर्प्रवृत्तंगतिमेव
   देहेऽक्षमता नौक्ताः | - NyB, p. 5

3. I have construed 'mokṣa-siddhayye' with 'Pravakṣyate' following
   the given order of the words in the verse (Pranamya......
mokṣa-siddhayye pravakṣyate). However, one might feel like
   construing 'moksasiddhayye' with 'pranamya', because Bhāsarvaja-
   jña himself says - स्वातं किंवा महेश्वरप्राणामात्रिनिविवेकम्, मुदुपुष्पा विस्तंदेः
   विशेष प्रकोष्ठे तृतया देहेऽक्षममोक्षसांस्वातं धर्मसमाप्तिं व.
   बिप अविनाशत: स्यात् *(p.2).

But here also what is meant is that especially a seeker
should be doing all his activity (leading to salvation) with an
obeisance to Śiva, so that he could attain salvation as an
author can complete his work by bowing down to Śiva in the
beginning of his work. In the mangala verse of the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa,
the purpose behind writing a commentary is the attainment of
salvation. And the task of writing it could be completed by
making an obeisance to Śiva.
Maṅgala As a means of completion of the work: Commenting on the maṅgala verse of the Nyāyasāra Bhāsarvajña says in the Nyāyabhūṣana that the sentence, "Having bowed down to sambhū......" etc., is meant for an auspicious commencement of the treatise as well as for the knowledge of Relation, Purpose and subject-matter of the same. The nature of Relation etc. will be clarified in due course. While showing the importance of maṅgala Bhāsarvajña says that indeed the major obstacles resulting from demerits of an author could successfully be removed by the performance of maṅgala accompanied by an obeisance. It wards off the potential influence of demerits and consequently helps to bring a treatise to completion. Thus a maṅgala performed along with obeisance serves a special purpose and so it is meaningful. But where a work is found to have remained incomplete, it could be presumed that either the maṅgala must not have been appropriately performed by the author or he must have committed so many misdeeds that they could not all be removed by maṅgala. The fact that a work is found incomplete inspite of its having a maṅgala verse in the beginning does by no means prove that the maṅgala is always incapable of removing obstacles, since it is seen to have been capable in this respect elsewhere. Though a hundred pots, full of water, may prove incapable of putting out the fire in a stable, set ablaze, yet they are not found to be incapable of extinguishing (even a small fire) elsewhere also. On the other hand where a work is found to have been completed even without there being the
performance of maṅgala, it could be inferred that the author must have performed maṅgala either mentally, or physically (before he began writing his work.). Or the author must have accumulated merits by some means other than maṅgala.

Now, a question would arise here: If a maṅgala performed either physically or mentally could serve the purpose, why should one perform a maṅgala verbally? The answer to this question is that by performing a maṅgala verbally we would instruct others to the effect that the tradition of maṅgala should be followed in order to bring a work to completion. Not only the activity of writing a work, but all activities should invariably be preceded by a maṅgala performed with an obeisance to the great Lord Śiva (Mahesvara), especially so by one desiring emancipation so that, like completion of a work, emancipation also could be achieved without any hindrance.

Here a question may arise: It may occur that an author has committed no misdeeds which having resulted in demerits could furnish a cause for obstacles; or he has adequate merits in store that could ward off obstacles. Is such an author required to perform a maṅgala? A reply to this question is that everyone ought to perform a maṅgala suspecting that there might be demerits that could obstruct the completion of the work in hand; just as a king should store ammunition and weapons suspecting that he could have enemies (unknown to him). Thus, according to Bhāsarvajña, a maṅgala should be verbally performed by every author in the beginning of his work.
Necessity of Expressing Relation etc.: The expression of Relation etc., at the commencement of a work is significant inasmuch as it motivates the audience, or reader to employ himself in reading the work. If the reader, having faith in author's words, would accept the relation etc., as stated by the author, he would proceed to read the work. But even if he were to have a doubt in the truth of the author's words, he would employ himself in reading to find out whether the purpose etc., stated by the author are found accomplished in the work or not. But if the relation etc., are not stated by the author in the beginning of his work then a man would not apply his mind to reading the work on account/having the doubt or suspicion that he would come across something meaningless or undesired in the work. That is to say, when purpose etc., are not stated in the beginning of a work, a man would not proceed to read it on account of his entertaining a suspicion that he might come across something unwanted. The work in which purpose etc., are stated could be compared to a house that has been announced as "Restaurant" or "Boarding House" motivating a hungry man to enter it, while a work in which purpose etc., are not stated could be compared to a house not announced as such, and hence motivating none to enter it.

1. विनिश्चितापनाचा: व पुने: बापत्तिक त्वामाक्षांक प्रयोजनाविद विनिष्ठत्व प्रवत्त्यान्त्रिक | बापत्तिकांसात यु प्रकारही | - तांडवील पृ००३,४, बनारस, १५२५
Here it may be contended that there would arise the fault of infinite series, if the above point be conceded. To wit, in order to motivate a man to read, a statement of purpose etc. would be required. But in order to activate a man to read the very first statement informing him about purpose etc. again a further statement of purpose etc. would be required and this process of making statements pertaining to purpose etc. would go backwards infinitely. Or this would also involve the fault of mutual dependence. A man first comes to know the purpose etc. and then he begins to read the work; on the other hand a man first begins to read the work and then comes to know the purpose etc.

The answer to this is that this contention cannot be upheld; because an initial effort to read the very first statement describing the purpose etc. could be made even through curiosity. Or making a beginning would require little effort (Kāpida) on the part of a reader and so he would begin to read it. Thus, no earlier statement describing purpose etc. would be required and there would be no scope for any logical error such as infinite series of statements or their mutual dependence. The reader would initially start reading the book just out of
curiosity even if it means some little inconvenience.

But since further progress in this activity needs much endeavour on the part of a reader, an intelligent person would expect a clear statement regarding the purpose etc. at the commencement of a work. Further, what is needed to motivate person desirous of achieving the highest good (i.e. emancipation) is not just the statement of relation etc., but also the statement of the purpose that is meant and that of the subject-matter known as means etc. of achieving the purpose. In addition, the relation of the treatise with purpose (i.e. Sādhyaśādhan-bhāva) and with the subject-matter of the same (i.e. Viśayavīśayibhāva) as well as the relation of the treatise with teacher and with pupil should categorically be stated in the beginning of a work. Accordingly, the first Nyāyasūtra stating the purpose and the subject-matter or contents of the Nyāya runs as follows: A man

1. यदृच्छ्यबाणीः कार्याच्याचं गृहः नृत्यकर्मरूपाभिज्ञानस्य रतुत्सन्ति: तत्र कार्यपीडा
   शमित्तुपपि प्रज्ञांस्यते। - पारो टिंठ १, कार्यपीडिति सन्न्याद्गः पाठः। कार्यपीड़िति पाठे सहायु शीठा कार्यपीडा
   तथा हस्त्यः। - पारो टिंठ ३, प्राचार्युपापः।
   The original ms has प्रधान्य जिज्ञासात् कार्यपीडायां प्रवृत्ति।

' = सहायु शीठा' - Marginal Note, Photostat,p.1 So the reading कार्यपीडा (on account of only a little effort required on the part of a reader) seems to be more correct than the reading कार्यपीडाय (for the purpose of soothing the physical ailment).
can attain emancipation through the true knowledge of pramāṇa etc. Here emancipation is pointed out as the purpose, while pramāṇas etc. are pointed out as constituting the contents of the Nyāya. In this sūtra the relation of the treatise (i.e. Nyāyasastra) with the teacher and the taught is not stated since it is logically implied therein. However, the fact that the author of the Nyāya-sūtra has not mentioned this relation does by no means indicate that a commentator of the Nyāya-sūtra also could ignore it. He should clearly state the mutual relation as this - "This treatise is related to the purpose and like such a teacher is competent to teach this treatise. I am also an eligible pupil to study this treatise". This construing the relation a man would proceed to read the work. Thus, in Bhāsarvajña's view, an author should necessarily state the four requisite items, namely, purpose, subject-matter, entitled teacher and pupil and their relation with the treatise (anubandhacatustaya) in the beginning of his work.

Now, we find that the purpose that is mentioned in the maṅgala verse of the Nyāyasāra is to impart instruction to the beginners. This is the immediate purpose which is subsidiary, while the attainment of emancipation is the distant purpose, which

1. परदेवतातुतिनमकारणं मात्रं परिष्मण्डितं अष्टितीर्थश्रमनस्तिदेशः सम्बन्धप्रतियोग्यतां वाह - प्राणायं शम्स्का...। - न्यायसुक्तवल्ली (कपिराजदेव), पृ २
is the principal one.

Here a question may arise: Why is the primary purpose, viz. emancipation which also could serve as a motivating factor for a man in reading the work, not mentioned in the māṅgala verse of the Nyāyasāra? The answer to this is that this contention does not stand to reason, since the principal purpose, i.e., emancipation is certainly understood as implied in the māṅgala verse in the statement of the immediate and secondary purpose, viz. instruction or enlightenment. It is quite certain that instruction or enlightening is meant for emancipation. It will be discussed in what follows as to how the instruction could be a means of emancipation. Or it is ascertained on the basis of its study of Veda, Sūtra, that the true knowledge is the cause of emancipation. Therefore the inquiry now is in respect

1. प्रवचनेते न्यायसदर्थसामग्रहः | - मङ्गलशूलोऽऽ्यात् पूजा पूजा ॥
   संग्रहेः कर्मातू नोष्टमिः ? - न्यात् पूजा पूजा ॥
   इति मानसीप्रमिते न्यायसारे प्रथम: परिच्छेदः | -न्यायसार,न्यासार्य ७६ ॥

   Thus we find that "Nyāyasadarthasamgha," "Samgraha,"
are different names of the Nyāyasāra.

2. न्यात् पूजा पूजा २२, ४६६

3. It is intriguing that Bhasarvajña mentions śrutī after Veda and Sūtra. He has perhaps used the word in the sense of 'Sravana', learning from a teacher. The photostaté copy also has the same wording (p.1) - केदयुज्वसूतितो वा तत्त्वानम्.
   Could the reading be - केदयुज्वसूतितः?
of the cause of true knowledge, and keeping this in view the author has stated the subsidiary purpose.

Bhasarvajña has employed the word 'Sisú' in the maṅgala verse of the Nyāyasāra to signify the beginners in the discipling of Nyāya. Explaining this word 'Sisú' he says in the Nyāyabhūṣāna that when persons who may be even teachers in the Śāstras other than the Nyāya but are davoid of philosophical knowledge approach a teacher of the Nyāya darsāna with the modesty worthy of a disciple, they should be affectionately treated and taught like a son. In order to bring home this idea, the author has significantly used the word 'Sisú' in the maṅgala verse.

Contents of the Nyāyasāra: The subject-matter in the Nyāyasāra is of two kinds - primary and secondary. Topics like pramāṇa, prameya etc. may be regarded as primary, while the definitions of pramāṇa etc. as secondary, because the latter is meant for the ascertainment of the former. Even among pramāṇa etc., prameyas are principal, again among prameyas the primary position goes to the soul-entity, since all the other categories, namely pramāṇa etc. are meant for the ascertainment of the nature of soul. Thus the topic of definitions comes to be subsidiary.

1. दिविषयप्रज्ञाकलिष्यम् - प्रश्नसम प्रश्नां व । तत्र प्रश्नां प्रमाणाद्वयं वदायी ।

श्लोकान्तः प्रश्नेष्यं, तत्तत्ववाचिर्वाच लक्षणाः । प्रमाणादिषु ब्रह्म


- लांटी (राजेश्वरसाहित्याचैथ्र, पृ २६६)
Here an objection may be raised on the basis of grammatical rules. The term *pramāṇa-tadbheda-tadany-a-laksanam* (definition of pramāṇa etc.) is grammatical, known as Śaṣṭhi Tatpurusā-samāsa. And the final word in a Tatpurusa compound is regarded as principal and the initial one is subordinate. As for example, in the compound Rāja-purusa, the last word purusa is principal and the initial one, i.e., Rājan is subordinate. Similarly in the Nyāyasāra, contends the opponent, the word Laksāna which is the ending word in the compound should be principal and pramāṇa etc. are sub-ordinate. Thus it follows that the main topic of the Nyāyasāra is the exposition of definitions of pramāṇa etc. and not the exposition of pramāṇa etc themselves.

The answer to this is that this contention is not tenable. In a tatpurusa compound even the initial term is sometimes found to be principal. As for example, in the statement, "a century of students is fed (Chātra-satam bhojitam)", the term 'chātra-satam' is a tatpurusa compound, but here the initial word 'chātra' is principal and the final word 'satam' is.

---

1. प्रमाणातपेक्षादन्वल्लभागः । - न्याय चारौ, न्याय पूर्व पूर्व ।
2. "उद्योगविमितिस्तस्वत्वः तत् तपस्वः . . . . . . इत्यतीति चाराचर्याः प्राचाचर्याः । -
   - दिलो तम वस्तीत्वाण्वः, पूर्व पूर्व, निरप्रेक्ष्याबग
   ब्रह्मचारी - उद्योगविमितिस्तस्वत्वः तत्स्वत्वः तत्स्वत्वाण्वः एव निरप्रेक्ष्याबग एव निरप्रेक्ष्याबग एव निरप्रेक्ष्याबग एव निरप्रेक्ष्याबग.
sub-ordinate, because the dining or feeding is related to students and not to the number hundred. Thus in the compound 'pramāṇa...laksanaṃ' the initial word pramāṇa may be taken as principal. Or the ending word in the compound, i.e. 'laksana' may be taken as principal in deference to the grammatical rule. Accordingly the author of the Nyāya-sūtra has first shown tattva (i.e. the real nature) as separate from pramāṇa etc. by using the sēṣe Saṣṭhi such as 'pramāṇadīnam Tattvam' (the true nature in respect of pramāṇa etc.); and then he has said that emancipation could be attained through the true knowledge in respect of pramāṇa etc. Here it is very clearly pointed out that the direct means of obtaining emancipation is the knowledge regarding its true nature of pramāṇa etc. And what is meant by true nature of pramāṇa is just their definition. In order to know the true nature of pramāṇa etc. one has to define them, so that the true nature of pramāṇa etc. could be precisely understood. Thus

1. प्रामाण्यसूत्र, निर्णयस्थानां तत्त्वज्ञानातु निश्चेयकारिकम्। -न्यायसूत्र १-२-२;
प्रामाण्यादिनां तत्त्वज्ञानिः शैष्यकी अष्टी। - न्यायभाष्य

2. ”Sēṣa is a grammatical technical name given to that which does not fall within any of the case-relations denotive of active agency towards an action. In the case of the genitive, when no case-relation is found possible, it has to be taken as expressing mere relationship in general Nyāya-sūtras, F.N.,p.4, Ganganadā Jhā"
the word 'tattva' in the Nyāyasūtra signifies the definitions of pramāṇa etc. Hence the compound in the Nyāyasūtra (pramāṇa......laksanam) is supported by the Nyāyasūtra.

Here one may contend that in order to know the true nature of pramāṇa etc., their definitions are to be framed, discussed and ascertained. It amounts to saying that pramāṇa etc. are neither to be known nor to be expounded. The answer to this is that the contention is made on the flimsy ground and so it is not proper. When definition of a thing is formulated they cannot remain something that is unknown, for the definition is meant to precisely express the true nature of a thing. It is not that a cow remains unknown and uncertain, when someone defines a cow, saying "An animal endowed with hoof, hump, cow-ness, dew-lap etc. is a cow". On the contrary, by framing a definition of a cow, we could well ascertain the nature of the cow. To wit, a characteristic which through its own certain knowledge helps to ascertain the nature of the object by not allowing it to be confused with others and singles out the particular object is the defining characteristic (or the definition) of the object. And when the definitions (defining characteristic) is not determined, the definable categories can never

1. The reading should be 'Khura-kakud' instead of 'Khura-kakudada'

be ascertained. Thus, the treatment of laksana or definition amounts to the ascertainment of the nature of categories, pramāṇa etc. Therefore, there is nothing wrong if we accept that the treatment of definitions is predominant in the Nyāyasāra.

Contention over the Purpose behind stating Definitions:
Now Bhāsarvajña tries to establish that it is really necessary to frame definitions of pramāṇa etc. and then he proceeds to discuss and ascertain them properly, as this helps to dispel the misconceived ideas regarding the true nature of things. In this context Bhāsarvajña quotes a verse from the Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasena Divākara, a well-known Jaina philosopher. The verse is given in the Nyāyāvatāra as containing a prima-facie view.

This verse says that pramāṇas and the practice or behaviour on their basis are well-known to the people. Therefore, no purpose is served by stating definitions of pramāṇas etc. The same could be said of the exposition of prameya etc. also. What is meant by this contention is that it is quite obvious that a definition cannot bring about the object which is to be defined.

1. प्रसिद्धानि प्रमाणानि व्यवहारूत्तत्त्वतः ।
प्रमाणवङ्गकाश्योक्तः सास्ते न प्रयोजनम् ॥ २ ॥ (कारिका)
प्रसिद्धानि प्रमाणानि लक्षणोक्तः प्रयोजनम् ।
तद्व्यायमोहिनिविविष्य स्याद् व्यायामप्रस्थापित ॥ ३ ॥ (कारिका)
-Nyāyāvatāra, pp. 25, 27; (Dr.P.L.Vaidya), Bombay, 1928
As for example a cow itself and the characteristics defining the cow, such as, hoofs, dew-lap etc., are simultaneously seen. The distinctive characteristics, dew-lap etc., cannot be admitted as bringing about the cow— for a cause should be prior to an effect. Moreover, some of the definables like Ātman etc., can never be believed to have been produced by their respective distinctive characteristics, because such definables are eternal. Thus it is clear that the defining or distinctive characteristics are not productive causes of the definables. Nor can the laksāṇa, i.e., defining characteristic be regarded as a cognitive cause, one that enables us to know the definable. It is found in the world that even when definitions are not known to the people, they fully know the definables. Thus it is apparent that the defining or distinctive characteristics could become neither a productive cause nor a cognitive one in respect of definables. Further, the formulation of definitions (distinctive characteristics) would certainly involve the logical fault of infinite series, and it could not be avoided. The exposition of an object would depend upon its definition, again the explanation of that definition which itself would be a definable, would depend upon another definition. And that would again require another definition. In this way the process of framing definitions would be endless. This is the fault of infinite series.

Against this, one may argue that the practice or behaviour in respect of pramāṇa etc., which consists of activity or desisting from it or which is verbal in form, or which is based
on the relation of sublated and sublator cannot be established, unless the definitions of pramāṇa etc. are stated. e.g. the people are found going towards sweets and retreating from a serpent. This practice is based on their knowledge of the special or defining characteristics of these (sweets, serpent, etc.). Similarly if we know the special characteristics of something, we speak about it or refer to the relation of things, as sublator - sublated.

But this argument cannot, says the antagonist of definitions, be maintained, since the practice or behaviour referred to above is found established even in the absence of definitions. We find the practice of behaviour characterised by the relation of sublated and sublator as well established in the world. Again, it may be urged that technical terms, i.e. bāḍhya, bāḍhaka etc. are, as a rule, not known. For this reason the definitions are needed to be framed so that definite terms could be used to denote the definite things. But the reply to this objection is that people are certainly familiar with such terms. Thus, even illiterate persons are heard saying - "Your statement is contradicted by perception itself." This shows that even ignorant people know what perception is and how a statement is contradicted by perception, without having known any definitions whatsoever from the śāstras. When worldly affairs can be successfully executed without the knowledge of definitions it is not at all necessary to give a treatment of the definitions of pramāṇa etc.
Bhūsarvajña’s rejoinder: Bhūsarvajña rejoins: It has been argued by the opponent that the defining characteristic is neither a productive cause nor a cognitive cause of the object to be defined. Here it may be clarified that the Nyāya thinkers also do not accept the view that a definition furnishes a productive cause for the definable. Thus, the non-acceptance or rejection of the first alternative, a defining characteristic is a productive cause of definable, is itself a rejoinder to the first contention. However, as regards the second contention (i.e., a defining characteristic is not even a cognitive cause of definable), it could be asserted that we certainly get the knowledge of a cow or the like through its definition. Nobody would deny that a defining characteristic helps us in knowing the thing in question. As for example, a man, who knows some uncommon characteristic such as a white mark on the forehead of the cow, could easily recognise and determine his own cow from among a herd of cows. But on the other hand, a man who does not know any such uncommon characteristic would certainly feel a doubt about his cow. This is true of all the particulars of the species of things, movable as well as immovable, e.g., a jewel etc. That is to say, each and every category in the world could individually be known as such and such only through its own peculiar characteristic. Thus, the fact that a defining characteristic helps us in knowing the definable cannot be denied. Therefore, in order to know an object precisely a definition is certainly needed and hence it should be stated in a treatise, pertaining to it.
Moreover, as regards the argument that in order to ascertain a definition, another definition would be required and that would ultimately lead to an endless process of making definitions - it cannot be upheld. For, the rule of stating definitions is accepted only in respect of what is subject to doubt. Whenever a doubt arises in respect of some object, the decision regarding the same is to be arrived at by apprehending its distinctive characteristic. This rule of ascertaining distinctive characteristic only when a doubt arises, is generally accepted. And a doubt would not arise everywhere, that is to say, in respect of each and everything. For example, on seeing a trunk of a tree in the dark, we feel a doubt whether it is a man or a trunk. But in respect of particulars of the tree such as winding hollow in the trunk, etc. a doubt does not arise at all. When we come to a decision that what is seen in the dark is a tree, there would not be scope for a further doubt. And if we accept that a doubt does arise in respect of hollow in the trunk etc., then this amounts to contradicting and perceptual experience or the like.

1. The reading 'Vakrādi' could be corroborated by the Praśastapadabhāṣya and the Nyāyakandali, a commentary thereon: 

- PB, p. 414, Varanasi 1963

- NK, pp. 422-23, with PB, Varanasi, 1963
Against this, a question may be raised: Why does a doubt arise only in respect of a trunk of the tree, and why could it not arise in respect of the series of particulars also? viz. crooked or winding cavity of the tree etc.? In answer to this, Bhāsarvajña says that a doubt arises only in regard to the trunk of a tree, because there is a ground for the provocation of doubt. And such a ground is not present elsewhere. That is to say, wherever such a ground is present, a doubt arises; but where it is not present, doubt would not arise.

Pursuing to put forth the further questions, the opponent may say that the explanation given above is not proper; there is scope for a further question: Why does not the ground for a doubt exist in the series of particulars also? The answer to this could be given as follows: Such is the nature of things that a ground for doubt exists in respect of certain things and does not exist in respect of all of them. The answer can only be that the respective natures of the things are such; but we should not be blamed for speaking of a thing as it is seen.

Further, the opponent may raise an objection that even in respect of an object which is subject to doubt, the decision is arrived at by perceiving some particular (Vīśeṣa) of the
object, and not by seeing its defining characteristic. But this is not proper, says Bhāsarvajña. For, the terms, 'particular' (Visēsa), 'mark' (an̄ka), 'sign' (Cihna), 'special characteristic' (laksana) are all synonyms. So the fact that a decision is arrived at by seeing a particular of the doubtful object or a mark or a special characteristic does not make any difference.

Here one may contend that if all the above mentioned terms were to be accepted as synonymous, then as a corollary it would follow that the distinctive characteristics which are inadequate pervasion or over-pervasion would also have to be admitted as definitions; e. g. an animal which is running is horse, an animal which has horns is a cow. As a rule, a definition

1. किलेक-कच्च-चिह्न-लक्षण-संक्षा‌नास पायैयत्वात्। - न्यायसूत्रकृतः See यतपुरांह पूणणः (६५० ईसा) लक्षणः चिह्नः लिंगकिति प्रायः हति, तवतु, व्याप्तः व्यवहारः वा सावधे विन्यमः अववकाशाः। व्युत्पन्नस्य स्वयमेव व्यवहाराः। व्युत्पन्नस्य संप्राप्तिक्यावावात्। - किलेराजाली (उदयनाचार्य), प. ६०५० ईसाः ३०, Baroda, 1971 यदैव वर्णीयमान्‌ः - यतपुरांह पूणणः ..... सप्तप्राप्तिक्यावावात् हति, न तद निशाचः। न खलु लिंगवाचः लक्षणापद प्रत्येकपदः आचारः किले विलेकाक्षेनिः चिह्नशक्तानाः पायैयत्वम्। .....
ought to be free from the faults of over-pervasiveness inadequately pervasiveness and improbability. But if the terms Viśeṣa etc. were admitted to be synonymous, there would arise the contingency of faulty definitions being accepted as true ones. In respect of the above examples, we can say that a horse could be stationary and a buffalo also has horns. So they cannot be regarded as true definitions of horse and cow respectively.

In answer to this, Bhāsarvajña says that the contention cannot be upheld. For, an over-pervasive or inadequate pervasive character also can serve as a distinguishing factor, where it can distinguish a thing from others. For instance, when the characteristic of being horned can distinguish a cow from others, it should be accepted as a definition of cow. Similarly, when an inadequate pervasive characteristic can mark an object as distinct from others, it also should be recognised as a definition. As for example, the characteristic of being endowed with motion can serve as the definition of substance (dravya). It is not that the characteristic of being endowed with motion that we find in a thing does not determine the thing as substance. It certainly does so. And it is quite obvious that whatever can be a substratum of motion is exclusively a substance alone. Nothing else than a substance can be a substratum of motion. On this basis we can say that whatever is endowed with motion is always a substance. However, the fault of inadequate pervasiveness would arise, if we say that only that object which is endowed
with motion is substance. For, this means that what is devoid of motion is not a substance. This would give rise to the contingency of Ākāśa being non-dravya. The above definition of substance is faulty, because it cannot cover the whole range of substance which is here definable. For, Ākāśa, though being admitted as dravya would not be covered by the above definition, since it is devoid of motion. But, on the other hand, if we intend to say that whatever is endowed with motion is necessarily a substance, then the definition would be faultless, as no motion could ever come into existence without having a substance as its substratum. Bhāsarvajña has thus established that a characteristic, whether inadequate pervasive or over-pervasive can serve as a defining characteristic. The author of the Nyāya-sūtra also seems to have given the following definitions, admitting the above view:

Definition of Ātman- Desire, Aversion, Effort, Pleasure, Pain and Cognition are the indicatives of the Soul.

Definition of Body- The Body is the vehicle of actions, of sense-organs and of objects (pleasure, pain etc.).

1. See चैक्र-प्रयत्न-स्वह-दुःस्व-स्वागानि बाल्मण्डिलस्व ॥
   - Nyāya सुः १२१६ ॥

2. चेष्टा-हन्निक-कर्य-आक्षयः: शीतस्व ॥ Nyāya सुः १२१५ ॥
Definition of Mind - The non-origination of simultaneous cognition is indicative of the Mind.

Definition of Nirṇaya - When there is an ascertainment of the real character of the thing after duly deliberating over the two sides of the question - an argument in favour of a certain conclusion and also that against that conclusion - we have what is called 'Demonstrated Truth', Nirṇaya.

Now, the general definition that a substance having desire etc. is an Ātman could not be applied to an emancipated soul that is free from desire etc. In the case of such an emancipated soul, the usage of calling it Ātman could be established by another characteristic (atmatva). Similarly, though Ākāśa etc. are not endowed with activity, they are called substance on account of their state of being endowed with qualities like sabda etc. In the same manner, even an emancipated soul is called Ātman, since it is endowed with soulness (atmatva), though it is devoid of qualities like desire etc. Likewise, despite the absence of common distinctive characteristic of not allowing two cognitions to take place simultaneously, the internal organ (Antahkarana) deserted by the emancipated soul, called Manas, on account of its having

1. युग्मतः ज्ञान-वृत्तचिः मनसः लिङ्गः। १२१६।। कष्टः
2. विद्वृत्य पञ्चप्रतिपण्डाम्याः क्ष्यविचारण निगण्यः। ११३-४२।। कष्टः
'Mindness'. Similarly though a body buried under stones cannot be the substratum of actions or movements, it is called body, because it is the abode of sense-organs. In determining a palm no consideration for and against is required still the definite knowledge about palm is called 'nirnaya'. This applies to other definitions also.

Here someone may contend that the latter distinctive characteristics (Soulness, Mindness etc.) should be accepted as definitions, they being extensive enough to cover the whole range of the definable in question. For example, the definition that "a substance endowed with soulness is called Ātman" is extensive enough and therefore more appropriate than the definition - "A substance endowed with desire etc. is called Ātman." Thus it is useless to state non-extensive definitions. The reply to this is that even the alleged non-extensive definitions are capable of determining their respective definables. Even in the apprehending of 'Soulness' itself the special characteristics, viz. 'desire etc.' are found to be useful. That is to say, nothing except the characteristic of desire etc. could explain to us what actually 'soulness' signifies. If another definition is required in respect of each defining characteristic employed in a definition, then there would be infinite series.

But this contention is not tenable. For, a controversy would not possibly arise in respect of each and everything. If a
man who has a difference of opinion in regard to definitions agrees to the generally accepted nature of 'sentient,' 'non-sentient,' 'means' and 'the result to be achieved by the means,' then to such a man other matters also could be explained on the basis of the same reasoning. However, if the person does not admit anything, he does not deserve to be addressed even a single word. If even on seeing a tree, a person says just anything, he should be ignored like a lunatic, because no communication could be possible with such a person.

The opponent's contention was that lakṣaṇa (definition) would itself have to be defined, and this definition would have to be defined again and so on infinitely. The answer to this is that it is not so. The definition of definition distinguishes definition from all other things, and since it is itself a definition, it is included in the class of definitions and as such is distinguished automatically from all other things; and no further definition is required. For example, the sentence, "All words are non-eternal" establishes the non-eternity of the whole class of words, and at the same time expresses its own non-eternity. The injunctions 'The Veda ought to be studied,' besides enjoining the study of the Veda, also lays down its own propriety of being studied, as it is included in the Veda.

The opponent may argue that if a definition distinguishes one class from the rest and it distinguishes itself also; then it becomes an instrument of the act of distinguishing, and at
the same time it becomes an object of the same act. That the object and instrument in regard to the same action should be identical is not proper.

The answer to this is that this fact of object and instrument being one is sometimes found in the usage. For example, a pramāṭā (knower) and prameya (object of right knowledge) are sometimes found to be one. This happens when a man (soul: knower) tries to know the nature of soul.

The opponent may urge that this very illustration might lead to the contingency of their non-difference under all circumstances. But this argument cannot be maintained, because it is well established on the basis of perception etc. that a cloth (object) is different from shuttle, loom etc. (instruments). Thus, there would not arise the alleged contingency of object and instrument being non-different. Therefore, the statement of definition is not useless, since it helps us to arrive at a decision whenever a doubt arises.

Again, an objection may be raised: If definitions alone could determine doubtful matters, pramāṇa (source of valid knowledge) would come to be useless.

But this also is not proper. For, when a definition serves as a means of arriving at a decision, it also becomes

1. The text should be read as विश्लेषणत्वेन instead of विश्लेषणविलचन प्रामाणितवाच | - Photostat, p. 2.
The opponent may here ask the following questions:
Is definition synonymous with pramāṇa? Or is it one of the recognised pramanās, viz. perception etc.? Or is it a thing different from pramāṇa?

In answer to this Bhāsarvajña says that in the view of certain scholars a definition is purely a negative statement of reason. By negating all other things it distinguishes what is to be defined from others. For example, the characteristics of being endowed with dew-lap etc. negates all objects that are non-cows and thus distinguishes of particular animal, i.e. a cow, from others. It may be noted here that the word 'eke' in the Nyāyabhūṣana is taken to mean 'Pūrvacāryaḥ' by Aparakadeva in the Nyāyamuktañāli, a commentary on the Nyāyasāra of Bhāsarvajña. Vācaspati seems to be later than Bhāsarvajña, the latter could not be referring to Vācaspati, but must be referring to some earlier writers. However in Bhāsarvajña's view as said above, terms like vīṣeṣa (particular), anka (mark), cihna (sign) and laksana (defining characteristic) are synonymous. Therefore, definition is not a synonym of

---

1. केवलव्याविधिके हलि रक्षे॥ - न्यायो यूँ पूँ ६
2. केवलव्याविधिके इत्यक पूवाच्यायोऽः तु क्वाौण ॥ - न्यायो यूँ पूँ ७
3. किषेषाङक्षिण्वल्पलाणाशुद्धान पवाच्यायोऽः - न्यायो यूँ पूँ ७
pramāṇa. All means whatsoever of valid knowledge are called pramāṇa; whereas laksāna is a defining characteristic or a distinguishing character belonging to the prameya. That is to say, every laksāna, being a means of valid knowledge, is pramāṇa; but every pramāṇa is not laksāna as it is necessarily a distinctive characteristic of prameya. For example, the characteristic of being endowed with dew-lap etc., which defines a cow can be called pramāṇa, inasmuch as it becomes a means of valid knowledge. To elucidate the point we can say that a laksāna or a distinguishing quality of prameya, as cooperating with the sense-organ etc. may even be called perception etc. When we see with eyes a dew-lap which we know as a distinguishing characteristic of a cow, we have the determinate knowledge of cow, so definition serves as a means of perceptual knowledge. Thus the definition, though being an auxiliary to pramāṇa is purposely mentioned separately from pramāṇa in the maṅgala verse of the Nyāyasūtra, just as the five members of syllogism, though being constituents of inference, are mentioned separately from pramāṇa (especially anumāṇa), in the first Nyāyasūtra.

1. The text should be read as प्रमाणार्थस्य instead of प्रमाणार्थस्य। - Nyās, p. 9;
2. प्रातिकृतिकार्यं यथार्थस्य प्रमाणार्थस्य। - Nyās 90 207;
3. प्रातिकृतिकार्यं यथार्थस्य प्रमाणार्थस्य। - Photostat, p. 3.
Special Purpose served by the Statement of Definitions: It may be contended that definitions of pramāṇa etc. are already known to the people even without the Śāstras being referred to. Otherwise it would not be possible for a common man to speak of pramāṇa etc. Consequently, the treatise which treats definitions of pramāṇa etc. (i.e. the Nyāyasāra) serves no special purpose, it is not required.

The reply to this is that this contention is not justified. For, the treatise describing definitions is meant for removing illusion by repeating or by making a explanatory reference to something known to the people. Deluded persons who are dogmatically obsessed with the philosophical systems other than the Nyāya; state the definition or distinguishing characteristic of pramāṇa etc. in diverse ways. Consequently ordinary people also are confused and they also start differing. Such confusions are removed by making an explanatory reference to the definitions or distinguishing characteristics which are already known to the people; just as the embarrassment of a child deluded in recognising his own father can be dispelled by making a reference to some particular characteristic of his father which is already known to the child. Persons deluded by other philosophical systems, seek to establish true pramāṇas having Ātman etc. as their objects, as false pramāṇas or as semblances of pramāṇas (pramanabhāsa) and to establish Arthāpatti (Implication) etc that are not distinct entities,
as independent ones. When such confusions are created in respect of pramāṇa etc., it is positively stated that whatever serves as a means of true knowledge should be regarded as pramāṇa. On the other hand, when the semblances of pramāṇas (pramanābhāsa), having non-dualism, momentariness, eternity of vedas, non-existence of Ātman, etc. as their

1. The text should be read as 'Vedanītyatva' instead of 'Veda nītyatva.' Nyāya, p. 10
objects, are sought to be established as true pramāṇas like perception etc., and when the pramāṇas which are in fact independent ones are sought to be established as non-different from others; it is negatively asserted (prohibited) that whatever does not have such and such characteristics cannot be regarded as a pramāṇa. Thus a motive behind explanatory reference (anuvāda) can be detected in the case of the definitions of soul etc., and in the case of the definitions of doubt etc. This also dismisses the doubt that it is already known from the Upaniṣads and other sāstras such as Yoga-sāstra, that the true knowledge of Ātman is a means to the attainment of emancipation, so this sāstra laying down this, is meaningless. Indeed, the knowledge of Ātman, emancipation etc. is not laid down afresh in the Nyāya-sāstra. This is well-known, so referring to what is known, the Nyāya - sāstra only shows afresh how the knowledge of Ātman etc. can be held to be tenable by means of pramāṇa and this it does by logically affirming the existence of soul, etc. and refuting all contradictory positions. It does this in order to dispel the illusion of those who are misled by the philosophical systems of the Buddhists and others, and therefore, falsely regard the knowledge of soul, etc. as the cause of mundane existence, and regard emancipation while the soul persists to exist as a non-reality. It would thus be possible to come to the conclusion that all that is stated in the Upaniṣads etc. is true only
and a man with true insight becoming free from doubt can resort to the means of emancipation, known to him from the Upaniṣads, etc. and attain, emancipation.

Thus we see that in his introductory remarks in the Nyāyabhūṣana Bhāsarvajña has shown the importance of maṅgala and of the mention of the anubandha-catustaya, as without knowing these, no reader would take up the work for study. The practices of performing maṅgala in the form of an obeisance to one's own deity was prevalent from early time and it was followed by the wise for the completion of their works without hindrance. As Annam Bhaṭṭa points out, the existence of a śruti enjoining maṅgala can be inferred from the accepted practice of maṅgala that was followed by the learned. We find that Prasastapāda, the earliest known commentator on the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, pays homage to the Lord, who is the cause of all that originates and to the sage Kaṇāda. Uddyotakara, it may be noted, has not written any maṅgala stanza, but as Vācaspati Misra explains he must have performed maṅgala orally in the form of an obeisance to his accepted deity, but since this procedure was well known, he has not introduced it at

---

1. निर्विवेकपरिशमनात्त्वः शिष्टाचारात्तामित्वातिविविधक्षणवेदाधिकारिनवधेयक्रियामयः कारणोत्तराचारात्मकम्।

2. प्राणम्य श्रेष्ठमात्रेऽपि सुनितं काणादमन्वतः।

---

Patardeepamgraḥ pravakṣe mahādyam: II" - Prasastapādamāṇya
the commencement of his work, Nyāyavārtika. Jayanta pāfys his respects to Lord Śambhu, Bhavānī and Gaṇādhīpati in the beginning of the Nyāyamaṇḍari. Bhāsarvajñā as we have been bows down to Lord Śambhu or Umāpati and to all the predeceptors in the beginning of his works. Vācaspati Misra offers a prayer to Pīnākin (Śiva) and pays homage to Akṣapāda at the commencement of his Nyāyavārtika-tatparyatīka. Śrīdhara performs obeisance to Lord Puruṣottama in the maṅgala verse of the Nyāya-kandalī. Moreover, he remarks that the removal of obstacles can be effected only by means of maṅgala, as the wise have accepted this as a rule. He further says that the commentators of the Nyāya and the Mīmāṁsā (Vātsyāyana and Śabara) have not performed obeisance to the deity; nevertheless they must have certainly done it orally though they have not introduced it in their works. Udayana performs obeisance to Sarasvati in the beginning of his commentary, Pārisuddhi. Thus we see that the procedure of performing maṅgala was followed as an accepted practice of the wise, by a number of writers of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika schools.

1. अक्षीतशिष्टाचारप्रम्रायप्रायत: परमशिष्टेन वालिकः रेण कृत: जाप इष्टदेवतानमस्कारः न शास्त्रेन निर्देश्यते। ।...
2. प्रसिद्धात् तत्त्व कालया न्नस्त्तर्ष्ट्रिशिष्ट्य असर्मभोग्यते हस्ति सर्वेक्षनात् ।-तार ८०००००२, वर्ष १६६०।
3. See; Nyāyamaṇḍari, maṅgala verses 1, 2 and 3
4. नमस्कारादेव विच्छोपसम्, करारस्य विद्ये निकेतन तस्योपातानात् । न व न्यायमिमाशांप्रमाणार्थवाचु न कृतप्रजाकारः, किंतु तत्र ब्रुपनिक्षेपः।
   .... यथिष्टां परमासिकं परिचितवर्ष्णामिनी नानुविष्टत हस्ति असर्मभोग्यवथि ब्रह्म ।-न्यायकृदन्ती पु० १६६२, वाराणसी १६६२
As regards the four requisite items known as anubandha-catustaya, we find that most of the authors seek to assert and clarify in the beginning of their works, the purpose, the subject, the qualifications of one entitled to teach or to learn that work and the relation of the work with the purpose, subject etc. It is generally accepted that the mention of the purpose etc. is necessary to motivate the reader or the audience in respect of the activity of reading, or learning the work in question. In Uddyotakara's view, the attainment of the highest good of man is the purpose of the Nyāyāstra; a person entitled to study this Sāstra should be one who has not come to know the true nature of things through perception and inference and at the same time one who is endowed with spiritual power. Jayanta says that in order to give an impetus to the reader, the author should necessarily mention the purpose and the subject of his work at the outset. He further remarks that the relation of the work with purpose etc. could then be taken as implied by the mention of the sub-strata of the relation, viz. the subject etc. Following this tradition Bhāsarvajña has, as we

1. कश्च शास्त्र पुरा सभाः भविषये । प्रत्येकानुमानानन्तकालस्तुल्लकः । वाच्यालिनेनन्तकन्तन्त्रायुक्तः कन्तंवासी । - न्यायवाच, न्यायवाचस्य पृ १०।

2. वाच्यालिनेन प्रयोक्तत्वम् भविषय्यमस्य शास्त्रस्य । प्रतिपादित्वम् श्रोत्प्रवेशाहोत्साहितस्य ।। ...... भविषय्यस्य शास्त्रस्य वाच्यालिनेनाशकालणा: सम्बन्धः । शास्त्राद्ध्वेष्य निःशक्तस्य व साध्यासंपादः सम्बन्धः । तदाश्यनिदेशाङ्ग एव सिद्धः । - न्यायवाचस्य (सुर्याचार्याय पुत्र), पृ २०६, ८।
have seen, mentioned the purpose etc. in the beginning of the Nyāyabhūṣāna. It may be noted that like Bhaṣarvajña Jayanta, Vācaspati Misra, Śrīdhara and Udayana also have pointed out the importance of mentioning purpose etc. at the commencement of a work.

It is likely that the practice of mangala must have been initiated by the Buddhist writers. Nagarjuna, Dīnāga, →

Dipakāra, Dharmakirti - all these have performed maṅgala in their respective works. Umāsvāti, the Jain author, also has followed this practice. So also Parthasarathi has performed maṅgala in his Sastradīpīka. Vyāsa in his Yogabhāṣya also has accepted the practice of maṅgala.

1. Abhidharmakośa, part 1, p.4 ed. by Svāmī Śvārikādāsa Śāstri, Varanasi, 1970
2. Abhidharmadīpa, pp. 1, 3 ed. by Padmanabh S. Jaini, Patna 1959
4. Tattvārthadhīgamasutra, Part 1, p. 15, Kārika 21-22
   Edited by H. R. Kapadia, Bombay 1926
5. Sastradīpīka, p. 2, ed. by Pt. Laxmaṇa Śāstri Drāvida, Banaras 1913
6. Pātanjaladārsana, p.1, ed. by Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara Bhattacārya, Calcutta. 1895