STATEMENT

In 1968 A. D. Svāmī Yogīndrānanda edited the Nyāya-bhūṣana of Bhāsarvajña and it was published by the Sad Darsāna Prākāśana Pratisthāna. Till then this was thought to be a lost work and hence its appearance was regarded as one of the most exciting events in the history of scholarship pertaining to Indian philosophy. Even before the publication of the Nyāyabhūṣana, scholars like Gopinath Kaviraj, Dineshchandra Bhattacharya, Anantalal Thakur, had tried to show the importance of Bhāsarvajña's works, either on the basis of the Nyāyasāra or on that of the numerous references to and quotations from the Nyāyabhūṣana found in the later works. The theory of three pramāṇas; the acceptance of only four prameyas; the first known alternation in the Nyāya school, in the definition of perception; his suggestions to modify the Vaiśeṣika categorical structure, the elaborate criticism of the Buddhist views, the cognition of the presence of positive bliss and its consciousness in the state of emancipation - are some of the outstanding novel features of the Nyāyabhūṣana. Fascinated by the rational and progressive tendency of the author, I decided to attempt a critical study of the Pratyakṣa-Pariccheda of the Nyāyabhūṣana; and I am confident that the result of this study will, to some extent, help in filling up the big gap in the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature.
To my knowledge, the Nyāyāsāra is the first independent work on the Nyāya after a long series of commentaries and sub-commentaries based on the Nyāyasūtra, directly or indirectly. It is probable that while designating his treatise as 'Nyāyasadartha-samgraha' and his commentary, i.e. Nyāyabhusana, as 'Samgraha-vārtika', Bhāsarvajña had in his mind the 'Padārthadharmasamgraha' of Prasāstapāda and the 'Nyāyavārtika' of Uddyotakara respectively. And at the same time, he has openly criticised the views of Prasāstapāda and Uddyotakara.

Moreover, in the history of the Nyāya-Vaisēśika literature, Bhāsarvajña's Nyāyasāra is, as I sought to prove, the first manual or prakarana work. After this, there begins the tradition of composing manuals in the Nyāya-Vaisēśika literature. The Saptapadarthī of Śivāditya is also a subsequent work, and not a prior one, as some have held.

Though we do not find any conscious effort to syncretise the two schools, the Nyāya and the Vaisēśika, either in the original work, i.e. Nyāyasāra or in the commentary, i.e. Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, yet Bhāsarvajña has given in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa an elaborate exposition as to how the Vaisēśika categories could be perceived. Varadācārya, who has explicitly referred to Bhāsarvajña's views in his Tārkikarakṣa, seems to have been influenced by the Nyāyasāra and the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa.
Moreover, I have tried to find out the auto-commentaries or Svapajnātīkās, especially in the Nyāya-Vaiseṣika literature, and after my study, I came to the conclusion that Bhāsarvajñā is the first author of the Nyāya-Vaiseṣika school to write an auto-commentary, namely, the Nyāyabhūṣāṇa on his original work Nyāyasāra. Varadarāja (the Sārasamigrha on his 'Tārkikarakṣā'), Viśvanātha (the Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī on his Bhāsapariccheda), Annam Bhatta (the Dīpikā on his Tarkasamgraha) and others seem to have followed in his wake.

Besides, it seems that Gaṅgesā Upādhyāya, the author of the Tattva-cintāmaṇi, was to some extent influenced by writers like Bhāsarvajñā, especially in giving the prime importance to the topic of epistemology and in dividing his work into chapters,—one chapter for each pramāṇa. Similarly, Rāghunātha Siromāṇi who gave a severe stroke to the categorical structure of the Vaiseṣika, might have been influenced by Bhāsarvajñā, who so far as we know, (—among the writers whose works are available to us—), for the first time challenged the legitimacy of the Categorical structure of the Vaiseṣika.

Thus after my study, I came to the conclusion that Bhāsarvajñā's works, (—especially the Nyāyabhūṣāṇa—) are landmarks in the history of the Nyāya-Vaiseṣika literature, which inspired the later authors in numerous ways, and which opened many new avenues.
While studying the text of the Nyāyabhūṣāna, I came across certain doubtful readings, but I was fortunate enough to find the manuscript and a photostat preserved in the 'Hemacandrācārya Jain Jñānamandira, Patan', and in the L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, respectively. With the help of these, I have emended the text at number of places and noted accordingly in the foot-notes in my thesis.

In the first chapter, I have tried to collect all available information regarding Bhāsarvajña and his works. For this, in addition to the printed text of the Nyāyabhūṣāna I referred to the histories of S. C. Vidyabhūṣāna, Gopināth Kavirāj, D. C. Bhattācārya, Introduction to Gānakārika by C. D. Dalal, Introductions to Jñānaśrīnīibandhāvali, and Ratnakīrtinīibandhāvali by Anantlal Thakur, the article 'Bhāsarvajña' (third Oriental Conference, Madras, 1924) by V. P. Vaidyā, the article "Some Lost Nyāya Works and Authors" (Oriental Conference Seventeenth Session, Ahmedabad 1953) by Anantlal Thakur; the article "Nyāyabhūṣāna : A Lost Work of Medieval India Logic" (The Journal of the Bihar Research Society, Patna, 1959) by Anantlal Thakur; etc.

In the second chapter, I have tried to ascertain the precise nature of prakāraṇa works and of syncretic works, on the basis of some standard syncretic manuals or texts and
assess the Nyāyasāra of Bhāsarvajña in that light. An attempt is also made to trace the tradition of auto-commentary, in the different philosophical schools. Similarly in the third chapter, I have tried to trace the tradition of maṅgala in the works of different schools of philosophy.

The Fourth and Fifth chapter deal with the excellence of Nyāyavidyā and the topic of pramāṇa, pramāṇa and prāmāṇya; respectively.

In the sixth chapter, while treating Doubt, I have attempted to compare the view of Bhāsarvajña with that of Vatsyayana, Uddyotakara, Jayanta Bhatta, as well as of Vācaspati Misra and others. The seventh chapter is devoted to Error (Viparyaya). It is interesting to note that Bhāsarvajña elaborately describes the eight types of khyāti; namely akhyāti, asatkhya and atmakhyāti of the different sections of the Buddhists, smṛti-vipramogā-khyāti and alaṃkārthakhyāti of different schools of the Mīmāṃsā; Prasiddhārthakhyāti of cārvāka, anirvacaniya-khyāti of Vedāntin, and anyathā-khyāti or viparīta-khyāti of the Naïyāyika. To my surprise, I found some parallel passages in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa and in the Prameyakamala-mārtanda of Prabhācandra. According to Mahendra Kumar Shastri, the date of Prabhācandra is 980-1065 A.D. (Introduction to Prameyakamalamārtanda); hence we may say that Prabhācandra must have taken passages almost verbatim from the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. I have quoted such passages in the foot-notes.
The eighth chapter deals with the various views on the concept of karana. For a proper comprehension of these views, I have referred to and quoted in the foot-notes the sūtras of Pāṇini, the relevant verses from Bhartrhari's Vākyapadiya, passages from the Siddhānta-kaumudi, Ślokavārtika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Śabarabhāṣya; the Pramāṇavārtika with the auto-commentary of Dharmakīrti on Svārthānūmāna and the commentaries of Prajñākara and Ācārya Manorathanandin; and so on. I have also tried to compare Bhāsarvajña's view regarding 'karana' with that of Uddyotakara, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and Vācaspati Miśra. I came across certain places in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa where a part of some verse quoted by Bhāsarvajña is amalgamated with the prose-text of the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa (e.g. NyB, p. 152). I have tried to trace such quotations and to arrange or construe the text properly.

The ninth chapter deals with the other Nyāya topics as they are discussed by Bhāsarvajña in continuation of prameya, viz. Prayaṇa, Drśtanta, Siddhānta, etc. An attempt is made to show how Bhāsarvajña differs from Vātsyāyana. In the exposition of Siddhānta, our author clarifies the signification of the term 'Saṃānata tantra'. In his view, the Vaiśeṣīka is not the 'Saṃānata tantra' of the Nyāya. According to Bhāsarvajña, the common source of for many writers or commentators is 'saṃānata tantra' for them. For example, the Nyāyasūtra is the saṃānata tantra for all the writers and commentators of the Nyāya school.
The tenth chapter discusses the number of pramāṇas. A noteworthy change wrought by Bhāsarvajña is his acceptance of three pramāṇas. Quoting Gṛhaṇādisūtra he argues that though the author of the Nyāyasūtra enumerates only five sense-organs, he later admits the mind also as a sixth sense-organ. He seems to suggest that the enumeration given by the author of the Nyāyasūtra is not exact and exhaustive. Though our author seems to struggle to show that his view is not in conflict with the view of Aksapāda, yet he does not seem to be convincing. Including Upamāna in Sābda, Bhāsarvajña admits only three pramāṇas, namely, Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Sābda.

The eleventh chapter is devoted to the discussion of the definition of perception. It is for the first time after Aksapāda, that Bhāsarvajña formulates a unique definition of Perception in the Nyāya school - 'a means of right non-indirect presentative experience is pratyakṣa' (Sāmyag-aparokṣa-mabhava-Sādhaṇam pratyakṣam). This definition covers all the three types of knowledge - (i) that which is generated by sense-object contact, (ii) that which a yogin could have by the power of concentration; and (iii) that which is eternal-God's knowledge (See: NyB, p. 463). The significance of Bhāsarvajña's definition is elaborately elucidated by Gopinath Kavi-rajb (Gleanings From The History And Bibliography of The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature, pp. 3-4) and by Sukhlalji Sanghavi
(Advanced Studies in Indian Logic & Metaphysics, p.57). In Bhāsarvajña's view, aparokṣatva (i.e. non-indirectness) is the uncommon or special characteristic of perceptual knowledge. The phrase 'indriyārtha-sannikāraṇa' (sense-object contact) in the Nyāyasūtra 1.1.4 indicates, as he says, the genus 'aparokṣatva'. I think, Bhāsarvajña is first to elucidate so elaborately that a past or a future thing is a positive entity, though it is not there. And even though it is not generative of cognition, it could certainly be an object of cognition. That which is manifest in cognition is its object, and not that which generates the cognition.

In this context, Bhāsarvajña seeks to interpret the Nyāyasūtra 1.1.4, defining perception. According to him the term 'avyapadesya' (inexpressible) is meant to include non-determinate perception. Determinate perception is, in Bhāsarvajña's view, suggested by two Nyāyasūtras 'prthivyādīgūrṇaḥ tadārthāḥ' (1.1.44) and 'vyakti-ākṛti-jātayaḥ tu padārthāḥ' (2.2.66). It is evident that the relation of qualifier-qualificand in qualificative cognition is suggested here. Alternatively Bhāsarvajña says that determinate perception is included by the term 'vyavasāyātmakam' in the Nyāyasūtra 1.1.4. Bhāsarvajña further says that the terms 'vyavasāyātmakam' and 'avyabhicāri' signify that there are only two types of non-valid cognition, namely, Doubt and Illusion, and not four types (Samsāya,
In the twelfth chapter, varieties of perception are treated. Before Vacaspati Misra, Bhasarvajna has very distinctly classified perception into savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka. According to Bhasarvajna, both, yogic and non-yogic perception, can be divided into savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka. Our author rejects the classification of perception into types, given by Dharmakirti (viz indriyajñāna, manovijnāna, atmasamvedana and yogijñāna). In the context of non-yogic perception, Bhasarvajna takes pains to establish the existence of the 'whole' (avayavin). As such an exposition is found in almost all the standard works on the Nyāya, we did not deem it proper to devote one whole chapter to this topic. Nevertheless, all the salient points from this discussion are mentioned in the last chapter.

Bhasarvajna repudiates yogic perception as accepted by the Buddhist on the ground that since all cognitions in the Buddhist view, are without any objective support, yogic perception cannot be distinguished from other varieties of perception, as admitted by the Buddhist.

While describing determinate perception, our author says that in qualificative cognition (Surabhi dravyam, or vahnīman parvataḥ), it may be either perceptual or inferential, the
base is only the qualificand (viṣeṣya). Bhāsarvajña then puts forth in the prima-facie view the Buddhist arguments in full details, which repudiate determinate perception. Then, as usual, he refutes them one by one, and seeks to establish determinate cognition as valid perception.

The thirteenth chapter deals with the problem of 'prāpyakārttvā' of the sense-organs. Refuting the Buddhist view that the visual organ and auditory organ give rise to cognitions without coming into actual contact with their objects, Bhāsarvajña strongly supports the accepted Nyāya view that all sense-organs are capable of giving rise to cognitions only on reaching their objects. Our author seems to suggest that all instruments - whether axe or magnet or anything else - bring about the effects only on coming into actual contact with their co-operative causes. Even a deity comes into actual contact with the devotee before fulfilling his desire.

The fourteenth chapter is devoted to the question as to how dravya, guṇa, etc. could be perceived. In this connection, Bhāsarvajña denies guṇatva as an entity that could be perceived and also denies Saṁkhya, parimāṇa, etc. as guṇa. He seeks to include karman in the list of guṇas. Because of such a revolutionary or progressive tendency, Vallabha in his Nyāyalilāvatī calls our author 'indisciplined' (anāmnata).
In this context I have referred to the Padārthataṭṭvamāraṇa of Raghunātha Siromāni who has also rejected Samkhyā, etc. as guṇas. Thus we come to know that suggestions to modify the categorical structure of the Vaiśeṣika, which are attributed to Raghunātha Siromāni to-day are made in the Nyāya-bhūṣana long before Raghunātha Siromāni.

In connection with the perception of Samavāya Bhāsarvajña says that the statement in the Nyāyasāra that 'Samavāya is sometimes perceived' should be taken as the view of a section of the Naiyāyikas. Alternatively he confesses that he might have been mistaken earlier because of writing without full consideration of the topic. Our author seems to believe that perception of Samavāya is not like an ordinary perception of a jar, etc; it is a logical necessity before we can know of perceive any two things as related by Samavāya (e.g. a piece of cloth and yarns). For a proper comprehension of perception of Samavāya and abhāva, I have tried to find out parallel passages in the Nyāyavārtika and the Nyāyaśāṅkārī and quoted them in the foot-notes. In connection with the etymological explanation of the term 'Sannikarṣa', the views of Ācārya Adhyayanapāda and Viśvarūpa are referred to by Bhāsarvajña. For this, I have referred to the article "Forgotten Naiyāyikas - (2) Ācārya Adhyayanapāda" - Dr. E. A. Solomon, Vidya, 1974.
In the last chapter (15), I have attempted to evaluate Bhāsarvajña as an important thinker of the Nyāya school, especially on the basis of what I came across while studying the original text of the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. For this purpose, I have also collected material from various sources. I have also tried to show how Bhāsarvajña elaborately analyses and criticises the Buddhist Views. Some objections raised by the Vaisēṣi­kas and others and rejoinders given by Bhāsarvajña have also been noted. I have also sought to show how Bhāsarvajña prompted by a religious bent of mind readily admitted certain fundamental revolutionary or progressive changes in the Nyāya-Vaisēṣika system, especially in respect of ontological problems. It has also been shown how our author emerged as a great thinker of his time and the precursor of the Navya-nyāya school. (1) To the best of my knowledge, an attempt is for the first time made here to give a thorough exposition line by line of the text of the Pratyakṣa pariccheda of the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa with an attempt to study the rival views from the original works and in a proper perspective.

(2) A fresh study of syncretic works has been attempted and an attempt has also been made to find out a criterion for syncretic works.

(3) I have, for the first time, attempted, to bring into relief the Nyāyasāra as the first Prakaraṇa work known to us.
(4) To the best of my knowledge attention has for the first time drawn to the fact that the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa of Bhāsarvajña is the first known auto-commentary (Svopajña-tīkā) in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.

(5) I have tried to show that the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa is the first known Nyāya work to discuss problems at length and in the light of different systems, especially in the context of the discussion of epistemology. In this respect, Bhāsarvajña seems to have been inspired by Dharmakīrti and other Buddhist writers.

(6) It has been prominently shown here that Bhāsarvajña is a precursor of Navya-Nyāya in respect of epistemological bias, as also in respect of progressive outlook in regard to the ontological categories of the Vaiśeṣika. Attention has been drawn to this by Matilal and others, but I have argued out a case for Bhāsarvajña on the basis of his own words in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa.

(7) To the best of my knowledge the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa is for the first time studied in the light of works, earlier and later.

(8) So far as I know, I have for the first time utilised the well known commentaries on the Nyāyasāra, Nyāyamuktavali by Aparārkadeva, and other commentaries to ensure a proper understanding of the text of the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa.
Attention has been focussed on Bhāsarvajña's unique treatment of prameyas and to his acceptance of emancipation as endowed with bliss.

I have also drawn attention to Bhāsarvajña's religious bent of mind and fervour which goaded him and even made him open-minded enough to accept the truth in the criticism of Nyāya-Vaisēśika categories by rival thinkers, especially in relation to Saṃkhya, Parimāṇa, etc; and even dik, Kāla. This in its turn perhaps inspired Raghunātha Siromāṇi to examine the ontological categories especially of the Vaisēśikas in a fresh and critical light.

To the best of my knowledge an evaluation of Bhāsarvajña as an important thinker of the Nyāya school is for the first time made here on the basis of a close and critical study of the text of the Nyāyabhūṣāṇa.

I have also pointed out perhaps for the first time that there were thinkers in the Nyāya school even prior to Bhāsarvajña who perhaps under Buddhist influence did not find much justification in the acceptance of all the categories as accepted by the Vaisēśika and even rejected or interpreted differently some of the Vaisēśika categories. Bhāsarvajña seems to be quite appreciative of their outlook. He says that
he could not be dogmatic in such respects, as such problems do not affect the attainment of emancipation.

(13) I have consulted the original manuscript and attempted to correct the errors in the printed text as also suggested emendations where I felt they were necessary. I shall feel very happy if fresh light is thrown on some passages of the text about the interpretation of e which I am not quite confident.

I hope, this humble effort of mine in the churning of the great ocean in the form of the Nyāyabhuṣaṇa, will certainly prove to be some contribution, however small it be, to the vast literature on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. I also hope that this study will be helpful to some extent in bringing up big gaps in the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature. We find in the Nyāyabhuṣaṇa the mention of names of thinkers like Adhyāyanapāda, Visvarūpa or the like as well as the titles Tikākārah, Ācāryaḥ and pūrvācāryaḥ, but their works are lost—perhaps for ever. Hence there are still a number of explorable horizons beckoning researchers. I shall consider my efforts fully rewarded even if I have succeeded in pointing out some of the missing links and in giving a detailed and critical exposition line by line of the Pratyakṣa Pariccheda of the Nyāyabhuṣaṇ.
**Scheme of Transliteration.**

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