A very interesting and lively problem discussed by the various schools of logic in connection with perception is whether the organ of perceptual knowledge should come into actual touch with the object it perceives. In perception we acquire knowledge by means of sense-organs. The Naiyāyikas think that for the rise of sensuous cognition, the actual contact of the sense-organ with their respective object is indispensable. It is easy to understand that sense of taste and sense of touch actually come in contact with their respective objects and give rise to cognitions. Smell as subsisting in substance-particles also reaches the olfactory organ and thus the actual contact is brought about. But how could the visual organ and auditory organ be said to come in contact with their respective objects? How could there be the contact of eyes with the star? How could there be contact between auditory organ and sound? According to the Nyāya view, the subtle visual organ actually goes out and reaches the object, e.g. a star. And in the case of auditory organ, sound travels in a series, each perishing after giving rise to the succeeding one, and thus it reaches the ears in a continuum.

1. इनक्ष्यपालकनिरपूज्यांचें शान्तः... प्रत्येकर्षः I - NS, 1-1-4;
2. See: NS, 3-1-42-44
according to the Nyāya view, the sense-organs are prāpyakāri, capable of operating only on contact being established with the object. On the other hand, the Buddhist holds that the visual organ and auditory organ give rise to cognitions, without coming into actual contact with their respective objects.

Now, we shall see how Bhāsarvajña deals with this problem. Establishment of the view, that the sense-organs function only after reaching the objects: Now we shall discuss in this chapter the Nyāya view endorsed by Bhāsarvajña that the sense-organs, while giving rise to a cognition, actually reach the object. In this connection the Buddhist view may be noted here. According to this view, there does not occur any contact between sense-organ and object, while a cognition is produced. In order to establish an illustration to show that there is absence of any kind of contact they say: The visual organ and the auditory organ do not function after reaching their objects, that is to say, they need not come into contact with their object, while giving rise to cognition, for, we are aware of the distance between these sense-organs and their objects. If the visual organ and the auditory organ go out of the body and come in direct contact with their objects, then the knowledge that we have of the distance between sense-organs and objects would not have been there; just as when an
axe and a tree come in contact with each other, we do not have the knowledge of any distance between them. And if the sense-organ is said to reach the object, how does it do so? There can be two alternative ways: Does the object reaching the place of eye come into contact with it? Or does the eye go out and reach the place where the object is, and come into contact with it? Now, if the first alternative is admitted, it would go against our experience. And, for instance, when we perceive fire, should the fire come to our visual organ, then this would involve the contingency of our eye being scorched by the fire. As this does not happen, and as we do not see the object approaching the object the first alternative is not tenable. The second alternative also contradicts our experience. As for example, the visual organ is never apprehended by anybody as going out of the body and coming into contact with object, just as an arrow is seen, flying in the air and reaching the target aimed at.

If it is urged by the Naiyāyika that since the visual organ is too subtle to be apprehended, i.e., supersensuous, it cannot be so seen, the answer to this is that it is not so. For, it is known to the whole world that the visual organ is nothing but the orifice of the eye. In support of this we can say that when the eye-ball is injured, there is not the visual perception of object. And even if to humour the Naiyāyika, it is admitted that the visual organ is too subtle to perceive, there would arise the question:
Is it subtle because it is incorporeal like ether? Or is it subtle on account of its having a very small dimension? Now, if the first alternative is conceded, the visual organ would come into contact with all the objects and apprehend them simultaneously. For, all incorporeal substances (things) are accepted by the Naiyāyika as all-pervasive. Now, if in accordance with the second alternative the visual organ is admitted to be subtle on account of its having a very small dimension, that too is not proper. For, it apprehends objects of larger dimensions. Nail, scissors, etc. are found to be functioning (scratching, cutting, etc.) only in as much area as they are in contact with. On the ground of this analogy, it would be untenable that the visual organ of very small dimension should be capable of apprehending mountain, etc.

In addition to this, for this reason also that a branch of a tree and the moon are simultaneously apprehended by the

1. The text should be read as - 'अत्परिप्रार्थनेन' instead of 'अत्प्रार्थनेन'
   - NyB, p.94, Photostat, p.41

2. The text should be 'सवार्थिकस्मृक्तचाल दुष्पद्य ग्रहित्वं स्वार्थः', and not 'सवार्थिकस्मृक्तचालरुपाल्क्यं स्वार्थः'।
   - NyB, p.94, Photostat, p.41

3. Compare: हन्द्रीकारंकित्तिनिनिबन्धम् हर्ति कुक्ति, हन्द्रिकारं
   क्रायकारिव्राति। क्रायकारिणी चन्द्रः चोत्र: हर्ति के। तत्र च च्यां
   कुक्ते, क्रायकारि चचुः: सान्तर्ग्रहणात्, पृथ्वियोगमातृ च हर्ति।
   - NV, NCG, p.201 (NS 1.1.4)
visual organ, the latter could not be admitted as going out and reaching the object. For, if the visual organ were to go out of the body, it ought to have successively reached the objects and been capable of successively coming into contact with the objects and consequently would have successively apprehended the objects that is to say it should first apprehend the object nearer to it, e.g. a branch of tree, and then distant objects like moon, etc. However, our experience is not such.

The Naiyāyika may urge that there certainly is an interval of time between the apprehension of near and distant objects, though we conceive that they are simultaneously apprehended because of the excessive speed of the sensual organ. But this cannot be maintained, says the Buddhist. For, the moon being too distant, it is likely to be reached by the visual organ necessarily after a long interval of time and so we would certainly come to know of it if it were there. Again, it may be urged that we may set aside the visual organ for the time being; but as far as the auditory organ is concerned, sound travels from the place of its production in a continuum and reaches the portion of Ākāśa circumscribed by the physical ear. Thus sound or sābda comes into contact with the auditory organ and is consequently apprehended. But this is not tenable, says Bhāsarvajña. For, when we cognise sound, we also say from
which direction it comes. If sound were apprehended in the space confined in the ear, it would not be consistent to refer to sound as being in a particular direction, such as east or west, or to 'sound from the village' or 'from the forest', etc. Thus it is established that the auditory organ does not come into direct contact with the sound. On the basis of this analogy, we should repudiate the belief that the sense-organs operate upon objects only after reaching them, or coming into contact with them.

Refutation of this view by Bhāsarvajña: Bhāsarvajña says that as regards the argument put forth by the opponent that since the space-interval between sense-organ and object is apprehended, the sense-organ cannot be said to operate upon the object only reaching it; the answer is that the reason in the above argument is not established. So it is not a valid reason. For, the visual organ, etc. are super sensuous and hence cannot be apprehended by means of a sense-organ, and hence also the interval of space between the object and the sense-organ cannot be apprehended, for this requires the knowledge of the two limits. How could it be then claimed that the separation of the object (from the sense-organ) is apprehended by perception? By inference, on the other hand, we can know that the sense-organs like visual organ, etc. are capable of illuminating objects only when they come into direct contact with them; just as a lamp illumines objects only by coming into contact with them (things are illumined only as
As for the question as to how the direct contact of sense-organ with object takes place; it can be said that the visual organ itself reaches the location of the object through its rays, and comes into direct contact with the object, just in the same manner as a lamp reaches the object through its light-rays. However the light rays emanating from the visual organ cannot be seen as they are devoid of any manifest colour. It may be urged that it is not proper to say that the light-rays emanating from the visual organ, can illumine objects, for they themselves do not have manifest colour. In answer to this Bhaśarvajña says that this is not tenable. For, the

1. रूपप्रकाशनिपत्तिविशेषतः लक्षणानां । - NS 3-1-34;

"The said apprehension (of large and small things) is due to the peculiarity of the contact between the light rays (emanating from the visual organ) and the object (perceived)."

- Gaṅgānātha Jhā

2. अनुचूपलम्: च कर्मानव रक्षिन्, तद्भव प्रत्ययंतः न सम्भवे हति ! -

- NB on NS 3-1-38; "It is for this reason (of perceptibility depending upon the manifestation of colour) that the Light-ray from the Eye, having its colour unmanifested, is not perceived with the Eye, (and certainly this non-perception does not prove that the ray is non-existent)."

- Gaṅgānātha Jhā
light-rays emanating from Eye, being associated with the light of lamp, etc. can bring about the knowledge of objects. Hence in the case of those whose ocular rays arise as endowed with manifest colour by virtue of adṛśa, these rays emanating from their Eyes can illumine the object without the aid of external light; just as it happens in the case of night-rovers (naktāṅcara), namely, the cat, the owl and the like. Also, in the case of certain night-rovers like the cat and other animals (of the feline species), the ocular rays emanating from their Eyes can be seen just by perception. Here

1. सात्यप्रकाशानुगहाद्विषयोपलब्धेः अप्रभवक्तः: अनुपलब्धिः।
   - NS 3.1-42; "The perception of things being brought about by the aid of external light, the non-perception (of the visual light) must be due to the non-manifestation (of Colour)." - Gaṅgānātha Jhā.

2. नक्तचरानगलिपरमविजयायाच।
   - NS 3.1-44;
   "Also because we actually perceive the light in the eyes of night-walkers". Jhā.
Bhasarvajña echoes the view of the author of the Nyāya-Uttara.

Giving an alternative explanation Bhasarvajña says that the ocular rays, as they are produced from the component parts of the eye, along with the component parts of light, they are produced even as endowed with manifest colour. Indeed light

1. See: "Against the view that the visual organ cannot perceive external objects since it has no manifest colour, Bhūsānakāra is said to hold that here light etc. serve as aids to the eye. There are animals with manifest colour in their eyes and they require no external aid to see through darkness. Rays issuing out of the eyes of some night-rovers are perceived — यद्व तु दूसरणोऽन क्रमायं क्रमाव्य अनुभूतत्तप्यानातु अर्थात्कारकत्ययु हति बैठ, न, प्रदीपप्रकाशकशिलानां कदुपपची। कत एव दृष्टास्मृतस्मृतमातृतु उद्यमत्तप्या नायना राष्ट्र उत्पन्ना: तेनां बालूकधारिनिपेटि खार्ष्य प्रकाशप्रहलादः, यथा नक्षत्रचरणां। तथा च केषां चित्तु नक्षत्रचरणा नायना राष्ट्र: प्रत्यक्षरूप दृष्ट्यन्ते। —

(NyB, p. 95) - Sādvādaratnākara, p. 322 (Vādidevasūri) — Nyāyabhūṣaṇa — A Lost Work of
Medieval Indian Logic, Prof. Anantlal Thakur, The
(or heat) is seen as being possessed of very quick destruction and production; and the colour as well as the touch of light are seen to be alternatively endowed with manifestation and non-manifestation. That is to say, when light is produced; its colour and touch become manifest, but it immediately perishes, so they become non-manifest. 

Though the ocular rays are produced as endowed with manifest colour, they are not perceived distinctly and separately as they enter into another light e.g. sun-light or lamp; just as when light-rays of many lamps come into contact with one object, they cannot be distinctly and separately known.

Explanation of Visual organ Apprehending very large objects: As for the reason adduced by the opponent that the visual organ cannot be admitted as coming into direct contact with the object, since it can apprehend very large objects, mountain, etc., - the answer is that the reason given is inconclusive. Indeed it is not that a lamp can illumine an object only of as much dimension as it (i.e. the lamp) has. As a matter of fact, the lamp pervades even a larger object than itself through its rays. This is true of the visual organ also.

Moreover, the opponent has put forward the argument that the Eye cannot be said to come into direct contact with the object, since it can simultaneously apprehend a branch of a
tree and the moon. He says that if the visual organ is believed to be coming into direct contact with the object, it should take more time in reaching the moon than that in reaching the branch of the tree. But here also the reason is an unproven one; and so cannot prove the thing that is to be established. Really speaking, the light-rays emanating from the eye are so excessively swift (-1,860,000 miles per second, is the accepted velocity of the light-rays-) that we cannot make out the difference between the two time-points (i.e., the time when we apprehend the branch of a tree and the time when we apprehend the moon), though it is there. Because of the tremendous velocity of Eye-rays, we feel that the branch of the tree and the moon are simultaneously apprehended, though it is really not so.

It may be urged that since the moon is excessively remote, the Eye-rays cannot reach there within so short a time, and so the time-interval should be known; but it is not known. The answer to this is that this is so because the Eye-rays being very light can move with extraordinary swiftness, just

1. Compare: अपृभत्यः हि कैवः लापवार्तिशण लेगार्शिमो युद्धविगिरिरिलाम बारोस्त्थ्य मात्रेदिकरणी भवनेवदेव वालोक हस्ताभिमानो लागिकिवानाम। ताध्वं चाढ़ुदागमणि तेजः क्रमेणापि गच्छत युग्मत तत्र तत्र प्राप्तम् श्रति लज्जते।

- NVTT, NCG, p. 217 (NSm l-1-4)
like the rays of the sun. We do not come to know any successive order in regard to the rays of the sun, when they come into contact with the objects, far and near.

**Explanation About the Reference to Direction in Auditory Perception:** The objection was raised that if the contact of the auditory organ with sound took place inside the region of the Ear, then reference to the direction, 'Sound from the east,' etc. could not be possible. But this objection is not tenable, says Bhāṣarvajña. For, the reference to the direction is possible otherwise also. As for instance, when a person apprehends a sound, in the region of the ether limited (—and differentiated from the rest of the Ākāśa) by the ear-cavity that is qualified by the eastern direction; he understands that the sound is produced in the east. It should be so understood in the case of the other directions, south, etc. also. Indeed the auditory organ is nothing but a portion of ether limited by the parts of the ear-cavity. And those parts of the ear-cavity exist in all directions. It is, therefore, proper that sound should be apprehended as limited or conditioned by a particular direction. And the knowledge

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1. The text should be read as - 'पूर्वदिशिविषिक्षृणुष्णकालयां
    याविक्षिण्यं' and not 'पूर्वदिशिविषिक्षृणुष्णकालयां
    याविक्षिण्यं' - NyB, p.96; Photostat, p. 42
that the sound is produced at a particular distance is inferential.

According to the sound-theory as accepted by the Naiyāyika, sound is non-eternal. It travels from the place of its production in a continuum and reaches the ear-cavity. The first sound produces a second similar sound and then it perishes; then the second sound produces a third similar sound, and so on; until the last sound reaches the ear-drum and is directly perceived by the auditory organ. Sound is born of the operation of its cause (e.g. conjunction between a stick and a drum). A man who hears such a sound, reaching the ear in continuum, even while he is in the know - by means of perception or by verbal testimony - of the place where the sound is originally produced, comes to know in the manner as mentioned above, of the special distinctive characteristics of the particular sound. Thus he has the knowledge of the peculiar character of the sound coming from a particular distance. Later if he apprehends a sound with the same peculiar character, he can at once infer as to from how far

1. व उत्पन्नः शब्दः स्वादिशकारिनि शब्दान्तराणिः करोति । तात्विकपि प्रत्येक शब्दान्तराणी तावल्ल यावदू कष्टिण्यकलीमत्यथाकाशकेः हति ।
   यः कष्टिण्यकलीमति आकाशदेवे समस्तिः स सम्बायात्तुपलम्यते ।
   - NV, NC G, pp. 199-200
the sound is coming even if he does not see the cause or source of the sound. This can happen just as by certain peculiarities a man can know (by inference) that the sound is that of a conch or is the voice of a particular speaker. Thus this knowledge of distance is inferential only. However, a person who cannot mark such peculiarities, has a doubt - 'Whose sound is this?' 'Whence does it come?' Thus it is inferred that sound is produced in a particular direction; after such an inference the person thinks that a village or the like could possibly be situated there and refers to the sound as one produced in that village or the like. It is not that the place or the like where the sound is produced is apprehended by the auditory organ. Therefore, it is established that like the gustatory organ, etc. even the visual organ and the auditory organ actually reach the objects and cognise them; since they are external sense-organs.

Contingency of all objects being apprehended, if the sense-organs are not admitted as reaching the objects: If indeed the sense-organs are not admitted as coming in direct contact with objects, there would arise the contingency of all objects (howsoever near or far off) being apprehended. And if

1. The text should be read as 'कृष्णकारणस्य ' and not 'कृष्णकारणस्य' - NyB, p. 96; the Photostate (p.42) also seems to have faulty reading: 'ताबृष्णकारणस्य'
the attainment of the object by sense-organ is not there, there does not exist any other capability, so that it could be said that a thing, which is at a 'proper' place (i.e. a place where a thing is capable of being perceived) is apprehended.

On the strength of the analogy of magnet and iron-piece, the opponent may again enter the arena. It may be argued that the sense-organs can cognise their objects, without reaching them, just as the magnet occasions movement in the iron-piece, without coming into direct contact with it. In answer to this Bhāsarvajña says that doubt (or the dispute) cannot be allayed merely on the strength of an instance. Two alternative questions could be asked: Are the sense-organs to be regarded as not reaching the objects, like the magnet, etc.? Or are they to be admitted as reaching their objects, like axe or the like. The opponent cannot adduce any specific reason as to why the sense-organs should be regarded as being operative without reaching their objects, like the magnet, and not as operative like the axe or the like by being in direct contact with the object.

Moreover, even in the case of the instance of the magnet, the special air-substance which is produced as being closely associated with - just like
breath (Special air-substance) in the body - certainly reaches the iron-piece and attracts it even as the breath is capable of sucking water or capable of attracting towards the body very light substances like cotton, etc. It is true that in these illustrations, the touch of this special air-substance is not apprehended; yet the existence of this wind produced as such could certainly be known just by its function (i.e. the attracting of things by it). It may be noted here that Bhāsarvājña puts forth the illustration of incantation (mantra) and deity (devata) in support of his view that the sense-organ operates upon the object only after reaching it. He says that even an incantation propitiates a deity only after coming into direct contact with the deity. The particular deity also establishes its contact with the devotee, who mutters the incantation (japa), and then fulfils his desire. There is no thing which could operate upon an object without actually coming into contact with it or reaching it.

1. The text should be read as 'क哑ः प्रापि ख्व' or could it be प्राप्येव, and not प्राप्येव?
   - NyB, p. 97; Photostat, p. 42
2. See: NV, NCG, p. 201 ff; NWT, NCG, pp. 214-218; NM, part I, p. 69; part II, p. 50
Signification of the term 'präpyakāritva' in Bhāsarvajña's view:

It may be urged that a word the internal organ or mind and the like give rise to knowledge of a past thing or the like, even though they do not come into direct contact with the past thing or the like. How could it then be accepted that everything operates upon an object only after reaching it? In answer to this Bhāsarvajña says that this is not so; and the argument advanced by the opponent is based on his ignorance of the fact. The term 'präpyakāritva' signifies that any cause whatsoever, while it brings about an effect, does take the aid of its auxiliary cause. That is to say, each and every cause is assisted by its auxiliary cause, before it produces its effect. So what is to be attained by the cause is the

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1. सहकारिण ग्राप्य कारणस्य कार्यकलाप प्राप्त्यकारित्वमु उच्चते।

-NyB, p. 97;

See: यदि बृजकाळिनि कारणानि परस्परप्राप्त्यान्येकारणा स्ववृषं
क्रियान्तिकारणं कार्यं श्रेयं क्रान्तं वैत्तिकं
वक्तव्यं। ऋ: न क्रान्ति क्षणकारिकं अक्षतिः। केवलहेकरकाशुकहणं
तृतीय व्यवस्थितम् श्री-क्रियार्थेनिक्षेपणेत्तपन्नु श्रेयं। -

-NV, NCG, p. 203

Also see: सहस्रसाक्षकल्यं तावहं न प्राप्ते। वैतरिच्चिे। हृति उन्माद। -

-NVTT, NCG, p. 218

Also - हन्निव्यं कारकत्वेन प्राप्त्यकारित्वपुरुषं व कारकं कलाप
कलापं श्रेयं कल्याणं। संस्कर:। -

-NM, part I, p. 69;

कारकं व क्षणकारिकं वैतिषिनां।। क्षणकारित्वते व शक्ते। अविषेधानुि
कृत्यवादिव्यवहितमपि वक्तु विन्दुण्णा दृष्ट्याऽऽ्। -

-NM, part II, p. 50
accessory cause (- prāpya = having attained, kārin = becoming operative). And we find prāpyakāritva thus understood, even in the case of word, internal organ, etc. The cause should reach its co-operative cause in order to be regarded as prāpyakārin. Now, a past or future object is just not the cause of anything. Hence even if Sabda, etc. were not to attain them, they cannot be said to be 'a-prāpyakārin'.

However, the objects of visual organ, etc. cannot said to be non-generative of cognition. The fact that such objects serve as co-operative causes giving aid to the special cause (e.g. visual organ, or the like) can be proved by means of positive and negative concomitance; just as light, etc. are proved to be co-operative causes. It may be urged that though collyrium, etc. are in direct contact with the eye, etc.; they are not apprehended. Thus we find here the discrepancy that though the thing is in direct contact with the sense-organ, it is not apprehended. In reply to this, Bhāsarvajña says that this objection too is not tenable. For, it is not the rule that whatever is in direct contact with the sense-organ, is necessarily apprehended. What then is the rule? In fact the rule is this that whatever is apprehended by external sense-organ, should necessarily be something that is in direct contact with the sense-organ. This is so for this reason that since the external sense-organs are formed of material substances - or they are elemental products,
they can illumine only those objects which are in direct contact with them; just like lamp.

Again, it may be argued that there would arise this contingency that the mind being an organ should be capable of illumining only that thing which is in direct contact (- and not through external sense-organs-) with it. The answer to this is that this does not generally happen, because the mind is not an elemental product. So the contingency urged is not tenable. But on some occasions this is true of the mind also. For example, when the mind apprehends the soul or its qualities, it is in direct contact with it. So proving that the mind comes into direct contact with the object involves the fault of proving what is already established. On the other hand, in the alternative of the restriction, the contradiction with past and the like objects, has been pointed out (- they are cognised even though not reached; as they are not generative of cognition, and hence not auxiliary causes; so there is no question of the sense-organ coming into direct contact with them). Moreover, it is established by the joint method of agreement and difference that the thing which is existent in the present and which is generative of cognition is apprehended by the sense-organ. And only when all the causes productive of cognition are mutually connected (prāpya), do they bring about the effect viz.
cognition. Just as when the inherent cause (e.g. clay), non-inherent cause (e.g. conjunction of two halves), add efficient cause (e.g. potter) are all mutually connected, only then can they become the cause of the effect, i.e. jar. Thus it is established that the sense-organs come into direct contact with their objects, and then give rise to cognition.

Recapitulating we may say that Bhāsarvajña has sought to fully establish the accepted Nyāya view that sense-organs are capable of giving rise to cognitions only on reaching their respective objects. He refutes the opponent's argument that we apprehend the distance between sense-organs, especially visual organ and auditory organ on the one hand and their respective objects on the other; by asserting that this is not possible as the sense-organs are supersensuous.

According to Bhāsarvajña we can establish by inference the fact that sense-organs are prāpyakāri, i.e. capable of working, only on reaching the objects; just as a lamp reveals objects by coming into contact with the objects through light-rays.

In answer to the question why ocular rays emanating from the eyes are not seen, Bhāsarvajña puts forth two alternative views: (i) As ocular rays are devoid of manifest colour, they are not seen; (ii) Or though ocular rays are produced as endowed with manifest colour, they are not seen
since they are merged with other light-rays; as for example, when light-rays of many lamps are mixed with one another, they cannot be distinctly and separately seen.

Bhāsarvajña says that the visual organ can illuminate the object of a size bigger than its own, just as a small lamp reveals objects of a size bigger than its own. Bhāsarvajña rightly says that because of the tremendous speed of the ocular rays, we cannot mark the sequence in their reaching the objects that are nearer and farther.

As regards the auditory perception, Bhāsarvajña says that sound, travelling in a series reaches the ears and thus the actual contact between the auditory organ and sound takes place before the cognition of sound arises. He says that we can understand the reference to direction by marking the cognition of sound that is produced in the region of ākāśa circumscribed by the parts of the ear-cavity, qualified by the east or the like. The parts of ear-cavity are in all directions. As to the knowledge of distance, Bhāsarvajña says that a man first marks the special characteristics of the sound, the source of which (lying at a particular distance) he knows either through perception or verbal testimony; then on some other occasion the man can judge, while hearing the sound, from how much distance it comes, by making its special characteristics; even when the source of sound is not seen or known.
Bhāsarvajña thus concludes that like the sense of taste, or the like, the visual organ and the auditory organ also are capable of functioning only on reaching their respective objects. If this were not admitted, then all objects without restriction would come to be cognised by the sense-organs. According to Bhāsarvajña, even in the case of a magnet, there takes place contact between magnet and iron-piece, through a particular air-substance. Even a deity helps the devotee by coming into contact with him. Thus in all cases, an instrument is seen capable of bringing about the effect only on reaching the object. In regard to a past object or the like Bhāsarvajña says that since the past object or the like is not itself the cause of cognition, this question does not arise in their case. Bhāsarvajña thus critically examines all aspects of the problem of 'prāpyakāritva' and strengthens the view generally accepted in the Nyāya school. We find a similar discussion in the Nyāyāvārtika of Uddyotakara. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa also has discussed the problem of 'prāpyakāritva' and supported the generally accepted

1. क्यों न क्राणः अप्राप्यास्त्त वसीति | खेडवण्डकुलां हरणा लोककेश हरि श्रद्धां देशिति
   तस्मात् व्यक्तिस्ततः हस्तियथा विनिबध्यवेत्तान्विति |
   - NV, NCG, p. 203 (NS, 1-1-4)

   compare: वेंकृत्वर्ते प्राप्त स्वविशेषस्य कार्यः कृतज्ज्ञ, बनकर्त्ये सति
   तद्प्राप्ताः कषयकर्त्याः | यज्ञानस यद्यप्राप्ताः यन्त् जन्यति तत् तद्प्राप्ताः
   स्वतं तत्जन्यति, यथा कुमारकः कुमारकः लोकः अप्राप्ताः कुमारसं वृत्तिः तद्प्राप्ताः
   एव कराति तथा च स्तुति | तस्मात् तथा हरि |
   - NVTT, NCG, p. 217
Nyāya view. Sridhara in his Nyāya-Kandali also supports this view.

As D. M. Datta says, in spite of the crudeness of this account, this possesses a certain suggestive value. At first sight the view that senses go out to reach their objects would appear as absurd. But a little thought would show that the modern theory, that influences from objects reach our senses, is not so obvious or satisfactory as it seems, nor is the opposite Indian theory so absurd as it is thought to be. Difficulties are at least equally balanced on both sides.

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11 कार्य व अप्रायकारित्व द्वितीयतः। अप्रायकारित्वेन शक्ते: अविचितता कुद्यादिज्ञातितमपि वस्तु चढृष्टा दृश्यत। एव यवत्करणाः प्रायकारित्वं परमर्यादिः।

- NM, part II, pp. 50-51

2. See: NK (With PB), p. 60 ff