Chapter-12.

Varieties of Perception

Types of Perception (or the Varieties of Perception):

Giving the classification of Perception Bhasarvajña says in the Nyāyasāra that it is two-fold: (i) Yogic Perception, and (ii) Non-yogic (i.e., ordinary) Perception. Commenting on this Bhasarvajña says in the Nyāyabhūṣāṇa that the Definition of Perception has been stated as not being opposed to the sutra. Then in order to acquaint us with the varieties of perception it is said in the Nyāyasāra that Perception is two-fold: (i) Yogic Perception and (ii) Non-Yogic Perception. The use of the word 'ca' in the Nyāyasāra establishes that Perception is classified otherwise also, viz., into Determinate Perception (Sāvikalpaka Pratyakṣa) and Non-determinate Perception (Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa). The purpose of classifying perception into two varieties is to repudiate the view that

1. See: तद् दिविचित्रम् - योगिप्रत्यक्षम्, अयोगिप्रत्यक्षम् चेति (NyS, NyB, p. 191)

   तत्र अयोगिप्रत्यक्षम् - प्रकाशदेशकालयोधिनुग्रहादि विद्यायथेः म्यथविदेषे । स्वलोऽध्यास्मि (p.102) .....अयोगिप्रत्यक्षम् तु देशकालस्माविद्याप्रकृत्यार्थमुः । तद् दिविचित्रम् - गुत्तावस्थायाम् अवुक्तावस्थायाम् चेति (p.170)

   अवस्थायाम् अवुक्तावस्थायाम् भक्तद्विचित्रम् प्रकृत्याविद्याचित्रेणात् (p.170) | तव दिविचित्रसशिक्षेकर्षेन निविचित्रम् चेति | - NyS, NyB, p. 173
Perception is four-fold. For, the two additional varieties, viz. Mental Sensation (Manovijnjana) and Self-Conscious (Atma-saśvedanam) that brings about the cognition of passions, ideas, volitions, etc.; mentioned by others are not possible.

Here Bhāsarvajña is hinting at the view of Dharmakirtī who recognises four varieties of Perception: (1) Sense-knowledge (sensation) - Cognition, as far as it depends on the activity of the senses (alone), is sensation; (ii) Mental sensation follows the first moment of every sense-cognition which is thus its immediately preceding homogeneous cause. The latter is co-operating with the corresponding moment of the object, i.e. with that momentary object which immediately follows the proper momentary object of sensation. (iii) Every consciousness and every mental phenomenon are self-conscious. Dharmottara says

1. See: विविधं सम्प्रथ्यां शास्त्रम् (p.7)। प्रत्ययां अनुपातः च। तत्र कल्पनापौडः अनुप्रेष्यम् प्रत्ययां। (p.8)। विशिष्टकृत्यांशविधानं तत्र कर्तव्यम्। तत्र कल्पना क्या तत्र? चतुर्विधा। तत्र चतुर्विधा। (i) चिन्त्रिक्यानां, (ii) स्वविष्ण्यानां, (iii) राज्यानां, (iv) मूलादेशवनां, पद्यानां योगिनां चैति।

- Nyāyabindu (Dharmakīrti), pp.12-14, ed. by Ācārya Candrasekhara Sastrī, Banaras, 1954


3. चिन्त्रिक्यानां शास्त्रम् चिन्त्रिक्यानां। चिन्त्रिक्यानां च च तत्र प्रत्ययां।

- Dharmottarāṭīka, Ibid, p. 12

contd...foot-note No.4: see next page 569
contd..foot-note no.4 : see page:568

4. See: स्वयंचारणन्तरविश्वासकारिजि शिन्द्रमणनेन समान्तप्रत्येका
अनिलं तनयिभिजाजनमं।

Read: स्वं वात्मीयः विषयः शिन्द्रमणसम्य यथा कान्तकः। न पिताते
कन्तकम् बल्य रति कान्तकः। बन्तरं च व्यस्थानं विशेषः चौख्ते।
ततः परिपरि प्रतिनिधिः समाधातीयः। विशेषानांभाषी उपादेशातः
शिन्द्रमणविश्वासकारिजि उपरयोणम्: स्वयंचारणन्तरविश्वासकारिजि
मुः। तथा न रति शिन्द्रमणविश्वासकारिजि
उपरयोणम्: स्वयंचारणन्तरविश्वासकारिजि
विशेषानांभाषी उपादेशातः: स सहकारी यथा शिन्द्रमणविश्वासकारिजि
नतस्य तथातत्त्वम्। इतिविचः। तथा सहकारी। परस्परापेक्षा स्वयंचारणन्तरविश्वासकारिजि
वह च ज्ञाते सृष्टि वित्तियानांयोगोद्वारे ग्रहणार्थ कार्यार्थ कर्मार्थ सहकारी गृह्यते।
आत्मनांमस्य च मनोविश्वासम् स्वयं किमते, यतं तदन्वयं: न परस्पर-
सहकारित्वात्। हृदयं शिन्द्रमणानां बालम्बनप्रत्येकं चौख्ते योगिजाः
जन्यते। ततनी राजानि समान्तप्रत्येकं पृथ्वीयां
सम्म: चार्ची ज्ञातनदे
कान्तकः। च त्या बल्यविश्वासकारिजि स चार्ची प्रत्येकं: च हृदयानुसा च
समान्तप्रत्येकं प्रत्येक।।

Dharmottarāṭikā, p.13

5. See: स्वयंचारणायु आत्मस्वेदनम्।
Read: चिप्पु अर्माणायाहि। रूपम्: विषयाः स्वयंचारणग्राहयाः। बुधवाये।

.... नासक्तापिन्नि चिप्पुविविधा यस्मात् प्रत्येकं बालम्बनं न प्रत्येकं स्वार्थी।

Dharmottarāṭikā,

Dharmottarāṭikā Nyāyabindu, p.14
that consciousness simply apprehends the presence of an object. Mental phenomena apprehend special states of consciousness, such as pleasure etc. There is no mental phenomenon whatsoever it may be, which could be unconscious of its own existence. And this aspect of our knowledge which represents a feeling of its own existence is direct knowledge. (iv) The mystic intuition of the Yogin is produced from the subculminational state of deep meditation on transcendental reality.

Of these four varieties, Bhasarvajña rejects the second and the third, viz. Mental sensation (Mānasā jñāna) and self-consciousness (Atma-saṃvedana). He says that both these varieties are not proper, as there is no proof for them. Mental sensation is repudiated by the denial of the theory of momentariness. As explained by stcherbatsky, Mental sensation is based on the theory of momentariness. Accordingly, the first point-instant gives rise to pure sensation. This pure sensation in collaboration with the second point-instant in

1. See: मूलाधारवान प्रकृति प्रतिरूपिणी योगिजान्ति नैविद - Nyāyabindu, p.14
   Read: मूल: सबमूल: कथ: | प्रमाण: उद्देश्वर: च सहमूल: | यथा चत्वारित
   आध्यात्मिक (वह समस्यानिर्बोधमार्गिकानि) शुद्धाध्यात्मय भावना पुन: पुन: पूज्य: विचित् विचित्रकृतयु।
   मायानया: प्रकृति: मायावनाशांभाश्य झानस्य सफुटमत्वारथ:। प्रकृत्स्य प्रविष्ट्य यदा सफुटमत्वारथ: ईशान्य: कामयु:।
   सत्त्वित्यमिद दशा सर्वत्र सार्वत्रविभागात् प्रकृत्यमर्यादात्। काल्याणं तत्त्वाध्यात्ममात्रां तत्त्वाध्यात्मस्य
   सार्वत्र एव सप्तमत्वारथ: उच्चात्। तत्त्वाध्यात्ममात्रां यद्य शास्त्रं मायावनाशांभाश्य झानस्य सन्नितिस्य एव सफुटतात्त्वारथात्।

-Dharmottaratikā, pp.14-15
the series of point-instants of object gives rise to Mental sensation, a flash containing no synthetic imagination, and hence which is yet nirvikalpaka perception. As said above, Bhāsarvajña rejects this on the ground of the denial of theory of momentariness.

Self-conscious perception is also denied by Bhāsarvajña. He says that pleasure, etc. are not accepted as being self-conscious, and are not of the nature of consciousness (according to Nyāya-Vaiśesika). So this variety of cognition that apprehends passion, etc. cannot be accepted. In fact pleasure, etc. are cognised by the mind, and since the mind is accepted as a sense-organ, the perception of pleasure, etc. is in no way different from sensuous perception. Therefore the classification of perception into two varieties, viz. Yogic perception and Non-Yogic (ordinary) perception, is quite proper.

Exposition of Non-yogic Perception: On account of yogic perception being super-excellent, it is mentioned in the beginning when the varieties of perception are enunciated in the Nyāyasara. Yet Bhāsarvajña first takes up the topic of

2. See: तद विचित्र्य योगिप्रत्यक्षम क्योमः प्रत्यक्षम चैति : -
   - NyS, NyB, p. 101
3. See: दुर्लाश्य स्व स्फूटानुस्वस्त्वम स्वविदिताः : -
   - Dharmottaratika, Nyāyabindu, p. 14
Non-yogic perception for discussion in the Nyāyasāra, because unless we know what non-yogic perception is we cannot comprehend what yogic perception signifies. Hence non-yogic perception is assigned the first place in the exposition. In order to illustrate non-yogic perception it is said in the Nyāyasāra:

There is from among aggregate of perception, non-yogic (ordinary) perception is that which apprehends the gross object through a particular contact of the sense-organ and the object with the aid of light, space, time, merit (dharma), etc; is called non-yogic perception. Here Prakāśa signifies light characterised by lamp or the like as well as by the concentration of the mind (i.e. application of the mind to the desired sense-organ). Dharma or merit is instrumental in the cognition of desired object, while adharma or demerit is instrumental in the cognition of what is not desired. In addition to these, there may be other accessory causes which are not mentioned here and yet which are indispensable in the apprehension of the object, they are all to be understood here by the word adi ('and the like') in the Nyāyasāra. Thus the accessory

1. तत्वायोग्यप्रत्यक्ष - प्रकाशदेशकल्पपांचिप्रियासाहूः विनयायासयस्यचालनेष्योऽप्रेमदायी - NyS, NyB, p.102
2. It may be noted that the term 'Kāla' is found in the text of the NyS and is found commented upon by Vāsudeva Sūri in his Nyāyasārāpadapāñcikā (p.7). However, it is not found in the text of the NyB. This may be so because there is nothing special to say with regard to Kāla. - NyB, p. 102
3. प्रकाशदेशकल्पपांचिप्रियासाहूः - NyS, NyB, p. 102
causes are indicated here by light etc; and they signify here aids to the sense-organs. The sense-organ thus aided by the accessory causes becomes the most efficient cause in bringing about the cognition of the object. Here 'being the most efficient' in its case signifies that the sense-organ being endowed with a particular sense-object contact brings about the apprehension of the object.

It may be urged that the lamp also is known as the most efficient cause e.g. 'I see with the lamp' (and not just the sense organ - 'I see with the eye'). And there is nothing to contradict this. Then how could it be said that the sense-organ alone is the most efficient or the special cause and the lamp is the instrumental cause only? In answer to this Bhāsarvajñād says that it is true that lamp, etc also are causes in the bringing about of the cognition, but in view of the sense-organ's predominant role, it is called 'pratyakṣa' (means of valid cognition). And this predominance of the sense-organ is signified by the naming of its fruit after the sense-organ, e.g. caksusa Pratyakṣa, Ghranaja Pratyakṣa, etc. Everything is named after that which is peculiar to itself, for instance, when a seed of barley(yaṅa)

1. See: साधारणतः च भवायतः यह सन्निप्पत्तिः प्रतीति इति भवति।

   तत्र उपेक्षा

   विवेकेयस्य अन्वेषणस्य सन्निप्पत्तिः प्रतीति हि।

   - NyB, p. 103, Photostat, p. 44

   Compares: साधारणतः भवायतः भवायतः सन्निप्पत्तिः प्रतीति हि।

   - NyB, p. 61
sprouts, it is due to a number of factors, such as the particular time of the year, the seed, the soil etc; and yet the sprout is named not after the time of the year and such other factors, but only after the seed, which is the one factor peculiar to the sprout, which distinguished it from all other sprouts - it is called barely sprout. From different points of view, the lamp etc. also could be regarded as the most efficient cause; e.g. since the lamp aids the other instrumental causes, the cogniser, object etc.; it could also be regarded as a special cause. Or we can say that since the fruit (i.e. cognition) is produced just immediately after the sense-object contact, contact alone is the most efficient cause. As for example, when all other necessary causal factors are present, The perceptual Cognition in regard to a jar etc. arises as soon as the sense-object contact takes place. At times the sense-object contact may not be the final cause, yet it is the (special) cause of the cognition. For instance, when other factors such as the sense-object contact etc. are present, as soon as the lamp is brought in, the cognition arises. In this case it is the lamp that is the final cause and not the sense-object contact; and still the latter is certainly the (special) cause of the cognition. However taking into consideration the usual circumstance generally it is a said

1. The text should be 'बाल्यापचेन्यां', and not 'बाल्यापचेन्यां'.

-NyB, p.103;

also in the photostat the text is faulty.

-Photostat, p.44
that the sense-object contact is the final cause. Thus according to Bhāsarvajña, different causal factors could individually be regarded as a special cause. But if Sadhakatamatva, the character of being the most efficient cause is to be pinned down to one particular entity, it is the sense-object contact, immediately after which the cognition arises. As a matter of fact, from among the causal factors, sense-organ, etc., whatever is the final cause, is the most efficient cause. This is what is expressed by the ending 'tva' in the word 'Sadhakatamatva'. This signifies the generic nature of 'Sadhakatama', which could at times subsist in the lamp or in the sense-organ or in the sense-object contact. There are more than one, Sadhakatamas; and so the character that subsists in such factors is 'Sadhakatamatva'.

It may be urged that if 'the being the most efficient cause' is said to signify contact, then there would arise the contingency of the object being cognised in its entirety, i.e., with all its attributes. For, this sense-object contact, being a generic characteristic, would embrace the object in its entirety. Hence when there is contact of the visual organ with a jar, all its characteristics should come to be perceived. In reply to this Bhāsarvajña says that this contingency

1. The text should be परमार्थिः and not परमार्थः - NyB, p.103, Photostat, p.44.
2. साधकातमिः अधिकतत्त्व अष्टाध्यक्ष सति: क्षिप्यासांकवचेऽ (साधकातमिः) - NyB, p. 61
does not arise. Every cause is efficient i.e. capable of
doing something only in respect of its specific sphere. As 1
for example, when an axe comes in contact with a tree, it
cuts the tree only and not all its attributes and just because
it is connected with them. Similarly, even in the case of
inference, smoke indicates the presence of fire, and not all
its attributes also. As a matter of fact, the fault pointed
out by the opponent could be said to be present in his own
view. According to the Buddhist, dharma (attribute) and
dharmin (an object endowed with attribute) are non-different.
There is no dharmin distinct from the dharma. When an object
in its entirety giving its own shape, gives rise to a cognition,
there would arise the contingency of the cognition determining
the object in its entirety. Thus the Buddhist gives rise to
a situation to which the maxim of 'The camel and the Stick'

1. कारणस्य नियतविषये साम्याः । — NyB, p. 103
   It should be कारणस्य instead of कारणयः —
   See: Photostat, p. 44
2. See: उष्णकृत्त्वाय: — उष्णः — क्षेत्रः, लुकः: — लुकः: । यथा
   उष्णः स्वप्नस्य-उष्णमान्ति एव लुक्के नाताल्पे तथा तत्तत्वातः मदन्तः अपि
   स्वेत बापािदिलेन दोषेण शृंगितः: मक्तीति भावः: । —
   — NyB, p. 104, Footnote 1;

As the camel is struck with the stick that it carries on
its back, the fault that the Buddhist urges in the
view of others is found in his own view.
would apply. He would certainly be relegated to a ridiculous position! On the other hand, in the view of one who regards the dharmin and the dharma (substance and attribute) as different from each other, the dharma or the dharmin, which is capable of being cognised by the sense-organ, with which the contact is established is alone apprehended by the sense-object contact. That which is not capable of being apprehended by that sense-organ is not apprehended even though it may be in contact with the sense-organ (e.g., akasa, atman). Therefore it is said in the Nyayasara that non-yogic perception apprehends only gross objects (that are capable of being cognised by the sense organ.)

**Exposition of yogic Perception:** After discussing non-yogic (ordinary) perception, Bhāṣarvajña takes up the topic of yogic perception. He says in the Nyayasara that yogic perception apprehends things which are remote in time as well as space and which are by nature beyond the range of

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1. The composite whole, the separate existence of the physical object is denied by the Buddhists and is established by the Naiyāyika. The perception of dravya, guna, etc. through various kinds of sense-object contact sāmyoga, Samyukta Samavaya and the like (NyB, pp.154-170) will be discussed in a separate chapter.
of the sense-organs. It is two-fold: (i) Perception in Yuktavastha, the state of a yogin who is in the stage of union or contemplation (Samādhi); (ii) Perception in ayuktavastha, the state of a yogin who is not in such a stage. Among these two, in the yuktavastha, yogic perception apprehends each and everything only due to the contact of atman and the internal organ i.e. mind, accompanied by the auxiliary causes, dharma, etc. On the other hand, in the ayuktavastha, the yogic perception apprehends things due to the contact of four (atman, manas, sense-organ, object), or three (atman, manas and sense-organ), or two (atman and manas), as the case may be. The perception by the seers is included in yogic perception only, since it is alike produced by virtue of excellent merit (Nyāyasāra p.170).

1. योगप्रत्येकं तु दशकलत्सैर्वचिब्रूक्ष्याग्रहः। तदाविविख्युक्तवास्तवानुपूर्वकारणेः
स्थायाद्रूक्ष्यावायाय शैलोक्यवादानुपूर्वकारणेः।
संयोगादेव धामादिशक्तिः क्रोणाश्रयाठतः।
द्विप्रयुक्तवास्वायाय चुक्त-वृत्तियक्ष्रयाठतः।
गृहस्थ्यादिशक्तियुक्तवास्तवानुपूर्वकारणेः।
चक्षु अर्जुनव व्यापुपत्तिः।
गृहस्थ्यादिशक्तियुक्तवास्तवानुपूर्वकारणेः।
- NyS, NyB, p. 170
Read: योगः समाधिः तदविद्विस्ट्रा युक्ता�। सेवकस्था इत्यादि...
परिपक्व-समस्या: यदृच्छिकव तत्सात्य क्रोणाश्रयानुपूर्वः।
द्विप्रययादिशक्तियुक्तवास्तवानुपूर्वः।
योगस्य विनियोः: विनियोः।
तदविद्विस्ट्रा युक्ता, सेवकस्था तस्याः
चक्षुपादेव कर्माचान्त्वदाय विण्निनिष्ठः।
- NML (Apararakkadeva), p. 178;
Compare: कस्मदविद्विस्ट्रानां तु योगिनां सुक्स्माः।
योगस्यादिशक्तियुक्तानमस्य।
द्विप्रययादिशक्तियुक्तवास्तवानुपूर्वः।
विण्निनिष्ठः।
तस्याः व विनियोः।
समाधिः।
कर्माचान्त्वः।
- NyS, NyB, p. 170;
contd..foot-note: see next page
Read; *Nyāyakandali* on this ; योग; समाधिः। स द्विवचिन्ता; सम्प्राज्ञातः क्ष्णप्रज्ञातविः। यूक्तानां समाधविष्टंतायाः।(यूक्तानां पुनः हति) अन्तःयोगायामोपायिथपरिशिष्टः क्षणिकविष्टता अद्य ये अतीति स्वरूपं पर्याब्दते विदुक्ताः। -

- NK pp. 464, 470;

Compare : अतिकालेवर्य मानविधिमलावर्य भूसिद्धार्थः। मनो न समले श्यामस्वर्णपीतकरी परावर्य रतिः। प्रत्यहावस्था मायायापितामहेश्वरवर्य सिद्धार्थः। योगिना तु मनः श्रद्धा कविवार्य न पश्यति।-NM, p. 98;

Compare also : तारकं (स्वप्नकालांमध्ये अनावधेशकस्वप्नं - व्यासमानं)। सर्वसूचियां सर्वसूचियां अर्थं वैति विवेकसं सान्तः। -

-Yogasūtra 3.54;

Read: "Uptil now, the philosophers, while defining perception used to keep in view only the cases of generated perception, but in medieval times, i.e. after the Nyāya-Vaiśesika system clearly made room for God in the shape of the creator of the universe and the author of the Vedas, Divine Perception came to be regarded as an eternal variety, and hence there arose for the theistic philosopher, the problem of formulating a definition common to the generated and eternal types of perception. The first attempt at formulating such a common definition seems to have been made by Bhāsarvajña". - Advanced Studies In Indian Logic and Metaphysics, p. 57, by Sukhlalji Sanghavi (Calcutta 1961).
Commenting on this, Bhasarvajña says in the Nyāya-bhūṣāna that instances of objects remote in space are the worlds, Satyaloka etc. that are very remote in space and the worlds, Nāgabhūvana etc. which are separated from us. Similarly, cases of objects remote in time can be illustrated by things of the past and the future. Objects which are remote by nature or which are beyond the range of the sense-organs are pāramāṇus (atoms), ākāśa and the like. Perception which apprehends either collectively or severally those objects of the three kinds mentioned above which are remote in respect of time or space or nature, is called Yogic Perception. Such a perception occurs in two states of a yogin - in the state of union (yuktavastha) and in the state of non-union (ayuktavastha). Of these two states, in the former in yogic perception there is the apprehension of all things without exception by means of the contact of ātman and the mind, accompanied by auxiliary causes like dharma (merit) etc. This has been stated keeping in view the supreme or highest yogin, as each and every yogin cannot apprehend all without exception.

Moreover, as regards the phrase in the Nyāyasāra - 'just (eva) by the means of contact of ātman and the mind' (Ātmanabhakaraṇa-samyogādeva, Nys, p. 170), the word 'eva' signifying restriction is employed in order to negate the contact of sense-organ with object, it is not meant for negation of all auxiliary causes, since it has been stated in the
Nyayasara that the contact of atman and the mind, is accompanied by merit etc. (dharmad-sutra). How the contact with object could possibly be negated has been already explained.

Now, as regards the state of a yogin who is not in union (contemplation), i.e. ayuktavastha, there can be the contact of four things. When any one of the four sense-organs, namely olfactory sense-organ, gustatory sense-organ, visual and tactual sense-organs, grasps an object, atman comes in contact with the mind, the mind with the sense-organ and the sense-organ with the object and thus there is contact of four things. But when the auditory organ grasps its object, i.e. sound, there occurs the contact of three, namely, atman, manas and the

1. चप्पूराजीप्रियावक्ष्यान् बन्ध्यायामायावानुविधानेन यदृच्छः इत्यादि ज्ञानमुदयैः
तत्रतपत्तिः स्थायिमिति तप्ताराध्यायं सन्न्यस्यविज्ञानेन उपपालितस्य
कमरोजानुकुमार्वः स्व लक्षणाऽविचारः प्रतिपपस्य, न य व सन्न्यस्यविज्ञाय,
तस्य अन्यपावाभारात्यावस्मयाद इत्युक्तः ।

- NyB, p. 93;
Read: ज्ञानभावारण्याभावाद्-अन्यपावाभारात्यावस्मयाद सन्न्यस्यविज्ञाय,
तत्स्य अन्यपावाभारात्। योगिनां ब्रह्मान्निः अपि उपपालीयाः
तस्य अन्यपावाभारात्।

- Editors Foot-Note 4, NyB, p. 93

2. तत्र सन्न्यासः- NyB, p. 170; Here the word स् श्च ग्रंथां should be added to the list of sense-organs.

See: ग्रंथाः सन्न्यासः- बन्ध्यायामायावानुविधानेन... Nyayamuktavali (Aparakadeva), p. 178
auditory organ for sound subsists in the auditory organ (which is अकाश) itself. And when the mind grasps its objects, pleasure, pain, etc. there occurs the contact of two thing only, viz. आत्मन and मनस. The soul comes in contact with the mind and immediately pleasure, etc. can be apprehended. Aparārkadeva, the commentator of the Nyāyasāra says that the distinction of yogic perception from ordinary perception should be noted here that a yogin though being in the state of non-union, अयुक्तावस्था, can easily perceive subtle things even by means of the external sense-organs.

Arsajñāna or intuitive knowledge possessed by the seers is also included in yogic perception. It should not be regarded as a separate variety of perception; as it is comprehended by the definition of yogic perception. Indeed the definition of yogin perception signifies that right and direct apprehension of things which are remote in space, etc. is yogic perception. Precisely this very kind of perception occurs in the case of Vyāsa and others owing to the excellence of their merits. However, this excellence of merit may occur due to the practice of the eight aids to yoga (yama, niyama etc; i.e. Abstentions, observances, etc. - Woods); or due to the excellence of

1. बहुरितिनिर्मेयार्थि सृष्टिविद्येन श्रेष्ठम् श्रेष्ठाय श्रेष्ठायाम्
   श्रेष्ठायाम्: विशेषः: इ। -
   - NML, p. 187
2. तत्र सम्य-क्षमाप्व-अनुसविधानुप प्रत्येकामु (p.84), तत्व द्विविधिः
   योगप्रत्येकामु, अयोगप्रत्येकामु च श्रेष्ठः (p.101), योगप्रत्येकामु
   तु वैस्कालसमाविश्वाण्यष्ठायाम् [p.587]
   - NySa, NyB, p. 170
3. See: NySa, NyB, p. 587
penance or due to the excellence in respect of means like sacrificial, etc. But it may be noted that the distinction in excellence of merits does not entail any distinction in respect of the pramāṇa (source of valid knowledge). Excellence of merits achieved in any of the above mentioned ways, in all cases gives rise to yogic perception or arśa-pratyakṣa which is the same in character. If different varieties of perception are admitted in accordance with the distinction in the means leading to the excellence of merit, then there would arise endless varieties of pramāṇa— which is absurd. However, the existence of such yogins is well known in the literature of Sruti, Smṛti, pūrṇa, Itihāsa and various yoga-sastras. This is the proof of their having existed. The denial of this leads to profuse sin, which would become the cause of endless agonies like a hell etc. Bhāsarvajña says that he would later on describe how even inference can establish the existence of yogins.

1. See : NyB, p. 585
2. कैलावला प्रमाणपद्: व कारणानां प्राकृतप्रति (न)पेदेन प्रमाणादन्त्यप्रसङ्कः। - NML (Aparākkadeva), p. 179
3. (योगप्रत्ययम् अनुगातस्याम: ) अनुमानश्रूप्य वर्णित केषाचिं प्रत्ययं प्रयोत्स्वल्पातु करत्लावलं हति। सिपादन्त तु तार्किकं योगिविनो केष्यस्य प्रसङ्कः। - NML (Aparākkadeva), p. 179; (There are lacunae in the NyB, pp. 594, 598)
Yogic perception as accepted by the Buddhists: Others (the Buddhists) explain yogic perception differently. It is said—That knowledge which is non-inconsistent, devoid of any mental construction, and which arises very distinctly by virtue of contemplation (bhāvanā—repeated forcing into consciousness) like that in fear, etc., is regarded as pramāṇa, yogic perception. According to Buddhist philosophy, there are three kinds of consciousness (prajñā), (i) Srutamayī prajñā, (ii) Cintāmayī prajñā and (iii) Bhāvanamayī prajñā. Knowledge which is acquired through hearing words—instructions from a

1. पावनार्थतत्त्वम् भावाभिः पावेत् ।
   यज्ञानविचिन्द्रति तत्त्वाभिः भक्तयते ॥
   - NyB, p. 171
   Compare: भूताश्चावनाप्रति योगिज्ञार्थनेति ।
   - Nyāyabindu, p. 14
   Read: भूताश्च भावना पुनः पुनः कैलक्ष विनिशेचम् ।
   - Dharmottaratika, Ibid., p. 15
   The contemplation of transcendental reality means its repeated forcing into consciousness—
   - Stcherbatsky, BL,II,p.31

2. अविष्कर्षे(६५४)विविध धन्नै नित्या बन्युना—अशुमयी, चिन्तामयी,
   भावाभिः । तत्त्वात्पर्वतिकलिता ऊतमयी, युक्तिः निर्बंधिता चिन्तामयी,
   समाविभावनेनुता भावाभिः ।
   - NyB, p. 77, -Editor’s Foot-Note 1
a reliable person is Drutamayi prajña. When this knowledge is determined by means of reasoning, it is called Cintamayi prajña. When on the same lines further knowledge is produced through repeated forcing of the object into consciousness, practised in contemplation (samādhi-bhāvanā), it is called Bhavanamayi Prajña. Accordingly, in the first stage, a yogin apprehends things by means of knowledge that he has attained through hearing. He then determines the same things by means of knowledge which is constituted of reasoning. In the third stage the yogin contemplates the same things determined by reasoning, by repeated forcing them into consciousness. And when he reaches the culminating point of contemplation, knowledge apprehending with absolute vividness, the contemplated things, is brought about. Such a knowledge is called yogic perception.

This perception is regarded as pramāṇa (valid knowledge) inasmuch as it is not inconsistent with reality. And this yogic perception apprehends the object with absolute vividness and so it is devoid of mental construction (avikalpaka). In order to

1. See: कर्तलामलक्ष्मे मायेनानस्य कालस्य यदि दर्शनं तद्य योगिनः प्रत्यभाषा।
   तद्य हि स्पुटाक्ष। स्पुताक्षसाधवै निर्विकल्पकम्।-
   - Dharmottarātika, Nyāyabindu, p. 15

2. See: प्रायुःक्त योगिना स्वा तेठाः। तदा भवनाक्षः।
   विलुक्ल्यनानाभां स्पष्टेष्वाववासेः।-
   - PV 2.281;
   Read: प्रायुः कथमपरिचिते योगिना श्रान सत्यविषयभुक्तः। तेठाः।
   योगिना भवनामयं भावावमेव निष्पाधिः।। तदा श्रान सत्यस्वप्निपत्तिः प्रक्रमेन विशुद्धकथितनानाभां, विष्किर्तीत्वात् च स्पष्टम् विकार्यवामे वाववासेः।-
   -Manorathanadivṛtti
clarify this point the example of distinct knowledge arising on the occasion of fear, etc. has been given in the verse. That is to say, on the occasion of fear, etc. the distinct knowledge is brought about only by force of strong concentration of thought obsessing the mind, even in the absence of the rise of knowledge by virtue of the object. This very point is elucidated by Dharmakirti as follows: Persons who are overpowered by the mania of lust, grief and fear or are obsessed by the idea of thief, dream, etc., see/seeing, as if they were present in front of them.

In the case of such persons overpowered by lust etc., though the knowledge that arises due to the intense (emotional) concentration on the objects that are not present before them, is quite vivid, yet it is not regarded as pramāṇa (valid knowledge), since it is not consistent with reality. Contrary to

1. मामायामायाः स्पष्टम् भवदाविव भास्ते । ।
   - NyB, p. 171

2. कामशेषोध्योवीचारवाचपाणपुष्पुला: ।
   अतुलापि परस्परतिपुरलोक्वस्थालिकः । ।
   - PV 2.282

   Read: मामायामायाः कर्ष स्पष्टम्? तत्वाह - कामशेषोध्योवीचारवाचपाणपुष्पुला: तै: उन्नवादः चौर्यस्वाध्यर्य देति कामशेषोध्योवीचारवाचपाणपुष्पुला: उपपुला: प्रागः: ते कूलूव श्रृंप कथायो मामायामायाः पुरात: कर्ष स्पष्टाति व व्यवस्ताति, वस्मात्व जन्तुभुवां प्रवृत्ति च भवति: । ।
   - MV

3. See "the difference fixed between a dream and a (yogic) perception consists mainly in the vividness (sphutabhatya) of the latter. A new characteristic of perception is therefore introduced, the vividness of the mental image ".

   - Stcherbatsky, RL.II,p.30,foot-note 2

   Compare: प्राप्त्यव्याप्त्यक्षरयव्ययो व दशनः तल्योगिन् प्रत्यक्ष ! कल विन स्फारण !
   - Dharmottararitika, Nyayabindu p.15
this, in the case of yogins, the direct perception (darsana) of the four Arya Satyas (Noble Truths) (Sorrow, the origin of sorrow, extinction of sorrow, and the means thereto) as well as of the other worlds, etc; which arises from intense meditation on Reality is pramāṇa (Valid knowledge), since it is not inconsistent with reality. As Dharmkirti says in his Pramanavartika - Therefore, whatever it may be, either Bhūta,

1. चतुर्थसत्यित्तु - (१) दुःसंय, (२) (दुःसंय) चनुर्य: - दुःसत्यां (२) (दुःसंय) निरौषः। (३) (दुःसत्यां) मार्गः: दैवति चतुर्थसत्य: -
   १. दुःसत्या आप्सित्तु - बाजः: बपिदुःसत्या, बरा बपिदुःसत्या, व्याख्यापि दुःसत्या, मण्डपिपुरुः, बमिर्यम: समयोऽदुःसत्या, प्रियव: विप्रयोग: दुःसत्या, यामिपुरु सत्वां न तत्वे तद्वपुरु दुःसत्या। २. दुःसत्या आप्सित्तु या बृहम दुःसत्या, अध्यावित्तः, काल्पितः, क्षम्यत्तः स्वप्नः धारितः:। ३. दुःसत्यां मार्गः, योऽद्रमा व तुःसत्या या त्याः: पुरुषितः: काल्पितः:।
   ४. दुःसत्यां मार्गिनी प्रतिपितः: आप्सित्तु, अपेक्षे: आर्य: व्याप्तिमार्गः:।

Compare: - Nyaya, p. 171, Editor's P.No 1;
(1) दुःसंय चनुर्य: चनुर्यः:। - PV 1-149,
   (दुःसत्यां मार्गिनी प्रतिपितः आप्सित्तु, अपेक्षे: आर्य: व्याप्तिमार्गः:।)
(2) काल्पितः: किन्यः दुःसत्यां चनुर्यः। - PV 1-181,
(3) यावत्मार्गः न प्रेमः: हानिः: स परित्स्थितः।
   तावः दुःसत्यां राधिमार्गः न च स्वस्यामास्वतिः - PV 1-193-94,
   यावः च वाद्यान्तः युक्तान्तार्विषयेऽस्तु स्वस्यामास्वतिः।
   न हानिः: तावः दुःसत्यां राधिमार्गः न प्राणिः वर्णिनः: दुःसत्यां: परित्स्थितः दुःसत्यां:। न च दुःसत्यां- क्षमाधोपययः स कलेष: विना
   स्वस्यां स विना: काल्पितः।। - MV
(4) उहः गः: तद्यासाइ आप्सितः: परित्स्थिः। - PV 1-207
viz. the four Ārya Satyas or Abhūta, viz. anything inauspicious, other than the four Ārya satyas (i.e. which is not ārya satya), when it is very intensely contemplated upon and when the contemplation reaches its culmination, it brings about knowledge of the contemplated thing with absolute vividness. Thus the bringing about of vivid knowledge of the contemplated thing is the fruit of contemplation. Of these vivid nirvikalpaka perceptions, whatever enables us to attain the things, e.g. the four Ārya satyas as determined previously, is accepted as pramāṇa or valid knowledge, which is born of contemplation. Even when anything other than the four Ārya Satyas is intensely contemplated upon and when the contemplation reaches its culmination, it produces vivid knowledge of the contemplated object. Such a knowledge too is recognised as pramāṇa (valid knowledge). The rest of the cognitions, in dream, etc., though arising due to intense concentration, should be regarded as erroneous (since they are not consistent with reality - do not lead us to obtain the thing contemplated). This is the concept of yogic perception as recognised by the Buddhist.

1. तस्माद भूताभ्यं क्या यद्य यदु क्वतिमांस्याति ।
   मानवनामसंयमित्रवै तत्स्फुटात्कल्यालीकस्व ॥
   वश प्रमाणं संवाचितं कस्य यत्र मांहिन्द्रियस्वल्लवं ।
   तस्य मानवात्यं प्रत्ययमाम हृदमशेषाः उपपालवः ॥

   - PV 2-285-86;

contd., foot-note see next page: 589
It may be noted that Acarya Manorathanandī reads: 

अतिमात्रम्, while Prajñākaragupta बालिमात्रम्. The reading बालिमात्रम् or बालिमात्रम् seems to be faulty. 

- NyB, p. 172

Read: यथा मायानयः मायास्पष्टतायां मायापदम्, तत्त्वादेश यथां उच्चाक्षरत्वादि, क्षूद्रो अभिवधिः यद्य यथां स्व अभिवधिं मायानयः तत्त्वादेश यथां मायास्पष्टतायां मायानयः वायुनिरपिधायोंचकालविशिष्टियाः पारिनिष्ठाः स्वुतां कल्पिष्ठी: 
सा-मृत्त फलं यथा तदा तथा ॥ स० ॥ तत्र मायानावलम्बनिन्दु स्पष्ट॥ (?) 

निर्निर्निर्णयं तदौ कर्मवर्गम् तदौ मायानां प्रत्ययं मिन्दु स्पष्ट॥ विशेषत्वं वस्तु विशेषत्वूर्ध्वं 
वस्तु विशेषत्वूर्ध्वं विशेषत्वं वस्तु विशेषत्वूर्ध्वं विशेषत्वं वस्तु विशेषत्वूर्ध्वं विशेषत्वं वस्तु विशेषत्वूर्ध्वं विशेषत्वं वस्तु विशेषत्वूर्ध्वं विशेषत्वं वस्तु विशेषत्वूर्ध्वं विशेषत्वं वस्तु विशेषत्वूर्ध्वं विशेषत्वं वस्तु विशेषत्वूर्ध्वं विशेषत्वं वस्तु विशेषत्वूर्ध्वं विशेषत्वं वस्तु विशेषत्वूर्ध्वं विशेषत्वं वस्तु विशेषत्वूर्ध्वं विशेषत्वं वस्तु विशेषत्वूर्ध्वं 

Also read: न हि यथा मायानयः कन्याज्ञानो मायानागौरलाभु। 

tat: यथा यथा स्व अभिमात्रम् तरं तरं स्वुताकल्पिष्ठी फलस्य अभिमात्रम् मायापारिनिष्ठाः। 

- Pramanavartikabhāṣya (Prajñākaragupta)
Bhāsarvajña examines this Buddhist view as follows:

The Buddhist accepts all cognitions as not having external things as their objects (nirālambana, baseless) and as just self-perception (sva-saṃvedanamātra). Here the question arises as to what the difference there is between yogic perception and ordinary perception. Both being independent of external objects, they would be non-different. The Buddhist may say that there is certainly difference between them, inasmuch as yogic perception is pure, while ordinary perception is impure. According to Dharmakīrtī, yogic perception, having the shape of the vivid object illumines it very vividly, as it is entirely free from the network of mental construction. In answer to this Bhāsarvajña says that this may be so. Yet it is not proper to say that the four-fold ārya satyas or the like are the objects of yogic perception. Indeed when cognition is accepted as being the apprehension of its own self, and nothing else, it

1. प्राप्तुक्क योगिनां ज्ञातं तेषां तद्भवनेतरावृत्तिः
अपविवेकत्वं स्पष्टंकल्पनानां स्पष्टंकल्पनानाभासति

- PV 2.281

See: योगिनांमायास्तुमाहः प्राप्त प्रथमपरिच्छेदे योगिनां ज्ञातं
सत्यविवेकस्पष्टं तद्भवनेतरावृत्तिः
- Manorathanandivṛtti.
is not proper to say that one has realised the four-fold aryā satya or the like by means of yogic perception. As once it is admitted that the object of cognition is nothing other than its own self, how then could it be said that such a cognition directly apprehends the four-fold aryā satya? If this be admitted, it would lead to extreme absurdity on there being something as the object of cognition, just anything could be cognised! The Buddhist may argue that since the cognition assumes the shape of its object, whatever shape is there of the cognition, that is the object of that cognition. The answer to this is that if it were so, the Vijnānavādin comes to accept the view held by the Sautrāntika school, according to which, existence of external object is to be inferred from the shape of the object that the cognition assumes. Is the opponent prepared to endorse the Sautrāntika view? Truly, even though he may admit this, it cannot be explained how past and future things could become the objects of cognition (i.e., yogic perception). Indeed a past thing or the like is non-existent, and a thing that is non-existent cannot have any shape. It may be argued that the shape which has been seen or heard or inferred appears as vivid only due to the force of intense contemplation.

1. हिन्दुभासिनिकृष्ट विज्ञानः उत्तमेण ज्ञानेमेव स्वातांस्मरप्तियोऽस्मिन चाकारणेन तस्य श्रेयं, अनुभैद्योपयर्वः।

- SVD (Sautrāntika view), p. 79
(bhāvāna-balataḥ). In reply to this Bhāsarvajñā says that if this were admitted, yogic perception would come to be illusory inasmuch as it would then apprehend a thing which is in fact not there as being there just like a dream-cognition. It may be urged that it cannot be said to be illusory, since it is not inconsistent with reality. The answer to this is that in the view of the Buddhist, inferential cognition though it may be not inconsistent with reality, is accepted as illusory. Hence the fact of being or not being consistent with reality cannot be the criterion for illusoriness. The Buddhist may urge that though inference is erroneous illusory, it is regarded as pramāṇa, (source of valid knowledge) inasmuch as it is not incompatible with Reality. The answer to this is that if this is admitted, then this would be in conflict with the qualifying attribute of Perception, i.e. non-erroneous given

1. See "Inference is indirect knowledge, it is an illusion, because it is indirect. It is constructed, synthetical, subjective knowledge. It is, nevertheless, right knowledge since it, although indirectly (प्रमाणपर्याय) also leads to successful purposive action" - Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic II, p. 18 foot-note 1.

2. The text should be सबादितै, and not सबादिते न

-NyB, p. 193; Photostat, p. 78. This whole passage has been quoted in the Ratnakirtinibandhāvalī (pp. 14-15)
in the definition. There would be no sense in defining valid perception as non-erroneous or non-illusory when knowledge could be regarded as valid though it be illusory. On the contrary it would be like giving a contrary definition. Thus this view that knowledge may be valid though illusory, is in conflict with the definition of Perception as given by the Buddhist.

Moreover, even non-incompatibility cannot be explained in any way in the Buddhist view. What does a this non-incompatibility of cognition signify? It could signify either its pointing out the object to be attained, or its showing the object of purposive activity, or the achievement of successful activity in respect of the object that is manifested in the cognition. Of these three significations, which are recognised as meant by the term non-incompatibility? None of these is possible in the case of the cognition of a past thing or the like (Yogic perception is accepted as having a past thing or the like as its object). When the object itself is not present, it is useless to talk of its cognition as pointing out the object to be attained and so on. Besides, in view of the doctrine of momentariness, even in the case of cognitions

1. तत्र कल्पनापौष्टिक अभावस्त्र प्रत्यक्षः । - Nyāyabindu, p.8
2. The text should be त्चन्द्रः, and not त्चन्त्रः See: Photostat, p. 78
3. See Nyāyabindu, p. 4
of present objects the said non-incompatibility can by no means be justified. Therefore we may conclude that even the exposition of yogic perception as given by the Buddhist is inconsistent.

Division of Perception into Savikalpaka (Determinate) and Nirvikalpaka (Non-determinate): Now Bhasarvajña takes up for discussion the topic of two-fold perception, Determinate Perception and Non-determinate Perception, with which the Pratyakṣa Pariccheda ends. In the Nyāyaśāra he says that in addition to the classification of perception into non-yogic perception and yogic perception, perception can be divided into Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka perception also. Of these, the perception which becomes the cause of the origination of cognition along with the comprehension of the relation of name, etc. is called savikalpaka pratyakṣa (determinate, perception); e.g. 'This Devadatta is one with a stick' (daṇḍin), etc. In this cognition, not only a thing (man) is apprehended, but also its relation with name (Devadatta), qualifier (vīsesaṇa, daṇḍin), etc. is apprehended. The cause of such a cognition is called Savikalpaka pratyakṣa.

1. तत्र द्वितिः सविकल्पकं निर्विकल्प्कं वैति ।
   तत्र संहारितम्ब-पौोलेन शान्तर्पिनिमित्वं सविकल्प्कं ।
   यथा - देशवचः कयुष्म पण्डी हत्यादिः ।

   - NyS, NyB, p.173
Commenting on this, Bhāsarvajña says in the Nyāya-bhūṣaṇa that the word 'tat' in the statement of the Nyāyaśāra signifies yogic perception, while the word 'ca', signifies the inclusion of non-yogic perception. It means that both, yogic perception and non-yogic perception, are two-fold, viz. determinate and non-determinate. Perception is first divided into yogic and non-yogic perception. Now each of these is further divided into savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka perception. Of these, the perception which is the cause of the production of the cognition, by the comprehension of relation of the thing perceived, with name, etc. is called determinate perception. This determinate perception in the form of a source of valid knowledge, is supersensuous and so is not possible to be directly illustrated or mentioned. Hence only the result brought about by this perception is mentioned. 'This Devadatta is one with a stick'; and so on. The cognition 'He is Devadatta' arises along with the comprehension of the relation of the individual with the name alone, while the cognition 'He is one with a stick' arises along with the comprehension of the individual related to a qualifier (one with a stick, đaṇḍin). Thus cognitions that arise as such so as

1. सक्तिक्षण नाम, यथा आदि। यथा विशेषणान्तरगम्य, तैम सह च। सम्बन्धः, तस्य उद्देश्यं काययाणं सह, नायन्त्र विशेषाणविश्वास्य उपपत्तिः निमित्तम् श्यति। ततपुन। अत्विच्ययत्वारं न साधितुः देक्तस्य उद्देश्यम् श्यति तत्कलस्य शाहहति।—NML (Aparakadeva), p. 181
to comprehend (or so as to refer to) the connection of an individual with quality, etc., which serve as qualifier, should also be illustrated here.

It may be asked as to what is the base (ālambana) of a cognition of a thing. There may arise the question as to whether the base (ālambana) is exclusively the qualified thing (qualificand) or it is both the thing qualified and the qualifier. That is to say, in (qualificative) cognition, as we have seen, a thing is cognised as related to name, class, etc. Here the question arises as to what actually provides the basis or becomes the object of cognition. In the cognition, 'This is Devadatta, possessed of a stick', what is the object? Is it the qualificand (Devadatta) alone? Or is it both, the thing qualified (individual Devadatta) and the stick possessed by him? One may ask here: What is sought to be proved by raising

1. See: यथार्थात्कालेषु हि नामं विशिष्टः कर्मः उच्चते हित्य चति। ज्ञातिकोलसं जात्य गोः क्षणः हिति। गुणानां विषय गुणः शुक्लः हिति। क्रियायाष्ट्रेषु क्रिया पापक हिति। ग्रन्थानां दयानन्दीं, विषाणी हिति।

NVTT, NCG, p. 241 (NS 1-1-4); Bhāsarvajña seems to have felt that the expression in the Nyāyasaśra is not precise. He should have given an example comprehending quality, etc. e.g. gauḥ Sūklaḥ calah ditthāṁ.
such questions? The opponent may answer that if the cognition is regarded as having the thing qualified alone as its object, then the cognition 'a man with a stick' would not arise at all, as happens in the case of a person without a stick. And the thing (being with a stick) which is not cognised, though being existent, is as good as non-existent. Against that one may argue how could the cognition of a person, which is produced by the stick that is itself qualified by its own cognition be said to be unqualified? (A stick gives rise to its own cognition, and then the stick thus cognised brings about the cognition of a man with stick). The opponent may answer that this is not proper. For, the inferential knowledge is produced by the indicative sign (liṅga), or the like, which is indeed qualified by its own cognition. But such an inferential knowledge of fire is not apprehended as being produced in the form 'This is possessed of smoke'. That is to say, if just the thing qualified is regarded as the object, the knowledge 'a man with a stick' would not arise; and if the latter is said to arise on account of stick qualified with its own knowledge, it would not be perceptual knowledge, whatever else it be. And in inferential knowledge, the probans does not figure, whereas in the cognition 'A man with a stick', the stick

1. The text should be स्वज्ञानविशिष्टम् हि लिङ्गादिना, and not स्वज्ञानविशिष्टे हि लिङ्गादिना - see: p. 174(NyB)
does figure. So this knowledge could not arise because of stick qualified by its own knowledge. Moreover, if in the cognition 'Devadatta is a man with stick', the person qualified, alone is admitted as the object, then there would arise the contingency of the knowledge - 'This place is endowed with fire' (which is accepted as inferential knowledge) being the fruit of perception inasmuch as only the place is in contact with the sense-organ and so is the basis of perception as required.

Arguing further the opponent says that even if the other alternative, that both the thing qualified and the qualifier are the basis of the cognition, is admitted, still the cognition should arise in the form - 'There are a stick and a man'. Moreover, when both, stick and man, are equally the basis of one cognition, the relation of principal and subsidiary between the two would not entai. This would also lead to the contingency of the cognition 'Devadatta is a man with stick' not having the same substratum as the cognition of Devadatta or the like ( - since there would be two substrata, a man and a stick). That is to say, if both (the thing qualified, i. e. Devadatta and a stick) are admitted as the object of one cognition, then the cognition would arise 'There are a man and a stick'; and not that 'There is a man with a stick'. Thus it is evident that whether exclusively a thing qualified or both, the thing qualified and the qualifier are admitted as object, difficulties are bound to arise. And this is the
reason for raising a doubt in respect of the base (ālambana) of the qualificative cognition.

Some others hold that the object or basis of cognition should be ascertained as it is actually experienced. According to this view, the basis (i.e. object) of the cognition 'Fragrant substance' is visēṣya, the thing qualified alone, while the basis of inferential cognition, etc. is both the thing qualified (e.g. place) and the qualifier (e.g. fire). Refuting this view Bhāsarvajña says that this cannot be maintained, as there is no proof for the acceptance of such a difference between the base of perception and that of inference. Nor is it right to say that inferential cognition has two objects (e.g.
(600)

mountain and fire) as its basis, since we find that even the
cognition of a thing to be inferred (e.g. fire) etc., along
with the cognition of mountain or the like is in respect of
the same substratum. If inferential cognition is regarded as
having two things as its basis, then the residing of the two
cognitions in one and the same substratum would not be possible-
(we then should have had the two separate cognitions, one of
the mountain, another of fire; and not that 'The mountain is
endowed with fire'). It may be argued that apprehension of the
same substratum does not necessarily prove that there cannot
be two things as the basis of a cognition. Even when there is
one common substratum, there may be more than one thing as
the basis of a cognition. As for example, the cognition of
nation, army, or the like and the cognition of their leader
have the same substratum (e.g. याजा राष्ट्रम, नायाका सेना).
Here though the two concepts 'leaders' and 'nation'
have the same substratum (सामान्धिकरण्या), the cognition
(e.g. 'the king is the state or the like) has certainly two
bases (अलम्बनास), namely 'the state' and 'the king' or the
like. So the reason 'because of having the same substratum
(सामान्धिकरण्या, सुरभि द्रव्यम्, वाहिमान परवताः; राष्ट्रम
राजा) proves to be inconclusive.

1. विवादाध्यासितं विशेष्यानां कैलाशेष्यालम्बनः प्रत्यार्थं वर्तमानं
विशेष्यानतत्त्वां सुरभि चन्द्रनां विशेष्यानत्त्वां। प्रत्यार्थं वर्तमानं
शैलविवादाध्यासितं।

- NK, 278
Rejecting this view Bhāsavarjana says that even in such cases (e.g. rāja, rāstram, etc.), the cognition does not have two things (i.e. the state and the king, or the like) as its base (ālambana). As a matter of fact, in the cognition 'The king is state' in which 'the king' is figuratively spoken of as 'the state', has only one base (ālambana), i.e. the state. And the king is not accepted as the base of this cognition. Hence the said reason is not inconclusive. Therefore the cognition in which two things are expressed as having the same substratum has always one base (ālambana).

Similarly the cognition 'One with a stick' does not have stick as its base; since the cognition 'one with a stick' and the cognition 'a man' have the same substratum (i.e. dandi purussah). Both the cognitions refer to the same thing (an individual man, ayam purussah dandi), just like the cognition of Devadatta or the like. That is to say, the cognition

1. See: न चायासार्यसु यथा ' मनो श्रवणमुपालते ' 'आदित्यो ब्रह्मत्यादेष्,' दयो च मनोबाधित्यादिषु श्रवणस्यमुपालतेऽ '।
   - Saṅkarabhāṣya on BS 1-1-4;

Also see: अः अः अः अः अः अः अः अः अः अः अः अः अः अः अः अः अः अः अः अः अः अः अः अः अः अः अः
   - Catuhsūtrī, ed. by Gautam Patel and L. V. Joshi, Notes pp. 176-77
of Bevadatta (name) and the cognition of the man (puruṣa) refer to the same thing (ayam dandi, ayam Bevadattah). Thus all determinate (qualitative) cognitions should be established as not having the qualifiers (Visesānas) as their base, but as having the qualificand (visēsyā) as their base (ālambana).

The opponent may argue that the fact that the cognitions of the thing qualified and the qualifier (e.g. a man and a stick) have the same substratum is erroneous. Hence the inferential cognition has two things (e.g. fire and mountain) as its basis (ālambana). Refuting this argument Bhāsarvajña says that if this were so admitted, then the view of the Buddhist philosophers comes to be upheld. This would lend us into the acceptance of the Buddhist view. According to this view since all cognitions which are of the nature of conceptual construction have no objective basis, it is simply not proper to ponder over the basis of cognition (the Buddhist regards all determinate cognitions as erroneous; NyB, p. 176). And if the Buddhist view is denied, then just as the cognition of a man with a stick is non-erroneous, so also the cognition 'That very man with a stick is eating', or the like should be

1. The text should be 'विषेषणालब्धनः', and not विषेषणालब्धनः' - NyB, p. 174, Photostat, p. 79
(accepted as non-erroneous only. This means that a thing qualified by more than one qualifier, viz. quality, action, etc., may be cognised and yet the cognition would be non-erroneous. It may be urged that in the above example, the parts are figuratively said to be the whole. It is a part of the man (i.e. hand) that is possessed of the stick and yet the whole is said to be 'dāndin'. And only a part of him (i.e. mouth) is engaged in the activity of eating and yet he is said to be eating. That is to say, the cognition, 'The man with a stick is eating', has two, the hand and the mouth, as its bases and not one whole. The manifestation of the whole as object in the cognition is due to the figurative use of the word (viz. the parts, are figuratively said to be the whole - qualified thing). In answer to this Bhāsarvajña asks the question—Whether the cognition which arises because of the figurative use of the word is erroneous or non-erroneous. If the answer is that this is erroneous, then it is not proper, because the Buddhist view that a thing like the whole (avyāvayin) does not exist in reality has been refuted by Bhāsarvajña. And if even figuratively the knowledge 'one with a stick' is established as non-erroneous and as having just the man as the base, then what proof is there that there is another knowledge which has both as its base in the primary sense of the term? There is no

proof for such a knowledge. Ans if some knowledge other than this knowledge 'One with a stick' is established in the primary sense, the imagination of a secondary sense here is not justifiable. For, it would lead to absurd over-extension — unwarranted licence in reasoning, viz. secondary sense could be accepted anywhere even when the primary sense is possible. That is to say, when the primary sense of words is established without difficulty, one should not try to imagine the secondary sense of the words. Only when the primary sense is inconsistent or unintelligible, one is required to imagine a secondary sense.

It may be argued that in the cognition — 'Devadatta is one with a stick', the fact of the knowledge of the possession of a stick and of the knowledge of Devadatta having the same substratum (Sāmanādhi karāṇya) is due to keeping the principal thing in view. If by this the opponent intends to say that that which is principal in the cognition 'one with a stick' is principal even in the cognition 'Devadatta' and the like, and thus the principal thing being common to both the cognitions, the sāmanādhi karāṇya (that which has a stick has also the name Devadatta) can be justified. Thus though there are two bases, i.e. one that has a stick and the one who has the name Devadatta, yet in view of the principal thing, i.e. the man; there is Sāmanādhi karāṇya, dāṇḍi (puruṣah) Devadattaḥ (puruṣah). This is not proper, argues Bāṣarvajña. For, indeed no one has such a
cognition that that which is principal in the cognition 'One with a stick' is principal also in the cognition 'Devađatta'. That is to say, the fact of two things being co-subsistent is by no means commonly manifested in the cognition. As a matter of fact, everyone has the cognition 'Devađatta himself is one with a stick' and the cognition 'One with stick is himself Devađatta'. So the thing qualified alone should be accepted as the base of the cognition. Again, it may be argued that in the above instances what is pointed out is the principal entity itself. Humourosly accepting the opponent's argument, Bhsāravajña says, 'How fine it is when the opponent behaves in a favourable manner!' If by the cognition 'One with a stick', the principal entity is itself admitted to have been pointed out, then that principal entity itself is established as the base of the cognition - this is what was intended to be proved. Similarly, only that person who is possessed of a stick is called 'dandin'. And the cognition is in accordance with what is mentioned.

The opponent argued that inferential cognition is produced by the mark (probans) or the like, which is qualified by its own cognition, and the inferential cognition does not arise in the form 'the Smoky fire', or the like. Likewise the cognition which is produced by the stick that is qualified by its own cognition, should also not be accepted as one arising in the form 'one possessed of a stick'. In answer to this
Bhasarvajna says that this is not proper. In respect of the production of the cognition of a qualifier, there cannot be restriction in respect of this much cause only. That is to say, the knowledge, 'one with a stick' is not produced by just the stick qualified by its own knowledge. This is not the only cause of the production of the qualificative cognition. As a matter of fact, the qualificative cognition is produced by the knowledge of the qualifier and its relation, in co-operation with the memory of convention samaya; just as in understanding the meaning of the verbal expression of the knowledge 'dandā', we follow the different conventions known to grammar regarding the terminations signifying possession, etc. And the cause of memory is indefinite. Such causes are mentioned in the Nyāya-sūtra (3.2.41). Therefore even though conventions may be

1. See: तद्भवं ज्ञेऽस्ति-ज्ञेऽस्ति-हृति महुषा॥ - पौर ५-२-६४; पौष्पिन्द्रप्रक्षालसुत्तिवविविखियां विद्वानि महुषाणः। गोपाजाएँकस्तन्वं, चीरी वृणः, उदकरिणीनक्षा, दण्डी (स्वभावः); - Terminations, 'Mat' etc. are added to nouns to signify possession.

2. See: प्रविधानविनिर्देशामांसलिङ्गिनाञ्जिनानुस्पारिप्रयोगाः स्वक्षिस्मेऽवनन्त्यं-निवियोजनायकारोपविविखियांस्ववान-सुखानादेखानयाधिक्षिण्यांग-पर्याप्तमिन्निमित्ते॥ - Recollection arises from such causes as - attention, association, retentiveness, indicative, distinguishing feature, likeness, ownership, supporter, supported, relation, sequence, separation, co-profession, emnity, superiority, acquisition, cover, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, fear, need, profession, affection, merit and demerit - Gangānātha Jhā
employed in a number of ways, still as memory arises due to
the waking of the impressions of the past, accordingly a par-
ticular cognition in regard to that very object is produced
by the co-operative sense-organ. Thus cognition may differ
from occasion to occasion in accordance with the memory that
arises due to the waking of the impressions of the past. As
regards the inferential cognition, the smoke in the place is
not cognised along with its relation with fire, so that there
could be urged the contingency of the inference being the
generative of the cognition ' (fire is) possessed of smoke'
in respect of the fire. Moreover, it was argued by the oppo-
nent that there would arise the contingency of the cognition'
This place is possessed of fire' being the result of per-
ception. The reply to this is that if the knowledge 'This
place is possessed of fire' arises due to the contact of the
sense-organ and the object, then why should it not be regar-
ded as the fruit of perception? It may be contended that
this knowledge is generally known as inferential. But this
is not proper, says Bhasarvajña. For, the popular opinion
may be possible even on account of figurative expression;
- The place which is qualified by the fire which is the object
of inference is also called ' anumeya' ( one that is the
object of inference). And there would not arise the contin-
gency of smoke not being the attribute of the subject(pakṣa).
The pakṣa is the thing as qualified by the attribute that is to be established (mountain qualified by fire). It does not make any difference whether this pakṣa is anumeya or not. What is important is that the reason (proban, mark) is certainly something situated there only i.e. in or on the pakṣa and so, there is not the contingency of probans and probandum (hetu and sadhya, smoke and fire) having different substrata. Moreover it is not accepted that the apprehension of a qualifier necessarily requires the prior apprehension of another qualifier. It is not that when one knows fire by inference, one must necessarily know the qualifier of smoke also. Only if this were admitted would one have to necessarily know some other qualifier that qualifies smoke, and there would be no end, and proceeding on this line, one would have to have a large series of cognitions. Besides, (- the thing is qualified by the probandum - mountain qualified by fire), then

1. See: "प्रमाणस्य भौपत्तिकाः कन्नुनांवर्ग क्ष्याणशयो दुरुः।" - Solomon, the paper accepted for the All-India Oriental Conference, Dharwar, 1976.

2. The text should be तथा प्रातिशयो ऐतिहासिकोऽस्मिन्साम समस्तेऽहितविषयः - NyB, p. 174; photostat, p. 79.

3. The text should be 'न च प्रक्ष्यानांवर्गं एवं नामयो' शाश्वताः - NyB, p. 174, photostat, p. 79.
the knowledge of smoke as qualifying the mountain should be preceded by the knowledge of fire, and that of fire as qualifying mountain would be preceded by the knowledge of smoke as qualifying mountain and this would lead to the fault of mutual dependence. But since it is not accepted that the knowledge of a qualifier necessarily depends on the prior apprehension of another qualifier, there would not arise the above mentioned contingency of a large series of cognitions nor also the fault of mutual dependence. Therefore only one cognition, having fire and its relation (with the place) which cannot be pointed out as 'This is fire' is produced by inference. The cognition 'This place is possessed of fire may arise due to perception also (When there is contact of sense organ and object).

In the view of those who believe that perception of the thing which is qualified by a supersensuous or non-sensuous qualifier is not proper, there does not obtain determinate perception. For in determinate perception, the person who is qualified by the name 'Devadatta' is cognised as Devadatta. But when the person is perceived, the name 'Devadatta' is not perceived; and it is the name that serves as a qualifier, just as a stick or the like distinguishes the person from

1. The fire that we know by inference cannot be pointed out as we point out the fire when we know it by perception.
others and becomes a qualifier. It is not that name Devadatta is perceived and then it becomes the qualifier of the man. Like the stick etc, the qualifier Devadatta serves to distinguish the man from others. As for example, when someone says - "From among the Brāhmaṇas, the Brāhmaṇa with a stick (dandin) should be invited for dinner," the particular Brāhmaṇa is distinguished from other Brāhmaṇas by virtue of the stick. In the same manner, when one says - "From among the men, Devadatta should be called", the particular man is distinguished from other men just by the name 'Devadatta'.

One may urge that danda is a mere upalaksana - adventitious factor that distinguishes a thing for the time being from other things of the same class. So a stick or a name is an upalaksana, and not a qualifier. The answer to this is that it is not so, since both, an adventitious factor (upalaksana) and a qualifier (visesana) are in fact synonymous. The words,

1. Could the text be emended as - न च देवदत्तः प्रत्ययः संसाया-\textsuperscript{1} स्नाविवेजणात्वं ? -(NyB, p. 175) Photostat, p.79-80.

Here the photostat also seems to be faulty.

2. The text should be दण्डाविवेजः व्यवक्षेत्तरात् , and not दण्डाविवेजः व्यवक्षेत्तरात् - - NyB,p.175;Photostat,p.80
'Upalaksana', 'Visesana', 'vyavacchedaka' are all synonymous. It may be argued that if this were admitted, there would arise the contingency of Devadatta's house being cognised as 'kakī', possessed of a crow. That is to say, we never have the knowledge 'Devadatta's house is 'kakī'-possessed of a crow.' We use the expression 'Devadatta's house is indicated by the crow' (kakena Devadattasya graham). In answer to this Bhasarvajña says that it has been already said that the qualifier (Visesana) dandin and the adventitious factor (Upalaksana) kakī are in fact synonymous. The knowledge (dandena Parivrajakah or kakena Devadattagraham) arises according to the convention of usage. We use the term 'dandin', and not 'kakī'. A Parivrajaka (ascetic) is known by the stick, similarly Devadatta's house is known by the crow. There is no distinction between the two cases in their function of distinguishing objects. Therefore all that distinguishes something from individuals of the same class, or from individuals of a

1. Compare: दण्डः हि स्वप्रपवज्ञनप्रतिपत्तिः पुरुषोऽनुसम्पद्य द्वारे-स्माकृ व्यवस्थिनचि। क्षणेव चास्यपञ्चाश्चिर विशेषः। उपलब्धिपरिपराश्चिर व्यवस्थिनचि, न तु स्वप्रपवज्ञनप्रति विशेषः। न हि यथा दण्डीति दण्डी-परीति पुरुषोऽनुसम्पद्य तथा व्यवस्थिति ततः। हति तस्मातः क्षणेव व्यवस्थिति-
दण्डोपपति पुरुषोऽनुसम्पद्य चार्यते क्षणिः चार्यवाचवत्वप्रति-श्यामनेन। - NK (with PB), pp. 278-79
different class or from a different state of a thing, is called qualifier. Hence the name 'cow' or the like and its relation (with an individual), while being remembered, give rise to the qualified cognition 'cow', or the like and hence are qualifiers, though they are remembered, and not perceived. It may be contended that in fact only cowness is the qualification of a cow, and not the name 'cow'. It is not so, says Bhasarvajña. For, even when there is perception of cowness, the cognition 'There is a cow' or the like does not arise; in the case of a man who does not know the convention that such and such a thing is called 'cow'. Therefore, cowness on the one hand and the name 'cow' and its relation with the individual on the other hand are both in fact qualifiers.

In this connection some thinkers say that if the name is regarded as a qualifier, then the cognition would arise in the form - "This is possessed of the name 'cow';" or "This is denoted by the word 'cow'." And such a cognition is recognised as inferential, and not perceptual. That is to say, as smoke is the indicative sign signifying the presence of fire, the name 'cow' or the like signifies an individual of certain class. Hence the cognition "The name of this is 'cow'" is based on the previous knowledge of the conventional relation between a name and a thing. So this cognition is inferential, and not perceptual. The fact that a certain thing (the entity which is called 'cow') generates cognition is respect of itself
on the strength of the co-operative cause in the form of the word 'cow' signifies that the name of the thing is 'cow'. Thus the fact of having the name 'cow' cannot be perceived, as it is supersensuous. As a matter of fact the cognition 'cow' (without the verbal designation) is produced by the qualifier 'cowness'; and hence it is accepted as perceptual. To wit the cognition 'This is a cow' and the cognition 'This is endowed with cowness' signify one and the same thing. And the conventional relation also is explained and understood thus only viz. 'This thing possessed of 'gotva' is called 'go'. So the perception is only in respect of the individual thing possessed of the genus 'gotva', the verbal designation is not part and parcel of determinate perception.

In answer to this Bhāsarvajña says that this is not proper. For no one understands or teaches at the time of the instruction of the convention ( - teaching the use of language - words-) that a particular thing is associated with cowness, and therefore is called cow. And even when the conventional relation between a word and a thing is not known in regard to it (cowness), the association of the thing with cowness is known by perception. For, even a person who does not know the word-convention 'cow', does see the thing as being distinct from buffaloes, etc. and so also its similarity with (cow-) individuals of variegated colour and the like. Therefore when an
elderly person instructs a child in regard to convention by the use of one of the expressions, viz. 'This is a cow', 'This is called a cow', 'This is denoted by the word 'cow', all conveying the same meaning - it is the relation of denoter-denoted that is taught and the one who comes to know this (i.e. the student or the recipient of the knowledge) also understands thus only. Hence the person who recognises the cognition 'cow', etc. as the result of perception should not accept the qualifier (cowness) and the qualified (the individual) as objects of one knowledge. The cognition 'This is called cow' is due to the conventional relation between object and word; while the cognition 'This is an individual (pinda) is perceptual. Now also can it be asserted that the cognition of the thing qualified that is produced by a qualifier which is not amenable to the sense is never the result of perception. For example,

1. Compare: यथा,  

2. The text should be 'विशेषाणानुप्रत्ययानं नाणान' instead of 'विशेषाणानुप्रत्ययानं नाणान' NyB,p.175; Photostat,p.80; Compare: न च यथा सूत्रांश्च विद्यायास्मिनिक्षेपः उपजनितं तदूः विद्यायास्मिनिक्षेपः न पवित्रं। - NVTT,NCG,p.231
the name 'Devadatta' not being amenable to the senses cannot be perceived. But the individual, while being qualified by such a name can certainly be perceived.

The opponent may ask: - How could the cognition of a thing qualified by many qualifications (piece of cloth qualified by red, yellow, white colours) be accepted to be arising in the form - 'This is variegated'? How could a thing be seen as variegated? The answer is that this is not difficult to explain. For it is the successive apprehension of only qualifier and qualified that is accepted, and not also of the qualifiers and their relations, for they are recognised as being objects of each respective cognition only. (e.g. 'There is a variegated cloth'; in such a case one sees first the variegated colour and then sees the cloth; but such a successive order is not there in the apprehension of the different qualifiers and their relations to the cloth, as they all simultaneously become the base of each of cognition.) Sometimes, though the things may be apprehended in succession,
they serve as qualifiers in a much as they become the objects of one memory.

Therefore the position is finally this that the cognition of the thing qualified does not have two objects, qualifier and the thing qualified, but it has the thing qualified alone as its base.

1. See: NyB, p. 276 ff; The letters are known separately but remembered in one piece of memory - cognition and hence we have the knowledge of word and so also knowledge of sentence from the words being remembered in one piece of memory - cognition.

Also see: सच संस्कार उवाचाद्वानवान्तस्यं पूज्यदिष्टं स्फोतिं जन्यति। तथा कण्यवै धिमित्यक्ष्यं कल्पितं वाक्यं।

- (NyB, p. 275);

पूज्यदिष्टं बाष्ट्रविन्याय्य स्वरूपोपालस्वरूपम्। कालविविध्यक्ष्यं कधी बाष्ट्रविन्याय्यस्वरूपम्। शतिः चैव,

न; गतविविध्यङ्क्ष्यं वच्चुर्भाष्यस्वरूपम्।

- NyB, p. 278
It may be urged that the knowledge of the union (or application, Samyojana) of word, etc. is not sensuous knowledge, because it is of the nature of conceptual construction. Now can it be said to have an objective thing as its base. In reply to this Bhāsarvajñā says that this is not tenable. For, there is nothing contradictory, even if determinate cognition is regarded as produced by a sense-organ, and as having an objective reality as its base. And whatever arguments are put forth by the opponent to show that determinate cognition is not perceptual, will be refuted in the discussion that just follows. Therefore, determinate perception is thus established.

At the end of the pratyakṣa pariccheda of the Nyāyasāra, Bhāsarvajñā says that the cognition which manifests just a bare thing is called non-determinate perception. For example, the cognition which is produced by the very first contact of the sense-organ and object is non-determinate perception. Similarly, the cognition of a yogin who is in the state of meditation is also non-determinate perception.

Commenting on this, Bhāsarvajñā says in the Nyāyabhusāna that indeed the cognition which is produced by the very first

1. वस्तुमात्रार्थमास्ति निर्विरोधास्ति, यथा प्रत्याक्षसन्निवेष्टितं स्त्रां, युक्तावस्थायां वोगिन्ध्रां व ।

- NyS, NyB, p. 176
contact of the sense-organ with the object is non-determinate perception, inasmuch as it is produced independently of the remembrance of the convention (e.g. word-convention in regard to the thing) and the apprehension of its qualifier. Hence it is said to be free from determination (vikalpa); it is non-determinate. The word (yukta or) yoga signifies samādhi (meditation) or ekāgrata (concentration). And the cognition of the yogin who is in such a state of meditation or concentration is non-determinate perception alone, since concentration is not possible, when there are predicate-realitions in the knowledge.

1. तत् (निविष्टक्लय प्रत्यय) वह स्वतन्त्रगतिम् पद्धयति, विकल्पतः
   विचारित्वेत् अस्मातः।।

   - NyB, p. 99

2. See: यदा पुनः शक्तिस्पर्शिति प्रकृतिपूज्याः क्रमानुसारनिविष्टक्लयस्न्यायाः
   समाधिप्रायस्य स्वस्यमाकर्षणं अवश्यः।
   अथ: तत्त्वस्वमाकारमाक्षणा यथा
   कालिकास्य सा च निविष्टक्लय समापि:।
   तत्परं प्रत्ययाः।।

   - The Vyāsabhāṣya on the Yogasūtra 1.43; "When however the memory is purified from (remembrance of) the conventional-use (Samketa) of words and when the concentrated insight is free from predicate-relations (in the form) of ideas either of inferences or of something that has been heard, the intended object remains as it is in itself and nothing more, and nothing more, and is specifically characterised as having just that form which it has in itself and as nothing more. And this is the super-deliberative balanced state. This is the higher perception." James Haughton Woods
Buddhist view of Perception: Now, with a view to refuting the Buddhist view in regard to determinate and non-determinate perception, Bhāsarvajña proceeds to put forth perception as recognised by the Buddhist. The Buddhist holds that all perception is just non-determinate (nirvikalpaka) and accordingly Dīnāgā defining perception says: "Perception is free from conceptual construction". This definition should be viewed along with the definition reiteration of the common characteristic of valid knowledge, that is, 'that which is not incompatible'. Hence the definition is free from conceptual construction and which is not incompatible is perception. Explaining the term 'Kalpaṇa-apodham' (Kalpaṇayā apodham) Bhāsarvajña says that the term 'apodham' signifies 'free from', 'devoid of'. So the compound means 'that which is devoid of the nature of conceptual construction'. One may ask: 'But what is actually meant by the term 'Kalpaṇa'? The answer is that it signifies the coalescence of a thing with name, genus, etc; that is to say, the association of a thing with name, etc. For instance, in the cognition 'Devadatta', there is association with name; in the cognition 'cow' there is association with genus; in the cognition 'is going' there is association with action; in the cognition 'white' there is association with quality; in the cognition 'one with stick' there is association with substance. Thus the five-fold conceptual construction (association with name, genus, action, quality and substance) is illustrated by the Buddhist
keeping in view the categories of the rival system - the padārthas acceptable to others (especially the Nyāya-Vaisēsika).

However in his (Buddhist's) own view, all these conceptual constructions are no more than conceptual construction of the form of name. It means that all these conceptual constructions can be put under the head of the conceptual construction of name. As Dharmakirti says - "Construction (or judgment) (kalpana) implies a distinct cognition of a mental reflex which is capable of coalescing with a verbal designation."

1. Compare: पंच चैता: कल्पना मवन्ति, जातिकल्पना, गुणकल्पना, (क्रियाकल्पना), नामकल्पना, ब्रजकल्पना वैति, ततः च कवचिवं कहैंदे बपि भेदकल्पनातु कवचित् च भेदे बपि भेदकल्पनातु कल्पना उच्चन्ते।

- NM (Pramāṇa-prakaraṇa), p. 87;

Read: कप्रे तु मन्यते प्रत्ययं कल्पनापोठमो वैति।
कपि केवल कल्पना? नाप्नात्मकत्वादिको? -
- NV, NCG, p. 207;

Also Read: संप्रति विनागाय स्वकाराम् पुन्नवस्तविभिन्नवृत्तिः किंतृति। एकौऽ कल्पनाकसङ्ग्लेष्वपर्यः पृक्ष्यति। किंतृति। नामयास्तिरुच्चाकारणस्ववृत्तिः किंतृति। एकौऽ कल्पनाकसङ्ग्लेष्वपर्यः पृक्ष्यति।
ज्ञातिशुद्धेषु ज्ञात्या गतिः किंतृति। गुणशुद्धेषु गुणोत्तर वृत्तिः किंतृति। ज्ञातिशुद्धेषु ज्ञात्या गतिः किंतृति। ज्ञातिशुद्धेषु ज्ञात्या गतिः किंतृति। ज्ञातिशुद्धेषु ज्ञात्या गतिः किंतृति।
सेतु कल्पना यत्र जाने नासित किंतृति। स्वतांत् वा तत्कल्पनयो व्यौऽ प्रत्ययः।

- NVTT, NCG, p. 241
Similarly it is stated (by Śāntarakṣita) "Sense-perception is free from conceptual content and not erroneous - 'Conceptual content' is idea associated with verbal expression; it is not (regarded as ) the basis of verbal expression, etc." Others say - Coalescence with a name etc signifies the situation where the denoted aspect of a thing and its verbal aspect are fused together as one in the state of apprehensibility by knowledge. Thus, when the denoted fact and the word denoting it enters into one act of cognition, it is said that there is coalescence of the word and the object. If Kalpaṇa (conceptual construction) referring to mental reflexes accompanied by words alone were here mentioned, the Kalpaṇa of those who do not speak would not have been included. But since the expression is "Capable of coalescing", they too are comprehended. The mental constructions of a new born babe are not accompanied by words, they certainly are suitable for such a connection. Indeed even a child who does not speak does indulge in conceptual construction; for example a child perceives its mother's breast, or the like, and thinks that this is the self-same as was seen before. Having thus imagined, the child is satisfied.

In order to point out the significance of the term 'śabṛha-ntam' (non-erroneous) in Dharmakīrti's definition of Perception, it is said that if cognition only by virtue of being

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Foot note see next page: No. 622
Foot note see same page: 621.

1. लिपिदेश: कल्पना ।

- Nyāyabindu, p. 10

2. प्रत्यय: कल्पनापौड़मात्रमिलापिनी ।

- Tattvasaṅgaha-kārika, 1214;

The Tattvasaṅgraha of Santaraksitā with the commentary of Kamalasila, Translated by Gaṅgānātha Jhā, Vol. I, Chap. XVII, p. 614, Baroda, 1937

3. लिपिदेश: अनेन शर्त बलिलापो वाचकः शङ्खः । बलिलापो संस्कृतः बलिलापोऽस्मि । एकस्य स्वार्थः शास्त्रेऽबलिलापो वाचकः शङ्खः । ततो यदेक्षस्य स्वार्थः बलिलापो शङ्खः:

- Sharmottarāṭikā, p. 10

See also: Buddhist Logic (Stcherbatsky), Vol.II p.20
non-determinate non-constructive is perception (and if the term 'abhrāntam' were not included in the definition), then the erroneous cognition of two moons would also have to be regarded as (valid) perception. For, since it is produced by the visual organ, it is certainly free from conceptual construction. Similarly dream-cognitions also, being quite vivid or lucid are devoid of conceptual construction and so would have to be regarded as perception. Not only this, the dream-cognition is also not incompatible, inasmuch as it becomes the cause of the mental reflex (pratibhāsa) in respect of the act of going, attainment or the like. On this account, it would have to be regarded as perception. In order to ward off this contingency, Dharmakīrti defines perception as follows:

'Perception is cognition which is free from conceptual construction and which is not erroneous; Erroneousness signifies revealing the thing differently (as what it really is not); or going astray in respect of the shape that is to be grasped.

Some believe that the erroneous cognition of two moons, or the like does not arise from the sense-organs. They say that

1. Compare: तद्विवचनाविद्यान्मान्यमपि मानसः
   मनोप्रम हस्येष्य बाचायाः: ! -
   - MNV on PV 2.294;
seeing one moon, a man imagines it to be two. So also a man sees the shape of hair, present in consciousness and imagines it to be external. Thus it should be viewed in other cases also. Finding fault with this view, Dharmakirti says that this cannot be maintained. When the sense-organ is present, the perceptual cognition occurs and leads to the truth (e.g. there is a jar); and when the sense-organ is absent, the perceptual cognition does not occur. This clearly shows that perceptual cognition indispensably requires the presence of a sense-organ. In the same manner in the case of erroneous cognition too the presence of sense-organ is equally needed.

1. कब्जे तु कुस्ते - मानसे द्विवचननादित्याने यदा द्विद्वावणां कारणात्मकः कस्यांति तदा मानस्य द्विवचननाभविष्यति (चिन्तनमु?) स्वातः !

........ किमोन्नतं यथावणां मानवामायानुरूपिः वैतुः !
तत्त्वं न विन्धयतु वैतु स्वेच्छयैं किंतनितिष्ठते ! ! -

- PV, 3.297

यदि तात्त्व मानसकेतु भविष्यदित्याने मानिवावणामायानुरूपिः न स्वातः ! अथ द्विद्वावणामायानुरूपिः वैपि मानसः च ज्ञातं तथा सति समावेशानेषु वैपि मानसत्त्वः ! -

- Pramāṇavārtikabhāṣya (Prajñākaragupta), p.336

2. द्विद्वावणामायानुरूपिः तत्त्वाध्यायोजकलक्ष्यं तत्त्वात्प्रावित्रिक्षणः तुव्यः ! -

- NyB, p. 177;

Compare: तदु किम् द्विद्वावणामायानुरूपिः तत्त्वाध्यायोजकलक्ष्यात् तथं तत्त्वात्प्रावित्रिक्षणं स्वतः !

- Manorathananandivrtti on PV 2.296
Hence when there is a defect in the sense-organ, the cognition that arises would also be defective. For, the fact that cognition arises as defective or non-defective depends on whether the sense-organ is defective or not. As for instance, when there is some defect in the visual-organ, one has the erroneous cognition of two moons or the like; but when the defect in the visual organ is removed, the erroneous cognition also recedes. If this erroneous cognition were exclusively mental, then even if defect in the sense-organ continued to exist the erroneous cognition could have been dispelled. But the man with diseased eyes continues to see two moons, though he is convinced that there is only one. In contrast to this the erroneous cognition of a serpent in a rope arises due to a mental perversity, and it certainly recedes when its cause is removed. This is not the true of the case of the erroneous cognition of two moons as it arises due to a defect in the visual organ. And in the erroneous cognition of two moons were admitted to arise not due to a

1. See: सम्प्रेष्णान्तिकव चास्यः स्वादाहिकृतत्वपि ।
   निवृचि', न निवृचि, निवृचिः प्रकाशिक्षव ॥ -
   - PV 3-398 (Rahula Samkrtayana);
   यदि मानसी हि द्विवन्द्धादिप्रभृतिः, ब्यविचलिते ब्रह्म निवृचिः ।
   ब्यविचलिते हि (ब्रह्म?) स्मर्यान्तिः, सति ब्रह्म (हि?)
   निवृचिः निवृचि, न द्विवन्द्धादिप्रभृतिः ।.... द्विविधयः
   प्रत्ययांमयः विकल्पः, निविर्क्तीकथ्रिविन्धवः । -
   - Pramanavartikabhasya (Prajnakara), p.337.
defect in the sense-organ but due to mental perversity, then there would arise the contingency of such an erroneous cognition not being dispelled even when the defect in the sense-organ is removed. Therefore, the erroneous cognition of two moons though produced by a sense-organ is yet not (valid) perception, since it is illusory.

According to the view of Diṇṇāga as interpreted by Prajñākaragupta, and as mentioned by Bhaṣarvajña (NyB, p.177), there is a difference between sense-illusion and illusion of the understanding. When we, for instance, mistake a piece of rope for a snake, this illusion is due to wrong interpretation by the understanding of the matter presented to the sense organ. The illusion ceases as soon as we have been convinced that it is rope and not a snake. But if a man sees a double moon because of some defect in the eyes, the illusion will continue even if he is convinced that there is only one moon and even when his mind (citta) is busy elsewhere. Prajñākaragupta points out in his Pramanavartikabhasya or Pramanavartikālāṅkāra that the characteristic of being "non-erroneous" was intended even by Diṇṇāga as a qualifier of perception, though he has not explicitly mentioned it. For this purpose, Diṇṇāga by inserting

1. "प्रत्यधारण गत्यन्यापौढः (कर्मयत्) "नमस्त्वार्थयःकालुकत् "।
   - Pramanasamuccaya 1-3
the word 'iti' in the verse, distinguishes between the semblance of perception or illusory perception which is characterised by eye-disease and the class of (erroneous) perception accompanied by conceptual construction.

1. प्रामाणिकपरिवर्त्तिकायम् कुमारागुप्तामणोकानिष्ठ ।
   औसत्तितितितिधितिप्रत्येकसुऽप्रयोज्यस्त्रेपं ॥
   - NyB, p.177; Pramanasamuccaya 1-8

The verse of Dinnāga has been quoted by Prajñākaragupta in his Pramanavārtikabhāṣya.

"Dinnāga treats the problem of error separately. In his view, error is wrongly supposed to be brought about by defects in the senses; it is in fact due to the functioning of the intellect. Such invalid perceptions are of four kinds: (i) empirical illusions, e.g. mirage; (ii) all empirical perception is a transcendental illusion inasmuch as it mistakes objectivized images for external reality; (iii) inference and its result, as inference has for its object a mental content of a general and unreal character;... (iv) all memory and all desires, since they are called forth by former experience, are produced by the understanding".

Avidyā - A Problem of Truth And Reality-Dr.E.A.
Solomān, pp. 459-60
Showing the purport of this verse of Dharmakīrti, Oharmakirti says in his Pramāṇavārttika that the illusory perception is four-fold: That which arises due to conceptual construction is three-fold; while the fourth type of illusory perception is that which is brought about by some defect in the substratum, i.e. sense-organ and is thus non-conceptual in characters.

Trividham Kalpanajñam
āsthiyopapalavodbhavam | #
avikalpakamekam ca
pratyakṣabham caturvidham //
-PV 2.288, (Varanasi ed.)

Before we see how Bhasarvajña interprets this verse, it will be interesting to note the interpretations given by Prajñākara-gupta and Ācārya Manḍrathāthanandin. Prajñākara says that illusory perception is two-fold: One that arises due to conceptual construction and the other that arises from some defect in the substratum, viz. sense-organ. Of these the former is

1. This interpretation is according to the Buddhist commentaries. Bhasarvajña interprets differently.

2. स स खुरिविचः/चुहुरिविचः | कल्पनाप्रमाणे प्रत्यक्षां, ततः सिद्धप्राणां
निर्विचिन्तित: कप्रि प्रत्यक्षायामां ||
तत्र प्रात्मिकां शुअत्दृशयाकाविष्ठां
तथा विशिक्षय विन्दुप्रकाविष्ठां प्रत्यक्षायामां ||
वेश्बिज्जतु क्योंनिर्माणात्मक-रोपात तद्भवकेलपाभिषृवतवात ||
अनान्ततक्लापिद्वां यूनाणुवुत-कल्पनय धत त गतां प्रत्यक्षां ||

-Pramāṇavārtikabhāṣya on PV 3.289, p.332, Patna, ed.
three-fold: (i) illusory cognition, e.g., one mistakes water, etc. for mirage, etc.; (ii) all empirical perception is a transcendental illusion inasmuch as it mistakes objectified images for external reality, (iii) inference and its result, because of their being the conceptual construction of what was experienced formerly. Acarya Manérathanandin also interprets the verse in the same way.

Now let us see how Bhāsarvajña interprets this verse: It may be noted that unlike Manorathananandin, Bhāsarvajña takes the term 'āsrayopaplavedgavam' (one that is produced by the error located in the substratum) as a qualifier of the cognition that is of the nature of conceptual construction, and not of the cognition that is free from conceptual construction. That is to say, he takes the qualifying phrase 'āsrayopaplaveddbhavam' with the first line where it is as qualifying Kalpaññājñāna. He interprets the term 'āsrayah' in two ways: (i)

1. प्रत्ययत्यामाकः चामी वकल्याम | त्रिविधं कल्पनाशानम प्रतिज्ञामाकः -
   मूर्तिकायां जलयंकाय स्निताम, संहुता विशेषाविद्यकाय-
   सांवल्कामु, पूव्वै गत्वक्कल्पनाप्रमु लिमाजपेयाविज्ञानम।
   अविकल्पं
   च चस्य प्रतिज्ञामाकः। कीदुशाः । वाच्यस्य श्रीनिवास्य उपपल्ल: तिक्तरा-
   धुधुपात: तस्माद मवः यस्य तत्त: ततः। एवं च चुविनिस्म च प्रत्ययत्यामाकः। -
   - MNV on PV 2-288, Varanasi ed.

2. अविकल्पं च एकं प्रतिज्ञामाकः। कीदुशाः । वाच्यस्य श्रीनिवास्य
   उपपल्ल: तिक्तराध्युपातः तस्माद मवः यस्य तत्त:। - MNV
   Compare: वाच्यो विषय: तस्योपपल्ल: - तत्त्वाद्वस्त्रार्थाः। कृत्वा
   काल्पनाज्ञानमाश्च: तस्योपपल्ल: - वासना विशेष: तत: त्रिविधम्।
   कल्पनाज्ञानम भवति। – NyB, p. 177
'āśraya' signifies viṣaya or object (and not sense-organ as Manorathanandin interprets it). Upaplaya or defect in respect of the object signifies the remembrance of a thing that is similar to that object (while a rope is being perceived remembrance of a serpent may occur); (ii) Or the term 'āśraya' signifies causal knowledge or basic-consciousness. Its upaplaya signifies 'a particular residual impression or internal Biotic Force (vāsanā). From the remembrance of a similar object or from a particular residual impression or a particular Biotic Force, three-fold cognition which is of the nature of conceptual construction arises. Then, keeping the verse of Dīnāga in mind, Bhasarvajña seeks to enumerate this three-fold erroneous cognition. For example, when we mistake a rope for a serpent, or a mirage for water, an erroneous cognition is said to be produced. Such cognitions are signified by the word 'bhrānti' in the verse. This is the first kind of the three-fold constructive cognition. Then all empirical perception, such as a cognition of a jar (as jar) or the like, is the second kind of the three-fold constructive cognition, and this is signified by the word 'Saṁyptisamjñāna' in

1. प्राच्यि-संपूर्ण-संसारानस् क्लेशा अथुक्ति नामाननिकक ।
स्मातापिलास्कर्षं चैति प्रत्येकाणां सत्समर्पसः ॥

-Pramānasamuccaya 1-8

Compare: त्रिविधं क्लेशासानां सामायोपस्वातोऽक्षमस्तु ।
ब्रह्मक्षणे च प्रत्येकाणां सत्समर्पसः ॥

-PV 2-288 (Varanasi ed.)
in 'Dīṇāga's verse. The knowledge of the means of inference (probans) as well as the inferential knowledge (of probandum) is also erroneous. These two - i.e. cognition of means of inference (probans) and the inferential cognition (of probandum) - are comprehended by the previous two constructive cognitions only (i.e. bhṛanti and saṃvṛtisamjñāna). However, in order to show that the previous two types of erroneous cognition - viz. illusory cognition and all empirical perception - are not in fact produced by the sense-organ; they two are mentioned separately from the non-constructive cognition (i.e. a cognition of a double moon) by which reality is certainly perceived, but wrongly presented due to the defect in the sense-organ (Pratyākṣābhām Satānimram). Then the third kind of the threefold constructive cognition is mentioned in Dīṇāga's verse by the words smārta (cognition arising from memory) and

1. Compare: कथाजचत्सिद्धार्थमुलते हवे प्राणिवदेशनात्।

विद्वानुमादिवकं साधनायेव पुंक्योऽि।)

- PV 3.290 (Patna ed.)

"कथाजैहं तत्तदिति परेणामु प्राणिः भूम्क्त रेणकार्कामः। तथाहि।
हस्तिन्धार्थसिद्धार्थमुलशास्त्रूपेः सामु अस्त्याप्तस्य अस्त्याप्तारिथ प्रत्यक्षाः
हत्येतः कृत्वा ज्ञातन्वर्त्तनमियसाधनायायाभिवार्यिन्नशङ्कू।
यदि पुनः हस्तिन्धार्थसिद्धार्थमुलशास्त्रूपेः सामु अस्त्याप्तारिथ प्रत्यक्षाः
अस्त्याप्तारिथ व्याख्यानम्।"

- Pramāṇavārtika (Prajñākara)
'ābhilāṣīka' (cognition arising from will) - all memory and all desires, since they are called pūth by former experience, are produced by the understanding. Among these, the conceptual judgments, which arise as 'this', and pertain to assertion and negation in respect of a thing which is non-existent; are signified by the word 'śmārtta'. With a view to establishing that recognition (pratyābijña) is also not born of the sense-organ, Dīnāga has separately mentioned 'ābhilāṣīka' (This is the same Devadatta whom I saw yesterday). Then in the verse the cognition arising due to a kind of eye-diseases (taimira) is mentioned separately from the class of constructive cognitions. This is done in order to suggest that such a cognition is exceptional inasmuch as it is free from conceptual construction, and yet is not (ayād) perception, that is defined by Dīnāga as cognition which is devoid of conceptual construction. Dīnāga wants to suggest that erroneous cognition arising due to taimira is an exception to the general rule 'Whatever cognition is devoid of conceptual construction, is perception'. It may be noted that the term 'taimiram' in the verse signifies all cognitions arising due to defects or injury in the sense-organ. Thus according to Dīnāga, there are four kinds of illusory cognitions: (i) erroneous cognition of rope as a serpent, (ii) all empirical cognitions, 'a jar' etc; all inferential cognitions; (iii) memory cognitions, Recognition; (iv) erroneous cognition of two moons arising due to the eye-disease, i.e.
timira. From among these, the first three are conceptual in character, while, the last is of non-conceptual nature.

In this connection Dharmakīrti says - "knowledge exempt from such construction, when it is not affected by an illusion produced by colour-blindness, rapid motion, travelling on board a ship, sickness or other causes, in perceptive (right) knowledge" (Stcherbatsky). Moreover, in the Buddhist view the cognition of hair, etc. and that of the moon, etc. are not conceptual construction; inasmuch as they reflect the object distinctly. Hence Dharmakīrti says that the cognition in which is impregnated with conceptual construction cannot

1. तत्स्माद् तस्याबिकल्पैः प्रामाण्यं प्रविष्टिष्यते ।
विसवादाः तद्भवं व प्रत्येक यो ज्ञातिष्यतं ॥ -
- PV, 2.300
Read: तिमिराश्रमस्य विकल्पेऽविकल्पत्वं सति प्रामाण्यं प्रत्येकात् ज्ञाति।
प्राप्तं 'सतेमिन' हस्ति अस्ववेदन विसवादाः प्रविष्टिष्यते,
स्वाद्विष्टतत्त्वाः प्रामाण्यं ॥ -
- MNV

2. तिमिराश्रमान्यात्माकाङ्खात्त्वेति विविधिक्रिया सा ज्ञात विभेदः ॥ -
- Nyāyābindu, p. 12
reflect the object distinctly. Similarly it is said elsewhere also: The cognition that reflects the shape of an object very lucidly whether it be of a man who is asleep or of a man who is awake, is a cognition free from conceptual construction. But in contrast to this, the cognition that does not reflect the shape of an object very lucidly, either way (whether it is of a man who is asleep or awake) is of the nature of conceptual construction.

1. Na vikalpa-nubhavasya (NyB, p.178) spstaa-paryadarsita
   Cittiyamapi sthitam sama' na v va tata tatuvarjyate
   - PV, 2.283
   Nenu vibhavakalpine sthapi sthatah samadhanam jna'n bahutah
   Samyake bape samatah samadhanah kuchinda utphale
   Na v va tata prabhojanavastuva
   Kip tathaa? Vastasthitham sp斯塔apanam svakhy
   - Manorathnandivrtti on Ibid.

2. Suptaaya jagati vapi khe: sukshma-sastra
   Sa nirvikalpasamastam kayakah kampyak
   -PV.2-299(Varanasi ed.)
   Read: tathaat vakal suptaya jagat: ahip yechi: sukshma-sastrini vyak-
   granthakara sa nirvikalpa bhumapalaya! vynapke hi vakshma-sastrini
   Khe: umanyo suptaya jagat: ahipa vai kalyana yugaka!
   - MNV;
   Compare: visakhy pravakshay III 19 II
   - Pramanamimamsa Adhyaya 1,Ahnika 1
   Tathaa v pravakshya graha: visakhy samastam yogitam yuktah suptaya h_am:
   (vyak-sastra: Pramanamimamsa adhyaya 1 pratiyogy Pratistha 1,68)
   - Hemacandra's Pramanamimamsa, ed. by Satkari Mookerjee, Varanasi, 1970
According to Dharmakirti, the fact that perception is free from conceptual construction is known by means of perception itself. He says in his Pramāṇavārtika - the fact that perception is completely devoid of conceptual construction is established by perception itself - by its being so cognised. An apprehension of an object, unaffected by conceptual construction is immediately or directly cognised by consciousness. So it should be accepted precisely as it is cognised. If perception were to be of the nature of conceptual construction, it would have been so cognised. If conceptual construction which is associated with name (nāmasamśrayah), were to be regarded as perception, it ought to have been so cognised by everybody. Dharmakirti further says that even when a person withdrawing his thought from all things (which could be imagined) and with the inner self steadied in this state, perceives a visible

1. प्रत्ययः कल्पनायोऽपि प्रत्यक्षाणेऽव सिद्धाति ।
प्रत्यक्षात्मायेष्व सवैष्णव चिकित्सो नामस्यः: ॥ -

- PV. 2-123 (Varanasi ed.)

Read: एदानीमेवश्राप्तां प्रत्यक्षाय सवैष्णवस्य विभागाद् तत् प्रत्ययात्मिति प्रविष्टिः । तत् कल्पनाया अपेक्षा इत्यवच्च कल्पनायार्थग्निष्ठस्य विद्यार्थः। तत् न तदेव इत्यवच्च प्रत्यक्षान्विति स्वसवैदन्तिनिः सिद्धाति; कल्पनार्थक्षस्य कर्मस्य हृदय सवैदन्तिनिः अपरोपात्तात्। यदि तु कल्पनास्वावलयमस्य स्वातु ततेव प्रकाशेन; विकल्पस्य कपरापात्तात्। तथा हि-प्रत्यत्तमेष्य: सवैष्णवां प्रश्राणिनां विकल्यः। नामस्यः। नामस्यविधाः। स यदि स्वातुः उपल्यै श्च नक्षी ।

- MNV
object (rupa) through visual organ; this is called the cognition produced by the sense-organ, and free from conceptual construction.

Moreover, the view that cognitions born of sense-organ are certainly conceptual construction, but they are not apprehended as such, is also not right. After the stage of conceptual construction, a man, while conceiving of the past, comes to know that 'such was my conceptual construction'. However in the case of a man who has withdrawn his thought from all conceivable things and has steadied it, the perceptual cognition that he has with his eye is free from conceptual construction. Hence there is not even an iota of consciousness of

1. संप्रुत्य सत्तात्सविति स्तितिमितान्तसरत्वना ।
   इम्यन्तरमिप चच्छेदच रूप्य रूप्य हैते सायामत्व अख्यति: ।-
   - PV 2-124 (Varanasi ed.)
   Read: तत्साभ संप्रुत्य बहुक्ष्य सत्तात्सविति विकल्पीयाच विचन्त: सज्जर्ष
   - PV 2-124 (Varanasi ed.)

2. पुन: विकल्पयतु (विकल्पयतु – NyB, p.178)विकिंत्व बासिन्द्रे कल्पना श्रद्धृषी।
   वैचि वैचि न (इति वैचि न NyB)पुवर्तकाकास्यायु हन्निकार्याद गता ।-
   - PV 2-125 (Varanasi ed.)

Read: अन्ति ख हन्निकार्याद्यः कल्पना: तास्तु नोपलन्तत ततत अधि ॥
   कल्पयत: कल्पना हि-विकल्पाकास्याय: ऊष्माच पुन: विकल्पयतु पुमाचु ‘बासिन्द्रे
   वैचि, न हन्निकर्यादृ उत्पन्नादः गता ॥” हेतुपूर्वांच वेत्तिकार्यानां कल्पनां ततः
   हत्वाविनां नुद्धी: उक्ततवस्य यथा: तस्य: कल्पना वैचि। हिन्दुस्तान सात्तिकार्य स्रुति: बायेत।

-MNV
According to the Buddhist view, constructive cognition (i.e. Determinate Perception) also is certainly erroneous, inasmuch as it reveals an object as what it really is not. Yet in order to ward off the controversy (that may arise in regard to the definition of perception even from the opponent's point of view), the term 'Kalpanāpodham' (Cognition that is devoid of conceptual construction is perception) has been separately mentioned. That is to say the term 'abhṛntan' was otherwise sufficient (as far as the Buddhist is concerned) to define perception and so the term 'Kalpanāpodham' would be redundant. But according to the opponent's (Naiyāyika's and others') view, even determinate perception which does involve construction (e.g. 'This is a cow' or the like) is perception, since it is born of the sense-organ and since it is not erroneous. They are obstinately firm about or obsessed with this view. Hence in order to negate all such cognitions, the term 'Kalpanāpodham' ('free from conceptual construction') is inserted in the definition. Thereby all constructive

1. तत्र कल्पनापोदमः अन्धवच्च श्रवणवच्च । -
   - Nyāyabindu, p.8.

2. The text should be अच्छ्वत्वालव, and not श्रवणवच्च
   - NyB, p.178; Photostat p.31
cognitions, such as 'cow' etc. are excluded from the sphere of valid perception. As a matter of fact; it is not possible that association with name should be reflected in cognition which is produced by the sense-organ. For a cognition arises by virtue of the object and the cognition which arises thus would certainly follow just its form (i.e. the form of the object by virtue of which the cognition arises). Indeed the names are not contained in the objects, nor is the word of the nature of the object, so that when object is manifested in knowledge, words too should be manifested. This word which is arthasaṁśparsa (not intimately connected with the object) is not characterised in any way by apprehension. And words are really arbitrarily objects. And words are really arbitrarily objects. This statement is found almost verbatim in the Tātparyatikā. According to the Parisuddhi, this can be

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2. न वि अथै: श्रव्य: सन्नीति तद्वात्मानः तिया, येन तस्माद
   प्रतिमाणानि प्रतिमामित्रः ।
   - NyB, p. 178;
   Compare: न वि अथै: श्रव्यः सन्नीति तद्वात्माः वा, तथा सति
   क्रयुत्यतन्वापि खुत्यतन्वायक्षराः स्वातः ।
   - NVTT, p. 133 (Benares ed. 1925)

2. न च वायु: अन्तिस्स्पक्ष्यस्तेवदन्याम; वर्ष्यथ्यु तिन्योजनातः ।
   - NyB, p. 178; the photostat (p.81) has the same text.
   Compare: न चावलियानां धार्मिकं स्पन्दनमः वर्ष्यथ्यु तिन्योजनातः ।
   - NVTT, Benares, ed. p. 133;
   (1925 A.D.)
interpreted as follows: If the name is an attribute of cognition, then the question arises as to whether that attribute is of the shape of the thing to be grasped or it is of the shape of the knowledge that grasps the object. Of these, the first alternative is not correct, since the name is not connected with the object (arthāsamspāra) as it does not subsist in the object, nor is it originated from it.

The second alternative also is not tenable, because the name is conventionally connected with the external objects after they are known. It is due to the definite convention

1. यदि नाम क्रिया है, तद्भवात्तै, अस्याकारारूपवा नामसम्पारा अस्याकारारूपे नाम सम्पर्केत्, अस्याकारारूपमच्छु च बिन्धुद्रव्यादिक्षीत: विज्ञानाय:। नापि निर्दैवन, यथा तत्त्वायाकारारूप:। निर्दृष्टं जाननाति। नियोजनाति। निम्बुद्वारे नियोजनाति। नियोजनभवायाकारारूपात:।

- Parisuddhi, NC3, p. 269;

"If the name of the object is not to be found in the external world, neither can it be found inside us, it is not an idea. It is arbitrarily applied to an object, but this does not mean that it can be got out of the object".

- BL, II, p. 259; Stcherbatsky
that we find the name referring to an external object (āram ghatah). Hence the name cannot be accepted as an attribute of cognition. It is not apprehended while the object is apprehended. For if the word is actually apprehended there would arise the contingency of the object being cognised even when only the word is heard. Therefore the object which produces the cognition, it being the indispensable factor immediately after whose entry in the causal complex the cognition arises — would justifiably produce a cognition in consonance with its own self, and not a cognition of the shape of another object (i.e., of the shape of a word). Indeed blue does not give rise to a cognition of the shape of white or of the shape of taste, etc. Nor does it stand to reason that the cognition which arises by force of the object blue etc. should follow some other object as the cognition of taste, etc. does not follow the other object, blue etc. Being what it is it does not have the potency to give rise, to a cognition which could arise from some other sense-organ. For instance blue or the like has not the potency to produce the cognition

1. The text is तत: क्षानामस्वतितिप्रस्थानं. Could it be emended as तत: क्षानाम रतनितिप्रस्थानं? Or could we interpret as follows — 'Word is associated with an object, for otherwise, it would not convey any meaning at all? This latter is not quite plausible.
of taste or the like that is capable of being produced by a sense-organ other than the visual organ. For otherwise there would be extreme absurdity — anything could produce any cognition; taste could give rise to the colour-cognition.

However, as regards determinate perception conceptual construction, being a knowledge produced by the mind does not require the presence of the object. Such a knowledge is brought about by an innate natural constructive capacity (Vikalpavāsanā-Stcherbatsky). Such a constructive cognition apprehends an object not restricted to any specific sense-organ; on account of some relation (of that cognition) with some (past) experience, it may apprehend an object sometimes as related to the verbal designation and sometimes as separate from it.

1

And it is said — "If perception requires, even when the object has been contacted (upāyoga' pi); the association of a word recalled by memory; the object (in that case) would become interrupted". Indeed a person who does not recollect

1. क्योऽयोगेष पुनः स्पर्शः शब्दात्योजनेः।
कण्ठश्रीवर्यपेशेत सङ्ख्याओऽ्यवहितां चवेत्॥

This stanza is found in Dharmakirti's Pramāṇa-viniscaya (V.95) - Stcherbatsky Buddhist Logic, II, p. 271, Foot-Note;

This stanza is found in Jayanta's Nyāyamañjari (p.56) and in Vacaspati's Tatparyatīkā (p. 136); क्योऽयोगः:

स्रोतांकर्णः ॥ - Parisuddhi, NCG, p. 274.
name is general that is associated with the object at the
time of determining the conventional relation between name
and object; cannot associate that word, with the object
cognised by him; as he does not associate any other
name, 'horse' cannot be associated with the object known as
'cow', so even the name 'cow' would not have been associa-
ted, had he not remembered the conventionally established
relation between the two. When no internal modification is
effected by virtue of the influence of the object, there
cannot properly be memory in respect of a particular word,
for if memory were caused by the object itself, then there
would be the contingency of the name being known when any
object is known (even by a child who does not know the conventi-
onal relation of object and word). And when a name is remem-
bered after cognising the object and when the cognition 'This
is a cow' or the like, arises, thus (then) remembrance is
an intervening factor between the object of determinate cogni-
tion and the sense-object contact. On account of such an
intervention of memory, the direct contact (Upayogah = sanni-
karśah = Parisuddhi) cannot be accepted one as giving
rise to the fruit immediately without anything intervening.

1. तत्स्मृत्या त्वेवषानु न क्योःप्रयोगः कन्तरायपार्शवः स्वातः ।
   - Nyā, p. 179;
Compare: अपि च अऽलोकिते वस्तुनिः हन्निच्येण तदन्तराप्तप्तं सक्षमिस्या-
स्यविवेद्यायापि हन्निच्ययू अर्थार्च न सर्वाकशिल्पायिपि विभागं उपजनितांगुः
वहते: ।
   - NVTT, NCGR, p. 228
The special cause is that whose operation gives rise to the fruit immediately without anything intervening. It is said, "The object, which did not produce the determinate perception in the first instance (i.e., when it produced the indeterminate perception) will not produce it even afterwards, because the contact (of the object with the sense) is the same in both the cases." The sense-organ contact, being present alike in both cases, has the same capacity before and after the rise of memory. It is not possible that one and the same thing does not do activity and does activity in respect of the same thing. That is to say, the sense-object contact cannot be regarded first as non-generative of conceptual construction and then (after the rise of memory) as generative of it; in respect of the same thing.

Moreover, memory whose domain is past object can never cognise a present object which has not been apprehended before. If that were possible, the blind would be able to perceive.

1. यो प्राणजनको बुद्धि हुष्टे: उपायों विक्षेपण: इ
स पन्तावरणि तेन स्वाधिपेयिपि नेत्रि: इ
- NM, p. 86;
NyB, p. 179; NVTT, NCG, p. 228; Read: यदि श्रद्धायांनिकर्षण: तत् (कल्पनाबुद्धिः) जनकः यथेत, प्रयन्तकेश तथाविद्यं घिर्यं जनयते,
न च जन्मति, तद्यथं श्रद्धामुखी: उपायिपि न जनक हर्तिन्यामेहः इ
- NM, p. 86
colours by memory. This has been said by Dharmakīrti: "Then a visual sense-perception would be possible, even when the object would be lost'. And if memory be admitted as an intervening factor then the object would not be useful in producing the direct cognition; it should be regarded as useful in arousing memory. As a result, direct cognition would not require the existence of the object what is not helpful to it. And when the cognition is brought about, by the contact of the sense-organ with the object, there is always the absence of the memory of verbal designation which is something quite alien.

It may be argued: "It may be that the conceptual construction in regard to names is not produced by the sense-organ. However, conceptual construction in regard to genus, etc. will certainly be produced by the sense-organ."

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1. तैं स्वाद सन्यासियो दि खाद्य नैक्षः || NyB, p.179;
   Read: "This is the continuation of the stanza whose first part is quoted above. It is found in Dharmakīrti's Pramanaviniscaya". - Stcherbatsky, BL,II, p. 272,
   Appendix 1, Foot-Note 8 (See the preceding Foot-Note, for the complete verse)

   Compare: न व स्मृति: कृतितिविभाय वनसपतिपुष्पं वर्तनानं गोवरमयैर्जल्लिते ।
   तक्षोवरधे व अन्यनामयं लघुसाङ्गकारार्थः, यथाः ।
   तैं स्वाद सन्यासियो बिन्दु नैक्षः || - NVT,NGC,p.229

2. The text should be ना पूर्ण नामविकल्पस्य, and not
   ना पूर्ण नाम विकल्पस्य || - NyB, p. 179,Photostat p.82
In order to refute such a contention Dharmakirti says - Knowledge first apprehends each individually, i.e. distinguishing qualifier, the qualificand that is distinguished, the relation between them, i.e. samavaya, etc. which is the determined arrangement known in the world; and then the qualificative cognition having coalesced all these together knows the thing as qualified by qualifiers. But if the qualifiers are not known such a cognition would not arise. That is to say, we generally classify or arrange things in our understanding as qualifies, qualified and their relation and being obsessed with this we come to know things thus only, and not otherwise. We understand a man as one with a stick after the

1. विशेषणप्रमाणेः विशेष कथा सर्व लोकस्तु तथा प्रयङ्गति नान्यथा || –
शृष्टितव्यः संकल्पयतैः तथा प्रत्ययति नान्यथा || –

NyB, p. 179;

PV 2.145 (Varanasi ed.), quoted in the Tatparyatika (NCB, p. 229); and also in the Nyāyamaṇjari (p. 86);

Read: विशेषणप्रमाणेः व्यवस्थेऽविशेष्यं व्यवस्थेऽस्य ... सर्वस्य व्यवस्थानोऽस्मादिकं लोकस्तु किल्येन स्थिरं व्यवस्थां च जात्यावलिकं विशेषणं, विशेषं इत्यंदि, विशेषणाचिह्निष्ठाध्यवस्थः ... प्रकृतिनियम दशति पृष्ठ प्रत्यक्ष स्वल्पेण शृष्टितव्यः तदन्तरवर्ण स्वयं संकल्प सम्बिधः तथा विशेषणाचिह्निष्ठत्वेन प्रत्ययति विशिष्टवस्तिः नान्यथा विशेषणाचिह्नेऽस्मादिकं प्रत्ययति नान्यथा विशेषणाचिह्नेऽस्मादिकं प्रत्ययति नान्यथा || –

MNV
the apprehension of the stick, the man and their relation. The cognition of a thing qualified could not be otherwise possible. Unless the popular ordering of things, such as the relation between the qualifier and the qualificand their designations, is known, the cognition of the thing as qualified would be impossible. But a cognition of a qualificand is not possible in the case of substances endowed with genus, quality and action, because we neither cognise the discrimination (viveka) between the form of genus, quality and action; and the object qualified by them; nor do we cognise their relation (Sambandha) to the object. And it is obvious that unless two things are known to be different from each other; they cannot be possibly coalesced. As for instance if a man has first known milk and water separately kept in different vessels; he can then understand that milk and water that were separate are now mixed together. But one who has not seen milk and water separately, can never know that they have been mixed. Similarly, a man who has never seen cowness or the like separately from the cow-individual, cannot cognise that a cow is qualified by the genus 'cowness'. On the other hand, in the case where one has the knowledge of difference between two things, one can apprehend the mixture of the two.

As regards verbal construction, Dharmakirti says that it cannot be associated with the visual cognition or the like. For,

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1. Foot-Note See Next page No. 647
Foot-Note see page 646:

1. The punctuations in the text should be put as follows:

\[ \ldots \text{अभावाद्वृत्त} \text{ जातिविवरणक्रियावतापूर्वकं त्य} \text{ न संपूज्वतिः स्म स्वविवेकंसंवर्यम्:} \]
 Ashirvadbhanam pustanayogam, chhironodddh人才 अभेदीपिविनियम् NYB, p. 179;

Compare: जातिविवरणक्रियावतापूर्वकं त्य न संपूज्वतिः स्म स्वविवेकंसंवर्यम्: 
Ashirvadbhanam pustanayogam chhironodddh अंसबिनेत्रुक्तम् SA.

- NVTT, NC, p. 229;

Read: यदा दर्शिदि जात्यादि विवेकनागरुपानाub

तद्वता योजना नासिस कल्पनाच्यव नारस्त्य:। - PV 2-146 (Varanasi ed.)

Also Read: यदा दर्शिदि वक्षी कः अति विशिष्टविनियमं द्वस्तृत्तस्म खादिर्ग्राहणपूर्विका तद्वतः बत न संपूज्वति। वाति: आर्थि यस्य करणकम: 
Svadbhyा जात्यादिविशिष्टविनियम: विवेकस्म स्वविवेकंसंवर्यम् तद्वता जातिमाता योजना 
Visheshanāvakṣaṇāve: नासिस। क्लौ योजनाबिरहारां कर्तारिमात्यां कल्पनापि नासिसीति तस्मात्त जात्यादियोजनागरुपाना 
कल्पना नासिस। सहस्य-नोजनार्थिका तु सम्प्यावेत वापि स्वदानेष्व सैतानावापूर्णो निरस्त्रा प्राप्तः।

- MNV

2. सैठस्यायोपायां दुस्स्वेकलनात्मकम्

पूर्वपरापरांश्रेणीं तत्त्वाधृतेऽकथम् ॥ -

- PV, 2-174; (Varanasi ed.)

Read: तद्वैत जात्यादिजल्पना तत्स्थन्कल्पना च नासिस द्वस्तृत्यम्। 
शुद्धकल्पना पि संपूज्वतिः द्वस्तृत्यम् - शुद्धकल्पना हि पूर्वमहीततय। सैठस्यस्य 
स्वायत्व उपायः यस्य सैठस्यायोपायायु, वाक्षर्वेत्ते दृष्टब्ये शुद्धस्य लक्ष्यं 
तथास्यश्रेणम् भाष्यम् यथ तथै द्वस्तृकल्पनात्मक प्रक्षिपोऽभिमुः। तत्व पूर्वस्य दैवी 
कालस्त्रावकश्चूक्तस्य, भार्या दृष्टयामार्थिक्य, परार्थाः वाच्यायायोजनानस्य, 
तेन शून्या शुद्धाविमंखस्वस्यस्मार्थिणि कालोऽन्ते स्मार्थे।

साज्ज्यं व भाष्यार्थोपालकाणां दृष्टिभाष्यानां द्वस्तृत्यम् दृष्टिभाष्यानां हेत्यः ॥

- MNV; See: NM, p. 87
verbal construction is aided by the remembrance of the conventional relation between word and its meaning; it is of the nature of connecting the word that has been formerly known as denotative of the object (with the object); whereas the visual cognition (or the like) is devoid of the consideration and linking up of what precedes the cognition, i.e. the denotative word known at the time of determining the convention; with what succeeds the cognition, i.e. the object cognised. Hence such a visual cognition cannot having anything to do with the verbal construction as described above.

Again, the sensuous cognition is not capable of bringing about the association of verbal construction with itself with such a limited effort, i.e. sense-object contact. Cognition is produced by the stimulus coming from the object which is at hand. It has nothing to do with conceptual construction or discursive intellecction. But if the sensuous cognition is admitted as related to conceptual construction then there would not be any difference between the apprehension of distinction of the things, the past and the future on the one hand and the non-apprehension of the same on the other;

1. Compare: न हि हस्य कथा: च्यापारात केलं स्वभावं सन्निहित-विश्वाध्यक्षेन उत्पन्ने बौद्धार्कत्वाचार । -NyB, p.180;
Compare: न चतावत: च्यापाराक्त: विश्वाध्यक्षेन उत्पन्ने बौद्धार्कत्वाचार । - NVTT, Benares ed.,p.137
there would not be any difference between conjecture (- that is referred to by mental construction) and non-conjecture (- the absence of conjecture in the sensuous perception); there would be no difference between the necessity of the presence of the object (- the characteristic of the sensuous perception) and non-necessity of the same (- the characteristic of mental construction). That is to say, there would be no water-tight distinction between the characteristics of non-determinate perception and those of mental construction, either could have the characteristics of the other.

It may be urged that the sense-cognition which is influenced by the mental cognition apprehends mental construction. In answer to this the Buddhist says that this cannot be maintained. For, the sense-cognition does not apprehend certain things as mentioned above, viz. genus, etc. their relation, verbal designates, etc. Hence it could not possibly proceed to apprehend such things, because no knowledge proceeds to function in regard to a thing which is not its object. And genus, etc.; relation, the past thing, verbal usage, etc. are not objects of sense-cognition. Therefore, we can say that sense-cognition does not enter into conceptual construction that is arbitrarily coalesced with or associated with an object.

1. The text should be read as शिक्षानानश्च शिक्षानि, and not शिक्षानानि. — NyB, p.180; Photostat, p. 82
The cognition which arises due to conceptual construction would recede at one's will. Besides, such a cognition would not look up to i.e., require the presence of the object. That is to say, this cognition which arises due to the conceptual construction, such as the qualifier or the like, though it has come about, in the case of a man who is equipped with all necessary causal complex, would cease to operate at one's will, like any other conceptual construction. Indeed conceptual constructions can be dispelled by means of discriminative knowledge, on the other hand, sense-cognitions cannot be so dispelled. As for instance, when the entire causal complex for the rise of cow-cognition, is present, a man may try to prevent the cow-cognition (from arising) and he may imagine what he actually perceives (viz. cow) as a horse; but despite his effort, what he actually has is the perception of the cow. Again, this

1. जापने कल्पनास्वतः यत्र शृङ्खला निवेशिताः।
   तत्रेकभावः ग्रन्थिरु प्रायोजनान्तिकः कल्पना जापने, यत्र संकेतानि
   शृङ्खला निवेशिताः। न च हेतुविवधाय शृङ्खलाय दस्ति न वान्
   शृङ्खलान्तिकं प्राप्तं, कथेंत्रविवधाय स्व शृङ्खलान्तिकं, तदा तेन
   शृङ्खलान्तिकम् करणं हेत्तावः प्रवर्तते दक्षाः: प्रत्ययाविविकल्प्तं,
   न चैततम्, हेत्ताप्रवर्त्तिः वा बाह्यार्थोपन्निकान्वितप्रशस्तवाः, भृगुव्यः
   नेत्रेत् दक्षाः: प्रत्ययाविविकल्प्तं ॥ ॥
   - MNV

2. There should be full-stp after 'गोर्भानात' -
   - NYB, p. 180
conceptual construction does not, as said above, require the presence of the object. Indeed, it is not that the conceptual cognition of a cow or the like occurs only in the presence of the object. Therefore, we can conclude that perception is just non-determinate cognition.

Now, in the view of those (Buddhists) who accept the external object as real, the shape of an object is pramāṇa or the means of right knowledge; and the cognition of the object is the fruit; while in the view of those (Buddhists, vijñānavādins) who recognise consciousness alone as reality, the cognition of itself or self-apprehension is the fruit; and the shape of knowledge that apprehends is the pramāṇa or the means of right knowledge; for it is on account of this that the self-apprehension is determined.

It is said in the Pramanavartika. This being the case, when self cognition is admitted as pramāṇa, just as in the case of the cognition of passion, etc; the consciousness itself is pramāṇa (special means of valid knowledge), since it is cognised as it were endowed with operation, and is also the fruit.

Sāvikalpa Also Established As Pratyakṣa: With reference to the denial of determinate perception as pratyakṣa pramāṇa

1. तत्त्वज्ञानिषये माने यथा त्रिगुणविवेकने ।
 सम्बन्धार्थप्रतीत्त्वाय प्रामाण्यं फलकेष्व च ॥ - म ३६५
-NyB, p.180;
comtd...see foot note next page No.652
Stcherbatsky - "Every consciousness and every mental phenomenon are self-conscious"...."Consciousness simply apprehends the presence of an object. Mental phenomena apprehend special states of consciousness, such as pleasure, etc.... According to our system when an external reality, such as a patch of colour, "\emph{ \textit{auskara reality}}\textit{ such as arrak of color}\\textit{ which is apprehended, we at the same time feel something internally in the shape of well-being or some other emotion}".\"
by the Buddhist, Bhāsarvajña seeks to demolish the Buddhist view, and to establish determinate perception also as produced by the sense-organ. Here he says- The fruit of pramāna has already been examined in the context of the repudiation of the view held by Buddhists and others. Hence it is not repeated here. However, it is established here that the cognition 'cow or the like is necessarily born of the sense-organ. It is urged that since cognition arises by virtue of the object (i.e. by the stimulus coming from the object), it certainly imitates the form of that object. But this cannot be maintained, says Bhāsarvajña. For, the view that knowledge assumes the shape of the object has been refuted by him in the context of the exposition of karana. As regards the argument that words are not contained in an object, and so on; this has also been refuted in the context of the denial of qualifier and the thing qualified being the base (ālambana) of one cognition. Now it is proved being proved that determinate cognition too is valid knowledge and is produced by the sense-organ. It is not that a word becomes manifest in the cognition 'This is a cow'. What is actually manifest in this cognition is an object endowed with dew-lap, etc. For, qualities, action, etc. are cognised to be residing in the same substratum, when

1. See : NyB, p. 84ff; NyB, p. 93
2. See : NyB, pp. 47-48
3. See : NyB, p. 178
we have the cognition 'This white cow, which is fat and endowed with horns is going'. And it is a fact that the cognition 'This is a cow' arises due to the stimulus coming from the external object (that is endowed with dew-lap, etc.), and not due to conceptual construction. It is for this reason that a cognition 'This is a cow' does not arise as being a compatible cognition in respect of buffalo. It is not proper to say that the cognition 'This is a cow' in respect of a cow is false, because it is endowed with conceptual construction, like any other determinate cognition. For, there would be the contingency of a similar argument being put forth that non-determinate is false, because it is devoid of conceptual construction, like any non-determinate cognition; since the objection and the rejoinder are on a par. So neither party scores over the other.

Dharmakīrti has said - The mind functions simultaneously or very quickly in respect of determinate and non-determinate cognitions, hence a stupefied person determines both these cognitions as one. Bhāsarvajña examines this view of Dharmakīrti. Does the person determine as one those very determinate and non-determinate cognitions which have been produced simultaneously or successively? Or does he determine as one their objects? Now it may be asked as to what is sought to be established by seeking an answer to these questions. If these cognitions are determined as one, then the activity of

Foot Note See next page No. 655
Foot Note No. 1 see page No. 654

1. मनसे यूगपदूवेशः सविक्ल्याविकल्पयोः ।
   विमुः लुभुवेशः वा तयोऽेक्यम् व्यवस्थित ॥
   - PV 2.133;
   ननु विन्द्रयोज्यायापि समवालपु बहिः बहिः \े शति चारावाहि
   सविक्ल्याः ब्रह्मां प्रवति । यदि तु तब्र्र विकल्पकमु बविकल्पकमु
   च ब्रह्म इक्षुः तद्वा विकल्पेन विकल्पस्य व्यवाहाराः दैवत्वं विच्छेदनं
   स्थापतु, न चैत्यस्य न युगपदं जान्मन्या? \: कृष्ण - मनसः
   सविक्ल्याविकल्पस्यः एक्स्यात् समन्तराङ्गु युगपदः वृजेः कारणाङ्गः तथा
   ऐक्यम् विमुः: समन्तराङ्गु युगपदः अवृजेः कारणाङ्गः-लक्ष्ये: प्रतिपदा
   व्यवस्थित । विकल्पस्य इस्त व्यावाहियायुः । विकल्पश्च
   वस्तुना: काृविन्यायते वृष्टि अवसायातुरूपाः तदविभायः । सहोत्तपमवः
   अवबिन्यायताः दुरपलवः । ततः सहोत्तपमः: एक्स्यायायोः
   ऐक्यप्रण श्च: । पराविभायाः युगपदः क्रृत्वा वृष्टि सविक्ल्याविकल्पाः
   लुभुवेशः श्रीमृद्देशाः कारणात् तथा: मुदविति: प्रतिपदा ऐक्यं व्यवस्थितः,
   कतेराहमान्ति च चक्रित ॥ -
   - कन्व
the person leading to the object and its attainment would not be there. So in this way determinate and non-determinate cognitions cannot be conceived as one. And when the determinate cognition is not incompatible, it could not possibly be erroneous, and so it could not be said that activity and the attainment of the object could be even due to erroneous cognition. That is to say, if the two cognitions are regarded as identical, as both of them are knowledge, then the knowledge would not lead one to activity or the like, the man would be concerned with knowledge alone and not the object. But as this is against our experience, the two cannot be said to be determined as one. Now, in view of the second alternative, one may say that the objects of the determinate and the non-determinate cognitions are determined as one. In this connection it is said — A man synthesises as one the two objects, viz. the object actually perceived and the object conceptually constructed; thus having determined them as one, the man proceeds to act in respect of it. This also is not proper, says Bhasarvijña. If the above view were admitted, there would be the contingency that a man may determine even the buffalo or the like as a cow, and then proceeding on this determination to attain the cow, he may be successful! There should be not be any incompatibility even here. And when two objects are determined as one, only the letters 'Ga', etc. in the word 'go' or 'ma', etc. in the word 'mahisa' cannot bring about the difference between the
two things, as there is equally in either case no relation of the letters either with the object 'cow' or the object 'buffalo'. And the determination of the two, viz. object actually perceived and the object conceptually constructed as identical is there as much as there is the determination of the two objects, viz. a cow and a buffalo, as one. Hence it is not true to say that the objects of the determinate and non-determinate cognitions are determined as one.

It is also said by the person who fancies himself to be learned - That cognition which arises as 'This' in regard to an object lying in front is produced by the sensuous cognition helped by the immediately next point-instant after its own object, is recognised as mental sensation. This has been said without the point of issue having been fully considered. The Buddhist has established the cognition 'cow' as determinate perception, inasmuch as it has as its object the letters 'ga', etc. Similarly this mental sensation also, which is accepted by the Buddhist as non-determinate perception, should certainly be accepted as determinate perception, since it too has as its object the letters 'ga', etc. in the cognition.

1. स्वविषयान्तरविषयविकारिका हिन्दौल्यानेन समन्तर प्रत्ययने
जनित तन्मोचित्रानुष्ठु - Nyāyabindu, p. 13;
मानवविज्ञानेन स्वविषयान्तरविषयविकारिका तन्मेष
प्रत्ययानुष्ठु... स्थिरतिपुरुषविज्ञानाचारणारुण प्रतिनिधिमानव
प्रत्ययानुष्ठु- Pramāṇavārti-kāśyapa, on PV. Ka. 3-244;
p. 305 (Patna ed.)
'idam, this'. In both the cases the association of word is equally reflected. It may be argued that there is a difference between the two. The cognition 'this' in regard to an object in front, arises as having a very distinct shape of the object in front; whereas the cognition 'cow' is not of this nature. In answer to this Bhasarvajña says that then some divine ordeal or factor alone could be resorted to, since there is no logic to support it.

Again, the opponent may seek to point out the difference between the determinate perception and mental sensation by arguing that the cognition 'cow' can sometimes arise even in the absence of the object. There is no need for the object being present for such a cognition; while the object is indispensable in the case of a mental sensation. The answer to this is that the cognition 'this' also sometimes does arise even in the absence of the object. So this cannot be the ground to prove the difference between the two.

Moreover, the view that the cognition that arises in the absence of an object is erroneous, while that which arises in the presence of an object is right, is equally true of both of them, viz. cognition of 'cow' and cognition of 'idam'. It may

1. दिश्यमन्तःस्वस - NyB, p.181 Photostat, p.83;  
I am not sure about my interpretation. Could it be दिश्यमन्तःस्वस?
be further argued that the cognition of 'idam' is non-determinate (and so right) since it does not reflect the coalescence with the word 'idam' (or with the letters 'i', etc.). But this is self-contradictory, says Bhāsarvajña. The mental sensation arises as 'idam' and yet it is said that the coalescence with the word 'idam' is not reflected therein. This is self-contradictory.

Moreover, if the Buddhist insists on the point that mental sensation is non-determinate as it does not reflect the coalescence with the word 'idam', then the cognition 'cow' also should be accepted as non-determinate mental perception since the coalescence with the word 'go' (or with the letters 'ga' etc.) is not reflected therein; since the same reasoning is equally applicable to both the cases. Consequently the accepted view of the Buddhist that the cognition of 'cow', or the like is not perception on account of its being conceptual construction, cannot be maintained.

The Buddhist has argued - A person proceeds after knowing a thing as only 'this' and this knowledge being provocative to activity is pramāṇa (valid knowledge). This argument too does not stand to reason. For, a person proceeds to act not

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1. Ḫaṭṭha-खट्ठयुक्तप्रवेषप्रस्तुती प्रवत्तिः। तेन प्रत्यावर्त्तमाणाय प्रमाणम्। -
   - Pramanavarttikabhasya, p. 305
after knowing the object as only 'this', but in fact only after having determined it as his desired object. Even a new-born child proceeds to press its lips to the mother's breast only after having determined it as its desired object. Hence this will alone be the proper rejoinder to the Buddhist contention—Mental sensation, which has been accepted by the Buddhist, as one of the four varieties of indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) perception, is in no way different from sense-perception. This variety of mental sensation is mentioned as separate from the sense-perception, only because it has been prescribed in the Buddhist texts. There is no proof

1. See: NyB, p. 185; This point has been elaborated later.

2. तत्त्व ज्ञानम् — इतिन्यायम्, ख्यातिवचनाविश्वास्त्राप्राप्तिर्भविष्यति। इतिन्यायानां स्वपन्नार्थप्रत्ययं अज्नतं तत् ज्ञानम्। सवैयं चित्तादात्मा प्राप्तिविनिः। ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य नात्मक्कर्मार्थं प्रकृतिविनिः। विद्याविद्या नात्मक्कर्मार्थं वोगिजां वैति।

किक—Nyāyabindu, pp. 12-14; "It is four-fold.
(i) Sense-knowledge (Sensation), (ii) Mental Sensation...
(iii) Self-consciousness..., (iv) The mystic intuition."
Stcherbatsky, BL, II, pp. 25-30

contd., foot note see next page
No. 661.
Buddha declares that colour is apprehended in two ways by the sense of vision and by the internal sense evoked by the external one. Dharmottara (Bh) deems it a sufficient proof and no other proofs are needed. ... Since sensation and mental construction are in this system, too quite heterogeneous sources of knowledge, something intermediate must be found which would be sensuous on one side and mental on the other, in order to account for a knowledge which combines sense-data with mental constructions. Thus the existence of an internal sense is proved by the existence of a subsequent mental construction. ... After having established a radical distinction between the parts of the senses and of the intellect in cognition, Diṇṇāga was evidently in want of something which would be partly sensuous and partly mental. He thus established his 'mental sensation'.

Stcherbatsky, BL II pp. 28-29,

Foot-Note 3
for it, as frankly admitted by Dharmottara in his commentary on the Nyāyabindu.

Again, the argument was put forth by the Buddhist that though an object in the Buddhist view being what it is, it has no capacity to bring about the cognition which is, due to another sense-organ. The object ‘rūpa’ cannot generate the cognition which has the shape of Sabda or the like. In answer to this argument Bhāsarvajña says that this should be taken as refuted just by its non-acceptance. For even the Nyāya school does not accept that Sabda is an object of the visual cognition or the like. However, this should be accepted that the cognition of ‘cow’ or the like is produced in regard to an object which is in the range (ken) of the visual organ or the like; by the visual organ or the like; assisted by the auxiliary cause in the form of knowledge of word-meaning

1. एतत् च विद्यान्तनसंस्कृतं मानसं प्रत्याश्योऽति । न तु अत्य प्रसादकयुस्बसमु 
 प्रमाणान्त व्याधातीकं तदृ यदि स्थान न कम्पितः व्रोणः स्वातः । –

- Dharmottarāṭīkā, Nyāyabindu, p.14

Read: “This internal sensation is a postulate of our system. There are no facts to prove it (directly). But there is no contradiction in admitting it”. Stcherbatsky;

2. See: NyB, p. 179
convention or assisted by the auxiliary cause in the form of its memory.

Again, it was argued that even though when there is a sense-object contact, if the sense-cognition needs the association of words, which is of the nature of memory, then there would be something intervening between the object cognized by the sense and the object known after the remembrance of word-meaning convention. The answer to this is that if the intervention is said to occur in the event of memory being needed; on account of the momentariness of the object, then this is not tenable, for the doctrine of momentariness is not established. That is to say, in the Buddhist's view, the object that is actually cognised by the sense perishes in a moment; then memory of convention arises and then the object is known as associated with word, etc. Here since the object is momentary; and since memory is an intervening factor, the object which was actually cognised by the sense, would not be the object of the cognition which is associated with word, etc. So the determinate cognition is not valid knowledge. But this is not right, since the doctrine of momentariness is not one that is established. Even the exponent of the doctrine of momentariness accepts that owing to the difference in the

1. See: NyB, p. 179
auxiliary causes, one and the same continuum can give rise to
different effects. As for instance, it is not that the one
fire-continuum is not accepted as a cause, (i.e. it is certa-
inly accepted as a cause), in spite of some intervening
factor, when it brings about a particular colour; etc. in the
case of earth-continuum or stone-continuum in accordance with
the particular auxiliary factor that is present. Similarly the
object-continuum and the sense-continuum first give rise to
non-determinate cognition and then they both, having obtained
a particular auxiliary cause, produce the cognition in the shape
of 'cow'. So how could there be any intervention in respect of
the object of the two cognitions? By this, the argument:
'the sense-object contact which was formerly not generative
of determinate cognition, cannot be the same afterwards, etc.'
also stands repudiated. Indeed it is not proper to say that
fire which was not generative of a particular shape at
some earlier point of time, would continue to be non-generative
of it even later. And the contention of the opponent that the
sense-object contact remains the same at the time of the

1. Flame of a lamp produces knowledge of a jar, and also
produces modification in the wick because it has
different co-operative factor in the two cases.

2. The text should be read as 'व्यवहितत्वेऽन कारणात्वम् इष्टते;' and not 'व्यवहितत्वेऽन कारणात्वम् इष्टते;'
-NyB, p. 182; Photostat p. 83
contd...foot Note see next page No. 665
contd. foot-note no. 3 see page No. 664

3. स्वतिमान्तर्त्रविभाषणकारिणां श्री-न्यायानन्द समस्ताकथ्यकृते
जत्तं तदं मनोविश्वासम्। - Nyāyabindu, p. 13

4. See: NyB, p. 179

5. कृषिके न हि न कृषिजनम्। (kept in a granary) श्रीजु, कृषिका—
भिन्नति, न समवहिते विविधादिसंक्षारिष्णम् बलं अर्ज किष्ठ कविकम् मयं।
   - NVTT, NCG, p. 230

व्यक्तिगत च वचना: प्रकाश्या पुस्तकाया दुनियाहरूसँगो विकल्प:।
न द्वि विविधके ज्ञात क्षति भवन्ति: अर्ज पठनि, भवत्प्राप्तेन अर्ज पुलितः:

......वाक्क्षण उपयोगाधिकारात् हन्तित्वालोकनमस्कारिणयावत् वाकक-
स्मारणायापि साक्षी-कृषिजनम् एव प्रत्यावरणनिनि व्याप्तिः हति, न
वाक्क्षणानित्तवेन स्मारणाय अर्जनाधिक विकल्प:, व्यक्तित्वाहिनिमित्य निर्देशीकरणम् रक्षा नियतायापि विकल्पः।......

न हि वाक्क्षणानित्तवो विज्ञानी निपिलियु विकल्पयति पत: अवभिषित।

- NM, p. 89

Compare: न च प्रागस्मात्म्रास्मारास्मापि विकल्पसः कारणां विकल्पस्य इति साध्वतः। यतः,
न किंचिदेक्षेपेक्षाः सामायक: सर्वं सम:। (प्रवचन २-२५६)
हति भवन्ति काल्याणः। अन्तःकरनोपकारसामापि कोन्हययु
निर्देशकम् न अन्येऽः।

- NVTT, NCG, p. 230
origination of non-determinate cognition and at the time of
the origination of determinate cognition; is also not tenable;
d since there is difference even owing to the attainment of some
particular auxiliary cause. The apparatus becomes different.
Again it was argued that it is not proper to say that the
sense-object contact first does not give rise to conceptual
construction, i.e. the idea of genus etc; and then does so
in respect of the same thing. Moreover, it has already been
shown (by the Buddhist) that even though the continuum has
not brought about the effect, and yet it is the agent of the
effect. Thus the reason put forth by the opponent, viz.
'Because the object does not directly lead to cognition' is
an unproven one or an unreal one. And what does the opponent
mean by stating that the object is useful in arousing memory?
As a matter of fact the object is not needed in the production
of memory; for; it has been accepted as not being born of
object.

It may be contended that an object is employed to bring
about experience which is generative of memory. Hence, since
a thing is employed in the act of producing experience, it can-
not be employed elsewhere; i.e. in the production of deter-
minate cognition. But this contention is not tenable, says

1. See: NyB, p. 179
   Bhasarvajña considers this point at length in the context
   of the discussion on non-momentariness of things;
   See: NyB, p. 510 ff.
2. See: NyB, p. 180
3. See: NyB, p. 179
Bhāsarvajña. For, we find that though fire is one, it is found to be successively employed in respect of things such as burning coal, ashes, etc. It is not that because fire is employed in respect of burning coal, it cannot be then employed in respect of ashes. Similarly, the object which was employed earlier, i.e., in the sense-cognition, is found to be employed in mental perception (which is accepted by the Buddhist as one of the four varieties of indeterminate perception). And in the mental perception an object also subsequently proves to be useful. The Buddhist may here urge that mental perception is not one which is brought about by sense-organ. Bhāsarvajña retorts that the controversy then pertains to whether the cognition (Svāvikālpa) is one that is brought about by the sense-organ or not, and not to whether it is brought about by the object or not. Now, it is accepted by the Buddhist that an object earlier has the potency or efficiency to give rise only to the sense-cognition in regard to a thing, and later the same object, when it cooperates with the sense-cognition, has the potency to give rise to even mental perception. In the same manner this too should be accepted that the sense-organ

1. It should be प्रागप्रयुक्तस्य and not प्रागप्रयुक्तस्य—
   - NyB, p. 182.

2. द्विन्ध्रयासनस्; स्वविश्वान्तरविश्वकरिजा द्विन्ध्रयासातेन समन्नातप्रत्यवेण जनितं तन्मनःविश्वासनस्
   - Nyāyabindu, pp. 12-13
and the object previously have the potency to produce only non-determinate cognition, but later when the same attain particular auxiliary causes, they can give rise even to determinate cognition. What contradiction is there in admitting this?

It may be argued that if this were admitted, there would arise the contingency of the two cognitions, viz. non-determinate and determinate cognitions, having one and the same shape. That is to say, if the sense-organ and the object are regarded as generative even of the subsequent cognition, then there would arise the contingency of that cognition having a shape just similar to that of the cognition arisen earlier. In reply to this Bhaśarvajña says that this is not so. For, we find that effects, which are produced by one and the same cause, but assisted by different auxiliary causes, possess diverse or numerous shapes. Otherwise all cognitions that are produced by visual organ and light would have only one shape, - which is absurd. If cognitions produced by eye and light are regarded as having one shape in some respect or the other, then even determinate and non-determinate cognitions can certainly be said to be of one shape - no one denies this (they can be said to be similar in character in that they are both cognitions).

1. The text should be 'केकारात्ववर्तनात्' and not 'इकारात्ववर्तनात्'. - NyB, p.183; Photostat, p.84
Moreover, the Buddhist had argued: When we see a qualifier (e.g. a stick) and a thing qualified (e.g. a man) very distinctly, we could then have the cognition of the thing as qualified by the qualifier - the thing qualified and the qualifier would be coalesced with each other. But this is not possible in the case of the things that are endowed with genus, quality, and action; since the distinction of form and relation between the substratum and genus etc. are not manifested separately, and so could not possibly be coalesced with each other. Bhāsarvajña says that this argument advanced by the opponent is not proper, for the reason ‘because they are not manifested separately’ is unproven. To wit, even a person who has not grasped the convention regarding word and its meaning, knows the individuals of Sābaleya (cow individual of variegated colour), etc. as excluded (or distinct) from the buffalo and the like individuals, and he knows objects as of one shape even by the apprehension of the nature of the cowness which is distinct (from the individual) and its relation (to the cow-individual). It may be urged that there is no distinct thing like exclusion (vyāvṛtti) other than the things excluded; exclusion (or what is called genus) signifies the thing itself which is excluded (from others). The answer to this is that this is not tenable, since the theory of exclusion (apohavāda) does not hold water. And  

1. Bhāsarvajña refutes the theory of Apoha later.

See: NyB, p. 250 ff.
when it is refuted, the fact is established that genus, quality and action as well as their relation (with the substratum) are entities quite different from their substratum (substance).

It was also argued that a person who has never known milk and water separately cannot know or say - 'This is a mixture of milk and water'. Likewise, a man who has never seen genus, etc. and their substratum separately, cannot say or know - This cow is cognised as endowed with genus, etc. Bhāsarvajña says that this also does not stand to reason. For, even though a man has not seen milk and water contained in different supports (or vessels), he certainly has the knowledge - This is a mixture of milk and water, especially when milk is mixed with plenty of water. Even when milk is mixed with a little water, one expert in examining the quality of milk is able to detect the presence of water in the milk. Or we may say that this is the very nature of things that some objects are found to be mixed as long as they exist (or from the time they came into existence), some entities are found to be mixed some time after their origination; some entities are such that though they are mixed, they are separately cognised by all who see them; there are some that are mixed up and are known as such only to those who are experts, and

1. See NyB, p. 179
2. The text should be 'कस्तु स्वभाषा' instead of 'कस्तु स्वभाषा':

-NyB, p. 183 (photostat, p. 31)
there are some that are separately cognised by people like us, only when they are in an unmixed state, but, such things are not separately cognised when they are in a mixed condition.

Moreover, as regards the argument that sensuous cognition cannot be of the nature of synthesis, Bhāṣaṇa says that this is not proper. If by the knowledge of the nature of synthesis (Sāṅkalanajñāna) just the remembrance of a number of objects is meant, then this is not proper. For, the knowledge of 'one with a stick' is apprehended as one of the form of experience. That is to say, though it is of the nature of synthesis, it is known as a sense-perception. Even the remembrance of one with a stick indicates that what gave rise to it was the experience in the form of 'one with a stick'. Indeed if only the nature of man, stick, cow or the like is separately apprehended in perception, then memory of the shape of 'one with a stick', 'one with a cow and the like' could not possibly arise. So remembrance also suggests that there was previously experience of the shape of 'one with a stick' or the like, and not that it was of the shape of separate apprehension of stick, man, etc.

Now, if by 'Sāṅkalanajñāna' is meant just erroneous cognition, that also is not proper; because this Sāṅkalanajñāna

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1. See: Nyā, p. 180, PV Ka. 3-174
jnāna arises in the case of all as always non-inconsistent, just like the cognition of blue, etc. Besides, there is absence of any cause that could give rise to illusion; so far as synthetic cognition is concerned and therefore the said erroneous cognition could not be due to any defect in the sense-organ, or due to unbalance among the three humours of the body, viz. the gas, bile and phlegm (all kinds of diseases are attributed to an abnormal condition of the three humours). If the object is at a distance, there may be some scope for the play of imagination. But such co-ordinating knowledge arises in the case of all employed in some purposive activity, even when the persons are near the object; it arises alike irrespective of the time and place which may be different. This shows that even the said Saṅkalana jnāna, cognition, is rooted in the object and is not of the nature of constructive imagination. Here vasana (subliminal impression) also stands repudiated. That is to say, synthetic or determinate perception is not due to vasana. Also, there is no possibility whatsoever of such causal factors as similarity, etc. leading to the synthetic determinate cognition.

1. Read: "Whatsoever be the object, say, a patch of colour, it initially appears in the shape of some personal feeling. Then another feeling arises which we call the sense of sameness consisting in coordination between an image and the initial sensation. This our sense of sameness determines the object and our possible reaction to it."

- Stcherbatsky, BL. II, Appendix IV, p. 394
Now, if the Buddhist says that synthetic cognition arises as preceded by the apprehension of qualifier, etc.; then this is certainly acceptable; for a thing the efficiency or potency of which to bring about effect has been witnessed is accepted as the cause. So the apprehension of qualifier, etc. should be regarded as a cause of synthetic cognition. All the same the potency of the sense-organ also has been alike ascertained as producing the synthetic cognition, just like the potency of the apprehension of qualifier, etc. Hence the cognition 'a man with a stick' cannot be denied as one brought about by the sense-organ. It is not necessarily true that a thing does not at all function in respect of something in regard to which another thing is functioning. That is to say, both the sense-organ and the knowledge of qualifier, etc. together produce the qualified cognition 'man with a stick'.

As regards the argument that there cannot be the remembrance of convention of word and its meaning in sense-perception; the answer is that this also is not proper. For, there is no contradiction in admitting the sense-perception as having

1. The text should be साम्यविचारणाबिशेषणाः, and not साम्यविचारणाबिशेषणां - NyB, p. 134; the photostat (p. 84) also has the same text, i.e. साम्यविचारणाबिशेषणाः
2. See: NyB, p. 130.
3. The text should be: (सक्तादारणोपायत्वतःचुक्त्यवे:)विरोधामावात् instead of ......विशेषामावात् - NyB, p. 134; Photostat, 84
remembrance of convention as its cause (or means) and as being visual or perceptual. A cognition may be of the nature of visual perception and yet have convention as it means. And it is not that in synthetic cognition the object is not at hand. The cognition 'This one with a stick', etc. and even the recognition (e.g. 'this the same Devadatta whom I saw yesterday') do have the thing that is there at hand as their object.

It may be argued that in recognition (pratyabhijñā) an object that is not in proximity to the knower but which was formerly seen is referred to or considered by 'that' (sa evāyam Devadattaḥ). In reply to this Bhāsarvajñā says that this is not tenable. For, 'Devadatta whom I saw yesterday is now before my eyes'—Devadatta of yesterday and Devdatta of to-day are one and the same. Hence the object in recognition cannot possibly be said to be one that is not in proximity. 'That which is non-different from 'this' could not possibly be 'asannihita'—(one not in proximity). The question may be raised as to by what means non-difference between 'that and 'this' (Devadatta) is apprehended. The answer is that it is apprehended by the visual organ only. That is to say, knowledge of the nature

1. The text should be असन्निहितसत्वानुपप्तिः; and not सन्निहितसत्वानुपप्तिः. - NyB, p. 184; Photostat p. 34
of recognition is brought about by the visual organ along with memory. In that recognition (pratyabhijñā) the letters 'sa' etc. (Sa evaṁ Devadattaḥ...) are not manifested, nor is the previous perception manifest. But that very entity which was seen previously is manifest in recognition. And in order to dispel the thought or suspicion that what is manifest in recognition may be another object just similar to that which was seen previously (and not that very object), the words 'This is that very entity' are uttered by the person with the help of memory. Thus it is obvious that the object is not a different one in recognition. The same is true of determinate cognition, 'a man with a stick or the like.' That is to say, a thing which is the object in non-determinate perception continues to be the object of determinate perception also. It is not that the object in the two cases is different.

Moreover, if object is never apprehended as qualified by the association of verbal representation, then there would

1. The text should be 'प्रत्यभिज्ञाने न ', and not प्रत्यभिज्ञाने - NyB, p. 184, Photostat, p. 84
2. The text should be read as - किंन्तु स स्वार्थः। स च यादृशः।
   दृष्टीः तदेऽदृशः स परप्रत्यावस्थानार्थः...... उच्छारणं। -
   - NyB, p. 184, Photostat, pp. 84-85
3. The text should be अमलापासिक्षितविशिष्टः अथः,
   and not अमलापासिक्षितविशिष्टः अथः -
   - NyB, p. 184, Photostat, p. 85
not be the pronunciation of only a specific word (and not another word), in order to communicate the thing to others. This could not be explained unless we admit the object as apprehended as qualified by association with verbal representation. Otherwise any word whatsoever would be uttered by mistake. A cow would be spoken of as a buffalo, since there would be nothing to restrict the use of words if words were spoken just as non-qualifiers or as unconnected superimpositions. And consequently there would arise the contingency of absence of compatibility in the behaviour of all mundane people and one would not be able to follow the other and there would be complete chaos (what one calls a cow another would call camel and so on).

Again, it was argued that the sense-cognition is completely devoid of judgment or consideration, i.e. association of the relation of word and its meaning (i.e. convention is determined previously; the object is seen later; synthesis of this prior determination of convention and the object perceived later). And since the sense-cognition does not indulge in deliberation or judgment, it is said to be 'avicāraka'. Here the question may be raised as to what the term 'avicāraka' signifies. If it is said to signify

1. पूर्वापरपराप्रत्ययोः - तत् च पूर्वस्य सक्तालक्षणवाचकशब्दस्य, अपरस्य दृष्टव्यांनात्पूर्वक भावानापूर्वै: परामर्शः वाचवाचकायोजनम् । -

- MNV on PV ka 2. 174
'being of the form of memory', and for this reason, the sense-cognition is denied as having as its object a thing that is qualified by some qualifier, then memory itself should be admitted as having such a qualified thing as its object, and there, the Buddhist view that memory does not have any thing as its object would be contradicted. That is to say, if the Buddhist position is that sensuous perception cannot be the knowledge of a thing as qualified by its qualifier, then one will have to accept memory as such and he should not say that memory is devoid of an object. And it is not possible to determine two different objects - one for sense-cognition, and quite another one for memory; as a matter of fact, that which is the object of sense-cognition is also the object of memory, for memory is apprehended as one having the thing perceived previously as its object.

Now, it may be urged that even memory does not have a thing qualified by some qualifier, as its object. In answer to this Bhāsarvajña says that if this were admitted, there would arise the contingency of all practical (verbal) dealings or behaviour based on apprehension of memory coming to an end. When a thing qualified by qualifier is never made an object—is not cognised by memory as well as by direct experience (sense-perception), how then could such an unapprehended or uncognised entity be possibly spoken of? If it is argued that this would be possible due to illusion (i.e. Avidyā); then this cannot be maintained, because
illusion has already been refuted as being the cause of our practical or verbal dealings.

Now, it may be argued that the term 'a-vicārakatva' signifies 'the character of not being born of parāmārsa' (i.e. association of the thing perceived with the word-meaning convention). And this is the reason put forth by the Buddhist to establish the perceptual cognition as sensuous knowledge (because it is not born of parāmārsa). But this too is not justifiable, because it is not established that whatever it produced by parāmārsa (consideration about the association of the object perceived with the word-meaning convention) is not sense-perception. Indeed, consideration (parāmārsa) may signify memory or inferential knowledge or cognition in the form of doubt, etc. Which from among these is intended to be signified by the term 'parāmārsa'? As a matter of fact whatever be the signification of 'consideration', all these have already been established as helping the sense-organ as co-operative causes in the production of qualified apprehension.

It has also been argued that if the sense-perception is regarded as associated with (or as involving) reflections being conceptual construction, there would arise the contingency of sense-perception and mental perception being

2. The text should be 'परामार्शिवत्तम्' instead of 'परामार्शिवत्तम्' - NyB, p. 184, Photostat, p.85
non-different; and so on. That is also not proper, says Bhaṣarvajña. For, it is not that nirvikalpaka (non-determinate) cognition, as accepted by the Buddhist, does not have any distinction even while in all its varieties there is no difference inasmuch as all these sub-varieties are all these sub-varieties are dissociated from 'conceptual construction'. In the Buddhist view, four varieties of sense-perception are accepted. Though these are equally nirvikalpaka (devoid of conceptual construction) and non-erroneous, they are accepted to be different from each other. Thus there is difference among them in respect of their sub-characteristics as also difference based on their different objects, and difference based on their distinctive causes. Similarly sense-perception and mental cognition need not be non-indifferent though they are alike vicāraka.

1. भूतियज्ञानस्य, स्वविद्यान्तसंस्करितस्य तमोद्धाराने समन्तवपत्येन जनित मनोविज्ञानस्य, स्वविद्यान्तसंस्करितस्य आत्मविज्ञानस्य, हृतविद्यान्तसंस्करितस्य परंतर्ज योगिज्ञान चेति।

- Nyāyabindu, pp. 12-14;

"(i) Sense-knowledge (sensation); (ii) Mental Sensation; (iii) Self-consciousness; (iv) the mystic intution of the saint (the yogin)".- Stcherbatsky, BL, (II), pp. 25-30
And when the difference between sense-perception and mental cognition is conceded, there would not arise the alleged contingency of sense-perception apprehending the difference among the things of the past or of the future or the like, and not apprehending the same, etc.

The opponent has also argued that the connection with genus, etc. and the verbal representation in the form of word that has already passed away (i.e. word pronounced at the time of ascertaining the word-meaning convention), etc. are not objects of sensuous cognition. In reply to this, Bhāsarvajña says that this argument is not tenable. For, it is not established that connection of an object with genus, etc. (i.e. Samavāya) is an object of sense-organ in the case of a qualitative cognition. Besides, the qualitative cognition has been established as having as its base (ālaṃbana or object) the thing qualified alone and so there is no scope for the contingency of the words of the past and the like being objects of sense-perception.

Again, it has been argued that cognition which arises due to conceptual construction can be stopped at will. This also is not true, says Bhāsarvajña. For, when an object such

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2. तस्मात् योक्तिकोष समवायस्य प्रत्यक्षात्स्यम् ॥४॥ NyB, p. 169
as a beautiful woman or the like is present before a man, who is full of passion, it is found that his thoughts do not cease, even though he desires so. Hence we cannot say that savikalpaka perception is not sense-perception because vikalpa unlike sensuous knowledge could arise or cease at one's will. It may be urged that by tenacious practice of meditation, even thoughts in regard to a beautiful woman and the like can be brought to an end. The answer to this is that according to Patañjali and others sense-cognitions also cease by virtue of constant practice of the control of the mind-functions. Moreover, in the case of those who are asleep or whose minds are engrossed in something else, an object is not cognised even though it is in contact with the sense-organ. So it becomes evident that the sense-organ also cannot function independently of the mind or irrespective of the functioning of the mind.

And it has also been argued that when the entire causal complex is present, and the cow-cognition is thereby produced; a man may attempt to stop the cow-cognition, and imagine a horse in the place of a cow, but in spite of such an attempt what he is actually perceiving cannot be anything but a cow. Bhāsarvajña regards this argument as irrelevant trash. He says that the cognition 'this is a cow' is not possible even in the absence of either one from among (i) the memory of word-meaning convention and (ii) sense-organ.
This shows that both are indispensable in the production of the cognition 'this is a cow'. And memory of the convention is in no way less important than sense-organ in the bringing about of the cognition 'this is a cow'. This being the case, the argument advanced by the opponent that when the entire causal complex is present, a man may attempt to turn away the cow-cognition, and so on, has no bearing on the question.

Further, the opponent has argued that Sañkalanā-jhāna does not depend on the presence of the object near at hand or before the sense-organ; for indeed it is not that the conception or conceptual knowledge in regard to a cow or the like arises only in the presence of the object. In answer to this Bhāsarvajña says that this was argued without the point at issue having been fully examined. As a matter of fact, a qualified judgment is never found to be produced in the absence of object. A thing which is non-different due to word-similarity, is denied by the Buddhist himself as the cause of inferential knowledge; 'gaganam vastram eva ambaratvat; the sky is a cloth since it is ambara.'

Moreover, the cognition of hair or the like (which is in fact erroneous) is born of sense-organ. It does not depend on the object in its rise. On the basis of the similarity that cognitions are born of the sense-organ, there would arise the contingency of all cognitions that are born of
sense-organ arising in non-dependence on objects. That is to say, cognitions of jar, etc. would then arise even in the absence of jar, etc. As a result of this, no cognition would arise by virtue of the object. So the belief that cognition arises by virtue of the object would come to be unproven. Or just as, though dream-cognitions and yogic-cognitions are alike produced by their repeated forcing into consciousness (bhāvanājatva), yet yogic cognitions alone are admitted as non-erroneous, since they are not inconsistent, or in compatible with reality, whereas cognitions arising due to illusion like dream, etc. are not admitted as non-erroneous. Similarly, the cognition 'This is a cow' or the like, though it is endowed with judgment or synthesis - that is to say, though it is determinative in character is accepted as perceptual knowledge, inasmuch as it is not inconsistent and inasmuch as it proceeds to make the object directly visible or known.

It was also argued that a word is used in regard to objects on the strength of the convention pertaining to word-meaning. However, this convention cannot be made and taught in respect of an individual object; nor is it possible to do so in respect of genus. For,

Foot-Note see next page No. 681.
foot-Note No. 1 see page No. 683

१. एकह दृष्टां पेदे हि क्वाचिन्द्रान्यूत्र दृष्टासि ।

न तत्साहु मिन्द्रममत्वमुचु सामान्य हुद्धमेवतः।।

- PV 2-126;

किं च - वायुप्रवाचकारांसंख्याली प्रतीतिः कल्पना । न च

द्रियाभविषये अनुवियाति खैसानमपवत्र च श्लोकोत्तर बोधित ।

तथा हि - एकह देशायो न दृष्टासि, न च अनुवायिनि श्लोककैतः ।

सामान्यं अनुवायः चति चैव । तत्साहो मेलासु कर्मोऽधृति मिन्द्रं सामान्यं

नास्ति, बुद्धयमेवः।। १२५।। विदि हि सामान्यं धर्मं धर्मं

स्यात्, बालाकारं बुद्धिः प्रके । विशेषात्मान्त्रकः तु प्रत्ययांशुरिंधः

उपलम्यः।।

- MNV
Bheda or a particular individual thing which is seen at one place cannot be seen anywhere else. And in regard to a thing which does not continue to be seen elsewhere, convention cannot be ascertained. And there is not anything which is generality or genus, which is different from the individual thing. Had the genus been different from the individual thing, it would have been distinctly cognised. Instead there are not two cognitions one of the individual thing and another of samanayya or generality. But the cognition is apprehended only as having the shape of thing-in-itself; or we can say genus is not apprehended in cognition as being different from thing-in-itself.

In answer to this, Bhāsarvajña says that this also is not right. For, convention can possibly be established and grasped in regard to an individual and in respect of genus. Thus it is established that determinate cognition also is perception (valid perceptual knowledge). On this very ground, doubt etc. also, about which there is difference of opinion should be established as being born of sense-organ and as having an external thing as its object.

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1. Bhāsarvajña elaborates this point later on.

It may be urged that (Savikalpaka) determinate cognition is not regarded as valid knowledge, since its object is already known through nirvikalpaka or non-determinate cognition. But this is not proper, says Bhāsarvajña. For, it is known differently in determinate perception from how it was known in non-determinate perception. If the opponent's position were to be admitted, there would arise the contingency of even yogic perception not being valid knowledge, because that too has an object which is seen or heard previously or the like. And comprehension of the same object by a number of pramāṇas (i.e. pramāṇa-samplava) has already been proved. Therefore we can say that though determinate cognition has as its object that which is already known, yet it is not invalid. It is certainly valid. Moreover, it cannot be said that determinate cognition is just memory on account of its having as its object that which is already known. For, memory and experience, though they have as the object that which is already known, have different characteristics. Hence just like the different types of knowledge, i.e. Doubt and the like, memory and experience are already established as different from each other. And if it is insisted that valid knowledge must have as its object that which is not already known, then there would arise the contingency of perception, inference, etc.

1. See: NyB, p. 81
2. See: NyB, p. 43
also being non-different, inasmuch as they all alike have as the object that which is not already known. So there is no sense in raising objections leading to extreme absurdities.

Bhāsarvajña is perhaps the first Naiyāyika who gave a definition of perception which is applicable to transce­ndental perception (Yogic Perception) also. As Pandit Sukh­lalji points out, Bhāsarvajña is the first Naiyāyika who attempted to formulate the definition of perception as common to the "generated and eternal types of perception!"

It is interesting to note that according to Bhāsarvajña, the denial of yogic perception, is a very great sin that could lead to endless miseries of hell etc. (NyB,p,171). Bhāsarvajña, repudiating the yogic perception accepted by the Buddhist, says that since it does not have any real object as its base, the yogic perception accepted by the Buddhists would come to be erroneous. And as everything is regarded by them as momentary; perception of even present things would not be possible,

1. See : It is strange that whereas Nyāya Śūtras do not recognise Yogipratyakṣa at all, the Vaiṣeṣika Śūtras dwell upon it at great length (cp. Vaiṣe-Sūt. 9-1, 11-15). Neither Vātsyāyana nor Uddyotakara takes note of it.

much less of the perception of past things, etc. Though Yogic pratyakṣa. It may be noted that even before Vācaśpati Bhāsarvajña has classified perception distinctly into two types, viz. Non-determinate (nirvikalpaka) and Determinate (Sativikalpaka) perception. He also perhaps for the first time clarifies that Non-determinate perception is supersensuous (atindriya, Nyā, p. 173), which as a means cannot be directly illustrated; only its fruit is illustrated.

In the discussion on determinate Perception, Bhāsarvajña raises a problem as to what would be the base of qualificative cognition. Could it be qualifier? Or could it be qualificand? Or both? He refutes the view that in the case of perception, the base of qualificative cognition (e.g. 'Surabhi dravyam', 'fragrant substance') is qualificand only, while in the inferential cognition, both, the qualifier and the qualificand, serve as the base of cognition. According to Bhāsarvajña, the base of cognition, whether it be perceptual or inferential, is the qualificand (Viśeṣya) alone.

1. See: "म अभ्यासम्: -
   निर्विकल्पकां व्याख्यातिमिकवाक्यः
   यथावत् यथावत् व्याख्यातिमिकः दृष्टः"
   - WTT, p. 133, Benares ed., 1925

2. See: "Both these authors (Vācaśpati Miśra and Śrīdhara), have not however brought out clearly, as is done by Gaṅgeśa and later Naiyāyikas, that nirvikalpaka is beyond our cognizance (atindriya)".
   - Critique of Indian Realism, D.N. Shastri, p. 440
In this context, Bhāsarvajña puts forth the Buddhist concept of perception. According to the Buddhist view, non-determinate cognition is the only valid perception; whereas, determinate perception, being conceptual in character is not valid. Besides, gems, quality, etc. are never distinctly cognised independently of their substrata. Hence they cannot be said to be perceived as connected as qualifier and qualificand. Elaborately repudiating this view Bhāsarvajña seeks to establish determinate perception as valid. It is valid because, when we act on the basis of determinate perception, we obtain the thing as perceived and our purpose is thus served. Sense-object contact does not first give rise to determinate cognition, but it can do so subsequently. It is not that fire which does not bring about a certain effect cannot do so even later.

Moreover, it is true that the object of determinate perception is already known in non-determinate perception. But this not prove that determinate perception is not valid. Otherwise yogic perception would also come to be non-valid, since that too pertains to things that are already known. He thus proves that determinate cognition is certainly a valid perception.