Definition of Perception: In the Nyāyāsāra Bhāsarvajña defines perception as follows: Among the (three pramāṇas), the means of right non-indirect knowledge is pratyakṣa. Commenting on this in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa Bhāsarvajña says that there is a Karmadāraya compound (Appositional Determinate Compound — Kielhorn) of the terms aparokṣa (non-indirect) and anubhava (knowledge) just as there is one of Samyak (right) and anubhava. Thus both the terms, 'samyak' and 'aparokṣa' qualify the noun 'anubhava'; and so the compound signifies, 'Right and non-indirect knowledge'. And the means of such a knowledge is called pratyakṣa. As to the type of compound in the term 'pratyakṣa', Bhāsarvajña raises a question: What compound is it in the term 'pratyakṣa'? According to some

1. See: तत्र सम्पथ्य-क्षरोच्च-क्षमक्षरणस्य प्रत्यः — NyS, NyB, p.84
2. क्षरोच्च: च क्षर अक्नम: च दृष्टि कर्मधारय: ॥
   सम्पथ्य च क्षर अक्नम: च दृष्टि कर्मधारय: ॥
3. See: "Uptil now, the philosophers while defining perception used to keep in view only the cases of (contd...see next page-493)"
generated perception, but in medieval times, i.e. after the Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika system already made room for God in the shape of the creator of the universe and the author of the Vedas, Divine perception came to be regarded as an eternal variety; and hence there arose for the theistic philosopher the problem of formulating a definition common to the generated and eternal types of perception. The first attempt at formulating such a common definition seems to have been made by Bhāsarvajñā; for he defines perception as right non-indirect (i.e. direct) cognition (Samyak-aprokṣa-ambhava) — definition applicable to the cases of generated as well as of eternal perception —

- Advanced Studies In Indian Logic And Metaphysics, p. 57
Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghavi, Calcutta 1961
it is avyayibhāva (Adverbial Compound). This can be dissolved thus: Perception (Pratyakṣa) consists in the operation of each sense-organ upon a particular object (aksam aksam prati vartate iti' avyayibhāva). Now, if an avyayibhāva compound is admitted here in the term pratyakṣa, then it will take the termination 'am' as a substitute for the terminations of all the cases except the fifth; the third and the seventh; in respect of the third and the seventh their own specific terminations also can be optionally retained. In view of these

1. See: बजस्य बजस्य प्रतितिविषयं दृष्टं प्रत्यधाः। दृष्टं तु सादिक्षेति
   शान्ति वा। तत्त्व सादिक्षेति: तथा शान्ति प्रतिनिधित्वः। तत्त्व शान्ति तद्वाशः
   यामासभास्कः: फलं। - НВ, НГГ, п. 182(НГ, 1-1-3)
   Also See: बजस्य बजस्य प्रतितिविषयं दृष्टं प्रत्यधानिति। अथां
   सुनिवचनायामया क्रियायिवाम। समासं। - НВ, НГГ, п. 184
   Read: वजस्य बजस्य प्रतितिविषयं दृष्टं प्रत्यधानिति। अथां
   सुनिवचनायामया क्रियायिवाम। समासं। - НВ, НГГ, п. 184
   Also See: वजस्य प्रतितिविषयं दृष्टं प्रत्यधानिति। अथां
   सुनिवचनायामया क्रियायिवाम। समासं। - НВ, НГГ, п. 184
   Read: वजस्य प्रतितिविषयं दृष्टं प्रत्यधानिति। अथां
   सुनिवचनायामया क्रियायिवाम। समासं। - НВ, НГГ, п. 184

2. प्रत्यधाः, (१), प्रत्यधाः (२), प्रत्यधाः-प्रत्यधीण (३), प्रत्यधाः (४),
   प्रत्यधाः (५), प्रत्यधाः (६), प्रत्यधाः-प्रत्यधीण (७)
   See: नायकी मावतिव त्वपर्वत:। - पानिनिः सूत्र 2-4-28 and
   तूतीयास्त्यायोर्गुह्याः। - PS 2-4-34;
   Read: काट्यां आक्षेपायाम बुधो न लुङ। तस्य तु पाणवी विना बनाधेशस्व
   स्थायम्, दिक्षयौध्ये काक्षाय। (सिक्को);
   Also read: प्तुप्राणिन्स्य सु बुधौ: बनाधेश्व: स्त्याः। पवियास्तु खु न
   पक्तीति लक्ष्ये। ... काक्षायम् पवित्र्यिन्स्यविभक्तिनामुकारणाय पवियास्तु
   काक्षायम् हत्युदेश्यित्वात् (वाल्मीकिर्म). Again read: काट्यां आक्षेपायाम
   तूतीयास्त्यायो: बुधो आक्षेशाय: स्त्याः। काक्षायम् - काक्षायम्
   काक्षायम्। (सिक्को)
   - वायकरापासिद्धान्ताकुमुडः, pp. 657-58,
   ed. by Gopālaśāstri Nene, Varanasi, 1961
rules laid down by Pāṇini, usages like 'Pratyakṣasya laksanam (Definition of Pratyakṣa, genitive case), Pratyakṣaḥ ghaṭaḥ (a perceptible pot, nominative case), Pratyakṣaḥ nārī (a perceptible woman, feminine nominative case) would not be permitted.

But in fact such usages are permissible. Hence it is not proper to take the compound (Pratyakṣa) as an avyayībhava. So according to Bhasārvajña, 'pratyakṣa' should be accepted as a tatpuruṣa compound in conformity with the Sūtra 'Kugatipradayaḥ' (PS, 2-2-18). Accordingly when the first member of the compound is an upasarga (prefix) such as Pra, prati etc; tatpuruṣa compounds are formed. So the compound 'pratyakṣa' signifies 'an object that comes in front of the corresponding sense - organ' and hence usages in all cases and genders are permissible.

However it may be objected that there is another Sūtra of Pāṇini which lays down the rule that the gender of the whole compound of this class, viz. Dvandva or Tatpuruṣa must be determined in accordance with the gender of the final member of the compound. That is to say the Dvandva or

1. कुगतप्रायः। -PS 2-2-18; Read: स्वेत समयेन निम्नं समस्यन्ते।
2. कुगतप्रायः। - Siddhāntakaumudi, p. 1537
3. पापस्यच्छ कुक्कुटभयोऽऽ। - PS 2-4-26; Read: एतयोऽऽ।

पापस्य हव लिंगं स्वातः, कुक्कुटभयोऽऽ। मय्येऽऽऽ कुक्कुटोऽऽऽ।
(विषयकोऽऽ)
Tatpuruṣa compound takes the gender of the final member. Now, the final member of the compound 'pratyakṣa' is 'aḍa'. And the word 'aḍa' in the sense of sense-organ is always in the neuter gender. According to this, 'pratyakṣa' being a tatpuruṣa compound would take the neuter gender alone (pratyakṣam), and hence usages like 'Pratyakṣaḥ ghaṭaḥ' (the compound in masculine gender), etc. would not be permissible, as it would violate the above rule.

In answer to this Bhāsarvajñā says that it is not so. According to a vārtika of Kātyāyana, when the first member of a 'Dvandva' or 'Tatpuruṣa' compound is 'praṭa' or 'aḍaṇḍa' or 'alama' or when the compound belongs to the class of 'gatisamāsā' the rule that the compound takes the gender of

1. ब्यापायु हिन्द्रयेँ। - Amarakoṣa (2773); Read: हिन्द्रयेँ।
   करारुऽ क्लीमुभः। - Māheśvarīṭikā on AK.
2. गतिः - a term for prepositions and some other adverbial prefixes (such as Pra etc.) when immediately connected with the tenses of a verb or with verbal derivatives (Pāṇini Sūtra 1-4-60 ff)

The Niṭāta (a particle - all adverbs including conjunctions and interjections) Uri etc. are called 'gati' when they are associated with action. Also the words ending with the terminations cvi and dać are called 'gati'। उपस्य: क्रियायोऽः। ।
1-4-58 गतिः। - 1-4-60; प्रावः गतिस्या: ख्यः; प्रावः क्रियायोऽः उपस्यंसं गतिः।संख्यः। - Siddhāntakaumudi
   अध्यायं धातुसारः। - 1-5-61;
   उत्तरीक्ष्य, नीतीकृत्य, पदपार्क्ष्य अर्द्रकरोति धति उत्तरीक्ष्य, नीतीकरोति धति नीतीकृत्य, पदपार्करोति धति पदपार्कृत्य।
final member is prohibited. Now, as the compound 'pratyakṣa' belongs to the class of gatiṣmatā (pratigatam akṣam -pratyakṣam) it cannot take the gender of the final member, i.e. akṣa, according to this special rule setting aside the general one. So it takes the gender of the thing that is denoted. That is to say, the compound 'pratyakṣa' can take any one of the three genders, strictly following the gender of the substantive like 'ghaṭa'. Thus in Bhāsarvajña's view, the compound 'pratyakṣa' is a tatpurusa and so it can take the terminations of any gender. Here in the present context the compound 'pratyakṣa' takes the gender of Śādhana (Pratyakṣam śādhanam). It signifies 'a means of right, non-indirect knowledge, in which an object comes before the corresponding sense-organ'. Such a means (śādhana) is pratyakṣa.

Difference between the meaning suggested by Etymological Analysis (yutpatti) of the word 'pratyakṣa' and that by its denotation: In regard to the etymological analysis of the word 'pratyakṣa,' Bhāsarvajña puts forth a question: How is it said that what is said to be pratyakṣa has approached the sense-organ (Pratigatam akṣam)? The answer to this question is that various factors are said to be pratyakṣa, as they

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1. 'प्रायांक्षाः तत्पूर्णाः गतिष्माः प्रवृत्तिप्रतिषेधः' ।

- NyB, p. 84

contd. see next page No. 498
The Vārtika is actually found as -  

Prāptaparājapānaḥ kāmikāmāyaḥ | 
Pārtha-śīlopanāsyaḥ Śrī, |  
Prāptajīviḥ śṛṅgāvaḥ, nāṃśabāmśaḥ puruṣaḥ।

2. Tatra sva-dhaśānāmānuśāsanaḥ pratyakṣaḥ। — NyB, 84

3. See: "Pratyakṣa means that the sense-organ is approached, reposed upon. The compound word is composed, according to (the rule) that prepositions like ati etc. in the sense of (ati)-krānta etc. can enter into composition with (their complement) in the accusative case. In words compounded with Prāptā, apanna, ālam and prepositions (the rule) according to which gender of the compound must be the same as the gender of its last member is not observed, (and therefore) it agrees in gender with the object to which it is referred, (and thus) the word pratyakṣa is established as an adjective which can be used in any gender".

— BL, II, p. 12, Foot-Note 2 (Stcherbatsky), Compare: Pratīta-sahāṅkamāyaḥ | pratyakṣaḥ śīlopanāsyaḥ kāmikāyaḥ |  

Prāptaparājapānaḥ kāmikāmāyaḥ | pratyakṣaḥ Śrī, nāṃśabāmśaḥ puruṣaḥ।

— Nyāyabinduṭīkā (Dharmottara), p. 8
approach the sense-organs through different relations. Some approach the sense-organ by being produced by that sense-organ, some by becoming its co-operative, while some by becoming its object. To wit, the fruit or resultant cognition is said to have approached the sense-organ inasmuch as it is produced by the sense-organ; similarly the means of producing the fruit, i.e., contact of sense-organ with object, is said to have reached the sense-organ, in the sense that contact becomes a co-operative of the sense-organ. And the content of the fruit or resultant cognition is said to be reposing in the sense-organ, since it becomes the object of the sense-organ. Thus fruit or resultant cognition, its means (i.e., contact of sense-organ with object) and its content can all be said to be pratyakṣa, as they all approach the sense-organs in different ways.

It may be urged that if a means (i.e., contact) is accepted as pratyakṣa, since it becomes a co-operative cause of the sense-organ, then it would follow that the sense-organ could not be said to be pramāṇa. For here that means is said to be pratyakṣa which becomes a co-operative of the sense-organ. So

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1. कथं पुनः कण्ठं पलितम् (प्रत्ययम्) ? -

Read: प्रत्ययोऽश्च त्वं ज्ञानम्, तत्साधनाभिन्न्यम्, तत्तत्त्विन्द्रणः, घटाविविषयं चोज्यते। ततः ज्ञानभिन्न्यस्य जन्यम्, सत्त्वस्य हंस्यत्त्वा सकारार्थेन, घटावः हंस्यत्स्य विषयः। अनक्रियाविक्ष्मम्यः: ज्ञानार्थाय हंस्यत्त्वापि तत्त्वस्य हंस्यत्त्वम्। इति मावः।

- NyB, p.84, Editor's Foot-Note No.8

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sense-organs cannot be called pratyakṣa-pramāṇa, because they cannot be their own 'co-operative'. It is not proper to say that one and the same thing becomes the main cause and also its own 'co-operative'. These two must be different. Moreover, if we concede that whatever functions as a 'co-operative' of the sense-organ is pratyakṣa (pramāṇa), then knower also would come to be 'pratyakṣa' inasmuch as he too functions as a co-operative of the sense-organ - but this is not true. Again, the acceptance of the etymological analysis of the word 'pratyakṣa' will create one more issue. If we admit that whatever is produced by the sense-organ is the fruit of pratyakṣa, then there would arise the contingency of doubt etc. and pleasure etc. being the fruit of pratyakṣa; since they also are produced by the sense-organ. Thus if the etymological analysis of the word 'pratyakṣa' (pramāṇa) be accepted as the cause of the use of that word, then it would involve many absurdities.

In answer to this Bhāsarvajña says that this contention is not tenable. For by giving etymological analysis of a word, one can only explain the meaning of that word; but etymological analysis alone cannot be accepted as the cause of the use of words to denote specific objects. That is to say, the etymological explanation justifies the use of the word to denote some thing, but it cannot explain why the word denotes that and not anything else, to which also the etymological
explanation equally applies. As for example, words like 'go' (cow), 'pañkaja' (lotus) etc. are employed to denote specific objects not on account of their etymological analysis, but on account of the objects having certain characteristics like gotva (cowness) or the like. Thus on the basis

1. See: अस्तान्तिकत्वं च भूतपूर्वसिद्धान्त कश्चन् न हूँ प्रवृत्तिनिदेशः। — Nyāyabindūṭikā p. 8, Read: 'This meaning of a knowledge dependent upon the sense is suggested by the etymological analysis of the word, not by its actual use in philosophy'. - Stcherbatsky

2. See : भूतपूर्वसिद्धान्त कश्चन् न हूँ प्रवृत्तिनिदेशः। — Nyāyabindūṭikā p. 8

Also see: केन् ..... अर्थात्तकारित्वः लग्ये। तवेद्भवः प्रवृत्तिनिदेशः। तत्रव यतः किंचि अर्थत्तकारित्वस्य तत्रतपः चाप्यते।।।।। यथा गच्छितः गृहः गमनाक्षरार्थः भूतपूर्वः। अपि गौर्जः गमनिक्षेपलिपितस्य क्षार्थस्य वेदं भूतपूर्विनिनिधिः। करारती। तथा च गच्छितः काच्छितः च गच्छि गौर्जः। सिद्धः नक्ति। — Dharmottara’s Nyāyabindūṭikā, p.8
of class characteristics different words are used to denote different objects. And the word 'pratyakṣa' is not an exception to this. It may be noted here that there is certainly a difference of characteristics between 'pratyakṣa' in the sense of pramāṇa (means of valid knowledge) and 'pratyakṣa' in the sense of phala (resultant cognition). It is thus:

Right, non-indirect apprehension is 'pratyakṣa phala', while the means of such an apprehension is 'pratyakṣa pramāṇa'.

It may be argued that there would arise the contingency of anumāna and āgama also being pratyakṣa, inasmuch as their fruit also is non-indirect (a-parokṣa) like happiness etc. This argument is not proper, says Bhasarvajña. For the word 'a-parokṣa' is intended to be used here to denote the genus 'a-parokṣatva'. So any thing what so ever in which the genus 'a-parokṣatva' inheres is directly and primarily denoted by the word 'a-parokṣa'. And happiness etc. are called a-parokṣa, not because the genus 'a-parokṣatva', inheres in them, but only because they become objects of a-parokṣa presentative knowledge. It is not that the genus 'a-parokṣatva' inheres in objects. If it were so admitted, there would be the contingency of objects being 'a-parokṣa' for all persons who would be able to apprehend this aparokṣatva in them. And it is obvious that genus is known in common by all. It does not happen that an object endowed with the genus 'blueness' is perceived as blue by a particular person alone and not by all.
So if the object had 'aparokṣatva' as its attribute, it would be 'aparokṣa' for all. But when knowledge (anubhava) alone is accepted as endowed with the genus 'a-parokṣatva', then there does not arise this contingency of an object being a-parokṣa to all. A thing becomes a-parokṣa only in the case of that person whose a-parokṣa knowledge has that thing as its object. In short, only when a thing becomes an object of a-parokṣa knowledge, does not become a-parokṣa. Just as there does not exist any special object which universally becomes 'an object of doubt' for all. But a thing becomes an object of doubt in the case of that person only whose knowledge is of the nature of doubt in regard to that object. Thus it is apparent that there does not exist the genus 'a-parokṣatva' in things, just as the genus 'saṃdigdhatva' (the state of being doubtful) does not exist in things. In this way, the inferential knowledge, even though it is parokṣa (indirect) can be called a-parokṣa when it becomes the object of a-parokṣa knowledge, just as the same is called 'doubt-ful' when it becomes the object of doubtful knowledge. It is not that inferential knowledge is a-parokṣa by virtue of being endowed with the genus 'a-parokṣatva'. It may be noted here that according to Bhaṣarvajña perceptual knowledge is a-parokṣa, while knowledge obtained by means of inference or by means of verbal testimony is parokṣa, as the

1. सष्ठ—अविनामावेन पराजोगकारकं श्रवणं अनुसयं।

- NyS, NyB, p. 194
respective genus 'a-parokṣa' or 'parokṣa' inheres in them. And in the Nyāya view, cognition can become the object of perceptual or non-direct cognition. Hence accordingly, inferential knowledge is called parokṣa since the genus 'parokṣa' inheres in that knowledge, and the same can be called a-parokṣa when it becomes the object of a-parokṣa knowledge, but then itself does not have the aparokṣa-gati in it as it is just the object of aparokṣa-jñāna which is endowed with aparokṣa-gatī.

Determination of the genus Pratyakṣa after the refutations of the rival view: Some thinkers do not accept that the specific genera parokṣa and a-parokṣa subsist in knowledge. However he also would have to point out some cause of the usage, viz. 'parokṣa knowledge', a-parokṣa knowledge'. It is also not right to argue that because the knowledge is produced by the contact of sense-organ with object it is called a-parokṣa. Till the fact that the knowledge which is produced by the contact of sense-organ and object has aparokṣa-gati is established, this usage 'parokṣa jñāna' cannot be established.

1. सम्य-अपरोक्ष-अनुव-वाचनन् प्रत्यक्षम्ília
   - NyS, NyB, p. 84
2. सम्य-विनामानात् परारोक्ष-अनुव-वाचनन्त्र अनुमानम्ília
   - NyS, NyB, p. 194
3. सम्यभूतं सम्यपरारोक्ष-अनुव-वाचनानम् बागम्ilia
   - Ibid., p. 379
4. य: अपरोक्षयोगतफळःilia - Marginal Note-, Photostat p. 37
And it is not justifiable to admit that a thing which is itself not established as such, could qualify another. Unless the genus a-parokṣatva is established, we cannot regard it as a qualifier of knowledge - 'aparokṣa jñāna'. It cannot be said that just apprehension of object is the mark or sign (the reason proving the existence) of the genus a-parokṣatva. Besides, a particular apprehension is not possible in the absence of the genus a-parokṣatva, and sākṣātkārita (the state of being directly apprehending) is only another word for 'a-parokṣatva'. So if it is said that a-parokṣatva is the state of being direct experience, it would not be an explanation, but a tautology, as the two words 'a-parokṣatva' and 'Sākṣātkārita' are nothing but synonyms.

There would not possibly be difference between the perceptual knowledge of soul and the inferential knowledge of soul in the absence of the knowledge having the genus 'producedness by contact,' 'non-directness' or the like. That is to say, the difference between the perceptual or direct knowledge of the soul and the inferential knowledge of the soul could not be tenable - it could not be upheld. It may be urged that aparokṣatva is a property (dharma) of knowledge, and not a genus. That property is the illumination of an object as qualified by particulars which may be capable of being pointed out, or not capable of being pointed out. Man can have the direct apprehension of milk etc., but he can point to others only some
particulars like whiteness etc; while he cannot point to others the exact sweetness etc. In direct apprehension an object is illumined as qualified by such particulars. Such an illumination of the object constitutes the aparokṣatva of knowledge, it is an attribute of knowledge, and not a genus.

The answer to this is that (in Bhāsarvajña's view) that property of knowledge, which is expressed by the word 'being illuminative' (avabhāsitva) is nothing but a specific genus of knowledge. Besides according to the definition given by the opponent that knowledge which illumines the qualifier (e.g. touch of wind) without the qualified thing (e.g. wind would not be aparokṣa). For in this view, the property of being illuminative in the case of knowledge is possible only in respect of a thing which is qualified by some particulars, while in the present case only the particular characteristic or qualifier is known through perception and not that of which it is the qualifier. The opponent may argue that a particular expression (e.g. aparokṣa) may be used by virtue of the thing being produced by a cause (contact of sense-organ and object) and one need not hypostatise a genus 'aparokṣatva' for this purpose. Bhāsarvajña replies that in that case the expression 'jar', 'tree' etc. would have to be similarly justified, and not on the basis of the genus 'jarness', 'treeness' as is accepted by even the opponent. He says that such a line of thinking would only result in the repudiation of genus, the Buddhists would
have their wish fulfilled. Therefore things are called 'tree', 'jar' etc. owing to the genus 'treeness', though there may be particular causes. As in the case of tree, jar etc. so in the case of different knowledge-individuals (perceptual, inferential etc.), intermediary specific genera, which are the causes of the usage common to some and exclusive of others, should be accepted, even though the respective specific causes of knowledge-individuals may be present. Hence a piece of knowledge is called aparokṣa on the basis of its genus aparokṣatva, and not on the basis of any other cause of it, such as the contact of sense-organ and object. This being once accepted, there would not be any scope for those who believe that a thing like genus does not exist at all. Thus by the specific kinds of genera like apprehension-ness (anubhāvatva), non-indirectness (aparokṣatva) etc. the fruit of pratyakṣa, viz. perceptual knowledge is distinguished from other types of knowledge, such as memory (saṃmāraṇa), inference (anumāna) etc. And this perceptual knowledge being thus distinguished, distinguishes the means of perception (eye, etc.) which are supersensuous, from other thing of the same class (ear, etc.) or of a different class (viz. vyāpti which is instrument of anumāna and so on). To wit, aparokṣa cākṣuṣa knowledge distinguishes the eyes which are supersensuous, from the ear, etc. as well as from the instrument like vyāpti etc. With this in view the author of the Nyāya-sūtra also stated the distinctive characteristics such as, 'being produced by the contact of sense-organ and object, etc.
in respect of the fruit (i.e. resultant cognition) only.
That is to say, pratyakṣa can denote the means of valid knowledge, but the Sūtrakāra, while defining, has used this word 'pratyakṣa' in respect of the fruit or perceptual knowledge only, and he has done so purposely as explained above.

The existence of Genus Aparokṣatva and the like is supported by the words of the sūtra: It is said in the Nyāyāsūtra that the perceptual knowledge arises from the contact of sense-organ and object. By this, the author of the Nyāyāsūtra intends to say that the knowledge that arises is qualified by the genera apprehension, and non-indirectness. Since the fact of knowledge being qualified by these class characteristics is established by pratyakṣa, they can properly serve as its defining characteristics. Unless knowledge is established as qualified by these genera, it could not be defined. So, unless the specific fruit is established, the contact of sense-organ and object itself remains unproved. As a consequence of this, the fact of knowledge being produced by the contact would be uncertain. And how could an uncertain characteristic be a defining characteristic of knowledge? It may be said that the contact of sense-organ with object (in the case of perceptual knowledge) is inferred from the fact of the non-apprehension of an object.

1. इन्द्रयास्मात्मन्निःक्षतिपत्त्वान् सान्यम् अध्यदेयस्यम् वच्चामिच्छारि अवसायत्स्वप्रत्यक्षम्
   - MS 1-1-4
which is far off and cut-off by a wall or the like. (where sense-object contact is not possible). A distant object, or one between which and the sense-organ, a wall or the like obstruction intervenes, is not apprehended. From this we can infer that when there is apprehension there must have been contact of sense-organ and object. Bhasarvajña says that one should not say so. The non-apprehension of a distant or cut-off object many help us to infer the absence of sense-object contact in its case (but it cannot enable us to infer the presence of sense-object contact when there is perceptual knowledge). It may be argued that the apprehension which arises only in the case of an avyavahita (not-cut-off) object, enables us to infer the sense-object contact. But this is not proper since the concept of obstruction (vyavadhāna) which is the condition in the above argument for the non-apprehension of the presence or absence of the contact of sense-organ and object, is not tenable. In order to refute the concept of intervention (vyavadhāna) in this context, Bhasarvajña puts forth alternatives. What is this intervention? (i) If it is said that intervention signifies 'being in a remote place', then this intervention would be there in the case of sun or the like also, as it is very far away from the earth. Secondly if it is said that intervention (vyavadhāna) signifies the presence between the object and the sense-organ of a substance, whose components are compactly knit

1. The text is धनाशयविज्ञानवाचिक्षेत् यादानवाच्, and not धनाशयविज्ञानवाचिक्षेत् - NyE, p. 36; Photostat, p. 37
with each other (so that one cannot see through them), then such a vyāvādhaṇa would be there in the case of something between which and the sense-organ, there is the intervention of glass, mica, crystal also (and it should not then be perceived). Thirdly if it is claimed that a thing which stands in between and impedes the apprehension of an object is alone the intervening factor in respect of that object; then the fire which is cut-off by a wall would have to be admitted as non-obstructed inasmuch as it is apprehended by means of inference and verbal testimony. Still further, it may be urged that direct apprehension of an object by the sense-organ serves as a reason for establishing an object as non-obstructed. That is to say, when there is such an apprehension of the object, it leads us to infer that the object is not cut off by any intervening factor. But in reply to this Bhāsarvājña puts a question: Is the mind not a sense-organ? Is the knowledge that is inferential or the like not produced by the mind? The gist of the question is this: The knowledge that is inferential or the like is produced by means of the mind, which is regarded as one of the sense-organs. Hence the object of such a knowledge would have to be admitted as not being cut off by any intervention—which is not right. Against this the opponent says: Who says that the knowledge obtained through the mind is not an apprehension by a sense-organ? However, the knowledge brought about by the mind which is not in contact with
the object (—of course the opponent means—not in contact through another sense-organ the eye, etc. or the like) cannot be recognised as caused by the sense-organ. To refute this Bhāsarvajña says that this argument is in a circle, which is unanswerable. For knowledge is established as produced by the sense-organ on the strength of the fact that it is brought about by contact of sense-organ and object; and by virtue of the knowledge being produced by the sense-organ, it is established as apprehension of a non-obstructed object. And further on the strength of the fact that it is an apprehension of a non-obstructed object, knowledge is established as produced by the contact of sense-organ and object. Now, unless one of the above grounds is first proved by reason, all would come to the position of being unproven.

As to the opponent's argument that knowledge, produced by the mind which is not in contact with the object, cannot be admitted as produced by the sense-organ, Bhāsarvajña, seeking to cross-examine, puts a question: How could it be that though the mind is held as an instrument, it is admitted as giving rise to the act of cognition even when that instrument (i.e. mind) is not in contact with the object that is to

1. वद्राध्यायिन्न-नकर्षत्तम = A
   वद्राध्यायिन्न-तम = B
   वयतिप्रत्ययाध्यिन्न-तम = C
   वद्राध्यायिन्न-नकर्षत्तम = A
be inferred or the like? If this be admitted, it would be contradictory to what is accepted, viz. an instrument, an axe or the like is found to be producing the act of cutting only when it comes in contact with an object like wood etc. Hence it is not true to say that the mind is an instrument, and it produces the act of cognition even without coming into contact with the object. Again, it may be urged that as there does not exist the contact which is of the nature of conjunction (samyoga) etc. between the mind and the object to be inferred, etc. the mind is said to be non-connected (viz. to be not in contact with the object). In reply to this Bhāsarvajñāna says that this is not true in all cases. Contact of the mind with the object to be inferred, viz. ātman or the like is possible. So the knowledge of ātman acquired through inference would have to be admitted as aparokṣa, since it is produced by the contact of the mind and the object (i.e. ātman), which is absurd. Again, it may be argued that Ātman and the like are not objects of sense-organs, so the contact of the mind with Ātman in inference cannot be said to be 'contact of sense-organ and object'. The answer to this is that if this is admitted, then it would follow that Yoga perception in respect of Ātman could not be regarded as produced by the contact of sense-organ and object (i.e. Ātman). But this would not be acceptable even to the opponent. It may be urged that with special reference to Yoga, Ātman and the like are accepted as
becoming objects of the sense-organ. Here Bhāsarvajna asks the opponent: What is the special reason for making such a distinction between yogic perception and the ordinary one? To this the opponent may say: The sense-organ of yogin is capable of generating a special distinctive knowledge in respect of atman, etc. Then again Bhāsarvajna asks a puzzling question to the opponent: What other than the genus 'a-parokṣatva' is meant here by this distinctiveness? Besides, the fact of being directly apprehending is also a synonym of aparokṣatva only. Hence, according to Bhāsarvajna the genus 'aparokṣatva' should be accepted as subsisting in knowledge itself.

The opponent may contend that the distinctive characteristic of yogic perception is that the knowledge is not produced by the remembrance of the relation between the thing and its name. It may be noted here that in a case where the relation of the object with a word is not known (i.e. where we do not know the name of the object that we perceive), the apprehension

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1. सम्बन्धस्य विशेषत्वं विशेष है - NyB, p.37
   Read: प्रथमालोचितः क्रि: सामान्यविशेषनां संक्लीपणसमयवस्तुपमेः।
   बाल्मणि: कर्मश्च स्मारयनि तत्कालभावनि शुद्दमपि स्मारयति कर्मस्तवतः।
   - NVTT, NCG, p. 230
   Also read: तदेव स्मृतिविप्रेक्ष्याय अविभाजित रण प्रत्ययः शृङ्खला विशेषः।
   - NM (Pramāṇa-prakarana), p.75
of the object is certainly never spoken of by means of any name. In the present context, the opponent says that when ātman becomes object of yogic perception, the relation that "this thing is to be understood by this word 'ātman'" is not remembered. This is how the knowledge obtained through yogic perception is distinguished from the knowledge attained by ordinary perception in which the relation of a thing and its name is remembered.

In answer to this Bhaṇāravajña says that this alleged peculiarity also of yogic perception is not so far ascertained by proof. The opponent may argue here that in yogic perception even though there is absence of the apprehension of the relation between a thing and its name, knowledge does arise, on the ground of this, it can be ascertained that in yogic perception, knowledge arises without the relation of a thing and its name being remembered. The answer to this is that this is not proper. For, the non-apprehension of the remembrance of the relation of thing and its name does not necessarily prove that there is absence of such a relation. Even if the remembrance of the

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1. See: निविकल्पप्रूपं सविकल्पस्य प्रूपिः तत्व्य संज्ञिकृतिकृत्वात्।
स्पर्शेण हुः तद्वर्त्तं नास प्रियत: "गो: अम्स" - इत्यादिदृश्यं न
स्पर्शितमात्रः, तत्त्व्य शास्त्रान्वितवा।
- NyB, p. 99;
शविकल्पप्रूपं प्रत्यथादु... प्रत्यदाविषयस्य विशेषत्ववाच्यमुत्प्रतिपादनातु
अधिकलविषयार्थिः प्रारम्भवत्व्यात्भुतमात्र न हति।
- NyB, p. 100
relation occurs very quickly, its non-apprehension may possibly occur. In the case of yogic perception, by means of the power of concentration, a yogin can remember the relation, such as invariable connection (avinābhava) between a thing and its name, or the like. And as soon as this is remembered, the object invariably connected with the name sometimes comes to be perceived. But merely on this ground it cannot be claimed that in yogic perception, ātman or the like does not become an object of a sense-organ. Therefore it is reasonable to say that in respect of whatever thing knowledge as qualified by non-indirectness (aparokṣatva) is produced on account of adṛṣṭa etc. in the case of a person, that thing itself is called the object of the sense-organ in the case of that person. Hence it is concluded here that the genus 'aparokṣatva' subsists in knowledge, and not in an object.

Purpose of the epithet or qualifier 'being produced by object' of perceptual cognition: According to some, the

1. It would have been better, if the expression were

कार्यः प्रत्ययः भवति, but the text in the printed edition (p.37) as well as in the Photostat (p.38) is:

कार्यः प्रत्ययः भवति।

2. हन्नेनार्थसिनिकासः पौर्णिन्यासंन्यासं आयनं अवयवप्रत्यायत्मकम् अवयविन्यायि व्यक्तसायत्मकः प्रत्ययः। — - NS 1-1-4
epithet (qualifying expression) signifying that perceptual knowledge is produced from an object is inserted in the definition of perception in order that the definition should not apply to memory (-in order to ward off memory). But this too is not proper, says Bhaṣarvajña. For the knowledge that does not arise directly from the object and that which pertains to an object of the past or the like is also recognised as the fruit of pramāṇa. Otherwise a thing of the past or the like, not being generative of cognition, it just would not be an object of any one's knowledge. Consequently a thing of the past or the like would never become the object of pramāṇa, i.e. prameya or knowable. And if it is regarded as generative of cognition, then this must be held to be existent in the present. For only a thing which is existent in the present can possibly generate cognition. So a certain thing becomes prameya by virtue of its being manifest in the cognition, and not by virtue of its being generative only. In the case of inference and verbal testimony a thing becomes prameya on the basis of its being manifest in

1. The text should be corrected as follows:

बन्धाया हंसीरास्फऽस्य जनक्लशामावान्तः कस्य विज्ञानः
विष्णवत्वास्य स्य प्राप्तमुप्यः जनक्लशः वा वत्तान्तः स्यात्।

-NyB, p. 87; Photostat, p. 38

2. The text should be जनक्लशः वर्त्तान्तः , and not जनक्लशः वर्त्तान्तः

: See: Photostat, p. 38
the knowledge. And this rule that whatever is manifest in
knowledge is prameya, e. g. the prameya of inferential cogni-
tion, etc., applies to perceptual cognition also, because
a thing of the past or the like does become an object of the
Yogic perception. That the object should be existing at the
time and should be the producer of amubhava does not necessari-
ly apply to even perception for past and future objects are cer-
tainly the objects of perceptual cognition. So the qualifica-
tion that perceptual knowledge is generated by an object will
make the definition too narrow.

The Nature of the things of the past or the like: It
may be urged that things of the past and of the future are noth-
ing but negations of the nature of destruction of the thing and
of the nature of non-origination of the thing respectively. And
these negations are accepted here in the sstra to be generative
of knowledge. So the knowledge of past and future must be ad-
mitted as arising from object. How then could the knowledge
of past and future things be said to be one not produced by
object? The answer to this is that the things of the past
etc. are not precisely of the nature of negation. That for
bringing about which an appropriate cause is picked up is said
to be anāgata, that which has not yet occurred, i. e. future.
And the antecedent negation (prāgabhāva) is not of such a nature.
It cannot be said to be anāgata viz. a thing which is yet to
come, for antecedent negation is regarded as beginningless. Thus
a thing which is anāgata and prāgbhāva are different from each other. Similarly, whatever has ceased to exist is called 'atita' or a thing that has passed away. And posterior negation prādhvamsābhāva) can never be called atīta (a thing that passed away), for it never comes to an end, never passes away. So a thing which is atīta is different from prādvamsābhāva.

One may put a question here: What then is the nature of the thing which is past or the like? Some answer this question as follows: A thing of the past or the like cannot be accepted as a positive thing (bhāva), since it is devoid of existence, etc. Nor can it be called negation (abhāva), inasmuch as a thing of the past or the like is, as shown above, different from prāgbhāva etc. Thus a thing which is anāgata or the like is neither a positive thing like an existent jar, nor a negation like prāgbhāva of a jar, etc. Therefore a thing of the past is a third type of prameya, that is different from positive and negative prameyas. Rejecting this view Bhāsarvajna says that no such object is seen anywhere in the world, which is neither positive nor non-positive. As a matter of fact, 'jar' and 'non-jar' pervade or comprehend all things in the world. As for example, a thing can be jar or non-jar, if it is not jar, it must be non-jar and if something is negated as non-jar, then it must be a jar. No third alternative is possible. In this manner all those things which are not bhāva must be definitely abhāva. And when there
are two negatives such as 'a thing is not non-positive' it comes to this that the thing is positive. It is not that like adharma (demerit), a-bhāva is characterised by a specific genus like 'abhavatva' so that a-bhāva could be classified as a third kind of prameya (examples of these being the past things and the like). This may be true in the case of akṣa a-dharma (demerit) because it is altogether different from the negation of dharma. Indeed, the defining characteristic of abhāva is just this: That which is different from bhāva (positive) is bhāva (negative or non-positive). A thing is either affirmed or negated. Since there is no practical usage other than affirmation and negation, there is not a third kind of prameya.

It may then be asked: What is the nature of a past thing or the like? The answer is that it is certainly of the nature of a positive entity. Even a past or future thing is certainly bhāva (positive), though non-existent. It is not remembered or known as the negative of anything. Against this it may be argued that a thing of the past or the like is devoid of reality, etc.; and so it is not proper to say that it is of the nature of a positive entity. The answer to this is that it is not established that it is devoid of reality etc. To wit, a thing like a jar is itself called atīta (a thing that passed away), or anāgata (a thing that is yet to come into existence) or vartamāna (a thing that is existent in the present). This being the case, how could a past thing or the like be devoid of reality etc.? It may be urged that if a past thing or the
like is admitted as being always endowed with reality etc; there would be the contingency of the thing being eternal. The answer to this that it is not so, for the substratum for reality etc. is not established as eternal. And when dharmin (substratum, e.g. a jar) is not always there how possibly could it have the attribute, reality etc.? Indeed a jar which is destroyed or which has yet not come into existence could not be said to have reality - we could not say: 'The jar is in respect of such a jar. However such a jar is there as atīta or anāgata.

It may be asked: well, does this jar assume various forms like an actor? The Answer is 'Yes it does'.

If it is asked how this could be so, the answer is that it is so apprehended. And surely if a jar assumes various forms (atīta, etc.), then how could it be that it is not there? The opponent may say that a thing of the past or the like is said to be not there, since there is the absence of the attribute, reality, etc. The answer to this that the attribute of reality, etc. too assumes various forms before or after its present existence, just like a jar, then how could it not be there? It should certainly be there. It may be said that since there is the absence of connection of the attribute, reality, etc. with the past jar or the like, that (past) jar is said to be not there. The answer to this is that this is not proper. Here also the objection equally stands. This connection also should be
admitted as assuming various forms, such as atita etc; then
how could the connection be said to be not there? By this the view that destruction is the absence of the state of being present and that the antecedent negation is the absence of manifestation should also be taken as refuted. For, the state of being present, and manifestation, being attributes, should be admitted as assuming various forms, atita etc. and so they could not be negated at any time. Therefore a jar as just asat (non-reality) is not (i.e. cannot be) there if any form—whether as non-produced or as destroyed. Further, it may be asked as to how a jar that is not there could be a qualifier of prior negation (prāgabhāva) etc.? (avidyamānasya ghaṭasya prāgabhāvah—here avidyamāna ghaṭa is qualifier of Prāgabhāva). It is obvious that in order to be a qualifier a thing should be there. Some answer this question as follows: Even an unreal or non-existing thing which is superimposed by imagination can become a qualifier of negation, Prāgabhāva etc; just like hare's horns. As for example, a man sees horns elsewhere and then imagines those of the same genus, to be on the head of a hare. But in reality the man finds absence of horns on the head of a hare. And he has the cognition of the absence of hare's horns. In fact hare's horns do not exist anywhere. Similarly, though a jar of the past or the like does not exist, we imagine it to be there and call it anāgata etc. which becomes the qualifier
of prāgabhāva etc. If a jar or anāgata or the like had been actually apprehended as the qualifier of negation, then there would not have been absence of it as in the case of genus etc. That is to say, gotva or cow-ness is actually apprehended as a qualifier of 'go' (or cow), so there is not non-existence of cow-ness. But this is not true of the jar which is anāgata or the like. It is merely imagined, and not actually apprehended. So it does not exist. That is why the usage 'hare's horns' is certainly false, but the usage 'negation of hare's horns' cannot be said to be false. As for example, a person suffering from some eye-disease may perceive two moons instead of one. In this case, the talk of there being two moons is false, but the talk of the negation of two-foldness in respect of the moon is not false.

Moreover if the talk of negation be false, it would mean the establishment of its positive existence. The denial of the negation of a jar establishes the existence of a jar. Thus the talk of the earlier or the later negation of jar, etc. is not false, but the talk of its positive existence is certainly false, like the talk of the negation of something when it is positively existent. So cloth or the like seen elsewhere is superimposed

1. शास्त्रविष्णुप्रस्तावः; प्रायमावः, प्रवेसामावः।
2. तत्त्वात्त्व कथ्यते कृष्टस्य पतावः। - NyB, p. 89;
   पतावः - Photostat, p. 39; the reading पतावः would have been better in the present context.
here by constructive imagination and then it becomes the
qualifier of negation but not so in reality.

A thing of the past or the like, becomes the qualifier
of negation through its being remembered: Rejecting the above
answer given to the question how a jar which is not there could
be the qualifier of prior negation, etc; Bhāsarvajñā says that
things, anāgata or the like cannot be compared with hare's
horns. For, hare's horns are never seen at any time anywhere
by anybody. Hence they are absolutely non-existent. So it is
proper that such horns be superimposed by imagination. But in
contrast to this, a jar, anāgata or the like could not be superimposed
by imagination as it is sometimes apprehended, and it
is this alone that is known as being the qualifier. As for
instance a jar that was seen, has now ceased to exist and so
we have the knowledge that the jar does not exist. However
when we refer to its negation the jar that was seen formerly
is remembered, and not that it is superimposed by imagination.
It may be urged that imagination is just remembrance. In reply
to this Bhāsarvajñā says that none can prevent the opponent
from arbitrarily giving names to things. So he could regard
imagination as synonymous with remembrance. However the word
'kalpanā' is well known in the world as conveying the sense of
false imposition of a thing. As for example, a man superimposes
eagle etc. on his own self, or a king or a horse or the like on
a picture or the like. Here though the man is not really eagle, he imagines himself to be so. This is Kalpana (imagination). On the other hand, in remembrance it does not happen that we imagine something different from what we have seen. For, memory is recollection of a thing as it was seen.

Again, it may be contended that experience of a thing, aitata (past) or anāgata (future) is nothing but its memory (Smṛti). Rejecting this view Bhāsarvajña says that it is not so. For in the absence of apprehension (anubhava), there cannot be remembrance of the thing. How could a person first remember a thing which he has not previously apprehended. To wit, Pāṇḍyas have not been seen by us. So their remembrance is never possible. Besides, it cannot be admitted that a person apprehends one thing and remembers something other than that, for if it is so admitted, there would follow an absurd over-extension. Anything could be remembered on the basis of the apprehension of just anything. Therefore the apprehension of a thing, that becomes the cause of remembrance, must be admitted as having been previously occurred.

One may urge that if 'a past thing' or 'future thing' is directly experienced, then how could it be said to be one that has passed away (aitata) or one that is yet to come (anāgata)? The answer to this is that this can be explained on the strength of the interval of time. As for example, the very same post
as it really is, is called 'remote' or 'near' owing to there being intervention of place and non-intervention of place respectively. Similarly the very same thing is called 'anāgata' because of the intervention of the time of prāgabhāva (the expanse of time between the time past when we speak of it as anāgata and the time-point of the origination of the thing). The very same object is called 'atīta' owing to the intervention of the time of pradhāvamsābhāva the expanse of time that intervenes between the time point of destruction and the time point when we speak of its destruction. And when there is no intervention of either of these times, the thing is called vartamāna (present).

Again, it may be argued that there would arise the contingency of the thing, atīta or anāgata, being practically efficient in spite of the intervention of time, just as the moon or the like is a efficient (arthakriyākāri) though there is intervention of place. In answer to this Bhasarvajña says that the alleged contingency would not arise, because there is no connection between the thing, atīta or anāgata and our sense-organs or the like. On the other hand, in the case of the moon, the practical efficiency is justifiable, though there is certainly the connection of the moon and man's sense-organs or Kumuda (night lotus) or the like. But unlike the moon, a
thing, past or the like which is separated by or in time is not there in its own form, so it is not connected with anything, hence its practical efficiency is not there. And if such a thing, atīta or the like is admitted to be there the fact of its being separated by or in time would be contradicted. As a matter of fact, a thing which was not there previously or which is destroyed cannot be one that is there.

It may be urged that a thing which is not there cannot be generative of cognition and it cannot have any connection with anything. This being the case, how could a person's knowledge be restricted to the particular object, viz. 'This is its cognition'? The answer to this is that such a restriction is possible due to the causal complex or apparatus consisting of adṛśta etc. Inasmuch as knowledge reveals the thing we see that knowledge is produced as manifesting that thing restricted to it only. And since we have the experience of knowledge manifesting that (past or future thing), even though this thing be non-productive, it is said to be related to the knowledge as its object (there is said to be subject—object relationship between knowledge and the thing). It is very important to note here that though a thing is generative of cognition, if it is not manifested in knowledge, it cannot be an object of cognition; a sense-organ or the like is never the object of perceptual knowledge, though it is generative of knowledge.
Despite its non-generativeness, a thing that is atita or anāgata, becomes an object of knowledge: It may be urged that in the statement 'I know the atita thing, or the like', the thing is not generative of cognition. Then how could that thing be the karmakāraka? How could it be related as object to the act of knowing? In answer to this Bhasarvajña says that it is not right to say that a thing of the past or the like cannot be the object of knowledge. It is seen in common parlance that those things which are not kāraka (active agency) in the strict sense, are called kāraka merely on the basis of the speaker's intention to express it as such. As for example, in the statements - 'I cause a jar to originate', 'a jar originates', a jar becomes karmakāraka or kartṛkāraka. As in this example only kārakatva (the character of being active agency) not being there it is superimposed, and not the act of origination which is real, so the act of knowing in respect of a past thing or the like is by no means unreal. Thus a past thing, or the like, though not being generative of knowledge, can be called karmakāraka in common parlance; the act of knowing is not a non-reality, though its kārakatva is a superimposed one.

It may be urged that if the act of knowing is admitted to be real in respect of a past thing, or the like, then the cognition of sky-flower also is not unreal, and therefore the Sky-flower also would be established as a reality. In reply
to this Bhāsarvajña says that it is not so. If by 'cognition of sky-flower' is meant the cognition 'the sky-flower does not exist', then this cognition is one negating or denying the existence of sky-flower. Then how could it be said to be affirming or establishing its existence? And if by cognition of sky-flower is meant the cognition 'The sky-flower, is', that too is erroneous, inasmuch as it is sublated later on and hence such a cognition also cannot establish the reality of sky-flower. If the cognition of sky-flower is produced by the very word 'sky-flower' then also such a cognition would either determine its reality or would be doubtful in respect of the same or negate the same. In no any other way could the cognition be there.

The opponent may argue that this cognition of a past thing or the like is similar to the cognition of sky-flower. The answer to this is that this is not proper. For, the cognition of the past thing or the like even while determining that thing, is not erroneous, as it is not sublated later on. We know a past thing as 'It was there (āsit) and it is never one 'That was not there'; so also a future thing is known as 'It will be', and it is never one 'That will not be'. However,

1. The text should be as follows:

   न मविष्यति - Photostat, p. 40 - NyB, p. 91
if the cognition were to be the atīta or anāgata thing is there even how it would certainly be erroneous, since there is deviation from its nature (of being atīta or anāgata).

Inference having things of all the three times as object would be contradicted if things of the past or future are not accepted as reality: Moreover, if the cognition of a past thing is regarded as erroneous (asāmyakā), then the concept of inference having an object pertaining to all the three points of time would come to be opposed. Before we proceed further, it is necessary to be clear about the nature of three kinds of inference. It is laid down in the Nyāyasūtra: Then (i.e. after Perception) comes Inferential cognition, which is led up to by Perception; it is of three kinds — (i) the Pūrvavat, (ii) the Sesavat and (iii) the Sāmanayātādṛṣṭa. These are explained in the Nyāyabhāṣya as follows: "(i) the Pūrvavat Inference is that in which the effect is inferred from the cause; e.g. when we see clouds rising we infer that there will be rain; (ii) the Sesavat Inference is that in which the

1. See : सदृशीवर्ण च प्रत्ययादी, सदृशिक्षर्णां च अनुपायम् ।
कस्मात् ग्राह्य प्रत्ययादी, विकल्पत्व केवल कमणेन गुष्टवते
- भविष्यति हत्यन्यस्य, वे फलिते हति च, अभुते हति च ।
कारण कलो विनयतु कर्तारं च हति । -
- NB on NS 1-1-5

2. कथ तत्पुरुषं त्रिविधनित्यां पूर्ववत्-सैणवत्-सामान्यतत्तरं ।
- NS 1-1-5
cause is inferred from the effect, e.g. when we see that the water of the river is not like what it used to be, and that the stream is fuller and the current swifter, we infer that there has been rain, (iii) the Ṣamānyatodṛṣṭa Inference.... is based upon a general observation,....we infer that because the sun changes its place the sun must be moving.

According to Bhāsarvajña, inferential knowledge of the future and the past rain should be regarded as right (sāmyak), as past and future thing are apprehended as they really are. The opponent may urge the inference of the future thing (anāgata) is just the inference of the potency of the cause. A man sees clouds in the sky and infers the potency of clouds to bring about rain. Here what is actually inferred is the potency of clouds, and not the future rain itself. Similarly, inference of the past thing (atīta) is that in which the connection of the river with the upper catchment area where it has rained, is inferred. A man sees the flow of a river, being different from what it was, and being swifter than before, he infers the connection of the river with the upper catchment area. Here what is inferred is the connection of the river with the upper catchment area, and not the past rain itself. Hence, even though the things of the past or the like are now reality, there will be no contradiction in accepting the inference as pertaining to the three points of time, viz. past, present and future. In reply to this Bhāsarvajña says that if the potency of the

1. -See: The Nyāyabhāṣya on NS 1-1-5 (Ganānātha Jhā)
cause to bring about the effect and the connection of the river with the upper catchment area which are there now inferred, then these inferences pertain to present things, since the things, potency of the cause, etc., exist at the time of inference. Then how could these inferences be admitted as pertaining to the things of the past or the like? This interpretation of the nature of object of inference made by the opponent is in conflict with the view that an inference pertains to things, past or the like. And if in inference a thing that is not there is inferred, then how could one say that a thing that is not generative of cognition is not a prameya, a thing to be known by pramāṇa? That is to say, a past thing or the like being non-existent cannot be generative of cognition, and still should be accepted as prameya.

Again, it may be urged that when potency of the cause or the like is inferred, by implication of that only, there is the cognition of things that are atīta or anāgata. Thus these things do not become directly the objects of inference. The answer to this is that even though the past things or the like are accepted as cognised indirectly by force of the inference of connection of the river with the upper Catchment area, etc; yet one has certainly to accept that a thing that is non-generative of cognition also can become the object of pramāṇa. So the atīta or the like should be accepted as becoming the object of pramāṇa.
But in that case inferential cognition of past or future things should be false. Now, the case of anumāṇa pertaining to objects of all the three times, has been very well examined and established; so there is no sense in challenging it now by saying that the inferential cognition of past and future things is false. The opponent may argue: Since the particular place etc. are generative (of knowledge), future things become objects inasmuch as these objects qualify them (e.g. anāgata-व्रस्तिमन्न Pradesah). In reply to this Bhāsarvajña says that it is not so. Let the particular place etc. alone be the objects of knowledge inasmuch as they have generated it; but not the things that are their qualifiers. For, the past things, or the like, that are the qualifiers and particular place etc. that are qualified by the past things etc. are different from each other. Now, if it is admitted that one thing (place, or the like) is generative of a cognition and a thing other than that (past thing) becomes an object of that cognition, then there would ensure the extremely absurd situation (atiprasaṅga) where a cognition could have anything as generative and anything as object.

The opponent may urge that it is not that things of the past and the future are not accepted as objects because ।

1. The text is तद्विशेषणादाय , and not तद्विशेषणादाय -
   - NyB,p.92;Photostat,p.40
2. The text should be क्षण क्रीतानागतायाणातु विश्रयावच न हत्यते,
   instead of क्षण क्रीतानागतायाणातु विश्रयावच हत्यते -
   - NyB, p. 92
there would be contingency of the cognition in respect of them, being devoid of any object and so not the fruit of a pramāṇa. But the particulars, place, etc. which are ancillary in respect of the past thing or the like, serve as supports (objects) of yogic perceptual knowledge of inferential knowledge acquired by people like us. Bhāsarvājña’s answer to this is that this also is not tenable. For, if the knowledge of past things or the like is accepted as not the fruit of pramāṇa because it is objectless; then the knowledge of place etc. that are qualified by past things or the like would necessarily come to be erroneous, inasmuch as this knowledge is produced as limited by non-real qualifiers, viz. past things or the like. As for example, the cognitions 'there are two moons', 'there is a happy post', etc. are regarded as erroneous, since they are cognitions of things limited by unreal qualifiers such as 'two', 'happy' etc.

And if the knowledge of the place etc. qualified by past things, or the like is accepted as non-erroneous, then the apprehension of past things or the like, as qualifier must necessarily be accepted; for what is not grasped cannot possibly become a qualifier. And if this cognition of past things or the like, is admitted; it is established that even what is not generative of knowledge can be an object of knowledge.

1. The Text should be read as this: इति तद्विषिष्ठप्रक्षेपिन्नात्
...... प्रान्तकेक्ष प्रक्षेपिन्नात् । द्वै वनवः स्वल्प स्तम्भः हस्ताविशालः
क्रान्तयाच । इति -
- NyB, p. 92
Moreover it cannot be said that the knowledge of past things or the like is erroneous since it is devoid of any object. For, apprehension of those things is non-discrepant inasmuch as the past things or the like are apprehended in it as they really are (as past or the like). Verily the apprehension of a thing as it is really not, even in regard to an existent object is affirmed as discrepant, just like the apprehension of a person, in regard to a post. On the other hand things may not be there now, yet if they are cognised in non-deviation from what they are (i.e. as they are—-as past or the like), e.g. 'The Pândyas and the like were there,' 'There will be jar and the like,' then their cognition is certainly non-erroneous as it is not contradicted, like the cognition 'This jar' which is non-deviating from its object and is not contradicted and is therefore non-erroneous. Besides, it is not proper to argue that if a thing which is non-generative of cognition is accepted as being generative, there would arise the contingency of all people being omniscient. For, the cognitions of mundane persons are strictly determined by the particular causal complex which consists of dharma (merit) etc., and thus these cognitions always arise as having specific things as their objects. However, the knowledge which is not determined by the causal complex is certainly eternal and it can have all things as its objects. Such a knowledge is possessed by Bhágaván Mahésvara.
Memory (Smrti) Also Arises From The object: Bhāsarvajña puts a question: How could it be said even in the case of memory that it does not arise from the object itself? The opponent may argue that this is so because the memory of a thing arises even in the absence of the thing. Again, Bhāsarvajña asks a question: why is it that a non-existent thing does not bring about memory? The opponent's answer is that it does not do so, because it is non-existent. But he can be asked: How is it then that the knowledge of past things or the like is accepted as arising from object? For, even in the case of such a knowledge, the past object or the like is admitted as not being there. Then on the basis of the Nyāya-sūtra, Bhāsarvajña says that memory arises from impressions on the mind accompanied by attention, association etc. Memory thus caused does not follow the presence or absence of things. That is to say, the rise of memory is not determined and regulated by the presence or absence of things. Similarly the anubhava (direct apprehension) also, which arises from the knowledge of words etc. accompanied by memory of conventional relation (between words and meanings denoted by them), does not

1. प्रविधान-निवेश-अनुसार-सिद्ध-निष्ठ-बाध्य-परिप्रेय-क्राय-साधन -सम्बन्ध-अनुसार-विवेश-अनुसार-विवेश-मापन-व्यक्ति -सृजन-क्रिया-साधन-अनुसार-बाध्य-निष्ठ-निष्ठावत्व:। — NS 3-2-41
necessarily follow (the presence or absence of) the object, for knowledge results alike whether the object be near or not. The upshot of all this is that anubhava or direct apprehension (e.g., 'there is a jar') arising from verbal representation is in no way affected by the presence or absence of the object. Thus memory and direct apprehension arising from verbal representation are similar to each other in so far as their rise is not affected by the presence or absence of object.

It may be urged that only knowledge which arises from word etc. may be erroneous, when it is produced in the absence of the object, but memory arising in the absence of the object is not erroneous. In reply to this Bhāsarvajña says that it is not so. For, knowledge is said to be erroneous only when it manifests an object as different from what is really is. Likewise memory also is certainly erroneous if it arises as manifesting an object as different from what it really was when

1. नामफे्यशुद्वेन व्यपदिश्यायाः कहे शास्त्रं प्रसिद्धाः?
वा ब्रह्म-अव्यपदेश्यामिति
यदृश स्वयम् क्रियाशेषमन्वे करित्य अस्त न तत्त् नामफे्यशुद्वेन व्यपदिश्यायाः
गृहोत्तबिधि श्वारवशेषमन्वे कस्य कर्मस्य कर्म शुद्धः, नामफे्यशुद्वीमिति
वदा तु यः कव्यं गृहस्य तद्वशेषस्य 
कर्माणि न विशिष्यते, तत् कर्मविश्वात् तांशौ शृङ्गव धार्तित।
तस्य तु कर्माणि वन्यं समानस्याश्वेद: नास्ति वैन प्रतीयमानं
व्यवहाराय कल्पत, न च कस्तीयमानेन व्यवहारः।

- NB on NS 1-1-4
directly apprehended. As for example, when a person sees a man resembling his enemy and says "How can I not recollect the wrong committed by this man to me?", the memory that arises in this case is erroneous, as it does not manifest the very enemy whom he knew as such. Erroneous memory could be understood even in the case of a pupil who recollects his lessons differently from what the teacher had explained. So whether it be presentative experience arising from verbal representation or memory, it is erroneous only when it manifests an object as different from what it is. Therefore the circumstances ensuring the well-being of one (knowledge of the past thing, or the like) also ensure that of memory. They stand or fall together. Hence memory also should be regarded as arising from an object (i.e. real thing); or the knowledge arising from the verbal representation also should be regarded as not brought about by an object. It is not reasonable to say that perceptual knowledge is defined as arising from the object in order to ward off memory because memory is one that arises from the object, or otherwise the knowledge by verbal representation would not be one that arises from the object. Therefore 'being non-direct experience' due to its being produced by sense-object contact and being connected with one object is alone meant to be the defining characteristic of the fruit of perception by the author of the Nyāya-Sūtra.

1. The text should be read as 'कथ न कथितत्वविरेणाः स्मृतिव्युदातायं' युक्तानिविति' instead of 'तता कथितत्वविरेणाः स्मृतिव्युदातायं' युक्तानिविति'- See: NyB, p. 93 Photostat p.40
It may be noted that Bhaśarvajña has distinguished between reality and present existence of a thing. A thing may not be existent in the present and yet it may be a reality as a positive past thing or a positive future thing. And it is only in the light of this that we can understand how inferential cognition of things of all the three times, and yogic perception of things of all the three times, can be regarded as valid knowledge, pramāṇa or samyak anubhava. No other writer seems to have clarified this point intimately connected with Nyāya epistemology so clearly as Bhaśarvajña; though we do find passages coming somewhat near to this approach in the Nyāyamañjarī and the Nyāyavārtika-tātparyatīkā.

Defining Characteristic of Perception in Bhaśarvajña's View: The Defining characteristic is seen to be known thus also: Some one says, 'This white thing that is going is a cow', 'That on which this person with an umbrella is seen is a horse'. In such statements also the people using them understand as defining characteristic, only cow-ness or the like which is not common to anything other than cow or the like, and which is (for the time being) indicated by 'going' or the like. The same is true in the following case also. "The knowledge 'This is a jar' arising or not arising in conformity

1. See : NM (Prameyaprakaraṇa), p. 32 ff; and

See : NVTT, NCG, p. 231
with the presence or absence of the contact of the sense-organ, eyes etc. and the object, jar etc., is called pratyakṣa (perceptual knowledge) " - When someone says this, here also, rational thinkers should understand 'a-parokṣa-anubhavatva' (the characteristic of being non-indirect apprehension) only as the defining characteristic, which is (for the time being) indicated by the characteristic of being originated from the contact, and which (a-parokṣa-anubhavatva) is not common to anything other than perceptual knowledge; but the characteristic of being originated from contact should not be understood as the defining characteristic, since it has already been pointed out that this characteristic cannot possibly be an uncommon one. That is to say, we cannot assert that whatever is produced by contact is perceptual knowledge, because memory also sometimes arises from an object; and because Yogic perceptual knowledge may not be one that is produced by contact.

Purpose of the Definition given by the author of the Nyāya-Sūtra: One may ask as to why the author of Nyāya-Sūtra has not directly stated the characteristic 'a-parokṣa-anubhavatva' (the characteristic of being non-direct apprehension)

1. The text should be amended as तदन्यामायारणं सर्पनक्षणत्चेन

2. तत्साधु तुख्योगस्तथातात् बायायं स्त्रूः: कष्टिस्मु ।

- NyB, p.93
In answer to this Bhāsarvajña says that the authors of the Nyāya-sūtra has inserted the characteristic of being produced by the contact of sense-organ and object in the definition of perception, in order to give us an idea of the different kinds of perception. For, the perceptual knowledge of people like us is just one that is produced by the contact of sense-organ and object. We shall discuss this later on. Or it is in order to acquaint us as to how the controversy in respect of contact, etc. has arisen, for investigation into something becomes possible only in the event of some controversy or difference of opinion. And it is after full investigation, that things like contact etc. can be determined.

As a consequence of this, the Buddhists who hold that things of the world are in a perpetual flux, undergoing destruction every moment and Vijnānavādin Buddhists who hold that consciousness (vijñāna) is the only reality, would find no scope for creating confusion in regard to the true knowledge of ātman or the like. The Buddhists repudiate relations like conjunction

1. \(\text{हिन्दूराजार्जिनिकार्येण स्त्रान्त्य बन्धवदेश्यमु क्ष्यथिन्यार्थीक यथार्थार्जिनिकार्यं} \)
   
   \(-\text{NS: 1-1-4;}

   \text{Compare: सन्ध्य-अपराध-कुमारकान्त प्रत्यक्षां} \)

   \(-\text{NyS, NyB, p. 84}

2. \text{See : NyS, NyB, p. 102.}

3. \text{See: NS 3-2-10-17; NS 4-2-26-37;}
   \text{Also See: NyB, p. 293 ff; 494 ff.}
or the like in order to establish their own views according to which, everything is undergoing destruction every moment or the like. They say that the only connection in the production of one effect by different things is the fact of its being dependent on one sāmagrī (causal complex). The Buddhists also repudiate the relation of cognisable-cogniser (grāhya-grāhaka, object-subject) in order to establish their theory of Idealism (vijnānavāda). In order to establish an illustration to show that there is absence of every kind of contact they say that the visual organ and auditory organ do not actually reach the objects (are not prāpyakārin) while giving rise to cognitions. For, we are aware of the intervening distance between the sense-organs and the objects.

Purpose of the term 'avyapadesya' (non-expressible by words) in the definition given in the Nyāya-sūtra: The question may be raised: 'What purpose is served by inserting the term 'avyapadesya' in the definition?' In answer to this some thinkers say that the author of the Nyāya-sūtra has inserted this term in order to distinguish the perceptual

1. कैफ्येकाप्तारा यथा प्राण्य निरी क्षयते। -
   - PV, 3-331 (Patna edition)
   Read: न ग्लि तव केशार्यो प्राण्ये बुद्धिः वेदिका तथ्य काश्चात्।

2. We shall discuss this problem (of prāpyakāritva) later on in a separate chapter.

3. The editor's Foot-Note(6), NyB, p.97
cognition (which is born of sense-organ only) from the
cognition which is born of both, the sense-organs and words.
That is to say, "Whenever the cognition of a thing involves
its name, it cannot be regarded as sensuous being as it is
verbal, and it is with a view to exclude such verbal cognition
that the Sūtra has added the epithet 'which is not expressible
by words.'"

2.

Other thinkers object to the above view and maintain
that this is not proper. For, a cognition born of both, sense-
organ and word, is not possible. To wit, some elderly person
points out an animal to a child, saying, 'It is a cow'. The
child hears the word 'cow' through the sense of hearing and
sees the animal with the eyes. The modus operandi involved in

1. नामयकश्चित्रो व्यपदिक्षयमार्थ तत् सार्थस प्रक्ष्यति तः क्षार - कथ्यदेशव्यः

   त।छ्रूमणकाले श्रृणास्मात्सवरः व्याक्रपतेषु व्यवहारकाले न व्याप्यिते।

   - NB on NS 1-1-4

Also तदपि प्रत्यज्ञास्मात् विष्णुमित्राणम् विविधविविधानावरूपिनां तत् विश्वासः

   - NV (NS 1-1-4), NCG, p. 204

2. पुनः भरव्यः हिति पुरातनिष्यपयः।- The editor's Foot-Note(?)

   See: "Forgotten Naiyāyikas : Acārya Adhyāyana"

such a perception could be explained as follows: When the word-sound 'cow' reaches the auditory sense-organ, the mind supervises that sense-organ and gives rise to the perception of the word-sound as 'cow'. As the mind cannot supervise two sense-organs simultaneously, it accomplished one act of supervising and then goes to supervise another sense-organ, i.e., the eyes. The mind does not function simultaneously. "The non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions is indicative of the existence of Mind". This being the case by the time when the mind supervises the eyes, the word-sound 'cow' uttered by the elderly person certainly ceases to exist and so is not operated upon by the auditory sense-organ. Moreover, the external sense-organs cannot operate, unless they are supervised by the mind. And the mind being atomic in dimension cannot simultaneously supervise two sense-organs. As a result of this, a cognition in regard to a cow cannot possibly be produced simultaneously by two sense-organs, viz. auditory sense-organ and visual sense-organ. So the moment when a man has a visual cognition of the cow, he cannot have the auditory cognition of the word-sound 'cow'. Hence there is no need to insert the term 'avyapadesya' (non-expressible by words) in the definition of perception, in order to ward off the verbal representation. This is the view as held by Rucikāra and others.

1. युनादि - बनाजुपार्चः मकः लिंगः I - - NS 1-1-16
2. See: NyB, p. 97, Editor’s Foot-Note No. 7
Then, Bhaṣarvajña says that even if we accept the view that the term 'avyapadesya' is meant for the exclusion of knowledge produced by two (sense-organs) i.e. visual organ along with knowledge of word, from the scope of sense-perception, still it could be asked as to what is the nature of that cognition which is said to be produced by both. Is it one that directly apprehends the objects (viz. object of sense-perception and of knowledge of word)? Or is it not so? Now, if the first alternative is accepted then the cognition produced by both (Ubhayaja) being one that is directly apprehending, is known everywhere as the fruit of perception (perceptational in character) and so being one that is meant to be defined here, would not be fit to be excluded, and hence the term 'avyapadesya' meant for warding it off would be meaningless. Now, if the second alternative is admitted, that is to say, the cognition born of the two is not one directly apprehending its objects, even then the object of such a cognition could not be said to be a sense-object. Then, how could such a cognition be said to be born of the contact of sense-organ and object? And if the cognition born of the two, is not produced by the contact of the sense-organ and the object, then it need not to be excluded by inserting the term 'avyapadesya', because it would be excluded by the term 'indriyartha-sannikarsotpannam' only.

For, it may be noted that a thing is not a sense-object, only because it is connected with a sense-organ. As a matter of
fact, only that thing which becomes the object of the directly apprehending cognition, is fit to be called a sense-object. Otherwise, there would arise the contingency that even a certain thing which is the object of inferential knowledge would have to be regarded as an object of sense-organ, merely because that thing is connected with a sense-organ. e.g. fire in hot water which is inferred by its hot touch could be said to be in contact with a sense-organ, viz. eye; but that does not make it a sense-object. Otherwise in order to exclude the cognition of such a thing some additional qualifier would be required in the definition.

Again, it may be asked as to how a cognition that follows the presence or absence of words (when there is presence of words, there is a cognition, and when word is absent cognition is absent) could be known as born of the contact of sense-organ and object? In answer to this the opponent may say that such a cognition is known as produced of a contact of sense-organ and object because it arises in the form "This (is a cow). 'This' suggests that there is the contact of the sense-organ and the object. In reply to this Bhāsarvajñā says that this is not proper. For, even in the case of fire that is inferred from touch we find the cognition.

1. See: क्षयः प्रकाशः उद्भवस्मान्तः क्षयः वनः, यदि किंतु
वारिष्ठे तेजसि प्रत्यक्षामावः । - - NK(pb), p. 444
arising in the form, "This (is fire)". If it is admitted that whatever is cognised as 'This', is the object of perception, then there would arise the contingency of the fire in water being the object of perceptual knowledge, though it is in fact inferred from touch.

Besides, the cognition which is born of the two causal factors whether it be the fruit of both the causes or the fruit of a pramāṇa (means of knowledge) other than these two but how is this cognition stated to be sābda (verbal) only? The opponent may answer that the author of the Nyāya-sūtra himself has told us this. He took such a cognition as sābda (Vyapadesya, expressible by words) and to ward it off he inserted the term avyapadesya in the definition. Here the answer given by Bhāsarvajña is worth nothing as it shows the progressive tendency of the author of the Nyāyabhūṣana. He boldly says that on account of the fear of the command of the the author of the Nyāya-sūtra, things do not deserve to give up their own characteristics! (Milk would not give up its whiteness if the author of the Nyāya-sūtra said that it was of some other colour). Similarly if the cognition born of the two is not intrinsically sābda; it would not become sābda, only because the author of
the Nyāya-sūtra commands so. And if a statement of the Sūtrakāra is admitted as an authority just without its being fully examined then the sūtras that deal with the examination of the categories enumerated and defined in the foregoing sūtras, would become meaningless. That is to say, the fact that the categories that are defined in the foregoing sūtras are fully examined in the later sūtras shows that even according to the author of the Nyāya-sūtra the nature of a thing should be ascertained only after examining it by proper reasoning. Therefore the opponent should point out some sound

1. See: न क्षु दै बुध्काराक्रियानियोगमयाः पदायाः। सप्तसौ दातिमहेन्नित्त। यदि व विचारारितौ बुध्काराखः प्रमाणाः। परिचारकप्रकारणाः तर्हि बौधस्य स्वाभाव तस्पात उपस्तत्त्व कठिनत्वे न्याये वाच्ये। —

NyB, p. 98;

Compare: बुध्काराशयमनुसरते। शाश्वतः एवं ज्ञान प्रतिपादने यदवं हृदागारः प्रत्येके शब्दानुप्रस्तेर्ममक्षेत्राय विशेषता। हस्युपविषयत्।,... उच्चते —

मनुष्यवृत्तिः न गर्भयोगदेशः।

येनेकद्वृत्तिः तस्य बौधान शाश्वताः।

वस्तुतिष्ठत्स्य तु निरूपणाः। कन्याकथ्यायनयतिरक्तानुविश्वायत्सवः

एवं विज्ञाने न प्रत्यासालत्तामालिकाति। —

NM(Pramāṇa-Prakarana) p. 74

2. See: न्यिविधा वाच्य शास्त्रस्य प्ररुचिः। उद्देशः। लक्षणम्। परिचार वैति।

तत्र नामयेन पदार्थायाः श्रविधाविभागादिः। तत्रविधिदस्त सत्त्वव्यवस्थेऽर्थः त्वर्थः लक्षणाः।

लक्षितस्य यथालक्षणां उपपत्ते न वा हर्ष अनुमानः।

क्लस्थानां परिचारं। — Introductory NB on NS. 1-1-3
reasoning to justify his contention that the cognition born of the two is verbal.

It may be argued that since the cognition is stated as 'This is jar', it must be one that is sabda or verbal. Rejecting this Bhāsarvajña says that the argument is not tenable. For, the verbal representation could be otherwise explained. It is not born of the contact of the sense-organ and object, and so is not needed to be excluded by the term 'vyapadesya'. It is thus: Devadatta tells some person: "This thing is denoted by this word". Then the person thinks that Devadatta has told me this denotative relation between word and thing; and he mentions it thus: "This denotative relation between word and thing is told to me by Devadatta". This is the only way to know such a relation. Otherwise, from what source could one have the knowledge of this relation? And this verbal representation is seen to be there only when a person knows the relation between the word and the object. As for instance, a person does not know of the samaya (convention) that a particular man's name is Caitra or he is denoted by the word 'Caitra'. Though the person sees the man known as Caitra, among others, he does not know him as such and so he asks someone: 'Who is

1. The text should be read as तद्व्यपदेशात् instead of तद्व्यपदेशात्ता - NyB, p. 98; Photostat p. 43
Caitra among these? Then, someone points out Caitra to him just with his finger or in some such way (without uttering a word). Subsequently the person understands the conventional relation (between the man and the name Caitra) just because the finger has been pointed at him or in some such way. After knowing this relation, the person says, 'This Caitra has been introduced to me by this man'. Thus the knowledge of the conventional relation is not born of the contact of sense-organ and object. And therefore it is not right to say that the term 'avyapadesya' is meant for the exclusion of the cognition which arises from both, from the sphere of perceptual cognition.

Another thinker explains differently the significance of the term 'avyapadesya' in the said definition of perception. He says that what is actually cognised in the apprehension (the thing-animal as denoted 'There is a cow', or the like is the object by the word 'cow'). Here the qualifier (i.e. name 'cow') and the qualified (object, an animal) are both the objects of a single cognition. That is to say, when we have a cognition 'There is a cow', there are two objects, viz. an animal and a word 'cow'. However, merely on this basis it is not proper to say that such a cognition is produced by the contact of the sense and the object. For, the sense organ comes in contact with the object, animal, but not with the name (cow) that qualifies the animal (i.e. object). Despite this fact, some philosophers hold that the knowledge of object as qualified by name is produced by
sense-object contact. Hence in order to repudiate this view, the author of the Nyāya-sūtra has inserted the term 'avyapadesya'.

Bhāsarvajña's contention is that if the above view is to be accepted, then one may even ask as to what qualifying expression is inserted in order to repudiate the view of some who would accept that even some inferential cognition is produced by contact (contact of sense-organ and object serving as linga for the inference of the movement of the sense-organ). It may be argued that the qualifier 'being produced by contact' itself seems to repudiate inference, from being regarded as perceptual. But in that case, this very expression would suffice to keep away the knowledge 'cow' etc. (knowledge of object as qualified by name) and the term 'avyapadesya' is not required for that purpose.

1. येष्वनान्याक्षरस्यापि कस्यचित्ता ज्ञातव्य सिद्धिनिर्देशायथाया केष्वं अनुयुग्मादनां विन्यारकरणायथूं चिन्मध्यायण्यं हि विशेषणायूं ? -

NyB, p. 99;

Compare : 'कपरेऽ पु ज्ञापदेशयु वस्थनेन अनुपानं निराकुलात्ति। तत्भ नेषु। कस्मात्'। तत्वत्थायान्याक्षरस्यापि स्ति सिद्धिनिर्देशायथायात्ति सिद्धिनिर्देशायथायां अनुपानं मन्त्रिति। क: न प्रधानान्मान:।' -

NV, NVG, p. 204

Also : 'वक्ष्यान्याक्षरस्यापि कथमति। हिन्यात्मानिकर्तुं हि निन्यात्मानिकर्तुं निन्यात्मानिकर्तुं तदि प्रत्याका ज्ञापिते सापि प्रत्याका प्रस्वते हि तत्तत्तवारणाय ज्ञापदेशयु मात्रेशृधि किलवचनसु।' तत्तव तदात्मायेय: विशिष्टं ज्ञापितु:। तत्भ सार्थसु ज्ञापितवायारामारं क हृतमानसु ज्ञापदेशयु।

NVTT, NVG, pp. 223-224
Then, Bhāsarvajña mentions the view of some philosophers according to whom the term 'avyapadesya' is meant for the refutation of the Sabdadvaita (Sabda is the Non-dual reality). But, then, they should also point out some other qualifier in the definition which could repudiate Brahmādvaita and the like. The two cases are parallel. Thus Bhāsarvajña rejects the views that the term 'avyapadesya' in the sutra is meant for the exclusion of the cognition produced by two, or the cognition of object qualified by name or inferential cognition or it is meant for the refutation of Sabdadvaita.

Purpose of the Term 'Avyapadesya' in Bhāsarvajña's view:

One may ask the question here: 'Then, is this term 'avyapadesya' meaningless? The answer to this is that it is not meaningless. It is meant for the definition of a specific perception just like (the definition of) 'Determination' (Nirnaya). That perception which is free from conception is defined by the term 'avyapadesya'. Indeed this is the perception (nirvikalpapakā) which is ardently desired by all yogins. So long as there are

1. ये कः शब्दावलिनिराकारणार्थम् कथ्यपदेशयन्ति वर्णयितम् .... | -
   NyB, p. 99;
   ये कः = ०य़ौऽकोक्तेऽपि धन्ति प्रार्थीन रिप्रेशणम् | -
   Editor's Foot-Note(2), NyB, p.99;
   Read: तथा हन्तियाराष्ट्रिकरणार्थत्तथा शास्त्राविषयनायक्यते
   हस्ति माध्वः | तपोप्रताध्याया दृष्टिः - कथ्यपदेश्यथिति | सतः हेतु
   (contd..Foot-Note: see next page:552)
cont foot-note No.1: see page: 551

Also Read :  न शब्दप्रमाणात्त्वम् शास्त्रानि तद् प्रत्यक्षाम्।

तथा च न शब्दप्रविष्टति शक्ति तत् उत्पन्नः तात्पर्यं स्व। -

- NV, NCG, pp. 203-204

Read : "Every object has a name; there is nothing that is
devoid of name; this establishes the inseparability of the
name of a thing, whenever a thing
is cognised it is cognised as bearing its name,......
the perception of things must involve the perception of the
name also; hence there can be no perception devoid of verbal
expression".

-Gangānātha Jhā, Nyāyasūtra, p. 20, Foot-Note.

This led to the view of the Grammarian that Šabda
is the only Reality.

2. "विज्ञान प्रकरणात्मक विवेचनां निधायं" - NS 1-1-41;

Read:" विज्ञानात्मक कथम हि कालादिक्षु अन्नादिक्षु वाचातः। एवेन न
निश्चयो कृष्ण हैति, न किंविन्ययाधिन्यन्तिस्य लक्ष्यते विभेदत्वात।......
निश्चये-कृष्ण-हैति, कपनिविन्ययनिः कपनिविन्ययनिः-लक्ष्यते निराविन्ययनिः-
विद्याताः तु अविवेचनां निधायं हत्वेत्तद्वेयं NYB, p. 69
सूत्रं प्रकटं हैति।"
conceptual determinations in the mind, it is not possible to bring the mind into the state of stability. Indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) perception is the original source of all kinds of knowledge. For, in the absence of this perception, the other pramāṇas (means of right knowledge) cannot possibly function. Truly, in the absence of perception, Inference etc. cannot possibly function, and in the absence of the functioning of indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) perception, determinate (Sāvikalpaka) perception cannot possibly function; because this latter is preceded by the memory of name (viz. the memory of the conventional relation between name and object leads to Sāvikalpa pratyakṣa). A man who has known the conventional relation between word and thing, sees an object, i.e. cow. Instantly the memory (of the conventional relation between word and thing) arises from seeing that object; and this specific memory gives rise to the cognition 'This is a cow'. But just any memory—one which is not produced by the direct perception of the object

1. तत्र शुद्धार्थानिविष्टस्य: संकीर्णाः सचितकः समायति: || -
   - Yogasūtra 1-42,
   स्मृतिपरिसुद्धो स्वकपूण्या हे वैभक्तानिविष्टभाव निर्विष्टकः || -
   - Ibid, 1-43

"Of these (balanced states) the state-balanced with deliberation is confused by reason of predicate - relations between words and intended-objects and ideas"(1-42); "When the memory is quite purified, (that balanced-state) which is, as it were, empty of itself and which brightens (into conscious knowledge) as the intended object and nothing more-is super-deliberative" - (1-43); James Haughton Woods
is not ascertained as being capable of bringing about the
cognition 'This is a cow' In the indeterminate perception
the nature of qualifier, of the object apprehended, then and
only then can the cognition 'There is a man with stick'
aris Hence under any circumstance the determinate (Savika-
lpaka) perception is certainly preceded by the indeterminate
(nirvikalpaka) perception.

It may be argued: Whatever perceptual cognition
there is, is determinate only; since perception is a source
of valid knowledge, just like inference. That is to say,
inferential knowledge is always determinate and is regarded
as pramāṇa, so perceptual knowledge also should be determi-
mate only. But this is not proper, says Bhāsarvājña. For,
the conclusion drawn from the above inference that all percep-
tional knowledge is determinate only could be sublated (by
another proof, i.e. our experience).

1. See: सविकल्पर्व बाद्याधेक्षणपद्धतिविश्लेषणबलचत्वात् स्व त्रिशरस्रुतिविश्लेषण-
यजम्। निरविकल्पकपिद्रशिष्यविश्लेषणयजम्, सविकल्पक श्वासित्व
अभूतपद्धतिविश्लेषणप्रश्निकांचांकेस्वतवात्। निरविकल्पक नाम केनचिद
विशेषणविश्लेषणग्रहणं स्वपर्शविश्लेषणरूपस्य, तथा मूलम
क्लासिकपमि ग्रहणायस्तैतु, अनुपूर्व-दृश्य । केनचिद विशेषणम् 'प्रभु
कल्पू: ' सति स्वप प्रश्नीति: उपवायेत्, क्लासिकासंवादिस्यांविशेषणम्
विना क्लासिकपमि पद्धास्य ग्रहणायस्तैतु । क्लासिकासंवादिस्यांविशेषणम्
विना क्लासिकपमि पद्धास्य ग्रहणायस्तैतु । क्लासिकासंवादिस्यांविशेषणम्

contd. foot-note see; next page: 555
contd. foot-note No. 1. see page : 554

- (Rāmānujaśārya), Brahmasūtra 1-1-1, Sūryabhasya, para 29, pp. 47-48; ed. by R. D. Karmarkar, Poona, 1959;

Read: "Without the samsthāna (configuration), the Samsthān cannot be apprehended even in the form 'idam itham' and so in the nirvikalpaka we do apprehend the samsthāna - configuration also, and not merely 'idam kinicit'. (This is but a special pleading on the part of Rāmānuja and is against the accepted view. According to Rāmānuja, even Jāti etc; are perceived in the nirvikalpaka and only 'Jātyādyamuvrtti, the continuity of Jāti etc; is added in the savikalpaka pratyakṣa... ...)

- Notes (R. D. Karmarkar), Ibid, p. 11.
Again, it may be urged that (nirvikalpaka) indeterminate perception is not pramāṇa (valid knowledge), as it cannot stimulate any practical activity on the part of the knower, just as indecisive knowledge (anadhyavāsa, e.g. what should be the name of this tree?) does not provoke a man to activity. But this also is not tenable, since it has not been established. To wit, a person perceived just by means of indeterminate perception the absence of serpents, thorns and the like, which are unlimited in number, and which are not desired by anyone and having this的知识 he goes ahead fearlessly (or unsuspectingly). Similarly the person sees once by means of indeterminate perception positive things (bhāvatmak'amartham) which are unlimited in number and then having occasion to gradually come across the causes of memory in sequence, he remembering what he saw in indeterminate perception tells others also - 'This was seen, this was not seen by me.' That is to say, he has the knowledge that there is nothing (none of the innumerable things) that could be harmful to him and he just goes ahead fearlessly. He also sees a number of things which immediately do give rise to non-determinate knowledge but not determinate knowledge (That is to say, he is not at that time clearly conscious of their presence); later when he comes across causes leading to the awakening of impression he remembers the particular things he saw or did not see on that particular occasion when he saw these, but was not conscious of the presence or absence of particular things. And

1. See: NyB, p. 23
that perception also described above is not just determinate perception; because it does not arise in the form 'This is blue'. Thus there is indeterminate perception and it is a means of valid knowledge. So it is but proper that it should be defined. Hence in order to define indeterminate perception, the author of the Nyāya-sūtra has inserted the epithet 'avṛpa-padeśya' (non-expressible by words) in the definition. The cognition that arises as indeterminate perception is not liable to be verbally designated as 'This is Devadatta' or 'A man with a stick'. That is to say, in indeterminate perception a thing cannot be expressed as qualified by genus, name, quality etc.

Now, determinate (Savikalpaka) perception also has been slightly suggested by the two sūtras, viz. "Odour, Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound which are the qualities of Earth (Water, Fire, Air and Ākāśa), are the objects of the aforesaid (sense-organs); and "But in reality, the Individual, the configuration and the Universal - (all three) constitute the denotation of the Word." This shows that in determinate perception, the qualities like odour, taste, colour, etc;
and individual or configuration or genus can be apprehended. Of these two sūtras, in the former, the 'qualifiedness' (the state of being qualified,) of the object of determinate perception is established, while in the latter, expressibility (being expressible, vācyatva) of the object of determinate perception is established. And a thing which is cognised in indeterminate perception as something non-qualified and non-expressible by words is itself cognised in determinate perception as qualified and expressible by words. Though the object of determinate perception is one already known in indeterminate perception, the determinate perception having such an already known object, is accepted as pramāṇa (means of Valid knowledge). Therefore determinate perception

1. See: पञ्च कैत्या: कल्प भवन्ति जातिकल्प, गुणकल्प, (कम्पकल्प) नामकल्प, इत्यकल्प चैति, तासा क्वचिद्क भैर बैर बैरकल्पाः क्वचिद्करै भैर भैर कल्पकल्पाः कल्पना: उच्चासे । -

   - NM (Pramāṇa-prakaraṇa), p. 87

2. नवास्तवसंगीतिः पृथिवीकृतविनोगुणः तथा । - NS 1.1.14

   "पृथिवीकृतविनोगुणः यथाविविविष्ठारणः यथाक्रमः कारः: विषयः हरित।" - NB;

   "पृथिवीकृतविनोगुणः गुणः हरित भास्तिसमासः। पृथि-

   व्याप्तदिः च गुणः हरित जन्वः। पृथिवीकृतविनोगुणः वेणाः हरित

   वहलहितः।। चित्रह तत्त्वम हरित। जन्वसमासः वस्तेत्तव तत्त्वम।।

   - NV, NCG, p. 417

3. See: कृताय निरविशेषक्षेत्र खर्चन्वतन्तु स्मृतिवाच विपश्चप्यासुधिकुमारः हरित ससकिर्तपमपर मैत्रत्वार्थाहितचातुः क्रमांकः हरित मन्येत्व चतुर्थ न साधु

   पूर्णविप परिपुष्टत्तवाः, न हि कृतियात्कामनुत्त्रः प्रमाणायुः हरित उक्ततः,

   गृहस्य्याः ब्रह्म प्रमाणाय प्रमाणत्त्वानिनवेः।।

   - NM, (Pramāṇa-Prakaraṇa), p. 90
(Sāvikalpaka pratyakṣa) is also accepted and somewhat defined by the author of the Nyāya-sūtra.

Or we can, says Bhāsarvajña, understand the definition of determinate perception as comprehended by the term 'Vyavasāyātmaka' (determinate) itself in the definition given by the author of the Nyāya-sūtra. Moreover, instead of saying 'Samyak' (right), the author of the Nyāya-sūtra employs the two qualifying terms, 'avyabhicāri' (non-erroneous) and 'Vyavasāyātmaka' (determinate) and thus gives a 'word-heavy' definition of perceptual knowledge. He has done so with a specific purpose. By employing the above mentioned two terms, he intends to convey to us that wrong or incorrect knowledge is only of two kinds, viz. 'Vyabhicāri' (erroneous) and 'avyavasāyātmaka' (doubtful), and not of four kinds as held by some. This has already been discussed at length.

It may be urged that it is well known among the people that which is non-erroneous and of the nature of determination can only be knowledge. So it is not necessary to employ the term 'jñānam' in the sūtra; as it is redundant. The answer to this is that this is true. But the author of the Nyāya-sūtra has inserted the term 'jñānam' with a special purpose in view.

2. See NyB, p. 12 ff
Some hold that the fruit of pramāṇa consists in the removal
of ajñāna (ignorance). Hence in order to dispel the suspi-
cion of such an interpretation as being meant here, as well
as for promoting the easy comprehension of the thing that is
meant to be qualified (i.e. knowledge), the author of the
Nyāya-sūtra has employed the term 'jñāna' separately in the
sutra. So this is no fault.

Thus we can conclude that according to Bhasarvajña,
non-indirect presentative apprehension (a-parokṣa-anubhava)
is called pratyakṣa or perceptual cognition. Aparokṣatva
is a genus that subsists in knowledge. The things of the
past and future do not exist at the time of perception and so
they could not become generative of cognitions, but they could
certainly become objects of cognitions inasmuch as they are
manifest in knowledge. The defining characteristic of percep-
tional knowledge is its 'being non-indirect experience', and

1. See: सान्तत्तिक प्रामाणयः पूर्वेण ज्ञातादु " Nyāyāvatāra 25
Also see: ज्ञात्वा सिद्धेत्वा विशेष्यादेशायांभि, तत्स्य हि द्विन्द्रार्थान्तरिक्षां
tयत्र राज्यत्वायीयति विशेष्यानि, तात्त्विक्ष्यति कथ्य विशेष्यानिनी
स्म: रति । कथा वा सुभाषितवृत्तत्वाय शान्तप्राप्तानि । -
- NM (Pramānaprakārana), p. 70

2. अथ द्विन्द्रार्थान्तरीक्षां तत्तथेत् प्राप्ताप्रचाराचार्यविशिष्टम्
केतुकिलपसम । (NyB, p. 86) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- NyB, p. 87

3. तत्प्रतिचालित्वात् स्वायत्तिक न्यायरूपेण तथ्यावते
सह विशेष्यविशेषायां: स्वस्त्वा: हि लघूविवर्त्तान। यथा न शान्ति
प्रतियोगिति तस्य ज्ञात्यापि न विषयते यथा द्विन्द्रादेव। -
- NyB, p. 90
not 'its being produced by the sense-object contact'; as the latter is not found in the case of yogic perception. According to Bhāsarvajña, indeterminate perception (nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa) is intended to be defined by the term 'avyapadesya'; while the definition of determinate perception (sāvikalpaka pratyakṣa) is slightly suggested by the two separate two sūtras (NS 1-1-14 and NS 2-2-68), or it comprehended by the term 'vyavasāyatamaka'. Moreover, in Bhāsarvajña's view, the author of the Nyāya-sūtra has employed the two epithets 'avyabhicāri' and 'vyavasāyatamaka' instead of one term 'samyak' with a view to suggesting that wrong (asamyak) knowledge is two-fold only; viz. erroneous knowledge and doubtful knowledge; and not four-fold as held by others (Prasastapāda and others)

1. अर्थं केवलोपलसितं करोदतात्मकङ्केऽपि तत्त्व विवर्णं विवर्णं विवर्णं: प्रलेख्यवध, 

   न तु अर्थं केवलोपलसितं तत्त्व विवर्ण्यायार्थार्थार्थार्थम्बद्ध इत्युक्तम्।

   - NyB, p. 93

2. यथा तद् विनिरदेशनं विद्यते (सत्यपदेशपदेन) तत्त्व।

   - NyB, p. 99

3. सार्विकत्वमपि प्रत्यक्षम् बृत्तियद्विविधता: तद्भवः। इत्यतः। "व्यक्तिबद्धविविक्षितः तु पदार्थः। इत्यतः च लेखः। सूचितपितः। -

   - NyB, p. 100

4. केवल व्यक्तियद्विविधतान्तः सार्विकत्वमपि कपड़विविधोऽहित। - NyB, p. 100

5. सम्यक्षिदिस्तव्यं वदोपिविचारं व्यक्तियद्विविधोऽहितविविधतान्तः सत्त्वादिकम् रूपं तथा। सामय-सामय्यश्च व्यवहारिनवायूमेऽतत्ज्विविधतान्तः सामय-सामय्यश्च व्यवहारिन्द्रोष्ट्रादिकम् न चायुष्मय। - NyB, p. 100

- Prasastapādabhaṣya (With NK), p. 411
And the author of the Nyāya-sūtra has inserted the term 'jnāna' in the definition in order to suggest that the fruit of pramāṇa (means of right knowledge) is the resultant knowledge, and not the removal of wrong knowledge. This also helps us to easily understand what the qualified thing is here.

It may be said that Prasūṣastapāda (about 4th cent. A.D.) was the first to introduce the distinction of non-determinate and determinate perception into the Brahmanical fold, though he does not use the terms nirvikalpaka and savikalpa. According to him there is Svarūpalocanāmatra (bare observation of nature) with regard to substances etc.; which are a composite of a number of components, are of a visible size and are of manifest forms; by means of the contact of object, sense-organs, mind and soul, when accessory factors like merit (dharma), etc. are present. Out of the contact of soul and mind which also is in expectancy of the qualifications, viz. universal, substance, quality, action, there arises sensuous knowledge (pratyakṣa), e.g. the existing substance; earth; horned, white bull goes.

1. कैचिन्द्र उधाननिश्चे: प्रत्यक्षात्मापानु: | तदाभन्तरापनायथः विषेषप्रतिपत्तिः —
   धर्मः पृथ्वी भानु अविद्यामिति न दोषः ! — NyB, p. 100

2. See: तद्र तवागामवर्त्ते प्रतीयत्वापि प्रत्यक्षादयुपति। — PB (With NK), pp. 442, 447, 459;
contd..foot-note see next page: 563
It may be noted avibhaktālocana is mentioned in Prāsaḥ-stapādabhāṣya as serving as a pramāṇa (means of right knowledge) in the case of Svarūpālocana.

Also: यदा निरिन्द्रियं सामान्यविक्रियायां ज्ञानविनिमयं प्रमाणम् कार्यालीकतिपत्ताऽपि
तदात्मांसु अविभक्तालोचनयो वाक्यशास्त्रस्तु प्रत्यक्षां प्रमाणम्
वाक्यत्वेऽ अनेन हृति वाक्यन्यो हृत्वत्वाध्यायार्थां निनक्षेपितत्वाऽपि
तन्त्राः प्रमाणस्वरूपाः अविभक्तताः केवलं ज्ञानपरेभाः हृति वाक्याः

Also - अविभक्तताः ज्ञानाविक्रियाः स्वदायित्याविक्षेपित यावत्
किं पदार्थयात्?
वाक्यत्वेऽ अनेन हृति वाक्यन्यो हृत्वत्वाध्यायार्थां निनक्षेपितत्वाऽपि
तत्तत्वां तत्तत्त्वं प्रमाणं बृहस्पति वाक्ये नायत् प्रमाणं अविभ, कुतः?
तस्य फलावल्पत्वाः

However, M.J.Shah writes:"This Avibhakta Alocana is nothing but a passive reception of sense-data, or pure sensation.....This Avibhakta Alocana gives rise to the Svarūpālocana type of cognition. Here the mind becomes active and analyses the content of the Avibhakta Alocana.....It would not be much logical to treat the second stage as that of indeterminate perception, though following the medieval commentators of Prāsaḥ-stapādā-scholars, have generally done so". Akalaṅka's Criticism of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy, p. 237
Jayanta Bhatta (about 910 A.D.) discusses at length in his Nyayamanjari the definition of perception given by the author of the Nyayasutra. He gives various interpretations of the term 'avyapadesya' as held by the ancient thinkers and at the end of the discussion Jayanta remarks that from among these views, one should accept the view which one deems to be true. He shows the clear distinction between nirvikalpa and savikalpa, perception, using the terms 'nirvikalpa' and 'Savikalpa'. He says emphatically that determinate perception is the very breath (prāna life-force) of the Naiyāyikas and hence the cognition that arises from both, sense-organ and word, should not be regarded as verbal (Sābda).

Bhāsarvajña (about 950 A.D.) also uses the terms nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka and regards them as two distinct varieties of perception. As we have seen, he seeks to show how the śūtrakarā suggests the two distinct varieties of nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka varṇakāra perception. Bhāsarvajña has elaborately discussed these two varieties at the end of the

1. See: NM (Pramāṇa-prakaraṇa), pp. 61-100
2. तत्र बुद्धविश्वासिकोऽवस्थायातः प्रत्यावरणानि भवति (प्राप्ति) हेतु प्रत्ययानि (प्राप्ति);
   तथा बाह् मूलाक्षणः ... (प्राप्ति); तदेद्विन्यायाः न ज्ञानं ... (प्राप्ति);
   वेण पुनः प्रवर्तनां प्राप्तं ... (प्राप्ति); तदेद्विन्यायाः प्रक्षिप्तार्कार्यम् ... (प्राप्ति) -
   NM, pramāṇa-prakaraṇa
3. नैयायिकानां च सहितल्प्रस्तुतां विद्यमानां। प्राप्तां तथातां न उपस्थित्यां शास्त्रविद्यमानानां वान्यवानः।
   निर्विभावतः तत्स्यात्म प्रत्यां विधितं प्रक्षिप्तम्।
   समशाश्वत्वतदिह पदेयनावनम्।
   इत्याविषयकां शास्त्रविद्यमाणो दर्शितानि यथार्थं।
   वेदेः: शरणामागति वधांस्ततवलनमहताम्।

NM, pp. 31, 82
pratyaksa pariccheda of the Nyāyabhūsana, which we shall treat in a separate chapter.

Vācaspati Miśra (about 977 A.D.) was till now generally regarded as the first Brahmanical author to give the two distinct varieties of nirvikalpa and savikalpa perception. Vācaspati who is very confident about his view argues that this two-fold classification of perception is too evident and well-known to the students of logic to bear any repetition. Such a consideration might have dissuaded Vātsyāyana and Uḍḍottakara from discussing this point. But Vācaspati himself would like to follow the foot-steps of his preceptor, Tri-locaṇa and give an explicit exposition of both the kinds of perception. We find the Bhāsarvajña has noticed this classification even earlier.

Sṛḍhara (991 A.D.) the author of the Nyāyakandali, a commentary on the Prāṣṭaṭapādabhaṣya also divides perception into nirvikalpa and savikalpa and explains their nature in details.

3. See: [source text not legible]
4. [source text not legible]
Thus besides Prasastapāda who deals with the two varieties of nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perceptions without using these terms, Jayanta Bhatta, Bhāsarvajña, Vācaspati Misra, Śrīdhara and others have discussed these two kinds of perception using the terms nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka.

We shall discuss the classification of perception according to Bhāsarvajña in a separate chapter.