Chapter - 10

Number of Pramanas

Bhasarvajna says in the Nyayasara that Pramana (means of valid knowledge) is three-fold: (i) Pratyaksa (Perception), (ii) Anumana (Inference) and (iii) Agama (Verbal Testimony).

Commenting on this in the Nyayabhusana Bhasarvajna says that now the number of pramanas is stated by means of the expression 'Pramana is three-fold' (NyS). This is addressed to a person who desires to know the number and the defining characteristics of pramana means of valid knowledge) for the purpose of the origination of true knowledge. The word 'trividhata (three-fold) in the Nyayasara is meant to be restrictive of the number of pramanas. This indicates that all other pramanas such as Upamana (Comparison) etc. are covered by the definitions of Pratyaksa, etc. only. Accordingly Bhasarvajna has shown how Upamana and the like could be included.

1. त्रिविद्ध प्रमाणस्त्र प्रत्यक्षं अनुमानं विचार कर्तव्यम्

   - NyS, NyB, p.79

2. Compare: चतुर्विद्धा चात्रं चिन्तितापि द्विक्षत चिन्तितापि

   - Nyayabindutikā, p.7 "They (Contrary opinions) are fourfold, in so far as they concern the number of varieties, their definition, their object and their result".

   - Stcherbatsky
under one of these three as the case may be.

In the third pariccheda Bhāsārvajña has shown how comparison (Upamāṇa) can be included in Verbal Testimony. Upamāṇa is thus illustrated: 'As the cow so the gavaya' (yathā gṛḥ tathā gavayāḥ). This can be subsumed under Verbal Testimony, since it is of the nature of a sentence, just like 'Bring the fire.' If however only on the ground of its being of the nature of comparison (analogy or upamāṇa), Upamāṇa be admitted as an independent variety of pramāṇa (means of valid knowledge), then there would arise the contingency of there being many varieties of pramāṇa even on the basis of the difference of vidhi (Injunction), Arthavāda (Description), Anuvāda (Reiteration with a purpose), etc. The Mīmāṁsaka may argue that upamāṇa (comparison) brings about the cognition in regard to an object which is not in the vicinity. When a person wandering in the forest sees an individual gavaya, the knowledge arises 'My cow is like this.' This knowledge cannot be perceptual as the man's cow is far away in his house. Refuting this Bhāsārvajña says that this is just memory (which is not acceptable as a pramāṇa, even to the opponent).

1. See: खर यथा ग्रह: तथा गवयः - इति उपमानं शब्दान्तर्भूतं वाक्यदुपवाएः
   अर्गन्यु यथा यथा हत्याधिकतं । -
   - NyB, p. 417
3. See: NS 2-1-63
Some others (i.e. the author of the Nyāya-bhāṣya and others) hold that the purpose accomplished by Analogy is to give rise to the cognition of the connection of the name with the object (Sāṁjñāsāṁjñi-sāmbandha-pratipatti). Bhāsarvajñāna says that such a connection is already known through the words of a reliable person and when one sees a gavaya, what arises is the remembrance of that connection. Strengthening his argument Bhāsarvajñāna says that when a person is questioned as to how he knows that 'It is gavaya', he says: I know this by means of the words of a reliable person dwelling in the forest. But he does not say - I know this by means of Upamāna. It may be urged that from the sentence - 'As the cow so the gavaya' what one knows is only similarity, and not the connection of that particular name with that particular object. For this purpose, the observer should know of the assertion 'the gavaya is similar to the cow' and also he should perceive the similarity to the cow in the animal concerned. In reply to this Bhāsarvajñāna says that it is not necessary for the cognition of the connection to perceive the gavaya. In the case of Indra or the like, the connection of the name with the object can be known even in the absence of the object. Secondly, if this connection is not known by means of the sentence, 'the gavaya is similar to the cow', the sentence would be meaningless. For,

1. See: NB on NS 1-1-6
2. See: NyB, p. 420
even the person who has not heard that sentence, knows the similarity alone by means of the visual organ accompanied by the memory of the cow; and not the said connection. Therefore the sentence 'As the cow so the gavaya' is meant only to convey the connection of the name with the object and so Upamāna (e.g. 'as the cow so the gavaya') is subsumed under Sabda or Verbal Testimony. Besides, we find the usage: 'I know the jar by perception', 'I know the fire from inference by means of smoke', 'I know the heaven through Verbal Testimony'. Such a mention is not found in the case of Upamāna. Hence it is not a separate means of valid knowledge.

The Carvāka view And Its Refutation: Some (viz. the Lokāyatikas) hold that there is only one pramāṇa, viz. pratyakṣa. This is not proper, says Bhaśarvajña. For, if only one pramāṇa viz. pratyakṣa be admitted, it would not be possible to distinguish between 'pramāṇa' and what is other than it. When a person accepts only one pramāṇa, by perception, the divisions of pramāṇa and what is not pramāṇa would not be established - this being within the scope of definitions which arevyatireka-anumāna. Moreover, if just perception is recognised

1. See: प्रत्यज्ञकों एक प्रमाणाभित्र बाबाका:। प्रत्यज्ञटाणे के एक इति बांधूः। प्रत्यज्ञ अनुमान आप्तवचन व इति त्रिशिना प्रमाणाभित्र इति बांधूः। आप्तकः प्रमाणाभित्र समांकप्रमाणं: प्रतिपन्नवतत्:। -
   - NM, p. 26 (Pramāṇa-prakaraṇa).

2. अन-वष्ण-मखे-तमथ-सखे-इति उपमानां शब्दार्थानि प्रमाणा-अप्रमाणाभितः इति लक्षणातुति प्रमाणां वाणुमाणाभिति भावः।
   - Margin Note, Photostat, p. 35
and inference, etc. are not admitted, man would not have the knowledge of the causes that accomplish pleasure, pain etc. and consequently it would not be possible for a man to engage himself in activity or to refrain from it, as these both are dependent upon the knowledge of the causes of pleasure, pain etc. It is strange that on the one hand the Čārvākas accept that there is no pramāṇa other than pratyakṣa and on the other hand they compose a Sūtra or make statements in order to convince others. Thereby they make a mockery of their own activity by means of their own words! That is to say, the Čārvākas have to take resort to āgama while composing a Sūtra (or giving instruction) or to anumāṇa, while advancing arguments to convince others. What wonderful scholarship they have displayed!

Refutation of the view that anumāṇa is the only pramāṇa:

Some are of the opinion that anumāṇa is the only pramāṇa. This also is not proper, says Bhāsarvajña. For in the absence of perception, inference cannot possibly arise. However far one carries one’s thinking, one who recognises the functioning of inference will necessarily have to accept the cognition by means of perception of the dharmin (Pakṣa, subject e.g. mountain), probans (e.g. smoke) and example (e.g. kitchen). He will necessarily have to admit that he has acquired the knowledge of these through perception and only then he could proceed with

1. See: बांधकंडे तिष्ठति शति चिरतनांकिप्यावः।
    - NyB, p. 80, F.N.No.3
inference on their basis. By this the view that āgama is the only pramaṇa should also be taken as refuted. For unless one knows the meaning of the terms, sentences etc. by means of perception or inference, one cannot understand the meaning of āgama.

1. By means of perception a man comes to know the relation between a word and a meaning denoted by it. Or on the basis of such a relation a particular meaning is inferred from a particular word.

Read: शब्दादिनामपि अनुमाने क्षत्तावः समानविविधताः। यथा प्रसिद्धाध्यायस्य अवदिर्गलिंदिनश्च प्रसिद्धाध्यायस्य अतीतिन्द्रवै कर्म क्षत्तिः अनुमानानस्य सं शब्दादिनाम: क्षत्तिः। -

PB (With NK), p. 512.

Compare: यथा व्याप्तिग्रहण्यात अनुमान महत्त्वः तथा शब्दावथः। कर्म इत्यस्य । इत्यादि:। अथ सम्विद्यः अविनाशाय:।। -

NK (PB), p. 512;

e.g. The man desires to convey the meaning of a thing possessed of hump etc; because he is one who has uttered the word 'Go', as I do.
Refutation of the Jaina view: According to the Jainas, pramāṇa is two-fold, Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa (direct knowledge and indirect knowledge). This view too is not proper, says Bhasarvajña, since the usage of parokṣa is not known among the people. For example, the usage, 'I know this thing by means of parokṣa' is nowhere current just as one is familiar with expression like 'I know a thing through pratyakṣa or anumāṇa or āgama.' Besides, such a division does not serve any purpose. The purpose behind the separate mention of the pramāṇas, viz. Perception, Inference and verbal Testimony, is to set forth the separate respective means of the attainment of knowledge endowed with validity. Again, since the nature of valid knowledge brought about by perception, Inference and Verbal Testimony differs from one another, the means of right knowledge are divided accordingly into perception etc. But no purpose is served by the inclusion of anumāṇa and āgama under the head of Parokṣa. However, if by virtue of his attachment to his dogmatic view, the Jaina logician were to argue in order to establish only two kinds of pramāṇa, that Parokṣa is a common head in the classification, while anumāṇa and āgama are its particular varieties having distinct characteristics, then he may say so, but could prevent him from doing so? But even if pramāṇa is thus divided into two kinds, the division

1. See: प्रत्यक्ष च परोक्ष च विषय न्यैनिरस्क्यात।
   - Nyāyavātara 1.1
made by Bhāsarvajña into three varieties is not violated, because the distinctive characteristics exclusive of each other are mentioned even in the Jaina view. If it is argued that the meaning conveyed by pratyakṣa and parokṣa is the very same as the meaning conveyed by Pratyakṣa and anumāna, the answer to this is that still pramāṇa cannot be said to be two-fold, as āgama also, which is a different entity from pratyakṣa and anumāna is a pramāṇa. Bhāsarvajña later refutes the concept of its being subsumed under anumāna. In anumāṇa it becomes necessary to have the knowledge of attribute or indicative sign residing in the subject (pakṣa-dharma-grahaṇa) before one makes an inference; but this is not necessary in the function of verbal testimony. Sabda becomes a pramāṇa only when it is uttered by a reliable person, whereas in inference it is not necessary that līṅga or indicative sign should be shown by a reliable person. Hence sabda pramāṇa is quite independent of anumāṇa.

The view that recognised Three Pramāṇas is not opposed to the Nyāyasūtra : Bhāsarvajña now explains his view as against the general belief that four independent pramāṇas are recognised by the Nyāya school. It may be contended that pramāṇa cannot be said to be three-fold, inasmuch as this is opposed to Aksapāda's Vibhāgasūtra ( the Nyāyasūtra stating the

1. See : NyB, p. 388
Bhāsarvajña says that one may think along these lines: According to the Vībhāga-Sūtra, pramāṇa is four-fold; pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna (inference), Upaniṣad pramāṇa (comparison) and Sābda (Verbal testimony). The purpose of this classification is precisely to deny or exclude any number which is greater or less than this. If this were not intended by the Sūtrakāra, the specific statement of the classification into four varieties would be meaningless, since such a classification would be established even by the statement of four separate definitions. Nor is this what is termed enumeration (uddesā) for this statement is examined. The enumeration of pramāṇa etc has not been examined; but the classification given the Vībhāga-Sūtra has been examined by the sūtra (2-2-1, ff). So the pramāṇas are four in number according to the author of the Nyāya-Sūtra. That is to say, the sūtras just enumerating the categories are not examined. But what is stated in the Vībhāga-Sūtra regarding the number of sub-divisions of pramāṇa, has been subjected to examination, so the author of the Nyāya-Sūtra is in the full know of other views and hence asserts that pramāṇa is four-fold.

In answer to this Bhāsarvajña says that this is not proper. For, the reason put forth by the opponent is inconclusive. It is

1. See: प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानांशसंहि: प्रमाणानि । -
   - NS, 1.1.3

2. See: न चतुष्क्षिप्त रेतियायायांपिक्षाय चषांपणामाणि । -
   - NS, 2-2-1 to 12
seen otherwise in the case of the Ghrāṇādīsūtra (the sūtra stating the division of sense-organs, sense of smell, etc.). For, in this sūtra the classification of the sense-organs is stated and then that classification is examined by the statements in the sūstras. 'There is only one sense-organ, that is sense of touch, etc.' But there is no restriction that the sense-organs are five only, for mind also is accepted as a sense-organ. Though the contents are equally examined in the case of both, if it is insisted that only the sūtra classifying pramāṇa into perception, etc. is meant for division, whereas the Ghrāṇādīsūtra is meant only for explanatory reiteration (anuvāda), then the Kośapāṇa (the ordeal of making one drink pitch water and thus ascertaining whether one is guilty or not) is the only means ak to testify the truth.

There is no specific reason for the discrimination of the two cases (Pratyakṣādīsūtra and Ghrāṇādīsūtra). Therefore, just as the Sūtrakāra, having raised only the question whether the sense-organs could be less than five, has refuted it, and so there is nothing opposed to the acceptance of the sense-organs being more than five, similarly in the present case

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1. See: प्राणामनवपुस्तकरूपन्यात्रेण विद्यानिः पुलेः।
   - NS., 1-1-12
   also see: त्यत्र विद्यानिः पुलेः।
   - NS., 3-1-53

2. See: कोशपाण्य = जयसिद्धी। हुगुणपरसंपुंजयं तत्तत्प्रपन्नाय मन्त्रे।
   अभिप्रयो शनिचन्द्र यन पायेष। चतुर्विंश्च मन्त्रे स ज्ञेयप्रविष्ट।
   वैत दुष्प्ते! वन्यमान निरंग्न वस्य निर्णयिः कैन।
   - NyB, p.81, Foot-Note 4
the Sutrakāra raises a question as to whether the pramāṇas could be more than four, and then repudiates it, so there is nothing wrong if one accepts less than four pramāṇas. Hence the acceptance of the classification of pramāṇas into three varieties is not opposed to the Nyāyasūtra. In both the cases the final classifications are alike obtained on the strength of logic. Bhāsarvājñā expounds later on how the classification of pramāṇas into three kinds is obtained on the strength of reasoning and how it is not opposed to the Sūtra. Just as the Sutrakāra has spoken of sixteen categories, five sense-organs, twenty-four Jātis (Futile Rajoinders, Parity, Sādharmya etc.), but the number of varieties is not strictly restricted, similarly he has spoken of the four varieties of pramāṇas, but this by no means suggests that pramāṇas cannot be less than four (in the above examples the number of varieties may be more than sixteen or five or twenty-four respectively). It is the tendency of the Sutrakāra that sometimes he does not categorically state even the doctrines that he facetiously admits with a view to indicating that only those pupils who are endowed with the excellence of the potency of making conjectures are primarily entitled to study the Nyāyasāstra. Hence the view admitting only three pramāṇas is in no way opposed to the Sutrakāra's words.

1. See: चतुर्याथ्यावहः श्रीपदार्थादिशः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता

2. See: चक्षुस्बन्धयंग्यत्वमुखस्वयं शास्त्रवादनानां विद्यासीमाः कविताय प्रकाशस्त: न अभिमन्यु शिष्याः प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता चतुर्याथ्यावहः सत्यायतनाभि: परं प्राणिता

- NyB, pp. 426-27
Do pramāṇas have a mutually exclusive scope (viplava) or a non-exclusive one (samplava)? It may be asked as to why the term 'Pramāṇa' is used in the Nyāyasāra in the singular number? The answer to this is that it is used in the singular number to show that the object of all the three pramāṇas could be one and the same. As for example, when a trustworthy person says, 'there is fire at a particular place, mountain or the like, the person has the cognition of fire by means of word of a reliable person; then approaching nearer to the place, the person sees smoke and infers the existence of fire on the basis of this; and then the person reaches quite near the place and perceives the same fire with his own eyes. Thus one and the same fire is the object of all the three sources of knowledge. Similarly a person can know the nature of ātman by means of the instruction of the reliable teacher; and he can also know the same through the presence of indicative marks desire, etc. (i.e. by means of inference); again, he realises the very same nature of ātman through yogic perception by virtue of meditation. Thus the functioning of all the three pramāṇas in respect of one and the same object is established. This is called Pramāṇa-samplava.

1. त्रिविधम प्रमाणम प्रत्ययाम अनुमानम आगम हेति। - NyS, NyB, p. 79
2. See : क्षमदेशप्रयत्नकु रःक्षज्ञानति आत्मनः तिमुः। - NS, 1-1.10
3. See: किं पुनः प्रमाणति प्रमेयम् बप्प्तमस्तेद्? कथ प्रमेयं व्यावस्थितं हेति? उपयथा दर्शनम्। - NB on NS, 1-1.3
It may be noted that in the discussion of Pramāṇasamplava and pramāṇavyavasthā, Bhāsarvajñā follows the Nyāya-Bhāṣya so much so that he cites the same examples as are given in the Nyāya-bhāṣya.

Again, in the Nyāyaśāstra the three pramāṇas viz. Perception, Inference and Verbal Testimony are mentioned individually to suggest that at times each pramāṇa may even function in regard to its own specific object. As for example, that the Agnihoṭra should be performed by one desiring heaven we can know only, by the words of the Veda (agnihotram juhuyāt svarga-kāmāḥ); ordinary persons like us cannot this by means of perception or inference. Similarly when we hear the sound of thunder we can only proceed to indulge in an inference regarding the source of the sound as ordinary people like us have not read or heard from any authoritative source about the cause of this sound. And when we apprehend our hand by means of direct perception, no Inference or verbal Testimony need be operative in this case, as there is absence of any expectancy in respect of it.

It may be urged that there is not sufficient ground to prove that in respect of an object of pratyakṣa alone, the expectancy of other pramāṇas recedes—that is to say, there is no need for the functioning of the other pramāṇas—and the expectancy does not recede in the case of an object known through āgama and anumāna. But this argument is not tenable.
It is obvious that perception alone can properly reveal an object qualified by many specific characteristics some of which can be pointed out to others while others cannot be pointed out. Hence perception is capable of dispelling the need for other pramāṇas. And it is also obvious that anumāṇa etc. do not cognise a thing as possessed of as many characteristics as are shown by perception as qualifying the thing. One may raise an objection here that in that case the functioning of all the three pramāṇas in regard to one and the same object would not be possible, since the object of perception and the object of inference etc. are not one and the same, as these have an unequal number of objects. But this objection cannot be maintained, says Bhāsarvajña. From the point of view of substance qualified by certain characteristics, samplava is tenable. For example, the very fire as qualified by place, etc. which is known through āgama, is also known through anumāṇa and the very same fire is known through perception. Thus samplava is tenable. It is true that in some cases, even though a thing is apprehended by perception, the other pramāṇas do function, whether one desires or does not desire to acquire the knowledge of the object as qualified by some specific characteristics that are super-sensuous; e.g. when a person sees a sacrifice being performed; whether he wishes or not, Śastra steps in saying that this sacrifice will create apūrva which will bring about heavenly existence, or when a person sees a mountain
with smoke and by force of habit infers the mountain as possessed of fire. Still this does not happen in all cases. So where an object is known through one pramāṇa only, and the other pramanās have no scope to function, there can be established the restriction (vyavastha) that a specific pramāṇa functions only in respect of a specific object. However in all other cases samplava is established.

It may be argued that when a thing has been known through one pramāṇa, the function of another pramāṇa would be meaningless. But it is not so, says Bhāsarvajña. For different pramanās function in different ways. One pramāṇa may cause a specific trouble to the knower, while another may be conducive to happiness. That is to say each brings about pleasure or pain in a peculiar way. Besides, if more than one pramāṇa function, the impression left on the mind is intensified. Moreover it should be noted that the functioning of pramanās is not always dependent on and guided by some desired end or goal of man. They may function even in regard to a blade of grass or the like which has no specific purpose to serve. Likewise pramanās are found to be functioning even in respect of bondage that is not desired by anybody (the scriptures tell us about bondage and the like about which one does not want to know).

Doubt in regard to the untenability of samplava from the point of view of the Buddhists, and its Refutation: It may be contended here that the objects of perception and inference are
of an altogether different nature. Hence the functioning of
more than one pramāṇa in regard to one and the same object is
not possible. Every object is possessed of two types of charac­
teristics: One is the very essence of the thing and is pecu­
liar to the individual and is not common to all, whereas the
other characteristic is of the nature of universal or generality
and is a common one. Now, what is perceived by (nirvikalpaka)
perception is its peculiar characteristic; e. g. when a man sees
fire with his own eyes, the peculiar characteristic of the
point-instant fire (Svalakṣaṇa) comes to be known. On the
other hand, what is cognised through inference is the common
characteristic of a thing (Sāmānyalakṣaṇa e. g. fireness, etc.).
When a man infers fire from smoke, the Sāmānyalakṣaṇa (i.e.
fireness) is cognised. What is meant by the Buddhist is this :
The nature of object known through perception is altogether
different from that known through inference. So perception
and inference cannot be said to have an object in common. Hence
Samplava of pramanas is not tenable.

This is true says Bhāsarvajña sarcastically. In fact this
is the wishful thinking of the Buddhists. But it can never be
fulfilled as it is false. Bhāsarvajña repudiates this view later

1. See : स्वलपाः | समु अवधारणा तथा तत्त्व स्वलपाः ।
वचनः। ति अवधारणा च तत्त्वमात्र शामान्य च । यद अवधारणा
शा तत्त्वमात्र श्रीविजयः ।
( Nyāyabindutikā, pp. 15, 16)
contd....see next page No. 489
The particular means an entity or an essence which is unique, which is shared by nothing else (which is the thing in itself). (Every) reality, indeed, has its real essence which is the particular (the unique) and a general (imagined aspect). That which is apprehended in direct perception is the unique (pp. 33, 34). ...... The object of knowledge which is other than the unique (point), which does not represent the unique point, is its general character. ... The universal character of something is that essence which exists owing to generality, i.e., that essence which belongs equally (to an indefinite number of) points of reality. Indeed, (the fire) existing in imagination refers equally to every possible fire. Therefore it represents the universal essence...... this universal essence can be apprehended by indirect knowledge.-

BL, part II, pp. 37, 38 (Stcherbatsky).

Also See: NV, NCG, p. 8.
If perception and inference are not admitted as having one and the same thing as their object, and if invariable concomitance or similarity of relation is not admitted as the object of perception, the object of inference could never be known.

In Bhasarvajna's view even in inference not only the general characteristic of fire, etc. is known, but also a concrete object endowed with that general characteristic. So it is concluded here that there is samplava of pramāṇas, and in regard to some object vyavasthā or restricted exclusive division of functions of pramāṇa also holds good. Even the author of the Nyāya-sūtra has accepted both samplava and vyavasthā of pramāṇas. By mentioning the term 'pramāṇa' in the compound he wants to convey that more than one pramāṇa can have one and the same thing as their common object. And he has also employed the term, 'Pramāṇa' in the plural in another

1. See: स्वच्छ दृष्ठाः प्रामाणेः संप्लव स्वच्छावद्यादेः प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वं

2. यथाविकिर्ष्ये कथा पूर्वप्रत्यक्षेण दृष्ट: | स ख्य संप्लवादित: कालान्तरः।

3. यथाविकिर्ष्ये कथा पूर्वप्रत्यक्षेण दृष्ट: | स ख्य संप्लवादित: कालान्तरः।

- NyB, p. 193


3. यथाविकिर्ष्ये कथा पूर्वप्रत्यक्षेण दृष्ट: | स ख्य संप्लवादित: कालान्तरः।

- NS, 1-1-1
sūtra, thereby suggesting the exclusive orderly division of functioning of the pramāṇas - a particular pramāṇa for a particular object. In order to point out the mode of the exposition followed by the Sūtrakāra to indicate Samplava and vyavasthā of the pramāṇas, Bhāsarvajña has adopted a different mode of explanation. The term (iti) in the Nyāyasāra is meant for the very same type of restriction as is mentioned above—in this very manner pramāṇa is ascertained to be threefold. Otherwise, pramāṇa is of one kind only, inasmuch as all the three pramāṇas are equally means of right presentative knowledge. But, if somebody desires to describe the sub-varieties of pratyakṣa etc., pramāṇa can be said to be of seven or more kinds. Therefore only in view of the division into Perception, Inference and Verbal Testimony (i.e. without considering the sub-divisions), pramāṇa is said to be of three kinds.

1. वैज्ञानिक प्रमाणप्रमाणशक्तिः प्रमाणानि —
   - NS - 1-1-3
2. न्यायस, न्याये, प्रमाणविज्ञान - प्रत्येकाक्षु अनुभव यथिति —
   - NyS, NyB, p. 79