

Pramātā And Prameya : In the Nyāyasāra Bhāsarvajña defines pramātā (cogniser) and prameya (object to be cognised) as follows: The Substratum of valid (presentative) knowledge (pramā) is called pramātā; and the object of valid apprehension (pramā) is called prameya. Explaining the same in the Nyāyabhūṣāṇa, the author says that even the difference between pramā, pramātā and prameya is not unreal, since their characteristics are really different. To wit, pramā is valid apprehension, pramātā is the substratum of pramā, that is to say, pramātā is the inherent cause of pramā. Pramā, being knowledge, is a quality. And it resides by the relation of inherence (Samavāya-sambadha) in the cogniser (ātman, recognised as substance or dravya). And the thing which is manifested in valid apprehension is the object of valid apprehension, prameya.

Now, it may be urged that if the difference between pramātā (cogniser), Pramā (valid knowledge), etc. is real, then in the first Nyāyasūtra, like prameya etc; pramātā also should have been mentioned separately from pramāṇa since the

1. प्रामाण्यः प्रमानः प्रमाणभिन्नः प्रमेयः हति । - NYS, NyB, p.62
2. प्रामाण:प्रामाण्याप्रामाणयाज्ञानात्वक्कल्पक्षन्यात्वक्कल्पकल्पितं-हेतुपाभेत्वादैवतिनिग्रहस्थानान्तप्ल्ल्यानाद: तत्त्वमाः निःश्रवायिण: । - NS, 1-1-1
characteristics of pramātā are different from those of pramāṇa. But it is not separately mentioned. The answer to this is that it is not necessary to mention pramātā separately in the first Nyāyasūtra, because it is established just by the mention of pramāṇa (source of valid knowledge). Indeed, without pramātā, no pramāṇa is possible. So when pramāṇa is mentioned, pramātā is automatically implied. Moreover, this is deliberately done so in order to show that the circumstances ensuring the well-being of one also ensure that of the other. That is to say, the very maxim or principle, through which the existence of pramāṇa and its capacity to bring about the qualified and non-qualified results are established, would establish the same in the case of pramātā also. For example, we find that the sense-organs (pramanas) are cognised by means of Inference based on the fact of their respective objects being duly apprehended; e.g. the sense-organ of the Eye exists, because we have cognition of colour, which could not be possible except by means of the visual organ. Likewise, apprehension or cognition indicates the existence of pramātā, as cognition being a quality cannot exist without a substance in which it could subsist by the relation of inherence, which is here pramātā. Hence the author of the Nyāya-sūtra has not mentioned 'pramātā' separately from

1. द्वितीयांशतः ताक्त व्यविष्कर्णणेव बन्धताल्लेचे | - NB on NS. 2-1-19
2. द्वितीयांशतः प्रायवत्तेषु समन्तानी अण्येन: लिंगः | - NS, 1-1-10
pramāṇa in the first Nyāyasūtra. It may be argued that on the same ground we can say that like pramātā, prameya also need not be mentioned separately; but it is mentioned. This is true, says Bhāsarvajña. The Sutrakāra also does not accept that each and every prameya should be mentioned separately. What has been mentioned by the Sutrakāra as 'prameya' in the first sutra is in fact prameya in particular. And this is done so with a special purpose. Bhāsarvajña discusses this purpose later on, while dealing with the special characteristics of prameya. So what the Sutra has done is the specific mention of only those prameyas whose right knowledge brings emancipation and wrong knowledge leads to birth and rebirth. This does not mean that these are the only objects that can be cognised. Like the mention of prameya in general, the mention of true knowledge in general (pramitīmātra) also is included in the mention of 'pramāṇa'. However, by the term 'tattvajña'...

1. See : दण्डकुञ्जे प्रेयपदेत्वा वस्य उद्देशः कृतः तस्य हेदानां लक्षणः वक्तव्योऽ | तु च व्यक्तविषयः तत्त्वहत्तर्गुणितविषयेन एव नि:शेषायं मववति, निष्पञ्जकल्याणं व संसारं प्रतिनिः, तत्र प्रेयम्यो......

- न्येन, p.436;

(i, that which is fit to be discarded, e. g. pain;
ii, its causes, e. g. ignorance etc;
iii, that which is absolutely destructive of pain, i.e. true knowledge;
iv, the means of attaining true knowledge).
in the first Nyāyasūtra, a particular true knowledge (pramāṇa) is mentioned with a view to telling us that it is the cause of emancipation. One may contend that by the term 'prameya' in the first Nyāyasūtra, some particular prameyas are taken as mentioned. If this be so prameyas like space, time and atoms of earth etc. could not be incorporated in prameya. As a result of this, we can say that all the causal factors of the world are not treated in the Nyāyasāstra. And then it could not be designated as 'adhyātma-Sāstra' or the science that deals with the soul only. The answer to this is that this is not a drawback. For in the prameya in general, that is implied by virtue of the mention of pramāṇa (prameya in particular being specifically mentioned by the term 'prameya' in the sūtra), all prameyas (dik, kāla, etc.) are included. This being the case, nothing whatsoever, existent or non-existent is left unmentioned, for whatever is the object of true knowledge is prameya. Therefore it is said that when pramāṇa is mentioned, pramātā and prameya are automatically mentioned. Yet with a special purpose, the author of the Nyāya-Sūtras has mentioned 'prameya' separately. And the mention of 'pramāṇa' implies the mention of prameya in general. Thus the mention of pramāṇa and prameya in the first Nyāyasūtra is justified.

1. बाल्मशारी रेन्नियार्थुंस्विनमः प्रवृद्धिवृद्धिस्विनिग्रहवृद्धिस्विनां कुः तासुषः तु प्रमेयः ।

Compare: तन्त्रवृद्धिकस्य १. हेयः, २. तस्य निर्देशिकस्य, ३. हानमात्यन्तिकस्य, ४. तस्यापाय शिप ।

- NS, 1-1-9;

- NyB, p. 436
Now, one may contend that if pramātā and the prameyas like space etc. could be included in 'pramāṇa,' then Doubt etc. also could be included either in pramāṇa or in prameya and so their mention in the sūtra is redundant. In answer to this Bhāsarvajña says that the contention is not justifiable. For, even though doubt, etc. are included either in pramāṇa or in prameya, they are mentioned separately in the first Nyāyasūtra because it's a special reason; that is to say, their separate mention serves some purpose. Out of fourteen topics, Doubt (Samāśaya), Purpose (Prayojana) etc. that are mentioned after pramāṇa and prameya; the purpose of the separate mention of Doubt (Samāśaya) has been already explained. And this purpose is to show emphatically that doubt is the cause of the process of the methodical inference. To wit, first there arises a doubt as to whether the mountain that one perceives before him is endowed with fire or not; then the syllogistic process starts. The Sūtrakāra did this bearing a special intention in his mind that doubt etc. would be well determined by their separate mention and separate treatment. Consequently it will be easy to understand how each one of them serves a special purpose of its own. With this in view the author of the

1. प्रमाणप्रमेय-संस्कृतिभं जन्मेन् शुद्धिवत्तनात्तक्तकल्लो नयविवाचवज्ज्वलितथा-
   हेतुवाचाराचलगतिनिग्रहस्यानातास्तत्तत्त्वानास्ति निःश्लेषानिधिम: ।।
   NS, I-1-1

2. प्रयोजनान्तर्वेदनं पृक्षाधिवाचारं संस्कृतिनयं ज्ञातुद्वर्तायं केलिम्। कथयः ।
   दानुषपतिः न निरुपिति अर्थं च ज्ञायं प्रकटी, किं तर्कः । संशोधिते ।
   रचने च सति न संशोधनं चिन्तायम्यस्यापि विचारान्तर्वेदनं प्रमाणप्रमेयवतः-
   सम्पूर्णतत्त्वापि पृष्णाधिवाचारं प्रष्टस्त। ।
   NyB, pp. 20-21
Nyāya-sūtra, ignoring even the proverbial craze for brevity of the sūtra-style, composed a lengthy sūtra (daṇḍaka sū-ram). Of these, only the nature of doubt and the special purpose served by it have been already treated. But the nature and purpose of prayojana, dṛṣṭānta, siddhātana, etc. have not yet been dealt with. So they are treated here.

Now, Bhāsarvajña elaborately discusses the nature of prayojana etc. and the special purpose served by each one of them. In accordance with the order in the Nyāyasūtra, first he takes up the topic of prayojana.

Purpose And Nature of Prayojana: What is the purpose of purpose? It may be urged that this question has no propriety; since purpose itself is of the nature of purpose. The question of purpose can possibly be raised if we take up a thing which is not of the nature of purpose, e.g. 'What purpose is served by this?' Hence the question regarding the purpose of anything except purpose itself is understandable. But it is not proper to raise a question of purpose in respect of a thing which is of the nature of purpose. No one ever raises a question as to what purpose is served by happiness; since happiness is itself the purpose

1. प्रमाणप्रमेयस्यप्रयोजन – NS, 1-1-1
2. See: NyB pp. 12-25
of activity. When happiness itself the purpose it is meaningless to ask a question - 'what is the purpose of happiness?'

In answer to this Bhāsarvajña says that this controversy is raised, because the opponent has not been able to grasp the point. It is not the question here as to what purpose is served by purpose. Here what is to be enquired into is this: 'What purpose is served by the mention of prayojana separately in the first Nyāyasūtra, though it could have been included in pramaṇa or in prameya?' On this point Vātsyāyana the commentator of the Nyāyasūtra, says - this (motive, purpose) beams upon all living beings, all actions and all sciences; and this forms the basis of all reasoning or investigation (Nyāya) - without some motive or end in view, one does not have recourse to reasoning. Bhāsarvajña says then in a jocular mood - 'My dear brother, we fail to understand this, because the fact that purpose has bearing in a wider sphere than that pointed out by Vātsyāyana is well known in the world as well as in the Śāstras. To wit, all those who know Śāstras and all ordinary people, know in general that all creatures, deeds, sciences and the syllogistic inference (Nyāya) do have their own purposes. But in respect of their specific purposes, they make enquiries: 'With what purpose in mind has this person started doing this?' For what purpose is this action undertaken? 'What purpose is served by this science? 'What is the use (purpose) of this inference?' So keeping in view
the significance of the second type of purpose (i.e. specific purpose), the author of the Nyāya-sūtra has mentioned 'Prayo-

jana' separately.

In this regard, some thinkers reject the view that knowledge of the Higher Self or God leads to emancipation. According to them the said 'Great Lord' has no purpose to serve and so no activity is possible on His part, Consequently He does not exist. Thus they establish the non-existence of God. Moreover, these atheists do not recognise the purpose of God, as pointed by the Naiyāyikas, that is, inflicting punishment to some and granting favours to others. It is true that a soul (jivātman) can have the purpose of obtaining emancipation, i.e. bliss or total absence of miseries. However, it would not be reasonable to say that the purpose of soul could be the purpose of God. Devadatta's purpose cannot be Yajñadatta's purpose. Thirdly, as God is said to be free from attachment (or aversion), (granting favours to some and ) inflicting punishment (on others) could not be the purpose in the case of God.

In order to repudiate this view and to justify the purpose in the case of God, the author of the Nyāya-sūtra separately mentions prayojana and points out its nature, which is well known to the people. He says - 'That aiming at which one acts,
is called motive or prayojana'. What is meant is this that even in the world whatever object a person seeks to attain or avoid for his own sake or for the sake of others and then acts accordingly, is known as his purpose. Similarly, in the case of God also, that every object aiming at which He acts, is His purpose. Though indeed God is endowed with knowledge, non-attachment and sovereignty that are all unsurpassable, yet He is of such a nature that He acts keeping in view the aim that all mundane people should get punishment or reward in accordance with their deeds. Hence this itself should be regarded as the purpose in the case of God, as it is endowed with the characteristic of prayojana, like pleasure, etc. (which are accepted as prayojana) by both the parties. Thus it is concluded that either in order to emphasise the importance of a specific purpose of a being or an action or a science or in order to justify the purpose in the case of God, the Sūtrakāra mentioned prayojana separately.

**Nature of Drstānta and Purpose of mentioning it separately**

What is the nature of drstānta? What is the purpose of mentioning it separately in the first Nyāyasūtra? There are different views regarding the exact nature, of drstānta. Some hold that

1. See : NyB, p. 458
substitute or abode where we can observe the concomitance of two things is drṣṭānta. As for example, kitchen is a place where we can frequently see the concomitance between smoke and fire. On frequently seeing such external concomitance. We are inclined to formulate an internal concomitance in our mind, e.g. 'Wherever there is smoke, there is fire'. Hence the place of kitchen serves as drṣṭānta in the case of the concomitance between smoke and fire.

Some others are of the view that drṣṭānta is a thing which is different from the Sadhya (dharmān) or subject (pākṣa) in respect of which something is to be proved (e.g. a

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1. विभिन्नरूपितस्वादस्य दृष्टान्तत्वम् हस्तेके । - NyB, p.64;
   When this refers to the concomitance of cases containing smoke with those having fire, it is called bahīrvāpyāpti; and when it refers to the conviction of the concomitance of smoke with fire, without any relation to the circumstances under which the concomitance was observed, it is called antarvāpyāpti. The Buddhists since they did not admit the notion of generality, etc. preferred antarvāpyāpti view of concomitance to bahīrvāpyāpti as a means of inference"-

   A History of Indian Philosophy, I, p.346

2. साध्यविचित्रतिरिक्त: साध्यसाधनविरूपातः तद्दृष्टान्त इत्यथे । - NyB, p. 64
mountain is Sādhya-dharmin -); and it is endowed with the probandum and the probans, or it is devoid of both. To wit, a kitchen is different from the mountain; it is seen to be endowed with smoke (probans) and fire (probandum); or sometime it is devoid of both smoke and fire. In short, in kitchen we observe the co-presence and co-absence of smoke and fire. In the Nyāyabhāṣya it is said - 'as regards Example (drstānta), it is something that is directly perceived. The author of the Nyāya-sūtra defines it as follows: "that is 'Example' with regard to which both, the ordinary man and the trained investigator, entertain similar ideas." Explaining the word 'yatra' in the Nyāyasūtra, Bhāsarvajña says that the word 'Yatra' signifies (i) a place where we can observe the external concomitance between the two things; or (ii) it signifies in the example'; or (iii) it means 'a thing in which we see the co-presence or the co-absence of two things.' The author of the Nyāya-sūtra had all these different concepts in view. According to Bhāsarvajña the meaning of the sūtra is as follows: That in respect of which is understanding between (or a view commonly shared by)

1. अथ दृष्टान्तः प्रत्येकविश्वाय: अर्थं। - NB on NS 1-1-1
2. लोकिकपरीपाकारेत्यस्य यस्मिन अर्थं वृद्धिकालं स दृष्टान्तं। - NS 1.1.25

Compare: यत्र लोकिकपरीपाकारेत्यस्मि वृद्धिकालि सदृष्टान्तः। - NyB, p. 64

We do not find the word 'Yatra' in the Sūtra, but यस्मिन्ति अर्थेः = यत्र
the teacher and the pupil (or the one explaining and the one to whom it is explained) is drstānta. It may be urged here that when an inference is drawn for one's own self and when there is absence of two parties or persons (viz. pupil and teacher), how could there be a thing like drstānta which is the object of the common understanding of the two? The answer to this is that it is not right to say that in the inference for one's own self, drstānta has no role to play. Even in this case, a single person plays a double role; the thinker himself assuming the role of a pupil, raises questions, and he himself assuming the role of a teacher answers them, just like a man who composes a śastra by raising questions and answering them. So a drstānta is needed even in the inference for one's own self. Or this can be justified on the basis of capability. Such a thing can serve as a drstānta when it is employed as such, or it is found necessary to put it forth as a drstānta to strengthen the argument. Or some other characteristic which is not comprehended by Sūtrākāra's definition, should be sought for and noticed; as in the case of a substance like ether (ākāśa) which is not comprehended by the definition - 'A thing endowed with action is dravya'. For ākāśa is devoid of action and still it is dravya.

1. लौकिकतरी तात्त्विकाः = प्रतिपादप्रतिपादकानां बुद्धिस्या म्यु - सम्प्रतिपतिः। - NyB, p.64
Sane others explain the definition of \textit{drṣṭānta} as follows: The term 'laukika' signifies 'the attributes of the probandum (Sadhyā, e.g. fire),' and the term 'Parīksaka' signifies 'the attributes of the probans (sādhana, e.g. smoke). That where agreement can be reached in respect of the establishment of the relation of the one being the pervaded and the other the pervader (Vyāpya-vyāpaka-bhāva) between the attributes of the sādhana and those of the sadhyā - that is the drṣṭānta. Thus the definition of drṣṭānta given by the Sutrakāra has been variously explained by earlier thinkers.

Moreover, the purpose behind mentioning drṣṭānta separately in the first Nyāyasūtra, has been explained by Vātsyāyana as follows: 'Inference and Verbal Cognition are both dependent upon it; it is only when there is an Example (to corroborate the premiss,) and not otherwise - that there can be a valid inference, or verbal cognition. It is thus on the basis of an Example that all Reasoning proceeds; as in demolishing the opponent's position, it is necessary to show that it is opposed to (not compatible with) an Example (admitted by both parties); and in establishing one's own position also, it becomes necessary to show that it is corroborated by an Example. (There is yet

\begin{enumerate}
\item 'यत्र लौकिकपरी प्राकारां बुद्धिसत्त्मक स दृष्टान्तः \item...
लौकिका: - साध्यम्; परीक्षा: - साधनम्, तेषां व्याप्तिपरकिषिद्वारि
अविचारिति: यत्र स दृष्टान्त हितं \item NyB, p. 64
\item See: NB on NS. 1.1.1
\end{enumerate}
another reason why importance has been attached to Example; it is through this that the position of the atheistic Buddhā becomes doubly untenable. If the Atheist admits a corroborative example, he renounces his atheistic (Nihilistic) position (as by Nihilism, all things have merely momentary existence; and hence it is not possible for the Example, which must be in the form of something that existed in the past, to be present at the time that it is put forward); if, on the other hand, he does not admit an Example, on the basis of what could he attack the position of his opponent? Further, the enunciation of Example among the categories is necessary, because it is only when the example has been described that we can have the definition of the 'Instance corroborative of the inferential premiss' propounded in Sūtras 1.1.36 and 37 - 'the corroborative instance is that Example which possessing the properties of the Probandum, is similar to it' (Sūtra 36), and also it is 'that Example which, not possessing the properties of the Probandum, is dissimilar to it' (Sūtra 37). Thus the specific mention and exposition of Example is found to be very necessary in the Sciences of Reasoning.

1. See: साध्वाकारमीद तद्वप्रेक्ष्याब्रवी तृप्तान्ति उदाहरणाम् || - NS. 1.1.36
tद्विपरियावद वा विपरीतम् || - NS. 1.1.37

Read: साध्वान साध्वाप्रवेद हत्यापात माण्डन || तस्यार्थः साध्वान शर्मिभाति
शब्दके साध्वाप्रत्यात्य स्थालायादेः कृतकर्मं हेतुं || तद् ति
अवश्यतेन साध्वे च शब्दे तृप्तान्ते च स्थालायादो समानत् ||
- NVTT, NCG, p.562

2. Gāgānātha Jhā’s Translation
After quoting the above-mentioned passage from the Nyāya-bhāṣya, Bhāsarvajñā again refers to his own view regarding the purpose of mentioning 'dṛṣṭānta' separately in the first Nyāya-sūtra. As he says, he has already pointed out the purpose in general and the same he repeats here: The statements regarding the emunciation and definition of dṛṣṭānta etc. are meant for explanatory reiteration as otherwise dṛṣṭānta etc. and quite familiar to people. And the purpose of such a reiteration is to dispel illusion from the minds of those who are deluded. This also serves the purpose of affirming what a real dṛṣṭānta is and of rejecting a mere semblance of it. And besides this, whatever is said by Vātsyāyana which is not in conflict with this, could also be accepted.

Nature And Purpose of Siddhānta (Doctrine): Now, in accordance with the order followed in the first Nyāya-sūtra, Bhāsarvajñā takes up the topic of siddhānta in order to explain its nature and purpose. What oneself accepts is siddhānta - one's own tenet. The term 'artha' in the above definition of Siddhānta is included in order to exclude from the range of siddhānta, that which, though accepted by one's own self, is not really acceptable as one's own view but is accepted as the prima-facie view or as a bold assertion in a controversy (Prauḍhivāda- 'Suppose I accept this view of yours, even then there is some...

1. See: शास्त्रस्तरीयपापप्रमाणादिविद्याप्रशिद्धप्रेम | अन्यथा शास्त्रवाचककार ध्रुवमाप्रमाणादिविद्याप्रशिद्धप्रेम | प्रशिद्धप्रेम तदन्तः। न प्रशिद्धप्रेमसिद्धिकारकतः। - NyB, p.10
2. See: व्यायम्यपुराणम्: कविः सिद्धांस्य | - NyB, p.65
difficulty). And it is also meant to convey that which is being accepted in the present time also not only thing accepted in the past alone, can be called Siddhānta. In this context Vātsyāyana has said - A proposition or statement of fact approved in the form 'this is so' is called Doctrine, Siddhānta.

Bhāsarvajña here refers to a view held by some 'Tikākāras', according to whom that which is accepted as endowed with some general and some particular characteristics, by virtue of the acknowledgement based on the means of valid proof is siddhānta. They interpret even the Nyāyabhāṣya in this way. According to this, a particular view regarding a specific attribute of a thing whose reality in general is accepted even by others, is termed siddhānta, tenet or doctrine. The controversy is not regarding the thing in general, but its particular character. One's ascertained view that is being accepted regarding this character, is Siddhānta. Criticising this definition, Bhāsarvajña says that in this definition, the qualification "endowed with general and particular characters" is redundant.

1. See: बाल्यत्र धृति बन्धुव्यायमान: अर्थः विद्यान्तः | -
   NB 1-1-1; NyB, p.65

2. See: सामान्यविशेषावात् अर्थः प्रमाणपूर्वैः बन्धुपूर्वव्यायाम्:
   सिद्धान्त्व धृति दीर्घकाराः | -
   NyB, p.65

Compare: इत्युत्तरं वै त्वामयम् | हंदिन्ति सामान्यं: अधिनिपातं |
   इत्युत्तरं वै विशेषत्: | एतद्वलं वै विशेषत् सामान्यविशेषयां
   सिद्धान्त्व धृति | -
   NV,NCG (NS.1.1.26),p.500;

Also compare: तत् इत्युत्तरं वै विशेषत्: वापसे-हंदिन्ति
   सामान्यं धृति: | भवेष्य च सर्वस्य: इत्युत्तरं वै विशेषत् सामान्यविशेषयां
   बन्धुपूर्वव्याय प्रमाणयां: विशेषयान्त्वतारामापिन्ति: सर्वस्य: इत्यथः | -
   Ibid,p.500
Besides, the indication of the present acceptance (i.e. abhyupagamyamānāh) in the definition is also futile. It is not that what is accepted previously is not Siddhānta. In Bhāsarvajña's view, it is meaningless to mention general and particular aspects of a thing, while we formulate a siddhānta; as this can be easily understood.

It may be urged that which is accepted without being ascertained is also siddhānta. The answer to this is that in that case of siddhānta can be defined as: 'Whatever is accepted (abhyupagata) is siddhānta'. What is the use of making the definition cumbersome by adding more letters. Moreover, it is also needless to include the term 'pramāṇamūlena - on the strength of the means of valid knowledge' in the definition. Bhāsarvajña himself believes in a simple definition of siddhānta, which should be: 'Whatever is accepted by one is one's siddhānta'. Corroborating his view he says that if a thing accepted by the (Mādhyamika) Buddhists and others is not regarded as siddhānta (according to the definition of the Nyāya-sūtra as interpreted by the commentators), then one could not urge the ground of censure (nigrahasthāna) called 'contradicting one's own doctrine' against the (Mādhyamika) Buddhists and others. How could one contradict a doctrine, when one does not have one? It may be argued that the word 'siddhānta' is employed even in respect of what is just its semblance, just as the word
'pramāṇa' is sometimes used in respect of what is really pramāna-nabhāsa (semblance of pramāṇa). In answer to this Bhāsarvajña says that this is merely a popular usage (- in such a cases the use of the word is not strictly proper or scientific). But this should not serve as a guiding factor. It is obvious that no sane person points out a fault in the opponent's stand on the strength of even a pramāna-nabhāsa, even when he knows it as such. For, if a person urges that the opponent has contradicted his own view on the strength of pramāna-nabhāsa (- viz. when there is really no fault in the opponent's stand) there would arise the contingency of his being trapped by the ground of defeat (nigraha-stāna), which is known as 'adosodbhāvāna' or 'niranyo-jyānyuyoga', finding fault with what is faultless. Therefore, even what is accepted by the Buddhists and others, should be accepted as 'siddhānta' in as much as they are established as what is acceptable to them. Accordingly among the people as also in the sāstras we find the usage - 'this is the doctrine (Siddhānta) of the Buddhists', 'this one of the Sāmikhyas' 'this one of the Mīmāṃsakas'. However, if this is the conception of siddhāntas is general, they may also have the special character of being justifiable by pramāṇa, or not

1. तुद्यामाऩये द्रव कोणोइभावनिग्रहस्यानांमा कार । - NyB, p.65
   Compare: 'किग्रहस्याने निग्रहस्यानाभियोग: निरयोज्यानुयोग: । -
   NS.5-2-23
   Also read: 'किग्रहस्याने'... (न्यायोप ५-२-२३) । अवोधे
   दृश्याविशालमहत्वः । - -NyB, p.374
being so. In this connection, Bhāsarvajña quotes the Nyāya-
sūtra defining 'Siddhānta' as: "Doctrine is a theory or convi-
tion resting upon philosophy, on implication and on
hypothesis" (NS, 1-1-26). Bhāsarvajña says that the word
'Samsthitih' (Stand or Position) in the sūtra is synonymous

1. See: तन्त्राधिकरणांमुच्युपमसंस्थिति: सिद्धान्त: || - NS, 1-1-26-
Read: तन्त्राधिकरणांकणांमुच्युपमसंस्थिति: सिद्धान्त: тन्त्राधिकरणां
ये संस्थित तन्त्राधिकरणाः, तेन अभावमुच्युपमसंस्थिति: इत्यां
व्यवस्था धम्मनियम्: सिद्धान्त: फ्यू टिं: इति। कियाँ त फ्यू टिं?
य: कर्म: क्षास्मेत: तस्याङ्गुपमम: न सिद्धान्त: इति ||
- NV, NCG, p. 501

2. The translation of the sūtra in accordance with the
interpretation of the Vārtika and Tātparya would be:
"Doctrine is a theory or conviction in regard to the
exact nature of a thing dealt with by Philosophy" (Gaṅgānātha Jhā);
Also Read: "The word 'siddha' literally means accom-
plished, hence anything that has come into existence;
and it is only with regard to such a thing that any
opinion can be held as to its exact nature; the word
'anta' means 'end'; by which, in the present context,
is meant that final and well-determined conviction which
people have with regard to the exact nature of any
particular thing" - Gaṅgānātha Jhā, Nyāyasūtras, Foot-
Note, pp. 57-58, Poona 1939
with 'siddhānta'. Siddhānta is three-fold: (i) Doctrine resting upon philosophy (tantrasamsthiti), (ii) Doctrine resting upon implication (adhyakaranasamsthiti), (iii) Doctrine resting upon hypothesis (abhyupagama-samsthiti). Bhāsarvajña clarifies here that according to the Bhāsyakaṇā's view, Doctrine is of four kinds on account of diversity among the several philosophical systems as described in the sutra 1-1-27.

1. See: तन्त्रस्थितिः बधिकरणस्थितिः बधिपुनस्थितिः श्रति
   निर्विन्य: सिद्धान्तः। - NyB, p.65
   Compare: तन्त्रस्थितिः तन्त्रस्थितिः। तन्त्रस्थितिः। विरूद्ध क्लर्यासनिधि
   उपदेशः श्रास्त्रः। बधिकरणगृहकारस्थितिः। बधिकरणस्थितिः।
   बधिपुनस्थितिः। विवधारातिरिक्तीप्रपथः। तदिविषेणपरिणतिः
   बधिपुनसिद्धान्तः। -
   - NB on VS 1-1-26;
   According to the Tapāraṭīkā the purport of the general definition by the bhāṣya instead of following the sutra, precedes it.
   Read: कर्म भाष्करः सिद्धान्तभाषाप्रलक्षणां अभिचित्तेऽत्तत्त्व
   व्याच्ये कर्म सिद्धान्तः इत्यादिति। - NVTT, NCG, p.500)
   Again, in view of the Tapāraṭīkā, the bhāṣya that
   follows the sutra 1-1-26, as a matter of fact, explains
   the sutra 1-1-27 that succeeds it.
   Read: तदवर्तमानवाक्यवाक्याय, सामान्यतत्त्वाय प्रतिः। खृष्ट
   व्याख्यान्त्वक्षेत्र, विवधानी प्रति-तन्त्रस्थितिः श्रति। -
   - NVTT, NCG, p. 502

2. खर्चविराजितनवार्तिकरणम्युपगमंस्थितिः। खम्ब्यालावालः।
In this context Bhasarvajna gives an interpretation of the sūtra in question as put forth by some commentator (Tīkākāra). According to this view, the exact position (Sāmīsthiti = itthambhāvavasthā) of acceptance regarding a particular thing, which is based on pramāṇa or tantra is called siddhānta. He is of the opinion that this very sūtra suggests the character of the thing being endowed with general as well as with particular property and so on as said above. Again, this Tīkākāra explains the Bhāṣya as stating the threefold varieties

1. तन्व प्रमाण, तदं वर्णणं सूलं वस्त्र्यं अन्वितष्ठेनान्युपमस्तिष्ठते:

2. See: शामान्यविशेषायार्थः प्रमाणस्यैन्युपमम् बन्धुप्रमाणानि: निम्बुषान्नती: । - NyB, p. 65

Compare: शामान्यप्रक्रियास्य बन्धुप्रमाणस्य प्रमाणात: विशेषणंविन्दता-परिश्याति: सौस्थ्यतः हस्यः । - NVT, NCG, p. 500

Also see: हद्यु हस्यमुवत ब हस्य: बन्धुप्रमाणानु अर्धातमु सिद्धव्यु, सिद्धस्वते सौम्यत: सिद्धान्तः। सौस्थ्यतः हस्यमप्रक्रियास्य-परिश्याति:। - NB (Preceding NS, 1-1-26)

See: हद्यु हस्य: बन्धुप्रमाणात: अविविद्यत। हस्यमुवत ब हस्य: विशेषणः।

- NV, NCG, p. 500
of siddhānta as a view of a section of the Naiyāyikas according
to which, the Nyāyabhāṣya admits that siddhānta is three-fold.

According to Bhāsarvajña's views the definition of siddhānta is as follows: 'Determined position of an accepted thing
is siddhānta. The term 'abhyaṇa' (acceptance) signifies
an accepted object. And Saṃsthiti of such an object means its
determined position. In short, a thing whatsoever, is accepted
by one, is one's siddhānta or doctrine. Such a determined posi-
tion of an accepted thing is three-fold: (i) Tantra-viśeṣitā,
that which is qualified by tantra, or by its resting upon the
direct assertions of tantra or philosophy; (ii) Adhikaraṇa-
vistā, that which is qualified by its resting upon implication
(adhikaraṇa), and not upon direct assertion; (iii) Nirviśeṣitā,

1. It may be noted that this view which interprets the
Nyāyabhāṣya as accepting three-fold siddhānta is not
found in the NV or in the NVTT.

2. See: अन्यमन्दिरां तू अभ्ययनमार्श्च यस्मात् अभ्ययनः वत्सलः ।
कथू ? अभ्ययनमार्श्च यस्मात् अभ्ययनः कर्ष उक्तः,
तस्य लोकविलोकितः = व्यवस्था । यो नैं समे अभ्ययनः
स तस्य शिरायण्टम हत्ययः । - । NyB, p. 66
that which is unqualified - unqualified doctrines. Therefore Siddhānta is three-fold. Those who debate without accepting any tantra (philosophy) are subject to the charge of Apasiddhānta. Only in the event of their contradicting the adhikarana or the abhyupagama Siddhānta and not when they contradict or argue so as to come in conflict with the tantra- Siddhānta or philosophical system (as they have none). In order to convey this, there is the statement of its being three-fold. It may be carefully noted that in Bhāsarvajña's view, the purpose of giving the three-fold division of Siddhānta is to show that a person may without accepting any tantra or sāstra make a tentative acceptance of an opinion not duly ascertained, and when he in debate, while being questioned, states what is opposed to this accepted opinion, he is subject to the charge of Apasiddhānta. It is interesting to note that in the discussion on Nigrahasthāna, Bhāsarvajña gives two alternative

1. सा व संस्कृति: त्रिविषया भवति- तन्त्राविशेषणता, अभिकरणाविशेषणा; निविषयित्वा व हत्यत: निविषयः सिद्धान्तः। -
   - NyB, p.66;
   Compare - तन्त्राविशेषित: तन्त्राविशेषि: तन्त्राविशेषि: तन्त्राविशेषि: तन्त्राविशेषि: तन्त्राविशेषि: तन्त्राविशेषि: कर्ममूलसः उपदेशः शास्त्रः। बिधिरागुणायकार्थस्याविशेषित: अभिकरणाविशेषित:।
   बन्धुकारणाविशेषित: कलचारिताध्येयस्य: तद्विषेषपरी ताराय।
   बन्धुकारणसिद्धान्तः। - NB, succeeding NS. 1-1-26(अन्नदिकला: समुदायदिकला: सिद्धान्तः)

2. See: सिद्धान्तमथा कथाप्रयागः कथाप्रयागः: सिद्धान्तः।
   - NS, 5-2-24; "Having taken up one standpoint, if the party carries on the discussion without restriction, it is a case of 'inconsistency' - Gāgānātha Jñā.
interpretations of the sūtra (5.2.24); one is the usual way in accordance with the Nyāyabhāṣya and another is his own. However if it is intended to show the sub-varieties of tantra-Siddhānta the sub-varieties of Šāstra, Siddhānta would be four-fold and hence we have the Nyāyasūtra 1.1.27. Doctrine is of four distinct kinds: (i) Doctrine common to all philosophies, (Sarvatāntra), (ii) Doctrine peculiar to one philosophy, (Pratitantra); (iii) Doctrine resting on implication, (adhikaraṇa), and (iv) or just accepted position or doctrine – Hypothetical doctrine (abhhyupagama).

It may be argued that it is not established that one of these is different from others. And unless the difference among them is established, we cannot say that doctrine is of four kinds. The answer to this is that the difference among them is known through their different characteristics. That is why the Sutrakāra has composed four sūtras, one each for

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1. See: तस्मात् शास्त्रस्य ब्रम्हस्य कृतं प्रभुविपयत्मः कपिषिद्धान्तं धर्मितः। केश्वा य व सिद्धवियोग्यवादिप्रतिष्ठा, शेषचिन्ह प्रयोगेन कृताः, पुनः तदर्थकर्कर्यात् कथां कृत्वा कपिषिद्धान्तं धर्मितः। – NyB, p. 375

2. सर्वस्त्र-प्रतित्त-अधिकारण-ब्रम्हस्य-सर्वस्त्रत्वान्त्विर्भाष्यः। – NS, 1.1.27
defining each kind. Bhāsarvajña quotes the definitions of the four kinds of doctrines, given by the Sutrakāra and interprets them in his own way. The definition of the first kind of Siddhānta runs thus: 'The Doctrine common to all philosophies is that philosophical conviction, or theory, which is not incompatible with any philosophy, and that which is recognised in one's own philosophy.\(^1\) As for example, the determination of an object depends upon the means of knowledge.' 'An effect is produced from its cause', 'knowledge of the meaning desired to be expressed by the speaker arises from the hearing of a statement based on well-known convention in regard to word and its meaning'. These are the doctrines that are generally accepted by all philosophies. If these doctrines are not accepted, no sane man could justifiably engage himself in the activity of composing a sāstra or in that of learning a sāstra or in that of expounding it; or in a controversy.

The definition of the second kind of doctrine is: That which is accepted by only one philosophy, and is not accepted by any other philosophy, is called the Doctrine peculiar to one philosophy (pratitantrasiddhānta).\(^2\) Here a question arises

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1. सर्वत्राचिह्नितम्: तत्त्वे विश्लेष्ट: कर्म: सर्वत्राचिह्नितम्: । -
   - NS, 1.1.28

The text in the NyB, should be सर्वत्राचिह्नितम्: and not सर्वत्राचिह्नितम्: - ।- NyB, p.66; photostat p.28

2. See: सत्यात्मकप्रतिलक्ष्य: परत्त्राकसिद्धियर्थ: प्रतित-असिद्धियर्थ: ।-
   - NS, 1.1.29
as to what is meant by 'Samānatantra' in the Nyāyasūtra. According to some, the proper example for 'Samānatantra' is as follows: the Yogasāstra of Patanjali is 'samānatantra' or 'sister system' for the followers of the Sāmkhyaśāstra of Kapila; and the Sāmkhyaśāstra of Kapila is 'samānatantra' or 'sister system' for the followers of the Yogasāstra of Patanjali. Bhāsarvajña then mentions the view of the Tikākāra, to whom he has frequently referred in the discussion on Siddhānta. The Tikākāra holds that the above example (of Sāmkhya and Yoga) for Samānatantra is not appropriate, because it is unwarranted. According to him, the proper example for Samānatantra is this only: the Vaiśeṣika śāstra is 'samāna tantra' or 'sister system' for the Naiyāyikas, and the Nyāyasūstra for the Vaiśeṣikas.

1. See: कस्मारः...समानत्तत्रे कण्प्रत्वते.... परत्रेः व सांत्वाचिश्चायेते.... सांख्यां..... समानत्तत्रे श्रीप पारंत्को योगाचाये.... परत्रेः तु वेशेशीश्चा- दिमले.... — NM (Prameyaprakāraṇa), p. 128

Read: सामान्तशिशिष्याक्तवता निम्नेन्द्र कप्तुमस्त। प्रतिलोकादिशायं छत। यथा मात्रतिकानि हृदयांयार्थित योगानां, अभयतिकानार्थित सांख्यानां छत। — NV, NCG, p.503;

'Yogānam' = Naiyāyikānam - Gopinath Kaviraj - Gleanings from the History And Bibliography of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature, p. 4.

Also Read: समान्तेऽः श्रीप्रत्वतेः। नेयविकानां दिस्यां तत्त्व न्याय-शास्त्राप्रत्वतः श्रीप्रत्वतः श्रीमान्ताचिश्चायेत। — NVTT, NCG, p.503.

Read: अन्नक्षेत्र-वैषयिकाय श्रमिक समान्तत्व वाच्यां भास्त्रित्यांशिकानां कृष्णित। — Parisuddhi, NCG, p.504
However, Bhāsarvajṇa follows neither of the views and gives an altogether different interpretation of the term 'Samaṇatantra'. In his view, the tantra or Sāstra which serves as one common basis for many writers as well as for many teachers and pupils is called Samaṇatantra, one common authority for many. To wit, a house which is common to many is Samaṇa grha (common house), wealth which is common to many is common wealth or Samaṇa dhan. A thing which is accepted in that one common school of thought but which is not accepted at some places or anywhere in a rival school of thought is called pratitantrasiddhānta, the Doctrine peculiar to one philosophy. This clearly suggests that a thing which is not established in one's own philosophy does not become a pratitantrasiddhānta (a doctrine peculiar to one's own school of thought) though it is accepted in a similar philosophy or in a sister system. And it is for this reason that even when such a thing (not accepted in one's own philosophy, though accepted in similar philosophy) is opposed, one is not subject to the charge of Apasiddhānta (giving up one's own accepted view). It is very interesting to note that Bhāsarvajṇa, though being a Naiyāyika refutes certain views accepted in the Vaiśeṣika school. In view of the above interpretation of the term 'Samaṇatantra' he is not subject to the charge of Apasiddhānta in spite of his having repudiated the Vaiśeṣika views.

1. See: न्यायशास्त्र व्याख्यात्वम् कस्माकं वेषणन्दन्त्यं विरोधों न वेषाय। - NyB, p.163
Then, Bhāsarvajña takes up the third kind of siddhānta, quoting the definition given by the author of the Nyāya-sūtra.

It is thus: "That is called 'Doctrine resting on Implication' on the knowledge or acceptance of which depends the knowledge

1. See: यत्सिद्धवार्त्यप्रकरणसिद्धिव: स: अबिक्रियासिद्धांतः।

- NS, 1.1.30;

Read: यत्सिद्धवार्त्यप्रकरणसिद्धिव: कथ्ये कथ्ये कृत्यज्ञनसे, न क्षे विना स: कथ।

- NV, NCG, pp. 504-

Also read: बाक्यार्थसिद्धवार्त्यप्रकरणसिद्धिवतः य: कथ्य: स: अबिक्रियासिद्धांतः

- NV, NCG, p. 504;

See: यत्सिद्धवार्त्यप्रकरणसिद्धिव: कथ्य: कथनसेरें बनानेकर्ता: गत्यसे,

- NVTT, NCG, pp. 504-5
or acceptance of another fact." Explaining this definition, Bhāsarvajñā says that when it so happens that a certain fact having become established or known, or when the establishment or knowledge of a certain fact is implied by virtue of some other fact, the object under discussion is established faultlessly, then the former fact becomes adhikaraṇasiddhānta; the Doctrine resting on Implication; as for example the establishment of the fact that the effects, earth, etc. must have an intelligent creator is faultless only when it is established by virtue of implication that this creator has the attribute of omniscience, etc. It is obvious that one who is devoid of attributes such as omniscience etc. would not be capable of creating effects like Body, Worlds etc. in accordance with the fruition of the actions of living beings. Thus a fact which is ever known as connected with another fact which is to be proved (sādhya) is called adhikaraṇa siddhānta. Thus in order to accept God as the creator we must by the bye necessarily accept that He is omniscient, omnipotent, etc; this latter being the adhikaraṇa-siddhānta. Then Bhāsarvajñā gives an alternative interpretation of the sūtra defining adhikaraṇa siddhānta. The fact to be proved is itself the adhikaraṇa siddhānta. This can be explained as follows: When a fact to be proved (sādhya) is being established, and the establishment of its other particulars result only from the fact that it is being proved, that is to say, when the thing that is to be proved becomes established taking in its stride other
particulars, it is the adhikaraṇa siddhānta. That fact which
is to be proved becomes established only in the company of
those other particulars. Such a fact is called adhikaraṇa
siddhānta. To wit, the knowledge of the fact of Earth etc.
having a creator, includes the knowledge of the fact that he
is omniscient and the like the latter being implied by the
former, and hence the former is adhikaraṇa siddhānta.

1. See: यथा नित्यापदिकायी सुलभमल्लक्षणक्षेरसिद्धिः पतःकुः:
सर्वज्ञत्वादिकायी सिद्धिः साम्याविभाजनां निर्विभा म्वति। न हि
sर्वज्ञत्वादिकायी सिद्धिः प्राणीवक्षणा नुस्ताविना नुनुत्तातिकायी।
उत्पादकेन स्यतः। तवेन साम्याविभाजनां चतः: कर्ति: बाधिकारणसिद्धार्थि
हतिः। बन्ध दात्य: बाधिकारणसिद्धाज्ज्ञ:। कथम्? वस्तु साम्यवस्तु
सिद्धिः क्षेत्राँ क्षेत्राणां तद्विषेण विशेषाणां प्रकरणाग्रतः तत्तावणादेव
सिद्धिः म्वति, च साध्य: कर्ति: तात्र विशेषां गुहेतन्त्रा विद्या:
बाधिकारणसिद्धाज्ज्ञ: हतिः।

NyB, p. 67;

Read: सचच मूरणामृत: विद्वा न्यायाध:। यत्स्रर्ववर्तताम सर्वज्ञतादेव:
विशेषान्त्र सिद्धाः, निर्माय:। सर्वज्ञत्वप्रवति स्थितां विद्वा:
सुर्वज्ञताः। विशेषान्त्र: बाधिकारणहर्ष:। कथम्? वस्तु सर्वज्ञतादेव:
सिद्धिः क्षेत्रै: क्षेत्रां बधिकारणविभाजनाः: सर्वज्ञताः। विपि विशेषाः:
सिद्धिः प्रति अधिकारणसिद्धाज्ज्ञ: हति। तदन पराध्य विपि फलत: न
क्षिप्स्नै: विशेषाः: हति।

Parisuddhi, NCG, p. 505.

Also Read: "In connection with this Sūtra the Parisu-
ddhi adds an interesting note 'Bhūṣāna and other have
Contd. foot note No. 1. (See page : 448)

provided two explanations of this Sūtra : (i) When an object endowed with the quality of omniscience is known, then alone is known the fact of Earth and the rest having a creator; so the former is an Implied Doctrine' and (ii) the knowl-
dge of the fact of Earth & having a creator includes that of the fact that there is an omniscient being, - the latter being implied by the former, and where the former is an Implied Doctrine, The Bhāṣya and its followers have not given this two-fold explanation, as there is not much real difference between the two".

Nyāyasūtras (Gaṅgānātha Jhā) 

p. 60, Foot-note.
Again, Bhāsarvajñā mentions the interpretation given by 'Ṭīkākāra' of this sūtra which describes the adhikarana siddhānta. In this view, the thing signified by the reason is itself the adhikarana siddhānta. As for instance there being the establishment of smoke etc. on the mountain, there is the establishment of fire etc. that are different from smoke, etc. Here smoke or the like is adhikarana siddhānta.

Bhāsarvajñā then quotes the Nyāyasūtra treating the fourth kind of Siddhānta: "When a fact is taken for granted without investigation, and there proceeds the Examination of its particular details, we have a case of Hypothetical Doctrine". According to the view of the Ṭīkākāra that which is to be proved or the probandum is itself the abhyupagama Siddhānta. To wit, Sabda or the like, which is not examined, or not

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1. See: कारीचितामयुणामततत्त्वविशेषपरीक्रणां अभयुणामसिद्धान्तः।

   - NS, 1.1.31;

   Also Read: कारीचिता असमयुणामतत्त्वविशेषपरीक्रणा अभयुणामसिद्धान्तः।
   यत: कृते नौपनिन्देऽस्य शास्त्रे नामायुणामः। स: अभयुणामसिद्धान्तः। यथा नौपनिन्देऽस्य शास्त्रे नामायुणामः।

   - NV, NCG, p.506

   Also Read: सम्भवे वेद योजनयेः, अभयुणामसिद्धान्तः केशे: तत: तद्विशेषपरीक्रणां ख्रियं, तत्तत: विशेषपरीक्रणांस्यां लक्ष्ये अभयुणामसिद्धान्तः।

   - VNTT, NCG, p.508
considered from the point of view of it being non-eternal etc.
is accepted as a thing endowed with an attribute i.e. as the
pakṣa. After accepting Sabda or the like as such, its parti-
culars, such as non-eternality etc. are investigated into.
And such an investigation is abhyupagama siddhānta. That is
to say, Sabda is first accepted as dharmin, an object endowed
with some attribute, without having ascertained it as non
-eternal etc; then it is ascertained as to whether it is
eternal or non-eternal. Such an examination is called abhyu-
pagama siddhānta. This is how the Tikākāra interprets the
sūtra.

Bhāsarvājña then refers to the interpretation of the Bhās-
yakāra. But on perusal of the lines in the Bhāṣya and in the
Vārtika, it seems that the interpretation which is mentioned
here is closer to the vārtika than the Bhāṣya. According to
this view, certain things are investigated into as they are
'heard' (i.e. taught) or enunciated in the sūtras. But a
thing which is not thus 'mentioned and therefore not examined'
is reverse of the thing that is 'enunciated in the sūtra and
examined in due course'. When such a thing that does not essen-
tially belong to one's own school, is qualified by acceptance,
it is called abhyupagama siddhānta; e.g. the Nyāya-sūtra does
not specifically discuss the indriyas, their nature, etc. Never-
theless, all this is acceptable to the Nyāya-system. In short,

1. The text should be परीक्ष्ये, and not परीराख्ये.
   - NyB, p. 67, photostat
2. See next page No.452.
2. Foot Note: (cont. see page: 451)

See: यत्र चिम्बेक कर्तितम कपरिचितस्य क्षत्रपणये, वस्तु द्रव्यं
शुद्ध: ...., द्रव्यस्य सत: निर्मलता नित्यता वा दद्विश्वेषोऽपीतः ये।
- NB on NS 1.1.31;

Also see: कपरिचित: क्षत्रियं।..... कपरिचित: श्रावत्तन्युपायं।
- NCG, p. 506;

Read: सूचकत्व प्रार्या परिस्तिथास्वतं, अन्ने व हिंदौत्तेन
केळित्वमिव हृदित्वता-न्युपायं: प्रमाणाविषकरणां: यहं, तस्मात् केवल
अन्युपायस्यििण्णम्। तु स्वतं योगीनिः, क्षत्रियमुपायाकेलोऽयं: यतः
द्विश्वेषपरिच्छेदां ध्यते तस्माति विशेषपरिध्वेषादाय यत्ते क्षत्रियमुपायं विपि
अन्युपायं दृढ़त्वार्योऽय।
- NVTT, NCG, p. 508;

Also Read: "The Vārtika explains, ' aparīksita' as
'not mentioned in the Sūtras'; but it appears simpler
to take it as meaning 'not investigated.'"

- Gaṅgānātha Jhā,
Nyāya-Sūtras, p. 61. Foot-Note.
acceptance of a thing without any 'investigation' is called abhyupagama siddhānta. This sūtra should be analysed in such a way that it yields this very defining characteristic of abhyupagama siddhānta. One may contend as to why one accepts a thing even though one knows that it does not essentially belong to one's own school. The answer to this is that one accepts something without examination, because one desires to investigate the particulars of that thing. This should be taken as understood, in the above-mentioned Sūtra. It may be asked: 'Is it not possible to investigate into the particulars of the thing in some other way?' The answer: 'Who says so'?

Before we proceed further, it is necessary to refer to the view of the Bhāṣyakāra, which explains the purpose of taking recourse to this kind of Doctrine. 'A dialectician has recourse to this kind of Doctrine with a view to show off the cleverness of his own intellect and through utter disregard for the intellect of others'. Now we come to our topic. In the above discussion, one may answer that investigation into particulars of a thing is possible even otherwise also (- viz.

1. See: स: अयु कश्यपमविभाजन: स्वरुपावतिश्चविलियाप्यणवाय

paraśvājānāya च प्रकटति दिति ! -

- NB on NS, 1.1.31

Also see: तत्त्व युक्तार्क: किन्तु ? परावाण्य: अयुक्तवात:...... ! यथवा: किं तत्त्व प्रतिपादित्वय? का परिज्ञाकानुसार एक अयुक्तवात! ? तदवि

न, अविश्लेषवद्यय: काह्यानस्य अयुक्तवातः ! तत्समां नार्य भूतार्थं ! -

- NV, NCG, pp. 506-7
without taking recourse to the Abhyupagama Siddhānta). But those who wish to show off the cleverness of their own intellect and to show utter disregard for the intellect of others take recourse to this kind of Doctrine, i.e. Abhyupagama Siddhānta. Against the above mentioned purpose, one may contend that it is not proper for a person, who is free from attachment and who is desirous of attaining emancipation, to show off or exhibit the excellence of his own intellect. In answer to this Bhāsarvajña says that this contention is not tenable. For, the Buddhists and others behave in this way (accepting without investigation) only with an eye on wealth, benefit, honour and fame. When with this purpose the Buddhists and others want to refute the rival views, they have to accept certain things without investigation. Such an acceptance becomes their Abhyupagama Siddhānta. If in the debate, the Buddhists and others contradict their accepted view or Abhyupagama Siddhānta, then even a seeker of emancipation does urge the ground of censure, known as Apasiddhānta (i.e. a

1. It may be noted that the text after the words 'kim tu' is missing in the printed edition and is provided here from the photostat:

2. Having taken up one standpoint, if the party carries on the discussion without restriction, it is a case of 'Inconsistency'—Gaṅgānātha Jñāṇa

Compare: तुत्तत्रूि करण्युग्म चित्रां कुले ताः अविकरणकरण्युग्मसिद्धान्तं स्वायूः निरोधेन अपसिद्धान्तं पुरस्ति न तत्त्रायायितविदेन ।

— NyB, p.66
case of Inconsistency. Besides this, the learned are seen to proceed on the lines of abhyupagamaśāda (i.e. discussion based on the abhyupagama siddhānta) in order to show that their own view has the support of different lines of reasoning. For example, when even after accepting the eternality of the Veda its validity is proved on the ground of the validity of an āpta (reliable person), for, we cannot understand the meanings of the Veda, if its words are not explained as yielding their definite significations; thus the exposition of the Veda, even while remaining something that is not the point at issue is meant for the instruction regarding the right meaning. Thus validity of the Veda depends upon something other than the Veda. The Naiyāyikas first accept the Veda as eternal and establish the same on the ground of reasoning (as there has been continuity of tradition of the texts and activity according to them is uninterrupted through all ages, past and future). Again,

1. Compare: मन्नत्राद् बुद्धान्तरं चतुतानागतवशु श्रवायाम्यास्मायो- विचरितः केदानां नित्यत्वम् व आप्तप्रामाण्यात् च प्रामाण्यम्। -

   - NB on NS 2.1.69

2. The text should be अप्राप्यवशोबनम् instead of अप्राप्यवशोबनम्। -

   - NyB, p. 67 photostat,p.29

3. See: यथा केदानां; यथापि स्वास्त्रे श्रवानाशु नानित्यत्वेन प्रतिपादित्वम् बस्ति तथापि प्रज्ञान्यावस्थाः कथं सास्त्रप्राप्ती (शास्त्रकृपात) नित्यत्वम्-परम्य बाप्तप्रामाण्याव्यावह्र प्रामाण्यश्रवानां र्ति यथा शास्त्रेति। कषुपुषाधि-

   - Photostat p.28,foot-note
they examine the particular of the veda, i.e. its trustworthiness and establish that it is due to the trustworthiness of the veracious Expositor. This is an illustration of abhyupagama siddhānta.

The purpose of learned who enter upon discussion on the basis of abhyupagama siddhānta is to keep away from the charge of apasiddhānta. The dialectician remains conscious of what he has accepted, i.e. his Abhyupagama Siddhānta and takes care in the discussion lest he subject himself to the Ground of Censure, known as Apasiddhānta. Only that person, who knows well the different kinds of Doctrine, is capable of avoiding contradiction of his own accepted view and pointing out such a contradiction of the accepted view in the statements of the opponent. Keeping this purpose in view, the Sutrakāra has given an exposition of the kinds of Doctrine. However, the purpose of mentioning siddhānta separately in the Sutra, according to the view of the Bhāsyakāra is as follows: "It is only when there are a number of different theories (siddhāntas), and never otherwise, that the three forms of debate - Discussion, Disputation and Wrangling - become possible".  

1. See: बतु बिषयात्मकेषु वाक्ष्यतपविविधाः प्रकरणे, न कः अच्छथा हेति।  

- NB on NS. 1-1-1
Nature of the Avayavas and Purpose of their Separate Mention in the Sūtra: What is the nature of Avayavas (members of the syllogism) and what is the purpose of mentioning the topic of Avayavas separately in the Nyāyasūtra? Quoting the Nyāyabhāṣya Bhāsarvajñā says that what has been stated by the author of the Bhāṣya in respect of the nature of Avayavas is acceptable to him. The Nyāyabhāṣya runs thus: "When a certain conclusion has to be proved, an aggregate or collection of words (sentences) has to be used; and they can be subdivided into five, viz. statement, etc; and these five taken collectively are what have been called 'Factors' (the seventh category in the first Nyāyasūtra)." The Bhāsyakāra has also pointed out the purpose of mentioning the topic of Avayavas separately in the sūtra. Describing the purpose, the Bhāsyakāra says, "All the means of valid cognition (or forms of valid cognition) are found to be present among these 'Factors'; for instance, the 'statement or proposition' is verbal testimony; 'the statement of the Probans' is inference; 'the statement of the Instance' is perception; 'the statement of the Minor Premiss' or Application (upanaya) is Analogy (Upamāna) and the Reassertion of the conclusion' consists in showing the capability of all the aforesaid means of Valid knowledge to bear upon the same object or purpose. It is this five-fold declaration that constitutes

1. See: NB on NS 1-1-1
the highest form of reasoning; (as it is only when thus stated that the Reasoning succeeds in convincing the unbeliever). It is on the basis of this form of Reasoning again that the three forms of debate (viz. Discussion, Disputation, Wrangling) proceed; they cannot do so without it; and the ascertainment of truth also is dependent on this form of Reasoning. This is acceptable to Bhāsārvajñā in as much as it is not opposed to his own view. But in Bhāsārvajñā's own view, the Sūtrakāra has mentioned the topic of āvayava separately, because he wanted to reiterate the well-known definitions of Pratijñā etc. for the purpose of laying down for the benefit of the misguided that only Pratijñā etc. which are so in the true sense of the term, should be employed; and for the purpose of prohibiting the use of Pratijñabhāsa, etc., which are but semblances of the former.

Tarka: The nature and purpose of tarka have been already discussed. The sūtra defining tarka runs as follows: "When the real character of a thing is not well known, there is put forward, for the purpose of ascertaining that real character, a reasoning (in support of a certain conclusion) which indicates the presence of proof (showing the undesirability or absurdity of a contrary conclusion);—and this is called

1. See: NyB, pp. 19-20; also see chapter 6
2. See: अविचाततत्त्वे कर्म कारणार्थप्पथित: तत्त्वचक्षुनापूर्गः तर्कः। - NS 1.1.40.
cognition". According to some earlier, Ācārya (Pūrgacārya), the term 'avijnātata-tattva' is a bahuvrihi compound and it can be dissolved as follows: A thing, whose real nature, or distinctive quality which is the cause of determining the real nature of that thing, is not well known is 'avijnātata-tattva'. The term 'kāranopapattih' (the putting forward of a reasoning which indicates the presence of proof) is inserted in the definition because there is the possibility of proof which could contradict the conclusion in question; some proof has to be put forth to demonstrate the absurdity of the contrary conclusion. Here Uha is a synonym of 'tarka'. This tarka is put forward for the purpose of ascertaining the real character of a thing; since it discerns the object of the cognition of the true nature of a thing. This is the interpretation of the sutra by a Pūrvacārya.

However, in Bhāsarvajñā's view, the term 'Kāranopapattih' in the sutra stands for the possibility of proof - the possibility of the probandum being present owing to the presence of the probans (Sādhana). On seeing a probans which would divert or be away very rarely from its probandum, a person deliberates, "this thing (probandum) must be there". Such a deliberation in respect of a probandum is Uha. Such a reasoning or

1. See: ॐ विज्ञातं तत्त्वं निर्मितिनिर्मितं विशेषणं यस्य वाच्यस्य स:  अविज्ञातत्त्वं: तत्समं कौँ कारणोपपत्ति: हैति शास्त्रवाचास्थम्बादा जह: तथ्याव्यः: मवति। ।
   ॐ च तत्त्ववाचास्थं: तत्त्ववाचार्यविभाजकनिबंधादि हैति तृत्याव्यः। ।

   - NyB, p.68

(cont...see next page foot-note)
contd...foot note No.1 (see page No.459)

Also Read: विविधात्वत्त्व द्विविधात्वात् द्विविधात्वस्य द्विविधात्वः। उपपत्तिः द्विविधात्वात् द्विविधात्वस्य द्विविधात्वः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्तिः। उपपत्ति
intellectual act may be meant for the purpose of true knowledge through the activity of a man (he can personally verify whether this result of deliberation is correct), or it can be for the safeguarding of true knowledge already attained, through the procedure of Vāda, etc. (tarkā is used in vāda). Tarkā can also be for the origination of the true knowledge of Victory and defeat in a debate. Then Bhāsāravyajña explains how tarkā also helps a man to attain true knowledge. As for example a man proceeds to practise yoga. He deliberates as to the (hitherto) unknown special means of subduing obstacles and as to the (hitherto) unknown special means of securing composure of mind. In this way Uha (or deliberation) is indirectly meant for the realisation of the self. So also even in other spheres, Uha should be considered as leading to true knowledge in respect of one's object or a different object through the activity of man.

Nirṇaya: Now Bhāsāravyajña takes up the topic of nirṇaya (Demonstrated Truth) for discussion. First he quotes the Nyāyasūtra defining nirṇaya, which runs thus: "When there is an ascertainm ent of the real character of the thing after duly

1. See: प्रमाणालंकारनोपाध्य: सिद्धान्ताविषुद्धों पंचायवाप्रमनः: पत्रार्थविपन्नविपिपिहो वादः:। - NS 1-2-1; "Discussion.....in which there is supporting and condemning by means of proofs and reasonings (tarka)....." (Gāṅgānātha Jhā).

2. See: विद्वृत्त पत्रार्थविपन्नविपिपिहो अन्तर्वाचारण निर्यति:।-NS, 1-1-41
deliberating over the two sides of the question - an argument establishing a certain character of a thing which is to be proved and that against this view (i.e., opposed to one's conclusion) - we have what is called 'Demonstrated Truth', 'Nirṇaya'. According to Bhāsarvajña, the term 'Vimṛṣya' in the sūtra means 'having raised a doubt'; because at first doubt is raised in respect of a thing, and then there is the ascertainment regarding the same. What is signified by the term 'Paksā-pratipakṣābhāyām' in the sūtra is as follows:

1. See: पाक्षिकविवेचन साक्ष्य, प्रतिपादकविवेचन दृष्टान्त हैं,

See: स्थापना- साक्ष्य, प्रतिवेचन- उपालम्बः। तत्त्व धार्मिकोपलब्धि
पाक्षिकविवेचनार्थे यथार्थविवेचना स्वभावेन प्रबंधनान्तर्गता उपजेते।

Remember: पाक्षिकुपलब्धि पाक्षिकोपलब्धि विवेचनार्थे उपलब्धः। तत्त्वात्त्विकी प्रबंधनान्तर्गता यथवा
व्याख्याता स निर्णयं है।

Also see: पाक्षिकविवेचनार्थे हैं विवेचनार्थे साक्ष्यन्तर्गतार्थ:।

Read: By 'Pakṣa' and 'Pratipakṣa' here are meant respectively - (1) the argument in favour of a certain conclusion, and (2) the argument against that conclusion. Such is the interpretation by the Bhāṣya, the Vārtika and the Tātparya. But the Nyāyāṣṭra vivaraṇa of Rādhāmohana takes 'pratipakṣa' as the argument against the view opposed to the said conclusion" - Gaṅgānātha Jhā, Nyāyāṣṭra, Foot-note, p. 76
Here pakṣa or thesis means by indication (Lakṣaṇa) 'proving the thesis'; and pratipakṣa or counter-thesis means the refutation of the counter-thesis. But one may ask here as what the purpose behind such a secondary use of the terms is. The answer to this is that such a secondary use of words is meant for the proper division of the spheres of work. The establishment is in respect of the thesis, and the refutation is in respect of the counter-thesis. Had the term 'Sāhanadūṣanābhyaṃ' been used in the definition, it could even be suspected that both have a common object. But what is meant here is that the ascertainment of the true nature of a thing is arrived at by the establishment of one thesis and the refutation of the counter-thesis. Bhāsarvajñā then says that the term 'arthāvadharana', ascertainment of a thing (in the sūtra) is a synonym of 'nirṇaya'.

It may be contended that the term 'vimṛṣya' (having raised a doubt) in the definition is not proper, because it is indeed seen that even in the absence of doubt, a man can come to an ascertainment, which may be either perceptual or inferential in nature, in respect of palm etc. or in respect of fire etc. respectively. The reply to this is that this contention is not justifiable. For, what the sūtrakāra intends to define here in this sūtra is not the ascertainment of ordinary things like palm and fire etc.; but the ascertainment of a super-sensuous thing like Ātman, because the aim of the
Sāstra is to enable a person to attain the highest bliss and this can be attained only through the ascertainment of the true nature of ātman or the like. Hence keeping in view the ascertainment of ātman or the like, the Sutrakāra has defined 'nirnaya' in this manner.

It may be urged that in the case of some, the ascertainment of even ātman or the like can be arrived at through authoritative Utterances (i.e. verbal Testimony) alone or through establishing one's own view by reasoning alone. This being the case, it is not proper to include in the definition the term 'pakṣa-pratipakṣabhāyām' (by the establishment of one thesis and the refutation of the counter-thesis). In answer to this Bhāsarvajña says that the said term in the definition is not irrelevant. For, the composition of Sāstra is meant for those who are by nature inclined to critically investigate into everything, especially because this is Nyāya Śāstra. A man of critical reasoning is entitled to study this Sāstra. And he should be led to a nirnaya, through the process of dispelling difference of opinions. Besides, such an ascertainment cannot be arrived at only by presenting arguments in support of one's own thesis or in support of the counter-thesis; for when there is the possibility of both the thesis and the counter-thesis having reasons to support them, there would be the contingency of the

1. Read: पत्नप्रतिपक्षामयित्वयुक्ताः in place of पत्तप्रतिपक्षाम- मयित्वयुक्ताः। - NyB, p.69; Photostat,p.29
reason (hetu) not being incongruent with what is opposed to its own probandum. Nor could such an ascertainment be reached only by refuting the counter-thesis, for it is obvious that in the absence of any probative reasoning, the thing to be proved (sādhya) can never be established. As a matter of fact, the ascertainment can be arrived at by the establishment of one's own thesis, accompanied by the refutation of ante-thesis, both supported by proofs. This is the reason for the inclusion of the term 'pākṣa-pratipākṣābhyaṁ' in the definition. All this refers to the ascertainment of ātman or the like, especially meant for a man of critical reasoning. But if the śūtra be intended to give the definition of just 'nirnaya' in general; it should be read - 'arthāvadhāraṇām nirnayaḥ, the ascertainment of a thing is nirnaya.'

It may be contended that since ascertainment (nirnaya) is the fruit or outcome of pramāṇa, (source of valid knowledge) it could be taken to have been enunciated just by the enunciation of pramāṇa. Not only nirnaya in general, but also a specific kind of nirnaya, viz. ascertainment in respect of ātman or the like is already implicitly mentioned by the term 'tattvajñāna' in the first śūtra. This being the case, one may urge: What is the purpose of mentioning the topic of nirnaya 1.

1. See: प्रमाण प्रके षय संशयप्रयोगस्य अन्तर्भाबाः च ज्ञात्वविवेकिन्यन्यः तत्त्वाध्याय निर्माणिः।
   - NS 1-1-1;

See: अन्तः लघु प्रमेयस्य तत्त्वाध्याय निर्माणिः।
   - NB on NS 1-1-1
separately in the first śūtra? The answer to this is that by mentioning it separately, the Śūtrakāra seems to instruct us that nīrṇaya or ascertainment of ātman or the like is the cause of the attainment of emancipation, for it is not meant for anything else. The true nature of pramāṇa etc. is described in the Nyāyasūtra, that is to say, their definitions are formulated. And through the ascertainment of definitions of pramāṇa etc.; the true nature of pramāṇa etc. is ascertained, and then through such an ascertainment the true nature of ātman or the like is ascertained. Thus in this order (ascertainment of definitions, then that of Pramāṇa etc. and then of ātman) the true knowledge of pramāṇa etc. is said to be the cause of highest bliss. Even when the ascertainment of pramāṇa or the like amounts to the attainment of true knowledge of pramāṇa etc.; it becomes the cause of emancipation only through the ascertainment of ātman or the like. But the ascertainment of ātman or the like is not thus required to lead to the ascertainment of anything else, before it becomes the cause of emancipation. Thus the ascertainment of ātman or the like being the direct cause of emancipation, its separate mention in the first Nyāyasūtra is but proper. The purpose of thus qualifying or distinguishing true knowledge is to suggest that unlike a śāstra which just preaches, merely true knowledge of ātman, etc. cannot become the cause of emancipation, especially for a man of critical reasoning, but only knowledge which is of the nature of ascertainment can be the cause of emancipation.
Such a knowledge of the nature of ascertain¬ment is brought about by well¬considered positive reasoning, accompanied by the refutation of the counter¬thesis and so remains unshaken.

But the author of the Nyāya¬bhāṣya puts forth the purpose of the mention of nirnaya separately in the śūtra as follows: It (nirnaya) forms the final aim of all Discussion, Vāda (a Discussion results in a nirnaya); and in order to safeguard an ascertain¬ment or well¬determined view (nirnaya), Disputation and Wrangling (Jalpa, Vitanḍa) are employed. It is the categories of Cogitation (tārka) and Demonstrated Truth (nirnaya) that help to carry on all the affairs of the world.

Vāda: The nature of vāda, Jalpa etc. is discussed by Bhāsarvajña, in the second Pariccheda after the elaborate treatment of the five factors of syllogism, Pratijña etc. The purpose of mentioning vāda separately in the first Nyāyasūtra as shown by the author of the Nyāya¬bhāṣya is as follows: "Vāda has been enunciated separately for the purpose of indicating its distinctive features; as it is only when it is carried on

1. See: NyB, p. 329 ff. प्रभातकृत्तिशासनोपालम्: विशेषाण्ताविविधः पञ्चाक्षरकौषाण्डन: पञ्चप्रत्यपातयिज्ञ: वादः। - NS 1-2.1 "Discussion consists in the putting forward (by two persons) of a conception and a counter-conception, in which, there is supporting and condemning by means of proofs and reasonings—neither of which is quite opposed to the main doctrine(or thesis); and both of which are carried on in full accordance with the method of reasoning through the Five Factors" (Gaṅgānāth Jhā)
in accordance with its distinctive characteristics that it leads to the ascertainment of truth. But according to Bha-
sarvajña, the author of the Sūtra re-iterates or refers to the nature of vāda (which is known to the reader) and thus it is stated as something which one who is desirous of attaining true knowledge should resort to and it is forbidden to have gain etc. as its desired end. To this effect, the Nyāyasūtra runs thus:
That (discussion) should be carried on with the pupil, the teacher, companions in study, and other well-known learned persons, who wish well (of the enquirer) and who bear him no malice. Being well-disciplined, says Bhasarvajña, a man should enter into a discussion with those who are endowed with intelligence or understanding of the best order with a view to dispelling his doubts, and confirming what he has ascertained and knowing what he has not yet ascertained. Moreover, in addition to the above attainments, maturity in thinking also can be attained by one who is free from ego through discussion with those who are on a par with him in intelligence and impartial or objective in outlook. And through discussions with persons who are inferior in intelligence, but who are really good, a man may be able to confer the benefit (of right knowledge) on them and the other benefits as shown above may be incidentally

1. गृहर्थिष्ठानुपलयानाथयुपलिपितेः व्यवहारः तत्त्वज्ञानार्थमववितः
   - NB 1.1.1.
   Read: उपपत्त्वां भानु …… उपलिपितेः भानुनिर्णयानाग्रुप्तिः
   तत्त्वज्ञानायमववितः मवविति उपपत्ते।
   - Bhāsyacandra by Raghūttama, Nyāyadarsana, p. 35
attained even by him. Now, as regards the topics of Jalpa (Disputation) and Vītamā (Wrangling) that follows 'Vāda', the author of the Nyāya-sūtra has said - "Disputation and Wrangling should be carried on for the purpose of defending one's own determination to get at the truth; just as the hedge of thorny branches is put up for the protection of sprouting seeds."

Hetvābhāsa, Chala, Jāti, Nisākrathastra: The purpose of mentioning Hetvābhāsa etc. separately in the sutra is to show what they are; as it is only when the real character of these has been shown that these could be avoided by one in his own assertions and urged with force in respect of the assertions of others. The author of the Nyāya-sūtra reiterates the definitions of fallacious reason etc. (which have been incorporated under the exposition of pramāṇa etc; or vāda, jalpa, - vītamā), and thus he asserts what could be called a hetvābhāsa or the like and denies this name to what is not such, especially keeping in view one who has misgivings as to what its nature is and what its nature is not.

1. See: तत्त्वाध्यक्षवाचयामर्जनानाथे विख्यातिपदे बीजपर्दशेषरत्नालंकृतम् अन्तःकरणावरणवाल | - NS, 4.2.50

2. This topic of Disputation and Wrangling is discussed by Bhasarvajña later on.
Now a question may arise as to why fallacious reasons are mentioned separately in the Nyāyasūtra, though they are included in the Nigrahasthāṇa (Clinchers). It is said in the Bhāṣya: "Fallacious Reasons are in fact included among the Clinchers (the sixteenth category); but they have been enunciated separately, because from among the 'Clinchers', it is these that can be urged in Discussions". Rejecting this view, Bhāsarvajña says that this is not proper; because the invariable concomitance between the separate mention and the character of being urged or put forward in Vāda, is not possible in either way. For if all those that are mentioned separately from nigrahasthāṇa are fit to be urged in a Vāda, then there would arise the contingency of doubt etc. also being ones that are fit to be objected in a vāda for Doubt etc. also are mentioned separately from nigrahasthāṇa. On the other hand, if we set forth the vyāpti - "All those topics which should be urged in a vāda, are mentioned separately from nigrahasthāṇa", - then also it would involve the fault of inconclusive reason for, Apasiddhānata etc. which are varieties of nigrahasthāṇa are

1. See: हेत्तामासाश्व निग्रहस्थानानि! -
   - NB on NS 5.2.25

2. See: यस्मात् किले वादे चौद्धे अध्यात्म: पृथ्वी उपविस्थि ति हि न, उभयथा श्रीम अन्नकाट्यात् । न वादे चौद्धीयत्वं पृथ्वीपदेशसिनामानि, पृथ्वीपदेशः वा वादे चौद्धीयत्वाचिनामाधीति! -
   - NV, NCG, p. 19
not mentioned separately from nigrahamāna though they are fit to be urged in a vāda.

Some seek to remove this difficulty by saying that those (hetvābhāsas) which though they are included in nigrahamāna, are mentioned separately from nigrahamāna should be urged in a vāda, just like casuistry etc. But Bhāsarvajña does not endorse this view. He says that in the above view the purpose of mentioning hetvābhāsas etc. separately has not been stated at all. If a person regards even chala (casuistry) and jāti (Futile Rejoinder) as being nigrahamāna, he must explain the purpose of mentioning all the three, namely, hetvābhāsa, chala and jāti; separately from nigrahamāna. But this has not been done in the above view. Moreover, the characteristic of being fit to be urged in a vāda does not constitute a sufficient ground for the separate mention of hetvābhāsas. For, though Apasiddhānta or the like is fit to be urged in a Vāda, yet it has been not mentioned separately from nigrahamāna. Apasiddhānta or the like can properly be urged even while it is not separately mentioned in the sūtra. So thinking on this

1. See: जल्पे निग्रहस्यानविनियोगादिवादेत तत्त्रत्त्विषेषः। प्रतिष्ठेये कस्य-चित्त अष्टुनानाथयेऽविदिष्यादिविद्य: हर्दवं ववनम्। 'सिद्धान्तस्य अष्टुनानाथयेऽविद्यादिविद्य: ' (१-२-६) हति हेतुवाभासय निग्रहस्यान्त्य अष्टुनानाथयेऽवादे। 'पण्डितस्यायपनः' हति 'किन्नकु अन्यळ्ये अथि कव्यवेष न्युनं' (५-२-१२), 'कृतहरणार्यात्मकः अभिकुम्' (६-२-११) हति व-स्त्तयः अष्टुनानाथयेऽवि हर्दवं। -

- NB on NS 1-2-1
line we find that no purpose is served by the separate mention of hetvābhāśas.

According to Bhāsarvajña the author of the Nyāya-sūtra has mentioned the topic of hetvābhāsa separately, since he wants us to have a detailed knowledge of its varieties and so give an elaborate exposition of the varieties of hetvābhāsa through a detailed discussion of their particular definitions. For Pratijnāhāni (violating the Proposition) etc., which are not mentioned separately from nigrahamānā, do not have such sub-varieties and so do not require to be so elaborately discussed as 'hetvābhāsa'. And if a person comprehends properly the different varieties of hetvābhāsas, only then he attains special skill and cleverness, enhancing his fitness to be a debater - one putting forth inferences (and not just a wrangler or sophist trying to trap and expose his opponent). If even chala and jāti are taken as included in nigrahamānā, the purpose of their separate mention could be only what has been shown in the case of hetvābhāsa.