The Concept of Karana.

The Concept of Karana or Sadhana: In this chapter we shall discuss what is signified by the term 'Karana' or 'Sadhana' of right knowledge. We shall see how Bhasarvajña has refuted the opponents views regarding the concept of karana and established his own view in this regard.

The Purpose of the term 'Sadhana' employed in the general definition of pramāṇa: In the Nyāyasāra, Bhasarvajña says that the term 'sādhana' is introduced in the definition of pramāṇa in order to exclude knower (pramāṇa) and the object to be known (prameya) as well as in order to show the distinction of pramāṇa as sādhana (means) from phala (the knowledge resulting from pramāṇa). If the definition be - Samyak anubhavaḥ pramāṇam (right apprehension is pramāṇa), it would apply to phala also, because the phala that results (from the complex) is right apprehension. If the definition were Samyak anubhava-Kāram pramāṇam (the cause of right apprehension is pramāṇa), then it would apply to pramāṇa and prameya also, as they also are kāraṇas or causes of right apprehension.

1. See: सम्यक् अनुभवान् प्रमाणम्—NyS, NyB, p. 11
2. See: प्रमात्त्वमश्च साधनं फलात्म अनुभवान् प्राप्त्वम्—NyS, NyB, p. 44.
It may be urged, says Bhasarvajña in the Nyāyabhusāna, as to how this much meaning could be understood by the term 'sādhana' which is not qualified by any epithet. The answer to this is that a kāraka (active agency) can be accepted as desired ( - here karana-Kāraka), and the term 'Sādhana' is thus qualified so it cannot be said to be an unqualified expression. Grammarians accept that any kāraka may be accepted as required ( kartrkāraka etc.). This word 'sādhana'

1. किविविदः कारकाणि भवन्ति हत्यन्वेः। यथा मूलपिण्डः घट्टं करोति। मूलपिण्डमािािपि घट्टं करोति। - NyB, p. 46
See: यथं व सति न ब्रव्यपातः कारकस स ब्रव्यमात्रम् किं तिहि? किविविदः किविविशेषायुक्तं कारकस। -

NB on NS 2-1-16; "From all this it is clear that 'kāraka', 'case-relation' ( or 'active agency') is a name given, not to the mere substance nor to the mere action, but to that which, while being endowed with a particular action of its own, becomes the means of the accomplishment of the other (principal) action." Gaṅgānātha Jhā - Gautama's Nyāyasūtras, Poona 1939

Also See: "Kāraka - is the relation between the noun and the verb in sentence. The meaning is derived from the etymology of the word kāraka, which is explained in two ways - kriyām karoti iti, Kriyām anveti iti Vā Kārakam; that which creates or is related to an action is called Kāraka." - Vaiyākaraṇasiddhānta-kāṣumādi, ed. by M.Y. Mahashabdi, Notes pp. 61, 62, Bombay, 1955.
('sadhyate anena' - that by means of which something is accomplished) signifies the karana that is intended here. So how could it express pramāta, prameya which are agent and object respectively and fruit which is produced by the Karana (sadhana)? A cause par excellence is karana. Many causes contribute to bring about an effect, but among them the cause that is the most efficient in bringing about the effect is the karana. Though karma etc. are kārakas, they are not the most efficient (Sādhakatama) in accomplishing the action.

But it may be asked as to what is meant here by the term Sādhakatama (most efficient). Bhāsarvajña puts forth conflicting views regarding the significance of the term Sādhakatama as held by the Mīmāṁsaka, the Vaiyākaraṇa, the Buddhist and others and refutes them one by one before he establishes his own view. First he takes up the view of the Mīmāṁsaka for discussion.

1. The text should be विविधविज्ञानप्राप्तिमत्वादि and not 'विविधविज्ञानप्राप्तिमत्वादि', 'Photostat, p. 18.
2. The text should be कारणानयम् instead of कारणानयस्. See: Photostat, p. 18.
3. See: साधकतमानि वि करणाः। - NyB, p. 44.
   Compare: साधकतमः करणाः। (पाञ्जु ०१-४-४२) क्रियाशिष्याः प्रकृतिप्रकारः करणस्य स्यात्। तद्भविषयं किम्। यद्याध्यायान्तरः फलनिष्ठाचिवः।
   लहु क्रेत्तस्। - Vaiyākaraṇasiddhānta-Kaumudi (Kāraka prakaraṇa).
   Also read: साधकतार्थं पुष्चक्ति-कः पुनरिति। उपर्युपायवस्य मावामाय्रोऽऽ
   प्रणाया: कार्यस्य तद्भवं मावामाकवता साधकतार्थः। -NVT NCG p.37.
Mimamsaka's view: The followers of Kumārila Bhatta hold that the operation of the agent (kārtr-vyāpāra) which is produced jointly by all the kārakas, is the most efficient cause (sādhakatama) for bringing about an effect. That is to say, all the kārakas become operative and serve their purpose by generating activity in the agent. Thus they have done what they were expected to do viz. made the agent operative. They have nothing more to do. On the other hand, the operation of the agent has not served its purpose (even when other kārakas have done so) until the effect is brought about by the operation of the agent. Secondly, the operation of the agent immediately produces the action. Because of these two factors the operation of the agent is the most efficient cause or is sādhakatama. Moreover the agent also does not

1. See: तदा शान्त फलं तव व्यापारस्त्रि प्रभावात।
   व्यापारों न तदा तेषां तदा नोत्पल्ले फलं ॥
   कर्तर्व्यापारस्त्रि सहस्ते किङ्क्ष्या विषयान्त:।
   ततार्थस्तत्र विषाणं न भिन्नविषयं तत: ॥
   प्रकृष्टसाधनव्यापारस्त्रि प्रत्यास्वें: स एव न: ।
   कर्मणं तेन नान्ये कार्येऽस्मि स्यान्त प्रभावात:॥

Slokavārtika 4-61,67,68, ed. by S.K. Ramanatia Sastri, Madras 1940.

Also See: "आत्मनःस्योऽविशेषा विधानम: उपयोरस्त्रि आत्मानिकत्वात् नालि
   विषयमेव:। ततार्थस्तत्र:। (Bhattombeka's Tatparyatika), p. 136.

2. सवीक्षणं िरू कार्यार्थि ब्यापाराणि मूलता कार्यं व कार्यं जानित्वा
   वैधितायानि वर्णितति कूटव्यापारस्थि व वैधितायात्वात्।

   - NyB, p. 41;

See: प्रभावात: सिद्धमुः हर्म्यादि, सिद्धमुः व तत्सत्त्विक्षणार्थि व्यापारस्थि
   उत्पादनव: वा कार्ये एव वैधित्यायं। कर्मणं तु हर्म्यादि तत्सत्त्विक्षणार्थि
   वा नान्ये वैधितायायं हति सावधानुष्माणं एव फले व्याप्रिति।

   - NVTT,NCg,p.3t.
depend upon the operation of other karakas, while he operates to bring about the action. Hence the agent also is said to be independent (svatantra). On the other hand, if it be held that all karakas conjointly generate the action, then the operations of all of them bring equal in respect of the production of the action it would be impossible to ascertain what the meaning of 'sādhakatama' is and what the meaning of 'svatantra' (independent) is. This view that admits the totality of causes (sāmagri karana vādā) goes against all schools of grammar. It is because of this that the operation of the agent is regarded as the most efficient cause or prāmaṇa. That operation of the knower resides in the knower who is of the nature

1. See: पर्ववादिकृष्ट उपयोग-निपातनादिविश्वेत्र व व्यापारीय स्वचालन प्रतिपथमना: कारणमिति व्याहृति । ......../... 

2. See: स्वतन्त्रया करणवेदं त्वा करणावलिती । न; न; सामाज्यायं पश्चात्त्वम्: हृति, किं तु दीपेन पश्चात्त्वम्: वच्चुर्यं निरी चाम्बले इत्यादि, तत्स्याः न सामाज्य अवर्तमान व न प्रनाणार्थ हृति । ........ वक्रेचं हि - यत् स्व गतकरणार्थ कारणावलिती त्वा कारणायं प्रमाणाः, तत् एव सामाज्याः: प्रणाणात्त्वम् युक्तस्, तद्विषित्वेत्रं कारणावलिती त्वा कारणायं प्रमाणाः; तत् एव कस्मवशे धारणे कारणावलिती त्वा कारणायं प्रमाणाः, न चालिसयं कारणावलिती त्वा कारणायं प्रमाणाः, तत्र व्यभिचारवस्तु वस्तुः: -

3. See: नि एव व्यक्तार्येन भवन्ति लेखिका: सामाज्यायं पश्चात्त्वम्: हृति, किं तु दीपेन पश्चात्त्वम्: वच्चुर्यं निरी चाम्बले इत्यादि, तत्स्याः न सामाज्य अवर्तमान व न प्रनाणार्थ हृति । ........ वक्रेचं हि - यत् स्व गतकरणार्थ कारणावलिती त्वा कारणायं प्रमाणाः, तत् एव सामाज्याः: प्रणाणात्त्वम् युक्तस्, तद्विषित्वेत्रं कारणावलिती त्वा कारणायं प्रमाणाः; तत् एव कस्मवशे धारणे कारणावलिती त्वा कारणायं प्रमाणाः, न चालिसयं कारणावलिती त्वा कारणायं प्रमाणाः, तत्र व्यभिचारवस्तु वस्तुः: -

-NM, p.12.
of consciousness as identical with and is therefore of the nature of intelligence (bodhatmakāḥ jñātryāyopārahāḥ). Such an operation of the knower is saḍhakatama or pramāṇa (a means of right knowledge).

Refutation of the Mīmāṃsā-View: The above view is not proper according to Bhāsavajñā. In this view, the operation of the knower is regarded as residing in the knower as identical with it. Hence when the operation is produced, the knower also must be admitted as being produced, since both are identical. Or we can say, when the knower is not produced, the operation of the knower also would have to be admitted as not produced. But if it be said that the operation of the knower is produced, then the identity between the two would be contradicted. They would have to be accepted as separate entities like ether and water. If in order to escape from this difficulty it is admitted that the operation of the knower is eternal, then there would be the non-cessation of the action.

It may be mentioned in passing here that explaining the statement in the Prasastapādabhāṣya to the effect that qualities, buddhi and the like are apprehended by the mind, Śrīdhara refutes the Mīmāṃsā view that buddhi is inferred from the cognition of objects, as it is the cause of the cognition of objects, being of the shape of the operation of the cognizer. In this context Śrīdhara has repudiated the Mīmāṃsā view that the
operation of the cogniser is the cause of the cognition of objects.

It may be urged that what is meant by the word 'tādātmya' is difference-cum-non-difference. This is not tenable, says Bhāsarvajñā. It is not proper to say that the operation of the knower and the knower are different and non-different simultaneously as this amounts to the acceptance of the doctrine of non-absolutism (anekāntapakṣa) held by the Jaina thinkers. (This has been refuted by Bhāsarvajñā in the third pariccheda of the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa.) If it be argued that the operation is

1. See: बुद्धिः सुकु ल दृश्यादेशप्रवचनं: तु अन्तःकरणार्क्यः।

Also read: यः क्षिप्ता कि विज्ञानक्वचनातुपयं आनुभविता सः कर्ति

2. यदि य स एव कारणः कर्ताः स एव तत्त्वलोपनुपति हत्ययम् एकान्तः स्वातः।

different from the knower; then one may ask as follows:

(i) Is that operation of the nature of movement?
(ii) Or is it of the nature of non-movement?
(iii) Or is it the final auxiliary cause (antimasahakāribhuta)?

Now, if the operation of the agent is admitted as of the nature of movement, then motionless entities (like ātman or the like) would never become causes in as much as they are devoid of movement. If the operation (vyāpāra) is admitted as of the nature of non-movement, then a question is raised — is it the cause of the effect or not? If it is not the cause, what is the use of such an inefficient thing to the Kāraka (agent)? And if it is admitted to be doing something then a further question may be raised — is this operation (vyāpāra) dependent on some other operation or not? If it is admitted that the operation of the agent requires another operation to bring about the (main) action, then the second operation would require a third and so on and on, and this would involve the contingency of infinite series. If the second alternative, viz. the operation of the agent does not require any further operation is accepted then such an operation comes to be one without operation. And if such an operationless operation is accepted as capable of producing an effect, then one can very well admit that kārakas (Kartrākara-ka etc.) also, though being devoid of operation are capable
of producing the effect. Then why should we bring in the supernumerary operation of the agent when there is no proof for it?

Moreover, that substratum in which the operation is produced must be accepted as its samavāyi-kāraṇa (Kriyākriyāvat), as substance is regarded as inherent cause in respect of quality. Thus a kāraṇa becomes the substratum of this operation or its samavāyi-kāraṇa (material cause). A potter who revolves the wheel while making a pot is one such kāraṇa. Here a question may be asked – Does the kāraṇa (i.e., a potter) first associate himself with vyāpāra and then do his vyāpāra (i.e., the revolving of the wheel)? Or does he do so without having associated himself, with vyāpāra? If the first alternative is accepted, then the vyāpāra is bound to be exhausted owing to the contingency of the series of operations. To wit, in order to be endowed with vyāpāra, the kāraṇa (i.e., potter) must first be endowed with vyāpāra,

1. स (व्यापार:) चलनात्मकः अवकलनात्मकः वा अतिमकसहकारितिः: वा क्षति ?
   चलनात्मकत्वं निष्क्षात्ता निव्यापारत्वेन कारणत्वं न स्यात् । कथ
   अवकलनात्मकः स: कायित्वं वा न वा ? यदि कहितुः तदा कि लेन अवकलन-
   रेणा कारकस्य । कथ कहितुः कितितु व स कि व्यापारान्तरापेतोः वा न
   अवकलनात्मकत्वेन प्रभृतिः स्स्मान वणोछानि स भूतानि अवकलनात्मकत्
   वा ? व्यापारान्तरापेक्षात्प्राप्तः अवस्था प्रतत्त्वः स्यात् । कथ
   निव्यापारः, तदा कारकाणि किन्तु निव्यापाराणि एव कार्यकर्षण्ति,
   न व्यापारः कल्मन्यः, तस्य निव्यापाराणांतः।

-NyB, pp. 44-45
and in order to be endowed with this vyāpāra, he must still earlier be endowed with vyāpāra, and so an infinitely. If at any stage he is not endowed with vyāpāra, the next vyāpāra would not arise, and so he would be not be able to bring about the effect. If the second alternative, viz. the kāraka (i.e. potter) remains himself operationless but does the operation of revolving the wheel; then he could bring about the effect even while being vyāpāra-less, and it would be meaningless to imagine vyāpāra-less. Therefore the view of the Mīmāṃsakas that the operation of agent is the most efficient instrument bringing about the effect cannot be maintained. Hence the statement of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, that all the kārakas first become agents (kartr) in the production of their own actions and they become karma, karana etc. in respect of the origination of the main action - is also refuted by this. For, the view that kārakas become agents in respect of the production of their own actions

1. 'सवर्णिण नारायण स्वभ्रवतार्याः कृत्तिणा, प्रभानक्ष्यत्स्वर्णा व वक्तराणाविद्वृत्तार्याः पुनर्नितिः, तत्त्वप्रक्षिराच्छयेत् । - NyB, p.45;
 cp. वर्णार्थकाणां चावान्तर्भ्रवताः कृत्तिणा प्रतिप्रभान्ताः प्रधानस्क्यतसु क्षार्दिकिम्: जाते । - Tantravārtika, p.377

Also cp. निष्पर्भवते कृत्तिणा सवर्णाविन्दित्वानि । त्यायामेयापि अद्यतनार्थाया करणार्दिकित्वमसंविद्: । - Vākyapadīya of Śrī Bhartrihari, 3-7-8, p.80 ed. by Prof. K.V.Abhyankar and Acarya V.P. Limaye, Poona, 1965
and then they are called karma, karana, etc. in respect of
the production of the main action involves the fault of in­
nite series, as shown above. Besides, this view is not proper
for this reason also that there is no proof to assert that
there exists any action over and above the action that is
produced conjointly by more than one kāraka; e. g. the ax-
which serves as an instrument, does not have its own action
in addition to the main action, viz. the cutting of the wood;
since a sole kāraka cannot generate any action. It is, there­
fore, established that the operation of the agent is neither
of the nature of movement nor of the nature of non-movement.

Now, Bhāsarvajña takes up the third alternative for
refutation. Nor could it be said that the operation or
vyāpāra signifies the final accessory cause. For it could
not possibly have another 'final', which could serve as its
vyāpāra, and so would be devoid of vyāpāra, and therefore there
would be the contingency of its not being a cause at all. Hence
Hence as a matter of fact, there does not exist any vyāpāra
belonging to kāarakas, which is distinct from their being
mutually accessory. Consequently it is reasonable to explain
the cognition of an object as produced by sense-organ, etc.
alone; and not by the operation (vyāpāra) of the agent, as
claimed by the Mīmāṁsaka.

1. See: अथ मिन्ने एव व्यापारः व दि नः कलनन्तपः कलनन्तपः वा
अन्तिमसहकारितः वा श्चति । - NyÉ pp. 44–45
It may be argued that the vyāpāra of the cogniser is established by means of Arthāpatti as karāṇa, since the means of cognition of an object cannot be explained in any other way. In answer to this Bhāsarvajña says that the means of Arthāpatti (Postulation) loses its force (i.e. it is exhausted) and so it cannot establish the vyāpāra of the cogniser as karāṇa. For the sense-organ etc. can be established as a means of cognition. So it is unnecessary to postulate the operation of the knower as a means of cognition. Further, the words 'samvitti', 'pramiti' etc. do not convey any meaning other than 'bodha' or cognition; so that the sense-organ etc.; though they are generative of the cognition of objects, could not be the manifestors of objects because they are insentient by nature. Nor can we apprehend by pramāṇa (source of knowledge) any attribute of an object, such as illumination (prakāśa) or revelation (manifestation), which is different from its cognition or different from the lustre of light (tejāḥprabhā); so that this so-called revelation which is supposed to be different from cognition of an object should require us to hypostatise buddhi (the vyāpāra of the cogniser which is identical with consciousness) in order to...

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1. See: दीर्घ ज्ञात्वायपार्य प्रति अर्थापिति: । - NyB, p.45; The Sāбарabhāṣya defines Arthāpatti as this -

अर्थापिति: दृष्ट: खुल: वा अर्थ: वन्यवा नोपपचले वर्ति कृतिस्म्यन्त: । -

- Sābarabhāṣya, l.1.5.
explain it, for it could not otherwise be explained. Therefore, the buddhi or the cogniser’s vyāpāra alone is not karāṇa, since it itself cannot be established and since it (buddhi) cannot bring about the fruit (in the shape of the cognition of objects). Therefore, it is concluded that buddhi or the cogniser’s vyāpāra is not karāṇa or sādhakatāma (most efficient cause) in the productions of the cognition.

The concept of ‘karāṇa’ according to the Grammarians: Others are of the opinion that according to the speaker’s desire kārakas can be designated as kartrkāraka, karmakāraka etc. So the word, and not the object denoted by it, is regulated by the different attributes, e.g. kartrtvā, karmatvā etc; as desired by the speaker. As for example, the axe, which is generally regarded as karāṇa, may be designated as kartr by the speaker, if he so desires. *The axe is cutting the tree.* So the attribute of being a karāṇa does not reside in an object. When a person desires to express the accomplishment of effect as taking place immediately after the operation of a thing, that thing is called karāṇa. In order to elucidate

1: See: शब्दे नियमो, न तु कस्तुनि !
कृत्येश्विवचारायं शब्दां वा कस्तु प्रतीयते ॥
कियाया: परिनिष्ठायथावधायारावनचाः ॥
विवस्यः यदा, तत्करणाच तदा स्मृतम् ॥
-Vākyapādiya 3.7-103, 90,
ed. by Prof. K.V. Abhyankara And Ācārya, V.P. Limaye,
this view, Bhāsarvajñā has given some instances. A clod of earth (mrtpinda) generates a pot (kartr̥karaka); having attained a clod of earth a pot comes to be (karmakāraka); by means of a clod of earth, the potter makes a pot (karaṇakāraka); a pot is produced from a lump of clay (apādānakāraka), a pot is a modification of a clod of earth (sesē-śaṣṭhī), a pot is produced in a clod of earth (adhnikaraṇakāraka).

Refutation of the Grammarians' view: Grammarians should be asked a question as to whether a thing, though it is not a kāraka, becomes kāraka by the will of the speaker, or because a thing has the capacity to be a kāraka, the word denoting that kāraka is used as desired by the speaker, in respect of that thing. If the first alternative is conceded, then in the production of a pot, a clod of earth may become the sampradāna kāraka (dative, i.e. mrtpindaya) and the potter may become the karana kāraka also (instrumental, i.e. Kulālena), - which is absurd. Besides, there will not be

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1. See: मृत्तिक्षितः घट्ट रातीति; मृत्तिक्षीत्वा घट्ट: मवति मृत्तिक्षितव घट्ट
कुलालः करीति; मृत्तिक्षाहृ घट्ट: मवति, मृत्तिक्षाश्व घट्ट: विकारः;
मृत्तिक्षि घट उत्पाधे होति। - NyB,p.46

2. Here it may be noted that sesē śaṣṭhī is not a kāraka, as it ordinarily expresses a relation of two nouns to each other, but not the relation of a noun and verb.

3. मृत्तिक्षाश्व कुलालेन घट्ट करीति।
- Which is absurd.
the possibility of any error arising from the wrong use of
the kāraka, since there is nothing to ward off the will of
the speaker that is free to designate a thing as any kāraka
anywhere.

If the second alternative is accepted, some cause deter-
mining the difference in the kārakas, viz. some difference of
nature of the respective kārakas, should be mentioned, so that
the words denoting kārtākāraka etc. could be included in the
specific definition just as in a weighing-scale a material of
certain definite proportion is put against some specific
(measured) weight. Thus it is concluded that a thing cannot
be declared as karaṇa (sādhakatama) only by virtue of the
will of a speaker.

Buddhist's view regarding the concept of karaṇa: Now
Bhāsarvaśaṇa puts forth the view of the Buddhist, especially
that of Dharmakīrti and elaborately repudiates it with all his
might. The Buddhists hold that with respect to the act of
knowing, the shape of the object, alone, which is present
in the cognition is the karaṇa, i.e. special instrument. Accor-
dingly it is declared by Dharmakīrti in his Pramāṇa-vārtika:

1. See: अस्मै घट्ययेनां न रिमुष्ट्यार्थविकारपरस्पराम् ।
वषयः स्वभावं व्यवस्थितप्रेक्षापरिधिकेयं कार्यत ॥
तस्मात् प्रक्ष्यार्थकोऽपि: प्रमाणं वेष्यपताः ।
सांवेष्यायं तत् कर्मसंयुक्ताः न प्रशस्ताः।
Pramāṇavārtika, 3-306,307, ed. by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana,
Patna; 1953

Also see: तदाकार्यं गर्भं स्वयंन्यस्त व्यवस्थितप्रेक्षापरिधिकेयं।
नीतिमति पीतं हेतुः।...
तदाकार्यं वेष्यपताः वर्णविषयेन प्रक्ष्यार्थकं
तस्मात् वेष्यपतां व्यवस्थितां तथा ज्ञातं व्यवस्थितं
श्लोकमपि कौशिके व्यवस्थितां सवेदन्स्यं वेष्यपतां
श्लोकान्तो तदाकार्यं खास्व रस्सियां।
नान्यं स्वभावं: मेक्षः: विज्ञानस्य
अस्मै घट्ययेनां।
Prajñākaragupta's Pramāṇavārtikabhashya, Ibid. pp.342-43#
There is nothing except the shape of the object to be known that is taken by the consciousness that can connect the cognition (pramiti) with the object. Therefore the shape of the object to be known, as possessed by knowledge, is pramāna (a means of the cognition) for an object to be known. That is to say, the fact that knowledge takes the shape of an object relates the cognition with its object. For example, only when my knowledge takes the shape of a table, does the cognition arise - 'There is a table'. Hence, the taking the shape of an object by knowledge is a kāraṇa. According to the Buddhist, it is not proper to say that only because a thing has in one case served as a means to bring about an effect, it is a means in respect of any effect whatsoever. But, as a matter of fact, a thing from which the effect is brought about is a means in respect of that effect.

1. See: क्रियासाधनमित्येव सर्वं सर्विस्य कारणः ॥
   साधनं न हि तदु तस्यः साधनं या क्रिया यतः ॥

   PV, 3.302

Also see: यदि एक्षः दृष्टिकारणमपि साधनांप-प-कल्प्यते यथा क्षणिः साधनस्योपयोगादानात् सक्षमनीविश्वसाधनमिति सर्वं जया
   विवाहानेन सूक्ष्मेण स्वातः ॥ न केवल ॥ करो या क्रिया यतो दृष्टा तदेव
   तत्र साधनं नापरस् ॥

   PV B on it.
Knowledge is of the same nature in view of its being pure consciousness. That is to say, knowledge, as pure consciousness, is one and the same. There is no difference in it. But whereever such a knowledge has something as its object, it (knowledge) must be of that nature (i.e. 'of the nature of that object'), so that the knowledge or the cognition in respect of each object could be distinguished, such as, 'this cognition is of this (blue), this cognition is of that (yellow). Unless knowledge becomes of the shape of its object, the difference could not be possible in knowledge which as pure consciousness is one and the same. Now, the question may arise as to how the difference is created in the knowledge; the cognition of the blue, is something different from cognition of yellow. What is that factor which creates difference in the knowledge? Against the Buddhist view, one may argue that the difference which lies in the causes like the contact of the sense-organ with the object, etc. distinctly determines the cognition- 'This cognition is of the blue.' The difference that lies in the sense-organs, etc. consists in their being endowed with operation or the like (e.g. when the sense-organs function and come in contact with the object, the

1. See: तत्तारूपवाणिः ज्ञानस्य वृद्धार्थं।
   भावं वेदार्थनां देव प्रक्षिप्तम् विषेष्यते॥ -
   -पु.3.303
See: तस्मात् कस्य शून्यस्य भून्यस्य भावस्य तेन बाल्यना, देव
   कर्मद्यप्रतिविमागः नीलमिद्य पीतमित्वादिविद्रः॥
   -पु.3.334
(Rāhula Śāṅkṛtyāyana), Patna, 1953.
cognition arises). But rejecting this view, the Buddhist asserts that though there exists the difference in the causes like sense-object contact, etc., it cannot determine the difference in knowledge which is of the nature of non-difference (abhinnatmanah), inasmuch as that difference (which lies in the contact, etc.) is not the essential nature or self of the knowledge. It is obvious that in order to create difference in knowledge, the differentiating factor must belong to knowledge alone. When there are different cognitions - 'there is a jar', 'there is a cloth', the difference does take place in the cognitions, but it is not due to the difference in the causes like the contact of sense-organ with object. And what is signified by karaṇa is to become the special cause of the action.

1. कारात्मकाः पेदेड्यस्य विचारानात: पिन्नेष्वर।
विन्ने कर्मीभिन्नस्य न चेदेन नियामकः।।
हेतुपूर्वे विन्दुव्यविद्यु: पेदे: विशेषः सम्बन्धार्यातादिकारणः;
विचारण: अपि, भवत्य ज्ञानस्य अनुभवमालकत्वा अभिन्नस्य,
विन्ने कर्म्यं वीलादिः श्राहते, पेदेन नियामकः नुक्तः।।
कर्त्सनानु इत्यादि - कारात्मकाः ज्ञान-अज्ञातपत्रातः हृद्यस्य
विशेषः प्रतिक्रियाः न हेतुपूर्वः कारणः।।

2. क्षेमनिवन्नत्वाः कर्णात्वकः।।
- NyŚ, p.47
That is to say, creating difference in knowledge or giving rise to particular cognitions is the action (kriya) here. And that instrument alone, which can accomplish this action deserves to be the karana. In consonance with this definition of karana, the contact of the sense-organ with the object cannot be called a karana. It is the taking the shape of the object by knowledge that creates difference in knowledge, that is, to say, gives rise to a particular cognition; and not the contact of the sense-organ with the object, etc. Hence the former, and not the latter is karana.

Moreover, when there is no difference in the shape of the objects, in knowledge, it would not be possible to differentiate the individual cognitions - 'there is a jar', 'there is a cloth'. The difference may be there in respect of the sense-organ-object contact, but this cannot differentiate the individual cognitions - or it cannot become the cause of the determining of objects - since it is not a part and parcel of the knowledge. According to the Buddhist's view, the difference in the moments of consciousness due to the taking the shape of the object by knowledge as a result of which, the cognition is determined in respect of an object, such as, 'This cognition is of this object,' - that is the sadhana (karana) in regard

1. See: तदक्षीर् तत्र श्री श्री विज्ञानात्मिकेऽ चतुः श्री श्री श्री विज्ञानस्य तदन्त्यत्या अकारणल्‌वात् । -NyB, p.47
to that cognition. And this connection of knowledge with a particular object is not possible due to anything other than arthasārūpya - the taking the shape of the object by consciousness. This cannot be achieved by the sense-organ, etc. Though the sense-organs etc. can make a difference in the cognition by means of their own differences, such as sharpness or dullness of the eyes, etc.; yet they cannot connect the cognition to a particular object; because there is no cause that could bring about the close connection (pratyasasti) between cognition and its object.

Against the Buddhist’s view, one may argue that the difference in apprehension. 'This is a jar', 'This is a cloth' arises due to the object and then owing to that difference in knowledge this understanding arises; it is not due to the shape of the object taken by knowledge. For example, the table that I perceive gives rise to an individual cognition, 'there is a table'. So what differentiates the cognitions is (external) object, and not the shape of the object taken.

1. तस्मात् क्योः कस्य स्वतंत्रस्यात् कस्य हयुः कविक्षिति: हिति कस्य कस्यः (बाधाने:) कर्मीण नियमः। सङ्ग्रहयथः । -Nyb, p. 47

०प. तस्मात्क्रोऽस्य स्वतंत्राक्षरोंऽस्याक्षरितित्थथः ।

क्रियाया: कर्मिनियमः सिद्धा सा तस्मात्क्रोऽस्य । -Pv, 3-305

Read: यत्: स्वहपलेवोऽयस्य संज्ञानाच्य हयुः कस्य नीरस्य पीतस्य चार्षितति: हिति नियमः। सार्य श्रेष्ठ: तस्मात्क्रोऽस्य । -Pvb, p.342
by knowledge. In answer to this the Buddhist may ask - How is it that the shape is not pointed out as caused by objects even though it, as caused by an object, exists in consciousness? If knowledge is accepted as not assuming the shape of an object, it cannot be spoken as such and such. That is to say, the difference in cognitions should be admitted as caused by the assumption of the shape of the object by knowledge, and not as caused by the objects (NyB, pp.47,49). Unless this consciousness assumes the shape of an object, it cannot determine objects through its own self which is not described (anirūpiten ātmanā). That consciousness should put to order and establish things, while being itself non-described (by them) - Viz. 'This is the knowledge of this' is something strange. Things would be wonderfully well-ordered thus! (That is to say, no knowledge could be said to be restricted to a particular object). Therefore it can be concluded that the part of consciousness having the shape of the object to be cognised is the sādhana or the karana of the cognition of the said object.

Repudiation of the Buddhist view: The Buddhist argues that there is nothing except the shape of the object assumed by consciousness that connects (ghatayati) the cognition

1. का किसु हूँदानो सतौपि सम्य न निर्दिष्यते ? न हदृश विद्यया
   सञ्ज्ञय व्यपदेश्युनि - NyB p.47
(pramiti) with its object. Here, if 'ghatayati' is meant 'it connects (sambandhayati)', that is not proper. For, the connection of cognition with its object is not brought about by the knowledge's assuming the-shape-of-the-object. But the cognition is produced by its own causes only as connected with the object; hence it does not require anything to connect itself with the object. Indeed it is not that the cognition arises first and then it is connected by something with its object. Nor can the knowledge's assuming the shape of an object be the cause of cognition, since there arises the contingency of there not being the relation of identity (tādātmya) between the knowledge's assuming the shape and the cognition. For the cause and the effect can never be identical. According to the Buddhist, the karana and the phala (resulting cognition) are both of the nature of consciousness.

Now, if the term 'ghaṭayati' in the above mentioned verse of the Pramanavārtika is intended to mean 'the knowledge's having the shape of the object determines (ghaṭayati) the cognition as connected with its object; that too is not proper. For the relation of determinant (niscayaka) and determined (nisceya), is not known & between the knowledge's having the

1. See: NyB, p.46; PV 3-306
shape and the cognition's being connected with the object. Nowhere can we apprehend the concomitance (sahacarita) between the shape of the object, that is present in knowledge and the cognition as connected with the object; so that the shape of the object assumed by knowledge could determine the cognition as connected with the object. (Smoke can determine the presence of fire, as there we find the concomitance between the two).

It may be urged that what is meant by the term 'ghaṭayati' is this: The capability of the knowledge to be produced by the object (in the form of individual cognitions - 'there is a ąjar' or the like) is itself the connection of cognition with its object. And this connection is not something different from cognition. And such a cognition which is non-different from this connection, and the shape of object present in knowledge there is the relation of essential identity. And because cognition is directly perceived as it is self-cognisable (sva-samvedya), its connection with the object, which is non-different from cognition, is also established by perception. Then how could one say that the connection is not known?

Bhāsarvajña's answer to this is that this argument is not proper. For, the relation of identity cannot stand to reason; and it has been repudiated by Bhāsarvajña in the
Anumāṇa Pariccheda of the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. Moreover, the Buddhist says that it is not proper to say that only because a thing has served as a śādhanā of an action, anything can become the śādhanā of any action whatsoever. As regards this, the Naiyāyika has nothing to say against it. On this point there is no controversy, since the Naiyāyika too accepts that a specific kāraka alone can be the śādhanā or karaṇa.

Again, it is said by the Buddhist that a thing due to which an object comes to 'prasiddhi' is the śādhanā. That also is

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1. न हि भिन्नवोगचौमयोः तादात्म्यं युक्तम् || कतःति च
tādātmyaṁ nātumānaṁ vaśyaṁ || lināṁ gacchāt
tadbhāvaḥ, samaye vā vinirbhāvāṁ eṣa līṅga
śādhanāḥ svato

- NyB, p. 298;

It is not proper to recognise the relation of identity between the cause and the effect; whose well-beings are altogether different. Even if there be the relation of identity, it cannot be known by inference. For, in this case it is impossible to have the conceptions of līṅga and līṅgin. Even if it were possible, the determination of the līṅga is itself the determination of the līṅgin, as both would have a non-different object;

Also See: NyB, p. 240, 250, 298.

2. See: NyB p. 46, PV 3-302

3. See: NyB, p. 46
not proper. 'Prasiddhi' may be characterised by production or by the making known (being manifest in knowledge) or by the expression through words. That is to say, the 'prasiddhi' of an object signifies its production by the 'sādhana' or its being known by the 'sādhana' or its expression through words by the sādhana. Of these, the first two meanings viz. its production and its revelation; are already considered. Now if the term 'prasiddhi' is taken to have the third meaning, 'the naming of objects' such as 'there is a jar,' then this also is not proper. For such a prasiddhi (i.e. giving appellations to objects) is accomplished by the will of the speaker, and not by the knowledge's having the shape of an object. A speaker may call a thing 'a jar' or 'a cloth' according to his will, the knowledge's having the shape of the object need not play any role in it.

The Buddhist has further said - the consciousness which is of the same nature as being the pure knowledge must be of the nature of an object, so that cognition could be differentiated in respect of each object; e.g. 'this cognition is of this'. This too is not justifiable. For though speech, which

1. See : न चार्थसिद्ध पाल ज्ञानस्य कारणं, तदात्मात्मानाक्रान्ताः इ

2. See : NyB, p. 48

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1. See : न चार्थसिद्ध पाल ज्ञानस्य कारणं, तदात्मात्मानाक्रान्ताः इ

2. See : NyB, p. 48
is of the same nature by its character of being expression in respect of all karmans, kartrā (whether it may be a jar or yajñadatta; all speech is the same as speech, 'jar' and 'yajñadatta are both equally expressive words), and is devoid of any shape, e.g. that of a jar or yajñadatta, yet it is found to be specifically associated, with a particular object. As for example the word expressing 'nīla' and the word expressing 'pīta', as well as the speech of Devadatta and the speech of Yajñadatta are associated with particular objects, though they do not have the shapes of 'nīla' etc. Therefore, in order that there should be differences in the cognitions of objects, it is not necessary that knowledge should assume the shape of the objects.

Again, the Buddhist has said that though the difference is there in the causes like the contact of sens-organ with object, it cannot differentiate the cognitions of objects, as it does not become the self of knowledge. This too is not proper. For, it is found that only a thing which has not become the self of an object can regulate that object. In short, the regulator and the regulated are always different from each other; e.g. a son is controlled by his parents, a servant by his master; curd etc. by mixture etc. And what is said by the Buddhist that the essence of kālāna is to

1. See : NyB, p. 47.
become the cause of an action, that is accepted by the Naiyāyika also. Again, it is said by the Buddhist that when there is no difference in the shape of the objects, in knowledge it would not be possible to differentiate the individual cognitions. This is not proper, says Bhāsarvajña, because the difference in action (here kriyā = pramiti) is possible even due to the difference in kārakas such as karmakāraka or the like. For example in the statements - 'A cow is going' or 'I see a cow', there arises the difference in the cognitions of the cow, owing to the use of different kārakas (here, kartṛkāraka and karmakāraka respectively).

Further it is also not proper to say that the difference in the self of knowledge, viz. its taking shape of an object, determines the cognitions of objects. For, the difference is not possible just in the self of knowledge. If there be difference in the self of knowledge, then its non-different nature would be contradicted. A thing that becomes the nature of knowledge cannot be different from it, and if it be different, it cannot be the nature of knowledge. And there is no proof to show that a thing can regulate its own nature or self. On the other hand, there is an inference proving the contrary of this: This cognition is determined by a thing that is different from the cognition, because the cognition is capable of being governed, just like a son. Even a restrained person or ascetic is controlled by a thing different from his self,
such as knowledge, effort etc. So there is no discrepancy in the reason. And the Buddhist says that the connection of the cognition with its object is not possible due to any other cause except the knowledge's having the shape of an object (NyB, p.47). But this cannot be maintained, because the said connection is possible due to the eye, etc. only.

Besides, it is said by the Buddhist that sense-organ, etc. cannot connect the cognition with its object, even though they give rise to some difference in the cognition by their own differences, such as, sharpness or dullness of the eyes etc. But this is not tenable, since it has not been proved so far. On the contrary it can be proved that the eyes, etc. can connect the cognition with object. For example, when one speaks - 'I see colour with the eyes,' it is known from this usage that the eyes, etc. alone, assisted by adṛṣṭa (unseen force) produce the cognition with respect to colour etc. Moreover, the Buddhist's argument that there is not any cause which can be the basis of a close connection between the sense-organs and objects - is also not tenable; since specific contacts between them are established (NyS, NyB, p.154). After all what is meant by the term ghaṭanā? The consciousness of the cognition as connected with the object is itself a ghaṭanā or connection, e.g. this cognition is of this object. And such a consciousness of the cognition is brought
about by the internal organ (antah-karana or the mind), assisted by adṛśta (unseen principle), since the mind can have personal (internal) as well as external things as its objects. Moreover, the specific rise of a cognition is itself the connection of the cognition with the object; and this connection is not of the nature of any physical contact. So when this connection is apprehended by the mind, the consciousness arises in the form - 'this knowledge is of this object.'

The Buddhist has pointed out a fault in respect of the difference in anubhava arising from the (external) objects—How is it that even though the shape due to the (external) object exists in the anubhava, the shape is not distinctly pointed out that this shape is caused by the object? That is to say, if such a difference really exists, it must be pointed out. It does not happen that though the difference in anubhava, brought about by the object, is cognised as such, it cannot be so pointed out. In reply to this argument Bhāsarvajña says that this is not justifiable. For there are certainly some special characters or differences that cannot

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1. See: यच्च अनुभवशरीरे दृष्टाः सुलभेभाषाय अथ निर्देशनेन द्वितीयमात्र स्थायिकपि स्थानं न निर्देशते हत्यासिद्धं, तद्भवन्त, सत्यति एव धर्म तथासूत्रात्। केवला विशेषणं ये प्रतीतिमात्र अर्थ विशेषणत निर्देशेणु न बलवते। -

- NyB, p. 49
be pointed out distinctly, even though they are cognised, e.g. very subtle difference, in various kinds of whiteness. To this effect it is said in a verse: Though there is a great difference in the sweet tastes of sugar-cane, milk and gur (jaggery or molasses), it cannot be distinctly expressed even by the goddess of learning (Sarasvati). This signifies that though this difference in taste is distinctly cognised as caused by the objects, it cannot be distinctly pointed out as such. Likewise though the difference caused by the objects exists in anubhava, it cannot be pointed as such. This being the case, the conclusion derived by the Buddhist viz. 'therefore the knowledge's having the shape of an object is the sādhana or karana of the cognition of the object to be known (NyB, p.46), is not justifiable. Moreover, how could the knowledge's having the shape of an object, which is non-different from the cognition be the sādhana of the cognition? How could the non-different things be cause and effect? Besides, no action or operation could be possible in respect of itself by a thing that is accomplished (i.e. the knowledge's having the shape of an object) or by a thing

1. The text should be 'शुक्लानाम्' and not 'शुक्लानां'. See: Photostat p. 20 "यथा शुक्लानां विशेषान।"
And this does not require to be emended.

2. इच्छुचिरागादीत्वा मायुरस्यान्तरं पक्ष ।
   मेद्वस्यापि नात्मातु सरस्वत्यापि शून्यः ॥ - NyB, p. 49
   cp. न हि इच्छुचिरागादीत्वा मायुरस्यान्तरं पक्षः
   शून्यः सरस्वत्या
   श्री नात्मातुः ॥ - Bhāmatī ed. (BS 1.1.3)
that is yet to be accomplished (i.e., a cognition of an object). A thing accomplished does not do any operation in respect of its own self because it is already accomplished; and a thing non-accomplished cannot do any function. In this case, the knowledge's having the shape of an object (meyarūpata) and the cognition (adhigati) constitute the knowledge (anubhava).

So both being of the nature of anubhava, the action by them in its own self cannot be possible. Hence one cannot be the sādhana of another.

The Buddhist may say that the rejoinders to the questions raised here are already given by the Buddhist thinkers. Dharmakīrti in his Pramāṇavārttikā has raised these questions as a prima-facie view and answered them. He says — if anything other than the knowledge's having the shape of an object (arthākāratā) be admitted as sādhana, then the connection of that sādhana with an object (tat-karmasambandhah) would never come to be known. And the shape of an object assumed by the knowledge becomes the very self of the cognition, i.e., sādhana (ātma-bhūtā eva samvedanasya arthākāratā pramānam - Prajñākaragupta), so the fruit is not a thing different from its sādhana. To wit

1. See: अथात्तर्फलचाहिणि हि सव दुष्कृति | अत्यथात्तरं \ सवेदनां अथाकारताम प्रमाणम | सवेदनं तदन्त्यभवपेत वेत \ प्रमाणाय | अथाकारतानुमयस्वरूपविशेषतः नान्यथाधारितः | - Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya (Prajñākaragupta) p. 343, ed. by Rahul Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Patna, 1953.
a cognition of object is a fruit brought about by the sādhanā, a cognition means the assumption of the shape of the object by knowledge and hence that cognition is by its nature not different from sādhanā. Dharmakīrti says further that the cognition of object which assumes the shape of an object seems, as it were, to be endowed with the operation (vyāpāra), on account

Also read:  

Also read: ग्राह्यग्राहकारः अपि भावः स्वः विषः विषयमुद्दार - तत्त्वज्ञानम् वाल्मीकि तपः कल्पना द्वार विषयं विषयमात्रता विश्लेषणेऽवथ व्यापाराः-व्यापाराः स्वकल्पित ग्राह्ये भावति। व्यापारिन्य वक्तृत:  

Manoratha-nandi-vrtti, p. 192
of its own object. Besides, though knowledge itself is not a kāraka, i.e. does not do any function, it determines the cognitions of objects by assuming the shape of object. And due to its function of determining, it seems to be endowed with operation, though in fact there does not exist anything like vyāpāra. In a nutshell, the Buddhist position is that –

(i) The connection of the cognition with its object, a jar or the like, can by no means be known, unless the knowledge having the shape of an object is regarded as sādhana or pramāṇa.

(ii) The cognition which is a fruit brought about by the sādhana is not different from sādhana or pramāṇa, viz. knowledge’s having shape of the object.

(iii) Since the knowledge determines the individual cognitions by assuming the shape of an object, it appears, as if it is endowed with operation, though knowledge itself is not kāraka.

Refutation of the Rejoinders given by the Buddhist: The Buddhist has said that if anything else other than knowledge

1. See: अख्तवादवादित्वम् हि सद्वेदनस्य अत्यात्मकेत्युद्दित किं कार्यकर्म प्रमाणाः। सवेदनस्य ।

2. See: न्यायविद्या, प्रमाणवर्तिकबहस्त्र (Prajñākaragupta), p. 343
having the shape of an object, be accepted as the sadhana or karana of the cognition, then the connection between the act of cognition (kriya-pramiti NyB p. 46) and its object or between the sadhana and the object cannot be established. This is not proper, says Bhasarvajna. For in fact only when the sadhana is different from the object, can the connection of the object, e.g. a tree or the like, with the action of cutting, etc. and with the instrument (sadhana) be established, to wit, 'A man is cutting a tree with an axe' (here, 'tree' is karma, and 'axe' is sadhana); there is cutting in respect of the tree (here, 'cutting' is the act, and, 'the tree' is the object). The same is true of the perception of a pot. In this case, the eyes serve as sadhana, the pot is object, there is the act of cognition and the cognition of the pot is the fruit. Here we say - 'a man is seeing a pot with the eyes', 'There is the act of cognition is respect of the pot.' Now, in the illustration of the axe etc; though the axe is sadhana it is not known to anyone that the axe is non-different from the cutting or that it has the shape of the tree. So the means of knowledge, the eyes, etc. cannot be non-different from the act of cognition which is accomplished by that means; nor can the means, the eyes, etc. have the shape of the object, a pot or the like.

Again, it was stated by the Buddhist that this consciousness assumes unto itself the shape of the object and that state

1. यह युन: ततुः, दयान तत्वः” (PV, 3.308) = करिया-स्वतंत्रिक घातिता तृतुः करिभ तत्वः सत्यापित करीण सत्याकरणह लह करीक्षमस्वतान्त्रिक व्यापारिक साप्त्ति।

- NyB, p. 50
of knowledge having the shape of an object, appears, like one endowed with operation in respect of the karma. Bhāsarvajña explains the words of the kārīka. Consciousness or knowledge in respect of the object assumes unto itself shape of the object. It appears to be endowed with vyāpāra in respect of the object, i.e. itself in the shape of an object on account of the operation in the form of its nature to cognise an object. Though in fact consciousness is itself not an active agent (kāraka), it seems to be so on account of its taking the shape of object and on account of its act of determining each object individually. By this, the Buddhist seeks to show how the śādhanā appears to be endowed with vyāpāra, though it is really not so.

In answer to this, Bhāsarvajña says that this contention also is not tenable; because such a consideration in regard to the śādhanā (which proves the śādhanā to be operationless) would establish it as a secondary means. That is to say, it would be a śādhanā only by secondary or figurative usage. And in all cases of secondary usage, there should be something for which the word ('śādhanā') could be primarily used. Hence the

1. द्वारा तत्क च - कर्षणान्त्स्वार्त्तनि धार्यं ताम्यकार्यतां । -
   -NyB, p. 50.

2. The text should be तत्वार्थवान्त्स्वार्त्तनि धार्यं ताम्यकार्यतां instead of तत्वार्थवान्त्स्वार्त्तनि धार्यं
   ताम्यकार्यतां ।
   - NyB, p. 50; Photostat, p. 20
Buddhist shouldstate what the primary sadhana here is. It is not known among the people nor in the sāstras that a thing which does not do any function whatsoever is still a sadhana, only because it appears like one, endowed with the operation or only because it is one that is being produced. Thus by means of just empty words (meaningless rigmarole), the Buddhist tries to create a semblance of the sāstra and to cheat the people of dull intellect and in doing so, his sole purpose is to acquire some gain, honour and fame. Like a dindika (a clown) the Buddhist serves the people not even in the slightest degree.

1. See: Dindika = Name of a mouse (M. W.), the word is used in a derogatory sense in the Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa (Act III); commenting on this Gānapati Sāstri says - विकृतवेशाणामाणिना जनाय हास्यं जनयत्र भिषाताकसौति न हिंदियनप। Also see: हिंदियन: नन्ना वाचस्य, ते निष्कृतस्य उपरिंिं नामेनैः प्रस्तावपि उपरिति प्रकरणाभ सन्धिकृतस्य नामेन श्रद्धिः प्रकाशम्। तथाहि ते कष्टवर्धिराधामास्ते योगिनः वन्यलक्ष्मीये कृत्यां नाम अनुष्ठानं अहंप्रिजिक्षयं बनास्तां बौद्धिता अन्त्यं वा तदुपि धार्मिक्रं नाम कृत्वा तद लिङ्गम प्रदुःखते। -

Hetubindutikā- Aloka (Durveka Mis'ra), p. 320, ed. by Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghavi And Muni Shri Jinavijayaji, Baroda, Oriental Institute, 1949
Moreover, even the simile that the said sadhana appears like 'a thing endowed with operation' is not proper. For it is not possible to divide things into those endowed with the operation and those devoid of operation, just as we divide animals into cows and gavayas (cow-like animals). A simile can be employed in respect of a cow and a gavaya, as they are different from each other, such as, 'a gavaya is like a cow,' but not in respect of things that are endowed with the operation and those that are devoid of operation, as such a division of things is not possible. Indeed in the Buddhist's view, no operation or the character of being a kāraka in respect of a thing is accepted as distinct from its being or existence.

It may be urged that since Kriyā (act of cognition) and kāraka (sādhana, consciousness having the shape of an object) are accepted as of the nature of becoming (bhūti), the non-differentiated vyāpāra which is not qualified by actions denoted by different verbs (as except 'becoming,' bhūti, there is no possibility of any other action), does exist in all cases of the cognition. The answer to this is that even though this is accepted, the simile cannot be explained. For, indeed we never say - 'this thing which is endowed with dew-lap etc; is like a cow.' The two things between which

1. तात्त्विकरूपानिर्देश कारणां अस्मिन्न कृत्य व धर्मविधानोऽभिव्यक्ते॥

Quoted by Kamalaśīla in the Panjīkā,
Tattvasamgraha, Vol.I, p.14, ed. by
Śwāmī Dwārikādāś Shastri, Varanasi,1968
the simile is employed, should be different. Similarly we
cannot employ the simile, 'avyāpāram savyāpāram iva bhavati'
because in either case there is just 'bhūti' (becoming). So
in the absence of the relation of Upamāna (the standard of
comparison) and Upameya (the object of comparison), there
could not be a simile (i.e. Savyāpāram iva ābhāti).

It may be urged that in this case simile can be common,
i.e. can be put in either way (Samāna Upamā iyam). For such
a simile is not employed in works on logic, or in the current
parlance of the people; and besides, such a simile would
not serve any purpose here. Of course in the figure of
anavaya (Non-connection or Self-comparison) one and the
same thing is described as being both an Upamāna and an
upameya. When one says that a certain object is like itself,
one means there is no other object similar to it. When one
seeks to establish the excellence of the war between Rāma and
Rāvana, which is not found there in any other war (anavya-
vrṛtti), one says that the war between Rāma and Rāvana is like
the war between Rāma and Rāvana. However, in the present
case, no excellence of meaning is sought to be established
by stating - the sadhana appears like one endowed with
vyāpāra. Thus the simile employed here can by no means be
explained or justified.

1. समान उपमा ह्यस्त |यज्ञ, p.50
The Buddhist may argue that a purpose is certainly served by this simile, it pursues the common practice in the world. What is meant by this is as follows: All the people call the axe or the like, karāṇa (śādhaṇa) while they know that the axe or the like is endowed with vyāpāra (operation) due to the operation known as act of raising, dropping, etc. Following this common practice of the people, the Buddhist has said - 'the śādhaṇa, is like one endowed with vyāpāra.' People accept an axe or the like as karāṇa (śādhaṇa) on account of their knowledge of it as endowed with operation. Likewise the Buddhist accepts the knowledge having the shape of an object as karāṇa on account of his awareness of that knowledge as endowed with operation by virtue of the operation that is of the nature of the apprehension of the object. And in respect of word and its meaning, there is not any other authority except the usage prevalent among the people.

Moreover, even in the case of a (karāṇa, or the like) the operation that is of the nature of the act (kriyā), of raising and the like, is in fact not something different from its (karāṇa's) own self; since an entity (i.e. the axe etc.) cannot serve as the substratum of anything (i.e. vyāpāra etc.) owing to its momentariness; and since such an operation (i.e. one imagined as separate from the axe, etc.) has no purpose to serve. To wit, if that substance (i.e. karāṇa) an axe; or the like is produced as endowed with action just from its
own cause, then the action which is a different thing from
the substance (śādhanā or karaṇa) does not have any
purpose to serve, since it becomes then redundant. Now,
if the substance (śādhanā or karaṇa) is produced as devoid of action, then even if action which is quite a distinct entity from it be produced, the substance could not become one endowed with activity by virtue of it. For, it would lead to the fault of atiprasanga (i.e. unwarranted stretch of a rule). That is to say, the production of something different from a thing, cannot make another thing endowed with action. Production of a pot cannot make the cloth one endowed with action. Otherwise production of something would make anything whatsoever endowed with action. What the Buddhist wants to emphasise is that an action cannot be accepted as different from karaṇa. According to this view, the action (kriyā) is nothing but the production of the axe in contiguous places following one another just as the motion of the shadow of umbrella etc. is nothing but the production of shadows in contiguous places one after another and so the impression is created that there is a kariyā or action in the axe or that the shadow is moving.

That is to say, the shadow of umbrella is not different from umbrella and so there is no question of producing it. Likewise action or operation (vyāpāra) is not different from the axe, so there is no question of the axe being endowed with operation. Similarly the shape of an object
is not different from consciousness and hence there is no question of its assuming the shape of an object. Yet we say in common parlance that the umbrella or the axe or consciousness (knowledge) is a karaṇa (in the primary sense of the term) as if some action or operation (vyāpāra) were produced as being different from umbrella etc. And on account of the knowledge of such an action (kriyā) appearing in the axe, the axe is said to be a karaṇa. Similarly the knowledge also, assuming various shapes of the blue (nīla), yellow (Pīta) etc. is cognised (understood) (pratiyātā) as endowed with vyāpāra and on account of this vyāpāra, the knowledge also is like the axe etc. regarded as karaṇa in the primary sense of the term.

1. Read: न हि व्यापारः पदार्थः भिष्टे । न उत्पत्तननिपतने पूलः व्यतिरिक्ते । तस्येव कारः व्यतिरिक्तानि उत्पचिः तथा व्यतिरिक्ती । न च सा व्यतिरिक्ताः व्यतिरिक्ती । तत: तत्र व्यतिरिक्तः भिष्टे: भ्रजयेण । यो हि यत्मस्त विभिन्ने भिष्टे स व्यतिरिक्तमेव व्यतिरिक्तमेव । परापरितः हृ देवदासः नाधः किस्ममेव व्यतिरिक्तमेव व्यतिरिक्तमेव भिष्टे । तत: तत्र व्यतिरिक्तमेव व्यतिरिक्तमेव व्यतिरिक्तमेव। — Prahāna-vārtikābhāṣya (Prajkākara gupta), pp.348-49, PV. Karikā 319-20.
Repudiating this argument of the Buddhist Bhasarvajña says that the denial of the kriya (action) as an entity different from the axe etc., on the strength of momentariness, is not proper. For, it is merely a fancy (or just a brain-wave) of the Buddhist. In the discussion that follows (NyB, p. 53), it is established how the axe or the like even while being non-momentary is one endowed with action just due to an action (kāriya), which is different from the axe. Again, if a thing be accepted as karaṇa only because it is known as endowed with vyāpāra, then a man also, who is cutting a tree, should be a karaṇa because he is known as endowed with vyāpāra.

1. See: किं पुनः कारणः । साधकत्वं करणः । (पु० पृ १२) । तवारिः प्रमाणे च विन्यासः सति अविन्यासः प्रमाणे च। ज्ञानयोगाधिरूपः कारणः । (p.12) - Tarkabhāsa (Kesāvamīśra), ed. by A. B. Gajendragadkar and R. D. Karmarkar, Poona, 1934
Also See: (वायारवः) असाध्यं कारणं करणः ।
Tarkasāngraha (Athālya - Bodās), p. 25; वायारवः असाध्यं कारणं करणः वत्थः । । यथा, दण्डवः । घटारिकं प्रवित्ति कायारस्यारस्यात्तवः । । प्रमाणदित्तप्रयासरवत्तवः च कारणः । - The Nyāyabodhini on The Tarkaśāṅgṛaha, Ibid, p. 25;
Read: "The definition of the ancients requires the karaṇa to be vyāpāravat and therefore strictly speaking it must always be a substance in which actions and

(cont...see page 367
qualities that constitute a vyāpāra may inhere; While according to moderns it is this vyāpāra itself which becomes the karana (p. 187) .... other efficient causes such as the knower and the object of knowledge are not called karana, even though they may be vyāpāravat, because the result is not produced even if they exist," — (Athalye) Notes on the Tarkasaṅgraha, p. 189; The vyāpāra is defined thus:

(Siddhāntacandrika) 'an operation which, not being a dravya is the product of a thing (tat), and produces the effect of that thing'. — Athalye's Notes on TS, p.187
It may be urged that the axe alone can be the karāṇa, and not the person who is cutting the tree, since the axe is in close proximity i.e. intimately connected in respect of the action of dividing the tree into two parts. But against this, the Buddhist should be reminded of the fact that when one says that a means of bringing about an action (kriyā), which is in close proximity to the kriyā (action) is karāṇa, one tacitly admits that the action of dividing into two is different from the sādhanā, (axe or the like). Similarly the kriyā (i.e. cognition) which is produced by the knowledge that assumes the shape of the object should be admitted as different from the sādhanā. If this be admitted, then how would the phala or result not be different from the sādhanā? The fruit would certainly be different from the Sādhanā.

It may be urged that even the axe is not regarded as karāṇa because it brings about the cutting of the tree into two, because in that case all things which could achieve this, would have to be regarded as the karāṇa. But having attained the contingency of the division into two, the axe is produced in a specific form, and it is this production of its that is the cause of the popular belief: 'this is its instrument,' and it is on the strength of this that it is styled the karāṇa; so also in the case of jñāna. The answer to this is that the argument is not tenable, since the momentariness of things is not yet established. Only when the momentariness of things
is established, could this procedure followed by the Buddhist to call a certain thing an instrument be alright. It is elaborately shown in the third pariccheda of the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa how the momentariness of things cannot be established. Unless a dharmin or a dravya having attributes is established, the inference cannot be drawn that non-momentary things do not exist.

Moreover, the Buddhist should point out what could be the karana in respect of the act of cutting the tree into two parts. And it is evident that no act is possible, without a karana. The act of cutting the tree into two parts itself cannot be the karana, because if it is regarded as non-different from the tree it would be of the nature of the thing to be cut (chedya) and so would be known as the karma (object) alone. And even if the dvaidhibhāva 'being cut into two parts' be regarded as an entity different from the tree and as being of the nature of disjunction, then also it would be known as just action only. Hence the dvaidhibhāva itself can in no way be the karana, as it could be either karma or kṛpyā.

1. See: यदि तावः केतास्वातानानां कस्तेकुर्म प्रकारसिद्धिः बनितेत, 
तदा कथि तत्वानातेऽवात || न हि एकत्रित अभिनिर्देशे हेतोः: 
पदार्थायतिः, न च एकत्रित पदार्थालिङ्ग गम्यति, तत्सातः केतास्वात 
करणिकाः हेति कृप्याः प्रतिशत || -

NyB, p. 510 ff

2. न च दोषीमाव एव करणं तद्भ क्षेत्रप्रकट्वः कर्मित्वेन्नां प्रसिद्धिकर्तवात् ||

NyB, p. 52
as shown above. Therefore, something other than dvaidhiḥbāva should be pointed out as the karana. Thus on the strength of the illustration of the tree, axe etc; the numerical difference between action (kriyā) and instrument (karana) is established in all cases. Then, how could the opponent dare to point out the non-difference between them anywhere?

Before we proceed further, it is necessary to note here the view held by Dharmakīrti. He says in the Pramāṇa-vārtika.

1. See: the Manorathanandivṛtti on the above:

(Pramāṇavārtika)

See: the Manorathanandivṛtti on the above:

MNV, pp. 193-94
Even the difference in the object of the two, kriyā (action) and sādhanā (instrument) is not accepted (by the Buddhist). If the action and sādhanā are admitted as having one and the same object, it is meaningless to accept pramāṇa and the phala as two different things; and hence there cannot be the sequence between the two aspects of knowledge, i.e. an aspect that assumes the shape of an object and the cognition (sādhanā and phala). The moment when consciousness assumes the shape of an object (Sadhana), the cognition of the object (phala) arises. As a matter of fact, knowledge's assuming the shape of an object and the rise of cognition are not two different acts. Besides, because these two aspects of knowledge arise simultaneously, there cannot be the relation of the sādhyā (one which is yet to be accomplished) and the sādhanā (an instrument which is already accomplished). In fact the knowledge that determines the individual cognition by assuming the shape of an object is determinant (vyavasthāpaka), while the cognition that is determined by this is thing to be determined (vyavasthāpya). So there is a relation of the determinant and the determined between the sādhanā - the knowledge assuming the shape of an object and the phala - the cognition.

Now to return to our point, it may be urged that the knowledge that distinguishes (visēṣaṇa) the cognition, i.e. the knowledge which has assumed the shape of object, and the
knowledge or the cognition that is distinguished (visēsya) (resulting cognition) can possibly be conceived as sādhana and sādhya respectively, and this relation of sādhya and sādhana between the two aspects of knowledge is based on the determination of the cognition as explained above. The aspect of knowledge that determines the cognition is sādhana, and the aspect of knowledge that is determined as cognition of something is the sādhya.

In reply to this, Bhāsarvajña sarcastically says that the Buddhist's exposition is a grand eloquent utterance. That is to say, there is more of eloquence than truth in it. Who other than the Buddhist who is blinded by attachment and infatuation towards his own school of thought, would dare to say that the relation of sādhya and sādhana between two different things, which is proved by a number of examples is not proper, and such a relation between the two aspects of one and the same knowledge (i.e., non-different), which (i.e., aspects) are not even existent by nature, is proper. Even the determining factor is so called only because it does some action in respect of the thing to be determined; e.g., the character of being a sīṃśapā tree does the action of determining a tree as sīṃśapā. Hence the sādhana, even though it serves as a determining factor, cannot be non-different from the action; and the thing which is to be determined is in fact prameya, and not action. That
is to say, in the above example, the genus of *simśapā* (simśapatval) which is a means of determining the tree, is different from the act of determining; so also the tree which is to be determined is different from the act of determining. Thus the *sādhana*, the *sādhya* and the *kriyā* are always different from one another.

The Buddhist may urge that this usage of *sādhana* etc. has no grounding in reality, i.e. things are not really as they are stated. But this refutation also is not proper. For if the usage is not at all real, there would arise the contingency of anything whatsoever being called *sādhana*. Hence the attempt to establish the knowledge that assumes the shape of an object as *pramāṇa* by rejecting all other views, is futile. Therefore a thing is a *karaṇa* only by virtue of being endowed with action, and this would not be proper, unless the action arises as entity different from the *sādhana* or *karaṇa*.

Dharmakīrti has argued in his *Pramāṇavārttika* that a *phala* is produced as having a nature just similar to its cause. So it is said in the usage that the *phala* takes the form of its cause though in reality there is no operation of its taking the form of the cause on the part of the *phala*.

1. See: यथा फलस्य देवनां सूक्ष्मार्थकयोऽद्विभवत्।
   हेतुलघेतुप्रहो लोकेकः क्रियावते-तत्कालिनः कथयते।।
   - *Pr. 3.311* (Patna Edition)

Read: यथा लोकेकः क्रियावते हेतुलघेतुप्रहोऽद्विभवत्। फलस्य क्रियावतेऽकः देवनां अर्थार्थादेव आदिवादः कथयते -
   धिन्दुः सूपं गृहीतं सुलेखं हत्वादि।।
   - *MNV*, p. 192.
Bhāsarvajña presents this argument of Dharmakīrti as follows:

Though actual activity is not there on the part of kartr the determination of particular kāraka, Karmakāraka etc. is seen to be only on the basis of its production was qualified by resemblance; e.g. 'a son is similar to his mother or he resembles his father.' In this case, there does not exist any action, such as resembling except the birth of the son looking like his parents.

The answer to this is that if there is not a distinct action other than the birth of a son looking like his parents, then let there not be the real determination of kāraka also as we see in the illustrations like the gavaya (Kartr-kāraka) resembles the cow (karma-kāraka). However, the karana, the eyes etc; of the action of cognising the similarity is certainly different from that action of cognising. And thus whenever an action or kriyā requires some pramāṇa (a means of knowledge) for its apprehension (i.e. in order to make itself known), there must be a karana different from the action, just as the axe is different from the action of cutting. If without a karana being there, the action occurs, then it would be accidental. Indeed, unless a person has seen with his eyes the parents, he is not able to know the fact that the son has taken the features of his parents, merely on the basis of the perception of the features of the son who looks like his parents. And in this example, the karana (i.e. the eyes etc.) must be admitted as different from the action of knowing the similarity.
Now, Bhāsarvajña raises some objections against the Buddhist view. He asks a question as to whether the shape of the object, blue or the like, present in the knowledge is a common one or is something peculiar. If the shape is common to all as having the characteristic of being etc; then how is the restriction of knowledge to its respective object possible? For its shape is present alike everywhere. If the shape is not common to all, i.e. is peculiar, having the characteristic of blueness or the like or having the characteristic of excluding all that is not blue or the like then there would be the contingency of the knowledge being of the nature of non-knowledge because of its relation to it. How could one say this? Blueness etc. never constitute the character of knowledge, so if it were characterised by blueness, etc; it would not be knowledge at all. That which is related to blueness that which is excluded from non-blue, is seen to be, as a rule, of the nature of non-consciousness.

It may be argued that though 'go' and 'gavaya' have one shape (anatomy), they are known to be members of different species, and so the rule is not an absolute one. Answering this Bhāsarvajña says that the example of a cow and a gavaya is not a proper one in the present context. The shape of a cow and a gavaya, that is characterised by a specific arrangement
of limbs, is a common one. This being so, their shape could be seen even in the wood-carvings or in pictures etc. But the shape present in knowledge can never be perceived. So the example of 'go' and 'gavaya' is not appropriate in the present context. By this, the example of father and son given by the Buddhist, should also be taken as repudiated. For their similarity in the composition of limbs can be seen. On the other hand, knowledge, being itself a gua cannot indeed have form (or colour) (Rūpa a gua) or the like or parts or aspects (avayavas). Consequently there cannot be even such a similarity between knowledge and the object, blue, etc; as the Buddhist claimed. And even though knowledge be admitted as related to such a similarity, the contingency of the knowledge being non-knowledge is difficult to avoid. As a result of this, there would neither be knowledge nor object. Thus nothing obtains. The case is parallel to the churning so much of the milk of she-donkey. However much you churn it, even a little butter cannot be obtained thereby.

It may be urged that since all things are of the nature of consciousness there is not a single example in respect of being of the nature of non-consciousness. So how could there arise the contingency of knowledge being of the nature of non-consciousness? In answer to this Bhāsarvajñā jocularly says -

1. See : तत्स्त्र न ज्ञान नाथः धर्म गर्भी जीर्णतथाप न विस्तिर्च स्वात् ।
   - NyB, p. 53

2. See : ननृ एवद्य व्यक्तं से निवर्तिष्याः ना तवरिष्या ।
   - NyB, p. 53
'You chap, don't be impatient, we shall certainly remove this difficulty of yours! Again, it may be urged that the case is similar to the mirror with the shape of the face. But this also is not proper for it is illusory. The knowledge of the face may be non-erroneous but the knowledge of its non-difference from the mirror is certainly erroneous. Thus the non-difference between the knowledge that assumes the shape and the shape of the object should also be admitted as illusory.

Moreover a question may be asked as to whether the shape of momentariness etc. is different or non-different from the shape of the object, blue or the like present in the knowledge. If it be different, there would arise the contingency of the shape of the object, blue or the like, being non-momentary. For the non-momentariness is characterised by the exclusion of the momentary shape. Hence on this line of thinking, the external object would be established also as non-momentary as it is established as having blueness etc. As blueness is accepted as belonging to the object so also non-momentariness should be admitted as belonging to the object. But if the second alternative, viz. the shape of momentariness is not different from the shape of the object present in the knowledge, be accepted, then also the momentariness of the object (must be perceptual and so) would be immediately established, just as its

1. See: NyB, p. 56
blueness etc. is established (by perception). Consequently the inference proving the momentariness would be redundant. If a thing is known by perception, inference for it is not necessary. That is to say, if on the strength of the shape of the object assumed by knowledge blueness or the like is known by perception, then on the strength of the same, momentariness of the object also must be known by perception, because the shape of the object is non-different from the shape of momentariness. Or if the momentariness is not established in that way (i.e. through perception), then blueness etc. also would not be established by perception, since both the shapes, i.e. the shape of blueness or the like and the shape of momentariness, are related alike to the knowledge - they are diffux non-different from the knowledge. And thus both shapes are present in the knowledge, so both of them should be cognised by perception; or neither could be perceived.

It may be argued- Indeed, that which helps us to ascertain is the pramāṇa. Hence, even though the knowledge has the shape of the objects, that is of manifold nature, only that aspect of knowledge, which is capable of producing the determination or ascertainment due to the intensity of impressions, is called pramāṇa, and not the knowledge in its entirety. Against this, Bhāsarvajña raises a question as to whether that ascertainment of determination is endowed with shape or not. Now, if the determination be endowed with shape, then the question may arise whether that shape of the object present in the determination is different or non-different from the shape
of momentariness etc. And again, in this case the same contingency would arise as shown before. Besides, if another determination is imagined in this case also, then it would involve the fault of infinite series. Now, if the second alternative that the determination or ascertainment is devoid of any shape, is accepted then in its nature as determination, knowledge would be alike in respect of all objects, and so how could it be possible to establish that a particular determination is necessarily of a particular object.

Moreover, if it is admitted that though the determination is shapeless, it determines only a particular thing by virtue of some reason, then it must be conceded that in all cases without exception things are determined without the shape-theory (—which is recognised by the Buddhist) being applied. Thus it is meaningless to imagine knowledge as assuming the shape of the object. Besides, if the shape of the object assumed by knowledge is regarded as pramāṇa that brings about the valid knowledge of the object, then the shape of hair etc. must be admitted as pramāṇa (means of valid knowledge) for the cognition of hair, etc.; which is erroneous.

It might be urged by the opponent that the shape of the object is accepted as pramāṇa (means of valid knowledge), only in respect of knowledge which is not inconsistent or not incompatible, for it is said—"Non-inconsistent knowledge
is pramāṇa". In answer to a question as to what non-inconsistency signifies the opponent may say - That knowledge is non-inconsistent which enables us to attain a thing which is capable of successful activity; that is to say, a cognition is valid (non-inconsistent) when it provokes us to act in respect of its object. As it is said: One who proceeds to

1. See: प्रमाणः अबिलेप्ति ज्ञानः। - PV, 2-1 (Patna Edition)
   Read the Manorathanandi व्रत्ति on this - ज्ञान प्रमाणः, न अ-ज्ञानः इन्द्रियसम्भवक्षणादि। केभीसु? अविलेप्ति। विस्वादानसु विस्वादः। भवनसु, तथ्योगान् विस्वादः, न तथा अव: अविलेप्ति।

2. See: कभीक्रियाप्रत्ययः। - PV, 2-1 (Patna Edition)
   Read: कभीक्रियाप्रत्ययः प्रमाणावर्गता अविलेप्ताः। अथ: न यथे ज्ञानात् कथा परिच्छेदः अपि न प्रवत्तेऽवः प्रबृत्तिः वा कुलश्रुतिः प्रतिबन्धितः। कभीक्रियामात्रविनिष्ठः तत्वपु प्रमाणात्मेव प्रमाणावर्गतात्रत्ववातः अविलेप्तसंस्कारः सत्त्ववाचः।
   - MKV, p. 4
   Also Read: न कथा जन्मवत्सपत्तथात्रात्माः हेद मध्यमानितिः मूलः। फल्तिः तत्त्विः कथा दाहपाकः। क्रियाविष्कारः। तत्त्वः स्थितिः। अविलेप्तः। अविलेप्ताः। अविलेप्ततः। अविलेप्ततः। अविलेप्ताः। अविलेप्ताः। अविलेप्ताः।
   - PV (Prajñākaragūnta), p.4;

3. See: "न कथा अभ्यासः कथा परिच्छेदः प्रवक्तमानः। कभीक्रियायां विस्वादते। इति। -
   - NYB, p. 54
perform an activity for attaining what is desired after having determined the thing by means of perception and inference is never found to be led astray, he is not contradicted by experience there is no inconsistency here. Even in the world that which enables us to attain the object, formerly presented by it is regarded as non-inconsistent; likewise in the śāstras, the knowledge which enables us to attain the object presented by it is recognised as non-inconsistent. Also, to say that the knowledge enables a man to attain the object as it really is just signifies that the knowledge is capable of provoking him to activity in respect of the object; because unless there is activity in respect of the object it cannot be attained. Further, to say that knowledge inspires a man to act signifies only that knowledge reveals the object of activity. Indeed, it is not that the knowledge holds a man by the neck and compels him to act. Therefore, the non-inconsistency of knowledge which is characteristic of pramāṇa, is nothing but its being the manifesters of an object which is capable of successful

1. See: को च पुर्वदिशितं कर्म प्राप्यतं संवादवं उद्धेज्यते । तद्वशृ ज्ञानमपि प्रदिशितं कर्म प्राप्यतं संवादवकुञ्ज्यते । प्रक्षेपिते नार्येष प्रवर्तकत्वमेव प्राप्तत्सु, नान्यं । तथा हि न ज्ञानं, जन्मं कर्मं, प्राप्तति, ओपं तु अर्ध्य पुराणं प्रक्षेपितं प्राप्तति कर्म। प्रक्षेपितमपि प्रवाहितिविज्ञ्यादंशंकत्वमेव, न हि पुरुषं हठादा प्रकर्षितं शकनोति विज्ञानं ।

- Nyāyabinduṭikā (Dharmottara), p.4, ed. by Ācārya Candrasekhara Śāstrī, Banares, 1954
activity (Prajakatva = pravrttijanakatva = Visyaprakasakatva).

In answer to this, Bhāsarvajña says that this is not tenable, since there would arise the contingency of the pramāṇa characterised by inference being non-pramāṇa; as it cannot

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1. See: यस्याथिः सन्निधानसन्निधिनेनाद्यां ज्ञानप्रतिमार्गमेवः तस्य स्वलपप्राप्तं तदेव परमाप्राप्तं अवश्यासमाधीनानालवणां वस्तुः ।
न्यायाद्विभाग, सं: अनुमानस्य विषयः। तदेव च प्रत्ययः सन्निधिनेन अवश्यासमाधीनानालवणां ज्ञातः। अवश्यासमाधीनानालवणां प्रभावः, तदावश्यासमाधीनानालवणां अपरिवर्तितसिद्धे: हति।
- Nyāyabindu, pp. 16-17, Banaras, 1954

Read: अवश्यासमाधीनानालवणां एव किं निषिद्धः। तत्तथा सन्निधिनेन अवश्याशास्त्रामध्ये वस्तुः।
- Tīkā of Dharmottara

2. See: अन्यान्य अग्रारेष्टीतीतिसिद्धवां अपरिवर्तितसिद्धवां अवश्यासमाधीनानालवणां प्रभावः।
न्यायाद्विभाग, सं: अनुमानस्य विषयः।
- Nyāyabindu, pp. 17-18;

Read: सन्निधानसन्निधिनेन अवश्यासमाधीनानालवणां प्रभावः।
- Nyāyabindutīkā (Dharmottara), Ibid, pp. 17-18
manifest an object which is capable of successful activity. It
may be noted here that according to the Buddhist, pratyakṣa
cognises the svalaksana and anumāna the sāmānyā; pratyakṣa has
the unique particular for its object, and anumāna the universal.
Now the universal is unreal, a conceptual construction, (accord­
ing to the Buddhist) so anumāna would be erroneous. Moreover,
"both perception and inference contain judgments, but an infer­
ence deals with conceptions directly; it is essentially an act of conceiving. Perception is an act of conceiving only indi­
rectly as it is essentially and directly a sensation which in the later moments calls forth a conception. Still inference is regarded as a pramāṇa as it refers an imagined object to a particular point-instant of reality and thus the final result is just the same as in indirect perception."

The Buddhist may urge that inference though it has the
Universal as its object, it takes us to a point-instant of reality and so is pramāṇa. This also is not proper, says Bhāsarvajña. For, it is not possible that inference could have any realtion with the object that is cognised. And if the knowledge, even though it is not related to the object

1. See: जिविच सम्बंधानन् | प्रत्यावेदिनमानवान् | तत्र कल्पनापौड़ित्वाम् अपेक्षाः
   प्रत्यक्षम् | - Nyāyabindu, pp. 7-8;
   Read: प्रातां धि ज्ञातमानं | स्वप्रस्तावंस्य अन्यं अव्ययवमेत् प्रवचनारूप |
   - Nyāyabindutikā, p. 9

2. See: Avidyā - A Problem of Truth And Reality, p. 463
which is grasped, be admitted as non-inconsistent, then there would arise the contingency of the knowledge of the type of dream, magical illusion etc. also being non-inconsistent, as that knowledge too is related to some object. Against this, it may be argued that unlike dream-cognition etc.; an inference is non-inconsistent as it is related to the object about which the judgment is formed. According to the Buddhist there is a distinction between the object which is simply grhīta and the object which is adhyāvasita. Grhīta signifies a thing about which there is only a sensation, while adhyāvasita signifies a thing about which a conceptual judgment is formed. Bhāsarvajña puts forth the Buddhist’s argument as follows: The object of pramāṇas is two-fold; that which is grasped (grāhya), and that about which a judgment is formed (adhyāvasya). Now, though an inference does not enable us to attain the object which is grasped (grāhya), yet by means of inference we can attain the object about which a judgment is formed (adhyāvasita). For, even inference we form a judgment regarding the fire which is capable of accomplishing the successful act of burning etc. After such a judgment, those who desire to fulfil their purpose of burning etc. are found to be active in respect of the fire about which the judgment is formed. Therefore, it is concluded that like perception, inference also is non-inconsistent, since it enables us to reach an object about which a judgment is formed (adhyāvasita).
Refuting this argument, Bhāsarvajña asks whether that judgment is in respect of that object only which is seen or is even in respect of that which is not seen. If it is in respect of the object which is seen, then fire which is capable, of burning etc. could not be an object of inference as it is not perceived by it. And if the judgment is said to be there in respect of an object which is seen, then the inference which gives rise to such a judgment cannot be erroneous, as perception is not erroneous. Now, if the second

1. See: स पुनः बारोचितः अर्थं: गृह्यप्रणमणं: स्वल्पार्थकेन अस्तित्वं यतः।
   ततः: स्वल्पार्थकेत्यस्वल्पेत्यमेतु प्रृविषिविषयः: अवृत्तानुस्य ।
   - Nyāyabindutikā, p. 16
   "But this imagined object, which is apprehended (by inference) is definitely referred to an (imagined) particular. Thus it is that constructed particulars are the proper province of inference". (Stcherbatsky)

2. See: "And very interesting is the opposition between pratyakṣa and anumāṇa, the first moves from kṣaṇa to to santāṇa and the second from santāṇa to kṣaṇa, that is the reason that although bhṛnta the anumāṇa is nevertheless pramāṇa because through it we indirectly also reach kṣaṇa, the arthakriyākṣaṇa. It is bhṛnta directly and pramāṇa indirectly, pratyakṣa is pramāṇa directly and bhṛnta (asatkalpa) indirectly"

   - Stcherbatsky's Letter to S.N.Dasgupta,
   A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol.I, p. 409,
   F.N.1, Cambridge, 1969.
alternative that the ascertainment is in respect of an unperceived object, be admitted, then all things in the three worlds would become the object of the judgment, as they are all alike unperceived. The opponent may argue that judgment in regard to the three worlds by virtue of the superimposition of memory is not possible; for instance, when we see light, we form the judgment in respect of a gem, and not in respect of the three worlds. In this example the memory of gem is superimposed upon the light, so only the superimposed thing can be the object of judgment, such is not in the case of the three worlds. The nature of illusion is such that one thing is perceived and a judgment is formed about a different thing.

The answer to this is that if this be admitted, then perception also comes to be erroneous, inasmuch as in perception we form a judgment in respect of a point instant (ksana), which is different from the point instant that was perceived.

1. See: यथा प्रदीपाकले मणिभ्रेष्ठ विच्छेदितः, न केलोऽयुः। - NyB, p. 55
   Read: मणिप्रमाणेष्वैष्किन्द्रियभवतत् पारम्ययोऽक्षणितमभवति। - Sarvadarsārasamgraha, p. 45
   Also Read: यथा मणिप्रमाणेष्व अस्य मणिः। शोभा प्रेमयोग्य प्रभासोऽर्जुन्यातां मणिप्रमाणिः। भवति। -
   Tīkā (Vāsudeva Abhyankara), SVD, p. 45, BORI, Poona 1951
Besides, it cannot be justified that on there being the judgment of a point-instant (a momentary thing) which is perishable (in a moment), persons who desire to fulfil their purpose activate themselves (because when they reach, the thing perceived by them will not be there). Nor is the blue-element different from the point-instant (ksana, a momentary thing in series of successive cognitions) so that in respect of it there would be non-inconsistency in regard to the activity etc. And just knowledge is not non-inconsistent (na a-vi-samvadi) because the position is the same with respect to hair apparition, etc. also. That is to say, in order to establish a cognition as non-inconsistent, pure knowledge is not sufficient. Otherwise, while we have the illusory cognition of hair-apparition it must be conceded as non-inconsistent, merely on the ground of pure knowledge that we have. Moreover, it is also not proper to say that the same santanā (continuum) which was apprehended by perception is determined, since the santanā also is a conceptual construction and is really not existent as a separate reality from the point-instant (ksana—which alone is real).

The Buddhist cannot accept that perception has for its object that which is empirically existent (i.e. what is a

1. See : इव सत्ये समुपाधित्य कुडाणां समदेशनाः।
   लोकस्वरूपकथा व सत्यं च प्रमाणः।।
   - Mādhyamika-kārikā 24-8.

   Read: समथािपर्वाण्य स्वरूपम् कस्म ध समथािपर्वाण्य सवथशास्त्रायत्वात्
   कथावानां स्वरूपं हत्यथाते। परस्परसम्बन्धम् वा स्वरूपं कत्योपत्यांश्च अत्यमः
   इतर् औषधियाः। अत्यां स्वरूपं स्मितम् लोकस्वरूपवहाः। हत्यथं।| स च अभिवानाधिकपि
   सार्वभौमोयादि ज्ञानेवातिविद्या।।

   - Chandrakirti's Tīkā on MK, Mūla-Mādhyama-Kārikā of Nāgārjuna ed. by Dr.Heramba Chatterjee,Calcutta.1962
result of conceptual construction or Nescience, but is not existent from the highest point of view), because if this be admitted, there would be the contingency of this (i.e. perception) not being different from inference. And if purely from the empirical point of view, perception is said to be giving rise to a judgment about what is seen and is regarded as non-erroneous, then on the same ground inference could be regarded as non-erroneous like perception; for the position is alike. So let this great talk be ended.

Dharmakirti has mentioned four types of perception in his Nyāyabindu. They are as follows: (i) Sense-knowledge (Sensation), (ii) Mental sensation (iii) Self-consciousness and

1. See *Nyāyabindu*, up. 12-14; *Nyāyabindu*, pp. 13-14.

According to Dharmakirti, there are four varieties of direct knowledge: "(i) Sense knowledge (Sensation). Cognition, as far as it depends (on the activity) of the senses (alone) is sensation; .....(ii) Mental sensation follows (the first moment of every) sense-cognition (which is thus) its immediately preceding homogeneous cause. (The latter) is cooperating with (the corresponding moment of) the object, (i.e. with that momentary object) which immediately follows the proper (momentary) object (of sensation); .....(iii) Every consciousness and every mental phenomenon are self-conscious; (iv) The (mystic) intuition of the Saint (the Yogi) is produced from the subsculminational state of deep meditation on transcendental reality". Buddhist logic, II. pp. 25-30.
(iv) Yogic intuition. Bhasarvajña says that Yogic intuition which is accepted as pramāṇa by the Buddhist, would thus be non-pramāṇa. For, Yogic perception cannot point to a reality existent thing since the things of the past and of the future that are admitted as perceived by a yogin, do not exist in the present and so they are not capable of doing any successful activity. And in the absence of this characteristic, Yogic perception cannot be a pramāṇa. Likewise self-consciousness also cannot be a pramāṇa. For it cannot point to an object in respect of which our activity could occur. So it cannot be said to be non-inconsistent. Thus the theory of valid knowledge being non-inconsistent as held by the Buddhist cannot stand any investigation. Therefore, just the shape of an object assumed by knowledge cannot be accepted as 'pramāṇa,' for such a shape is possible even in the case of illusory knowledge.

1. कर्तारामलकाराभावानास्ति कर्तव्यं तद्विवृत्ते प्रत्यक्षः । तत् हि स्तुतयेऽस्तु 
स्तुतात्तवः तथावचिकत्वम् ।... प्राप्तिद्वयार्थग्राहित्वां च संवादकः । कतः प्रत्यक्षः । स्ततप्रत्यक्षवचः । (पौर १७), 
येन हि तदेण प्राप्त आत्मा संवादत तद्धृतम् आत्मवेदनं प्रत्यक्षम् ।... तस्माद आत्मात्व नीलाधारं अन्यदेव सातामनुस्ते नीलाधारानाने । तद्व ज्ञात्वम् ।
ततः अस्तित ज्ञातानुमयः । तत् च ज्ञात्वम् वेदनं आत्मवेदनं सातात्वार्थिनिर्विकल्पकम् क्षणात्त्व च तस्माद प्रत्यक्षः । ॥

Now, putting forth alternatives Bhāsarvajña critically analyses the shape-theory of perception, held by the Buddhist. He asks: 'Is the nature of the external object, as being non-consciousness (a-bodha), known or not? If the Buddhist answers that it is not known, then there should be an end to the talk about external object. A thing which cannot be known, cannot ever be discussed; the nature other than consciousness is not known, so it cannot be then talked about. Hence we could never know of a non-consciousness external object. The opponent may urge that it is known through the knowledge having the shape of the external object, the blue, etc. Then again it may be asked whether the nature of the external object, as being non-consciousness (a-bodha) is known through that knowledge as having the shape of the nature of non-consciousness or through that knowledge, as not having such a shape. If it be said that it is known through the knowledge not having such a shape, then the blue or the like also may be known just through knowledge not having the shape of the blue, etc. Then what is the use of imagining the shape of the blue, etc. as assumed by knowledge? But if it be admitted that the nature of the external object, as being non-consciousness is known through only knowledge which has

1. See: अध प्रतीयते असक्ष तद्याकारण जानेन, तद्याकारण वा
   कत्वाकारण वा ? — Nyā, p. 56
(तद्याकारण - क्याकिरण, तद्याकारण - अ-बोधाकारण,
कत्वाकारण - अक्षोष - बाकारण)
assumed such a shape, then even the cognition or the knowledge would be of the nature of non-knowledge or non-consciousness owing to the identity with this shape of non-consciousness. Now, if in spite of the identity of the cognition or the knowledge with the shape of non-consciousness, the Buddhist does not recognise the cognition as of the nature of non-consciousness or non-knowledge, then the shape of the blue, etc. could be accepted as of the nature of non-knowledge; though it is identical with knowledge, since both the cases are similar (i.e. in spite of the identity between the two, one is not of the nature of the other). And the nature of knowledge and the nature of non-knowledge being opposed to each other could not possibly be one. As Dharmakīrti himself says: - "Indeed, this superimposition itself of contrary attributes (upon the pure cognition of a thing-in-itself) and the difference of causes (that give rise to a cognition)

1. See: तथा च चर्मकृतिनिवोधेऽस्मि "कामेव हि मेदो मेदेलुव्वाः
   मावान्यं चतुर्दशायां: कारणमेदशः"। NYB, p. 57;
   Compare: कामेव खल मेदो मेदेलुव्वाः मावान् चतुर्दशायां;
   कारणमेदशः। तत् खल न मेदो, न कामेव खल मेदेलुव्वाः मेदेलुव्वाः
   इत्यं विश्वं स्यात्र। -
   Svārthānumāna-Paricchedā, with
   Dharmakīrti's own Commentary (Svopajñavṛtti); kā.35
   (Svārthānumāna), p. 13, ed. by Dalsukhbhai Malvania,
   Varanasi 1959
constitute difference among things or constitute the cause
of difference among things." And if difference could not be
established on this ground, no thing would be different from
anything else; and the world would be one substance. To
return to our point, we can say that the nature of knowledge
and the nature of non-knowledge certainly create the difference

1. Read: "The external reality, which is in the form of
unique particulars (sva-lakṣaṇa), has no extension in
terms of space, and no duration in terms of time; it
is devoid of all attributes, determinations or relations.
It has no form, and is therefore transcendent (thing-in-
itself). It is grasped through pure sensation, and in
terms of our thought we are never conscious of it as it
is "in itself"...... the universal is only a generalized
form imposed by our mind on the data (sva-lakṣaṇa or
unique particulars) grasped in pure sensation. Form
is given to object of experience by the intellect, for,
according to Dignāga, the universal or the generalized
form (Sāmānya-laksāṇa) is no external reality, but a
mere mental construction."

Critique of Indian Realism, p. 3.
between the cognition and the object. The acceptance that
inspite of the identity between knowledge and the shape of
the blue, etc; the shape of the blue, etc. remains as of the
nature of non-knowledge and consciousness as of the nature of
consciousness leads to the conclusion that the knowledge and
the shape of the external object are different from each other.
Hence the identity of pramāṇa and phala as held by the Buddhist
cannot be justified.

Dharmakīrti says in his Pramanavārtika that though the
self of the consciousness is not divided into parts, it is
determined ( and not actually grasped - Prajñākaragupta) as being endowed with the difference
of the object-aspect, the subject - aspect and the cognition
aspect (grāhya, grāhaka and samvitti) by thinkers (Naiyā-
yikas) whose outlook (i.e. thinking) has been led astray.

Further, Dharmakīrti says that the knowledge in the form
of subject-object-aspects is classified under the heads of

1. See : sff^rrPTTi[fH I

2. See : HTWFFvffwTq: 1

Also Read : "तस्मात् ग्राह्यग्राह्यकलापिपत्र पर वातपत: विष्णुमाणापि
पैयामानकलिस्थिति: यथावर्तमानमन्यि प्रियते । ग्राह्याकारो नेतः, ग्राह्याकारो
नामः, संविचित्ततनामु तर वयस्त्वपतः । -

- Manorathanandivrtti, p. 206
object to be known, pramāṇa and phala, though from the point of view of the highest reality, such a classification does not exist. It is only mentally constructed on the basis of accordance with its perception.

Bhāsarvajñā says that this view of Dharmakīrti is refuted by his above-mentioned argument as the difference of prameya, pramāṇa and cognition is established as real. If the arrangement of prameya, pramāṇa and phala is in accordance with illusory perception (or perverted outlook) though it does not exist in reality, then why is the same not done even in the case of illusory cognition of hair etc.? For, in both cases the illusory appearance (perverted, outlook) is alike there. Consequently we could not possibly differentiate pramāṇa from non-pramāṇa.

The opponent may urge that the answer to this objection is already given. It is as follows: The Buddhist who regards consciousness as the only reality would call that empirical behaviour (of seeing rope as serpent, or nacre as silver) invalid, seeing that it is regarded as unreliable even by an ignorant person who suffers from the faults of Neiscience.

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1. Read: विवक्तलब्धाराजाश्रावकाकारकोपलब्धा ।
   तथा कत्यवस्तैम केशावदिशामेवदत ।
   स नीलादित बहिदेश ग्राह्यम, बान्ताः च सवेदन्त शाक्क्ष सत्य
   दिप्लब एष: - । न तद्भक्षिणानविश्लेषश्च शाक्क्षव द्वाहः।
   केशाववास्य: अस्तित, किं ततः? केशावास्यः प्रकाशः स्य केवल: ।
   - MNV, p. 119
residual impressions and desires; and he regards the other behaviour (of looking upon serpent as serpent and the like) as valid in view of the fact that there is no inconsistency thereby in practical behaviour till the mundane life lasts, owing to the firm impressions left by the uninterrupted continuity of such behaviour. It is not proper that what is empirically valid should be such even from the highest point of view. But some fools (the Realists) create confusion in the mind of people even in this respect and so the vijñānavādin Buddhists repeatedly pondering on the knowledge of the form of reasoning lead the people in the direction of that which is valid from the highest point of view, being pure due to its distinction from illusion and unsublated.

1. See: "The Realists finds the origin of our knowledge in the objective world (artha) and passed (past ?) experience (sanskāra = vāsanā), the Buddhist finds it also in the same two places, but the objective world for him are only the momentary things, the point-instants of efficiency (sva-lakṣaṇa = kṣaṇa) and past experience (vāsanā), replacing the soul, assumes the role of a transcendental Force of Illusion (avidyā-vāsanā = māyā) creating the categories as 'fictions of the mind...... which a common delusion erroneously takes for independent facts' (Bradley, Logic, p. 96)"

- Buddhist Logic (Stcherbatsky), Vol.II, p. 291, Foot-Note 5
Bhasarvajña's answer to this is that this is not proper, because, while all pramāṇas that are known in the world are regarded as unreal, on what ground could the Buddhist ascertain that the other pramāṇa is pure due to its distinction from illusion and it is real from the highest point of view? For, the pramāṇas that are known in the world are the only means we have to ascertain the nature of anything. This cannot be ascertained by means of pratyakṣa, as yogic knowledge is not an object of the direct experience of common people like us. If it is argued that self-consciousness (ṣva-saṃvedana) is the only true perception, still the discrimination from what is other than the real could not be achieved by means of that so-called true pramāṇa, since it being a pure sensation, is merely conscious of its own existence which is unqualified. Nor can this discrimination be established by means of inference, as it requires the knowledge of the liṅga with triple characteristics. And the state of being three-fold in respect of the knowledge or the object which is devoid of parts is

1. See: त्रेष्वध्ययः पुनः लिंगस्वायुपेये तत्त्वङ्गे, सापधे वच्छ तत्त्वः, क्षापधे च तत्त्वः एव निर्विषतः। -NB, pp.22-23

Also Read: "'The three aspects of the mark are (first) 'just' its presence in the object cognized by inference, its presence only in similar cases; its absolute absence in dissimilar cases is necessary" -

- (Stchertbatsky) BL, II, pp.51,55,56
cannot be real. But if it be said that a real thing can be established on the ground of the linga with imaginary threefoldness, then even on the ground of inference as conceived by others (i.e. Naiyāyikas and others) the real thing (the external object) could be established, because there is no difference in both the cases. And the non-inconsistency in ordinary practical behaviour is possible even in the inference of the difference of pramāṇa, pramāṇī etc. Moreover, why do the Buddhists not accept the non-momentariness of objects, which is cognised as non-inconsistent with the practical behaviour of all people, just as the inference of fire is accepted on this very ground (that it works in practice). The opponent may argue that non-momentariness cannot be accepted, because men with a rational approach (i.e. Buddhists) have put forth refutations of it. This is not tenable, says Bhāsarvajña; for such refutations would be set aside later on by him. Besides, if even what is cognised as being non-inconsistent with practical behaviour is not accepted only because 'people guided by reason' (Buddhists) put forth refutations or objections, then the shape of the object present in knowledge should also not be accepted, since the Buddhist himself has put forth something which could sublate it. It is said in the Pramāṇa-vārtika:

1. See Nyā, pp. 510 ff

2. See: अन्वयोक्त्र भाष्य नानाप्रथामासिनः।
सन्य श्रुतारास्थित्वक्त्रं हानितः।। - PV, 3-358

Also Read: अन्वया यदि वस्तुः ग्रामिणिविभागः दृश्यो, तद्विभवार्त्त्र भाष्य ज्ञात्तमः नानाप्रथामासिनः: तदानाप्रतिपाप्लृत्तिः वाक्यार्थार्थितः: कर्म सत्यं स्वः, तत्त्व एकात्ततः: एकत्वक्त्रं हानितः।। - MNV, p. 206
like cognizer etc. are really apprehended, then how could the
knowledge which is an entity of uniform nature really have
the shapes of the object etc; which appear in various forms?
If these various shapes were real, the knowledge would lose
its uniform nature. Now, if it is urged that the target of the
above criticism (of Dharmakīrti) is the exponent who advocates
that nothing other than Ātman exists; (Ātmādvaitavādin); then
this is not proper. For the position is the same for both the
Buddhist as well as for the follower of non-dualism; since both
of them admit advaita (non-dualism). Bhāsarvājña refutes later
the Buddhist view that knowledge assumes the shape of the object.
So he concludes here that even in the Buddhist view, a thing
that could be the most efficient or special instrument (sādhaka-
tama) in bringing about the cognition, cannot reasonably be
established.

It may be noted here that Śaṅkarācārya also regards pramāṇas
as meaningful only so long as one does not realise the Absolute
Non-dual Reality. All injunctions and all other means of valid
knowledge terminate in this alone viz. "I am Brahman". When
there is the realisation of the non-dual self, there can no
longer be any means of valid knowledge.

1. See: Nyāyā, pp. 108-9
2. See: तस्मात् अहँ कहार्धिवर्गं द्वेषस्व-कहाना स्व सर्वं विषयः:
सुवाचिक नैवर्थिण न्यायाः अर्थात्
- SB on RS.1.1.4
View Held by A Section of the Naiyāyikas: The followers of one school of the Nyāya hold that an instrument which is specially efficient among all the instruments, in bringing about the result is called 'sādhakatama'. In grammar it is laid that in order to show the state of super-excellence, the suffixes 'tamap' and 'iṣṭhan' are added to words. Bhāsarvajña's answer to this is that what is said above is true. But this very super-excellence of one instrument from among many other instruments, is something that we do not see for all kārkas operate alike in regard to the same act (kriyā). Why, it may be said, Uddyotakara (Tamori = Enemy of Darkness) has explained the super-excellence (atisāya) in a number of ways. He says that the term

1. See: बर्तिलाद्ये लम्बविष्टाः || -Paññini-sūtra 5.5-55.
Also See: साक्षकम् कारणसः || पार्व ३२० दाणै ४२, हिताकुलिणि, प्रकटो-पकार्क कारणसः स्वातः। -Siddhāntkaumudi, kārakaprakaraṇa, p.33 (M.V. Mahashabde), Bombay, 1955

2. See: चक्रहरू केकिएकाघटकसिद्धे औषधि साक्षकल्प प्रमाणचः, न तु प्रमाणूप्ये के कलु साक्षकल्पार्थः। साक्षकल्प प्रमाणं चति केलक वाक्यवस्थितीयव नार्थं चति।
(१) नावामायकः: तदस्वचा। न प्रमाणतरिप्रेये वा कति प्रमा प्रभावित, सति तु प्रभावित। न पुनः सति मूल्यचे। प्रमाणं तु सति प्रभावित। स चावामायिश्च: साक्षकल्प स्वप्नविचारेत। (२) यदृच्छ वा प्रभिप्रेये स: वर्तितयः....(१) संयोजनव, चरसमावित वा, यथा वा सौंयोगः पुस्तांभावी ईकायणलिप्तिः तथा प्रमाणं चरसमावित चालुक्त्रयेतः प्रमाणशास्त्रप्रभावित चति पुस्तांभावः: अविशयः। (४) प्रतिपदे: अन्नंतरवा, यथौ वा प्रमाणान्नत्त्वं प्रतिपक्षेनव वा चावामायिश्च हरः। (५) चक्रहरु चारणकारणाः वा.... (६) प्रमाणान्तरसौंयोगविभक्तचन्द्रवा: वा। यथौ वा प्रमाणान्तरसौंयोगः, तस्य प्रमाणान्तरते वर्तितयें अविशयः चक्रहरु मे विवेकवाव्रुः। -

-NV, MNG, pd.9-10
'sādhakatama' or 'atisaya' signifies (i) a means, in the presence or in the absence of which, there is the presence or the absence of pramāṇa accordingly. That is to say, the presence or the absence of pramāṇa strictly depends upon the presence of or the absence of pramāṇa. In the presence of pramāṇa, pramāṇa, if it is to occur, occurs invariably. On the other hand, in the presence of pramā타 and prameya, pramāṇa arises, but not invariably. Even in the presence of pramā타 and prameya, the thing or the factor, the absence of which does not allow the pramāṇa to arise, is called 'sādhakatama'; or special means or most efficient means. (ii) Or the term 'atisaya' signifies 'caramabhāva', being the final. The other factors being present prarma (valid knowledge) does not invariably occur, but when finally pramāṇa comes, immediately after its addition pramāṇa arises, just as when a cloth is to be produced from fibres; it is not produced until the conjunctions of fibres take place. So its being final is 'atisaya' in it, its excellence. (iii) Or 'atisaya' signifies immediacy to the cognition. That immediately after which the cognition arises is 'atisaya' (iv) Or the term 'atisaya' may indicate the character of being an uncommon cause. Pramāṇa is a cause.

1. See : संयोगता चरणाभिष्टता वा । - NV, NCG, p. 10
   Also see : यथा तन्त्रातु पर्ते जनपेताव्यं कल्पत : संयोगमेता।
   यवन्त्वां पर्ते उपपथ । - NVTT, NCG, p. 38

2. ताओ तत्र साहारण्यां कारणं प्रत्यज्ञादिज्ञानान-नास ! संविश्वाचा दिशा प्रेमवर्धिकि अस्तुपर्यं बसाहारणात्वात् तथापुरुष ।
   प्रमाणं तद्र ताओ तत्र साहारणात्वात् प्रत्यज्ञानस। प्रायस्यात्र व शास्त्राचतुर्वेन' बलात्तेचं शर्मं शिंत। -
   - NV, NCG, p. 10
common to all cognitions, perceptual, inferential, etc. Prameya also, being common to all cognisers, is an ordinary cause. But pramaṇa being a peculiar cause of cognition is - prime; and owing to its primacy it is called 'sadhakatama'. (v) Or the term 'atisāya' may suggest the character of being helpful to the contact that gives rise to pramaṇa. It is the super-excellence of pramaṇa that it becomes especially helpful to the contact immediately after which the cognition arises.

(vi) Or the state of the pramaṇa having its purpose not fulfilled is the meaning of the term 'atiśaya'. Pramāta and

1. See: प्रामाण्यकोण्योगनयुग्मकर्त्तव्यम् वा। - NyB, p. 59
   Compare: प्रामाण्यसंवादं विशेषकर्त्तव्यम् वा। यो वा प्रामाण्यसंवादं संयोगः।
   तस्य प्रामाण्यसः, अनुग्रहे कृत्यां विद्ययोग्यविद्यविद्युः। - NV, NCG, p. 10.

2. Here it must be noted that this alternative is not given in the passage (NV, NCG, p.10) where this list of alternatives is put forth. But this can be traced in the preceding passage (NV, NCG, p.9). So it is not necessary to refer this alternative to NVTT as the editor of the NyB does;

The said alternative is as follows:

अविरितार्थिता वा- प्रमाणप्रमेये प्रमाणं कुल्यं विषयः महतः। प्रमाणं तु अविरितार्थित,
प्रमाणं कुल्यं विषयं भावितम् च, हृदयः। - NyB, p.59;

Compare: नन्त्र प्रमाणप्रमेये प्रमाणं कुल्यं विषयं सहजतः
विषेणाः वा वक्तव्यं हृदितः। कृं विशेषं प्रमाणं प्रमाणप्रमेये। वैराग्यसाधनां
प्रमाणान्य प्रमानं प्रमेयं च विषयम्। अविरितार्थिते तु प्रमाणाद। किं वदेना-
प्रलोक्ष्यकर्त्तव्यं हृदितः। - NV, NCG, p.9.

Also compare: तद्विद्र प्रमाणप्रमेये प्रमाणं वैराग्यसाधनां, अविरितार्थिते
व प्रमाणस्य, तस्याऽथ तदेव फलेऽहुः। - NVTT, NCG, p.36
prameya are said to have served their purpose by giving rise to pramaṇa. Their attainment of their purpose consists in stimulating the pramaṇa to function. When Pramātā and prameya have performed this function, they may be said to have served their purpose or to have been successful. But pramaṇa remains unsuccessful until it gives rise to valid knowledge. So pramaṇa is called 'sādhakatama' (vii) or that endowed with which the cogniser cognises an object is super-excellence or 'atisaya'. Thus Bhāsarvajña has mentioned here all the seven alternatives regarding the significance of the term 'atisaya', that are put forth by Uddyotakara in his Nyāyavārtika.

Criticising Uddyotakara for having put forth a number of inconclusive alternatives, Bhāsarvajña says that though the Ācārya attempted to dispel the doubts of his pupils, he in fact aggravated them considerably. Even after so many alternatives being presented, the question as to what is the 'sādhakatama' remains unanswered.

Some hold that from among the various alternatives, what is intended to be regarded as 'sādhakatama' or the special instrument is that cause alone, which is final - immediately after which the cognition occurs. But this is not justifiable, says

1. See: प्रकृत्य व संसायनिवृत्त्य न्ववेले आचार्यो ज्ञानसङ्क्षेपात्र सङ्क्षेपात्र प्रदल्याः प्रम्भविक्षितः स्व सप्तः। - Nyāya, p. 59

2. See: कैलिक तु अचार्योपोतकरोदितिविचिक्षितमेव सत्यप्राप्तव क्षेत्रप्राप्तः। चर्मविनिकाल एव तमः। तथा च यदन्त्वरं प्रमा जायते स्व तद्प्राप्तः। वास्तवायनिति। तदसः। - NML(Aparākṣadeva), p. 102
Bhasarvajña. For, even prameyas (objects of valid knowledge) such as pleasure, pain etc. are found to be the final cause in their own apprehension. To wit, when one perceives a pot, the pot is not the final cause in its apprehension, since the contact of the sense-organ with the pot is final. But when one perceives happiness etc; the object (here 'happiness') becomes final, because as soon as the happiness is present in the soul it comes in contact (by Samyukta Samavaya contact) with the mind without requiring any other sense-organ of media and its perception occurs immediately. So we can say that the presence of the object is final in its apprehension as even the contact of mind and soul does not occur after this, and still happiness or the like is not regarded as the special cause of the cognition of happiness or the like.

It may be argued that it is true that the object like pleasure, though being final, cannot be called pramāṇa. But the knowledge of pleasure-ness is final and so it can be called,

1. See: अत्त्वा मनसा सङ्कुच्येत पद्मिनेयं शिर्मयते।

- MB on NS. 1.1.4

2. See : प्रभास: कस्मौदित्यिकारं खलु भावना: संयोगः। य च सर्वभावायुरगः।

- NVTT, NCG, p. 38
'sādhakatama'. Such a knowledge of pleasure-ness can give then rise to the perception of pleasure. The answer to this is that in respect of the nirvikalpaka perception, the knowledge of pleasure etc. is not accepted as preceded by the perception of its generality, i.e. pleasureness. So the perception of pleasureness cannot be sādhakatama since it does not precede the perception of pleasure. And this point viz. the generality is not cognised before the thing itself will be elaborated later on. Similarly though the wholes (avayavins) are the final in the production of the colour etc. that reside in themselves, yet they, being the substratum of colour etc., cannot be karana. It is believed that dravyas remain quality-less in the first moment of their origination, and then the qualities are produced in them. Thus, any composite whole, though being final in the production of qualities, cannot be karana. But in the apprehension of colour etc. we must admit the eyes etc. as Karana. If we do not admit this, then the existence of the eyes etc. cannot be established by means of inference based on the concomitance of action and special instrument; e.g. the apprehension of colour.

1. See: Praṇyāmāṇaṁ niyāmaṁ āryaṁ sreṣṭhasaṁkāra-viśeṣaṁ gṛhaṇāni-virāpasya dhvān āne tvaṁ nityakālaṁ. - NV, p.176

2. See: Tṛṣṇāṅkaṁ niyāmaṁ deva-ś DataContext त्रि स्वविषयाचायं तैन तत्कालं श्रेष्ठ स्वविषयाचायं प्रविषयाचायं वेदितवामु, आधारणप्रवेश श्रेष्ठ। - NV, NCG, p.411 (N3. 1.1.12);

Also Read : च्हिन्नश्रुताक्षर्तिन्युथवात्स कर्त्वन्त ः श्वस्वविषयोपकालविश्वास्त्र-चेतन अनुपत्त्वायनः। - NVTC, NCG, p. 413
etc. is an action, therefore it must have some special instrument, just as the action of cutting has the axe as the special instrument. Bhāsarvājña emphatically says that though the sense-organ-object contact is final, it is not the karāṇa; in fact in the apprehension of colour etc. sense-organs alone should be accepted as karāṇa. Even in our mundane life, the axe etc. are known as karāṇa, and not the axe-wood contact, though it being final. That which is final cannot be accepted as karāṇa, since it is contradicted by the Tulasūtra. This sutra runs as follows:

1. लोक्यवहाराति लोक्यवहाराकिर्णवाचस्य तु प्राप्तः।
2. तत्त्वायोगस्य तुलासुत्रः
3. विरूपाति व न वर्णस्वरूपः कराण्त्वमेव हिः।
4. - NyB, p.60; Compare (Photostat):
5. लोक्यवहाराति काराण्त्व प्रक्षिप्तं, न तत्त्वायोगस्य तुलासुत्रविरूपाति
6. व न वर्णस्वरूप कराण्त्वभिमिति।
7. - Photostat p. 25. It may be noted that the whole line in the text of the Nyāyabhāṣā (वास्तवार्थिदिव्य: स्यात्, विशेषानावाराम लोक्यवहाराय सु प्रणाया) is not found in the Photostat.
8. It cannot be construed in the syntax. It is obviously out of place here.

2. See: प्रेया च तुला प्राप्ताण्यक्रमः।
9. - NS, 2-1.16
10. Also read: गुरूत्वपरिपरिमाणानवाचारं तुला प्राप्ताणं, आनविषयः
11. गुरूत्वपरिपरिमाणानवाचारं प्रेयक्षः। यदा सुवर्णार्थिना तुलान्त्वां व्यवस्थाप्ते
12. तदा तुलान्त्वार्थिनो शुवर्णार्थिवेशस्त्रां प्रणायां तुलान्त्वां प्रेयक्षमिति।
13. - NB on NS 2. 1. 16
"The weighing balance, which is a Pramāṇa, (the means of ascertaining the weight of things), is prameya also, (as regards its own accuracy). The Nyāyabhāṣya explains that "the weighing balance is called pramāṇa, when it is the means of bringing about the cognition of the exact weight (of the thing weighed), but when the gold thus weighed is made the means of testing (ascertaining) the accuracy of another balance, then in the cognition (of the accuracy) of this other balance, it becomes the 'pramāṇa', and the other balance becomes the prameya." So in the light of this, we cannot say that that which is the final cause is alone the karaṇa. Consequently, the view that what is the final cause alone is karaṇa cannot be accepted.

Then Bhāṣarvajña refers in this connection to the view held by Rucikāra, a forgotten Naiyāyika. In this context he says that

1. See: Nyāyasūtra (with Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya), NS 2-1-16, (Gangānātha Jha)
2. See: Durveka mentions three later names, Adhyayana, author of the Rucitika (Dharmottarapradīpa, p.175), Trilocana (p.173-74) and Viśvarūpa (p.175). All their works have perished due to Vācaspati's pre-eminence."-History of Nyāya-Nyāya in Mithila,p.23

Read: "Utpalakārikā: आचार्यान्याचार्यान्यां शास्त्रविद्यान्यां १५६ तमे पृष्ठात्ं सम्भवी निर्क्षणां, सम्भवी च ज्ञाविवेच: स्वेच्छ आचार्यांत्यास्यां पादं । प्रश्नोऽति - आचार्यांत्यास्यामापो भाष्यादो मतीम विन्यासां - न्यायं मूर्ति (१२४) सम्पन्नात: । कथेश्वर गुरुवाचरै राजायाः सुधिः सुचिः सृष्टिः सुचिः कारणां ज्ञानाम् ज्ञाता तद्गाढात: (कथेश्वर १२४)। कथेश्वर गुरुवाचरै राजायाः सुधिः सुचिः सृष्टिः सुचिः कारणां ज्ञाता तद्गाढात: (कथेश्वर १२४)। कथेश्वर गुरुवाचरै राजायाः सुधिः सुचिः सृष्टिः सुचिः कारणां ज्ञाता तद्गाढात: (कथेश्वर १२४)। कथेश्वर गुरुवाचरै राजायाः सुधिः सुचिः सृष्टिः सुचिः कारणां ज्ञाता तद्गाढात: (कथेश्वर १२४)

Also See: "Forgotten Naiyayikas -(3) Acarya Adhyayana" Dr. E.A. Solomo, published in 'Vidyā' Journal of Gujarat University, Jan., 1974
when various views are presented on a single issue, whatever stands to reason should be accepted. Or a man himself, observes Adhyayana, should deliberate upon this and arrive at a conclusion. He endorses the view of Uddyotakara and says that all causes other than karma (prameya) and kartṛ (cogniser, pramātā) should be admitted as sādhakatama (most efficient or special). This has already been stated in the view of Uddyotakara that an instrument, being endowed with which a pramātā (knower) can cognise an object, is called 'atisāya' (super-excellent). There are certain accessory causes that help the agent in the bringing about of an effect. The agent, endowed with these accessory causes, accomplishes an action in respect of the object; these accessory causes alone are sādhakatama, and neither agent nor object. This is how Adhyayana interprets the view of Uddyotakara. Or he himself made a conjecture and said: 'all kārakas other than kāryakāraka and kartkrkāraka should be accepted as karana.'

The view that the causal complex is sādhakatama: On the other hand, some do not endorse this view that a certain kāraka can excel over others merely on the ground of its having some difference in characteristics from others. They hold that the causal complex alone is sādhakatama. This causal complex

1. भूवात्र वा प्रमिश्रते रुप विनिंश: ।

2. See: "Nyāya-Vaisēṣika regarded all effects as being due to the assemblage of certain collocations which unconditionally, invariably, and immediately preceded these effects. That collocation (sāmagrī) which produced knowledge involved certain non-intelligent as well as intelligent elements and through their conjoint action...knowledge was produced and this collocation is thus called pramāna"—A His.ofIndiphilosophrn.320
(sāmagrī) once it fully comes about, immediately produces action; like its parts it does not stand in expectancy of anything. And in this sense sāmagrī excels over other single factors. Owing to such an excellence, the sāmagrī is called sādhakatama.

This view also is not proper, says Bhūsarvajña. Indeed sāmagrī signifies a totality of kārakas (active agencies—Jhā) like kartṛkāraka, karānakāraka etc. Then how could it be just karaṇa? It is not true to say that only when the doer or subject etc. are not generative of the effect, they are known as kartṛ etc.; but when they are generative of the effect, the same become karaṇa; for even their being kartṛ-kāraka etc. is based on their relation to some action. Nor is it proper to say that only when agent etc. are generative of the effect, they become karaṇa in view of the total assemblage (samudāya); but from the point of view of the individual constituents, they are kartṛkāraka etc., since viewed as such, i.e. as sāpeksa (relative), it would be imaginary and so there would be the contingency of its being unreal, like the unreal concepts accepted by the Buddhists. It may be urged that Sāmagrī is an altogether different entity from kartṛ etc. and it is this that is the karaṇa. But this is not proper, says Bhūsarvajña. For, if this be accepted, there would arise the contingency of kartṛ etc. not being generative of the effect at all. If causal complex alone be regarded as the cause in the production of an effect, there would arise the contingency of karma etc. not
being kāraṇa which is included in Sāmagrī. This view suffers
from all the draw-backs pointed out in connection with the view
that the final cause is karana. For sāmagrī is in a way the
final cause. Even the causal complex, which is accepted as a
cause (owing to its) being just an attribute, cannot reasonably
be regarded as kāraṇa, for there would be opposition to the
concept of kāraṇa being Sādhakatama Sāmagrī, being just an attri-
but (kārakānam dharma) cannot be the kāraṇa, since if sāmagrī
is accepted as kāraṇa there is nothing in comparison of which
Sāmagrī could be said to be Sādhakatama, as all is included in
sāmagrī.

1. सामग्री ख कार्यार्थम्, कराधिकोऽ अस्मात्सत्तप्रसंजते। चर्मकार्याक्योऽस्व
दुषणादुखत्वात् च हिशति। \--- NML(Apararkadeva)
p.103
The text should be read with punctuations as follows:
अष्टकाङ्क्षी: अमान्तिर सामग्री, तत्साम: कर्णात्वश्च हिशति, न, कारथि: करकस- पाठोत्तरणादुप्तत्वातः
त्त्वाचाग्राहाः, सामग्रीत्वम: एव कार्यात्वश्च: ए० त्वातः, चर्मकार्याः। \--- NYF, p.61 च।

2. Could it be चर्मात्सत्रर्थवान कार्यात्ववेचन अध्युपाताय अधिष्ठ, instead of
हर्मात्सत्रर्थवान कार्यात्ववेचन अध्युपाताय अधिष्ठ अधिष्ठ ? – \--- NYF, p.61;
the photostat also has the reading ‘कार्यात्ववेचन’.
Photostat, p. 25.

Also See : समग्राण्त चर्मात्सत्रर्थवेचन। \--- Photostat, p.25, Margin Note

4. See : कर्णात्वस्य: अवं प्रमाणश्च: करणां च साक्षतमं त्त्वाचार्थितोऽवं,
सि ति कार्यात्वस्य: साक्षतमस्य: हि तद्यथा: कार्यात्वस्य: च कर्णात्वश्च
त्वाचार्थितोऽवं। सामग्री: वैद्यधातु तदनिर्मित्तकार्यात्वस्य: चिकित्सं कर्णात्वस्य: कर्णात्वस्य: चिकित्सं
कस्य: अतिस्थित: हृद्य।।
\--- NM(Pramāṇa Prakarana), p.12
It may be argued that if the above views are not acceptable, the view of Adhyayana (Rucikāra - author of the Rucitīkā) may be accepted. According to it, all kārakas other than Kartrkāraka and Karmakāraka should be admitted as Karanakāraka. The answer to this is that this is not justifiable; because if this view be accepted there would arise the contingency of the absence of Sampradāna Kāraka etc. For, except Kartrkāraka and Karmakāraka, all kārakas would become only Karanakāraka, and so there would be no kāraka like sampradāna or the like. Again, one may argue that according to the maxim of Trnolapa (the relation of general and particular) the usage of calling sampradāna etc. would be possible. For except Kartrkāraka and Karmakāraka, all other kārakas are in general the varieties of karana, but they may particularly be called sampradāna kāraka etc; just as Ulapagras is in general called 'grass', but the same is particularly called 'Ulapa'. But this is not proper, says Bhāsarvajñā, since we never know them (kārakas) as such (karana). Indeed we never know the sampradāna kāraka etc. also as karana kāraka, just as we know Ulapa as grass. And if such a usage (of calling Sampradāna etc. as Karana) be accepted only on the basis of fixed convention (which is arbitrary), then kārta and karmāṇa would inevitably have to be accepted as varieties of karana. Consequently there would not be any real classification.

1. तृणाः = तृणामान्यम्, उलपः = उलपविशेषः | तन्त्रायेः = सामान्य-विशेषमान्यायः | —Editor's Foot-note, Nyāya, p. 61
of Karakas. Moreover, it is not proper to say that certain Karakas are excellent or most efficiently instrumental, simply because they are different from kartri and karmann. If this be admitted, there would arise the contingency of kartri and karmann also being Sadhakatama, since they are also distinct from each other.

After this elaborate discussion on the meaning of the term 'sadhana', the question as to what the Sadhakatama is stands undecided as before. Now, Bhäsarvajña himself attempts to answer this question. He says that an instrument, which is not yet to be accomplished, but is something already accomplished (asadhyasya), and is directly governed by the subject (sakṣatkartrddhisthitasya) and that which brings about the action is called Sadhakatama. These characteristics are not found in other Karakas like sampradāna etc. As for example, when a man seeks to accomplish an action of giving cows to the teachers, they (teachers) are not directly governed by the donor. In this case, what is governed is either the hand or the speech or the mind or something else. Hence, the teachers to whom the cows are given cannot be designated as karaṇa. And when the practical usage to call something 'Karaṇa' is made, even in the absence of any specific cause shown above (i.e. being governed by the subject, etc.), it (the usage) should be looked upon as secondary,

1. साधारणविशिष्टत्व असाध्यत्व सति: क्रियासाधकत्वम् (साधारणविशिष्टत्वम्) -
   - NyB, p. 61
and not as primary. In grammatical syntax we sometimes call karman kartr. But this usage is secondary. In fact unless a person has freedom to do or not to do, he cannot primarily be said to be the agent or kartr. And the word 'freedom' signifies here the accomplishment of an action by the agent's own will. And such a freedom is secondary or superimposed by imagination in the case of non-intelligent things. As for example we say that the a wall wishes to fall down. Here the freedom to fall down or such a wish is imagined in respect of the wall. Thus, such a secondary usage (calling sampradana karana) may be sometimes found in respect of other karakas. But only what has the above-mentioned characteristic can be called a karana in the true sense of the term.

The opponent may raise an objection that if the above-mentioned definition of karana be accepted, there would arise the contingency of an object like pleasure or the like being a karana, inasmuch as pleasure or the like is directly governed by a person and it serves as means in the bringing about of its own apprehension. The answer to this is that this is not proper. For, the qualification, 'that which is not yet to be accomplished, but is something already accomplished (a-sadhyasya),'

1. यूदम् बौद्धनं पतिति ।
   बौद्ध द: पति । - Here though 'odana' is karma, it is treated as kartr.

2. The text is Read with the phrase 'nay shruti karan', and not नृथ केदारनिष्ठु्. See: Photostat p. 25
has been inserted. Pleasure is not a-sādhyā, it is sādhyā, so it cannot be a karaṇa. The term 'sādhyā' signifies here three kinds of objects: (i) that which is to be brought about-nir-vartya; (ii) that which is to be modified (vikārya); (iii) that which is to be attained (prāpya). All these objects are sādhyā, those are to be accomplished. None of these karmas could be said to be 'a-sādhyā' and so also not karaṇa. So unless and until the definition of karaṇa is fully applicable to a karaṇa, there would not arise the contingency of that karaṇa being a karaṇa.

However, it may be noted that sometimes the definitions of subject, object etc. are found to be really applicable to one single entity. As for example, in the action of knowing one's own self, the self-same soul may be classified as a subject, or as an object or as an abode (adhikaraṇa of knowledge). The difference among kārakas due to their definite characteristics, having been thus established; the usage in regard to karaṇa etc. is certainly real. But when there is a mere semblance of karaṇa, etc; the usage should be viewed as secondary. And even when there is absence of any cause to serve as a basis for such a secondary usage, the usage could be possible even by the superimposition of the conceptual construction of its characteristic (_'Hare's horns do not exist!' - here 'hare's horns' is kārta-kāraka, in this case horns are superimposed on hare by the conceptual construction of the characteristic of horns). But in
the absence of some real thing, which could be called karman, etc; primarily, there could not be such usage even by the superimposition of conceptual construction. A thing which has never been seen before, cannot be imagined. We have seen the horns on the body of the cow, or the like and so we can imagine them to be on the head of a hare or the like.

Thus a thing whether it be of the nature of consciousness or non-consciousness which is in reality the most efficiently instrumental in bringing about valid cognition is called pramāṇa. Therefore it is concluded that by the word Śādhanā which stands for Pramāṇa; Pramāṇa (resultant cognition), pramāṇā (cogniser) and prameya (object of pramāṇa) are not signified.

Elucidating the concept of karaṇa or śādhanā, Bhāsarvajña has criticised the views held by the Mīmāṃsakas, grammarians, Buddhists, Uddyotakara and others. He also rejects the view that what is the final cause is the karaṇa. Besides, the view that admits the causal complex as karaṇa is also repudiated by Bhāsarvajña. Bhāsarvajña says that the agent's operation (karaṇa-vyāpāra) cannot be a karaṇa, as its production necessarily leads to the production of the agent, since vyāpāra and the agent are regarded as identical with each other. Vyāpāra

1. That text should be तन्न न तत्र instead of तन्न -
   - Nyā, p. 62; Photostat, p. 26
2. See: शिविभिन्नतायायाभिधायी साधनशंकेऽयमाप्रसः कृत्यपत्ती
   फलं व करणजन्यं कथम् अभिभावनस्तु अस्तिति?
   - Nyā, p. 44
cannot be eternal, otherwise the action would go on eternally without interruption. So the Mīmāṃsaka's view is untenable. As the grammarians hold, according to the speaker's desire, a thing may be regarded as karāṇa. But if this be admitted, there would not be definite arrangement or ordering of the kārikas. For, the speaker's desire is arbitrary; the Grammarians' view also cannot be maintained. The chief rival before Bhāsarvajñā is the Buddhist, especially Dharmakīrti. Bhāsarvajñā's quotes verses from the Pramāṇavartīka; analysing the subtleties of that view, he repudiates the shape-theory of cognition. He says that karman, karāṇa and action or phala can never be non-different. In the world we see that the tree (karman), the axe (karāṇa) and the action of dividing into two (phala) are all different from one another. So this view also cannot be accepted.

It is remarkable that even Uddyotakara is not spared. Bhāsarvajñā sarcastically says that the Ācārya intended to dispel the doubt regarding karāṇa from the minds of his disciples, but on the contrary he confused the matter by putting forth a number of alternatives regarding the meaning of 'atisāya'. Further, he rejects the view that what is the final cause is the karāṇa. Pleasure though being an object, is final in its cognition, but it cannot be accepted as karāṇa. Finally, the view that admits the causal complex as karāṇa has also been rejected by Bhāsarvajñā. According to him, the karāṇa is that which is directly governed by the agent; that which is not to be accomplished, but is already accomplished; and that which can bring about the action.
Even in the Nyaya-vaisesika school we find different views regarding the nature of karana. Vatsyayana says that the fact that pramanas are means of cognising things is indicated by the literal signification of the constituent factors, of the name 'pramaṇa' as it consists of the root 'mā' with the preposition 'pra' and the instrumental verbal affix 'lyuṭ'; its literal signification comes to be 'pramīyate anena', that by the instrumentality of which things are rightly cognised. According to Uddyotakara, that which is the cause of apprehension is pramaṇa. And the pramaṇa excels over other means in the bringing about of an action, so it is sādakatama. Then the Vārtika-kāra goes on describing a number of alternatives as to what the super-excellence of pramaṇa signifies. Basing his view on the Nyayamāñjarī of Jayanta Bhatta, Dasgupta writes - "Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika regarded all effects as being due to the assemblage of certain collocations which unconditionally, invariably and immediately preceded these effects. That collocation (Sāmagrī) which produced knowledge involved certain non-intelligent as well intelligent elements and through their conjoint action uncontradicted and determinate knowledge was produced, and this collocation is thus called pramaṇa or the determinative...

1. उपलब्धिकारणानि प्रमाणानि, विद्वत समावेशानिकीपनमाञ्चालायन्त्र वैश्वर्यम्।
   प्रमीयते केने विद्वत कारणायपदेवानि हि प्रमाणणः। -
   - MB on NS 1.1.3

2. उपलब्धिचेतुः प्रमाणः। उपलब्धिचेतुः प्रमाणत्वः। मावासध्वः:
   तद्वादि। ...... स वायवस्थाय: साधकतत्त्वानुत्त्यस्ते। यद्वादि वा प्रमिनितेः
   स: विद्वतः। -
   - NV, NCG, pp. 9,10
cause of the origin of knowledge. Mentioning conflicting views in respect of the concept of karana, Vācaspati Miśra says that in the view of the Maṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad, well-advanced in knowledge, that which is a means of apprehension is pramāṇa. Kesāva Miśra says in the Tarkabhāṣā that even though the knower and the object of knowledge are present, there does not arise right cognition, (while) when there is the conjunction etc. of the organ of sense with the object, right cognition arises without delay, hence it follows that only the conjunction of organ of sense etc. is the instrument. According to Annam Bhaṭṭa a

1. कपिलवत्तापीतिः कामिनीरः अक्षुरपञ्चाश वैद्यानिकोपनन्दकामानविः

2. Kesāva Miśra says in the Tarkabhāṣā that even though the knower and the object of knowledge are present, there does not arise right cognition, (while) when there is the conjunction etc. of the organ of sense with the object, right cognition arises without delay, hence it follows that only the conjunction of organ of sense etc. is the instrument. According to Annam Bhaṭṭa a

3. Hṛṣṭa akṣarapadāntā pramāṇāntā epikaṃ tvaṃ karāṇāntā


Also Read: (A.B. Gajendragadkar-R.D. Karmarkar), Poona 1934.
a cause which is peculiar and operative is Karana. Athalye writes in his notes on the Tarkasamgraha - "So the complete definition of a karana according to the ancient view is 'Vyāpāravat a-sādhāranam kāranam' i.e. a peculiar and operative cause. This has given rise to an important controversy between the ancients and the moderns. The latter disapprove of the ancient definition of karana given above and propose one of their own, 'a cause which is invariably and immediately followed by the product.' In the tenth century A.D. Bhasarvajña attempted to give an accurate and precise definition of karana. As said before, in his view, an instrument which is directly governed by the agent, that which is already accomplished, and that which is capable of bringing about an action, is called karana.

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1. (वाणार्काः - suspicious text) शासाधारणां कारणं करणं। - Tarkasamgraha, p. 25

2. 'फलायोगविविधन्तिकारणां'। - Anthalye's Notes on TS, - NyB, xxxxx67 p.37.

3. किस्म इतानेन ताहि साधकताय प्रदेय वेति? साधारणाय विषयस्य अस्वास्य सत: श्रीहासाधकत्वं। - NyB, p. 61