Chapter VI

Knowledge Other Than Pramā: Doubt

Definition of Doubt: Bhāsarvajña has pointed out that the term 'Samyak' in the definition of pramāṇa ('Samyak-
amubhava-sādhanam pramāṇam') in the Nyāyasāra is meant to exclude doubt and illusion from among the fruits of pramāṇa. He then proceeds to define these (i.e., doubt and illusion) for, unless we know the nature of a thing we can neither accept it nor reject it. The general definition of Doubt as given in the Nyāyasāra is as follows: Doubt is knowledge of the nature of non-ascertainment. The compound 'anavadhāraṇa-jñānam' is karmadhanaya, and so it means - knowledge which is of the nature of non-ascertainment. It may be urged that it is self-contradictory to call it knowledge and yet say that it is non-ascertaining. The term 'jñāna' itself signifies knowledge of the nature of ascertainment. How can knowledge be non-ascertaining?

1. तत्र अवधारणां श्रीमाता संस्कृत: I - NyS, NyB, p. 12;
   Compare तदनवधारणां श्रीमाता संस्कृत: I - NB on NS 1.1.23;
   See: संस्कृत: संस्कृत: हि द्वाराचनमु नवाचार्यां श्रीमाता संस्कृते
   बेनेन बार्त्त यथा यथा संस्कृत: I - NV (NS 1.1.23), p. 91
   Benares 1915

2. अवधारणां च तद्वा श्रीमाता श्रीमाता I - NyB, p. 12
In answer to this, Bhāsarvajña says that the objection is not tenable. For, the term 'jñāna' is used to signify the genus of knowledge, i.e. jñānatva, like the words cow etc. Thus the word jñāna is a common noun and so it could be used to signify both kinds of knowledge, right and non-right. Words like 'go' (cow), Paṅkaja (lotus) etc. are not used to signify their derivative meanings - that which goes is 'go' (gacchati iti gauḥ), that which is born in mud is 'Paṅkaja' (paṅke jāyate iti paṅkajam); but such words are employed to denote the genus cow, lotus etc. Similarly, the word jñāna also is used to signify the genus knowledge, i.e. jñānatva. And that genus, jñānatva resides in individual cognitions, among which some may be of the nature of ascertainment, while others may be of the nature of non-ascertainment. Hence, the knowledge which is non-determining is here called Anavādārāṇa jñāna, non-ascertaining knowledge. So there is no self-contradiction in saying that Doubt is knowledge which is of the nature of non-determination.

1. अप्राप्तस्य न युक्त द्वित प्रक, न, गौशालादिकाः जातिनिनिपवताः
ज्ञानशुद्धस्य त् — NyB, p. 12

Read: तत्र संस्कृत: तत्त्वं वस्तुस्तवप्रकारविशेषत्तम: प्रत्ययः त्

वनवावाणात्त्वम: च प्रत्ययः च हति व्याहिते न व्यापारः, स्वरूपः-

वचारणात्। स्वरूपस्ववचारप्रयति — अविन श्रेण्यज्ञानस्य हवि। —

— NV, NCG, p.14, Anantlal Thakur, Darbhanga 1967

Also read: परमाठले तु प्रत्येकशब्दो जातिनविचारं। ज्ञानत्व च ज्ञानायथः
स्वरूपादिषु वत्सल वस्तिः हवि न विरूपः: हवि। —

— NVTT Ibid, p. 476
In this context, Bhāsarvajña takes up the topic of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa (non-determinate perception) for discussion. He says that nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is always of the nature of ascertainmet and so the contingency of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa being doubt; does not arise at all. The fact that it is of the nature of ascertainment can be inferred from the memory that nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa brings about. To wit the memory may arise as of this nature - 'This thing is certainly not there;' 'That object is just similar to this;' 'That object is bigger than this one,' or 'It is smaller than this one,' and so on. The memory of such ascertaining nature helps us to infer that its source, viz. nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is also of the nature of determination. On the other hand, apprehension that gives rise to uncertain memory is itself also of the nature of non-determination only and therefore it is doubt. It is obvious that memory imitates the shape of its source. viz. direct apprehension. How could it be otherwise? Bhāsarvajña establishes here that nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa can be of the nature of ascertainmet and hence the memory that arises from it is also of the same nature.

One may raise an objection here that nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa arises at the very first sight of an object, and it arises without depending on the perception of the
particular feature of the object and the like factors. That is to say, such a perception does not depend on the apprehension of any particular of the object, or the remembrance of convention regarding a word and the object denoted by it. How could such a cognition be either of the nature of ascertain¬ment or of the nature of doubt? In reply to this, Bhāsarvajña says that the above contention cannot be admitted, since nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa arises as of the nature of ascertain¬ment from the causal complex of Adrṣṭa (unseen force) etc; and if we do not admit this, it will lead to the fault of infinite series. To wit, the perception of a particular feature that arises without the perception of a particular would be of the nature of non-ascertainment. Moreover, when no cognition of particular is certain or of the nature of ascertain¬ment, the cognition of that which possesses the particular would also come to be non-determinate. And ultimately the whole world would be of the nature of uncer¬tainty.

1. प्रथमादशर्तेन्त्र शान्त विकोषवद्विन्दिनिमित्त्वत्रेण उपजायमानव निश्चयत्वः संस्कृत्तम् वा कथ मिलतुः वहीत्त हति कृत्त, न, वृद्धादिधिमशाक्षी ततपिरे:। अन्यथा अनवधायत्व। विकोषसमुद्र अदार्जन उपवातुव विकोषवद्विन्दिनिमित्त्वत्रेण विनिपोल्लक्तः स्वातः। तत्त्व च विनिपोल्लक्तप्रव विनिमित्तः बपि विनिपोल्लकः हरित विनिपोल्लकः जातु स्वातः। - NyB, p.13

2. कक्षुमार्गायत्तक निकित्त्यकर्, यथा प्रथमादशर्तेन्त्र: शान्त। - NyB, NyB, p.176

Read: प्रथमादशर्तेन्त्र: शान्त विकोषवद्विन्दिनिमित्त्वत्रेण उपजायमानव निश्चयत्वः संस्कृत्तम् वा कथ मिलतुः वहीत्त हति कृत्त, न, वृद्धादिधिमशाक्षी ततपिरे:। अन्यथा अनवधायत्व। विकोषसमुद्र अदार्जन उपवातुव विकोषवद्विन्दिनिमित्त्वत्रेण विनिपोल्लक्तः स्वातः। तत्त्व च विनिपोल्लक्तप्रव विनिमित्तः बपि विनिपोल्लकः हरित विनिपोल्लकः जातु स्वातः। - NyB, p.176
In order to avoid such a contingency, it has to be admitted that even without a particular feature being seen ascertainment could be certain or of the nature of ascertainment. For example, even when we do not ascertain the particular features like head, hand etc. of a man, we do not find that there is absence of ascertainment in respect of the man. That is to say, the ascertainment about a person is not invariably required to be preceded by the ascertainment of head, hand etc. And once the capability of Adrsta (unseen force) is accepted, there is nothing wrong in maintaining that the ascertainment (in the case of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa) is due to Adrsta. Bhāsarvajña emphatically says that it is of no use bringing in the perception of a particular in order to explain how a thing is ascertained, because the perception of particular is itself of the nature of uncertainty and no means of proof is tenable in respect of it. Thus, it is concluded that even without the perception of a particular feature and such factors, knowledge can be on occasions of the nature of determination or of the nature of non-determination. Hence the definition of doubt, viz. "Doubt is knowledge of the nature of non-determination" is faultless.1

1. प्रथमानांमात्राकृति: बनवस्या, कथित धर्म विशेषस्वरूपसाधनादिनिमित्ते,
चन्द्राविख्यातिनिरुपेष्ये ववचारात्मकस्य संबंधेऽष्टेऽन्निष्ठा बनवस्यस्याचि।--
- NML (Aparārkadeva), p.11
Various kinds of Doubt And Their Definitions: It may be urged that if doubt can be defined so briefly and faultlessly, then the Nyāya-sūtra, "Doubt is that wavering judgment in which the definite cognition of the specific character of any one object is wanting, and which arises either - (A) from the cognition of the characters common to the objects concerned, or .......etc." is meaningless.

Bhāsarvajña answers that the Nyāya-sūtra describing doubt is not meaningless. For, it serves the purpose of giving the classification of doubt and of defining the particular sub-types. It is for this very purpose that it is said in the Nyāyasāra - And it (doubt) is divided into five types on the basis of difference in the causes that give rise to doubt. The five kinds of doubt as given in the Nyāyasāra are as follows:

(1) Doubt may arise from the cognition of a common property which is found in many objects; e.g. when we see a tall object at a distance or in the twilight, we are not sure whether it is a man or a post; since tallness is common to both.

1. तत्र अनवाचारणां सङ्क्यः | - Ny8, NyB, p. 12
Read: समानान्यकेशमपि विचिन्द्रियः उपलब्धिः-अनुपलब्धिः चिन्द्राचारः।

2. स च समानान्य-केशमपि विचिन्द्रियः-उपलब्धिः-अनुपलब्धिः चिन्द्राचारः।

3. तत्तथा-समानान्यकेशमपि किमं स्थाप्तं स्वात् पुरुषम्। वैति। -

- Ny8, NyB, p. 13
(2) Doubt may arise from the cognition of a peculiar property, e.g. when we find it difficult to decide whether sound is eternal or non-eternal, as it is the specific quality of ākāśa and is found neither in other eternal objects like atoms etc. nor in non-eternal object like jar and the like.

(3) Doubt may arise due to conflicting views, as for example, when we come across the controversy as to whether senses are physical or non-physical.

(4) Doubt may arise from apprehension, e.g. When we see water at a distance, we cannot decide whether it is real water or unreal (i.e. a mirage). That is to say, both a real thing as well as an illusory one may be perceived, so when we see something we have the doubt, 'Is an existent thing perceived or a non-existent one?'

(5) Doubt may be due to non-apprehension of an object, e.g. when we do not see a goblin, our mind oscillates between two alternatives - viz. Does the goblin exist but is not seen or it does not exist and so is not perceived.

1. अनेकानां वाक्याशिक्षाज्ञानार्थ विकस्य शब्द: नित्यः स्वातः अनित्यः

2. उपलब्धः - किं विप्रेमान धिति? उत्तर अस्त्रे त्रयोः, वर्णे तु आश्चर्याणाः धिति।

3. उपलब्धः - किं विप्रेमान धिति? उत्तर अस्त्रे त्रयोः, वर्णे तु आश्चर्याणाः धिति।

4. उपलब्धः - किं विप्रेमान धिति? उत्तर अस्त्रे त्रयोः, वर्णे तु आश्चर्याणाः धिति।
Now, we come to the comments of the Nyāyabhūṣana on the five-fold division of doubt. In regard to the first type of doubt, someone may contend that it is not probable that a doubt could arise simply from the cognition of common property. That is to say, merely a common property, e.g. tallness in a post and a man, or the like cannot give rise to a doubt. So the definition that a doubt arises from the cognition of common property or the like is not appropriate.

In answer to this, Bhāsarvajña says that this is not proper, for there is no emphatic restriction here. No emphatic restriction is meant that doubt arises simply from the perception of common property. That is to say, other factors giving rise to doubt are not excluded; but a peculiar cause is mentioned here in order to exclude things of the same type - other kinds of doubt - just as in the case of sensuous perception, 'contact of sense-organ and object which is peculiar to it is mentioned; but this is not meant to deny other causes like mind, soul etc. In the case of doubt categories of a different type (- true knowledge etc.,) are excluded by the general definition itself and so this particular definition of a sub-class of doubt presupposes the general definition of doubt.

1. समानप्रति किंमत स्थापु: स्थाप युक्त वे वेवि। -

   - इम्ड, p. 13
So it comes to this that an uncertain cognition (i.e., doubt) arises from the perception of common property—which is a part of the total causal complex giving rise to this doubt. Similarly an uncertain cognition (i.e., doubt) arises from the perception of uncommon or peculiar property, which also is a part of the total causal complex giving rise to this doubt. Now, the doubt that arises in the first case is categorically different from that which arises in the second case. Thus a particular definition of doubt distinguishes one kind of doubt from others and in the same manner all the other particular definitions are to be explained. Thus, no definition of any particular sub-class of doubt is seen to be too-wide or suffering from the fault of ativyāpti.

In Bhāsarvajña's view, the author of the Nyāya-sūtra has included in the definition of doubt the words "the uncertainty attached to perception and non-perception etc." in order to refute likely objections raised with some amount of malice, as well as to mention the auxiliary causes of doubt. However, the entire causal complex does not come to be propounded by the definition, since causes like Adṛṣṭa (Unseen force), Antahkarana (internal organ, mind) etc. are not mentioned therein.

1. सामान्यतःस्वरूपपद: विश्रलेपवर्गः उपविश्व-अनुविश्व-विप्लववस्थाः च विशेषापेशो विनिर्दिः संख्यः | - NS 1.1.23
In this context an objection inspired by malice may be specifically mentioned as follows: Even the apprehension of a common property cannot be a cause of doubt, because even when this is present, doubt does not arise. For example, when a man walks along a path and sees a common property such as greenness or the like; still he does not entertain a doubt in respect of the blades of grass etc.

The answer to this objection is as follows: Expectancy of the knowledge of a particular is also a necessary factor in the total causal complex of doubt. This is significant. One must feel that the characteristic perceived by him could be common to two things, which he is reminded of. And so he expects to see something particular which would help him to say definitely that a thing is one thing and not another.

If the person is not conscious of the fact that the characteristics perceived by him are common to two or more things and that he should perceive something particular (which he is reminded of in the case of each) before he could ascertain what particular thing it is and what it is not, then doubt is not possible. The fact that even in the presence of a

1. समानकालिकम् + विशेषापेचना—→ बनवधारणावान्—संक्षे पर
2. विशेषापेचना तत्त्व विशेषत: बनेचता सार्वाप्ना स्मृतिरतपा, यस्य
   संक्षेपब्ध कारणात्मक स तथोऽक: । —NyB, p.14
   Read: विशेषापेचने विशेष: संक्ष्य हति विशेषापेचने: विशेषास्मृतपेचने
   हति । — NV p.98, Benaras
   Also read: विनेचाश्रयाच: यथोपि ह शास्याम् वत्ति लघाणह विम्बधायाय
   वाक्यासन्यायाय । — NVTT, p.244
   Benaras 1925
particular cause, e.g. the perception of a common property. The effect, i.e. doubt is not produced owing to the absence of some auxiliary cause, does by no means imply that the perception of a common property is not the cause of doubt. If we were to admit the opponent's line of argument, there would arise the contingency of all causes being non-causes. That is to say, any of these causes, though individually not sufficient to produce its effect (e.g. a particular kind of doubt) is certainly indispensable in bringing about the effect and is a cause peculiar to it (that particular kind of doubt).

The opponent may contend here that even in the presence of both, viz. a particular cause such as a perception of a common property and an auxiliary cause like an expectancy of the knowledge of some particular feature a doubt may not arise. For example, when a man perceives his beloved at a distance, he marks a common property like her putting on a saree etc. as are found in many women and expects to grasp some particular feature like leanness of the body or a particular mode of walking. Still he does not entertain any doubt. This indicates that the two causes, viz. the perception of a common property and the expectancy for the knowledge of some particular feature do not suffice to bring about the effect, i.e. doubt. Therefore even the two together are not the cause of doubt.
The answer to this is as follows: The uncertainty attached to perception and non-perception is still one more auxiliary cause to be added to the causes mentioned above. That is to say, the perception or non-perception of the nature of ascertainment serves as positive (vidhi) or negative (nisedha) proof. But when there is uncertainty in perception or in non-perception, there arises a doubt. For example, when a man perceives his beloved at a distance, sees some common property as found in all women and when he expects to know some particular feature, he does not have a doubt; because he perceives the positive or negative indicative and thereby decides that the woman he perceives at a distance is certainly his beloved. But when his perception itself is of the nature of non-ascertainment or when there is uncertainty in his perception, he would certainly have a doubt. This shows that uncertainty in perception or in non-perception is an indispensable auxiliary cause of

1. समानयकपूर्णम् + किलेणापेता + उपलिङ्गं न वेन्द्वलिङ्गं-
बव्यवस्था ←→ अवन्याःणाःसनु = संकेतः
2. उपलिङ्गं-अनुपलिङ्गं-बव्यवस्थात् हि श्रेयति। चिन्तित्रत्वतः
निर्देशकारणार्थात् श्रवणः। - NyB, p. 14
Read : उपलिङ्गं-अनुपलिङ्गं न व्यतिशैले हि श्रेयति। ततथायः
बव्यवस्था तदनेन साधनकारणार्थात् श्रवणः। किलेणापेताः
ैैति किलेणापेतः: श्रवणः।
- NVTT, pp. 245–46
Benaras 1925
doubt in addition to the perception of common property and
the expectancy for the knowledge of some particular feature.
Thus the perception of a common property is the particular
cause of the first kind of doubt, while the expectancy for
the knowledge of particular feature and the uncertainty in
perception or non-perception are auxiliary causes of the
doubt. Showing the importance of the expectancy for the
knowledge of a particular feature, as an auxiliary cause
of doubt, Bhāsarvajña says that a man, while quickly pass-
ing through a wood of Panasa and other trees, perceives the
common property of trees; and there is uncertainty in his
perception or non-perception, he does not know for certain
of the presence of positive or negative indicatives which
could enable him to arrive at a decision as to whether the
tree he sees is a Panasa tree or another one. Still he does
not have any doubt, because he does not desire to know the
particular feature by which he can distinguish a Panasa tree
from others. That is to say, he is not interested in the
identity of the trees and he does not wish to differentiate
between one tree and another and so a doubt viz. "Is this
Panasa or some other tree?" does not arise. Thus the factor
of conation is equally important in the attainment of know-
ledge of any kind. Therefore, it is concluded that the
perception of a common property, accompanied by all the
auxiliary causes constitutes the cause of the first kind of doubt.

It may be noted that though the other auxiliary causes like adrsta etc. are not mentioned in the definitions of doubt since they are common to other effects also, yet they should be taken as implied in the definition. Like the particular cause of the first kind of doubt, viz. the perception of a common property, all other particular causes of other kinds of doubt, viz. the perception of peculiar property etc. also should necessarily be accompanied by all the auxiliary causes, viz. the expediency of the knowledge of particular and the uncertainty in perception or in non-perception.

It may be argued that what is said in respect of doubt in the first Adhyāya is repeated in the second Adhyāya of the Nyāya-sūtra. This involves the fault of repetition. The

1. सब्ज्ञकारिक्रेपत्त्वाय एव समानवृत्तीय संक्षेपहृत्वाय
   अनुपूर्वप्रति हृति । - NyH, p. 15
   प्रकृत्यात् - यथा एव समानवृत्तीय अपुमातिः-अनुपूर्वप्रति
   अग्निधृत्यात् - सब्ज्ञाकप्रति च निजःप्रति च प्रति तत्सः
   हृति । तैन ज्ञानाति समस्तसः सताः लक्षणात् हृति । -
   NV p.90 Benaras, 1915

2. See : NS. 1.1.23, 2.1.1-7
reply to this is that in the first Adhyāya of the Nyāya-sūtra, the categories like doubt etc. are enumerated and defined; while the same are dialectically and critically examined in the following Adhyāyas. So there is not the fault of repetition.

Explaining the compound 'Samānadharmā' Bhāsarvajña says that it can be dissolved in two ways: (i) "Samānāḥ asau dharmāḥ", common property, karmadhāraṇa; (ii) "Samānayoḥ dharmāḥ", the property of two similar objects. - sasthi tatpurusa. When we take it as karmadhāraṇa it means that the common or similar property, dimension or the like is found to be separate in each substratum; e.g. tallness in a tall man and tallness in a tall post giving rise to the notion of 'tall'. But when we take the compound as sasthi tatpurusa, it signifies that a non-different (i.e. one and the same) characteristic of the nature of common arrangement of limbs or parts' and the like is found in each of the substrata.

1. समानकर्म शत्यां समासवं विकल्प इष्टव्यम् -कर्मधारुणः: अस्थीतत्पुरुषः
   व शत्यः। यदा कर्मधारुणः: तदा समानः: सदृशः: परिमाणाभिलाषणः। यदा
   प्रत्याशय भिन्नः: तत्मयः। यदा तत्पुरुषः: तदा प्रत्याशय भिन्नः।
   यदा सामान्यारूपूकारणाभिलाषणः: लम्बतः शत्यः। -

   - NyB, p. 15

Read: स्वाप्तपुरुषाः: समानः अभ्यर्थिनिः। पश्चात
   प्रकृतिः च तयोः: विशेषाः कुमुदसमानः: किंस्वलोक शत्यं अव्ययं न
   अव्यय्याः तदा अव्ययाः जान्छ संस्यः। समान्याः अव्ययः: अभ्यर्थिनिः,
   विशेषाः अन्त्यत: योगायेष विश्वेषः हस्तेण वुद्धिः:। अथेतां संस्यस्य
   प्रविष्टेऽष शत्यः। - NB on NS 1.1.23 cont..see page238
For example, on seeing the common property residing separately in each substratum or on seeing the non-different property residing in two or more substrata, a man entertains doubt as to whether it is a man or a post.

Here by the bye Bhāsarvajña seeks to ascertain the nature of tallness (Urdhātva) that we find in a man or a post. He says that tallness is the cause of the concept of 'tall' in respect of an object which is perpendicularly long - situated in a particular direction. That is to say, due to tallness we call something tall. Questions may be raised here - Is tallness a dimension (quality)? Or is it a genus? Or is it a category altogether different from the six categories dravya, guna etc. recognised by the vāisēṣika school? It is very interesting to note here the answer given by Bhāsarvajña. He says that tallness may be a quality or genus or some category altogether different from the six, dravya, guna.

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1. foot note cont...see page 237

Read : समानवर्णपद: हत्याने घड़े बृहीरिविनामः प्रारम्भः स्वपदादिर्भूति।
करोऽकोऽच्छादः स्यात् स भवति समानवर्णकोऽसमानवर्णण: उपयोगः।
समानवर्णपदिः। किंफुक्तः मन्तरः। समानवर्णः दर्शनः दर्शनः पूर्णः।

- NV p. 98 Benaras, 1915

1. तत्कथा समानवर्णाः किंच स्यापु: स्यात् पुरुषोऽवेतिः। —
   - Nyās, Nyās, p. 13
etc., we are not concerned with this discussion here, as
this is not in any way useful in the present context.

Uddyotakara has raised a question as to whether 'sadharana'
is a guna or samanya; and answered that sādharana
(tallness etc.) is neither guna nor sāmanya. It yields only
the meaning/similarity between properties of two things.
Could Bhāsarvajña be referring to this discussion? His revolu-
tionary mood deserves special attention. Here ends the discus-
sion of the first kind of doubt.

1. Read: The classical list of twenty-four types of tropes
(gunas) is, from a logical point of view, a hopeless
hodge-podge (Introduction p. 13) - The Padārthottvā-
nirūpāna of Raghunātha Siromaṇi, Karl H. Potter, Cambridge,
Massachusetts 1957; See: NyB, p. 153

2. समानश्रु: साधारणेण समानाय चर्चः साधारणाय श्रति
याकु। किं पुनर्व साधारणं किं सुया: बाहरी सामान्यम श्रति?
न हृद: सुया: साधारण श्रति। नाति सामान्यम, अति तु
साधुशार्यां: समानार्थ:। यत् हत्ति चतुर्थ्व पूर्वसु ब्राह्मणाः
तयाः। य: चर्चः
उपव्यक्तात्तत्त्वम्: कल्पी, तेन चतुर्थ्व संवृत:। अथ चर्चः
उपलब्धत: श्रति। -

-NV, NCG, pp. 465-66, Darbhanga 1967

3. See: ऊध्वतं च दिग्विशालावस्थे दीर्घेऽवशे ऊध्व्रस्तयनिमित्तम्।
तत्र परिमाणं वा मक्ख सामान्यं वा षट्पदाल्प्यविविकतायमेऽवशे
वा नास्य विचारः किमतैते अनुपयोगित्वाद श्रति। -

-NyB, p. 15
The second kind of doubt arises from the perception of
uncommon or peculiar property. For example, S'abda (sound)
is a specific property of ākāśa. It is not common, as it is
found neither among eternal objects like ātman etc. nor among
non-eternal objects like jar etc. Thus S'abda being a special
property of ākāśa alone evokes a doubt - 'Is S'abda eternal
or non-eternal?'

Bhāsarvajñā dissolves the compound 'aneka-dharma' in
various ways: Aneka means two sets of objects of different
classes. An object belonging to a relevant class and one
belonging to the opposite class are aneka or non-one. Then
the word (anekadharma) signifies an attribute that distin-
guishes a particular thing from 'aneka' or an attribute which
is not related to 'aneka' (because it is related to only one),
or an attribute which is negated in 'aneka' or which is the
cause of the concept of 'aneka' inasmuch as it establishes
difference. Thus in all these interpretations we have to

1. अनेकवातिर् बाकाशविषेषणगुणात्फात् किंयं शब्दो नित्यः स्वातः अनित्यं
   वृत्ति । - NyS, NyB, p.15
2. अनेकवातिर्दिंति । श्रीचितजातियं तद्विचिन्तितं बानेिकु। बानेिकाइ
   व्याख्यानी यथा: अनेकस्य कस्मवन्यी या अनेकस्य प्रतिष्ठानात् यो वा
   अनेकप्रत्ययक्षेत्राः मेदसाहसंकरेऽदिनत: अनेक घर्ष वाति सर्वेऽ मध्यपल्लेपेन
   समातुः, सर्वैं विप ॥ इसापत्तानवर्णः अभिप्रेतः ।
   - NyB, p. 15
resort to a \textit{\textsuperscript{2}\textsuperscript{3}madhyama-pada-l\textsuperscript{4}pin} compound in which the middle term is dropped. But in all these cases an uncommon special property is meant. An example of this kind of doubt is this: As \textit{sabda} is the peculiar property of \textit{\textsuperscript{5}ak\textsuperscript{6}\textsubscript{a}s\textsubscript{7}} alone (and as it is not found in eternal or non-eternal things) there arises a doubt - 'Is \textit{sabda} eternal or non-eternal'?

It may be asked as to how an uncommon or peculiar property could give rise to doubt. Indeed, \textit{sabda} is never even perceived as associated with the contradictory particulars, e.g. non-eternity - eternity; so that its perception could become the cause of remembrance of those particulars. On the other hand, tallness that is possessed by man as well as by post may give rise to the remembrance of man and post. The same is not the case with \textit{sabda}. And the perception of a thing which is not connected with another, cannot give rise to the remembrance of another. Smoke may give rise to the remembrance of fire, because the former is invariably connected with the latter. Or the perception of height or tallness may remind us of a man or a post with which we have seen it as connected. And if we admit that even without such a connection, the perception of a thing may cause the remembrance of another - the perception of \textit{sabda} may cause the remembrance of 'eternal' and non-eternal' - there would
arise the contingency of all things apprehended in the past being remembered at all times. Moreover, unless there is remembrance of two things having contradictory properties viz. a man having hand, head etc.; a tree having branch, leaves etc., there would not arise a doubt, since it is never seen to arise otherwise.

It may be argued that this uncommon or peculiar property is but a viseṣa (particular or specific property) of that toward it belongs. And as said earlier even another doubt can be removed by the perception of a particular property (e.g. branches in the case of a tree, or hands, feet in the case of a man). How then could the perception of peculiar property give rise to a doubt? For example, we never find a doubt arising from the perception of cowness; because if it were to arise, there would be the contingency of its never being dispelled (for, 'cowness' alone can remove the doubt regarding a cow). Further, a doubt that arises from the perception of common property is removed by the perception of some particular feature. But how will a doubt that arises due to the perception of a peculiar property be brought an end to? Therefore, an uncommon or peculiar property like sābda cannot become the cause of doubt.
Some try to solve this difficulty as follows: They say that it is not correct to say that we cannot perceive an uncommon or peculiar property as accompanied by particulars that are contradictory to each other; since we see a particular in both ways, in the case of the entities of the same class (e.g. eternal) as well as in those of the class other than that (e.g. non-eternal) - in homogeneous things as well as in heterogeneous ones. That is to say, when by 'things' belonging to the same class non-eternal things are meant, then by 'the things other than these' the eternal ones are meant. For example, in homogeneous things like jar etc. resides the particular i.e. jarness etc; in heterogeneous things e.g. soul and the like resides the particular, i.e. soulness and the like. Thus, jarness etc. are known by means of the sources of knowledge, as accompanied by non-eternity; on the other hand soulness etc. are also known by means of sources of knowledge as accompanied by eternity. In this way, the particular feature viz. jarness or soulness, is found as accompanied in both ways, viz. by eternity as well as by non-eternity. That is to say, ghaṭatva and ātmatva though particular can co-exist with anityatva and nityatva respectively and no invariable concomitance of particular can be established with either eternity or non-eternity. And there is this specific property or viśeṣa in Sabda, viz. audibility
(Srāvanatva) and its being the specific attribute of ākāśa (ākāśa-viśeṣa-gunatva), so the doubt arises, 'Is this the Viśeṣa of sābda which is eternal or of sābda which is non-eternal? It may be noted here that Bhāsarvajña has regarded sābda itself as a viśeṣa (specific property) of ākāśa, as it is not found elsewhere. This peculiar property of Sābda gives rise to doubt. On the other hand according to the view held by the section of thinkers referred to here the state of being the object of auditory organ (Srāvanatva) and the state of being the peculiar property of ākāśa (ākāśa-viśeṣa-gunatva) constitute the viśeṣa of sābda, which leads us to doubt whether sābda is eternal or not.

But it may be contended that this (i.e., uncommon property) that is regarded as a cause of doubt is not different from that viz. the common property. It can be thus explained: The state of being endowed with generality or becomes the cause of doubt, inasmuch as it gives rise to the remembrance of two contradictory particulars, e.g., eternity and non-eternity. And the state of being endowed with particular or distinguishing property is common to eternal as well as non-eternal things - common in the sense that it is found connected with both eternal things and non-eternal things. Just as

1. See: तथा च बाकाशादिविशेषाणुपात्वातूः किम् शृङ्खलः नित्यः
स्वातः शतिवः का शति उदाहरणम् । - MyB, p.15
having commonness of property holds good of two or more things, so the state of being endowed with particular or distinguishing property is also common to eternal and non-eternal things. So how could the uncommon property be something different from the common property as a cause of doubt?

Some answer this question as follows: In the former case the possession of common property was mentioned as a cause of doubt, while here the possession of uncommon property is mentioned as the cause of doubt. So this difference itself is a sufficient justification for its being specifically mentioned separately.

However Bhāsarvajña establishes the uncommon or peculiar property as the cause of doubt by virtue of its uncommon character itself. The character of being excluded, or of being distinct, from eternal things is found in non-eternal things only, and the character of being distinct from non-eternal things is found in eternal things only. But this, sābda, about we are discussing, is distinct from both eternal and non-eternal things by virtue of its viśeṣa, viz. audibility etc. So we do not know whether being distinct from eternal things it is non-eternal like pot, or being distinct from non-eternal things it is eternal like soul etc. And it is not probable that both eternality and non-eternality could
reside in the same substatum, since one resides only where the other is absent. Thus the case of sābda is a case by itself and hence the doubt.

Besides as to the contention that if doubt were to arise from the perception of uncommon property, it would be perpetua- l, it is not tenable. For, the auxiliary causes such as uncertainty of perception or of non-perception would not be constantly present, and in their absence doubt would not arise at all.

Nor will there be the contingency of the doubt never being removed, because it will be dispelled when we see some vīśeṣa (particular) like artificiality (the character of being brought about) etc. That is to say if we know that sābda is artificial i.e. something brought about, we can definitely say that it cannot be eternal.

It may be contended that as doubt could arise because of the vīśeṣā 'audibility' etc; so it would arise from 'kṛtakatva' (being caused by another); also because it is as much a vīśeṣa as the former. But this is not proper, because kṛtakatva is seen elsewhere to be invariably concomitant with non-eternity. So it is established that an uncommon property can be a cause of doubt.
Then, Bhāsarvajña dissolves the compound 'anekadharma' in another way: anekah ca asau dharmah ca - non-one or different property. as a karmadhāraya compound. It signifies the co-existence of various contrary properties in one object. When we perceive such properties in one object, a doubt may arise. For example, the mind is found to be active like an arrow, and at the same time, to be intangible like ākāśa. So there would arise a doubt - 'Is the mind corporeal (mūrta) like an arrow or non-corporeal (amūrta) like ākāśa? It is obvious that the mind cannot be both, corporeal and non-corporeal at the same time; because corporeality and non-corporeality cannot co-exist simultaneously in the same object. Moreover, the uncertainty of perception and of non-perception serves as an auxiliary cause of doubt here also. So there would not arise the contingency of the doubt arising everywhere or at all times. That is to say, if one of the auxiliary causes is absent the doubt would not arise.

It may be urged here that since the contrary properties, e.g. possession of activity and intangibility in the case of the mind, are equal in force they would be non-producers of determination because of their being opposed to each other; but they would certainly not give rise to doubt. In answer to this, Bhāsarvajña says that this is not proper. For, doubt arises from this very state of non-rise of determination. The very condition in which a thing cannot be ascertained
gives rise to doubt. Moreover, a man who cannot ascertain the true nature of a thing does not remain inert like a non-sentient wall, nor does he remain in illusion for ever in respect of the thing. As a matter of fact, a man in such a state is seen to be critically examining the thing or asking questions about it. And unless a man has a doubt, he would not properly examine a thing or ask questions about it. Thus, the presence of investigation etc. pre-supposes the existence of doubt.

It may be argued that when either of the alternatives, e.g. corporeality or incorporeality of the mind, cannot be conclusively ascertained, what arises in the mind is anadhyavasāya (indefinite perception), and not doubt. This argument is not proper, says Bhāsarvajña. For, if this were admitted, there would arise the contingency of anadhyavasāya arising due to vipratipatti, difference of view or conflicting views also. That is to say, in the matter of giving rise to the said state of anadhyavasāya, the case of aneka-dharma (the apprehension of two or more 'aneka' contradictory properties in an object) is not in any way different from the case of Vipratipatti or controversy. Moreover, anadhyavasāya also

1. अथवा वेनेक: वाम्प वर्म: वैति कपिलाराय: तेन विरङ्कवानेकवर्नस्य स्कृत
उपल्ल्याणास्य संस्कृतत्वस्य लम्बजे, यथा किं नू प्रियवाचवदापि शारवनूषि
पन: स्वादिष्ठ उत्तस्मर्तत्वात्र अतुल्यम्: हति?

- NyB, p. 16
has been put forth as included in doubt. And the opponent (Vaisesika) himself has elsewhere spoken of two contradictory attributes as giving rise to doubt. The passage of the Prasastapadabh\text{\text{"}}asya, in which two contrary attributes are tacitly accepted as giving rise to doubt, runs thus:

\textbf{Question}: Is 'movingness' (gamanatva) synonymous with 'actionness' (karmatva)? Or is it a genus lower than karmatva?

\textbf{Answer}: How do you entertain a doubt here?

\textbf{Question}: We have the cognition of 'karmatva' in respect of all actions, viz. 'throwing upwards' (Ut\text{"}k\text{"}sepana) etc.; just so we have the cognition of 'gamanatva' in respect of these (actions); so 'gamanatva' is understood as synonymous with 'karmatva'. On the other hand, it is designated by a particular name 'gamanatva', as 'ut\text{"}k\text{"}sepana' etc. also are; so it should be regarded as a lower genus (aparasam\text{"}anya).

1. वनस्पतारात्माकिलोगः औहत-वनस्पतायायोः न संस्कृत्र अध्येतानांतःमावः।

   -NyS, NyB,p.16

2. अथ गमनत् किं कर्मभावाः? बाहोस्वीद अपरः सामान्यत्रिधिः?

   कूः ते संस्कृत्! समस्तायु उत्तरङ्गुरुः कर्मभावान्यन्त्र गमनप्रत्यया–
   विलोगः कर्मभावां इति गम्यते। यस्तु उत्तरङ्गवाच सः
   विलोगसंस्कृता बाहिनिः तस्मात् अपरः सामान्यं स्वाभिः इति।

   - PB (with NKL), V\text{"}ar\text{"}nas\text{"} 1963
Thus, what arises from the apprehension of two contrary attributes in one category is doubt, and not andhyavāsa; a fact which is accepted in the Prāśastapādabhāṣya.

Then Bhāsarvajña comes to the treatment of the third type of doubt that arises from contradictory statements; to wit, a doubt may arise when a man comes across a controversy - some say that sense-organs are physical, while others say that they are non-physical. Commenting on this, Bhāsarvajña says that Vipratipatti means controversy, contradictory views. When a man comes to hear a controversy, a doubt, 'Are the sense-organs physical or non-physical?' arises provided the auxiliary causes of doubt as mentioned above, are present. Other examples of this type of doubt, are as follows: Does ātman exist as distinct from body etc. or does it not exist as such? Is ātman eternal or non-eternal?

1. विप्रतिपत्त: एसे मौलिकानि विन्द्रवाणि वाहुः बन्धे तु व्यास्टिकानि हि ।
   - NyS, Nyō, p.17
   Read: एसे नेत्यायिकाविष्कारे मौलिकानि विजिरिल्विधाणि वाहुः।
   बन्धे काफिलाद्वः तु व्यास्टिकानि वाल्स्वारिकाणि हि ।
   - NML (Aparārkadeva), p. 19;
   Read: "Professor Ingalls has pointed out to me that the later commentaries, such as that of vācaspatimis'ra, adopt a rule which reads, "Knowledge other than perceptual exists only in the form of certainty" i.e. the only kind of doubt is perceptual; as for example, when one is not sure whether he is looking at a snake or a rope-Vātsyāyana, however, holds that doubt can arise from a verbal contradiction. Raghunātha is reasserting Vātsyāyana's view" - Karl H. Potter, The Padarthatattva-nirūpaṇa of Raghunātha Siromāni, pp. 81-82, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1957
After, this, Bhāsarvajña comes to treat the last two varieties of doubt. When a man perceives something like water at a distance in sunshine, he has a doubt as to whether it is real water or a mirage. On the other hand, when a man does not perceive a goblin (piśāca), there arises a doubt - 'Does the goblin really exist but is not perceived or it does not really exist and so is not perceived?' Commenting on this in the Nyāya-bhūṣaṇa Bhāsarvajña says that the cognition which proceeds positively is 'Upalabdhi' (apprehension, e.g. a man positively perceives something before he has a doubt in respect of water); and the cognition which proceeds negatively and so also non-rise of cognition in are called an-upalabdhi (non-apprehension, to wit, a man has the knowledge 'There is no goblin' or does not perceive a goblin and entertains a doubt about its existence). Here Bhāsarvajña specifically draws our attention to the fact that apprehension (Upalabdhi) and non-apprehension (an-Upalabdhi) are separate causes of doubt as well as epithets of uncertainty (avyavasthā, viz. Upalabdhi avyavasthā, anupalabdhi avyavasthā). This being the case, the Nyāya-sūtra (1.1.23) giving the definition of doubt should be taken as a collection of five sub-sūtras,
one for each definition. The uncertainty in perception and in non-perception should be taken as an auxiliary cause common to all kinds of doubt and so it should be associated with the particular cause of each kind of doubt.

There is a controversy regarding the number of doubts. Vātsyāyana derives the five kinds of doubt from this Nyāya-sūtra. He takes uncertainty in apprehension and uncertainty in non-apprehension as separate causes of doubt. Thus in his view a doubt arises from the apprehension of common property (sāmāna-dharma), the apprehension of peculiar property (aneka-dharma) from contradictory views, from uncertainty

1. समान-अनेक-चन्द्रपापेक्ष: विक्रियतिपेक्ष: उपलब्धिः-नापुलब्धिः-बत्त्वस्थातः

2. समानवधमपापेक्ष: अनेकवधमपापेक्ष: बत्त्वस्थातः चित्रेणपेक्ष: चिन्त: संशयः ।

From this five sub-sūtras could be derived as follows:

(i) समानवधमपापेक्ष: उपलब्धि-नापुलब्धि-बत्त्वस्थातः चित्रेणपेक्ष: चिन्त: संशयः।

(ii) अनेकवधमपापेक्ष: उपलब्धि-नापुलब्धि-बत्त्वस्थातः चित्रेणपेक्ष: चिन्त: संशयः।

(iii) विक्रियतिपेक्ष: उपलब्धि । संशयः।

(iv) उपलब्धिः-उपपत्ति: उपलब्धिः । संशयः।

(v) नापुलब्धिः-उपपत्ति: उपलब्धिः-नापुलब्धिः-बत्त्वस्थातः चित्रेणपेक्षः।

2. समानवधमपापेक्ष: अनेकवधमपापेक्ष: चित्रेणपेक्ष: चिन्त: संशयः। उपलब्धिः-बत्त्वस्थातः ततु चन्द्रिः ततु। चिन्त: संशयः। चिन्त: संशयः। अनेकवधमपापेक्ष: । अनेकवधमपापेक्ष: । अनेकवधमपापेक्ष: । अनेकवधमपापेक्ष: । अनेकवधमपापेक्ष: ।

- NB on NS. 1.1.23
of apprehension and from uncertainty of non-apprehension.
Against this view, Uddyotakara accepts only the first three
types of doubt taking the other words, viz., uncertainty of
apprehension and of non-apprehension as epithets of other
terms given in the Nyāyasūtra. Thus he derives three types of
doubt from the Nyāyasūtra. Supporting the view of Uddyo-
takara, Vacaspati Misra recognizes only three kinds of doubt.
However, Bhāsarvajña accepts five types of doubt, supporting
the view of Vatsyāyana and thus rejecting the view held by
Uddyotakara.

1. तत्र स्मानाभारायोपवे: कान्याभारायोपवे: विनिर्वतेश्वे: व विशिष्टस्य र्व सृष्ट
इत्यादिकाभासितमात्र: वृद्धितिः सूत्राः:।

- NV, NCG, p. 465

2. विशिष्टस्य र्व (सृष्टिः) इत्ये पंचविध्व प्रवचनाते ते निराकृतः।

- NVTT, NCG, pp. 475-76:

Read: "The interpretation of the Sūtra by the Bhāsya is
different from that by the Vārtika and the Tātparya.
According to the former the sūtra puts forward
five kinds of Doubt; according to the latter
it lays down only three." - Gaṅgānātha Jhā,
Foot-note, Gautama's Nyāyasūtras, p. 53,
Poona 1939
It may be contended that if the uncertainty of apprehension and non-apprehension are admitted as separate causes of doubt, there would arise the contingency of doubt arising everywhere in respect of every object of apprehension and that of non-apprehension. This contention does not stand to reason, says Bhāsarvajña. For, merely apprehension or non-apprehension is not recognised as a cause of doubt. The apprehension that becomes the cause of doubt should necessarily be accompanied by auxiliary causes such as the uncertainty in apprehension etc. Further, it may be argued that in spite of apprehension and non-apprehension being accompanied by all auxiliary causes, they do not prove to be independent causes of doubt, distinct from the apprehension of common property, which is the cause of the first kind of doubt. For example, if a doubt is admitted as arising in respect of an object of apprehension or of non-apprehension, as to whether the object that is perceived or non-perceived really exists or not; then the state of being apprehended in the case of apprehension of something becomes a property common to two things, viz. water and mirage; so this does not differ from the cause of the first type of doubt, i.e. the apprehension of a property common to two things. Similarly the state of being non-apprehended in the case of non-apprehension of something becomes a property common to two things, viz. the existence of goblin and the non-existence of goblin. Thus apprehension
and non-apprehension as causes of doubt do not virtually differ from the cause of doubt, viz. the perception of common property. The answer to this is that the two cases are different. In the case of common property - 'Samāna dharma', we do not doubt the existence of the thing that is cognised; we only have a doubt whether it is a post or a man. While here we have a doubt whether the thing which is apprehended as water is existent or not; or whether the thing (ghost) which is not apprehended is really non-existent or is existent. But this explanation also is not tenable, says the contender. Against, this it may be argued further that in spite of that difference in the two cases, apprehension and non-apprehension as causes of doubt do not differ from the perception of common property. For, the state of being manifested by knowledge becomes an attribute common to two things, viz. water and mirage. Similarly, the state of not being manifested by knowledge becomes an attribute common to the existence of goblin or the non-existence of it.

Some seek to refute this argument thus: In the first two kinds of doubt, the common property (Samānadharma) and the peculiar property (aneka-dharma) are such as subsist in the object cognised; while in the fourth and in the fifth kind, perception and non-perception subsist in the cognising person; and it is only by reason of this difference, that
these have been mentioned separately. However in Bhāsār-vajña's view, the separate mention of the last two causes of doubt has a special purpose. Some philosophers like the cārvakas do not recognise the existence of heaven, apūrva (potency of karman), gods and the like only on the ground of their not being perceived. On the other hand, others seek to establish that sābda is eternal; that consciousness belongs to the body that genus etc. are non-different from their substratum; e.g. cowness is non-different from cow,
only on the ground that they are so apprehended. In order to repudiate such views, apprehension and non-apprehension are said to be independent causes of doubt, separate from the apprehension of common property. That is to say, merely apprehension or non-apprehension of anything cannot conclusively ascertain the true nature of things; it only gives rise to doubt.

It may be noted that the Nyāyasūtra describing the defining characteristic and types of doubt is interpreted in two ways. Vātsyāyana interprets it in such a way that it gives the five kinds of doubt. Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña support the view of the five varieties of doubt, held by Vātsyāyana. As Jayanta points out in his Nyāyamañjarī, seven sub-sūtras can be derived from the Nyāyasūtra: One sūtra for the general definition of doubt, one sūtra for the divisions of doubt and five sūtras for the five particular definitions of the five types of doubt. Moreover, the view

1. नेनसंयस्य सनातनशब्दप्रत्याविधिकारन्नेव जन्तुशहत्तात् सामान्यत्वादित् पञ्चविश्लेषणं सामान्यत्वादित्वं विभागः विशेषविभागानि व कक्ष्यानि, तथा सामान्यत्वानि विभागे व सूत्रं, विशेषविभागार्थं व वचनं तत्रप्रेक्षानां सूत्रवेक्षस्य हत्वेव सप्त सूत्राणि प्रणोद्युक्तानि, नं केवल सूत्रं श्रुतं तथा कक्ष्यानि भविष्यति?

उच्चते (तत्त्वानां मय्यान् किन्नु एकस्य केवल द्वितीय वामाद्विविधवान्वित्य सप्तवा कक्ष्यानि कल्पितते). त् इति पञ्चविश। प्रणोद्युक्त सुनिनादशिचं एष संख्यः।-

- Nyāyamañjarī, p.125, Varānasī, 1971
which is referred to by Śrīdhara in the Nyāya-Kandalī as generally held by the sister-school of Nyāya (Samānatāntra) is that of the five types of doubt.

On the other hand, Uddyotakara interprets the Nyāyasūtra in another way as mentioning three kinds of doubt and rejects the view of five kinds of doubt. Vācaspati and Udayana accept the view of Uddyotakara and recognise only three varieties of doubt.

The view of five varieties of doubt seems to be more convincing than the other one. The last two varieties are primarily concerned with the doubt regarding the existence and non-existence of a thing respectively and hence these cannot be included in any one of the first three types.

1. यः समानतास्यपदे: वेदेष्यांपदे: क्षत्रियपदे: उपलब्धिः-वच्चवस्ततः।
   अनुपलब्धिः-वच्चवस्ततः: च समानताःस्यपदे: पंचकिंन: संस्यम: दशितḥ: स
   सख्रवः देविश्वेनेव समुस्तेऽः। -
   - Nyāyakandalī, p.421, Vāraṇasī,1963

2. कपरे पुनः समानतास्यपदावर्तमानम: पदे: पृथकृ पंचकिंन संस्यम: कार्यित्स।
   समानतास्यपदे: विशेषार्थमाण: निम्नाः संस्यम: हरित। एवं केवलो श्रेष्ठो फलो न।
   तत् युक्तम्। उपलब्धिः-अनुपलब्धिः-वच्चवस्ततः। पृथुपदावर्तमाणातः।
   (पृ०५६२)।।। एवं ताभु व्यवस्थापित त्रिविशिष्ट: संस्यम: हरित। -
   - NV, NCG, p. 473

See: NVTT, Ibid, pp. 475-76
See: Parisuddhi, Ibid., p. 494
It is not out of place if we mention here the view of the Vaiśeṣika school in regard to doubt. In the Prāṣastapādabhāṣya doubt is said to be of two types: (1) Internal and (ii) External. The former is thus illustrated: When some of the predictions declared come to be true, while others false, the foreteller, while declaring the next prediction, entertains a doubt - 'Will it come true or false?' Then the external doubt is further divided into two kinds:

(A) In respect of a thing perceived; e.g. on seeing a tall thing one may have a doubt - 'Is it a man or a post?';

(B) In respect of a thing that is not perceived; e.g. on seeing only horns, a man passing through a forest entertains a doubt as to whether it is a cow or a gavaya. Thus we find that in respect of the types of doubt there are different views in the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika schools.

Non-difference of Conjecture (Uha) and Indefinite apprehension (anadhyavasāya) from Doubt: As said before, doubt and illusion are excluded from true apprehension by inserting the word 'Samyak' in the general definition of pramāṇa given in the Nyāyasāra. Here the question arises - By what can one exclude conjecture and indefinite apprehension

1. Prāṣastapādabhāṣya, pp. 412-13, Vārānasi 1963
from the sphere of true knowledge? In answer to this question, Bhaçarvajña says in the Nyāyasara that since non-determination (anavadhāraṇatva) is common to doubt on the one hand and conjecture as well as indefinite apprehension on the other, the latter two are not essentially different from doubt. And so, just by excluding doubt from the sphere of true knowledge, Bhaçarvajña has tacitly denied conjecture and indefinite cognition (which are of the same nature as doubt) as the fruit of the means of right knowledge. Similarly, the author of the Nyāya-sūtra has inserted the word 'vyāvasāyatmaka' (well-defined of the nature of determination) in the definition of perception in order to exclude doubt; but he has remarkably not inserted any other word to exclude conjecture and indefinite cognition. It may be argued that doubt depends on the two objects alternately, that is to say, in the state of doubt the mind oscillates between two objects alternately—'might it be a man or a post?'; thus doubt has as its basis two objects alternately, whereas conjecture and indefinite cognition are altogether different from doubt. So how could the former not be

1. बनवधारणत्व-अविस्तारात्र उपह-बनवध्यायोः न संयमाय वधान्तर्भावः
- NyS, NyB, p. 19

2. एन्न्यायाःसन्निप्पितपत्यािजनस्य अव्यवस्थमकु वधमितारिः
व्यवसायात्मक प्रत्ययास्य र- - NS, 1.1.4
essentially different from the latter? In reply to this, Bhāsarvājña says that this is not proper. For, conjecture and indefinite apprehension are covered by the same definition. And simply because they have certain sub-variations, they cannot be regarded as altogether different from doubt. For example, it is not justifiable if one regards a stone as an altogether different category from earth, only because the stone is different from clay. Though in common parlance, the use of the word 'Prthivī' is restricted to a particular part of the earth, yet in the scientific texts stone etc. also are accepted as 'Prthivī' as it commonly possesses the distinctive characteristic, odour. Similarly since conjecture and indefinite apprehension commonly possess the characteristic of non-determination they are admitted as doubt. An objection may be raised here that if on the ground of having a common characteristic, i.e. non-determination, conjecture and indefinite cognition are recognised as one with the doubt, then there would arise the contingency of perception, inference etc. being admitted as one on account of their having a common

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1. See: तत्त्वविषयक निर्देशनान्य स्मयम्:।
2. न्याय, न्यन्त्र, p. 12

- PB, pp. 411, 434,
  Vārānasī 1963
characteristic, i.e. being the means of valid knowledge. This is not a fault, says Bhāsarvajña, because pramāṇa has been accepted as one category. The division of pramāṇa is only one and perception etc. are its sub-divisions. It is not that the cause of designating a means of right knowledge as 'perception' is present in inference etc. also; or the cause of designating a means of right knowledge as 'inference' is present in other pramāṇas also; so that this usage — different designations for the sub-varieties, would come to an end. That is to say, perception, inference etc. have this in common that they are all means of valid knowledge and so are classified as pramāṇa. But over and above this, perception (source of valid perceptual knowledge) has some distinctive characteristic which is not present in inference (means of valid inferential knowledge) etc. and so it alone is called pratyakṣa-pramāṇa. This is true of anumāṇa-pramāṇa etc. also. This argument also refutes the view that inference and verbal testimony are one inasmuch as they are alike the means of indirect apprehension. And it is not that the cause of designating some knowledge as doubt, viz. Non-determination, is not present in conjecture (Ūha) etc. It is, therefore, concluded that conjecture (Ūha) and indefinite apprehension (ānadhya vasāya) are not essentially different from doubt (samsāya).
It may be mentioned here that Vallabha has, in his Nyāyalilāvati, refuted this view of Bhāsravājña. He says that the view that this indefinite apprehension (anadhya-vasaya) is nothing but doubt, as held by Bhūṣaṇa, is not proper. Explaining the distinctive characteristic of indefinite apprehension, Vallabha says that when an object is generally known but particularly not known, an enquiry is made to know its particular that could be expressed by a word, in the form of a question—'What might it be called?'. This is the precise state of indefinite apprehension (anadhya-vasāya). Moreover, Vādideva also has in his Syādvādaratnakara, criticised the above view without mentioning Bhāšarvājña's name. He says that there is a fundamental difference between the two concepts (Sāmsaya - anadhya-vasāya). In doubt the mind swings between two different points. On the other hand, in indefinite apprehension it does not come in contact with either of them.

1. संस्कृत एव कवयितः मुनिण:। पृष्ठु सामान्यत: क्वाते, किंशैलयत: क्वाते, जिज्ञासिते वाच्याविशेषे, यदा किंशैलाभितापः तदा बनयभागः।
   - NL, p. 57, edited by M.R. Telang, Nirnayasagara, Bombay, 1923

2. नूत अयु अनय्ककारः संस्कृतु न विषेषे विक्षेपणवन्यारेणात्पत्तात्
   हति तु न लक्षणीयु, स्वतंत्रपेनात्। बनवीर्णात्नेककोषेश्च्यं परिशिष्टवः हि
   संस्कृतम वस्तुप्रभुः। वर्त्या कोषेश्च्यं व बनवीर्णाय स्वयं हति
   महान बनयो:ः श्रेष्ठः।
   - Syādvādaratnakara, p. 146, Pariccheda I, Sūtra 15, ed. by M.L. Osvat, Purvapattana, Virasamvat, 2453
The examples of indefinite apprehension (anadhyavasya) given by Sridhara in his Nyāyakandaḷi may be noted as follows:

When a king known to a man passes by, the man whose mind was pre-occupied or who is desirous of attaining the knowledge of some particular may have an indefinite apprehension

Some one passed by along this way. This is anadhyavasya. Or when a man who has not known Panasa tree sees that tree, he would feel like asking- 'What might this tree be called?'

This indefinite knowledge in respect of the tree is anadhyavya.

Thus in the Vaiśeṣika school anadhyavasya has been regarded as distinct from samsāya, while in Bhasarvajña's view, inasmuch as the attribute of non-determination (anavadhāranatva) is common to Īha and anadhyavasāya on the one hand and to samsāya on the other, the former are not essentially different from the latter.

3.2. अनवधारणत्वः-विशेषणाय उपह-अनवधारणाय: संस्कृत्वच द्वियम हृति । -

- NyB, p. 19

2. प्रस्तापाध्याय, p. 434, edited by Durgādhara Jhā, Vārānasi, 1963

1.2. व्यासांगम् वन्यक्रियाकारिकार्कादि विशेष्यप्रतीत्यदिन्तावाच किं इत्यालोचनात्सः।

गते प्रसिद्धे राजनि ॥ अयि कान्य पथा गति हृति आनमात्र ॥ अनवधारितः-विशेष्यात् वन्यक्रियः।

वायम् वाशीकृत्य यस्तादिभिः अनवधारायो महति ।।। पनवशीलनाम् वायः

क्रियंति प्रतििविवतः न महति ।।

- NKL, pp. 434-35
Then Bhāsarvajñā takes up the topic of Conjecture (Ūha) for discussion. In his view, conjecture is an intermediate cognition between doubt and determination, which is of the nature of guess or surmise, e.g. 'It must be a man in the stable.' Conjecture being of the nature of non-determination is one with doubt. It may be urged that conjecture cannot be one with doubt, as it is not of the nature of alternatives. That is to say, doubt is of the nature of alternatives, e.g. 'Could it be a post or a man?' This conjecture is not doubt, since it arises only after one of the two alternatives has receded due to some sublatory proof: nor is it ascertainment (nirṇaya) because conjecture arises even when there is no positive proof. Knowledge of the nature of ascertainment cannot be arrived at only by the denial of the opposite view. For, it is said in the Nyāyasūtra that ascertained knowledge (nirṇaya) can be arrived at only after considering the thesis and the anti-thesis. Moreover, since conjecture (Ūha or tarka) is separately enumerated in the Nyāyasūtra, it is neither doubt nor ascertained knowledge (nirṇaya).

1. See: Nyāyavārttika, p. 20
2. निर्णय अतिभाविताय अथाविकारण निर्णयं: ! - NS. 1.1.41
3. प्रमाणप्रमेयालयप्रयोजनवृत्तान्तयुक्तातिविकारात्तुष्ट-अवयव-तकः..... ! - NS. 1.1.1
As Bhāsarvajñā answers these arguments as follows: As the opponent's contention that doubt is always of the nature of alternatives, it is not right, because doubt is found arising otherwise also; that is to say, without the oscillation between two alternatives. For example, a man who has already known the particular result or effect entertains a doubt in regard to the particular means or cause that could bring about that result or effect - 'What could be the particular means to bring about this result?' Or a man who having ascertained that whosoever is born is sure to die, entertains a doubt as he does not know the particular time of his death - "When shall I die?" Here though the alternatives like 'Shall I die today or to-morrow?' etc. are not explicitly experienced in such doubts, they are certainly implied therein. This clearly shows that explicit alternatives are by no means indispensable in doubt. Bhāsarvajñā who asserts that conjecture (Uha) is not essentially different from doubt says that similarly in the case of conjecture one may feel - 'It must be a man', since one finds there abundance of positive proofs for the probability of being a man. Or what one sees in the stable might be something other than man, also; inasmuch as the absence of all other possible alternatives is not ascertained. And if it were so ascertained, it would come to be
ascertained knowledge (nirnaya) and it no longer remains conjecture. That is to say, when all other alternatives are absent, the tallness becomes a distinctive characteristic of man - on seeing a tall object one may feel - 'it' must be a man'. Other examples of conjecture may be noted as follows: On seeing a particular field one thinks - When the field is full of crop the owner of the field is expected to be there, in order to guard the crop. Or on seeing a particular householder one makes a conjecture - 'meal is likely to be obtained here'. In all such examples the absence of other probable alternatives is not ascertained. Hence in conjecture we do not have an ascertained knowledge of a thing. The cognition that arises in such cases is found to be of the nature of probability (bhavitavyātmaka pratyaya). It may be argued: 'Conjecture is different from doubt, because it arises after doubt, like determination'- Here if the reason 'because it arises after doubt' is stated with reference to the whole class of conjecture, then the probandum is not different from that which the Naiyāyika has accepted, as conjecture is accepted as a particular type of doubt. The reason 'On account of its arising after the rise of doubt' is not distinct from the probandum - something which is yet to be proved. In the above reason it is taken for granted that conjecture is something which is different from doubt and it arises after-
the rise of doubt. But this is what is yet to be proved.

Bhāsarvajñā seems to emphasise the point that if Conjecture is sought to be proved as a (sub) class of doubt, then that probandum is in no way different from the accepted one, because conjecture is recognised as a particular kind of doubt. On the other hand, if the above reason is stated keeping in view an individual case, then that reason would be inconclusive (anaikāntika). For a doubt also arises after an individual case of doubt. But it does by no means prove that the two doubts belong to different classes. Again, it may be urged that conjecture (Uha or Tarka) is different from doubt because they are separately mentioned in the Nyāyasūtra. But this reason also is discrepant since it co-exists even with the absence of sadhyā. For example, the members of syllogism, viz. pratijñā, hetu etc. though not being different from pramāṇa, are mentioned separately from pramāṇa. Similarly hetvābhāsas or fallacies of reason, though being subsumed in Nigrahasthāna (ground of defeat), are mentioned separately from Nigrahasthāna in the first Nyāyasūtra. Thus the separate mention of samsāya and Tarka

1. See : NS. 1.1.1
2. प्रमाणप्रकरणसाधनप्रयोजनहट्टानुसारसहस्राद्वन्द्व-वक्यव-वैयक्तिकविधावल्यविनिग्रह-हेतवाभाससनेहत्तत्त्वज्ञानानां निःश्रवाङ्ग: । - NS. 1.1.1
of ūha in the first Nyāyasūtra does not prove that they are different from each other. It may be contended that if the categories such as samsāya, Tarka etc. are not really different from each other, they ought not to have been mentioned separately from each other in the Nyāyasūtra. There is an apparent contradiction in such a treatment. Bhāsarvajña answers that there is no such contradiction, since the separate mention of some non-different categories (e.g. pramāṇa and avayava, samsāya and Tarka-ūha, hetvābhāsa and niglahasthāna) has been made in the Nyāyasūtra with a special purpose. The purpose of doubt in general is to provoke the Nyāya (syllogism). Quoting the words of Vātsyāyana Bhāsarvajña says that Nyāya or Reasoning functions neither with regard to things unknown nor with regard to those known definitely it functions only with regard to things that are doubtful.

If Nyāya or Reasoning is admitted as functioning with regard to the things un-known then there would arise the contingency of the Nyāya being a fallacy, known as āśrayā-siddha that we find in the example, 'The sky-lotus is fragrant'. On the other hand if Nyāya is admitted to be

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1. न अनुपलंघे न निणा रिते श्रेण न्यायः प्रकल्पने, कि तर्कः?
   संशयिते स्भं वर्ते। -
   - NB on NS. 1.1.1
functioning with regard to things known definitely, then it would involve the contingency of the Nyāya being futile, because the thing with regard to which the Nyāya proceeds to function is already fully known. Therefore it proceeds only with regard to an object which is known in general but not determined in respect of some particulars.

It may be argued here that if it is insisted that Nyāya functions exclusively with regard to those things which are doubtful (sandigdhe evaśrīthe), then it is not justifiable. For, Nyāya (inferential syllogism) is found to function even in respect of things that are not doubtful. For example, neither the proponent (vādin) nor the opponent (prativādin) has any doubt about the topic they discuss; still they employ Nyāya (syllogistic method of argument) while advancing arguments. This clearly shows that even in the absence of doubt, Nyāya could function. Against this, it may be argued that the above rule (that Nyāya functions only in regard to those things that are doubtful) is applicable only to the inference for one's own self. That is to say, before a man employs Nyāya in order to have an inferential knowledge for himself, he certainly entertains a doubt. But this also is far from the truth. For, a man, wandering from one forest to another with some other purpose, proceeds to make an inference about fire or the like on the strength of
smoke or the like, though he does not have the presence of fire. Hence it is obvious that even in the case of inference for one's own self anumāna is found to function in the absence of doubt. On the other hand if it is said that Nyāya functions invariably in all cases of doubt also (sandigdhe apy arthe pravartate eva); we can say that also is not possible. For, Nyāya is sometimes found not to operate even in the presence of doubt, due to the absence of desire (to have decisive knowledge regarding the object) or due to some such other factor. That is to say, the man is not interested in the presence or absence of the things, though the doubt may have occurred to him, and so he does not indulge in Nyāya. It is thus argued that doubt could not be regarded as the cause of the functioning of Nyāya.

In answer to this argument Bhāsarvajña says that the words 'samsayite eva arthe' cannot be interpreted as above. It should be interpreted thus. It is in view of the fitness for being an object of doubt, that the restriction (signified by the word 'eva') is accepted and in the light of this the first restriction is accepted, viz. it functions only in respect of a thing about which there is doubt. The word 'eva' in 'Samsayite eva arthe' (only in respect of a thing about which there is a doubt) signifies avadhārapa (restriction) in view of yogyata (capability or fitness for being
an object of doubt). This is what is desired to be expressed by the statement. This fitness consists in the apprehension of an object in general, accompanied by the uncertainty about its particulars and consists in the difference of opinion in discussions, etc. This being the case it does not entail that like doubt, illusion (Viparyaya) also should be separately mentioned in the Nyāyasūtra though it is implicitly comprehended by the terms pramāṇa, prameya etc. The reason for not mentioning illusion separately in the Nyāyasūtra is that it does not provoke one to thought or reasoning, while doubt certainly does so. When a thing has been ascertained by erroneous knowledge (which is certain knowledge, though it is wrong), hetu (reason) does not become a right means of knowledge in respect of it. Thus Viparyaya (error) unlike Samsaya (doubt) does not provoke one to thought or reasoning. Besides, a man is found to be trying to remove doubt but and one never sees him trying to remove illusion (viparyaya). And when a debater or proponent tries to remove the error or wrong belief of his opponent, he employs the syllogistic argument (Nyāya) with a view to removing the difference of opinion in order to strengthen has own ascertained view of instil the

1. The text should be read as प्रतिवादिविक्षयनिवृत्त्यथप् instead of प्रतिवादिविक्षयनिवृत्त्यथप्, NYB, p.21;
See : Photostat, p. 7
the sense of firm determination among his pupils. This Nyāya is meant for (the removal of) the doubt which is the subject of the difference of opinion; because two parties have two positive but contrary cognitions in respect of the same thing. So there is bound to be doubt and syllogistic arguments are meant to remove this doubt. Hence the author of the Nyāyasūtra has mentioned Sandeha or Samsāya separately as it is a supplementary factor of thought or ratiocination. It is, therefore, quite justifiable that the purpose of doubt is to cause Nyāya or syllogistic argument to function or to provoke it.

Now a question may be raised: What is the purpose behind mentioning tarka or Uha separately in the Nyāyasūtra, though it is included in doubt? The answer to this is that the purpose of conjecture or tarka is to render help to the pramānas. In support of his view Bhāṣarvajña quotes a statement of some unknown earlier ācārya, which runs thus: In respect

1. तक्कोविषयकै विषये प्रमाणानि प्रकटिप्राप्ति तक्तिको प्रमुखार्थात हति पुराविहारः।

- NyB, p. 21

पुराविहारः: न्यायामध्यमार्गः हति प्राचीनान्तिहारः।Fn2, NyB, p. 21

Compare: तक्तिको न प्रमाणान्तिहारः, न प्रमाणान्तिहारः प्रमाणानात हति प्राचीनान्तिहारः।

- NB on NS 1.1.1

Also compare: कथ पुनः कथ तत्त्त्वानात: हति प्रमाणाविषयः।।

- NV, NCG, p. 583
of the subject which has been critically analysed by tarka, pramāṇas proceed to function. In this manner pramāṇas are helped by tarka. Expressing his own view in this regard Bhasarvajña says that tarka has been separately mentioned in the Nyāyasūtra in order to clarify its purpose, viz. to qualify the functioning of discussion (vāda) etc. Thus in Bhasarvajña’s view tarka or ūha becomes useful in debate etc. and it is mentioned in their context. In this regard some hold that a Naiyāyika should not engage himself in discussion etc. The reason is that no rational being starts any activity without being certain. And here in debate etc. there is no such certainty beforehand that by such and such a refutatory argument or demonstrative argument he would be able to defeat the opponent or to enlighten him, since the intention of another is always difficult to judge. He does not know what counter-arguments the opponent would put forth and so also what he would have to say in answer to these. Not to take of opponents, the intellectual capacity of even a pupil is difficult to assess. It is seen that a pupil who is given

1. प्रमाण साक्षात्कारपौपल्यः सिद्धान्तिविद्रूपः पर्याववोपपनः पद्यप्रतिपुपरियः बादः || - NS 1.2.1
Also read: पद्यप्रतिपुपरियः बादः || तत्स्य विशेषणः प्रमाणान्तः साक्षात्कारपौपल्यः - प्रमाण तक्षाण: प्रमाणान्तः सक्षात्कारपौपल्यः || - NB on NS 1.2.1
instruction by a teacher does not sometimes understand the concepts properly or he understands them otherwise, even though his intellectual capacity had been assessed by the teacher over a long period. In short, in a debate it is very difficult to judge how the opponent would respond to the argument. And sometimes even the teacher is seen to be silenced by his disciple. For this reason, though tarka may be useful for one's own conviction, yet it does not invariably bring about the desired result and since the means for convincing others of the truth are not ascertained, tarka cannot possibly be employed in discussion etc., and so the knowledge of tarka for vāda etc. is useless. Bhasavarjñā says that against such a stand the author of the Nyāya-sūtra has enumerated tāke separately and defined it and established tarka as a means of participating in discussion etc. It is laid down in the Nyāyasūtra—"Discussion consists in the putting forward (by two persons) of a thesis sa and a counter-thesis, in which there is supporting and condemning by means of proofs and reasonings, neither of which is quite opposed to the main doctrine (or thesis), and both of which are carried on in full accordance with the method of reasoning through the five

1. The text should be read as 'kālena' instead of 'kāle na'—NyB, p. 21.
2. See: NS. 1.1.1; NS. 1.1.40; NS. 1.2.1
What is meant here is this - In a discussion etc., a Naiyāyika should be capable of putting forth the supporting (establishment) and the condemning (demolition) that are ascertained through pramāṇa or are subjected to the test of tarka, as causes of one's own victory and of the opponent's defeat. When a man proceeds to put forth arguments after having ascertained the matter with the help of a pramāṇa (source of valid knowledge), then he certainly achieves his end (his own victory and the opponent's defeat). When in the absence of decisive knowledge, he simply anticipates the possibility of the desired end on the basis of the causes (i.e. reasoning which indicates the presence of proof - showing the absurdity of a contrary conclusion - Kāraṇopattitāḥ); even then he does attain his end. It cannot be said that even a means of one's conviction could at times be discrepant, i.e. fail to prove the point, if it is found to be discrepant, it could be only according

1. प्रभावलक्षाकोपालम्: सिद्धान्ताविरोधः: पंचाक्योपपन्नः

Nyāyasūtra 1. 2. 1; translated by Ganganāth Jhā, Gautama's Nyāyasūtras, p. 80, Poona 1939. The numbering of the sutra should be 1.2.1 instead of 1.1.40. See: NyB, p: 22
to the maxim of kākātāliya-nyāya. That is to say, the failure must be due to some other cause and it is just a coincidence that the failure occurs simultaneously with the attainment of the knowledge of certain victory or its probability. Normally a man fully conversant with the rules of discussion (vāda) etc., certainly becomes successful. And it happens though rarely, that such a person is defeated. In the case of his defeat, the presence of the knowledge of vāda etc. and the defeat are accidentally simultaneous. They are not connected by a causal relation; just as the sitting of a crow and the falling of a fruit of palmyra tree have no causal relation. Normally one does attain the desired end, just as a weaver working on threads does get cloth.

1. "काकातालीयन्यायः" :- The maxim of the crow and the palmyra fruit. A crow alighted on a Palmyra tree; and at the same moment some of the fruit fell on its head and killed it. The maxim is therefore used to illustrate a startling and purely accidental occurrence.... काकस्य अगमनं यातृत्वादं नालस्य पतनं च। तैन तलातन पतला काकस्य वचः कृत्।  
...Molesworth explains it thus: 'Said when any occurrence synchronizing with, or immediately following, some other seems, however in truth independent of it, to have been occasioned by it; - as the fruit of a Palmyra falling at the alighting upon it of a crow, may appear to fall in consequence'"- लोकन्यायज्ञालि, A Handful of Popular Maxims, Colonel, G.A.Jacob, Bombay 1900.

2. काकलीयन्यायः यदि वामनतृति, यथा तन्तुण्य प्रपृत्तस्य कुविन्दस्य पत: हंसि। - NyB, p. 22
Hence a Naiyāyika should not proceed to indulge in a debate, though he is challenged or called to a dispute by his opponent, until and unless he has ascertained fully his own capacity of the form of excellence in knowledge etc; and as against this, the weakness of the opponent and also the capacity of the president and the judges to prevent unjust proceedings in the council and their quality of impartiality. And he who proceeds to debate merely on account of his ego, without having given due consideration to his own capability; is not a Naiyāyika - a rational being, because he does not examine rationally. Indeed, an intelligent person does not start eating food, though he is very hungry, without dispelling the doubt about the food being poisonous.

It may be contended here that doubt about the desired end (—it is as likely that he will succeed as it is that he will fail—) becomes a cause of activity; viz. doubt also inspires a man to act. Analysing and elaborating the opponent's contention Bhāsarvajña says that it means that all the three, viz. doubt, conjecture and certainty regarding what is not desired (i.e. failure) are causes which prevent a man from activity; similarly doubt, conjecture and certainty regarding the desired end (i.e. success) could be the causes of activity; viz. they provoke a man to act. Then, why could doubt not serve as a cause of activity in respect
of debate etc.? To this Bhasarvajña's answer is that it is not so. For, a doubt that desired end is likely to be achieved cannot serve as a cause of activity, because doubt of the likelihood of achieving the desired end provokes a man to activity differently. For example, when a man suffering from an ailment does not find a sure remedy for its removal, he being dubtful about various medicines starts taking a particular medicine even with a doubt about the desired result. And the ailment of the man who thus starts taking some such medicine might at times be cured. But conversely if a man does not start taking a medicine at all, his ailment would remain as it was. When a man has a doubt that certain factors could possibly be the cause of his desired end, and does not see any other cause of his desired end, or does not see the likelihood of there being too much effort required or does not see the likelihood of anything untoward happening in it, then he proceeds to act being provoked to do so even by the very doubt regarding the desired end (that it is as likely that he will succeed as it is that he will fail). Thus even a doubt about the achievement of something desired serves as a cause of activity in respect of a rational being. But this cannot be compared with the activity of a gambler who starts throwing dice without having any prior consideration about gain or loss. But if a man engages himself in disputation
and wrangling without consideration, he would be defeated and so he has to endure a great loss, while a man not thus engaging himself in disputation has not to lose anything. Hence a rational man should not take initiative in participating even in vāda (discussion) on account of doubt (of the likelihood of success). And if a man employs fallacious reasons etc. there would arise the contingency of his statements being neglected as falling within the range of dull intellect. Moreover, a man who enters into discussion with his teacher in order to determine his own capability of putting forth valid reasons etc. of which he is not initially certain, should be considered as just a pupil, because he aims at the acquirement of knowledge; like one who is engaged in the examination of the meaning of the scriptural text. He should not be regarded as a debater or dialectician proper. Thus it is concluded that tarka though included in doubt, has been separately mentioned in the Nyāyasūtra in view of its special contribution in the proceedings of discussion etc. Here it may be noted that with a slight digression Bhāsārajña has sought to elucidate the special significance of Samsāra and Uha or tarka in the functioning of vāda etc. and shown that they are not essentially different from each other in as much as the characteristic of non-determination is common to both of them.

1. The text should be read as साधनासम्बन्धचिन्दन्तयः instead of साधनासम्बन्धचिन्दन्तयः - -NyB, p.23,

See : Photostat, p. 8
Inclusion of Anadhyavasāya (Indefinite apprehension)

Under Doubt: Indefinite apprehension such as, 'What could be the name of this tree?' does not substantially differ from doubt. An object whose generic name is 'vrksa' (tree) is indeed found to have another name also such as a mango (tree) etc. Thus a man who has known the generic name of an object, e.g. 'a tree', infers that the object should have a distinctive particular name also e.g. a mango tree. Thus on the ground of genus, a man tries to recollect the distinctive particular name of the tree he perceives, and entertains a doubt - 'What could be the name of this tree?' In doubt the specific names find mention, e.g. 'Is it a post or a man?' In contrast to this, in indefinite apprehension no specific name finds mention, since in that case there are numerous types of names, some known, some unknown. For example, a man who possesses a thousand cows and who also knows their apex particular names such as Bhadrā, Nanda etc.

1. Compare: बन्धुनाथाद्रि प्रत्ययाद्रि नामानि एव संबंधिते । तत्र प्रत्ययाद्रिये ताक्तु प्रतिविध्यायेणु अव्रत्वा प्रत्ययायेषु व व्यास्याय बिंदुित्वात् वा किं व व्यास्यायेन अन्वयायात् । यथा वाहीकस्य पन्नादित्यो बन्धुनाथायो महत्ति । ....... पन्नादित्यो पन्नादित्या अनुवृत्तर्वा बालातिब्दिः प्रत्ययायेनव, केलक तुपदेशानाबादू विशेषानाश्रयात्प्रतिपादिः: न महत्ति । बालातिब्दिये बालिना जितित्वधियायिन: जस्तास्यात्त्रात्तिनात् को तु लुक अय प्राणीय स्वयाम्।-PB with NKL, pp.434-35, Vārāṇasi 1963

क्लेश बन्धुनाथाय: महत्ति ।
is informed that one of his cows has delivered a calf. On hearing this he entertains a doubt just in the form: 'Which cow could have delivered a calf?'. He does not resort to particular alternatives like 'Could it be Bhadra', 'Could it be Nanda' and so on? The indefinite apprehension (anadhyavasāya) arises when a man who makes arrows etc. (i.e. carpenter) being very busy and since he is not interested in this (type of tree) may just by the way ask such a question: 'What might be the name of this tree?' That also should be taken as included in doubt by the above exposition. Even in the case of the doubt, regarding post etc. a notion to the effect - 'We do not know what it is' occurs to the

1. क्लापमां गो: प्रश्नता वस्त्रयाकारार्थ संध्याविधिभिषेकिकार्यी || || - NyB, p. 23;

2. प्रसिद्धात्मेर्षु अप्रसिद्धात्मेर्षु वा व्यासात्र वार्तितवातु वा किमै वर्ति वालोकनाभाय: । || - PB with NKL, p.434, Varanasi, 1963

Compare: स्त्री व्यासात्र वार्तितवातू वा हसुकाराद्वित्तिवाक्य: संध्यान्वितः । || NyB, p. 23

Also compare: व्यासात्र व्यासात्राश्चतित्वातू विशेषावर्तिति-वार्तितवातु वा किंचिं वर्ति वालोकनाभाय । गते प्रसिद्धेऽराजनि कः वपि बनन पशा गतं वर्ति वालोकनाभास्वरीतिवक्षेण्यु वस्तवाभाय: । - NKL with PB, p.434, Varanasi 1963

In the photostat also the reading is: कवित्वातू , (p.9)
mind in between the perception of the thing and the actual form of the doubt, 'Is it a man or a post?' The occurrence of such a notion is common to both, doubt and indefinite apprehension. Hence merely on the basis of a minor internal variation in form indefinite apprehensions (anādhyāvasāya) cannot be said to be altogether different from doubt since both have the same characteristic of non-determinations. We should bear in mind that though nirvikālpa (non-determinate cognition) and savikālpa (determinate cognition) perceptions have some minor distinctive characteristics (sub-differences), yet they are regarded as one i.e. perception; on account of their having the same essential characteristic, viz the rising from the contact of sense-organ with object; so also in the case of anādhyāvasāya and samsāya. We, therefore, conclude here that-Uha and anādhyāvasāya are in essence not different from doubt (samsāya), since all of them have the common characteristic (not being decisive knowledge of an object).

Contention that there is nothing Like Doubt: It may be contended that doubt itself is not there, then how could one think that doubt includes-Uha etc. in itself? The concept of doubt cannot stand the critical investigation of the several alternative explanations of which the concept is capable. To begin with, what becomes manifest in the cognition of doubt?
The object? Or its qualities? (—post or tallness?). If the object, then is it real or unreal? If it is real, then a further question arises: How could the cognition of a real object be of the nature of doubt? When the cognition apprehends an object as it really is, it cannot be doubt, like the cognition of the nature of ascertainment of palm etc. But if it is said that the object manifested in doubt is unreal, then the cognition should be designated as illusion, and not as doubt, because it has unreal object just like the cognition of illusory hair etc. Thus the object (dharmin) cannot be admitted as being manifest in doubt. Now, on the other hand, if it is said that an attribute (dharma) of the object becomes manifest in doubt, then we ask alternative questions: Is that attribute of the nature of postness? Or is it of the nature of manness? Or of the nature of both? If it is said that the attribute manifested in doubt is of the nature of postness, then we ask: Is it real or unreal? And the same fault as pointed out above can be urged in both these alternatives. And if it is said that the attribute that is manifest in doubt is of the nature of manness, the same fault can be pointed out as shown above. But if it is said that both attributes, postness and manness are manifest in doubt, then again we ask: Are they real or unreal? Again
the same fault can be pointed out as above. If it is said that one of the attributes is real, while the other one is unreal; then there would arise the contingency that the same knowledge, having real and unreal attributes as its object, would have to be regarded as erroneous and non-erroneous simultaneously. Again if it is argued that a doubtful object becomes manifest in the cognition of the nature of doubt, then we ask as before: Does such a doubtful object exist or does it not? The same line of argument as shown above can be pursued here also. Alas! This poor doubt has fallen in the thicket of dialectical alternatives; it cannot assert itself as an entity distinct from true knowledge and error.

1. It is very interesting to note that a similar passage is traced almost verbatim in the Prameyakamalamārtanda (p.47). Prabhācandra (980-1065 A.D.) seems to have taken this passage almost verbatim from the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa (pp.23-24) of Bhāsarvajña (950 A.D.)

Compare: "तत्सम्बन्धे सम्म्यज्ञाने किं प्रतिमाति? यदी प्रयोगातां अतःहृदक: वा? ...........

-NyB, p.23( प्रेक्षणः)

"संश्यज्ञाने किं प्रयोगातां प्रतिमाति? प्रयोगातां अतःहृदकः कालाहृदकः वाः?

(प्रेक्षणः)

Bhāsārvaśāṇa's Rejoinder: This opponent who attempts to repudiate the very existence of doubt in the manner of Gomma-1
payasīṇāya (viz. by putting forth an utterly absurd argument) is ignored even by common people. Indeed each creature directly experiences doubt as being of the nature of non-determinate cognition. Whether it has a thing as its object, or its attribute, whether it is one knowledge or is plural in character, whether it has a real object or an unreal object - can this dialectical disputation do any harm however little to the existence of doubt? If the difference apprehended by direct experience is deliberately concealed, then indeed one should not recognise the difference between pleasure

Some stupid person is supposed to argue that cowdung is identical with milk, because it comes from the cow, hence it is used to denote an utterly absurd argument or statement."
A Handful of Popular Maxims Collected by Colonel G. A. Jacob, p. 17, Bombay, 1900

2. See: NyB, p. 24; compare:
and pain also as both are qualities of soul that are produced. If it is urged that this is what is desired; then against this a question may be asked - On what ground is it so desired? If the answer to this is that non-difference among things is accepted on the basis of the repudiation of all things being established (tattvopapalvasiddheh); then one may ask in turn as to on what ground tattvopapalava also could be established. If the answer to this is that it is established on the ground of the absence of the means of valid knowledge (in the absence of pramāṇa no principle could positively be propounded); then one may ask on what ground the absence of the means of valid knowledge could be established. If the answer is that it is established on the strength of the absence of definition; and here also if any further justification is shown in order to prove the absence of definition, then that reason itself would come to be a real entity (tattva). So how could tattvopapalava be established? On the other hand if no justification is put forth to establish the absence of definition,

1. "सन्देह: वहु वर्णार्थानां... शुद्ध: मेघस्यापहनव: स्वाधः। -

NyB, p. 24

Compare: सन्देह: वहु वर्णार्थानां... शुद्ध: मेघस्यापहनव: स्वाधः। -
Prameyakamalamārtanda, pp. 47-48

2. वहुं तत्त्वास्तिकोनित्यिन्यन्त्रण, प्रमाण्यनित्यिन्यन्त्रण: च प्रक्ष्यद्यवस्था -

tatttvopapalvasiddheh, p. 20
then in the absence of proof, absence of definition cannot 
be established. If by mere assertion a view could be estab­
lished then all doctrines would be established. Besides, 
'the absence of definition' itself which is put forth as a 
ground to prove the absence of a means of valid knowledge, also 
becomes a pramāṇa, as it truly proves something. Then how 
could one establish the absence of all pramāṇas? And if it 
is contended - 'We only challenge and repudiate the theories 
of others and we do not seek to establish anything positively'; 
then also there is no justification. For, unless one comes 
to some positive conclusion in respect of the 'other', principle, 
others, moreover, it no pramāṇa is recognized, 
one cannot justifiably challenge the views of neither this 
world nor its dealings could be established.

Nor also could be its pleasantness, as long as it is 
not investigated into. So all this is just meaningless prattle. In this regard some others believe that it is not proper 
that on perceiving one thing, viz. a common attribute (e.g. 
tallness) a man should entertain a doubt in regard to another 
thing, viz. the thing (e.g. post) which is different, from 
the attribute perceived, That is to say, a man perceives 
one thing, e.g. a common attribute and has doubt in respect of

1. सब्र व्यवहारः ज्ञानार्थमणिया: घटने।
   - Tattvopaplavasinha, p. 125
something else, e.g. an object. This argument is not proper. Thread etc. and clay etc. are both different objects as far as cloth or the like is concerned and yet only some thread or the like can serve as auxiliary causal factors and not all. As threads bring about cloth though different, so also perception of common qualities and the like give rise to doubt in regard to the thing, though the thing is a different entity from them. Bhasarvajña says emphatically that each and every effect has its own definite generative cause and also a definite auxiliary cause. Everything cannot be a cause of all. And this applies to the origination of doubt also. In Uddyotakara's view, while an object endowed with a common quality, e.g. tallness etc. is perceived, a doubt may arise in regard to the very same object in respect of its particular character. Thus it can be concluded that there does exist doubt and it arises from the perception of common property etc.

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1. वर समानयमयिण्ये: बन्धसिद्धां चरित्राणां संस्कृत्यं: मवति चति क: परिहारः? वर परिहारः बुध्कृति: समासं: ।...

- NV, NCG, p. 473