CHAPTER-XXIV. SOME ANTI-DHVANI THEORISTS.

While starting the exposition of dhvani as expounded in Dhv., we raised the question of the earlier writers, who did not accept dhvani and against whose views Ananda was trying to establish his theory. We noted that we have not been able to discover specific works of authors who hold views opposed to the dhvani theory. Consequently, we relied upon Dhv. and Locana for those opposing views (Ch. 24). We do, however, find works posterior to Dhv. which carry on their polemics against the dhvani theory. In order to complete the discussion on dhvani we now take up these views.

Among these works, we come across Abhidhāvṛttimātrkā (AVM) of Mukulbhātta (circa 9th-10th Cent. A.D.), Vakroktijaṅvita (VJ) of Kuntaka (Circa middle of 10th -11 the cen. A.D.); Des'turūpaka (DR) of Dhanaśayya (last quarter of 10th Cent.) with Avaloka of Dhanika; Vyaktiviveka of Mahimabhāṭṭa (circa 11th A.D.-12th A.D.) and Śrīgārāpakteśa (Śr. Pra.) of Bhōja (Circa 11th A.D.).

Before we start with Mukulbhātta, it should be noted that Bhatta-Nāyaka's name also should be mentioned first as he is said to have composed his Hṛdayadurgapāṇa with an object of dhvanidhvamsa. Pratihārenduṛṣṭa also mentions Udbhata as one who did not accept dhvani and knowingly incorporated the same under various figures of Speech. One Manoratha Kavi, a contemporary of Ananda, is also mentioned by Abhinava. He (i.e. Manoratha) wrote the famous verse viz. Yasminnasti na vastu etc. to ridicule dhvani.

MUKULBHĀTTA:

We begin with those आलंकारिकास who seem to include the suggested sense under laksanā. In this context, we may mention the names of Mukulbhātta and Kuntaka.

Mukulbhātta, like the older grammarians and the Mīmāṃsakas, satisfied himself with only two modes of expression, viz. abhidhā and laksanā. All implicit sense is put under laksanā by him. In his Abhidhāvṛttimātrkā (AVM), Mukula incorporates all the examples of the implicit sense under laksanā. He discusses the nature of abhidhā in his AVM, also treats of
laksana therein. Laksana is treated only as a subdivision of abhidha and virtually he believes only in one S'abdavatti viz. abhidha(1). He seems to incorporate the implicit sense under laksana which is only a part of abhidha.

He considers laksana to be three-fold on the basis of vaktā i.e. Speaker, Vākya i.e. sentence, and vācyā i.e. the meaning or context. On the basis of these three factors, sudhā laksana and upacāra laksana both become three-fold. Thus we arrive at six sub-divisions of laksana(2). The illustrations cited are as below:

Vaktrnibandhana laksana is that in which the laksyārtha is gathered with reference to the type of the Speaker. The illustration is: Dr̥ṣṭiśc he prakīrṇa pratives'ini etc. The Speaker is a wanton woman and the laksyārtha is gathered with reference to her. Makula holds that the future 'ratagopana' is the laksyārtha here. (For the dhvanivādin, however, it is an example of vyāñjanā, based on vaktrvais'īṣṭya or peculiarity of the Speaker, and herein we derive through Vyāñjanā some 'Vastu'or idea from another 'Vastu'or idea).

Vākyanibandhana laksana is based on a particular type of a sentence. The illustration is, praptaśrih esa kasmāt etc. Here, the natural movement of the ocean is taken to be due to something else. Here the superimposition is due to a particular vākyārtha or the meaning of a sentence. Thus, the 'upacāra'is'gauna'or subordinate. The superimposition of Viṣṇu on the king is the laksyārtha(3)(For the dhvanivādin, this is 'rūpakālampkāradrvani' i.e. suggestion of the figure called rūpaka.)

The vācyanibandhana laksana occurs when the laksyārtha is gathered on the perusal of the vācyārtha or the expressed sense. This is illustrated as indārvārā madanēśavo disi dis'i etc. Herein the vākyārtha or the expressed sense of the sentence is that as agni i.e. fire is superimposed on vasanta i.e. Spring, Kānadeva or the god of love etc., they become unbreakable. On perusal of this expressed sense, Vipralambha S'ṛṣāra is gathered through akeśa or implication. Thus, it is a case of upādēnlañkāsana

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(1) S'abdavatti, abhidha refers to the explicit sense, and it is divided into one or two sub-divisions.

(2) The six sub-divisions are: laksana, upacāra laksana, vācyā laksana, vācyādha laksana, vācyādha laksana, and vācyādha laksana.

(3) The examples from Vyāñjanā (a type of expression) and the dhvanivādin (a type of verse form) are mentioned for comparison.
Kuntaka accepts only one mode of verbal expression viz. abhidhā. The implied meaning which poems convey are for him so many different twists of abhidhā. So, he, instead of postulating the new mode of vyanjana, would explain-in everything by abhidhā and the more several twists to which it can be subjected. For Kuntaka, dyotaka and vyanjaka words, on account of their quality of the ability to give meaning (arthapratitaḥritva), may be termed as vācaka, metaphorically. Thus the dyotya and vyanīga arthaḥ i.e. suggested meaning in general, also are vācya or expressed on account of their quality of being gathered by us. He accepts only abhidhā, but he does not reject either laksanā or vyanjana as they are but the extension of abhidhā only (5).

Kuntaka tries to incorporate some of the implicit sense under upacāra-vākrtā. He subsumes some other implicit sense under some other variety of vākrtā. He does not seem to include the whole of vyanjana in laksanā. However, Vidyādha, the author of Ekāvalī holds that Kuntaka incorporates all dhvani under bhakti or laksanā (6). Dr. Harichandra Sūstrī (Kalidasa et l'Art Poétique de l'Inde pp. 96-7) suggests that bhakti stands for vakrokti and that Kuntaka, therefore, is a bhaktivadin. Dr. Kane does not agree with this. Samudrabandha, the commentator of Ruyaka observes that only laksanāmūla vyanjana (i.e. avivekṣitāvācyadhvani) under upacāravākrtā and that Kuntaka therefore, may be taken as a bhaktivadin only in a limited sense of the term. He has incorporated some other forms of the suggested sense (i.e. vyanīgārtha) under some other forms of vakrokti as well.

Kuntaka's vakrokti is termed as 'Vicitra abhidhā' (vaktroktih prasiddhā-bhidhānayatirekini vicitrawibhidhā-V.J.pp.21, De's edn. 1925). He also believes in only one vṛtti viz. abhidhā and considers laksanā as its factor. He tries to subsume some dhvani under laksanā. He incorporates s'abda-
For Kuntaka, upacāravakratā is said to be where in order to suggest some idea of uncommonness (ātis'ayabhāva) in the description of a particular thing, the qualities of some other objects are also described metaphorically. The figures such as rūpaka and the like are based on this. This upacāravakratā thus, is nothing else but pramojaravati gāṇī lakṣāṇā. The illustrations cited are all those of avivakṣitavācya dhvani based on lakṣāṇāmālā vyaśjanā, e.g., snigdhas'yāmalakāntī...and the like. Kuntaka says that in this particular verse, upacāravakratā lies in the word 'snigāha' used with reference to 'kāntī' or lustre which is not a object that can have this quality (8). When the upacāra or metaphorical expression is such as can be commonly experienced by all, it is not considered as an instance of upacāravakratā by Kuntaka. (9)

For Kuntaka, vakrokti is different from ordinary speech and is of the form of a peculiar type of abhidhā (ācitra abhidhā). The central idea in Kuntaka’s treatment is that the vakrokti is the essence (jīvita) of poetry. By vakrokti he means a certain striking or charming (ācitra) mode of expression (vinyāsakrama) and this is different from or it excels, the matter of fact expression of words and ideas in the śāstras and the like (10). It is therefore something quite different from the established mode of speech and goes to achieve a certain strikingness (valcitrya-or vichittiti), or an imaginative turn of words and ideas (bhāṅgibhānti or bhāṅtiprakāra) peculiar to poetry and abhorrent of common speech in which facts are more or less stated in a simple way. This forms the vakratva or vakrabhāva that lies under all poetic speech. A distinction, therefore, is implied between the methods of sciences and scriptures (śāstra) and that of poetry i.e. between the scientific and the artistic mode of expression. Kuntaka, after defining poetry as word and sense (11), continues to say in V.J.I.10. that these two viz., both word and sense are to be embellished and vakrokti
forms the common embellishment.(12).

The so called embellishments that go under the name of various poetic figures i.e. alaṃkāras, dhvani, rasa etc. form some aspects of this vakrokti and are to be included in the fold of the comprehensive scope of this "vakrokti".

Kuntaka explains(I,10) that vakrokti delights us by the skill of the poet and is therefore to be termed as: vaddagdhābhangī bhaniti, which ultimately resides on the skill of the poet (kavi'ala) or poetic genius (kavi-pratibhā) or on an act of imagination on his part i.e. kāvivyāpāra or kavi-kṣayapaśa but gives a six-fold division of the same as follows: (i) varṇavakrata i.e. arrangement of letters,(ii) and (iii) padapūrvartha and padaparārdha vakratā i.e. arrangement of substantive and terminal parts of a word,(iv) vākyavakrata or arrangement of a sentence,(v) prakaranavakrata or arrangement of a peculiar topic and (vi) prabandhavakrata or arrangement of the composition as a whole.

As noted earlier, Kuntaka tries to incorporate alaṃkāra, dhvani and rasa etc. under vakrokti. Anuprāsa of the ancient alaṃkārikas finds place in varṇavīśavakrata (e.g. in bhagamāvallarikāḥ ... and the like) Upanāgarikā and other vṛttiś of the ancients (i.e. Udbhata) are the same as varṇavīśavakrata. He says(V.J.II.5)

"Varnacchayāmsāreṇa guṇamārgānuvartinī.\n\nvr̥ttivaicitryayuktena saiva proktā cirantanaḥ.\n\nYamaka is also a variety of the same.

He says: 'yamakaṁ nāma ko'pyasyāḥ prakāraḥ paridṛṣṭe yāte.)
\nSa tu s'obhāntarēbhāvāt iha nāti pratyate...\n\nV.J.II.7)

Padapūrvardhavakrata has several varieties, such as rūdhivaicitryavakrata, paryāyavakrata, upacāravakrata, vis'esaṇavakrata, Saṃvātivakrata, vṛttivakrata, liṅgavaicitryavakrata, and kriyāvaicitryavakrata.

Rūdhivaicitryavakrata is defined as:

(V.J.II,8,9)-
There are two varieties of rūdhivaicitrya. Examples of the first variety are the word ‘kamalaiṁ in’tālē jāanti’ etc., and ‘rūmaḥ in’ snigduino ‘yāmala’ etc.

Examples of the second variety of rūdhivaicitrya are ‘tataḥ prahasyāha etc. (Raghu III.51) and rāma’sān bhuvanesu etc. (quoted in K.P.IV.)

From the illustrations quoted as above we can see that the lakṣmaṇāmūla arthāntarasamkramitavācya variety of dhvani seems to have been covered in rūdhivaicitrya.

Paryāyavakrata (V.J.II.11,12) is defined as:

"abhidheyāntaratamastasyātis’ayapośakah."

rāmyočchayāntarasparśāśattadāṃkartoṃśvareḥ.

svayam viś’esemāṃpi Svaścchayotkarṣapas’alaiḥ...

paryāyastena vaicitryam.

An example is: ‘nabhiyoktaṃ anṛtataṃ iṣyase etc., wherein the word ‘vajrīnāh’ cannot be replaced by ‘indrasya’ without killing the charm.

By this variety, paryāyadhvani or what is technically termed as s’abdas’akti —mūlaka anuṣaṅgupavyāniya pādaadhvani seems to have been covered. (13).C.

Kuntaka himself says this very clearly.

Then follows Upacāravakrata defined as: (V.J.II.13-14):

Yatra śṛṇtareṇyasmāt samānyamupacaryate.)

les’emāpi bhavatāṅcic vaktumudrikāśvṛttitiṃ...

rāmīlē sarasolekhaḥ rūpakādirāṅkṛtāḥ.

Upacāravpradhāṃśau vakrata kābhiçcvayate...

Examples of this are, snigduṇḍyāmala etc., gacchatiṣṇaṃ remaṇaṇavasatiṃ etc., and ganaṇam ca māttameham etc. The first and the last are cited in the Dhv. as examples of arthāntarasamkramitavācya, and atyantatirakṛtatavācya.

Varieties of dhvani.
As xx already noted earlier, probably this inspires the author of \textit{Alaṅkāra-sarvasva} to say that: \textit{Upacāravakrataḥ} dadihiḥ samasto dhvanipraapaḍaḥ svākṛtaḥ.

2 Vis'ēṣaṇavakrataḥ and \textit{saṃvrītavakrataḥ} are defined as: (V. J. II. 15. 16)

\textit{Vis'ēṣaṇavyaḥ māhātyat kriyāyāḥ kāraṇasya vā.}
yatraolasati lāvanyam sa vis'ēṣaṇavakrataḥ. ||

\textit{Yaddu samrīyate kṛpaḥ vastu vaicitryasya vivakṣayā.}
Sarvanāmādirbhīḥ keśicītsoktā samrītavakrataḥ. ||

The examples are s'ucis'ītalā, etc., and nīvṛtyatāmāli kimpyayam bātuh (Kūntaka, Sam. V. 83). This also partially covers what is technically termed as \textit{arthāntara-}\nsemkṛtaḥvācyadhvani.

\textit{Vṛttiveicitryavakrataḥ} includes vākrataḥ with reference to kṛt, taddhita, samāsa, ekta, āga and sammenta. This covers all dhvani derived by kṛt, taddhita etc. (Dhv. III. 16) (14) Dhv. III. 16 also refers to dhvani based on nipāta, kāla, upasarga, liṅga etc. (15) This is covered by Kūntaka's other varieties of \textit{padapārādhavakrataḥ} such as kāraṇavyakrataḥ, vacana, upasarga, pratyayā, nipātasvakrataḥ, puruṣavakrataḥ, etc.

In the third unmeṣa the author comes to the discussion of vākya vaicitryavakrataḥ. In connection with this he speaks of vastuvakrataḥ at III. i (16).

The vāstu may be 'sahaja'or 'āhārya' (i.e. kavī's ativartapattiparipākaprauḍha). The example for both these is anyāḥ sargavidhau etc. This variety includes some vastudhvani as the delineation is with reference to 'vastu' that may be not 'vācya' or expressed only, but also vyaśya i.e. suggested (17).

Kūntaka's vākya vaicitryavakrataḥ covers alaṅkārathvani as well as the normal figures of speech. He recognizes the \textit{pratīyaṃsā} variety of rūpaka, vyatireka etc. Where these figures are implicit. The illustration is: lavanya-kāntiparipūritadihimakhe'smin etc. Rūpakadhvani of Ānanda is also hereby covered. (18).

He also gives instructions here as to how sentiment and other objects can be used in a poem to yield charming results and how to lend charm to poetry by nourishing appropriate rasas, bhāvas etc. The verse tīṣṭhet kṛpavas'āt.
etc. is cited as an example of vipralambha and the lamentations of Vatsaraśāja (in Tāpasavatsarāja Act.II) as examples of karuṇa.

In the 4th unmesa he gives the treatment of prakaraṇavakrata and prabandha-vakrata. Prakaraṇavakrata is illustrated by several verses from the Raghu (VII), with the remark kuberam prati sāmantaṃ bhavasayā. jayaḥ jayāvatasayā kāmapi sahṛdayāḥ dhakṛtān prastāpyate. The introduction of the curse of Durgāsas is also an instance to the point. Yet another illustration in prakaraṇavakrata is the nṛgāyapraṣaṇa or the episode of hunting in Raghu (IX). The episode introduced with the words sūriḥ pravis'ati rajjuhastah puṇṇaḥ (Madhavākṣaṇa VI) is also an instance to the point.

Prabandhavakrata is defined as itivṛtti nyathā vṛttarasasampadesapekṣayā.

rasaṛṣṭareṇa ramyena yatra nirvahanam bhavet, kathāmūrtarūpālomitāśriyā. vināyānandaniṣpatyai sā prabandhasya vakrata...

The Ramāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata are the examples: Thus prabandhavakrata covers prabandhadhvani (19). Another variety of prabandhavakrata is, "trailokyābhinavollekhanaṃyakarṣasaposinā./

itiḥśaikades'ena prabandhasya samāpanam...

taduttaravartivirāṣātvajihāsayā. kurvīta yatra sukaviḥ sā vicītrāṣa vakrata...

An example is Kīrtiśaṅkara. He says that great poets show their imagination even in giving names to their works e.g. abhiṣākuntala, madhavārūkṣa, etc. etc. It is genius that makes all the difference, though the plot may be the same (20).

Again, at IV 26, Kuntaka reads—In all the compositions of poets, which are composed in different ways and which speak of the path of truth, there is a sort of vakrata (uncommon to others) (21). Compositions based on the same source acquire individuality due to vakrata. Thus, Kuntaka covers prabandhadhvani by prabandhavakrata.

Kuntaka's approach to the fact of rasa is also noteworthy. For him, rasa is the highest factor in the poetic art which is of the form of vakrokti. Vakrokti is related to rasa in the same way in which it is related to dhvani.
Thus, just as for the dhvanivadin dhvani is the soul of kāvya and rasa-
dhvani is the highest form of dhvani; in the same way, vakrokti is the soul of kāvya and rasa is the most important aspect of vakrokti.

Kuntaka seems to pay great importance to the fact of rasa. He wants poetry to be tadvidahladakarini i.e., such as would delight the critic(22)
At 1.5. in his V.J., while dealing with kāvyaprayojana he refers to rasa(23)
Again, while talking about sukumāra mārga, he says that a sahrdaya or tadvid
is rasādiparamārthajña (rasādiparamārthajñamenaḥ saṃvādasundyārah, I.26 V.J.)
while dealing with saubhāgyaguna, the critics are described as 'sarāsātma'
i.e. 'ārdracetas'. (24)

He also seems to take rasa as the soul of kāvya. He declares it categorically that prabandhavakrataḥ is the highest form of vakrokti. (25)
These prabandhas or compositions on which the fame of great poets rests, are full of rasa-'nirantararasodgaragarhhasa darbhanirbhāxaḥ' (V.J. IV.17). They do not depend upon kathāatra or story element or content alone(26)
Thus, for Kuntaka rasa is the soul of a prabandha or a composition and is one of the aspects of vakrokti. Kuntaka thus seems to cover rasadhvani of the asamlaksyavariety.

Rasa for Kuntaka is not vācya or expressed. While dealing with the problem of the alamkāras such as rasavat, prayas, etc., he laughts at Udbhata's theory of rasa becoming 'Svas'abdavācya'or being expressed by its own proper name (27)

While considering the nature of kāvyavastu or poetic context, Kuntaka takes rasa to be very important. Thus, at V.J. III.11 (vr̥tti) he says that rasanirbhāratā' or the condition of being drenched in rasa is the principal aspect of poetic context. He devides kāvyavastu-poetic content as two-fold, cetana or sentient and jāda or insentient, and takes the first one as principal and for that rasapariposa or the enhancement of sentiment is inevitable(28) . Then he gives many examples of vipralamba and karuna rasas and leaves other rasas to the readers(29) . For him, the description of jāda or insentient object becomes interesting on account of its
ability to evoke rasa.(30). In the same way and for the same purpose, i.e. to evoke rasa, the description of the unimportant sentient objects such as birds and the like, is also welcome(31). He adds that (V.J.III.10. 
Vṛtti) kāvyavāstu or poetic content is two-fold on account of its being 'svabhāvapradhāna' or 'rasapradhāna' and that both should be embellished, on account of both of them being 'sahajasaukumāryasarasa' or full of rasa on account of natural beauty. (32).

While discussing different mārgas also Kuntaka refers to rasa. The Sukumāra mārga is charming (V.J.I.26) on account of its being favourable to the mental aptitude of those who know the highest object called rasa. (33). The vicitramārga is also 'sarasākūta' i.e. accomplished by rasanirbhārābhīprāya (34). The madhyama mārga being a combination of these two must be necessarily charged with rasa - 'rasapuṣṭa'.

Thus we see that with his theory of vakrokti or a striking mode of speech differing from and transcending the ordinary everyday mode of speaking about a thing, and such that charms by the skill of the poet, Kuntaka seems to cover up all the sources of charm in poetry, beginning with alamkāra and ending with dhvani and rasa. As already noted earlier, even dyotaka and vyāñjaka words, on account of their quality of the ability to give meaning, -arthapratītiṣṭhīvācakā' i.e. expressive of meaning, metaphorically. Thus, broadly speaking, Kuntaka may be termed as an antarbhāvādāhin and a bhaktivādāhin to a certain extent.

DHANAJAYA AND DHANIKI:

We will now consider the views of Dhanañjaya and Dhanīka, (Circa 10th Century A.D.) the authors of Das'rupaka and Avaloka on it. These are also well known anti-dhvani theorists who try to explain the fact of suggested sense through tatparya or purport.

In the fourth prakās'a of the DR, the authors touch the problem of rasāmūbhūti or the experience of sentiment in poetry. Dhanika's elaborate commentary brings out their views clearly. They accept the fact of rasādī
but they fail to accept the proposition that rasādis are conveyed by vyaśjanŚ. They hold that the vyaṅgya or suggestion of the dhvanivādins can be explained with the help of tātparya s'akti or purport alone. In order to get the suggested sense through tātparya s'akti or purport, we will see how Dhanika expands the limits of tātparyārtha or purport-sense. The line of argument proceeds as below:

The laukika vākyas or sentences in day to day usage, such as 'gāmabhyaśa', where the kriyā or action is clearly heard of, and sentences such as 'dvāram dvāram' in which the kriyā or action is not heard of, but is gathered through prakaraṇa or context, only kriyā or action can be considered as the vākyārtha or the sense of a sentence. In the same way, even in kāvyā or poetry, rasa which is the ultimate purpose of kāvyā or poetry, forms the vākyārtha'. Thus rasa becomes the ultimate vākyārtha i.e. kāvyavrūdhvārtha and therefore, is at times expressed in clear terms such as 'prityai navodhā priyā', or is at times brought about by the particular vibhāva, amubhāva and vyabhirčāris etc. It should not be argued that as ratyādi and the like, is an apadārtha (i.e. not the direct meaning of a pada or word), it cannot therefore be gathered by vākyārtha or sentence-sense. For, ultimately, our tātparyas'akti or purport rests in the final kriyā or action—"kāryaparyavā-sāyitvāt tātparyas'aktē"—i.e. the action of enjoyment. Now, all sentences, pauruśeṣa i.e. used in human speech and apauroṣeṣa i.e. divine alike, have some action in their motive. If it is not so, any sentence would be as useless as the uttering of a mad man! With reference to the words in poetry, it can be said with the help of positive and negative soneomittance, that they aim only at the generation of its own unique joy. Kāvyā or poetry sets about to achieve this end only. There cannot be any other end in view, except this. So then, in a kāvyā, the vibhāva, amubhāva etc. stand for the padārthas (i.e. word-sense) and the ratyādi brought about by them is the vākyārtha (or purport).

Thus, a kāvyavrūdyka is formed. It should not be argued that as in case of song and the like, there is no vācyavrūdaśakabhāva or the relation of expresser and the expressed here. (In a song, the meaningless notes make for the experience
of joy). Because here, in the field of kāvyā, the experience of a particular rasa is felt by those alone who are conversant with vibhāva, anubhāva etc. Now in the realisation of such a rasa, which is the vācyārtha of a kāvyā-vākyā, only abhidhā and tātparya s'akti are quite sufficient and therefore, it is gratuitous to postulate the theory of Vyaśjanā.

Thus, the tātparyaśādin comes to the conclusion that whatever is supposed to be conveyed by vyaśjanā is really conveyed by abhidhā and tātparya. Surely, in case of 'anyoktis' wherever the purport is not expressed in clear terms, dhvani cannot be resorted to.

The dhvaniśādin cannot say that in case of sentences such as 'vīṣam bhukṣya', etc., the purport lies in the principal suggested sense, viz. 'do not take food at his place', gathered by vyaśjanā, and not by tātparya. For, in this case, the vācyārtha or the expressed sense is not at all over till the last limit of the full purport is reached. If at all there is any further sense left to be gathered later on, in that case, the vācyārtha or the expressed sense is not to be taken as complete in itself. It becomes complete i.e. Vis'rānta only when the ultimate sense meant to be brought out by the speaker is gathered by the hearer. Thus, on the acceptance of the fact of tātparya, it is redundant to assume dhvani or vyaśjanā.

A limit to the sense gathered from a sentence can not be put. A particular sentence can not be restricted to a particular sense only. Tātparya or purport rests in the ultimate action. So far as the so called desired sense is not gathered, the expressed sense or vācyārtha can not be said to be over. Tātparya is not to be measured on scales-tātparya na tulādhṛtaṃ - so as to limit its extent, and is not to be determined as just this much and not that much!

The pūrpaśa (i.e. dhvaniśādin) may argue as follows: - The sentence viz. bhramā dhārṇika etc., gives only the sense 'bhramāṇakriyā'. There is no word the giving/sense of prohibition and therefore, after giving the meaning in form of an injunction, the vācyārtha or the expressed sense finds its completion.
Then, on account of the peculiarity of the speaker viz. the wanton girl, the sense of negation flashes forth on the mind of the cultured critic. Thus, vyañgyārtha i.e. the suggested sense, flashing forth only after the expressed sense is completely gathered — vācyavis'ṛūti — will have to be accepted.

But, the tātparyvādin explains away the negative suggested sense from the positive expressed sense in bhrama dhārmika etc., with the help of tātparya alone, because the vācyārtha or the expressed sense can be said to only have been complete after the intention of the speaker is fully conveyed. If the intention of the Speaker is not fully conveyed, the expressed should be taken as incomplete only. Thus, if the sense of negation is not conveyed then for the Speaker, viz. the particular wanton girl, the expressed sense remains incomplete.

The sentence of human speech — (pauruṣeya) — are spoken with some idea in mind, i.e. with a desire to convey something — (vivakṣa), — and therefore, the full meaning of the speaker, i.e. his intention should be termed as 'tātparya' in poetry. Till this is not gathered, the sense cannot be said to be complete.

If the sentence is said to convey the full sense, then in that case, how and why should it give another sense? And, in case if it goes for it, it is clear that the sentence-sense is not complete.

Finally, Dhanika explains that the rasādī and the kāvya are related by way of 'bhāvyabhāvaka' relation and not by 'vyañgyavyañjakabhāva' (35).

MAMIMABHĀTTA:

Mahimabhaṭṭa points out the following ten blemishes in the definition of dhwani as given in Dhv. I.13, which has been noticed previously. For the sake of understanding the polemic of Mahima, I repeat it as under:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Yatrārthaḥ s'abdo vā} & \\
\text{tamarthamupasarjanīkṛtasvarthakā} & \\
\text{vyaṅktāḥ kāvya vis'ṛūtāḥ} & \\
\text{Sa dhvaniriti sūribhīḥ kathitāḥ} & \text{ (Dhv. I.13)}
\end{align*}
\]

The blemishes as pointed out by Mahima are enumerated as below:
(i) arthasya vis'istatvam.
(ii) s'abdah.
(iii) (S'abdah)savis'esamah.
(iv) vyaktih.
(v) dhvanih
(vi) 'va's'abda
(vii) dvivacanam'in 'vyan'ktaht(<=
(viii) tadah pumstvan
(ix) the term 'kavyavis'asah'
and (x) Vacanam ca kathanakartuh i.e. 'Sūrihhīh'.

The first fault according to Mahima is that the particular adjective viz. upasarjanīkṛtasa is redundant with reference to 'artha'. An adjective is one that is shown to be variable. Now, 'upasarjanīkṛtasa' or 'rendering one's own self subordinate' is an adjective which does not possess variability. For the expressed sense, being an indicator of the suggested sense, is necessarily and always subordinate. Says he:

'ydrarthasya vis'esanam.
gamakatvēnna tattasya
yuktamavyabhicāratah. ||
(Vy, V, I, 7.)

The purport of Mahima's argument seems to be as below. Adjectives are generally used to indicate a variable quality, e.g., lotuses may be white, blue or red. But that adjective which merely repeats the nature of the thing invariably connected, is logically speaking redundant. This is exactly the case in qualifying 'artha' by the adjectives 'upasarjanīkṛtasa', because it is always so.

It may be noted that the first fault as indicated by Mahima seems to be of the type of 'avācyavacana' or mentioning of something when it is not absolutely required.
The second blemish in the definition of dhvani as given by Ānanda consists in the mentioning of the word 's'abdah'. A word has no other function save expressing its own meaning. Thus, it cannot suggest any other sense. — S'abdah punaranupādeyaḥ eva. tasya svābhidhānamantareṇa vyāpārāntarāmpapadatarupādayīsyayamāṇatvāt. (Vy. V. I.)

Thus, it seems that the second fault pertains to making S'abda the conveyor of the implicit sense, because the sole function of the word is to express its own meaning. The second fault reiterates the position of Mahima viz. that the word has one continuous meaning and there is no room for anything else like vyakti.

The third fault lies in qualifying s'abda by the adjective 'upasarjanīkṛtārtha'. In the opinion of Mahima, s'abda is always subservient to its meaning, just as a jar is subservient to water that is meant to contain. S'abda can be said to be principal, if at all, when there is verbatim repetition in a quotation. So, it will bring in 'asambhava dosa', if word is qualified by the adjective, 'upasarjanīkṛtāsvārtha'.

Here therefore, there is the fault of 'asambhava', because the word being always subservient to meaning, there can be no contingency in which its meaning would be subservient to it, which would happen if its meaning is to be subordinated to itself in order to convey vyangyārtha or the suggested sense.

Even if the two faults previously shown are repudiated, Mahima says that it would be still open to the fault of 'punarukta' or repetition.

-(vyabhicārāsambhavayorapī vā yat svārthayorupasarjanīkṛtatevakacanaḥ tat punaruktaḥ. tayorarthāntarābhivyaktyarthamupātṛtyasyārthamārthādeva taddavagateryuktam. (Vy. V. I.)—)

It may be noted here that the blemish as pointed out here is merely of a formal nature.

Further, in continuation of the third fault discussed as above, Mahima tries to find the fault of avyāpti in this definition, because the dhvani which is suggested in such figures as dipaka would be out of the perview,
in as much as these figures are varieties of abhidhā and because 'abhidhā' is not mentioned in the definition, therefore they remain left out. If it is contended that the mention of abhidhā is included in the mention of s'abda and artha, then the mention of s'abda also would be redundant, because it is implied by mentioning artha.

The fourth fault mentioned by Mahimā refers to vyakti or vyānjana itself. He holds that it is wrong to say that word and sense 'suggest' further sense. The fourth fault thus refers to the very doctrine of vyānjana. According to him, the word has only one sense and whatever else comes out of it is a matter of inferential process. In this philosophy of word, word is a means to an end, (sādhyasaśrāhanabhāvē) and the end is what the hearer is supposed to do or not to do. The understanding of this sādhyā becomes possible through the process of inference. So, for him, whatever follows the direct meaning of the word is a matter of inference.--(sārṣeva hi s'ābdo vyavahārāḥ sādhyasaśrāhanabhāvagargbhatayā prayaṇānumānarūpo bhuyapagantaryah, tasya pratyayātāryātsanyathākartumās' akyatvataḥ. na hi yuktimanavagochan keścidvīpas'cidvacanamātrāt sampratyayabhāgahavati.) (Vv.V.t.)with reference to the second, one may incidentally point out that--

Having thus substituted inference for vyānjana, he comes upon a twofold division of meaning viz. 'vācyārtha' and 'anumeyārtha'. Says he-arthe'pi dividhō vācyo'numeyas'ca tatra s'abdayāpāraśāvyo vācyah. Sa eva mukhyā ucyaate. (Vv.V.t.) With reference to the second, one may incidentally point out that Mahimā really gives up his case by calling it 'anumeyārtha'. (He merely substitutes anumeyārtha for vyānjana).

Having thus substituted inference for vyānjana, he comes upon a twofold division of meaning viz. 'vācyārtha' and 'anumeyārtha'. Says he-arthe'pi dividhō vācyo'numeyas'ca tatra s'abdayāpāraśāvyo vācyah. Sa eva mukhyā ucyaate. (Vv.V.t.) With reference to the second, one may incidentally point out that Mahimā really gives up his case by calling it 'anumeyārtha'. (Vv.V.t.) Having thus established to his satisfaction anumeyārtha, he explains how vyānjya or suggested vastu, alamkāra and rasa are cases of anumeyā vastu, alamkāra and rasa respectively. He adds that while the first two can be directly expressed also, the third is only inferred.--(ṣa ca trividhā. Vastumātremalāmākara rasādāyas' ceti. tatrādiyamā vācyāvapi saṃbhavataḥ. anyastva anumeyā eveti.) (Vv.V.t.)
Here, Mahima has to face a great difficulty. According to the accepted definition of valid anumāna, his inferential process in poetry do not confirm to the cannon of (logical) inference. His opponents naturally show that what follows the direct meaning of words in a poem is not inference in any logical sense. Mahima's answer to this is as follows.

The meaning that comes to the mind as a sequence of direct meaning of a word is 'amumaya'. This later manifestation of meaning is supposed to be due to three causes. They may be described in the accepted dārs'anika terminology as kārkakahetu, and jāpakahetu, under which also comes the third vis.anumāna hetu or linga. The illustration of the first is curds resulting from milk, the second, the appearance of a jar by a lamp in a dark room, the third is the inference of fire on a mountain by the appearance of smoke. Now, the meaning following from the direct sense is not discovered by the first two, but by the third, and therefore, it is a process of anumāna or inference.

As to the validity in some cases of knowledge, he quotes a passage which says that even an illusory knowledge may become valid in a particular context. He quotes in his support from pramāna-vārtika II.5.57. Says he,

taduktaṃ-bhrāntir api sambandhataḥ pramāṇa iti.
maṇipradoṣaḥ prabhāyoh maṇibuddhyābhidhāvatoh. 
mithyājñānaviṣ'eṣepi vis'eṣo'ṛthakriyāṃ pratiḥiti ca. (Vv.V.I.)

"Between two people approaching two lights, the one produced by a jewel, the other by a lamp, (without being conscious of what they really are, but) with the idea that it is a jewel, there exists a difference in respect of casual cognition" (p. 36. The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta. -Romero Gnoli-SERIE ORIENTALE ROMA, XI.1956)

The purport of the verse is that the two persons see two lights of which the one is that of a lamp and the other is that of a lamp and the other is that of a jewel—both of them do not know whose light it is—but they run with a belief that it is a jewel. Here the ignorance of both is equal, yet the one who gets at a jewel has his purpose fulfilled.
Thus, even though the linga may be illusory, the inference may be valid if the purpose is served.

Mahima, however, before he goes into these arguments turns round his opponents and says that it is absurd to seek logical validity in what he calls kāvyānumitī and he waxes eloquent on the poetic charm of it.

Ifahima, however, before he goes into these arguments turns round Ms opponents and says that it is absurd to seek logical validity in what he calls kāvyānumitī and he waxes eloquent on the poetic charm of it.

In modern terminology, one might say that the inferential process in poetry is more of a psychological nature than of a logical type.

Having proved to his satisfaction that the relation between a word’s immediate meaning and the meaning that follows, is not of the nature of vyāgyavyañj a but of the nature of inference, he explains all the fine points worked out by Ānanda in the terminology of inference. In fact he gives the same illustrations and practically follows the same mode of argument.

The fifth fault arises as below. 'Dhvanī' is said to be there when the vācyā or expressed sense is said to be suggestive. But in that case an inferred sense, even if it is suggested, does not become dhvanī, for there is absence of expressed sense in it. Thus in 'dhvanī' there is gathering of the implicit sense through vācyā or expressed alone. But if this is the connotation of dhvanī, then it brings in the fault of the definition being ‘too narrow’. In the illustrations such as, ‘evam vādinī etc., there is first the suggestion of a bhāva called ‘laajā’ or ‘avahitthā’. Through that suggested bhāva, love of Fārvatī is suggested. This is a case of suggestion based on suggestion. Now ‘dhvanī’ as explained earlier has its scope limited to suggestion based on expressed sense only (Mahima shows how ‘artha’ can mean the expressed sense alone).

(kim ca yatra vācyasyārthasya vyāñjakatvam sa ced dhvanistarhi tadanumita-sya vyāñjakatve dhvanitvam na syāt, tasya vācyatvābhāvāt. tatas'ca, evam
Mahima holds that if the word 'arthah' in Dhv.I.13 means both vācyā and vyāngya i.e. expressed and suggested sense, then also ativyāptidoṣa or the fault of 'too wide' follows. He holds charm only with reference to implicit sense that follows immediately without any vyavādhāna or intermediary, or a vyavādhāna i.e. intermediary only in form of a vyabhicārabhāva or an alāṅkāra. If it is else than this, it is without charm. But the definition of dhvani embraces such instances also. Mahima says:

"Tadyartha iti vācyo'rtathothimato'vyāptireva sā.|  
yanaiavamvādiniyādāvarthesyārthōntarādgaṭih..||  
othobhau taryatīvyāptirdvitravastuvyavasāyinī.||  
prayelikādirūpe'pi kavye dhvanīyatmātyataḥ.|| (Vy.V.I. 21, 22).

In this, his fifth argument, Mahima shows two faults viz. avyāpti and ativyāpti; the first, by confining the meaning or 'artha' to vācyārtha alone, and the second by including vyāngyārtha also.

Sixth fault lies in the mention of 'vā'. 'Vā' suggests either option (vikalpa) or collection (i.e. samuccaya). It cannot mean option, for earlier 's'abda' is explained as not to be suggestive. And even if it is accepted to mean option, then it cannot be construed with the dual in form of 'vyāṅktah'. If it means collection then suggestivity will rest only on both 's'abda and artha taken together only. Thus, such cases of dhvani resting on only 's'abda' or only 'artha' will be excluded and avyāptidoṣa will follow:

-(kimciśtra vas 'abdo vikalpartho vā syāt samuccayartho vā. na tāvadvikalpāvthāh.  
pakṣāntarasambhavasya vyūtpādītatvāt. sambhaye vāsyā dvivacaśānapaptiḥ,  
tayōc samuccayābhāvāt. ...... Samuccayārthatve'pi yatra s'abdārthayorekaikasa  
vyaṅjakatvam tatra dhvanitvam ịṣṭam na syāt. (Vy.V.I.) ).

The seventh fault follows from the sixth and touches the use of dual in 'vyāṅktah'. Here, Mahimabhāṭṭa takes the substance of his argument from the discussion between Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta as given in the latter's work-'Locana'. Abhinava says that objections of Bhaṭṭanāyaka are due to
carelessness, because in the act of suggestion the word does it as related to meaning, and meaning does it as related to word, and therefore, the dual is justified. Mahima simply rejects this defence of Abhinava. (37).

Eighth fault results from the use of the pronominal stem. Here it refers to 'pratīyamānāṃ vastu' (Dhv. I.5). It is used in masculine instead of neuter, which would be grammatically correct—(kim ca tamitīs tajāh pumstvena nires'o'nupapannah. -Vy. V. I.). It may be noted that this argument is merely verbal and does not refer to the substance.

In the ninth blemish, the objection is against 'kāvyavis'esaḥ'. Mahima says that according to Dhvanikāra, a poem becomes a poem only if there is dhvani, and if there is no dhvani there is no poem. Therefore, it is pointless to use the word 'kāvyavis'esaḥ'. Taking this verse (i.e. Dhv. I. 13) in conjunction with 'kāvyasyatma sa evIRTHAH' etc. (Dhv. I. 5), Mahima argues further that where there is no rasa there is no poetry and therefore, to specify a composition as peculiar poetry is useless. Thus, it is useless to circumscribe the sphere of dhvani by qualifying the term kāvyā by 'vis'esa', in as much as it gives rise to the false notion that there are other specimens of kāvyā besides what can be properly subsumed under dhvani.—

(api ca kāvyavis'esa iti kāvyasya vis'istatvamanapapannam. kāvyamātrasyā dvani- vyapades'avis'anatvena īṣṭatvāt, tasya rasātmakatvopagamāt. .... tadabhāve cāsya kāvyaśaita na-syāt. kimuta vis'esaḥ iti anāmbhamāṣyameva etat prekṣāvatām syāt vaiphałyāt. Vy. V. I.)

There can be no varying degrees of charm in aesthetic realisation which can be made the basis of this differentiation implied by the expression—'k kāvyavis'esaḥ'; for, in each case the final blissful experience is indeterminate in its character and does not admit of any determinate analysis leading to comparison inter se. (38).

It might be argued that there are nine different sentiments (rasa) and, the distinction implied might have reference to any particular rasa amongst them. But such a course of argument would lead to the exclusion of poetic compositions from the category of dhvanikāvya that do not suggest that parti-
cular sentiment (39). One might however contend that there are other varieties of suggested sense besides rasa-dhvani which is raised to the status of the soul of literary art, viz. vastudhvanī, and alaṃkāradhvani. Thus, when rasadhvani would be characterised by the suggested vastu and alaṃkāra, severally or jointly, then and then only would it be regarded as a specific of dhvanikāvyā.

But this defence too would be of no avail, for when a piece of poem manifests exclusively a particular emotion without suggesting either vastu or alaṃkāra the designation of dhvani would not be applicable—a ridiculous position indeed! So, the qualifying word 'vis' esaḥ' is indefensible (40).

Tenth fault is avaśyavacanādoṣa as seen in 'śūribhīḥ kathītāḥ'. The specific mention of the nominative viz. śūribhīḥ, of the particular form 'kathītāḥ' is needless and therefore unjustifiable.—

The tenth fault—avaśyavacanādoṣa—is mentioning something which need not be mentioned. If merely the agents of 'kathītāḥ' are implied in general, they are already implied in the very use of the word 'kathītāḥ'. If some particular authors are implied, these are already referred to formerly. Thus the mention of śūribhīḥ is redundant.

Mahima, having thus refuted dhvani to his satisfaction, and being indisposed to bother himself with minor items, imporves upon the definition of dhvani as follows:

Vācyastadanumito vā
yatṛārtho'rtthāntaram prakāś'atyātī.)
Saṃbandhataḥ kutas'cit
Sa kāvyānumitirityuktāt 1 (Vv.V.I.25)

And adds,

etocca anumānasyadvai lakṣanam nānyasya. Yadāktaṁ triyupallīngat pariśkarānumānāmiti, kevalaṁ saṃjñābhedah. (Vv.V.I.)—
The ten faults shown by Mahima are not all of equal importance. As we have noted, some of these are mere verbal and some are mere quibbles. His main argument seems to be that the word 'artha' should be limited to the first direct meaning—vācyārtha—of the word. Therefore, whatever else follows this vācyārtha in the mind of the Sahārya should be regarded as anumeyā. He has this much justification in his view that the indirect thoughts and feelings arising out of the direct meaning can be psychologically regarded as of an inferential nature. This however, is in no sense a logical anumāṇa or inference. In fact, Mahima, as we have noted, laughs at those who while having 'kāvyānumitī' think of the 'tābākikāanumāṇī'.

He, like Andā, tries to elaborate this point, and show how the several categories of poetics can be subsumed under this. In fact in this part of the treatment of the subject, he practically takes the analogy of Ānanda's vyāñjana e.g. Mahima has his asamlaksyakrama and samplaksyakrama, so also vastu anumitī, alamkāraanumitī and rasāśi anumitī etc. The illustrations that he uses are mostly taken from Dv̄. Thus kāvyānumitī takes the form of Vyāñjana for Mahima.

BHOJA

Now, in order to understand Bhoja's position, let us consider briefly his S.K.Ā, and the published fragments of S'r.Pra., as well as Dr. Raghavan's learned and critical thesis on S'r.Pra. Dr. De seems to say that Bhoja does not accept the dhvani theory of Ānanda in toto, though he does quote many of the R kārikās of Dv̄ and appropriates some of its other matter. (41)

Dr. Raghavan in his Bhoja's S'r.Pra. tries to refute at length Dr. De's views on this point. We have, while tracing the earlier indications of vyāñjana pointed out that the idea of vyāñjana is to be found in some of the alamkāras discussed by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin (Vide Ch. pp. ) We can concur with the opinion that in S.K.Ā and S'r.Pra. there are alamkāras and guṇas which embody vyāñjana. This however, does not necessarily make him a vyāñjanaśādāvādīn, though we may concede that as Dr. Raghavan says, Bhoja may be called an antarbhāvavādīn.
We have seen that both Dhañjaya and Dhanika, in De, and its Avaloka, refute the theory of vyañjanà and substitute the tätparya vrtti in its place to do for vyañjanà. Bhoja, Jánu's successor, seems to follow the tradition of his learned assembly in not giving importance to vyañjanà. In this respect we can agree with Dr. De when he says, that Bhoja's school, "......stands in many respects apart from the kāśmirīkā kāśmirian school of Ānandavardhana", but we cannot agree with him when he says..., and appears to have been entirely untouched by the implications of the Dvāni theory". As to the use of Ānanda's kārikās and some of its matter by Bhoja, we may point out that even the greatest opponent of Ānanda, viz. Mahimabhatta also does the same. But thereby he does not become a vyañjanavādin. In contrast to this we may say that Hemacandra, the author of Kavyamrásana (Circ. 11th Cent. A.D.), who lived in the time of Siddhārāja and Kumārapāla accepts the views of the kāśmirian authors Abhinava and Mammaṭa, and as an ardent vyañjanavādin (see Kā. Sā. I, su. 20-25)

However, it may be added that a discordant note is struck by Rāmacandra and Gupacandra, the disciples of Hemacandra, who is their Nātyadārpaṇa (III, 109. sū. 163) take rasa to be 'spaṣṭānuḥbhāvanī ceyāḥ' and add that the term 'spaṣṭā' qualifying 'anubhāva' means well determined. For, only the well determined object serves as a mark of līngam. Spaṣṭāḥ iti spaṣṭāḥ samyati nirūt-tāḥ, asandigdham hi līngam bhavati. Thus the authors seem to lean more towards Sri. S'āṅkuka.

Mammaṭa who follows Ānanda in his theory of vyañjanā, after refuting the views of anumānavādin and the like, takes up the views of advaitavādins. Advaitavādins as they are, they assume an akhaṇḍabuddhi, i.e. the sense of the whole as responsible for the elucidation of meaning. Even they, however, have to accept the division of pada, padārtha etc. And so, in the illustrations discussed in this context, they cannot escape vyañjanā, if they have to arrive at the implied sense in those verses. (42)

Vis'vanātha, the author of S.D. (circa 1300–150 A.D.) discusses the
views of those who try to incorporate *vyāñjana* in the means of knowledge called *arthāpatti*. Vis'vanātha is of the opinion that as in case of *anumāṇa*, so also in case of *arthāpatti*, the basis is *vyāptijñāna* or the knowledge of *vyāpti*. Now *vyāñgya* or the suggested sense can not be said to rest on *vyāpti*. Now *vyāñgya* or the suggested sense can not be said to rest on *vyāpti* on account of *vyabhicāra* and *samađeha*. So, it can not be gathered by *arthāpatti* (43).

Vis'vanātha further adds that the suggested sense is not even *sūcanabuddhi* i.e. gathered by signs and symbols (*sūcana*). Even this depends on an earlier popular samketa. When it is already understood between the two parties concerned that the raising of the forefinger means a particular number, then only that particular gesture suggests that number. Thus, even this *sūcanabuddhi* is in a way of a sort of loose *anumāṇa* and the suggested sense cannot be gathered by it (44).

He also adds that the *vyāñgyārtha* cannot be gathered by *smṛti*. Others hold that the suggested sense can be gathered by *smṛti* or memory because the knowledge of *rasādi* is caused by *samskāra* or impressions. But in this case there will be *'ativyāpti' in'pratyabhijñā* i.e. recognition also, for *pratyabhijñā* is also form of *samskāras* but is not of the form of *smṛti* (45).

**CONCLUSION:**

The above review of the opponents of dhvani school shows that they are not opposed to *pratiyāmānatā* or implied sense as a source of charm in poetry. The difference arises as to how this implication is grasped. Ṭananda regards this as one of the functions of word, but this function is not, according to him, fulfilled by either *abhidhā* or *lakṣaṇā*. He therefore, posits a third function of word viz. *vyāñjana*. His opponents seem no necessity of adding a third function of word because the implied sense can be grasped by inferential processes of thoughts, by meanings yielded through *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*. So for them, to accept *vyāñjana* would lead to what is called *gaurava doṣa*. Thus, the question resolves itself into the acceptance or non-acceptance of this additional function of word. Modern logicians who discuss the function of language do accept, what they call the emotive use of language in additi-
addition to its scientific function. The various emotive associations that a word has, become, so to say, prominent in poetic language. But if one considers the psychological processes of the emotive function, one has to agree that they are of an inferential type. In fact, as Mammaṭa says, those who experience and enjoy rasa have to be keen in the inference of sthāyin-(loke pramāṇādibhiḥ sthārayanumāne bhyaśapātaṇavatām..."etc. K.P. IV.28). Thus it is not impossible to reconcile both the opposing views.
Chapter XXIV. - 340-  Foot-Notes.

(1) इत्यैलतिमितानुििद्धशानातिविषेिेचतुमूँ  ज्ञ. वृ. मा.: का. ३२ (सधिमाहृ्यिमातुटका)

(2) वकुं वाल्ष्य वाच्यस्य रुपेनावाराणाता।

लक्षणा त्रिमकारिणा विवेकवाया मनीषिनिधि:। ज्ञ. वृ. मा: (का. ६)

(3) अव्ययम्यात्मकापि सुप्रख्यात्मकायेनावथिते तत्तत्वसागारालिकावर्मणारएः। ज्ञ. वृ. मा. (प्प. १३)

(4) इत्यत्र हि स्मारस्मृतीया वज्ञानमयारोपितविकाशात्मानापि स्मारस्मृतीया वज्ञानमयारोपितविकाशात्मानाह्ति-भूतमूँ  अत: तत्त्व साध्यता। तात्त्वारोपोनांस्यावच्च विशेष म्युक्तारस्य आधारपि हल्ल्यादानात्त्विताका लक्षणा। -ज्ञ. वृ. मा. प्प. १४

(5) ज्ञ. जी. I. ८। (हृदि)-

यी वाचक: स शुभो यो वाच्य: च व्रम्भित: लोके धर्ति। नन्दुः व शतक्षु: साधारापि शाङ्को सम्पत्ति।

(6) एते यथा इन्द्रेन महतान्तराविती। अव्यक्तवर्त्तिप्रत्थायातमः। एकावली, प्प. ५१ (ब.स.स.ई.)। See also Jayaratha (प्प. ८)

(7) यद्यत्तार्नव: न्यास्यानावायुक्ता।।

(8) यथा मूर्ति वप्पु दल्लस्कार्यस्मृतिवचनोद्धाराः। रूपस्य च दर्शनात्त्यायनात्मको पति इत्यादिकुत्ताराः। ज्ञ. जी. II. १३, १४

(9) अव व च प्रत्याशनानारे बस्मिन्युक्ते न बस्मिन्युक्ते। यथा गोवित्तेः

(10) यशस्मानिः प्रविद्धानायावतीवन्यसार्थाकेति-ज्ञ. जी. I.

(11) शाश्वा गतिधारिणेनापि यथाविधायः। ज्ञ. जी. I. ७.
(12) उभावेतानलक्षणोऽग्रोऽपि पुनःरूपःौरितः।

व्यक्तिकरण वैद्यत्यमहिमादिविरोधितां तत्रतः । V.J.I.10

and also, उभावेतानलक्षणोऽग्रोऽपि पुनःरूपःौरितः। केनापि शोभातिशयकारणालक्षणः कर्त्तव्यं। विं तत् तां यत्राक्षरार्थः मित्र्यास्मिन्तंकर्त्तव्यं।

कार्त्तिकः कर्त्तिकः । भिन्नतिथिः अन्तः भिन्नतिथिः अन्तः प्रसिद्धा

मित्र्यास्मिन्तंकर्त्तव्यं। वेदग्य

विज्ञापार्थः विचित्र्यास्मिन्तंकर्त्तव्यं। वेदग्य

विज्ञापार्थः प्रसिद्धा। वेदग्य

विज्ञापार्थः प्रसिद्धा। V.J.I.10

(13) रूप: गः श्रद्धाविनिकृतः दुरुणस्थित्यतः प्रथमःविहस्यः। V.J.II.12। (वृषि)

(14) चन्द्रया. III.16 -सुपसितः चन्द्रमास्य प्रकाशितं। कार्त्ति...कार्त्ति।

कृत् तदिकानासहस्रोऽयत्वाः चतुर्थम्: कार्त्तिः।

(15) चन्द्रया. III.16 - च श्रद्धाः निपातापूर्णार्थार्थः। मुखी: बभिष्यायानाः

दृष्टेऽ।

(16) एव जी। V.J.III.1-उदारस्वपरिस्तवन्द्युन्दलच्यः।

वस्तुनां वृक्षालोकार्थेतन कर्त्ता...।

(17) V.J.III.1 - (वृषि)

वस्तुनां वर्णनीयात्त्व: प्रता.विविध: पवार्थः यज्ञविविधान स्त्रि: तत: कर्तः

वकृत्त्वा विचित्रि:। विचित्रि: हृत्याव: उदारस्वपरिस्तवन्द्युन्दलच्यः।

उदार: सौत्त्वणः: सर्वाविद्वारी य: स्थिरपरिस्तवन्द्युन्दलच्यः। स्वाद: विविद्वादी त: स्थिरपरिस्तवन्द्युन्दलच्यः।

वत्त्वायस्तिकृत्यात्माविषयः। वर्णिः प्रतिपाद्यायः। यथा कुण्डिकालोकार्थेतन।

वाच्योऽयत: नानाविश्वास्विशिष्ट: श्रद्धाविविधायात्त्व:। वाच्यतः।

वाच्यतः। वाच्यत: प्रतिपाद्यायात्त्व:।

(18) चन्द्रया. II.17 - हल्बायाविषये विशिष्टः। नुरुण्यात्त्व:। काव्याचार्यः।

इत्येवत्त्वः विशिष्टः। नुरुण्यात्त्वः। काव्याचार्यः। इत्येवत्त्वः। व्यक्तिरिहः व्यक्तिः।
(19) बाली ने । on I.21. प्रणय व वृक्षाचार यथा-कुन्याचन्वाकाश्विनित्वः रामग्यारे- 
परिष्ठ नाटकायां पाणिकथासंगीतां साच्चर्यावरूपसे वज्रवाचकावासी- 
मथके प्रतिपादिते। पराक्षेष्ठस्तु विनिमित्राध्यात्मकांपैकः। फार्मस्वति, रामवेदसी- 
त्यज न रावणविद्यति।

(20) क्योंकि नैसानजाने। पि क्षुपनित निकृतसारिः।

प्रणया प्राप्तिन इव प्रामाण्ये पृथ्वी धुरु।। इत्यन्तः रशोः। (३२)

on IV 25. बाली

(21) नूतनारपायिन्यननानवत्त्वं पैकिनार्याः। महाकाव्रुः प्रणयनाः सर्वांगाचित


(22) बाली I.10- see foot-note No.10.

(23) बाली I.56- सुनिभ्यस्ततिप्रिंगादंसंगीरं सरसालमाद्। उससालमाद्

उपचाति नाम्नामात्।

(24) बाली 1.85 जनराजः।

प्रणये प्रणये कीड़ेराणां कीर्त्तिकृतेषु कि कुः।।

(26) बाली IV.11- निर्दारालोकारस्यें मनस्वनियोगः।

गत्रे कमः चालान्ति न क्षणामाणान्तिः।

(27) बाली III.18- निर्माणकं महाति-यज्ञ स्वाधिः। लक्षदीयमानाः। श्रृवर्तमावपता-

स्त्रावेरानां सर्वाश्रयतोगोङे कुन्नीत्रित्वेन न्यायेन गृहापूर्वप्राप्तस:। कायमः। श्रावका-

रामीकायमानाः। तद्विताविधं स्मावत्त्वतिलीक्ष्ययं सर्वं यज्ञं चनिः चनिः रक्षणीयेन सत्तेन-

लक्षाविष्टैरस्येन तद्विपाचारानां स्त्रियां कामदशंसंपल्यं च्युतसृष्टिः। निरापदाते

हिति नसमेतः।

(28) J. III.7. (बृहत्) महाद्वार अति पाषाणस्य चैतन्यारुपानां किष्टमाभिनीष्ठवं तदेवाद्विषे

सत्त्वकों किन्तु महति स्वत्वपारागथर्गवतः प्रतिपादते। की० श्रद्धा-कोकिलस्तराण्मठ-रत्नाकरः-

परिप्रेयकामुद्धर-कोकिलः। कर्माविरित्व: प्रज्ञानानन्धराः। रत्नादि।

स्वाधिमानः। तस्म परिप्रेयः। श्रृङ्गारप्रेरितसत्त्वावणेः स्वाधिमान तु रसेत मैतृ

हिति न्यायार्थः।

(29) एवं विसर्गहृदियारकाः। सौंभावित उदाहरणार्धर्मिन विलित्। रसान्त- 

रासानांपञ्ज स्वयमुक्षारणिः। V J. III.7.

(30) जहानामानायाः। सहसिद्रसमायनार्धनेविवेकेः सतस्वीपतस्य विवेचनपुरुषे

वर्णिनियतानिहोः। V J. III.7.
(23) जी । १५।-चित्राकोणाचालामभणातिक्रमं तत्वज्ञानम्।
का यामुःसेनानाःस्वशस्त्रारूपं विलित्वेऽ
(31) राष्ट्रीयसाधनमभिनिर्मितसबवृहस्
चेतनान्य अमुनानाम् जडानांवापि मूः। ॥
V.1.3.8.
(32) व.सी.10।- (बुलती)-तदेकःस्वभावनाभानेन रसापानेन विद्वानां
सच्चारी कुमार्यतः स्वभावं वर्णिताविश्वासः गृहरक्ष्याधिकारिता।
(33)वाणिज्यवान: चवाणिज्य। ॥
V.1.1.26.
(34)व.पी. ४१।-स्वभावं सरसानीति पाणाः यन बये।
कैत्रापि काम्यावेल वैचित्र्यवानुवा:।
and also
विनियमं स्वरूपं तर्क्य अत्यत्वायति। स्वभावं इत्यादि (४१)।तत यस्मि
पाणाः स्वभावं स्वपरिस्फांद: सरसानीति प्रतिभानां
विधाते विवेद्ये ... etc. etc.
(35)कलोक ५। धारक ४७। इत्यय IV.
यथा कालिकवाणेषु वृक्षापंध्रेण गामिन्यालेखनं अपनाणं चिन्हेण न च यथारं
व्याप्तित्वादिनित्य्य स्वादोपाधारात् भ्रात्यायादिविश्वासः स्वाधीनतिविशिष्टे ब्रह्मेषे
कारकपरिचितावार्त्थार्थात् भाष्यांगी स्वादोपाधारात् ब्रह्मिकृतां नबोद्रां
प्रिये लेखवादे करिचत्र च भ्रात्यायादिविश्वासः स्वाधीनतिविशिष्टे-निम्नविस्तिर-NS। नियतविशिष्ट
विवावहमनामादुअ सा साद्धारमकृत्वात् विविधातिमाने हेतुपदिः स्थायी
स्वाधीन्यविभावमराधिकारिपरंतपदिकृताः। सुन्दरपद्यमः (परं) पारं शृद्धी-
प्राप्तिमाने रत्नादिज्यायारशी:। नाचार्य वायायत्री सार्वेक्षिति वाच्यम्।
काय्यक्षेत्रसामायितात तापकीर्दित्ते। तथा तत पौर्ण्य स्वाधीनं वायक वर्ग कार्ति-
पहुँचितं।) अवत्तपती नुवाचेत्वादिनः वायायादिविश्वासः कार्याधानाः च 
न्यायविधिरेषु निरतिस्मुत्यवादः वायायितरकण प्रतिपादितकाय:। प्रूढ़ितिविषयोः
पूर्वोन्नतानुसारे। (स्वाचोऽ) स्वाचेत्तिरेषु कार्येनाचार्याति। कालिकवाणिःपरं
शीक्षावर्ण सरसानी वृद्धमानं तत्त(स्वाधीन) सकाराप्रभृतिवान्तीरविशिष्ट पालनादारा
स्वाधीन्यविभाविकारिताः। तब विवावहायः प्राप्तिमानीयायसात् द्वृष्टी-रत्नादिज्यायारशी:। तद्भवन ख्याताम्यैव गृहरक्ष्याति पालनादिज्यायारशी:।
न अवै सति ग्रीवार्तिक सुनकनकवा: पयाम्यानात्तिक मार्त्यदेवेऽ। तदनेन वायिक-
पद्यमः निरर्त:। शृद्धिः च वायायादिविश्वासः पवित्रस्मात्तिभिस्मादिविशिष्टकृतेऽपि
समस्तवायायितरकणः। श्रवन्तीदर्पिनिकषप्म प्राय:। यथाः वाच्यम् कार्यानिः।
The NS. Ed. reading are bracketted ( ). It contains numerous mistakes. A revised text, with the corrections made by MM.

Kuppuswami Shastri is given here as quoted by Dr. Raghvan, Sr. Pra. (pp. 181-182).

(36) कर्म स्विस्तर्वतः शवः संशोचनः: तदः पुनःस्तम्भः

निवम्वनादृशै: व्यतिघ्निनामिः कार्यशविष्टम्।

वचनं च कथनंः: कर्पितः आनिश्चिन्द्रितः दश दोषः।

ये लघुने वर्णस्तेन्द्रकम्पा गताः न तेन गणितः।

(37) जननी वासिः.

जननी कार्यकारिणी सत्तानविधिविद्यासूद्धारम्भकारिणी कार्यशम्पि कार्यविशेषिनामाविशेषिताः

व्यक्ति हति विद्वेक्षे न्यायविविधित्व। श्रवेदाचार्यः च एव व्यासः। तथापि
स्वरूपवाचक सहभागिता न कृत्यति, अन्ययों आंतराशैि प्रस्तुत: तदशःस्थःस्फुर: स्यात्। विविधात्वांवर्ताये तु स्वरूपवाचक सहभागिते भवते, विशिष्टशास्त्रीयोपस्थितं विशिष्टात्मात्मान तस्च तासांस्यायंकारादिति सर्वं सर्वायमणोन्यन्ति अतन्त आपार:। तेन यद्य मूदेन वेद-विक्रमं दूषितः तदुपजनियों विद्या एव धर्म:। शहदो वा हिंदी-लोकन on Dhv.I.18.

See also, Mahima
क्षत्र केन्द्रित्व्येन्द्रयानि विश्वसर्वविश्वासाहित्यविचारया कार्यवाचकोऽयः। विविधातःप्रभूतिःसृजनमयः। त्योऽकारालिकाः स्वरूपवाचकायनिरस्ताम्। व्यस्तकाः महत्तः। तस्किन्यायाः अनुवेदःध्रीर विविधात्वांकारात्मात्मान्यन्यन्ति अतन्त आपार:। अनन्यार्याः प्रत्य पायनेन अन्योन्यायाश्वाहाराः। तदेकत्तात्स्यामुक्तकाः सहभागिताः अथात्यिकाः प्रत्यत्माराइयोऽस्य मृदुहृद्वाचारः। तदेकत्तै अष्टम:। हि विवक्षानिदेशः। प्राय्यायापेवान्स्य-वाचः। शहदो वैति किर्मीयः हि मन्यानाः अथह:। हि विवक्षानेवर्ताः। अष्टम:। शहदो वैति किर्मीयः पुरुस्त्रायामिन्ये:। धर्म:॥ ॥ धर्म-स्तम्भाः। न च तस्य विरेणाः। स्मर्यति निरुपितासनुस्ताद-ज्ञानालावः। यहाँः-

पाण्डवगङ्गः धृष्टानां कदः संपूर्णते रजोः। तद्वाविदार्यनेवः हृदयन्तिं: घानाम्।।।
ततो भिक्षुबोधयास्य स्वपुरुषविश्लेषः। निबः।
अज्ञेयेः नागानिश्चत्य येन तुष्टति योगिन:।।।
तद्वारे भाष्य कार्योऽद्य न स्यात्। किमुः विशेषः। हि काराक्षणिय-मूलतेः क्राकारात्म स्यात् वैश्वल्यात्। धर्म:॥ ॥
(38) न च रसायं वेदविशेषः तदात्मः। कार्य्य विशिष्टस्यनिर्दिष्टस्य युक्तः। वचtouches स्त्राद्वांस्य-नाम्यः।
Dr. De (Sanskrit Poetics II, pp. 229) says:

"It will be convenient in this connection to take up the school of opinion represented by the writer on poetics in the Agnipuranā and by Bhoja, which stands in many respects apart from kashmirian school of Anandavardhana and which appears to have been entirely untouched by the implications of the Dhvani theory."

On pp. 261 he says: - "He (i.e. Bhoja) even appropriates kārikās from the Dhvanyāloka, although he does not accept the theory."

K.P. II. बालबीपिनी

also वालाराण,

and also -अत्तेवदितिनिर्ग्रहः काव्यायै एव वाच्यः वाच्येव च वाचकम् हि यथार्थ: तैरयविवापति: फलदाःकल्पना कः काव्याद्वितीयतः तत: तत: काव्यसमुदायद्विता: विषयादि व्यक्य एव। K.P.V.

see also -परिनिर्विश्वाससंबंधिनां विपरिततां मतमार्थित्वे मूलों यन्त्रविवाहार हि तः स: कि विरोधायोऽबित्त्वेऽ बन्या III.

see also Abhinava on this, quoted earlier (Ch. VI.)

(43) एतेनाधिपितशिवपरमि व्यक्तिशास्त्रानि केवलं धर्मनिर्देशी: पुरुषसिद्धार्थिणि: चायाय उपार्णीयेऽपि पुनः। कयोऽयोऽवति स कुन्तलयज्वालिते जीवित चात्र गौड़यामविवाहानुभवः हल्यादै। S.D.V.
(44) कि च, वस्तुविश्वासो तर्कनिष्ठोऽन्य दशस्मृतिः निवर्तीति। सूचना सुमुखाभिर न भविष्यति। सूचना देकर तथा प्रत्यय सुधारितम प्रसारणम प्राप्यामध्ये उपलब्धानुसार रत्न गर्त देकर। S.D.व्र.

(45) यो व्यतितत्वात् रसायनदिवात् सम्बन्धोऽस्यहनितः हृति कैशवत। तत्रापि प्रत्ययमिकायाः कालाधिकारक्या कैशवानात्मा। S.D.व्र।