CHAPTER II
DEFINITIONS OR DESCRIPTIONS OF TERMS USED

Personality. We are dealing in the present study with one of the most intricate concepts in modern Psychology. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that we clarify this concept.

Personality is one of those snow-ball like ideas which began rolling as a tiny notion in Greek drama, and gathered momentum and volume through the medieval efflorescence of Philosophy, until it has become an immensely complex and dynamic concept in modern Psychology.

Personality comes from the Latin word persona. It is strange how one and the same name can in the course of time, be attached to contradictory meanings and come to signify the opposite of its original meaning; which reminds us of Shakespeare's:

"What's in a name? that which we call a rose

By any other name would smell as sweet."

But this word persona, writes F. Max Müller, has rolled along with wonderful bounds, striking right and left, suggesting new thoughts, stirring up clouds of controversy, and occupying to the present day a prominent place in all discussions on theology and philosophy, though few only of those who use it know how it came to be there.¹

"Personality," says G. W. Allport, is one of the most abstract words in our language, and like any abstract word suffering from excessive use, its connotative significance is very broad, its denotative significance negligible. Scarcely any word is more versatile. 2

The origin of the word "persona" dates back to the theatrical mask used in Greek drama and later adopted by the Romans.

Ignacio Errandonea, in his "Diccionario del Mundo Clásico," explaining the origin of the ἅρατος or persona, affirms that the mask, "persona" is a transference to the theater of the ancient use of masks among primitive peoples, which usage has its origin in religious and animistic belief. 3

Among the Romans persona signified the theatrical mask, and finally, using "pars pro toto," the term persona was applied to the characters of the play. Even today the characters played by the actors in a play are known as "dramatis personae."

The word "persona" underwent a tremendous transformation in the theological structurization of the early Christian

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2 Ibid., p. 25

Church, and in the medieval flowering of Scholastic philosophy it became a full-fledged philosophical concept. It is fascinating to note how a term, which meant in its origin a mere external instrument, a mask to conceal the real self, was adopted by Theology and Philosophy to designate precisely that very self, the uniqueness of the self, its individuality, and it is applied even to God, in order to designate His uniqueness, His separateness and independence.

This term enters the very definition of God, as current in Scholastic Philosophy and is accepted by many sectors of Western Philosophy. God is defined as "Ens a se personale," by which term personale, Pantheism is denied.

The philosophical definition of "persona" given by Boethius in the VI century has remained unchanged through the centuries to our own days: "Persona," defined Boethius, "est naturae rationalis individua substantia" (Persona is the individual substance of the rational nature).

It is difficult to translate these definitions with the propriety and exactness which the Latin Language gives to them. Solano explains it thus: "Persona seu ἔνα ἑσελέφυνσα vel ὑπὸ ἑσελεφύνσα obvio sensu intelligitur individuum rationale ab alio pariter individuo plene distinctum."4

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(Persona or Prosopos or Hypostasis, in its obvious meaning, is a rational individual as distinct from another individual of the same kind).

Philosophers and theologians warn us not to confuse person and nature (persona et natura), chiefly in connexion with the Nature of and the Persons in God: "Ad personam designandam adhibetur quis, ad naturam autem quid. Persona dicitur principium quod est vel agit, natura autem principium quo aliquis est vel agit".\(^5\) (To designate the person we employ the word who, to designate the nature we use the word what. Persona is the principle which exists and acts, while nature is the principle through which someone exists or acts).

To translate this philosophical jargon into simple language, we might say that a person (persona, \(\pi\rho\sigma\tau\omega\pi\omicron\sigma\varsigma\), \(\upsilon\omicron\sigma\tau\alpha\varsigma\varsigma\)) is a being that can say "I" and "me". This "I" or Ego (not in the Freudian sense) includes two further important concepts: firstly, one who can say "I" asserts the reality and consciousness of his own existence, and secondly, he affirms his relation to the others, viz., he affirms his existence as distinct and separated from others, "you", "he" or "it". The philosophical concept of persona excludes animals, they cannot say "I", and " a fortiori" inanimate beings.

\(^5\) I. Solano, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 30
Besides the philosophical and theological meanings, the term *persona* has taken on many other meanings, the juridical and legal meaning, the sociological meaning, the biosocial meaning, persons in Grammar, and finally psychological meanings. 6

If we now enter the psychological field, we get lost in the mushroom-like growth of the definitions of personality. Allport, in his excellent study of personality, has classified them, much as a Botanist might classify different varieties of plants, into five basic classes: 1) Omnibus definitions, the type of definitions which designate individuals as a sum total or aggregate of dispositions, impulses, instincts, etc. 2) Integrative and configurational definitions, which stress the organization of personal attributes. 3) Hierarchical definitions, which mark out various levels of integration and organization. 4) Definitions in terms of adjustment (biologists and behaviourists). 5) Definitions in terms of distinctiveness, as the pattern of organized reactions which sets off one individual from another. 7

R.B. Cattell describes personality in terms of

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6 For a comprehensive review of the meanings of persona see G. W. Allport, *op. cit.* to whom I am indebted for some of the ideas expressed above.

7 *Ibid.*, pp. 43-47
prediction of behaviour: "The personality of an individual is that which enables us to predict what he will do in a given situation." 

R. Le Senne, the best exponent of the modern French School of Characterology, defines personality as "La totalité concrète du moi, dont le caractère n'est que la form fondamental et invariable." (The concrete totality of the ego, of which the character is only the fundamental and invariable form). This definition is closer to the philosophical definition of the Scholastics than to the scientific definitions of the modern psychologists. Personality, according to Le Senne, covers the whole of mental life: "La personnalité ne laisse hors d'elle rien de ce qui appartient à la vie mental." (Personality embraces everything that belongs to mental life). It includes beside the character, all the elements acquired during life, "Qui comprend le caractère d'abord, mais en plus tous les éléments acquis au cours de la vie et ayant spécifié le caractère d'une manière qui aurait pu être différente, et en fin leur orientation synthétique." (It includes first the character, then all the elements acquired during the course of our life which have specified the character in a way which could have been

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different, and finally their synthetic orientation).

He does not intend giving a complete description of personality, he is more concerned with the definition of character, which for him has a greater connotation than personality. Character is included in the concept of personality but it is not the whole of it. He defines character as "L'ensemble de dispositions congenitales que forme le squelette mental d'un homme." (The ensemble of congenital dispositions that form the mental skeleton of a man).

This definition considers character as something more static and rigid, more like a skeleton, than personality. In the explanation of these two concepts he relies heavily on the theory of matter and form (materia et forma) of the Scholastic philosophers: "Caractère et personnalité sont par suite les deux extrémités d'une relation comparable à celle d'une forme et d'une matière." \(^9\) (Character and personality are consequently two terms of a relation comparable to the relation existing between matter and form).


It is strange to note how little is known in the English speaking world of this European school of Characterology which was begun by the Dutch psychologist Heymanns and has flourished mainly in the French speaking counties of Europe and in French speaking Canada, producing philosophers and psychologists of the calibre of R. Le Senne, A. Le Gall, G. Berger, R. Maistriaux, R. Mucchielli, G. Torris, etc.
Since we have to adopt a definition or description of personality as a screen on which to project our study, we shall try to choose the most comprehensive of all; a definition which, as far as possible, weds the old and the new, which distils the best of modern investigation and pours it in the old classic moulds. The definition of Allport seems to fulfill our exigencies; Allport himself makes high claims for his definition: it is, he says, perhaps as nearly central and synthetic in its significance as any single definition could be. "Personality," he writes, "is the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to his environment."\(^{10}\)

J. F. Donceel accepts Allport's definition and summarizes the latter's long and somewhat involved explanation in a more transparent and intelligible way. It is an organization of systems, says Donceel, not just a sum-total of traits. That organization is dynamic, it changes, it acts upon the environment and is influenced by it. The systems are psychophysical, they have a bodily and a mental aspect. This dynamic organization of systems determines the adjustment of the individual to his environment. The way in which he adapts

\(^{10}\) G. W. Allport, op. cit., pp. 48-50
himself is determined or explained by his personality.  

For the sake of clarity we shall try to avoid other terms which might be taken as synonyms of personality, terms like character and temperament. Yet it will not be out of place to clarify the meaning of these terms in case we are forced to use them.

Character is at times used interchangeably with personality. In modern psychology the meaning of character is restricted to a certain aspect of personality. Among many psychologists, as well as in the common speech, character has a clear reference to the will. A man of character is a man of strong will. Then again, character takes on a moral colouring and then it refers to the conduct of the individual. In this second acceptation it has more to do with Ethics than with Psychology. Ethically character may be defined as "the power of self-control, or the capacity of regulating one's life according to principles."  

Allport understands character exclusively in the


12 J. F. Donceel, op. cit., p. 278
ethical sense, and therefore, "Character is an unnecessary concept for psychology," "personality alone will serve. Character is personality evaluated, and personality is character devaluated." 13

Other authors follow the same pattern. W. A. Kelly describes character as "The intelligent direction and purposeful control of human conduct under the influence of moral principles which man chooses voluntarily and to which he adheres." 14

Character may also be understood in a psychological sense, and then it is described as "The organized totality of the tendencies of an individual." 15

This definition differs notably from the one given by Le Senne. It is more fluid and dynamic, and more in keeping with modern psychological thought. Le Senne's definition is more rigid and static, "Tout caractère est invariable," 16 and much closer to the etymological meaning of the word: character means engraving or imprint, from the Greek

15 J. P. Donceel, op. cit., p. 278
16 R. Le Senne, op. cit., p. 13
Character, whenever used in this study, should be understood in its psychological sense, i.e., the organized totality of the tendencies of an individual.

Finally, another term which is sometimes used for personality, is temperament, though the latter lays a stronger emphasis on physical constitution than the former. The investigator adopts the definition of Allport\textsuperscript{17} and Donceel:

Temperament refers to the individual's susceptibility to emotional stimulation, his customary strength and speed of response, the quality of his prevailing mood and the fluctuations and intensity of his moods. It includes the kinetic and affective aspects of human personality.

Once we have defined personality, we proceed to define the second term of our comparative study, viz. interpersonal relationships as investigated in the recent studies of Sociometry. A short explanation of Sociometry will, then, be in order.

\textbf{Sociometry and interpersonal relations.} Sociometry understood in its broadest sense, includes not only the sociometric tests, but all forms of social measurement, group interviews and group dynamics related to them.

\textsuperscript{17} G. W. Allport, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 54

\textsuperscript{18} J. F. Donceel, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 278
Sociometry means methods of social measurement. J. L. Moreno is the founder of this new discipline in its most systematic way. His whole conception of sociometry is profoundly religious, though his is a religion "sui generis." "I tried," he writes, "the sociometric system first in the Cosmos. God was a super sociometrist. The genesis of sociometry was the metric universe of God's creation, the science of "theometry." J. L. Moreno wove his psycholocial web of society with material taken from various sources. He is an eclectic in the real sense of the word. The "élan vital" of Bergson inspired him the idea of the training of spontaneous personality. Freud gave him another line of thought, which was rather a pointer, for Freud remained half way, dealing only with the subject who remembers. Moreno views the subject in his totality, and turns him into a spontaneous action. The school of Nancy built for him the bridge between the individual and the group, by making the stimulus of a person another person. Russian investigators perceived the group as a reality superior to the individual, but, then, by shifting the emphasis to the group,


they lost sight of the individual. Moreno met the difficulty by considering the individual in the group. Comte with his Positivism revealed the interaction between man and nature, man conditioned by the environment. Moreno went one step further; man is not only conditioned by nature's environment, but also by man's society, by its social structure. Marx insisted on the economico-materialistic evolution of society, but failed to solve the sociopsycological problems of society. Another line of thought which contributed to Moreno's system is Galton's idea of improving man as kind through eugenic measures. 21

The focus of sociometry is to comprehend and measure the socius, that is, the measurement of interpersonal relations and the measurement of groups.

"Sociometry," defines Moreno, "is the mathematical study of psychological properties of populations, the experimental technique of and the results obtained by application of quantitative methods." 22

Two concepts enter into the definition of Sociometry, viz. "socius" and "metrum." In Moreno's mind the stronger accent falls on "socius". This is clear from the following

21 J. L. Moreno, op. cit., p. 8 sqq.

22 J. L. Moreno, op. cit., pp. 15-16.
definition: "Sociometry is the science of socius measurement, an architectonically structured system of social measurements with sociometric tests at its base (which cannot be bypassed); it is not quantitative sociology but the socius quantified, the emphasis is upon socius first, metrum second." 23

Moreno characterizes the interpersonal relationships which he submits to measurement, by their spontaneity, their creative element, and their link with the moment.

The important point of Sociometry which distinguishes it from other social methods is that it gives its subjects research status by changing them from subjects into participating and evaluating actors.

The two fundamental principles laid down by Moreno are the universal concepts of spontaneity and creativity. He symbolizes them by the initials s and c. These two principles are not identical or similar processes. A man's s may be diametrically opposed to his c. Thus a man may be creative but may lack spontaneity. He will be a creator "without arms;" and vice versa. Only in God are these two principles identical. In God, all spontaneity has become creativity.

"Spontaneity and creativity," writes Moreno, "are thus categories of a different order; creativity belongs to the categories of substance—it is the arch-substance—spontaneity to the categories of catalyst—it is the arch catalyst." 24

Spontaneity is not bound by the law of conservation of energy by which it would be forced into a state of quantitative equilibrium. Spontaneity operates as a catalyst; it may exist in various degrees of readiness ranging from zero to the maximum. Man uses more or less according to the requirements of the situation. (It differs from the "reservoir" type of impulsive energy of Freud, which, if it is not allowed to flow into the proper channel, will find its way out through devious channels). Spontaneity functions only in the moment of its emergence.

The canon of creativity has four phases: creativity, spontaneity, warming up process and conserve. Creativity

24 Ibid., p. 40

Moreno here makes an unorthodox use of the concept substance. Philosophically substance is "quod subest accdentibus", i.e., that which sustains or supports the qualities or attributes. (Etymologically it comes from the Latin sub—under, and stare—to stand). Creativity is an attribute or quality of the creator, therefore it cannot be a substance.
is without any specialized connotation. In order to become effective it needs a catalyzer—spontaneity. Warming up is the "operational" expression of spontaneity. Conserves are manyfold, ex.gr., a biological conserve, i.e. an animal organism; a cultural conserve, i.e. a book or a robot).

The universe is infinite creativity. Spontaneity is a qualified energy. If we distinguish between two kinds of energy, conservable and unconservable, the cultural conserves will be the conservable energy; they can be saved up for further use; spontaneity will be the unconservable energy which emerges and is spent in a moment.

Spontaneity, inspite of being such an important factor in the world and in man's life, has hardly been developed. Man fears spontaneity as his ancestor, the primitive man, feared fire. Fear disappeared when he learnt the use of fire. Man will lose fear of spontaneity when he learns to make use of it.

25 This concept, creativity—spontaneity, in its interaction, seems to have been borrowed from, or at least inspired, by the hylemorphic theory of Scholastic philosophy: prime matter (materiæ prima) is "neque quid, neque quale, neque quantum, neque nihil horum quibus ens determinatur." Prime matter, in itself, is not determined to one form of existence or another, it has no quantity, it has no qualities, it has none of those attributes which qualify a being, it is pure plasticity open to any determination given by the form (forma).
"Sociometry deals with the mathematical study of psychological properties of populations, the experimental technique of and the results obtained by application of quantitative methods." This is done through methods which measure the evolution and organization of groups and the relative position of the individual within the group. "One of its special concerns is to ascertain the quantity and expansion of the psychological currents as they pervade populations." 26

Here are some of the fundamental concepts: As we consider the individual in the group, we see a nucleus of relations around him, which is "thicker" around some individuals and "thinner" around others. This nucleus of relations is a social atom. Besides, there are other intermediary sociometric structures, the superatom or molecule (several atoms linked together), the socioid, which is a cluster of atoms linked together with other clusters of atoms via the networks; the classoids, which are sociometric structures of social classes. Certain parts of the social atom link themselves with other parts of other social atoms, and these again with other parts of new social atoms forming complex chains of interrelations

26 Ibid., 51
which are called sociometric networks. These networks shape social tradition and public opinion. The process of attraction and repulsion between individuals, the flow of feeling composing the social atom and the networks is the tele. Tele is two-way empathy. One-way or projected feelings make no sense sociometrically. They require the complement of "retrojected" feelings. This has been studied through sociometric perception tests. The degree of sensitivity to the same tele ranges from total indifference to a maximum response. Sociometric networks are parts of a still larger unit, the sociometric geography of a community. The community is part of the sociometric totality of human society.

The object of observation in Sociometry is, as in other social sciences, man. But Sociometry gives this object a new status, a "research status." It accomplished this by considering the research objects not only as objects but also as "research actors," as co-scientists and co-producers in the experimental design they are going to set up. The differentiation between an organism-in-environment and an actor-in-situ is useful because the homo-metrum as an actor-in-situ is unique in the social sciences; the reason is that these new methods make it possible for him to set up his own frames of reference, create his own experimental
designs and be able to use the conclusions drawn from them to enlarge his knowledge about his own society.

The Sociometric methods are techniques by means of which society can be adequately defined and explored.

The Sociometric test is an instrument to measure the amount of organization shown by social groups. It is an instrument which examines social structures through the measurement of the attractions and repulsions which take place between the individuals within a group. The test determines the position of each individual in a group in which he has a function. This test has revealed that the underlying psychological structure of a group differs widely from its social manifestations, that, for example, chosen relations and actual relations often differ.

The responses received from individuals in the sociometric procedure are charted in a sociogram: besides being a method of presentation, the sociogram is above all a method for the exploration of sociometric facts. It shows the place of an individual in the social group and his inter-relationship with other individuals in the group. The pattern of the social universe, which is invisible, is made visible for us through the sociogram.

Sociometric criteria are sociometric norms. The criterion is the common motive which draws individuals
together spontaneously for a certain end. One of the simplest criteria is "living in proximity," and one of the earliest sociometric questions was: "with whom do you wish to live in proximity?"

What precedes is a very brief and fragmented résumé of Dr. Moreno's ideas and procedures regarding his child discipline sociometry. Many important ideas have escaped through the sparse meshes of this summary. Let this synopsis serve as a background against which we shall describe our sociometric tests and sociometric results.

We need not agree with all of Dr. Moreno's philosophical and theological theories in order to appreciate the vast vistas he opens before us and to utilize some of his techniques.

**Intelligence:** An intelligence test was given to the subjects in this study, for reasons which have been stated; though this test has only relative importance in our study, it may be convenient to clear the field and avoid misunderstandings as regards what is meant by intelligence and intellectual measurements.

Intelligence, from the Latin "intelligentia" and "intelligere," refers to a multitude of acts of our mind, such as the ability to respond successfully to new situations,
the use of the faculty of reason in solving problems, directing conduct, etc. 27

There is a great diversity of opinion in modern psychology about the meaning of intelligence. William A. Kelly mentions nine different definitions of intelligence with a wide divergence of meaning. 28

The aristotelico-thomistic philosophy or "Philosophia perennis" defines intellect or "intellectus" as "facultas cognoscendi" or "facultas cognoscitiva," the faculty of knowing, understanding as faculties the principles of action, or capabilities possessed by the mind for engaging in a particular kind of activity. 29

The nature of the intellect is spiritual, and so it differs in kind from mere sensitive principles of cognition though it depends intrinsically on material elements, such as sensory perception and imagination, to perform its operations. The nature of the intellect is known from its activities, according to the time-honoured dictum


29 W. A. Kelly, op. cit., pp. 27-28
"agere sequitur esse," i.e., the acts are of the same nature as the principle which produces them.

The following are the main activites of the intellect: to form universal concepts, and concepts of suprasensible things; to perceive relations as such (qua tales); to elicit judgments, to reason, and finally the power of reflexion through which one knows one's own acts and attributes them to oneself. All these various intellectual functions can be reduced to two main functions which are like principles and sources of the others, viz., the power of forming universal concepts and of perceiving relations as such.\(^{30}\)

\(^{30}\) "Nec abs re erit animadvertere, quod omnes hae functiones intellectuales, licet in multis inter se differant, possunt tamen ad duas principia reduci quae sunt veluti coeterarum principiorum et radix. Tales sunt conceptus universalis, et conceptus relationis." (Italics in the original).

(It will not be out of place to note here that all these intellectual functions, though differing in many aspects, may be reduced to two heads which are like principles and roots of all the others, namely the universal concept and the concept of relation).

We have explained the nature of Intelligence in the light of sound philosophy. This is an objective, qualitative definition of intelligence; but we are concerned in this study with intelligence as capable of being measured, and to measure means to define quantitatively. To measure intelligence will mean to determine quantitatively the extent to which an individual intelligence is able to perform those operations which are proper to it, viz., to perceive relations, to understand, to judge, to reason, etc. It is clear that the intellect cannot perform the operations which are proper to it without the help of some other accessory capacities, as sensory perceptions, since, according to the celebrated philosophical dictum, "nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu." (Nothing is perceived intellectually unless it is first perceived through the senses).

Then again, nothing is assimilated intellectually, i.e., learnt, without the help of memory, imagination and attention.

For the purpose of testing we may adopt the following descriptive definition, "Intelligence is considered to be the active cognitive capacity together with such accessory mental capacities as perception, imagination, attention, and memory." 31

31 W. A. Kelly, op. cit., p. 397.
Intelligence is a very complex phenomenon, hence no single test can claim to measure all the aspects of intelligence.

Intelligence tests measure not so much the amount of information gathered by the intellect, as the capacity of the intellect to acquire information or knowledge, and in so far as education is concerned, they measure the ability to succeed in academic work. This ability or capacity, is considered to be innate. The intelligence tests infer, rather than measure, this innate intellectual capacity. They infer this capacity from its manifestation in action. It is assumed that the intelligence tests measure the capacity of the intellect by presenting it with an opportunity to give its maximum performance. Further more, intelligence tests are designed to distinguish native capacity from what is the result of training. 32

All the claims made for a good intelligence test are far from being realized. In fact the various intelligence tests now in existence seem to include somewhat different aspects of intelligence, such as perception, imagination, memory, attention, problem-solving, insight, and so forth. Modern

psychologists, confronted with the problem of measuring intelligence, are still in the position of the hunter, described by Cronbach, who goes to the woods to find an animal no one has ever seen. Everyone is sure the beast exists, for he has been raiding the poultry coops, but no one can describe him. It is the very position of Binet, as Cronbach points out, when he first attempted to design an intelligence test. He knew there must be something like intelligence, since its everyday effects could be seen, but he could not describe what he wished to measure, as it had never been isolated.  

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