"There are," says T.S. Eliot, "at least two attitudes toward literature and toward everything, and that you cannot hold both."¹ The attitude which John Middleton Murry professed and practised was Romantic. In Western Europe there are two traditions, the English and the Latin, the Romantic and the classical. The first of these is empirical; the second, logical, abstract, absolute. "The classicist," Murry states, "must believe that nothing really exists that cannot be defined, and indeed that things are in virtue of their definition."² As opposed to this, "English Romanticism is Romanticism with a difference. It is not an intellectual gymnastic or a melodramatic gesture, as it has been in Latin countries; it is on the contrary a practical and experimental Romanticism."³ The Romantic critic starts with an experience, where the classical critic starts with a fact. The first looks inward to a sense of the whole which the work in question has left on his mind; the other looks outwards, examining the parts as they stand on the printed page before him. And this examination is performed according to canons of structure and taste which are not of the critic's devising. To Murry such a rigid approach invariably appeared suspect. "By any honest critic," he wrote, "I mean a man who builds his schemes and classifications solely on the basis of his own reactions - makes a cross-section of the universe of literature in accordance with his temperament."⁴ The classical critic confronted with a work begins by considering it in the light of a certain recognised
structure. Either it is an elegy, or an ode, a lyric, an epic, etc! and an elegy, an epic, a lyric, or an ode have certain agreed-upon qualities and virtues. This mode of measurement makes for clear judgment; but whether it makes for full and deep judgment, for subtle understanding, and close appreciation is quite another question. The Romanticist holds that by beginning with his 'experience' of the work, he is coming nearer to its complete nature. "First," Murry wrote, "the critic should endeavour to convey the whole effect of the work he is criticising, its peculiar uniqueness." Once more the classicist may ask whether this experience of the work, to which the Romantic critic lays claim, can be equated with its substantial nature, with its peculiar objective uniqueness. Murry's answer to this was that his 'experience' truly provided a configuration, in his own mind, of the work's essential stature. In support of his contention he quoted the distinction made by Coleridge "between form as proceeding, and shape as superinduced." "The latter," Murry wrote, "is either the death or the imprisonment of the thing," and this is the classical critic's concern. "The former is its self-witnessing and self-effected sphere of agency," and it is this the Romantic critic looks for.

Romanticism was the most powerful influence for nearly two hundred years. But a reaction against romanticism started at the beginning of the twentieth century. It entered modern literature through two sources, one American and the other English.
In America, at the beginning of this century, two powerful critics, Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More had begun to question the fundamental assumptions of romanticism. Irving Babbitt as lecturer at Harvard University and contributor to learned and literary periodicals and as author of several controversial books exercised great influence upon American literary theory. He was widely acquainted with continental literature and criticism. He opposed the intuition and gusto of Spingarn and Hunekar, and pleaded reverence for reason. There is a higher law, he declared, which man can rationally discern, and to which, by subjecting his emotions and his animal nature under his reason, he can hope to conform. Tradition on the whole is rational, and whatever opposes the conclusions of reason must be discarded. Romanticism with its later incarnations in realism and naturalism is dangerous yielding to emotion. Babbitt took for his theme the ills from which society and literature were suffering as the effect of their having abandoned right reason. In his book Rousseau and Romanticism he repudiated the philosophy of Rousseau.

"Most of the great literary names," writes Montgomery Belgian, "from Wordsworth and Shelley to the present day stood, according to him, for subsidiary expressions of an evil the full enormity of which Rousseau alone had perpetrated." In criticism Babbitt practised the very emotional detachment which he advocated. "Standards do exist by which to criticize literature, partly outside the individual, partly within him. The real problem is to find some medial position between the
legalistic Procrustes and the amorphous, impressionistic Proteus. Such a standard employs the universal part of the individual, that which he shares with all men, and a discipline based upon past practice without being purely traditional. By constant and clear thinking it adjusts the experience of the past to the changing needs of the present.  

Babbitt's running mate was Paul Elmer More. The two had begun a life-long friendship as graduate students at Harvard. More had soon abandoned the academic for the journalistic life. By 1910 he had won a prominent place among American literary thinkers whom he further influenced as editor of The Nation. His humanism differs from Babbitt's chiefly in his closer adherence to Christianity, and consequently his greater emphasis upon the moral purpose of literature. Though both men were condemned as Puritans by opponents, More's ethical discussions were much more detailed. Against both romanticism and naturalism, More fought desperately. The Romantic critic hardly differs from Anatole France's impressionist; being part and parcel of his object, he cannot judge objectively. The true critic, according to More, enjoys with gusto what he is considering, but at the same time conceives clearly the values of the object he enjoys.

In England, T.E. Hulme was the first to start vehement opposition against Romanticism. Thomas Earner Hulme was an Englishman. He was born in 1883. After his High-school education he entered Cambridge University which he left without taking a degree. Till 1914, when he fought in the War, he
toured Canada and Europe studying philosophy. He was killed in action in September 1917. Only three works appeared while he was alive. The first was his translation of Bergson's *Introduction to Metaphysics* and the second was his translation with a critical introduction, of George Sorel's *Reflections on Violence*. The only other work of Hulme published during his life-time consisted of a few articles and a group of five poems, printed with the title *Complete Poetical Works of T.E. Hulme*. The main tendencies of Hulme's thought were, however, contained in his notes, which were published by Herbert Read in 1924 with the title *Speculations*, the subtitle of which is *Essays on Humanism and Philosophy of Art*. For Hulme, the antithesis is between Religion and Humanism on the one hand, and on the other between classicism and Romanticism, which leads to "spineless liberalism" and false Utopianism in politics. Hulme advocates a return to religion. A civilisation built on humanistic foundations is on the way to total annihilation. If culture and civilisation are to be redirected from the road to ruin, discipline and order, both ethical and political, are essential. Hence the need for a religious revival. Order is not negative and destructive but creative and liberating. When order and discipline are imposed on the realm of letters we have classicism. Thus religion and classicism are related. Hulme cannot tolerate humanism. It seeks, according to him, to appropriate "the perfection that belongs to the non-human". "It thus creates the bastard conception of personality. In literature it leads to romanticism."
Such efforts at a repudiation of romanticism reach its culmination in T.S. Eliot. When Eliot began his literary criticism the most important schools of literary criticism were those of impressionism and abstract criticism. Impressionistic criticism assumes that the essence of literary criticism lies in the individual's response to a work of art. The impressionistic critic considers a high degree of aesthetic sensibility as the only requirement in the appreciation and judgment of work of art. All other equipments, either in scholarship or in the discipline of a literary tradition, are considered extraneous. Of this type of criticism Walter Pater is the best representative. He carried to the acme of perfection the impressionistic method of criticism. He was a pure aesthete. His criticism presents a particular point of view, not objective, nor scientific, but a highly personal one. In his Preface to *Renaissance* Pater defines the critical process as consisting of three stages. "To feel the virtue of the poet, or the painter, to disengage it, to set it forth - these are the three stages of the critic's duty." The representative of abstract criticism is Matthew Arnold. His point of view is opposed to that of Pater. Arnold was both a critic of society and literature. He sought to combine the achievements of the human spirit in a synthesis which he called "culture".

T.S. Eliot reacted sharply against both Arnold and Pater. In 1920 he published a volume of critical essays entitled *The Sacred Wood*. The first two essays in the volume, "The
Perfect Critic" and "The Imperfect Critic" constitute an attack on impressionism and the school of abstract criticism. The essay "The Perfect Critic" begins by attacking the movement initiated by Matthew Arnold, and that which is called "aesthetic criticism" or "impressionistic criticism". Arnold is dismissed briefly as a propagandist for criticism rather than a true critic. Such critics seek in a work of art for philosophical and historical material. They confuse social criticism with literary criticism. They mistake criticism for the history of ideas, and proceed on the assumption that poetry is the most highly organised form of intellectual activity. Eliot, then, examines impressionistic criticism. He takes Arthur Symons as a typical impressionistic critic. This kind of criticism ends by becoming a common type of popular literary lecture in which the stories, the characters, and the general qualities of a literary work are set forth. This is one of the worst defects of depending on mere "impressions" for the analysis of a poem or play. Further it is almost impossible to build criticism upon pure impressions. The moment we try to translate the impressions into words, we begin to analyse and construct. Consequently the verbal formulations of aesthetic impressions are not the same thing as impressions. Finally what we have is not criticism, but a few opinions based on the critic's aesthetic sensibility. In the sentimental person, a work of art arouses all sorts of emotions which are the accidents of personal association. Such a critic is an "imperfect critic".
Eliot brushes aside the very romantic theory of literature in his essay 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' which was first published in 1917. In the romantic theory, poetry is the product of the inspiration of the poet. The poet is essentially a "genius", a highly individualized mind creating poetry through the power of imagination. Thus the personality of the poet is of great importance in poetic creation. And there is a direct correlation between the biography of the poet and his literary career. The more individualistic the life of a poet, the greater his poetry. The "personalist theory of poetry" further postulates freedom from all traditional influences as a necessary pre-condition of artistic creation.

Eliot's essay attacks these very notions. Instead of the notion of "genius" he advances the concept of tradition. Instead of the theory of mind as an active shaping agency, he presents a conception in which the mind is a passive receptacle of impressions. Instead of direct expression of the personality of the poet in poetry, he advocates a suppression of the merely personal. The poet has no personality to express, but only a medium. This medium is the mind of the poet in which various impressions and experiences combine to become poetry. These experiences and impressions need not be those which are important to the poet himself. The appeal of a poem does not depend on the event in the life of the poet, or the emotions experienced by him. "Poetry is not a turning loose of emotion," says Eliot, "but an escape from emotion; it is not the expression of personality, but escape from personality." This is Eliot's impersonal theory of poetry, and it is this theory which is
made the basis of a new criticism. "Honest criticism and sensitive appreciation," according to Eliot, "is directed not upon the poet but upon the poetry.\textsuperscript{11} This is Eliot's fundamental principle which has been emphatically expressed in all his criticism. For instance, his essay on Dante written in 1929 begins: "In my own experience of the appreciation of poetry I have always found that the less I knew about the poet and his works, before I began to read it, the better. A quotation, a critical remark, an enthusiastic essay, may well be the accident that sets one to reading a particular author; but an elaborate preparation of historical and biographical knowledge has always been to me a barrier.\textsuperscript{12}

Eliot's influence, needless to say, was tremendous and widespread on both sides of the Atlantic. Professor W.K. Wimsatt of Yale, for example, subscribed to the same critical attitude in his two essays in which he collaborated with Professor Monroe C. Beardsley, "The Intentional Fallacy" and "The Affective Fallacy.\textsuperscript{13} The first of these was an attack on a biographical or genetic approach to literature, and the second an attack both on the idea that poetry can never express emotions without relating these rationally to situations or motives, and on the theory that the critic is mainly concerned with describing his own emotions, or even the emotions of the poet, in so far as we know about these, when he was composing the poem. Wordsworth's "emotion recollected in tranquillity" is a profound statement about what goes on in a poet's mind when he is composing; Housman's statement about going for a
country walk after drinking a pint of beer is a deliberately flippant and trivial statement. But both are equally irrelevant to the task of the critic faced with the job of elucidating a poem by Wordsworth or Housman. What it feels like to write a good poem, or to read one for the first time, is irrelevant to knowing what sort of useful things to say about a poem. Similarly the poet's biography is relevant to the strict task of criticism only so far as it throws light, in an actual text, on, say, an allusion in Yeats: to Maud Gonne or Parnell or on the special meaning which Yeats: attaches to an unusual phrase like "berne in a gyre".

The anti-romantic and impersonal approach of Eliot and his followers had its hey-day and then ended in disillusion. In a recent article 'The Function of the Imagination', Graham Hugh expressed his disillusion with this sort of criticism. "We who were growing up," he writes, "in the late 1920s into what we hoped would be a literary life were likely to think of criticism as something more than this. We grew up in the next few years into a new literature, and the literature was accompanied by a new criticism..... Most criticism written before 1918 seemed prehistoric, but to the latest kind we gave a very high rank in the intellectual hierarchy. It seemed that a new organon, a whole new range of intellectual apparatus had come into being...... I now believe that this was an illusion. Mr. Eliot's criticism was not a considered re-direction of the literary sensibility; it was a by-product of the development of his own poetry. The science that was to validate I.A. Richards's theory of value never arrived; it
was not science; it was not indeed anything. Edmund Wilson's *Axel's Castle* and Leavis's *New Bearings* were valuable pioneer guide-books; but once overtaken by the event their utility quickly evaporated. The peculiar light that seemed to shine from criticism in those days was a borrowed light; its source was not in the critical activity itself but in a stormy sun-burst of new creative work.... The critical renaissance of thirty years ago tended to establish certain shibboleths whose value we have since had reason to doubt.... One of these was to lay great stress on the impersonal element in literature, on all that could be accounted for by poetical tradition, the state of the language or the availability of a technique. This entailed a corresponding idea of impersonality in literary study. So far as it diverted attention from the love-life of Byron to his actual poetry this was a gain; but there went with it a faith in the virtues of technical analysis that has by now become grotesquely overblown." Graham Hough reminds us: "The only kind of criticism that constitutes more than a temporary service is that which becomes literature itself, which continues to be read not for its arguments or opinions but as an independent source of literary satisfaction. .... We have come near to forgetting that appreciation of the arts is inevitably a personal affair; it depends wholly, in the last resort, on a moment of fusion between the work of art and an individual sensibility that meets it."\(^{14}\)

Another eminent writer Mr. W.W. Robson restores the sense of the author (which Eliot condemned) as indispensable to our
understanding of his work. He asks "Is Henry Fielding's personal character relevant to the appreciation of his writings?" and then himself answers, "I should say, decidedly yes. True, we need not go outside Tom Jones to infer it. We can point to the warm, compassionate, masculine strength so evident in Fielding's best work. But it would be critical purism to maintain that our sense of this is not increased by our knowledge of the biographical facts; or that we ought, as critics, to try to keep this knowledge out of our minds. What we make of a work depends on what we bring to it; and justice and fairness in literary matters do not require that we approach literature with a blank mind, if indeed that is possible. Literature is a fully human product, and a sense of the author as whole may be indispensable to our pleasure and our understanding."  

"The fact is", as Mr. Lee T. Lemon observes, "that as he (T.S. Eliot) grew older he turned more and more toward a personality theory."  

In The Frontiers of Criticism (1956) Eliot had to concede that "any critic seriously concerned with a man's work should be expected to know something about the man's life." In Eliot's later view a poet is not a great poet unless we feel his works "to be united by one significant, consistent, and developing personality." In spite of the shortcomings, however, personality theories, as Mr. Lee T. Lemon affirms, "do provide a valuable insight into the nature and worth of poems. By focussing on the poet, they force the critic to add another dimension to his appreciation of the work -
a dimension that Lionel Trilling, writing about Keats's letters, called the 'virtue of potentiality'. Awareness of the personality behind the poem and respect for its worth forces the critic beyond the inwardness of his own experience and into a realization of another and possibly far different world. One of the values of literature is its use as a human document. To know of Coleridge's personality is to be able to find a quality in his work that is otherwise not so readily apparent. The hardheaded denial of such material or the claim that it is not 'aesthetic' is valid only within a very narrow conception of literary value. The denial is not valid if one of the tasks of criticism is to explain the total value of the poem, to explain why one work endures and another does not." 19

The personality theory has struck deep roots in literature and literary criticism. As early as 1778 Herder described the best reading as "divination into the soul of the author." Even Tolstoy could agree that the artist "should experience feeling." 20 Baudelaire declared that "the artist, ... the poet, should only paint in accordance with what he sees and with what he feels." 21 Eugene Veron sums up the theory best: "truth and personality" are the "alpha and omega of art formulas; truth as to facts, and the personality of the artist." Truth is "our personality itself." 22 Modern aestheticians as different in their general approaches to literature as Croce and Richards, Maritain and Dewey, Bergson and Bradley, have accepted some of the implications of the personality theory.
Recent personality theories grow out of either the intuitionist philosophy of Henri Bergson and Benedetto Croce or the relatively more pedestrian approaches of John Dewey and I.A. Richards. The former stress the artist's intuition, the latter his communicable experience.

Croce values intuition because it is the best part of man's experience; the more empirical Dewey also values the best part of man's experience as the source of art, but would hardly call it intuition. Dewey sees the source of art as an "excitement about subject-matter" which activates memories of previous experiences and translates them into "emotionalized images." Other major aestheticians have similarly found the source of art at least partly within the experiences of the artist. Like Dewey, Samuel Alexander sees the origin of art in a passionate excitement about the experience and about its re-creation. Jacques Maritain finds it in "that intercommunication between the inner being of things and the inner being of the human self which is a kind of divination." And even I.A. Richards cannot avoid a trace of the personality theory. He argues that a major value of art is its ability to transmit complex experience and that artistic genius is probably the ability to draw upon vast stores of experience.

In criticism, personality theories take either the intuitionist approach of Croce or the more practical approach of Dewey. Sir Herbert Read represents Croce's intuitionist approach. He says: "I believe that criticism must concern itself, not only with the work of art in itself, but also with
the process of writing, and with the writer's state of mind when inspired - that is to say, criticism must concern itself not only with the finished work of art, but also with the workman, his mental activity and his tools." He concludes that "all poetry, in its widest sense, originates in the personality." For Thomas Clark Pollock who follows Dewey's approach, "literature is the linguistic process through which a psycho-physiological experience of one person leads to the production of a series of symbols which in turn evoke in another person a controlled experience .... similar to, though not identical with, the experiences which resulted in the production of the symbol-series." The defects of such an approach are quite obvious, but, as Mr. David Daiches correctly points out, "if we prefer a criticism which claims to be more objective and 'scientific', we should not forget how an element of impressionism (that is, of criticism through a parade of autobiographical response to the work criticized) can, when used with discretion as part of a complex technique, achieve remarkable results." The impressionist approach has been successfully employed in illuminating and evaluating a work by Lamb, Hazlitt and De Quincey. Even judicial critics like John Dryden, Samuel Johnson, and Matthew Arnold had to resort to the impressionist method. In his life of Dryden, Johnson makes a significant observation:

"It is not by comparing line with line that the merit of great works is to be estimated, but by their general effects."
and ultimate result. It is easy to note a weak line, and write one more vigorous in its place; to find a happiness of expression in the original, and transplant it by force into the version: but what is given to the parts, may be subducted from the whole, and the reader may be weary, though the critick may commend. Works of imagination excel by their allurement and delight; by their power of attracting and detaining the attention. That book is good in vain, which the reader throws away. He only is the master, who keeps the mind in pleasing captivity; whose pages are perused with eagerness, and in hope of new pleasure are perused again; and whose conclusion is perceived with an eye of sorrow, such as the traveller casts upon departing day."

Another excellent impressionistic observation of Dr. Johnson about *Paradise Lost* in his *Life of Milton* tells us something about the greatness and the fault of the poem, but perhaps more about Johnson himself:

"*Paradise Lost* is one of the books which the reader admires and lays down and forgets to take up again. None ever wished it longer than it is. Its perusal is a duty rather than a pleasure. We read Milton for instruction, retire harassed and overburdened, and look elsewhere for recreation; we desert our master and seek for companions."³³

Matthew Arnold also depended greatly on personal response (though he might have argued otherwise) when he offered the "touchstone" theory of criticism.
So we see that literary criticism in terms of personal response to the work of art has been very effective even in the hands of those who generally refer to an Outside Authority and of those also who like Romantics Lamb, Hazlitt, and De Quincey consult their Inner Voice. Of course "the person forming such opinions must have a far-ranging taste, a wide reading background, a sense of judgment and discernment that is as much a mark of his personality as it is of his literary perceptiveness." 34

John Middleton Murry had all these qualifications. He would have gladly endorsed the view expressed by David Daiches: "Literary criticism remains an art, not a science, and the critic who tries to reduce his practice to the following of a rigid scientific method runs the risk of letting the true vitality of the work of literature elude him and his readers .... Art is meant to be experienced, and in the last analysis the function of criticism is to assist that experience." 35