CHAPTER-III.
PRAMĀNA VICĀRA.
(5) Pramāṇa.

Pramāṇa is the first of sixteen categories propounded in N.S.I-I-I-. Naturally, therefore, Kr and his commentators discuss it first. Nyāya - Vais'ēśika schools advocate realism in its fullest. They favour the view of the objective reality of the world as against the pure idealism of Buddhists and Vedāntists. Objects to them are not mere concepts, but are real entities that can be known through external means. The means of this knowledge is called 'Pramāṇa', the objects are 'Prameyas' and their right cognition is called 'Pramā'.

This clearly suggests that the stress should be laid on 'rather than only on'. In some cases this - 'prameyah prameya prameyam' may be expressed in a positive way also.
Definition of Pramāṇa.

Ka. gives the traditional definition of Pramāṇa as Pramāṇa karana, i.e., the instrument - (Karana) of right cognition (Pramā). To have the clear conception of this definition, the comprehension of the two words Pramāṇa and Karana is necessary. Ka, therefore, starts to explain them respectively.

Pramāṇa or the right cognition is the right apprehension of an object as it is (Yathārthānubhava). But what is 'Yathārthānubhava' is yet to be examined. Ka is satisfied only with the definition of the "Anubhava". He does not deal with the Yathārthata of it.

GV. followed by Gv. elaborately explores the meaning of the word 'Yathārtha' in the definition. They with their scholastic ferment rule out the series of possible objections against it. GV. defines conventionally 'Yathārthastvam' as Tadvati Tatprakāṛtvam - that generally means to cognize an object with that characteristic that is really possessed by it. 'Tadvati' is explained by Gv. as

45. Tpk. PP. 8-9, and TT. PP. 54-55. See also Ts & TD. P. 23. WhereNB explains Tadvati, etc. as । तद्वदुप्रकारः प्रकारिति । यस्य यथार्थत्वात्‍ अस्ति कर्मरूपस्य अनुभावात्।
Both GV. and Gh. take the stock example of silver (Rajata) to clarify this definition. In the cognition 'Idam Rajatam' (This is silver). Rajata is Visesya. It is possessed of Rajatata as the characteristic (Prakāra). If, however, a Sūkti (nacre) is cognized as Rajata, it is not Yathārtha-agnena, but is an illusion (Ahrama). In Ahrama or Viparyaya though we have "Sukta-Prajñāpradāna Gāthā", it is not चक्रवर्ति = गर्भजातित्वमन् but it is "sukta-prajñāpradāna gāthā", Gh. quotes a work called S'vomeni tīkā in this reference.

Gh. anticipates a few objections regarding the interpretation of तद्वर्ति, and refutes them all. According to him तद्वर्ति means तद्वरत्वस्य वर्तितम्. तद्वरत्वस्य वर्तितम् is not आश्चर्यविद्युत्स्य वर्तितम् or अपारापारे, but is rather अपारापारे. He explains further that here Sambandha is never meant to be an arbitrary one. It should be understood in its proper context — with its due limitations of time and space.

44. TT.P. 55. 45. Tbh. P. 9. TT.PP. 54-55

46 विनिर्भर-दर्शन निर्वपित नवला वालीभिक्षु सर्वोपरि तद्धिति विचारितानि संविधिकारयते. चतुर्दशमणिकी चालकमणिकः हृदेषु.

47. श्लोक: स्त्र. Tbh. 56. च. Tbh. लक्ष. 126.

चः यत्र अत्मविद्युत्स्य शरीर, तत्र अत्मविद्युत्स्य विचारे। Tq. 23.
GV. also puts his final interpretation of the 'Yatha-
-rthānubhava' as 'ज्ञातनामकापरं परमपरस्युपरात्मकोर्यों अतः
अत्तत्त्तत्त्तत्त्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्त at 49. Sn. elaborates this statement in no less than six pages, analysing it word by word and then by again puts it in simpler terms. He, as a sincere teacher, tries to explain a complicated problem in its simplest way to his pupils.*

Pramāṇa
Lakāhāra.

After Pramāṇa, naturally, the discussion of its karana follows. Ke defines it as "तत्ततत्ततत्तत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत
t he follows the ancient Mañjyuśīkā in accepting the Vyaṣpratva to be the chief requisite of a karana, in the definition of a karana. Accordingly, he believes 'तत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत्ततत
t not the indriyārahasanikāraṇa, as the later being a Vyāpāra plays the role of an accessory to the Indriya.


* On P. 9 of Tpk. lines 8 to 11 from वा इति गोपीधर्मायः मायादेशवादिनि seem to be out of context due to the scribal error. They should be related to the word वा on P. 9 where अर्थात् काल्य रक्ति are shown as कालिधात् by Ke. Sn., however, passes over this error. He, however, discusses अर्थात् also though it is missed by GV. TT. P. 52-55.
Supporting GV. On rejects the definition of Karana as stated by the moderns. The Karana becomes acceptable to him.

GV. gives the final definition of Pramāna:

He shows how this definition can be applicable in all of the four Pramānas, viz., Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, and Saṃśedha. Without explaining the above definition explicitly he simply says, and concludes with

and

51. TT. PP. 66-67. 52. Tpk. P. 10. GV. does not tell us which works are referred to here.
53. Tpk. P. 10. It is interesting to note that this somewhat complex definition of Pramāna is criticised by GauriKānta, "..."
Gn. explains this definition by examining it word by word. While explaining the Anubhavatva Jāti, he discusses the topic of Jāti as whether जन्तु is the only Jāti or should Pruthvitva, Jelatva, etc., be also considered as a separate Jāti.

(6) Theory of Causation.

Ārambhavāda

The Nyāya-Vaishēsika systems of thought - being the advocates of pluralistic realism accept - Ārambhavāda, i.e., in the beginning of every object that is produced. The Ārambhavāda is an empirical theory. The objects are seen to be produced and destroyed. The process of this production and destruction is also generally perceived and from it, one is led to locate their cause, because the common sense tells that every product being an effect must have a cause. To understand the nature of the empirical world, almost all the schools of thought, excepting that of the Mādhyamika Buddhism, accept the cause and effect relation as a logical necessity. They, however, differ in their concepts of the nature of the cause. Whether cause and effect are identical or are the two quite independent entities, or whether the effect is merely a projection of a -

54. TT. PP. 67-71 & 73-84.
55. Ibid. PP. 71-78.
cause or something other than that, are some of the points of controversy among the Indian philosophical systems.  

Ke. defines a cause as 'an invariable antecedent which is not Anyathāsiddhā - i.e., remotely connected with the effect.'

56. This controversy is generally four-fold viz., Pariṇāmavāda of Sāmkhyā, Vivartavāda of Sāṅkera vedant; S'ūnyavāda of Nādhyamitra Budhās and Arambhavāda of Nyāya-Vais’sāvikas. It is not necessary to enter into the detailed discussion here, as both Tbh and Tpk are silent in this matter. Cn. also makes a passing reference to the nature of cause. However, for details. See 'Conception of Matter' by Dr. Umesha Mis'ra-Ch. VI. PP. 224-233.

57. अनुलोकितप्रेतप्रेतापेषित नीतातिष्ठतां न नानाध्यात्मिकस्मथिपत्तां तत्त्वमृतात् ॥ २ ॥

Cf. also - [अनुलोकितप्रेतप्रेतापेषित नीतातिष्ठतां नानाध्यात्मिकस्मथिपत्तां तत्त्वमृतात् ॥ २ ॥]

Cn. also 'invariable unconditional antecedent' Mill.

58. The word Anyathāsiddha is translated in various ways:-

(i) Proved to be otherwise - Gajendra Sadkar. Thb. P. 5
(ii) Proved to be an unessential and accidental circumstance - Parenjape. Thb. n. P. 6.
(iii) Connected too remotely - Dr. U. Mis’re concept (of matter P. 234.
(iv) Superfluous - Swami Mādhavānanda. B.P.P. 23.
(v) Superfluous causality - Rover Trasm. of B.P.P. 10.
(vi) Proved to be antecedent through another - Athley T.S. N. P. 194.

Athley thinks that Anyathāsiddha is not a superflous thing that is not necessary for the production of an effect. Siddhānta -

शिलोक्षुरारोगयुगात् कोषाश्रयायामि तत्त्वमात्र-हर्मात्मक
Thus, every effect should be preceded by the cause, but any thing that is preceding cannot necessarily be the cause, i.e., a donkey which has nothing to do with the production of a cloth cannot be considered as the cause of the cloth only, cause it was the preceding factor. Hence, the word "Niyata" is inserted into the definition.

Thus, it means a thing, which is proved to be antecedent to the effect through the real cause. (T.S. n. P. 194).

In short it is "an antecedent which is not casually connected with the effect though conjoined with it". (Dr. RadhaKrishnan I. Phil. Vol.II. P.92)

Prof. Kiriymma, however, translates - An as 'exclusion' and thinking the various types of Anyathasiddha as unnecessary, includes them all in 'conditional factors' of - J.S. Mill. (Outlines of I. Phil. P. 244).

The translation of Dr. Mis're seems to be nearer to the sense of Anyathasiddha as implied by Gv. and Gv.
Anyathāsiddhā.

The definition is still incomplete. To make it complete, the word "Anyathāsīdāha" is added. This will remove the possibility of the colour of the threads (Tanturūpa) to be the cause of the cloth.

Kṣ. does not define Anyathāsiddha, but only gives the illustration of the 'tansurūpa' that is explained in the above paragraph. Gv. also does not define Anyathāsiddha. He, however, says that there are five types of Anyathāsiddhis and the proper understanding of all these five will clarify the meaning of the Anyathāsiddha.

Varieties of Anyathāsiddhis.

Gv. follows GV. in this respect and points out that Nyāyikas like Udayana believe in five types as Anyathāsiddhis, while those like Ganges'a accept only three types. Vis'vanātha explains this five Anyathāsiddhis, but his order is different.

59. Annambhatta follows Ganges'a, see TD. P. 26, n. P. 198.

60. ये सर्व सत्तु पुरुषभापुरुषममात्रलययः कारणाकोषीय वा तययः | प्रवन्तां प्रवत्तां पुरुषात्तथसदां चतुर्दशा महोऽविचारातः ॥ २ ॥
First
Anyathāśiddhi.

Out of these five, when anything that comes accidentally in conjunction with other things that alone are found elsewhere to be sufficient for producing an effect, it is the first Anyathāśiddhi. For example the rod, the wheel, etc., are sufficient in producing a jar, but if an ass is found to be present there by chance, the ass is an Anyathāśiddha, with reference to the particular jar.

Vide also Ts. N.P. 196, where it is shown how these five Anyathāśidhhis can be absorbed into the three as given by Annambhātta.

61.

अन्यथा कुष्णलिखयथर्पधारणेन चक कार्यसमभवे
वेदमहं भूतमयम नदधा स्वर्गदर्शियतीयमाः

Ṭṭh. 1.12, see also ṬṬ. pp. 84-86.
Second Anyathäsiddhi.

Anything that is already known to be antecedent to a particular effect, even if it is supposed to precede another effect, it becomes the second Anyathäsiddhi. Ākāśa, for example, is known to be the invariable antecedent of S'abda, and so, if it is supposed to be the cause of a jar on the ground that it precedes the later, it will be Anyathäsiddha with regard to the jar.

62. अनन्य प्रति पूर्वपूर्वविद्ये प्रृत्तीत वर्तत्वम् पूर्व-पूर्वितता अवृत्त ते, नादृशे द्वारासिद्धिः।

TPK. P. 12. See also TT. PP. 36-38.

The example of Ākāśa as given by GV. has invited a controversy. (TPK. P. 12) Ākāśa is always found to be preceding both a jar and S'abda equally. That S'abda being a quality must have its substratum the ninth Dravya, i.e. Ākāśa is not a satisfactory explanation. GV. says that it is a convention and Ga. also endorses it by saying, "प्रागाधिकारोऽभिः प्रति जंगत्याच्यैववचारायम्।" (TT. P. 39).

In fact, the examples of different Prāgabhāvas are the correct and non-controversial examples, because even some of the Nava Naiṣṭyikas do not accept Ākāśa, Dik and Kāla as substances.
The third

Anyāthāsiddhi.

Anything whose pre-existence is apprehended along with that of the real cause is the case of the third Anyāthāsiddhi, e.g. The "सूर्योसर" is the real cause of the "तेर"; but the colour of the "सुखो" (अक्षरोऽसरः) "सरीरा" "are always recognised. These "सूर्योसर" "तरुसर" etc. are Anyāthāsiddhas with regard to the "

The fourth

Anyāthāsiddhi.

Anything by accepting whose existence only, or thing can become a cause, becomes the fourth - Anyāthāsiddha, with regard to that effect. For instance, -ॷ, the cognition of a "कुंड " (a stick ) is possible only after the cognition of "कुंडोऽसर" and so the "कुंड" becomes the cause of "सर" (a jar) only after accepting "कुंडोऽसर" as its "कुंडोऽसरा". Here, "कुंडोऽसर" is Anyāthāsiddha.

The fifth

Anyāthāsiddhi.

The fifth and the last Anyāthāsiddhi takes place when the cause of a cause comes to the field. The father of the potter precedes his son in time, but he is in no way directed connected with the production of the pot on that ground.

63-64-65 (see next page)
31.

Gangeśa's view on these varieties.

It will be seen that the fourth variety of Anyathāsiddhi can be included under the third one, while the fifth variety may be included under the second. Gāṇḍā also suggests that according to Maṇikāra, the fifth Anyathāsiddhi can be included under the second one.

The term "Niyata".

Gāṇḍā supporting Cārvāka explains the necessity of the term Niyata in the definition of a cause, even though the term Ananyathāsiddha is there. This discussion, however, does not satisfy much, in its logical approach.

The nature of a cause.

Gāṇḍā now discusses the nature of a cause from the Nyāya-Vaisēśika point of view. He refutes the identity of cause and effect as accepted by Saṃkhyā. Supporting the view of Nyāya-Vaisēśikas he clearly explains that even Vyākhyā-Vyākhyābhāva

63-64-65. या पुरुषक्रत्वं यस्य पूर्वस्तत्तं श्रवणं तत्रित्यय-सिद्धार्थरत्नं। "-द्वािपादायं तस्य पूर्वपर्यस्तं त्र्यस्य तत्तस्तत्त-श्रवणं तत्तस्तत्त-श्रवणं। न तनं पूर्वपर्यस्तत्तस्तत्तक्रत्वं यथयथादिकत्र्य स्तस्तत्तस्तत्तस्तत्तस्तादिकत्र्य।" CTK PP 12-13, TTPPP 940.

66, 67. P. 90. Note that Bāhānidī has confused the 2nd variety with the 3rd.

68. Ibid. PP. 93-95.
between the objects cannot be proved to be the Kārya Kṛṣṇa, of the same. In fact, Kārya-Kṛṣṇabhāva is different than Vyāpya-Vyāpakaabhāva. Gn. explains this theory in detail. He refutes the view of those Naiyāyikas, who think the Vyāpya-Vyāpaka relation in terms of Kārya-Kṛṣṇabhāva.

Gn. here states the view of old Naiyāyikas, who defend the Vyāpya-Vyāpaka relation between the cause and the effect. According to them the Vyāpya-Vyāpaka relation between a jar and a stick may not be accepted, if this relation is considered to be spatial, but if it is considered to be in the context of the time, it can be possible. Gn. summarily rejects this view by saying that the space and time both are necessary in deciding the casual relation.

After refuting this view, he turns to the neo-logicians. They accept either 'Svarūpa-sambandha' or an independent category. Gn. agrees with them. The Kṛṣṇa of a 'cit' (stick), etc., lies in their nature of being a cause as propounded by the Kārya of a 'cit' (a jar), or just as 'cit' resides in a 'cit', in the same way it is related with the Kārya of a 'cit' (a jar). Thus, we come to rather a strange conclusion that the cause is a different object, and at the same time, a 'cit' is related. How this paradoxical state can be operative in its logical form, is not explained by Gn. Perhaps, he wants to make us understand that though cause and effect are different, there is
something peculiar in the very nature of the cause itself that makes the effect to be existent. If it is so, then the very definition of the cause as being an invariable, ananyatādīdēha antecedent becomes useless. Gā. also is pressed with this difficulty and tries unsuccessfully to avert it by saying that the definition is only suggestive of this real relation.

Gārvāka’s view.

This sort of interpretation of Kāraṇā by Gā. leads to a conclusion desired by the opponent schools like those of Gārvāka and others. They refuse to accept the casual relation as presented by Naiyāyikas, on the ground that it is nothing but the very nature (svabhāva) of the produce itself, that makes its existence possible. It means a thing’s very nature by itself is its source of production and there is no necessity of an external event to be a cause at all.

A Paradox.

Thus, "the distinction into the elements by themselves, their union and the production of the

69-70. ibid. pp. 94-95.

71. कारणात्मक द्वेषया। यथेच्यात् क्योऽजनं नित्यकरं हि, तत् तत्र नायाजयनात्मयो पदशोभे क्षतं दिव्य। 961d pp. 94-96.

72. Nky. 1-5. See also Vardhamāna’s commentary on this Ṛāja.
effects is purely ideal”, and the realism of Naiyayikas at this stage does not remain categorical. Though Naiyayikas have tried vehemently to refute this paradox, they have not become successful to completely. They have to resort to the pragmatic argument. "The notion of cause is deeply embedded in language of common sense". It is a popular experience to regard cause and effect distinctly and not to ask why 'A' and only 'A' is the cause of 'B', as it is taken for granted - perhaps by the traditional force resulting into intuition.

73. Dr. Radhakrishnan. I.Phil. Vol. II. P. 99.

74. Bhaduri Nyaya-Vais'esa Metaphysics P. 279.

75. After this discussion Gn. following Gn. - elaborates Ke's view that Anvaya-Vyatirekitva cannot be the proper definition of a cause, as in some case like Akasa, the cause of Sambda, there is no scope to test the definition by Vyatireka, because Akasa being eternal and omnipresent there is no possibility of its absence. See TT. PP. 96-106.
35.

(7) The three-fold division of a कारण.

(i)

के. divides a cause into सामवैयि (inherent), असामवैयि (non-inherent) and निमित्त (auxiliary), and defines each of them accordingly, Out of these three, the सामवैयि कारण is the principal one.

उपदान्त and सामवैयि.

The सामवैयि कारण of the नैयायिक is not same as the उपदान्त (material) cause of other schools. Though some नैयायिकs think सामवैयि कारण as उपदान्त कारण, "the usage is not quite warranted, as the implication of उपदान्त कारण is that, it should impart, its essence to its effect". But in न्याय-वैशेषिक school the cause and effect being two different entities, there is no question of former's imparting its essence to the later. The cause and effect though related have - their objective realities.

76. E.g. यदृ यदृच्छ यदृ यदृच्छकलायं ततेदुपदात्तविदेशिनम् ।

77. D.N. Shastri Critique of Indian Realism. P. 128. Dr. Bhaduri translates the word सामवैयि as - 'material', though he positively means it to be different from उपदान्त. My V.M. P. 293.
This relation, therefore, must be of a specific nature. It is called Samavayi Karana.

The yarns, for instance, are the Samavayi Karana of cloth that is made of them. But the shuttle, etc., cannot be called the inherent cause of the cloth, as the later is not made of the former. An inherent cause is the originating and the abiding ground of the effect. It must be a substance, because an effect can inhere in a substance alone. But it may have for its effect a substance or a quality of an action. Thus, "of all the antecedents which are concurrent factors in the production of an effect, that alone is the Samavayi Karana, which, besides originating the effect as intimately connected with itself, persists as the supportive substratum of the effect as long as the later exists. In other words it is the existent continual which precedes originates, underlies, sustains and even survives the effect." Samavaya is a unique Nyaya-Vaishešika concept.

It is defined as the relation between two inseparables (Autasidhās), and is thus, different
from "Samyoga", which is a relation between two separate entities.

Those two objects are called Autasiddhas, between which the one as long as it is not destroyed continues to be just dependent upon the other, i.e. if one wants to exist, it can be done only having the other as its substratum, e.g. the pairs like part and whole, attributes and substance, genus and species, quiddity (Vis'esa) and external substance are all Autasiddhas.

Meaning of Avinas'yad.

Gv. explores the meaning of the word Avinas'yad that occurs in the definition of Ayutasiddhas, given by Ke. He says that in the state of destruction, these Ayutasiddhas remain just not resorting to anything, i.e., the cloth does not remain resorting to anything when the threads are destroyed or the quality when there is destruction of the substratum. Vinas'yatevirabhya is necessary for the Ayutasiddha Sambandha.

"What is meant by ?" asks the objector. "Is it \textit{वर्तक} (वर्तकस्वविभागतिः), \textit{श्रेणिन्यो रत्नाभिन्नाती} \textit{तत्सतिः} ो। \textit{तत्सतिः} \textit{विभागतिः} \textit{वर्तकस्तेषां} ?" Gv. explains in detail the arguments of the objector, who prove that no one

83. TFK. P. 16, TT. PP. 107-109
of the above alternatives can work here. If the first alternative is taken, then, after the destruction of the pot, its colour should be independent (अत्मवत्ता), but it is not so. The second absurd alternative states the uselessness of the word 'धर्म' in case of Ayutasid-dha relation between two eternal things like paramaṇu (atoms). And the third alternative is simply impossible. There is no proof to show that nothing is being destroyed at the time of Ayutasiddha-sambandha between two entities.

Gn. replying to all these alternatives, states that the word Avinas'yaad conveys simply the fact that 'both of them' cannot remain independent of one another at the same time.

The Problem of samavaya between Guna and Guni.

In Samāvaya relation of Guna and its Guni, the objector raises the point of simultaneous production of both of them. This removes the Paurvaparyabhava and hence, also Kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva. Ke. instead of replying satisfactorily -

84. It should be noted, however, that according to Nyaya system, there cannot be any Ayutasiddha relation between two external objects.


86. विक्रमशाही(विक्रमसिन्धु) नाम तस्य: तस्य: कार्य: कार्यः। कर्म-समग्राः। दिवसाः।
accepts the absurd position of keeping the substance without the quality in the first moment. Gv. does not look to this absurdity. But Gv. understands it well and indicates also another absurdity resulting of the first one if a quality comes one moment - after the production of a substance, then certainly it will be perished one moment after the destruction of its substratum. i.e. the quality will remain - in - void - for one moment even after the destruction of the substratum ( Guni )

During this discussion, Gv. quotes a - Karika from Nyaya Kusumänjali, presenting the view of Gârvaka about the cause, and its refutation by - Udayana. He also cites the views of old Naiyâyikas and quotes, also Navyas like Raghunâtha. (ii)

A-Samâvâyi
Kerana.

Non-inherent ( A-samâvâyi ) cause is - another peculiar device of Naiyâyikas. The qualities and motion are also causes in the production of a - substance. They are non-inherent causes. Only the substance can be inherent cause, and only the - qualities and motion ( Kerma ) can be non-inherent

87. Gv., however, accepts this absurdity without any hesitation while explaining the meaning - of " विद्येयार्थयम् " before. TT. P. 110.
88. Ibid. PP, 115-119.
cause. It defines the non-inherent cause as a cause which is capable of producing an effect by being intimately connected (Pratyasanna) with the inherent (Samavay) cause of effect.

Two kinds of the Asamavayikarana.

The word Pratyasanna implies both the direct and indirect Pratyasatti. Therefore, the Asamavayi-Karana is two-fold. Gn. explains at length this two-fold nature of Asamavayikarana. He also shows the exact meaning underlying the conception of Pratyasatti. He suggests to understand "ekarthapratyasatti" by the word Pratyasanna. Gn. makes it more explicit by "Karyakartha-pratyasatti" and "Karanaikartha-pratyasatti", and thus explains the two-fold Asamavayikarana in a very simple way.

Though qualities are non-inherent cause, not all of them are to be so. To prove this thesis Gn. cites the example of "अऽति " which is considered to be a non-inherent cause by the objector. Gn. states that there is no proof to prove "अऽति " as an "उत्तम-प्रेयसी कारण " of some other qualities. In fact, the contact of soul and mind (अति स्वस्म-स्वाद्योज ) is the asamavayi-karana of the qualities of the soul as accepted by
Adrsta is an auxiliary cause (Nimitta).

The objector, however, tries to reverse the order and asks why should not then "करणात्मकता देन्ते ने निमित्तकारणा और अद्रस्ता के निःस्वातंत्र्य कारणे" be regarded as the nimittakārana and adrsta as a non-inherent cause. To this GV. citing another example replies that this cannot be so. If the objector’s view is accepted, then the peculiar device of the non-inherent cause itself will vanish. If the objector accepts the non-inherent (Asamavāyi) cause, then he would also accept the definition of the same.

The more logical explanation is perhaps furnished by Śrīdhara, who explains it thus: “It is an admitted fact that the asamavāyi-kārana produces its effects only in the place of its origin or in the immediate neighbourhood. If the special qualities of the soul were non-inherent cause of their effects, the adṛsta would not produce its reward and retribution in a different region. If, however, it is regarded as a nimitta-kārana, no such difficulty would arise.”

Other definitions of the asamavāyi-kārana.

Gn. then taking a ūnt from GV. discusses another objection as to why not přetyāsatti itself.
be regarded as an asamavayi-kāraṇa. But, it adds nothing substantial excepting the dialectical ability on the part of Gm.

He then following Gv. proceeds to examine some other definitions of the asamavayi-kāraṇa. Among these definitions, those of the author of Lilāvati and Ganges'a are also included.

"सत्त्व " the independent category of Mimāṃsakās and "विद्वत्ता सत्त्व " of Baudhāyas are both included in the asamavayi-kāraṇa.

Asamavayi-kāraṇa as different from the Nimitta-kāraṇa.

Those, who do not accept the asamavayi-kāraṇa as an independent cause, include it under the nimitta-kāraṇa. Generally, it is believed that the effect is destroyed by the destruction of an asamavayi-kāraṇa and not by that of the nimitta-kāraṇa. So, if the asamavayi-kāraṇa is not accepted as an independent, the remaining cause other than the samavayi one, should be considered as the determinant of the destruction of the effect by its own destruction. But it is not seen. Therefore, the asamavayi-kāraṇa must be accepted.

97. Ibid. P. 149.
43.

The objector, however, points out that sometimes even the destruction of a Nimitta-kārana is responsible in the destruction of an effect, e.g. "is the nimittakārana of " and the later is destroyed after the destruction of the former.

Hence, there is no necessity for the independent asamavayikārana.

GV. does not refute the objection directly. He simply suggests to understand the concept of the asamavayikārana into a broader sense. Gn. also does not clarify the position of GV. He only elaborates it. However, the reply of GV. does not satisfy the logicians.

Gn. does not say much about the nimitta-kārana. He follows Ka. and GV., and states that in case of negation (Abhāva) only nimittakārana is to be sought.

(iii)

Mīmāṃsakas' definition of the Pramāṇa.

Though, the definition of the Pramāṇa given by Mīmāṃsakas as "buddhottarapacālita, kṣānatra", has always remained a bone of contention between them and

98. Tpk. P. 24. TT.P. 149.
100. Tbh. P. 25.

101. For detailed discussion of the problem see.

दर्शन उद्देश्य (विभ. प्रथम. हिंदी एवं हिन्द. भाषा), पृष्ठ 25.
the Nyāya-āyākas and the concept of "सत्यवर्तिन रूपम्" has invited an interesting controversy. Gn. following GV. is not much interested in the problem, and hence leaves it undiscussed.

* * *

(8) Perception ( Pratyaksha )

(i)

Neither GV. nor Gn. discusses the definition of Pratyaksha, the first Pramāṇa, as given by Ka. They only remark that this definition should be understood in such a way that "सत्यावर्तिन रूपम्" may not be violated.

Nirvikāla and Savikalpa Pratyaksha

Gn., however, is interested in examining the two-fold division of the pratyaksha, as Nirvikāla (indeterminate) and Savikalpa (determinate). Bāṇūḍās accept only nirvikāla pratyaksha as "a thing in itself". "The nirvikāla is transcendental in the sense that if grasps a transcendental reality of which although we have a sort of awareness, we are never conscious in terms of thought". It is free from pre-conceptions and the qualification of the

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102. "सत्यावर्तिन रूपम्" अनुसरण अनुच्छेदः। तथा। प. 27
103. D.N. Shastri critique of Ind. Realism. p. 437
104. vide also pp. 434-471 for the growth and development of this two fold division.
object, such as a name and generality. In it, one simply grasps the specific individuality of the object (svalakshana), while in savikalpa, one superimposes the colours of one's imagination and hence mars its pure nature. "We twist the real out of its shape and so it is said to be invalid."

Its refutation.

But Nyāyāyikas severally criticise the Buddhist view of nirvikalpa, as it straightly affect their theory of realism per excellence. Gā. explains the Buddhahs' conception of savikalpa and nirvikalpa thus:-

Buddhas think genus to be only of a negative character (apoha) and, therefore, only imaginary. But this view is rejected by Nyāyāyikas to whom universals are as real as individuals and in which they subsist by samesvaya relation. Not only that, but even if the conception of the universal be regarded as 'अभाव अवृत्त', it can be a real object in the Nyāya school, as abhava is...
regarded to be a real category.

However, the conception of Nyaya Nyaya
Nyaya
Nyaya
view.

However, the conception of Nyaya Nyaya-
yikas in case of this two fold pratyaksha, differs
from that of the Baudhās. According to Nyaya-
Nyayaikas, the knowledge of an object, consists
of two parts - Viśeṣya and the Viśeṣeṣana. " तर्क " is the Viśeṣya, while " दर्शन " that qualifies
the " तर्क " is a " ध्येयक " . In nirvikalpa
pratyaksha though both Viśeṣya and Viśeṣeṣana are
perceived, their mutual relation, i.e., " विशेषय
विशेषात् तर्क " is not apprehended, and so the
knowledge is of the form of " तर्क विशेषात् " and
thus indeterminate. It will be seen that nirvikalpa
of Baudhās is not the absence of apprehending such
relation, but is the apprehension of the pure
individuality bereft of any universal. In the same
way the savikalpa of the Nyayaikas is not the
superimposition of name etc., but the apprehension
of all the characteristics connected with viśeṣya.
Thus, the controversy between them loses its force.

110. ...
The six fold context.

Though GV. does not touch the six fold sense object contact (जोडता अवस्था), Gns. 111 explores its significance.

While explaining "जोडता अवस्था" Gns. refutes the acceptance of the first two contexts, viz., "अर्हनाम" and "वर्दुष्कान्तरित". His arguments, however, are not convincing. Because "अर्हनाम" are not separately seen from the "अर्हणाम". In fact, his arguments will lead to non-perception of so many other things like "वर्दुष्कान्तरित" and soon. However, here he has not considered the full account of the problem.

110 (conti.) - it is not to be comprehended as the स्मृतुता कर्मणि, but it is शृङ्खला a तत्त्वज्ञातां born out of विज्ञानमि. On his explanation of विज्ञानमि and स्मृतुता, vide जीतकलिकाति's commentary - यदृशात अवस्था अवस्था वल्लभाये गृहम विज्ञानमिकर्तमिति गृहमिर्द्धिनेवै गृहमिर्द्धिनेवै गृहमिर्द्धिनेवै गृहमिर्द्धिनेवै गृहमिर्द्धिनेवै गृहमिर्द्धिनेवै. But this is a misunderstanding. GV. does not reject अवस्था. He simply says that it is not comprehended in विज्ञानमि.

111. TT.PP. 167-117. 112. Of NS. 2-2- 30 च 34.
In the discussion of "उपादिक्षणस्त" Gn. adds one more adjective of "प्रौद्योगिकस्तः". In fact in day to day experience the "सति" is not necessary for all individuals at all times, e.g. men residing in the forest are accustomed to see many things in darkness also. Similarly, men accustomed with powerful light require more light in day time also. So this is not an essential adjective.

Though Gn. considers the case of creatures capable of perceiving at night, it can be applicable to human beings also in certain cases as shown above. Hence, no generalization should be made.

113. TT. PP. 173-176.