CHAPTER VIII.

(16) Atomism - Paramāṇuvāda.

Creation and Dissolution.

The four substances earth, water, fire and air are both eternal and non-eternal. The compounds, which are products, are non-eternal, while the component particles that are not produced are eternal. And these particles are atoms. Their combinations are responsible for creation of this gross world, and their separation is responsible for its dissolution ( "अस्तु " ). This theory of production and destruction, through atoms is called the Atomic theory. It is generally supposed to be the contribution of the Vaises'ekas. It is adopted by the Nyāyāyikas without much hesitation. Ke. relates it in brief. He simply follows Gautama and other Nyāyāyikas in this respect. Gautama regards atoms as partless, indivisible, minutest parts of composite substances, which are not ultimately divisible into non-entities or void.

Atoms.

"The atoms are naturally passive, and their movement is due to external impact. During the dissolution of the world ( अस्तु ) the

245. NSB. on 4-2-16.
atoms subsist without producing any effects. They then remain isolated and motionless. According to Vais'asika, the movement of the ultimate atoms arise from a peculiar Dharma (धर्मं विशेषतः).
Pras'astapada, says, "Actions which are found in appearing in the rudimentary elements (स्वविशेषतः), and for which, we cannot find any cause either by sense-perception or by inference, and which are not found to be useful or harmful to us, must be regarded as produced by these unseen agencies -

Creation.

Thus, by the Divine will a motion is produced in atoms. Two of them combine to form - a Dyad (धार्म विशेषतः), three Dyads combine to produce a triad (धार्म विशेषतः). Four "धार्म विशेषतः" uniting together produce a "धार्म विशेषतः". These "धार्म विशेषतः", in their turn, lead to a creation of gross objects. "इद्धिया" the "धार्म विशेषतःकम्यत्वम्" and "अस्तित्वरूपः" the "धार्म विशेषतःकम्यत्वम्" are common to all these creations; Only the "स्वविशेषतःकम्यत्वम्" varies in each case; the two atoms are thus the "स्वविशेषतःकम्यत्वम्" of a "धार्म विशेषतः", the two "धार्म विशेषतः" are the "स्वविशेषतःकम्यत्वम्" of a "धार्म विशेषतः", the four "धार्म विशेषतः" are the

246. Dr. Radhakrishnan. Iphil. VII. II. P. 147.
" ṛṣekṛṣhunāḥ " of a " ṛṣeṣuḥ " and so on. Similarly, the qualities of all products are due to the atoms of which they are composed.

Dissolution.

Gn., following Ke. and GV., explains this process in brief. But while coming to the process of the dissolution, he enters into a detailed discussion, as Gn. seems to be quite familiar with the controversy between the ancient and modern Nāyāyikas on this point.

Difference between old and modern Nāyāyikas.

The ancient Nāyāyikas hold that, with one exception the destruction of effects is immediately brought about by the destruction of their causes ( i.e. " ṛṣeṣuḥvājakṛṣhunāḥ " ), the exception being " ṛṣeṣuḥ "s, which are destroyed not by the destruction of their causes, i.e., monads, which are indestructive, but by the destruction of the union of the " ṛṣeṣuḥ "s. In other words, the " ṛṣeṣuḥ "s are destroyed by the dissolution, and the subsequent products by the destruction. The

246-A: Thk. PP. 71-72 n.P. 52. TT. PP. 455-456
moderns object to this multiplicity of causes on the ground that, it is simpler (सन्नयता...) to assume only one uniform cause in all cases, viz., the dissolution of the union binding the parts than to suppose on cause for the "धारणशाश्वसन" and another for other effects. In their opinion, therefore, there is only one cause for the destruction of all effects, viz., the dissolution of the union, which is the "दृढ़संरक्षणापरापर" of the product.

Gn.'s favour to accept the old theory of "...सूक्ष्ममित्यादि..."

Ks. is satisfied with only presenting both of the above views without showing his preference to any one of them. Gn. is silent on this point. Gh. though generally an advocate of the moderns in many a point here does not agree with the modern view. At the time of "स्वरुप..." the destruction of "धारणशाश्वसन..." takes place by the destruction of their "लस्वायुक्तस्वरुप..." and so the "लस्वायुक्तस्वरुप..." also should be accepted for the destruction of an effect.

248. Gf. "...सूक्ष्ममित्यादि..."
Moreover, if the "अस्पदीयांकितम् वर्त्तमाने" only is to be accepted for a "कुरुच्छिद्वियांंकितम्" a peculiar state will take place. To be explicit - the destruction of "ऋणांक्षे" will take in the first moment, the destruction of the "कुरुच्छिद्वियांंकितम्"-"रस्वयंयोग" will be in the second moment, and in the third moment, the destruction of a "धर" will take place. The result of this process will lead one into the absurdity of accepting the existence of the "धर" at least for two moments even when the "कर्मवाचलय कारणम्" (i.e. "ऋणांक्षे" ) is not existent. It will be better, therefore, to accept the immediate destruction of a "ऋणांक्षे" by the dissolution of its "रस्वयंयोगः".

Again, the moderns cannot explain satisfactorily the destruction of "ऋणांक्षे" that are related to "ऋणांक्षे" by "स्वयंयोगः". "ऋणांक्षे" can be destroyed only by the destruction of the "ऋणांक्षे" and "ऋणांक्षे" being a "ऋणांक्षे" is necessarily a "ऋणांक्षे". If the moderns avoid this difficulty by adding a "ऋणांक्षे-कारणम्", there will be "ऋणांक्षे" and not "ऋणांक्षे".


249. TLP. 458-464.
If it is argued that the theory of "असत्यमेव्याज्ञातम कार्यमृत्तकः" cannot be applied at least in one place, i.e. in case of the "दुर्दशः सत्त्वः", whose "अनुभवतः" - i.e., atoms being eternal cannot be destroyed and thus, there will be a "चेतात्मा". The answer is - nobody has said that only "अनन्तां तत्त्वात्" is responsible for "अग्निदृश्यताः". It can be due to "सुविद्वाया कार्यमृत्तकः". What is to be emphasised here, is the fact that the "कार्योद्धरं सहनः" is not categorically dependent on the "कार्यविद्येयकार्यम् आहारः".

On agreeing with CV, states that it will be reasonable to say that the "अनन्तां तत्त्वात्" can take place by a "रिविविषेकल्मकुसबः".
"तदात्मा".

On, incidentally here proves the possibility of "तदात्मा". Generally, the doctrine of "तदात्मा" is accepted by all Hindu schools, excepting the निर्माणेन. The atoms of the four "तत्त्वाः" viz., earth, water, light and air are eternal, but their products are ever changing. The individual atoms combine with others and continue in the co-operative existence for some time and again disintegrate into their original 249-A solitary being to form a new combinations."
Beside the every day production and destruction of the material products of the universe, there are the universal creation and the Universal dissolution also. In other words, there comes a time, when every product is destroyed and reduced back to its ultimate cause, the "अर्थावलि". This period of time is known as the period of cosmic Rest (अर्थावलि).

Gur. says that the existence of a "अर्थावलि" can be proved by inference. The "अर्थावलि" of a product resides either in the product itself or in the Time (अर्थावलि) In the absence of the product, it has the Time only as its substratum. Thus, in the Time the "अर्थावलि" always exists. In the same way, the "अर्थावलि" of all possible products can be ascribed to the Time, i.e. there might be a Time when all the material products exist in the form of their "अर्थावलि", and this state is nothing but what is called a "अर्थावलि".

250. Dr. Umesh Nis'ra. The concept of matter P. 259. Pl. see also for the arguments of Mimamsakas against the doctrine of "सत्त्व" and then refutation of it by Brahmaikas- Ibid. PP. 259-263. Cf. also- it is not an act of cruelty on the part of इवरा that he brings about dissolution, for he does it to give some rest to the sufferings of the living beings - Desagupta. Ht. Phil. Vol. I. P. 324.
108.

Gn. takes note of the Naiyāyikas's view that Veda exists at the time of "तवाण्या कत्वत् " , but even Veda does not exist at the time of a 252 "सत्वाण्या कत्वत् " . However, if one sticks to the theory of the Karma and its result," of the line of argument of Gn. may not be found logical.

The existence of Pramāṇus.

In proving the existence of Pramāṇus and in explaining the process by which the gross products are formed, Gn. follows Ke. without adding anything new.

"The first compound consists of two atoms, for one does not enter into composition, and there is no argument to prove that more than two must for inchoation, be united. The next consists of three double atoms (ताद्युक्तह स ), for, if only two were conjined, magnitude would hardly ensue, since it must be produced either by size, or number of particles (or loose combination - 'तत्राय ' ), it cannot be their size, and, therefore, it must be their number.

251. TT. PP. 464-466.

252. Ibid. P. 467. During "तत्राण तथा " , all tangible products only are destroyed and during the "तत्राणात " , all things material or immaterial are merged in the final cause, i.e. "Pramāṇus".
Nor is there any reason for assuming the union of four double atoms, since three suffice to - 253 originate magnitude".