CHAPTER VI.

The controversy about Pramāṇya Vāda.

Gn., now proceeds to discuss the problem of the validity of truth reached by the Pramanas - discussed above. Pramāṇya-vāda is one of the most important topics discussed by the different schools of philosophy. The Śaṅkhyas hold that both truth and error are intrinsic, the Nyāyaśāstra hold that both these are extrinsic, the Baudhāyas think that the later is intrinsic while the former is extrinsic, and the Mīmāṃsakas believe that truth ( सत्य ) is intrinsic and error ( असत्य ) is extrinsic.

The controversy about the validity of truth, however, is seen more pertinently between the Nyāyaśāstra and Mīmāṃsakas. Mīmāṃsakas advocate " ज्ञात्यं निदर्शय " of cognition, while the Nyāyaśāstra favour " ज्ञातं ज्ञातवर्ज ".

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SDS. Cal. P. 131
The Mīmāṃsakas assert that all knowledge excepting memory is valid in itself, for it itself certifies the truth, but, if it is not a valid cognition, it may be found out later only by experience, and thus the "प्रामाण" is "स्रोत: " though the "उपसंस्कार" is "सलिल: ".

Three schools of Mīmāṃsakas.

-The Mīmāṃsakas, however, are not uniform in their arguments to prove the "प्रामाण: प्रामाण्य: " Each of the three schools of Mīmāṃsakas, (viz., those of Kumārila, Prabhakara and Murāri) has to offer its own theory. Thus, Prabhakara has the theory of "प्रकाशकार: " Kumārila comes with the theory of "शारणरा: " while Murāri Mis'ra presents the "उन्नतत्ववृत्ति: " theory.

Ke. presents only the theory of Bhatta School (i.e. of Kumārila), and refutes it. GV. though follows Ke., makes a reference to all the three schools at the end. But Gn. presents --

205. Cf. "प्रामाण्यसंस्कारं प्रयत्नं स्वतं अवलोकितं अवलोकितं। अतः सुधारं सत्य: मात्रेऽपि अप्रकाशाभिस्वतं तदार्थं तदवैकperation

different views of all the three schools clearly from the beginning.

Knowledge and
the Validity.

After stating the views of Mimamsakas and Naiyayikas in general, G needy explores the meaning of "सत्याभिव्ययम् " It means "सत्याभिव्ययम् ". "सत्याभिव्ययम् " should always be understood with reference to cognition (सत्य) here. It must not be understood in a general way. The perceivable objects and perceived by senses (चिन्तन). But the cognition of this perception does not belong to the senses. It belongs to the soul, as knowledge is the special quality of the soul and not of the senses. So, the word "सत्यम् " is inevitable with "अत्यन्तम् ". G needy quotes the view of Dakshahara - Mis're by "महीनहस्तः खण्डः लक्षितः लक्षणमादिः..." . In short, by "अत्यन्तम् " the absence of the "सत्यम् " necessary for the cognition and absence of the "अत्यन्तम् " meant for "अत्यन्त " should be understood. In this context the definition of "अत्यन्तम् " as "सत्यम् लक्षणमादिः " should be well understood. Thus, a valid knowledge is the apprehension of what exists in its object and invalid knowledge as the apprehension of what does
not exist in it. To understand the meaning of "असमाप्ति" in the light of this definition, of "समस्या", the term "समस्या" should be kept in mind.

The views of Gāruḍa (Prabhākara) and Nārāyaṇa.

Gāruḍa first explains at length the theories of Prabhākara and Nārāyaṇa. The Prabhākaras or the followers of Gaurumāta believe that knowledge is self-effulgent. The "असमाप्ति" that gives rise to the knowledge, establishes the validity of that knowledge too. No separate means is required for it.

In the view of Nārāyaṇa, the knowledge that rises first in the form of a "समाप्ति", is transformed itself in the "यातनासंवैधशास्त्र " - (apperception). Naiyāyikas argue here that the process by which "असमाप्ति" is accepted as being "समाप्ति" can also be applicable in the acceptance of "असमाप्ति", i.e., "असमाप्ति" also will be "समाप्ति". But Naiyāyikas reply - that any type of "असमाप्ति" is not to be accepted at random in such a process. Only that "असमाप्ति" is not to be accepted at random in such a process.

207-A. "असमाप्ति, असमाप्तिः प्रथा असमाप्तिः प्रथा असमाप्ति:।
असमाप्ति प्रथा: || समाप्ति समाप्तिः समाप्तिः समाप्तिः।
|| "TT.P.361.

208. Ibid. P. 367.
(याज्ञवल्क्य), which does not prove the falsity of the knowledge is implied here. On. explains the utility of the word "द्वािक" in favour of the Mimāmsākās. The "द्वािक" is nothing but the contact of mind with the soul. This contact gives rise to "ध्यान" and also at the same time, ascertains its "सत्यार्थ".

Followers of Murari state that when the "ध्यान" takes place, it is also perceived to be valid by the "द्वािक: सत्यार्थ" and that is "अनुििकत्वार्थ". But the Naiyāyikas hold that this "सत्यार्थ" is reached at by "अनुििकत्वार्थ" and not by "आलयर्थ अर्थेऽर्थ". To this, the Mimāmsākās reply that even in Nyāya school, there is a scope for "उन्नतिििकत्वार्थ". By this "अनुििकत्वार्थ" The Naiyāyikas themselves accept intrinsically the "द्वािक", "धर्मर्थ" and their "विद्यालय". We - the Mimāmsākās go only one step further. On. explains here that "सत्यार्थ" is a "चःि " and "अनुििकत्वार्थ" a "दिखायित". Thus, the "दर्शन" of the "उन्नतिििकत्वार्थ" is the "सत्यार्थ" in the form of "उन्नतिििकत्वार्थ", and this "सत्यार्थ" is "धर्मर्थ: विद्यालय". "उन्नतिििकत्वार्थ" has the object, its characteristics and other...

209. Ibid. P. 316. Cf. also "शास्त्रप्रमाणयां तद्भावारपि गृहसूचिकवाच्यं के मांकीहूँम इत्यादिन" "TD. P. 55.

210. TT.P. 368.
qualities and their relation with the objects as its " निवचयः "; and so just as in " अनु साराजः ", there is the relation between the object and its characteristics, in the same way characteristics are also realized in the object. And this is nothing but " निर्माणः ". But Naiyāyikas do not agree to this. They say that the " आसाधः " comes after the " अनुसाराजः ", and thus " अनुसाराजः " does not take the place of the " आसाधः ".

Mīmāṃsākās give here threefold interpretation of the term " निवचयः " which only means to ascertain the existence of the difference in an object of knowledge. In " चिन्तनः समाप्तिः ", the " रचयितः " of the " कथा " is comprehended, and " आसाधः " is nothing but the certitude of the " गरुद्धः " in the " शब्दः ". The Naiyāyikas accept the comprehension of " शब्दः " by " अनुसाराजः ", then how can they refuse to accept the " निवचयः " of the " कथा " that is inherent in the former ?. Thus, therefore, the " निवचयः " of " आसाधः " is to be accepted.

Mīmāṃsākās also reject Naiyāyika's view of accepting " निवचयः " to comprehend " शब्दः ". They accept " शब्दः " to

211. Ibid. PP 369-370.
212. Ibid. PP. 371-375.
be useful sometimes, but not in the case of "अनुज्ञय". It is to be applied to comprehend the "उत्तरायण", only.

Naïsâyikas, however, dis-agree with the above stand of the Mîmâṃsâkâs. According to them "अनुज्ञय" is inevitable in a "अनुज्ञयवाद". "Validity always refers to objective realization - of our desires and attempts proceeding in accordance with our knowledge - its attainment by practical experience of the object and the fulfillment of all our purposes from it! This "अनुज्ञय" is a "दृष्टि" in establishing the "प्रावद्य", i.e. "अनुप्रदय". The "अनुज्ञय" can be shown in the examples, like,

"ईदुः परिवर्त्तने प्रभाति
सत्यं प्राप्तं तत्त्वं वाचि।
पूर्वपरिवर्त्तिते कपल द्वारं।"

If after "प्रार्थित", one gets water, it is "अनुप्रदय", and if by chance one finds no water, but a mirage, it is "अनुप्रदय". Hence both the validity and invalidity are comprehended by "अनुज्ञय".

The Mîmâṃsâkâs disapprove the "राजर्षियकान्ति
अनित्यम्" of the "आयनं" at all. On the contrary, they are inclined to believe "सत्यतिः" to be "आयनेनुक्तिः". First, there is the knowledge

213. Ibid. P. 376.
of an object, in the second moment, there is "एकादशमायम्" together with the "आकारण" and only then follows the activity.

The above explanation of "एकादशमायम्" was based on the view of Prabhâkara and Mûrâli. The whole of this discussion is borrowed from Ç'ìntâmani.

**Bhêtta-view.**

Gn. now proceeds to explain the Bhêtta view of "एकादशमायम्". As this view is presented by Ke., he has only a few things to add. According to Kumârila, "आकारण" is "उपस्वरूप"; hence it cannot be perceived directly. But its existence can be presumed to explain "आकारण" (cognisancedness). When one says, "आकारणं घटतं", the quality of "आकारण" is produced. This "आकारण" is nothing but the "आकारण" itself, since the former is related with the later by "अनुवर्तयः उपस्वरूपः". And as this "आकारण" is not possible otherwise, it leads to one, suppose by "प्रवृत्तिः" that the cause of "आकारण", i.e., "आकारण" is approached simultaneously with its "प्राचेयः".

Gn., following Ke. and GV. explains in brief the Naiyâyikas' view that the conception of "आकारण" is unwarranted by any proof.
"सतितति" is nothing but "सतितति". If the Mīmāṃsakas argue that "सतितति" is different from "सतितति" in as much as the latter is the substratum of the former, it is not correct. Gn. quotes Ganges'a, who says, "(द्विपक्ष) राजस्विन्दु". 219

Gn. further meets with the other arguments of Bhattas and concludes that if "सतितति" is to be accepted in the case of "प्रासादि", it should also be accepted in case of "हिंदू", as the reason is equally applicable to it. If it is not accepted in the case of "उपप्रासादि", it cannot be applicable in the case of "सतितति" also.

Naiyāyikas do not share with Kumārila the theory of "उत्तरसतितति" of "राजा" and hence no need of "सतितति" is felt by them. Knowledge is apprehended by mental perception - "[नारासुपुरुषो]" and its "शासनम्" by inference.

Gn. then explains how an "उत्तरसतितति" can take place on the first occasion ("उत्तरासुपुरुषो") and how on subsequent occasions ("उत्तरासुपुरुषो") even an "उत्तरसतितति" also can be possible. He summarizes the "उत्तरसतितति", theory of the three schools of Mīmāṃsakas as Gn. 221

218. "सतितति". ज्ञानमानसम्पादयामिव विद्वानसिद्धामिव तद्विपक्षः प्रतिवादिः।
219. Ibid. P. 389.
220. Ibid. P. 396.
221. Ibid. P. 404-405
has GV, has referred to them in the end. He concludes the chapter, by stating that if "स्मार्तः
मधुरी द्वितीय तत्त" may be accepted, there would be no possibility of a doubt. The absence of the doubt will not give rise to activity, and hence the validity will not be ascertained. Even in the case of "मधुरी द्वितीय तत्त", though there is no doubt, there may be some absence of certainty. In case of the "मधुरी द्वितीय तत्त" theory, though there is no scope for doubt, there also a separate means other than "स्मार्तः" is applied in comprehending the relation between "स्मार्तः" and "मधुरी द्वितीय तत्त".

In fact, the "स्मार्तः" or "मधुरी द्वितीय तत्त" of an individual takes place until there is no doubt, whether it is "अवस्थःशास्त्र" or "अवस्थःशास्त्र-द्वितीय". When the doubt arises the help of another means is necessary. It does not mean that because the "स्मार्तः" was "मधुरी द्वितीय तत्त" was also comprehended. It is comprehended after - "स्मार्तःशास्त्र "

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222  Tpl. P. 61, TTP. 409.
223  Ibid. P. 412.