Some other philosophers are of the view that the production of things must be without nimitta (efficient cause), because we see that things like the sharpness of the thorn etc. do not have any nimitta. Yet they do have a constituent cause. The production of body etc. also must have taken place in the same way.

As Uddyotakara explains, this sutra is an illustrative one. The proper reasoning is: Body, etc. having a particular arrangement, are without a nimitta, because they are endowed with a particular configuration (Samsthāna) like the thorn, etc.

Uddyotakara thinks it fit to refute this position. He argues that when an efficient cause is not perceived, it should be established by inference because of similarity to other things which have an efficient cause.
All the entities, which are endowed with a particular figure, have an efficient cause, for example, jar etc. Body, thorns etc. also are endowed with a particular figure, hence they must have an efficient cause. That particular figure is the result of the fruits of the acts done before, i.e. in previous births. And hence, the particular figure, which is accepted by both the parties, is not without an efficient cause.

Vācaspati explaining this, comments: "Body, thorn, etc. whose efficient causes are not seen, are included in pakṣa (Subject of the Syllogism), since they are not regarded as different from things which are included in the pakṣa; otherwise no inference could be possible, because, it would be always easy to exclude anything from the pakṣa. To take an example, cloth, which is accepted by both the parties as an example, has an efficient cause; since it is endowed with a particular figure. And because thorn, body etc; are of the same kind, they also have an efficient cause. Vācaspati specifically says that this is the Siddhānta.

According to the Vṛtti, the prāvāduka here holds that entities do not have a cause. To prove this, the following inference can be put forth: (1) The production of jar etc. is not from an efficient cause, since it is a production, just like the production of the sharpness of the thorn, etc.
Jar etc. do not have a cause, because they are entities (bhāvatvāt) just like the sharpness of the thorn etc. Now some Ekadēsin refutes the Prāvāduka's intention thus: "Animitta (ne-nimittā) itself would be the cause - 'nimitta' - hence the said production of entities is not without a cause (animitta)"

It is alleged that the production of entities is from 'animitta' (animittatabh); and that from which a thing proceeds, is its cause.

Therefore, since animitta is the cause of the production of entities, what is said above that the production is without a nimitta, is not correct as the production is from 'animitta' and not altogether without a cause.

The opponent answers the above objection of the Ekadēsin:

'Nimitta' and 'Animitta' are two different things. Hence the answer offered (in sutra 23) is no answer at all.

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1. "The affix of a term, when it has a sense of Ablative, can only signify that the thing denoted by that term is a nimitta; 'animitta' here is such a cause".

- Says Viśvanātha in his Vṛtti on NS. 4.1.23.

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' Nimitta' is one thing and its negation 'animitta' is another. The denial itself cannot be the thing denied. When we say, "anudaka Kamandalu", (the gourd is without water; the negation of water cannot signify water. The Vārtika also explains thus: 'Nimitta' (being a positive term) affirms the existence of the thing, while 'Animitta' is its negation and certainly, it is not proper to identify 'affirmation' with 'negation'!

Vātsyāyana is of the view that the view propounded in Sūtra 22, in no way differs from the view that 'the origination of the body etc. is not due to the actions of beings and hence being identical with that view, it must be taken as refuted by the refutation of that view. (See NS III. 2. 66 ff).

Uddyotakara himself puts forth a dialectical refutation of the view that thorns, etc. have no nimitta. "He who holds that the thorn etc. are produced without an efficient cause, is to be asked if only thorns are produced without an efficient cause or everything is thus produced. If only thorns are produced without an efficient cause they can be proved to have an efficient cause by giving the example of things other than

\[1. \text{ न व प्रत्यास्यानेव प्रत्यावेयम् }\]

\[\text{वधा नुस्ल: कमण्डलुरिति नात्यक्रितेश्च, उदकम् भवतीति }\]

- Bhāṣya on N. S. 4. 1. 24.

\[2. \text{ निमित्तभियोगस्युत्त्वम्, अनिमित्तभियोगस्य तस्य प्रलिपिः,} \]

- NV, 4. 1. 24.
thorns which do have an operative cause. If everything is regarded as having no efficient cause then there is contradiction, because the opponent also accepts the relation of the 'signified' (pratipādyā) and 'Signifier-' (pratipādaka). Once you say that everything is produced without an efficient cause and then you expound a certain doctrine - obviously there is contradiction in this.

How there is contradiction is thus explained in the Tātparyatīka: The person to whom something is explained is the karma (object); and the person who expounds is the kartr (agent); kātā and karmā are kārakas (factors that help the performance of action), and kāraka is a nimitta of action. Thus even while expounding the doctrine that the origination of body, etc. is without a nimitta, the opponent admits the reality of nimitta.

Moreover, he, who tries to prove his view that things have no nimitta, cannot avoid the said contradiction, because he himself accepts the reality of 'nimitta' when he uses an expression to convey what he wants to say.

Further, "the production of entities is without cause," and "the production of entities is due to a cause" - both these are sentences, now if you do perceive the difference between the meaning of these two expressions - then this very
fact sets aside the contention that "the production of entities is without a cause." Since the perception of the difference in the meaning arises from (and has for its cause) the difference in the two expressions.

If you accept that different sentences denote different meanings, then the view that "things are produced without a nimitta" is contradicted; (because the difference in the sentences is the 'nimitta' of the difference in the meanings).

To avoid this situation, if it is held that the difference in the meaning is not due to the difference of the sentences—then he who holds this should not use a particular sentence to convey a particular meaning because any sentence could do so. The relationship with the whole world would be cut off, and no dealing would be possible for him who holds the view mentioned above.

Moreover, when he says that "things are produced without a 'nimitta'" all the entities are included in the subject.

1. अनिमित्तवृत्तं भावोत्पत्तिरितिः कर्मकर्मस्य सत्यसत्यं विद्यते व्याख्यातीति। ज्ञातं भवति अनिमित्तलो भावोत्पत्तिः रिति।

- NV. 4. 1. 24.
of the inference (pakṣa) and hence, no example could be given. If only the body etc. be included in the Subject, even then the thorn etc. should not be a proper example; because eventhough, they have a particular figure, they are not yet proved to be those produced without a nimitta and hence the example given is devoid of the one characteristic viz. being produced without a nimitta. On the other hand, that the thorns etc. do have a nimitta can be proved by the example of the cloth etc. and so the example given by the opponent could only prove that things have a nimitta.

Visvanātha in the Vṛtti, after explaining the Sūtra as above only, remarks at the end; The Nyāya Naiyāyikas regard Sūtra 23 as the answer of the Siddhāntin to the reasoning given in Sūtra 22 by the opponent. They construe the Sūtra thus: "Animittasya" animittatvasādhasa "nimitta" animittatvā nimitijanakatvād, "animittataḥ" iti vyāhatam.

The reasoning which proves the animittatva of things itself is the nimitta of bringing about the knowledge that these things do not have a nimitta and hence there is contradiction. On the other hand, if the opponent does not accept a nimitta to prove animittatva, then "animittatva could not be proved. And the sharpness of the thorn and the like do have a nimitta, because they are produced by the atoms helped by "Adṛṣṭavīṣeṣa", the respective adṛṣṭa (unseen potency of action).
Sūtra 24, according to these Navya Nyāyāyikas, points out another drawback in the prima-facie view. There is a difference no doubt, in nimitta and animitta, even because we know them distinctly; "this one is a nimitta and this one a animitta". Thus a nimitta must be there. Otherwise, the belief prevailing throughout the whole world would not be justified.

The explanation of the above sūtras (N.S. 4.1. 22-24) as given by Vātsyāyana leaves us wondering why the author of the Nyāya Sūtra did not refute this Prāvāduka-drṣṭi. This must have struck Vātsyāyana also, because he tries to explain that the author did not refute it, as it stands refuted by the refutation of the view that the production of the body, etc. is not due to karma (3.2.56 ff). Uddyotakara, as we have seen refutes the prāvāduka-drṣṭi even while commenting on Sū. 22. Sūl 23 is then introduced as giving the view of others (- the Siddhāntyekadesin); and this is refuted in Sū.24. But none of these could be said to state the Siddhāntin's view. Uddyotakara himself gives a dialectical refutation of the view that them, etc. have no nimitta. It is this difficulty that prompted the Navya Nyāyāyikas to explain sūtras 4.1. 22, 24. in their own way. They explain these sūtras as refuting the position propounded in Sūtra 22, and Viśvanātha was careful enough to refer to this interpretation.