CHAPTER - III

Prāvādaka- drṣṭiṣeṣa-

- Isvaropādānatāprakaraṇam.

Others say:

God is the cause (or the origin of things), since we do find the actions of men, turning out to be fruitless.

A man who wishes and strives for a thing, does not always get the thing desired. Therefore it is inferred that the obtaining of the fruit on the part of man is dependent (on someone) and that upon whom it is dependent is God. God is therefore the cause.

The Vārtikakāra adds:

"If man were independent of such a cause as God, and were able to enjoy the fruits of his own acts, the acts of none would have turned out to be futile; none would have created misery for himself. But both these things, (i.e. the fruitlessness of the action and creation of misery) are seen hence, God is the cause."
Visvanātha explains that since the fruitlessness of the deeds of man is seen, there must be some other auxiliary factor. So you must believe that God himself changes the things of the world according to his own wishes. Of what avail is then man's actions?

Before we go ahead it would be proper to consider the relevance of this discussion in the context of the Nyāya darsana.

According to Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Visvanātha, the problem here taken up for discussion is:

"What is the cause of the world? Sūtra 19 gives answer and states the Nyāya siddhānta. An objection is raised in Sūtra 20, and it is answered in Sūtra 21.

---

1. पुरुषकारणो ई द्विविद्यमणि दस्यते, सहसन्तरकारणयुग्म वाच्यम्।
   तथा चतुर्वृत्त एव यथा यथेव तथा ज्ञातिपरिच्छेदः यथेवास्तु किं च
   पुरुषकारणीयो गैव:।
   —वृत्ति. 4. 1. 19.

2. If the Sūtra ईश्वर: कारणव पुरुषकारणक्यदशताद।
   the siddhānta, established by the Naiyāyika himself, the introductory sentence of the Bhaṣya, ऐपार आह on Sūtra 19, would be contradicted so Gangānātha Jhā suggests that here ई should be explained as "न पर: कपर: स्वाध्ययो नेयाचिकः हैति याहुः। That is, "here the word, "Apara", is to be construed as "A-para", one who is" not para", i. e. not alien, not another, but of one's own party.
The Tātparyatīka takes this position as the rejection of the Vedānta view, that God is the constituent cause, (Upādāna Kāraṇa) (of the world) and the establishment of the Nyāya view that God is the creator, the operative cause and not the constituent cause of the world.

According to the Tātparyatīka, sūtra 19 puts forward the pūrvapakṣa, the view of Vedānta; sūtra 20 shows its untenability and sūtra 21 propounds the Nyāya siddhānta.

The pūrvapakṣa in summarised by Vācaspati as under:

"The phenomenal world may not have emanated from the Void, but it can be said to have emanated from Brahman. Brahman is modified as the phenomenal world, as earth is transformed into pot, etc. Or Brahman appears (Vivartate) as the phenomenal world of name and form due to the adjunct viz. the indefinable beginningless Avidyā as one face appears different according as it is reflected in a jewel, sword etc; due to the difference of adjuncts.

And even if the modifications of Brahman take place, even if Brahman be regarded as being transformed or modified in the form of the world; its identity will not be sublated since

1. वेदांतविनियोगानाविदितस्वतांभक्षयनां द्वितीयविभेदेन भवति
   मुक्तिविनियोगसङ्गीतापापाधिपति नैकविविधविभेदेन श्वति
   - NVT, 4. 1. 19.
the basic substance does not perish, but it retains its characteristics. It is said that also is eternal in which the basic substance does not perish. That is to say, not only a "Kūṭastha" (absolutely unchanging) thing; but also a "Pariṇāmin" (undergoing modification) thing. - is eternal. There is Kūṭastha Nityatā as also Pariṇāmi - Nityatā. Both these views are meant here.

He further explains: Brahman signifies Iśvāra because it has Iśana. Iśana signifies the potency of Sentience (Cetanā) and action (Kriyā). Both of these are there in Brahman. So Brahman is Iśvāra, the cause of the world. There is a Vedic expression: "Brahman thought - may I become many; may I be produced as many!"

This Vedic expression shows that the cause of the world is sentient, (one that cognises); and Negation, Prakṛti or atoms cannot cognise.

1. परिणामेष्ठि कत्वाविभाजणेष्ठि तत्त्वाविभाजणेष्ठि नित्यताय:।
   यद्याह यस्मिन्न तत्त्वः न बहन्ते वैधिः नित्यप्रियेक दशीणः।
   — NYTT, 4. 1. 19.

2. चेतनाशक्ति: क्षिप्राशक्तिः केदारः।
   — NYTT, 4. 1. 19.

3. The Pariśuddhi of Udāyanācārya remarks here that the sūtra has used the general term 'cause' but it is clear from the context that the constituent cause is meant.

   - noted by Gangānātha Jhā on p. 421 (Foot note) of his English translation of the Nyāya Sūtra.
It might be urged that the individual souls themselves are conscious (intelligent) and the actions of the sentient souls could be the cause of the phenomenal world. Hence there is no need to hypostatise God. Answering such an objection, this sutra (4.1.19) says that if the souls, be intelligent; if they could discern; they would not perform fruitless, acts, if they perform such acts knowing them to be fruitless, it follows that they are not really intelligent (cetana). Hence, God is the (constituent) cause of the universe.

Viśvanātha remarks in this connection: "As a matter of fact the problem on hand is that God is the only cause of the world. We do not find any evidence to show that this portion establishes that God is the constituent cause of the world?"

And so, he explains this sutra on his own way, differing from the Tātparyatīkā and agreeing with Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara.

The argument in the next sutra is:

"This is not so, because no fruit appears in the absence of man's actions" (न, पुरुषकर्मानि फलनिष्ठेऽः: 11 (4.1.20)).

1. वस्तुतःस्य केलेवर्त्तताप्रक्रियताभ्यस्त तद्प्राप्तप्राप्तापेन न किमिधि मानमार्क्क्याम्।

- Vṛtti on 4.1.19.
If the appearance of the fruits (of actions on the part of man) were dependent on God, such fruit could emerge without the desire (and action of man but this is not what we see.

The Vārtikakara says, that if God be the cause, then even in the absence of good or bad deeds, man would have to enjoy happiness or misery. And so, there would arise two faults, viz. the loss of action and absence of emancipation (कृत्यामपि अनिमित्तः)

Because if man gets happiness or misery in the absence of any such good or bad deeds which only can get him such a result, it has to be believed that the deeds he has done before, vanish without giving their fruits: and the fruits he is getting now are of the deeds never done by him. In that case, man would lose faith in the efficacy of action and no one would perform any action. So also, there would not be the slightest possibility of emancipation, because he would go on getting fruits of deeds never done by him, and there would be no end to such a process.

Furthermore, God is uniform in nature (एकप्रक्रिया:) and being such, he could by himself give either happiness or misery and not both of them.
If one believes that God allots the fruits according to the deeds of men, it comes to this that he does not create the deeds (karman) as he stands in expectancy of karman while allotting the fruits. The potter makes a pot, but not the staff and wheel, the help of which he requires. So if God stands in expectancy of karman he may be the creator of the world, but 'Isvara' would be 'anisvara' (not-Isvara) in respect of karman.

Visvanatha explains: If Brahman alone (absolute Brahman) be the cause, then, no desire of his distinct from him, nor its object should be recognised as if another subject be recognised, there would be the contingency of duality. So, everything would always be there and there would be no variety in respect of effects. Thus it is necessary to regard the action of man also as auxiliary; but Brahman cannot possibly be the constituent cause, as no asamavayi cause is possible. That is to say, we too accept God as just the instrumental cause.

Vacaspati interprets the sutra a little differently, and says that here is an objection to the theory of the Vedantins who hold that the world is a modification (parinama) or an illusory appearance (vivarta) of Brahman, which is the constituent cause (upadana-karaṇa), Brahman is not modified as the phenomenal world of name and form like the clay.
Is the whole Brahman modified or a part of it? If the whole be modified then the basic substance would lose its identity and so would be eternal. And if a part of it be modified, then it would be a thing having parts and so not eternal.

It might be urged that it is a modification of what persists as such, and that is Brahman. But in that case it is not a modification of Brahman.

If the Vedantin accepts that the world is an illusionary appearance (Vivarta) of Brahman, that also is not proper, since Brahman is one, devoid of parts, and directly perceptible by self-apprehension and cannot possibly be an object of wrong knowledge.

In the case of the mother-of-pearl, the wrong knowledge (that it is silver) is produced because we first see the mother-of-pearl in general without noticing its particular

1. तत्र सत्त्वविद्या परिणामे तत्त्वाविद्यात्वत्वत्वत्व |
   सत्त्वविद्यात्वत्व तत्त्वाविद्यात्वत्व |
   - NTTT, 4. 1. 20.

2. क्य तत्त्वाविद्यात्वत्व | तत्त्व ब्रह्म न तत्त्व परिणाम |
   - NTTT, 4. 1. 20.

3. न च निनिभैर्यक्ष्य स्वस्वभैर्यक्ष्य विपरीतसङ्गोत्सवम |
   - NTTT, 4. 1. 20.
form (character) and consequently there is an illusion due to the superimposition of another form (i.e., character). But no one who knows the form of mother-pearl would mistake it for silver. Brahman, on the other hand, is a whole, devoid of parts and directly apprehensible by self-apprehension (Sva-samvedana-pratyakṣa), so there cannot be the knowledge of it in general (Sāmānyagraha) or non-apprehension of its nature (Svarūpagraha). Therefore it is not proper to say that Brahman appears (vivartate) as the world.

So God may be regarded as the efficient cause of the world. But if some one were to hold that God creates the world irrespective of everything, then this is not acceptable, for a fruit cannot be achieved without the action of man, or as Uddyotakara, puts it, if God be the cause, then there would be the experience of pleasure and pain even without action on the part of man.

The above argument can be answered thus:

Inasmuch as the efforts of man are influenced by God what has been urged (in the previous sutra) is not a valid reason (न पुनःकर्मे फलानिष्ठं कर्मः कथितं: । : 4.1.20.)
God helps the efforts of man. When a man tries to obtain a certain fruit, God accomplishes it for him. And when he does not accomplish it for him, the action of man turns out to be futile. The fruits of man's actions are thus brought about by God, hence the reasoning put forward that "no fruit appears in the absence of man's actions" is not sound.

In this regard, Uddayotakara agrees with Vātsyāyana, and adds that by using the expression 'Tatkāritatvād', the idea is accepted that God, is the efficient cause of the world, and an efficient cause helps the other causes, viz. the inherent cause, and the non-inherent cause, as the shuttle helps the threads and their conjunction.

After explaining this much, the Vārtikākāra discusses at great length what the constituent cause of the world could be if god be the efficient cause. Before summarizing it, we may note the explanation given by Vācaspati. He remarks: God is the efficient cause of the world, and atoms are the constituent cause. And in creating the world, God stands in expectancy of the actions of man, but even these actions have God as their efficient cause (nimitta).

1. पुराणकारसैवकिस्तुषुभुक्ति ।

NB. 4.1.20.
It is not right to say that god cannot be the efficient cause of the actions which he himself stands in expectancy of. God brings about the efforts of man, and god, with the help of these actions of men, that is to say, keeping them in view, is the
nimitta-kāraṇa, (efficient cause, that is to say, the creator) of the world. So the argument put forth in sū. 20 (that god
could not be the cause, as the fruit cannot be achieved without action on the part of man-) cannot refute this position.

Uddyotakara says: "it might be urged that only after the establishment of the existence of God, could we set aside all the other alleged causes (viz. Time, etc.) and prove that none but god is the efficient cause of the world. But his existence is not yet proved. Hence it cannot be said that god is the efficient cause of the world.

In answer to such an objection, Uddyotakara says that the objection, Uddyotakara says that the very argument that proves god's causality also proves his existence, because a cause must exist in order to act as a cause.

Uddyotakara then proceeds to give arguments to prove the efficient causality ofĪsvara.

The Pradhāna (of the Sāṃkhya), the atoms and karma act only after having been directed by an intelligent cause;
because they are insentient, just like the axe, etc.¹

As an axe, not being intelligent itself acts only after having been manipulated by an intelligent carpenter, so if the unconscious Pradhāna, Kārma and Atoms also act, they could act in the same manner, therefore they also are directed by an intelligent cause.

In this connection, Uddyotakara tries to refute the theory of the Sānkhyas. They hold that puruṣārtha¹ is the governing factor of Pradhāna. Pradhāna acts as directed by 'Puruṣārtha', the end of puruṣa, i.e. the fruit which the puruṣa could enjoy. This puruṣārtha is twofold, viz the apprehension of sound etc. and the apprehension of difference between puruṣa and the guṇas. Both these are achieved only with the help of the activity of Pradhāna, because, unless pradhāna operates, no puruṣārtha is possible, no end of puruṣa could be served.

1. प्रधानपरमाणुक्षेपणाः प्रायः प्रवृत्ते: बुद्धिमत्तारणाबिषिद्यति
   प्रवृत्ते, अवेतत्वेऽवास्यादिकृत ।
   - NV, 4. 1. 21.

2. यथा वास्यादि बुद्धिमत्ता तत्वाति अवेतत्वित्वे
   प्रवृत्ते तथा प्रधानपरमाणुक्षेपणं अवेतत्वानि प्रवृत्ते
   तस्मात् नियम पुरुषार्थाय बुद्धिमत्तारणाबिषिद्यति हि ।
   - NV, 4. 1. 21.

3. पुरुषार्थायेऽव चैति । शब्दां सूचितब्दिः गुणपुक्रं न्वातेर्दशं चैति ।
   - NV, 4. 1. 20.
This contention of the Sāmkhyas is not justified; because the puruṣārtha could not be there before Prakṛti starts functioning. As long as Pradhāna is not modified in the form of mahat, etc., so long there is neither the apprehension of sound, etc. nor the apprehension of the difference between puruṣa and the guṇas. So in the absence of cause, there could not be the activity of Pradhāna. And if there be puruṣārtha even before, then according to the Sāmkhyas, what is non-existent cannot come into existence, and what is existent cannot be destroyed. It being so......

It being so, puruṣārtha that is existent, causes Pradhāna to operate, and then it cannot be said that the activity of Pradhāna is for the sake of puruṣārtha. We know in the world that one does not attempt again to achieve what one already has. Thus we have the contingency of perpetual functioning because of the cause ( - puruṣārtha ) being present. Puruṣārtha, the cause of the functioning, being eternal, the activity should be there always.

1. प्राक्र प्रवृत्ते | कदनावात्। यावत् प्राधान्यमहदाति मार्गेन ।
परिणामप्राप्तात्वमेव गुणप्रमाणात्वमेव सुइव।

- NV, 4.1.20.
If it is held that even though Purusārtha is existent, it does not provoke pradhāna into activity, then it comes to this that purusārtha is not the cause. Since, that alone can be regarded as the cause on whose presence and absence there are the presence and absence respectively of the activity. It can be argued that there is some obstructive factor due to which Purusārtha, even though existent, does not cause pradhāna to function. But in that case is impossible to get rid of such an obstructive factor, since an existent thing never abandons its existence. This obstructive factor would be there always and no activity would even be possible. It means that there would be the contingency of the continuous absence of activity in respect of pradhāna.

The Sāmkhya theory describes prakṛti as the state of equilibrium of the three guṇas. viz, sattva, rajas and tamas. They hold that when some disturbance arises in this state of equilibrium, the action of prakṛti starts.

1. Vācaspati explains here: "When purusārtha wants to cause pradhāna to function for happiness, adharma is the obstructive factor, and when it wants to cause it to function for misery, dharma is the obstructive factor.

-Jātarparyatika on 4.1.20.
One may ask as to how this state of equilibrium is disturbed. If the Sāmkhya answers that there is no fixed rule regarding the relationship of principal and subordinate among the three Guṇas; and because of the absence of such a rule, there is the inequality in the Guṇas, which causes Prakṛti to act. Here also the Sāmkhya can be asked as to how things which are in equilibrium, or in the same proportion, become more or less instead of remaining equal, when there has been neither accumulation of a new entity (pūrvāpastaya) nor any existing (pūrṇavānam). Moreover, are the sound etc. which were not apprehended by the Puruṣa before, and are now apprehended with the help of Buddhi—such, in which some additional excellence is produced? Or are they the same and do not have such additional excellence?

If the Sāmkhya holds that the sound etc., that are apprehended have an additional excellence produced in them, this would be contradictory to his own view, as what is non-existent cannot come to exist. If it be held that the sound etc. that are apprehended have no additional excellence produced in them, even then the contradiction is not averted, viz, Puruṣārtha urges the activity of Prakṛti.

1. "If the things are perceived, it means that the 'Purpose of man', - in the shape of the perception of things- is accomplished without the appearance of any fresh peculiarities in the things, then for what would the activity of Primordial Matter be necessary? So that the two doctrines are not compatible."

- foot note p. 36, Nyāya-Vārtika's English Translation by Gangānātha Jhā.
The more we examine this Pradhānavāda, the more it seems to be opposed to the pramanās; that is to say, it is untenable.

The author of the Nyāya Vārtika then refutes the Paramāṇukāraṇavāda.

Some people hold that the atoms - which are governed by the karma of Puruṣa - are the cause of the world; this view can be refuted as under:

The atoms exert themselves into action according to this theory. But then, there should be perpetual action. To avert this situation, it might be held that the atoms that are active stand in expectancy of the time of fruition, (Kālaviveṣa). In this case, as atoms being insentient, stand in expectancy of an intelligent director (Adhīṣṭhātā), similarly, kāla also stands in expectancy of an intelligent director because it also insentient.

It may be urged, that milk, etc; even though insentient, are active in feeding the child, similarly, unconscious atoms also can act for the sake of man. But it is not proper; since this example is sādhyasama; that is to say, just as it is yet to be proved that unconscious atoms are acting independently; so it is yet to be proved that
insentient milk etc. are active by themselves. If milk etc. could be active independently, then they should operate even in dead mothers or the like also. But it is not what we find. It can be therefore concluded that they (milk etc.) also are directed by an intelligent cause. The example of milk does not serve as a proper means of reasoning. So atoms etc. cannot be active independently. And so, wherever there is action of some insentient entity, it must be directed by a conscious, intelligent director. Another argument can also be put forth:

"The Mahābhūtas, etc. known as vyakta, directed by an intelligent cause, became the cause of pleasure, pain etc; because they are possessed of colour etc, just like the shuttle etc.

Uddyotakara them proceeds to give still another argument to prove that Isvara is the efficient cause. Merit and demerit; are instruments and must therefore be directed by an intelligent cause. He states it as follows:

Merit and demerit cause happiness and sorrow to man, because they are instruments, like the axe etc.

1. बुधिसिद्धार्थाधिविक्षितम् सहायतादि व्यज्ञानीति
   सुखुःकाच्यानि निमित्तं महति। कुप्पादिनुत्वाव। तुया वितवदिति।
   - NV., 4. 1. 21.

2. व्याख्यातः बुधिसिद्धार्थाधिविक्षिताः पुनः यथा उपयोगः
   कृताः करणत्वाद वास्तविकः।
   - NV., 4. 1. 21.
If it is urged that the soul is the controller of merit and demerit, this is not proper, as that to whom merit and demerit belong could not be their controller, because soul is not a cogniser and does not perceive colour etc., which are capable of being perceived as long as it is not endowed with the aggregate of body and sense-organs. Then how could it perceive merit and demerit, which are imperceptible?

Besides, if the soul could control its own destiny, and act independently, nobody would bring suffering on himself; as no one desires misery. Even he who mutilates his limbs or cuts off his body, also does so expecting some good in this mutilated condition or in death.

If atoms are held to be active being directed by merit and demerit, this is not proper; since they are insentient and cannot be active independently. An insentient thing is not known to become a director independently. And even if dharma and adharma be capable of causing activity, they could not do so, because an instrument by itself is not seen to bring about an activity.

1. यश्वात्मनोऽपोष्पातं शिर्भैर्दाहि कौरिति सौ मिमि
   तद्यथे प्राप्यो वा हिताद्वस्य प्रक्षते ब्रह्म ।
   - NV, L.1.21- p. 460.

2. वशुद्धापि च कार्यविश्वयोः,
   परममच्छुदेतिका मयीमि न, कार्याधिकृत्य चैव चिन्तामुद्रता
   वसामुस्यात् न हि कारणं केभीं चिन्ताम निर्विभूषितः ।
   - NV, 4. 1. 21.
If it be held that this is done by dharma and adharma depending on atoms (SSF-God), even then it is not proper as it is never found to be so. We never see an act being performed by the Karman (action) and sense-organs. If the soul be regarded as the agent (doer), this has have already been answered by saying that the soul is non-knower in that state. Origination cannot also be causeless, as this is not seen. There is no way out, so it will have to be accepted that the atoms and Karma etc. are made to act being directed by an intelligent cause.

An objection can be raised against this as follows: "God cannot be the cause; since he is not endowed with action. Agents such as potters, are found to be endowed with action. God is devoid of action and therefore cannot be an agent (cause or the creator of the world)."

1. यथा परमाणवेत्तावर्गे ज्ञातिसमावेश्याः प्रयत्ने तदपि न युक्तं अत्यद्यावाक | न हि कर्माणात्माः क्रिया जन्यमाहयोऽविचिदिम पश्याम: हति | बात्त्वाति कर्त्तव्यायीति, उच्चे केति, अवत्वादिति | अद्यायात्मपक्ति-भौविष्यायीति न युक्ते केति अत्यद्यावादिति |

- स्य. न. 4. 1. 21.

2. वाकस्पति हिंदु वल्लरिति: विवेकेन्द्र ् शुक्रनीविधिः, नाधुलु सत्के। ईश्वरे संपाकिनि शति सत्याण: शुकले।

- Which means:

"Action entails movement, and movement implies a material. Since God is devoid of material body and is omnipresent, creation is not possible in him."

- तत्पर्यातिका, 4. 1. 21.
The answer to this is:

This is not proper, as no alternative is tenable. With reference to which action is it said that God is devoid of action?

Action is twofold: that which in the shape of throwing up wards and the like and that which is spoken of by means of verbs.

The action expressed by verbs surely belongs to God and the objection that "God is devoid of action" does not hold good in this case. Because God is held to be eternally independent. This independence is also twofold: (i) not being made to act by another karaka and (ii) not causing another karaka to act.

That is to say, when action of substances ceases due to their coming into conjunction, the substances thus conjoined create a new substance; and when a number of substances are simultaneously brought together, only one substance (e.g. cloth) is produced from conjunctions which

1. करकाकाराकारा प्रयोजनीति करकाराप्रयोजनीति च

- NV. 4. 1. 21.
are different from the particular effects (viz. double thread (dvitantuka) from the conjunction of two threads) 
(see NVTT, p. 420.)

When one component (substance-avayava) is divided and when the former combination of substances ceases, the remaining components produce a new substance and this is production by a cause, not endowed with activity.

Then Uddyotakara explains that there are substances that create even while being active. When as a result of the conjunction due to the action of one or two substances, action ceases in the other substance, simultaneously with the cessation of action, a substance is produced. Further, the argument of the opponent involves contradiction, since his view does not admit of such action as throwing upwards and the like.

1. तवासाधारणाकार्यवृत्तिसे कर्मावर्ण : संयोजनः केनेव प्रथमुत्पर्यः।
   - NV, 4. 1. 21 (p. 461).

2. Vācaspati explains:
   न केवलूपनेनिति न धम्मेपहि इवार्थाद:। कविकन्तपरतिक्रियेष्यपि
   इवर्येष्यविशेषतंयोगेना: पूर्वाकार्यपर्तिः प्रथमंतरश्चाद:। एत्याह
   क्षात्यवाल्यविवाहगतिः।
   - NVTT, p. 420.

   The production of a new substance is seen not only in those substances in which some activity was there before and a thing was produced after that activity stopped, but also in substances, in which no activity arose. In this latter case, the former substance ceases, and a new one is produced from the conjunctions that are present in those substances.

3. यदा बन्तवतजन्तादेव कस्मसंयोगपरतिः कविकन्तपरतिः प्रथमुत्पर्यः।
   कविकन्तससकालन्व इवः प्रथमुत्पर्यः। तवा किमाक्तता प्रथमार्थादेव
   किमा कित्वानां: विरोधावलित्नातिहितः। क्रियात्मकां:।
   - NV, 4. 1. 21 (p. 461).
Here ends the discussion of Paramāṇukāraṇavāda. The view then referred to is that of an opponent who says that God is not the cause. He argues: "God is not the cause, since no alternative is "tenable". If he is the cause does he create independently of everything or does he depend on other things for his creation?

If he depends on something else, he is not the creator of that on which he depends. If he is not the cause of certain things, so also, he might not be the cause of other things. If he creates certain things independently of everything, it ought to be possible for him to create all the things. In the same way, if he creates everything independently, then in that case, the karma of man would be futile and there would be the contingency of there being no emancipation. And this view would be susceptible to all the drawbacks that have been urged against the view that creation is not in view of the actions of the souls.

1. C. Bulcke, in his 'Theism of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika' remarks, at this juncture: "If God were an independent creator, liberation would no longer be due to the exhaustion of karma, but it would not therefore become impossible; since God could freely bestow it." Uddyotakara does not stop to consider this point because he rejects the first alternation of the objection altogether.

2. See. Nyāya Sūtra, 3. 2. 64-72.
Uddyotakara's answer to this is: Inasmuch as the Naiyāyikas do not hold the view that God creates things independently of all things outside of himself, their theory is not open to the objection that merit, and demerit are futile, nor to those objections that be against the view that the creation of the world is not dependent upon the actions of man.

It might be urged that the "God would not be the creator of things which he stands in expectancy of ". But this is not proper. There is no such absolute or invariable rule that he does not create the thing which he stands in expectancy of.

A man skilled in many crafts is seen to make the axe with the help of some other means, the stick with the help of the axe and the jar with the help of the stick, and he cannot be a non-creator, simply because he creates them one after another.

In the same way, God creates body and its pleasure and pain with the help of merit and demerit. He creates the merit and demerit, with the help of Mind-Soul-contact

1. न च प्रयायकृत्वैः वस्ति कस्तौतिच्छः (Nyāya Vārtika, 4.1.21. p. 462.)
accompanied by pure and impure intentions (respectively) and he also produces the pure-impure intentions through the remembrance (on the part of men) of past pleasure and pains and with the help of the things that brought about the pleasure and pains.

It may be urged: that while he is creating something, the thing on which he depends is not created by him at that particular time and so cannot be said to be its creator. The answer to this is that this is not proper as he does not create all things at a time but creates them in succession; and in that case, the fault pointed out does not arise. It is useless to object that the first creation should have been brought about without the help of any instrument; that is to say, if he stands in expectancy of merit and demerit; while creating the body etc. that which he created first must have been without means. This is something not acceptable to the Naiyāyikas and so this should not be urged against them. According to them Samsāra (metempsychosis) (repeated deaths and births) is beginningless. It is thus also that merit and demerit in the several living beings can be effective only if samsāra is without beginning and the creator dependent upon thing outside of himself.
The objector may raise another question here: Why does God create all these things? We see in our day today life that all agents act with a certain motive, either to acquire or to get rid of something. But God has nothing to get rid of, since he knows no suffering, nor has he anything to acquire since he is all powerful (Vasitvat).

Some people hold that God created for the sake of recreation or to amuse himself. But this is not proper, since he is in no need of amusement; as he has no misery. Others think that he creates in order to manifest his extraordinary powers (Vibhuti) but this also is untenable, since by the manifestation of his powers, he does not acquire anything nor would he miss anything, by abstaining from that manifestation. In fact, God creates because activity is his very nature; just as the earth supports things because it is its very nature to do so.

It might be argued that if it be in God's very nature to act, he should act continuously without cessation and it would not be possible for him to be active and inactive by turns; and also it should not be possible for him to create things by turns. Because the nature of a thing is one and uniform (so that there cannot be activity and inactivity and consequent creation and non-creation one after the other). It would not be possible for God to say at one time, 'May this come to be', and at another time...
May this not come to be, for out of a cause which is of one uniform nature, we never find different kinds of products issuing: - The Naiyāyika's answer is that the objection does not hold good against them for they regard god as endowed with intelligence. And that which is endowed with intelligence and is dependent upon things other than itself can never be incessantly active; it cannot produce everything at one and the same time.

As a matter of fact, that alone comes into existence, the causes of which happen to be present; while that of which the causes are not present does not come into existence, and certainly, it is never possible for the causes of all things to be present at one and the same time, hence the contingency of all things being produced at the same time cannot arise. When god becomes active for creating a certain thing, he has to keep in view (a) the time of the fruition of merit and demerit, (b) the appearance of other causes; (c) the proximity of beings who are to enjoy the things to be created (d) the fruition of their merit and demerit, and (e) the removal of obstacles that could come in the way.

1. C. Bukke remarks here:

"It must be admitted that Uddyotakara's conception of the dependence of Isvara on karma is very rigid, and that it makes god the mechanical executor of an inexorable law, without the slightest opportunity for spontaneity."

- The Theism of Nyāya

Vaiśeṣika, -P.
Turning to Vātsyāyana, we see that he has thought it proper to describe the nature of god at this juncture. He says: God is a distinct Soul endowed with qualities. God is defined as being of the genus 'soul' so he cannot be put under any other category. He does not have demerit, wrong knowledge and negligence; on the other hand, he has merit knowledge and concentration (Samādhi). He is endowed with the eight-fold powers, ānimā (becoming as minute as he wishes) etc., as the result of his merit and Samādhi.

The Vārtikakāra, raises here an interesting question: "Is the power of god eternal or evanescent? If it is evanescent, you should point out the cause that produces it. In the case of the person whose powers are evanescent; there is always a diversity of causes bringing about those powers - the power of being minute or large at will and so forth, and so in the case of all other beings. And so there would be several gods. "What would be the harm if there were several gods? There would be this difficulty, that if two gods with conflicting motives, were to intend to act in respect of a single thing, - there would be no effective action at all. If it be held that one would surpass the other, then the one that surpasses would be the God;

1. गुणविशिष्टम् सत्यम् आत्मा तत्रूप ईश्वरः।

- NB, 4. 1. 2.
and not the other. If on the other hand, the powers of God are eternal, then there would be no use for Merit (in his case) as his powers, (being eternal) could not be the result of his Merit."

The Naiyāyika's answer is that the powers of God are eternal. And still this view would not be open to the objection that in this case, his Merit would be useless, for the Merit that belongs to God, does not produce powers in him; what it does is to help the aggregate of merit and demerit subsisting in each individual soul. And God does not have merit, so no such objection could be raised.

It appears that Uddyotakara's view differs from that of Vātsyāyana. Vātsyāyana says: God's merit confirms to his will. He causes the accumulated merit and demerit subsisting in each individual soul, as also the earth, and other material substances to operate.

Vācaspati clarifies the idea of Vātsyāyana with this remark. If aiśvarya signifies the power of knowledge and action, of God (ज्ञानस्कृति), it is eternal. But aiśvarya of the type of ānimā etc. is non-eternal. This Aiśvarya is the result of his dharma, and so non-eternal.

Vācaspati remarks that according to Vātsyāyana, God's dharma causes the merit and demerit, subsisting in each individual,
so also the earth etc. to operate. Vātsyāyana says so holding that God has Dharma. As a matter of fact; there is no proof establishing the existence of God's dharma, God can effect everything by means of his powers of knowledge and action which are eternal.

A further doubt here arises as to God's being a substance or one of the attributes. The answer is that he is a substance. Because Buddhi is his quality; as in the case of other substances.

It is not proper to urge that if Buddhi is his quality, he may be just another soul. He is not just another soul as his qualities are different.

To wit, as the earth etc. are not souls, because there is difference of quality (between the soul and the earth); in the same way, God is not just another soul, embodied being, because there is difference of qualities.

1. ब्रह्म बाहर गुणाद्वैनान्यतम : । ।
   - नव. 4. 1. २।

2. ब्रह्म बुद्धिगुणत्वात् ब्रह्मान्तरकः ।
   - Ibid.

3. बुद्धिगुणत्वात् तद्ध्वर्तमांतरत्ति ।
   न ब्रह्मान्तरः गुणपेशात् ।
   - Ibid.
What is the difference between God and the other Souls? Some hold that his Dharma (Merit), Jhāna (knowledge) Vairāgya (detachment) and Aisvarya (Powers) have an excellence; eternity of these four is the excellence.

But this is not acceptable, because, in regard to his having Buddhi, there is proof; while there is no such proof regarding the eternity of his Dharma etc., and a thing cannot be accepted, if there is no proof. But the excellence in question is the eternality of Buddhi. He has eternal Buddhi and the common qualities, number etc. God has six qualities like other. If anyone asks as to what is the proof regarding his Buddhi being eternal, the answer is: Here is the proof regarding the eternity of this Buddhi,

"Atoma act, when they are directed by an intelligent cause - this Buddhi is eternal because it is not limited to one object at a time. Those particular cognitions which are restricted to particular objects, arise only in the vicinity of such causes as the body etc., but God's knowledge is not restricted to one object at a time, because a number of things are seen to be produced simultaneously, as several inanimate things are produced at a time.

1. शास्त्र पुराणिन्ते प्रत्यथ्यीन्यानांसंवादः ।
2. शास्त्र प्रत्यथीन्याला दुर्भिष्णुवास्ते श्रीराजिकार्णस्वानेन

\[\text{सति महत्ति, न दिक्य प्रत्यथीन्याला, युगपनेकोपचत्तिकर्त्तान्}\]

\[\text{यथा स्थायर्मेदस्यानेकस्य युगपुस्तपद इति} \]

- Ibid.
Samkhya (Number), parimāṇa (Dimension), pṛthaktva (Individuality), samyoga (Conjunction), vibhāga (Disjunction) and buddhi (knowledge) are His qualities.

If someone holds that "God also should have a body, if he has buddhi", he will have to accept that such a body in respect of God should be either eternal or non-eternal. If he accepts the body of God to be non-eternal, he will have to accept the existence of dharma and adharma (due to which God is connected with the body and then is separated from it), and then such a god would not be 'Īśvara' in the real sense of the term as he would be dependent on dharma and adharma. On the other hand, if he accepts God as having eternal body etc., it would be equivalent to accepting something contrary to our experience, and it is better to accept the eternity of buddhi of God, than his having an eternal body. If some one holds that in God, there is a series of distinct evanescent intellections, then also, the production of inanimate things etc., at a time, would be impossible. Besides, this is also contrary to our experience and so it is better to accept his having eternal buddhi.

Now the question is whether this buddhi is eternal or in a flux (or continuum). But it cannot possibly be in a flux. If the distinct entities are regarded as different due
to difference of qualities, (attributes), could this mean that the things that possess the same qualities are identical, e.g. Time and Space? No, this is inconclusive. What is asserted here is simply that from the difference in qualities, there follows multiplicity. But due to sameness of quality, there cannot be indentity of the things. For example we find that though several jars are possessed of the same qualities, yet they are many; time and space, though having the qualities, are regarded as different by reason of the fact that they bring about diverse effects. Moreover, unless God were endowed with intelligence, it would not be possible for the world to come into existence.

Uddyotakara further explains that God's knowledge can cognise everything; it is of the nature of direct perception having as its object everything - past, present and future. It is not inferential in-character; nor also of the nature of Verbal testimony; since God's knowledge is eternal, there is no question of its impression (being left (साम्य)) and as there is absence of Sāṃskāra and because his cognition is eternal, recollection (सत्ती) has no chance to arise (क्षण). And in the absence of collection, there is no inference. Misery also is not there since there is no demerit. Further, there is no detachment; in the absence of any misery, he is not disgusted with anything, and so also there is no hatred or dislike (dveša), But Will
it is certain that, in respect of all things—unobstructed and free from affliction (i.e., ignorance). He is neither bound nor emancipated. He is not in bondage since there is no misery. He is not emancipated because he was never bound, for only he who is in bondage can be emancipated. God has no bondage, so he is not required to be emancipated.

UddyoLakara then proceeds to establish the relationship between God and other souls.

It might be urged that as God is not connected with other souls, it is impossible for him to be their director. That is to say, merit and demerit, which are closely connected with souls, cannot be directly connected with God; nor are they indirectly connected. And a thing cannot be controlled unless it is connected, and if he does not control them dharma and adharma cannot operate.

This is not proper, because the connection can possibly be beginningless. Some people accept the relation of the other souls and god as beginningless; this is not denied by us and hence is accepted. They establish this beginningless connection by adducing reasons as under:

God is connected with ether etc. and other all-pervading things because he is in contact with corporeal substances
like jar. The jar, being in contact with another jar, which is a corporeal substance, becomes related to ākāśa and other becomes related to Ākāśa and other all-pervading substances and as god also is similarly connected with corporeal substances, he also should be related to ākāśa and other all pervading substances.

Is this relation of god and soul all-pervasive or not? This need not be discussed as it serves no purpose. We can say only this much that there is such a thing as the relation between god and souls, but we do not examine whether it does or does not pervade god and the other souls.

Even those who do not accept this beginningless connection will have to recognize connection between God and souls because connection of god with the atomic mind is possible. All the minds of the different souls are related to god and so god directs them. He can justifiably be said to be connected with souls by virtue of being connected with minds which are connected with the souls.

To take an example, an activity is created in a hand by the conjunction of the soul and the hand as well as effort. Such a hand in which activity is created is connected with tongs, and then by virtue of this connection, it controls a piece of iron or the like.
We may here see how Vācaspati expands the arguments put forth by Uddyotakara. Proceeding to give the proof of God's existence Vācaspati says. The following is acceptable to the Ācārya.

The (existent) things of the world may be divided into three categories: (i) those that are known to have an intelligent maker, such as palaces, terraces, City, gates, arches; (ii) those that are known not to have such an intelligent maker, such as atoms, ether etc.; and those of which it is doubtful whether they have an intelligent maker or not, such as bodies, trees, mountains etc. We do not get any proof in favour or against this. There is doubt regarding this last mentioned having an intelligent maker or not, as they are objects of knowledge or because there is difference of opinion among the philosophers and there is no proof proving or disproving either view. Because atoms etc., which are not amenable to perceiving by their very nature, are not apprehended even though they are existent. To prove that "things under dispute viz. the body, trees etc. have an intelligent maker who knows the material cause to be made use of", Vācaspati gives the following syllogism:

"The objects in question such as bodies, trees, mountains etc. have a maker who knows their material well,
Because they have originated or because their material is unintelligent. That which originates or that of which the material is unintelligent, presupposes a maker who knows the material well, as in the case of places etc. The objects in question are such bodies, trees, mountains etc. Therefore they are thus produced by an intelligent maker, who knows the material well.

And the origination of such objects is not unproved. They no doubt, are effects inasmuch as they are made of parts or having a finite magnitude, are endowed with action.

The Vaisēvikas recognise cetana karma as the cause; the Mimāṃsakas recognise 'cetana' kṣetrajna (individual souls) and thus, a cetana creator or maker is established in these schools. Yet, the fault of 'Siddha Sādhanā' - proving of what is already proved' - cannot be alleged here in respect of earth etc; because these (karma, Souls) though cetana, do not know the material cause of which the creation is 1.

1. विवादायासितां सन्तुलांमहीरादयः उपाधानाधिकारूकः,
उत्पत्तिनिरपरं बनेत्नप्पडान्तवादा, यदुपत्तिर्मवेत्तिपावतुमक्
वा नलमुपाप्पणाधिपपुरुषकृतं यथा प्राप्तवादादि। तथा च
विवादायासितां सन्तुलांमहीरादयः तस्मात्स्थेति।

- NVTT, 4. 1. 21 (p.421).
made. And if they be regarded as knowing the material, then they are the same as our God, the difference being in name only. Instead of recognising 'Karma' and 'Soul' as the "Knower", it is better to recognise our god as the "Knower", because who would not welcome the accomplishment of the thing desired without any trouble?

The example of cloth etc., can not be said to be 'sādhya hina' (devoid of the probandum) because the cloth etc. also are made by a weaver or the like who knows the material. Hence also, the reason is not contradictory. It would be contradictory if the maker of the cloth etc. were one who does not know the material. But even the opponent does not admit this.

The presence of the body is also implied by the above reasoning, but it is contradicted by pramanās. When

1. नेताजप्तं केशाशिकानं कर्पणं चेतानेन भामासकानां
   चेतासैने चेतानेन भानकुल्लेश्वरिः ध्यानयादीना
   सिद्धास्यं, चेतन्येपि, भेषामुपादातानाभिभट्टात्।

   - NVTT, p. 421.

2. कष्टिपितस्य विशेषस्य सरीराविभावे:
   प्रमाणविराजोति चिन्तिता।

   - NVTT. 4. 1. 21.
we say: "Snow is fiery, because it brings about modification in grass etc.", the hot touch of fire employed in bringing about modification in grass etc. is implied in the very idea of its being fiery. Yet what we know by perception is that snow is cold, so our reasoning is 'Bādhita' contradicted and hence contradictory.

Similarly, the knowledge pertaining to the material producing earth etc. must be one having causes like contact of soul and mind and if this be not there, it would not arise. Hence, the contact of soul and mind and the like are implied when we say that the maker has the knowledge of the material. But no such contact is known by various means of knowledge to be there in God. And if mind etc. be not there, there would not be the knowledge on the part of the maker, hence he would not be the creator, we see that when it stops emanating, heat fire becomes frost. नृषो-धे

But "This is not proper. If two things are not invariably connected, one cannot be said to be absent where the other is absent. If the cause be said to be one not invariably connected (as the Vyāpaka) with the effect then all we can say is: "Doomed is the whole system of Vyāpya and Vyāpaka, i.e. logic."
What has been urged, could have been, true if his knowledge of the material of earth etc., were also an effect. But it is accepted as eternal; so even if body etc. are absent, it cannot be regarded as necessarily absent, as the body and the knowledge of god are not regarded as concomitant. Therefore, when the former is absent; the later need not be absent. Otherwise, simply because Maitra does not have a horse, he should not have a cow also. It is not proper to say that simply because knowledge etc. are mostly seen to be non-eternal, eternal buddhi can never possibly exist. The perceptible snow, hail stone etc. made of water, and the colour etc. in them, are non-eternal; but because of this, it does not follow that the atoms creating them and the colour etc. of these atoms are non-eternal.

Buddhi and these atoms and their colour etc. are alike eternal, because they are existent and do not have a cause. Simply because knowledge is seen at many places, to be co-existing with body etc., it is not proper to say that knowledge is invariably connected as the Vyāpya with body etc., which are the Vyāpaka. The relation of invariable concomitance is a natural relation and should be free from any extraneous circumstance (Upādhi); wherever knowledge is found to be co-existent with body etc., we have the upādhi (extraneous) circumstance) viz. its being an effect. The knowledge which
is an effect, is understandably absent when the body etc. which are its causes are absent. But where it is eternal, it is present even in the absence of the body etc. and yet this is in no way contradicts the apprehension of their coexistence. When the inference "word is non-eternal, because it is originated, like jar, etc." is put forth, someone may come forth with an objection based on the diversity of the attributes of the probandum and the illustration. To wit, if being originated, word is non-eternal like the jar, then due to this very similarity it should also be one possessing colour (like the jar).

But such a person can be defeated in a controversy by pointing out that he is employing the Utkarṣasama Jāti (futile rejoinder). Similarly, the man who says that God should have a body because he knows the material constituting earth etc., like the weaver etc., should be condemned and defeated as one employing the Utkarṣasama Jāti because he has argued this on the basis of similarity which is ineffectual in reasoning. Such similarities can be found between any two in all cases of inference and then there would be the contingency of all logic coming to an end. In fact, one thing can be proved from another only when it is invariably connected with it.

It may be urged: Origination in the case of jar etc. is seen to be invariably connected only with the presupposition
of a maker who knows the material, but on what basis could it be said that the maker is one endowed with eternal and all-embracing knowledge? This is not what is found in the case of the illustration given - the potter knows the material but not everything and that too not eternally.

And also the existence of eyes etc. cannot be inferred from activities, like colour perception, and the like; because the activities of wood-cutting etc. are not brought forth by means of the eyes etc. but are brought about by the axe etc. It might be argued that the fact of the senses being the means, though not perceived in the illustration, is established on the strength of pakṣa-dharmatā (the reason being there in the subject of the syllogism).

Now, the activity present in the apprehension of colour and the like can prove the existence of a karāṇa (instrument means) which is capable of bringing it about. Axe etc. cannot bring about apprehension of colour etc., so on the strength of pakṣadharmatā, it established a means which is other than the axe etc., though it is not seen.

The same is the case here: The world, being an effect postulates a maker capable of producing this effect.

---

1. अय इशारानामाणि अस्तमपि इन्द्रियादेशतुष्णि
   पंक्षः पराक्षाताः सत्यतिः सिद्धतिः (स्मृतिः)
   - NVTT, p. 422.
In this case, simultaneity of the creation of greatly varied effects, viz. the creation of infinite and undetermined Dik, (direction), Kāla (time) etc., things perceptible and not perceptible, so also things animate and inanimate would not be possible if the creator did not have eternal and all embracing knowledge. Such knowledge on the part of God could not possibly be brought about by body etc., which are effects. Because, if that were so, before this body was produced God could not have been intelligent, (i.e. could not have had knowledge), and then three would be the contingency of accepting another god, for the creation of other things brought about before that (i.e. before God came to have knowledge). And the latter also, not being intelligent, we would have to postulate another maker; and so on. So, instead of postulating several supra-sensible entities, it is better to regard God's knowledge as eternal. The supposition of body and sense-organs is also to be regarded as refuted along with this.

Some hold that even if it be held that things having a composite arrangement are known to have an intelligent cause, how could it be held that there is only one such cause? This

1. नै तत्त्वीदाः परमेश्वरविश्वाम कार्यशीररुर्दै वैभवति ।
   - NVTT, p. 423.

2. संयोगशास्त्रात्मकतः वृत्तिमयातेऽ अन्तः
   संयोगशास्त्रसङ्कारणता कैल?
also is answered by the same argument. The denial of one, who
is omniscient, could be successful if people with physical
(i.e., ordinary) eyes could have been able to see the atoms
embodied souls or the latent deposits of karman (karmāśaya)
which are inseparably connected with the soul. But this is not
so. Therefore you will have to suppose many beings which are
capable of seeing suprasensible things and are not like us.
But it is better to suppose only one instead of many because
that makes for simplicity of assumption (kalpanalāghavāya).

It may be urged: By virtue of just the connection
of souls—whose karma is occasionally ripe—and atoms, effects
like body, world etc., could be explained, hence there is no
need of supposing that they have a sensient creator. But this
is not proper. Because origination is invariably and naturally
connected with a maker who knows the material and is free from
the intervention of any extraneous condition. One
might point out in order to show the inconclusiveness of this
argument, that the instruments of knowledge viz. mind and
sense organs, function independently; also that milk which
is not inspired to activity by any one, functions independently
for the young one, moreover, in the forest, bushes etc. are
seen to be produced without any effect. But it should be noted that

---

1. NVTT, 4.1.21 (p.423).
all these are objects of dispute and hence should be included in the subject of the syllogism. It is not proper to urge that like the existence of the hare's horns the fact of their being effects is not apprehended, so, they cannot be included in the subject of the syllogism. If the thing is not capable of being perceived, it cannot possibly be contradicted by the opponent.

Otherwise, there would be contingency of putting an end to inferences, i.e. logic being paralysed. The hare's horns, if it existed would have been perceived, as it is capable of being perceived an a calf, so this is not a befitting counter-argument.

It might be urged: Origination in general is not naturally connected with an intelligent cause, only a particular origination is so connected. If even though a person who has not seen the thing being created, "has the idea that it is created by someone", only he can accept such a Vyāpti (invariable Concomitance) between Utpattimātva (having origination) and Buddhimaadhyateukatva (having an intelligent creator).

A jar is seen to be produced when an intelligent potter is there and not seen to be produced when he is absent. So such particular entities can be said to be connected with an intelligent creator. But body etc. are never seen to be connected with the presence or absence of the alleged intelligent creator.
Thus here is the intervention of an Upādhi (viz. Kṛtabuddhitva - the knowledge that it is created) in the Vyāpyavyāpakabhāva of Utpattimattva and Buddhimagdhetukatva and eventhough Utpattimattva is subsisted by this Vyāpti, the inherent concomitance of it with buddhimadhetukatva cannot be established because this relationship is not natural but dependent on an upādhi as shown above. Otherwise depending on the invariable concomitance of whiteness with fire as determined by smoke, there would be the contingency of the inference of fire from the whiteness, etc. present even in lotusas, pigeons, etc.

The answer to this is: He who holds such a view should cleverly clarify whether the Viśeṣa (particularity) according to him is its agreement in respect of presence and absence with an intelligent cause or the apprehension of such a creation. If the former, we do accept it when we try to prove the buddhimadhetukatva of the body, world etc. Even he who holds such a view cannot say that the cause does not have its existence or non-existence determined by the effects as he does not accept this.

1. बन्धु युनुक्तां युनुक्त्यापिन्युत्पन्निच्य याण्डादेः
   कुरुक्कोलायाणिन्त्यमयिष्यमुक्तः स्वस्य्ययागाः

   - NVTT 4 21
If the latter alternative is meant, a man who has not seen the process of creation cannot have the knowledge that it is created by someone. In that case, only that cloth could be accepted as made by an intelligent maker, whose agreement in respect of presence and absence with the maker has been seen and not any other cloth; which is in the market. It might be urged that when certain things of the same genus are seen to be in agreement in respect of presence and absence with such a cause, the other things in respect of which this has not been seen, but which are of the same class may also be regarded as such (i.e., as having an intelligent since they are of the same genus. The answer is that in that case, the jar etc. which are originated are seen to be agreeing in respect of presence and absence with an intelligent maker, then the body world, etc. also which are of the same genus could be said to be in agreement in respect of presence and absence with an intelligent maker, and they cannot be prevented from being so related however much they might be threatened not to be so related.\footnote{\textit{Nutt. 4. 1. 21.}}

\begin{enumerate}
\item तन्त्राची तत्त्वव्यतिरेकानुविद्यानवस्थातच
अदृश्य नसन्विद्यतरेकानुविद्यानमपि तन्त्राची तत्त्वाच तत्त्वाच हैति।
- \textit{Nutt. 4. 1. 21.}

\item उत्पत्तिनाह घटादि दुर्दश्यतरेकानुविद्यावैषयवत्तिन्यधपि
तन्त्राची तत्त्वाच तत्त्वाच न दश्यति तत्त्वाच भवति न दश्यति परामुक्तः।
- \textit{Ibid.}
\end{enumerate}
And if it be urged that the things of the genus of 'jar' can be said to have an intelligent maker; then palace, etc. could not have an intelligent cause since they are not of the genus of 'jar' the opponent might say that only the things of the same genus as that of the things whose creation is perceived to be invariably connected with an intelligent maker can be said to be connected in respect of creation with an intelligent maker. The answer to this is: places etc. - which are of the genus 'effect' - are seen to be created by an intelligent maker so body, world, etc. which are originated (and so are 'effects') could certainly be said to have an intelligent maker. There is no difference as far as their of the same 'genus' is concerned (एकादश तथा अन्यान्य एकादशिस्तम्र निति) That the anthill, even though a modification of clay (and hence of the same genus as jar) is not created by a potter, because it is contradicted by the fact that the potter is not perceived to make it. Even then we do accept an intelligent maker of it, who is not seen.

It might be argued: The invariable concomitance with an intelligent maker who knows his material applies only to those products, the material of which is perceptible to us and not to all the products. This is not the case with body etc. Even if they can be originated and hence in the absence of such a concomitance, they cannot be said to have an intelligent maker.
But this is not proper. It is only after establishing the invariable concomitance between "being a product" and "having an intelligent maker who knows his material" by positive and negative instances that you can hypostatise the possibility of knowledge of the material in respect of the knowledge of the effect.

It has been said earlier while discussing the qualities of God that after knowledge has been established in general as an attribute, on the strength of Vyāpti, its eternality is established on the strength of Pakṣadharmaṭā. (its being an attribute of the pakṣa). Therefore, since, no Upādhi can be traced throughout such cases, we must accept that there is natural concomitance between "being produced" and "having an intelligent maker". And it is not proper to entertain a doubt that origination which is naturally connected with having an intelligent creator, would be there even in the absence of that with which it is related, as in this case there would be the contingency of its abandoning its own nature.

It might be urged: "the earth etc. do not have a maker who is omniscient, because they are existent or because they are cognisable, like the jar etc." - such inferences can be put forth; which proves that the inference that the earth etc. have an omniscient creator is thus counterbalanced, and so is fallacious reasoning.
The answer to this is: What is denied by the given inference? Their (- of earth etc.) having a creator who is omniscient or their having a creator who is intelligent, 'Sarva' (all) in the said proposition being meant to be just indicative. If the former, then what would be proved is that the creator has partial knowledge. Then that is a wrong theory and is against your theory; and it is not possible also. Because of us with our narrow vision create earth etc., on the other hand if a creator who has any kind of knowledge is denied it is inconclusive in respect of jar etc (as the potter knows his material).

Some people try to prove that God is not the director of things and he is not endowed with all embracing knowledge. They put forth the following inferences: (1) God is not the director of atoms etc., since he has no body like the souls that are emancipated.

(ii) The knowledge of god is not all-embracing and is non-eternal since it is knowledge, like the knowledge of people like us.

But such inferences are dependent for the establishing of the pakṣadharma on the establishing of God, and of his having knowledge. Thus they cannot come to exist as against the proofs establishing these, much less could they contradict them.

1. तत्पत्तार्थतिरिक्तविषयं इतिएक्षरसिद्धिः तदविष्काश्च वापेक्षानां तत्कार्थक-प्रावणकथितविषयान्तमेव चावनासाध्यविपक्षिणि प्रागेव तद्विष्काश्च।

- NVTT. 4. 1. 21, (p. 425).
And the scriptures (verbal testimony) and inference do not establish such a God who is not the creator of the world, who does not have eternal, all-embracing knowledge, and hence, it follows that the said inferences cannot arise as contrary to these.

Like knowledge, his desire, and efforts also are to be recognised as proved as eternal, by the inference proving that the world has a creator, since kārtṛga is of the nature of an aggregate of knowledge, the desire to create and effort, and these latter three are invariably connected with each other so when one of them is proved, others are also to be regarded as proved.

Thus such a god is proved by virtue of the reason's being an attribute of the subject (paksadharmata); by the very reason viz. utpattimatva.

Or we may even say that the reason utpattimatva establishes a creator who knows the material, but inference by elimination proves his particularity through his being established as different.

---

1. परिशेषणामात्रानात्तु व्यतिरेकसिद्धे:  
   विशेषविभि: ।

   - NVTT. 4. 1. 21 (p.425).
To take an example: The creator who knows body, world, etc. is not one having non-eternal knowledge which does not embrace everything. Because then there would be the contingency of the creator being one who does not know the material. Such a one, knowing his material is not seen, as for example we ourselves. But god is one who knows the material. Therefore he has eternal and all-embracing knowledge. None other than such a god, is able to know the different atoms and the latent deposits of karma which are inherently connected with each embodied soul.

He is able to control the dharma and adharma of the other souls also, because he is connected with them. Direct conjunction and inherence are not the only connections because there are other connections also. To wit, atoms etc. are connected with God; and embodied soul with atoms. And dharma and adharma are inherently connected with the embodied soul. This is samyukta-Saṁyogi-samvāya (inherence in what is in connection with that what is connected with another). Or (god's connection with dharma and adharma is of the type of Saṁyuktasamavāya, since dharma and adharma inhere in the souls with whom god is conjoined, it may be noted that beginningless.
Connection also has been established and justified as possible.

And God, even without depending on His own dharma will provoke dharma-adharma, or the atems to do their own work, just as one who knows the poison-lave, makes the Vīṣaśakala (poison-stone) do its work. (see NYTT 4. 1. 21- p. 425).

(The view that the world has an intelligent material cause is also explained by this).

This long discussion by Uddyotakara ( and Vācaspati) proves the necessity of God as an efficient cause. Still, someone may argue, that such a causality may be admitted at the beginning of the creation. But it does not follow that God is an efficient cause even now.

Answering this, Uddyotakara says that the reasoning given above that dharma and adharma cause happiness and sorrow to man under the direction of an intelligent cause because they are instruments just like the axe etc. proves the efficient causality of God even at present, since, the merit and demerit of the dead require to be directed by an intelligent one.
He further adds: The great elemental substances (earth, water, fire, air, and wind) perform their respective functions of holding etc. under the direction of an intelligent cause because they are insentient, just like the axe, etc. And also grass etc. are produced by God because being effects they are objects of sight and touch.

Uddyoṭakara then concludes by saying that with regard to any created object brought up in discussion we may say that making it the subject (of a syllogism) the same conclusion can be reached by means of the same syllogism and the same illustration of the axe. Our scripture, that is to say, verbal testimony, also supports God as a cause (i.e. an efficient cause) - "This ignorant creature has no power over his own pleasure or pain. Actuated by God he would go to heaven or hell".

Manu says in his Suśrutī:

"When that God is awake, this world functions when the Quiescent Soul sleeps, everything is quiet."

1. स्व कार्यत्वातु तृणादीनि पद्मविष्ठ्य दर्शैन स्पष्टभाष्यत् वाचविशि ।

NV. 4. 1. 21 (p. 467)

2. जस्मी जन्तुर्बिषीयमात्मनः सुखःस्योऽस्यः ।
ईश्वर प्रेमितो गच्छेऽस्य स्वर्गावत्मेक वा ॥

NV, p. 467; NVTT, p. 426.

3. यदा स देवो जागर्ति
तदेद् वेष्टनि जागृ ।
यदा स्वप्निति शान्तात्मा
तवा स्वविष्मृ निमोलति ॥
Vācaspati commenting on this says that when Uddyotakara puts forth the inference, "The great elements perform their respective functions under the direction of an intelligent cause, because they are insentient, just like the axe etc."

"acetanatvāt" (because they are insentient) given as a reason (hetu) is just suggestive or illustrative 'Because they have a cause' and the like can also be considered as reasons.

This reasoning is corroborated by the Vedas: "By the command of this Imperishable, verily O Gārgī, heaven and earth stand supported".

"He was creates heaven and earth is one. He reflected may I be many, may I procreate".

The following Vedic passage also shows that since God's knowledge is without a cause, it is eternal - "Without hands and feet does he grasp (and) is swift; without eyes does he see, without ears does he hear. He knows everything and none knows him, They call him the ancient Man.

1 अपाणिपादो जवनै ग्रहीता
पञ्चत्वचूः स बुधूपात्तवकर्णः।
स वेदिते वेयं न च तस्यात्त्वितः कैव।
तमाहुरुष्यं पुरुषं पुराणः॥
That he is devoid of body is also shown by this passage. This has been discussed above in connection with Uddyotakara's exposition.

Vatsyāyana goes on to say; God's merit actuates the accumulated merit and demerit subsisting in each individual soul, as well as the earth and other elemental substances. Thus without allowing the souls to lose the fruits of their own actions, God creates the world by his rule, and this is to be recognised as the fruit of his own karma. And here his behaviour is like that of revered (or dependable) persons.

Just as a father acts for his children, God also acts father-like for his creatures in the same way. There is no category other than 'soul' to which 'God' could belong. And except buddhi, we cannot point out any attribute in God, which is indicative of him. The scripture also describes God as "The seer, the Cogniser and the Omniscient." If God could not be discerned by the buddhi etc. which are indications of the soul, who could render his nature as tenable when he is beyond the scope of perception, inference.

1. स्वरूपः स्वरूपायंगस्यालोपन निर्माणार्थाय निर्माणीवैर्यस्य स्वरूपः
   कर्मकर्यं वैदित्वायम् | आप्साक्ष्यस्वाभावम् || - NB. 4. 1. 21.
and Scriptural testimony. And hence God falls under the category of souls. And if God did not act keeping in view acts done by men, then this view would become open to all the objections that have been urged against the view that the creation is not due to the acts of souls.

We have discussed at length the arguments of the prāvāduka, and also the Naiyāyika's rejoinder to it, and incidentally, following Uddvyotakara and Vācaspati we have discussed a number of problems pertaining to creation and God's nature. Lest we lose ourselves in this maze, we recapitulate the main argument here:

Sutra 19 says that according to the Nyāya-theory, God is the cause, since we do find the actions of men turning out to be fruitless (actions of individual souls cannot explain everything). Sutra 20 mentions an objection that this is not true, for no fruit appears in the absence of man's action. Sutra 21 answers this objection—so much as the efforts of man are influenced by God, what has been urged above is not correct.

According to Vācaspati, Sutra 19 puts forth the Vedanta view that God is both the material and efficient cause of the world. Sutra 20 shows its untenability and Sutra 21 propounds the Nyāya view.

1. वैद्यायदिश्चिंत्वंपद्धत्वं परिवर्त्तनाय निरुपित्ताध्ययनः प्रत्ययः प्रक्ष्णान्यं विद्यवादानि
क: श्रवः उपाध्यायम्।

- NB, 4.1.21.