The Nyāya school holds along with almost all the Indian schools of philosophy, that emancipation is the highest goal of human life. And being an independent school of philosophical thought, the Nyāya recognises sixteen categories, rather topics-the knowledge of whose true character leads to the achievement of the highest goal, i.e. emancipation.

The means of right cognition, Pramāṇa is the first among these sixteen. Next comes Prameya, the object of right cognition. Enumerating these prameyas (objects of knowledge) the author of the Nyāya-sūtra says that "Soul, Body, Sense-organs, Things, Apprehension, Mind, Activity, Defect, Re-birth, Fruition, Pain and Emancipation—all these things constitute the objects of cognition."

Giving the characteristic of Pretyabhāva (rebirth), Gautama says that rebirth consists in being born again.

(A detailed examination of rebirth follows in N.S. 4.1. 10-13.)
It is established there that rebirth is possible only because the soul is eternal. It is the eternal soul that departs, abandons the former body and having departed after abandoning the former body and having departed after abandoning the former body it comes, it is born again, takes up another body and it is this that is spoken of as Rebirth—(pṛetyabhāva), being born after having departed.

In this context, the way in which the production of things comes about is thus described in N. S. 4. 1. 11, "The (production of) perceptible things (is) from perceptible things as is clearly proved by perception".

The various controversial philosophical views of various schools (prāvādukānām dṛṣṭāyaḥ) are then put forth, examined and refuted—or even accepted according to Uddyotakara and Vacaspatī in Nyāyasūtra 4. 1. 14-43. These are the views dealing with the production of things, earth etc. from different causes. Vātsyāyana calls them Prāvādakārtīs. The Tātparya-ṭīka interprets "prāvādukanām" as "Tirthikānām", "of heretics". Heretics are those who hold distinct views on several philosophical points. As the Vāṭika remarks: among these views of different philosophical schools, some are denied.

1. वात्यायते प्रत्येकाभिषिक्यः ।
2. वात्यायते प्रत्येकाभिषिक्यः ।

- N. S. 4. 1. 10.
- N. S. 4. 1. 11.
here while some are accepted. Citing an example of this, Gahgānāthajāhā says that, "all things of the world are emanated from void," is a view given here for denial, while the view that "God is the cause of the world" is meant for acceptance.

The word 'Prāvāduka' occurs in Jaina and Buddhist texts also. It generally signifies a distinction or a school which argues out a case for a peculiar view of its own.

The author of the Abhidhāna rājendrakośa thus explains the word 'pravāda': "Those who establish a view accepted by them with some special emphasis. In the philosophical schools, the view of others is called 'Pravāda' as it a rival view. So any view, established emphatically is a pravāda".

Giving the meaning of the word pāvaiya (pravādika) occurring in Acārānga, 1. 4. 3, the Abhidhānaraṇājendrakośa says: "these habitually speak vehemently within certain limits (within the limits of their tradition); they argue vehemently while giving an exposition of things as they are".

2. प्रकणोऽचते प्रतिपादते स्वामुपगतो क्यो वैरिति प्रवाद: ।
   वर्णितुन्म बन्योपलकप्रतिपथमावाच । यथा परे वलिरिता:
   प्रवाद: । प्रकृष्टो वाद: प्रवाद: ।
3. प्रकणोऽच ज्ञात्य वदितुह शील येभ्यं ते प्रवादिनः त स ज्ञात्य प्रवादिकः ।
   यथा वर्त्तमान्यत् वर्त्तमानं प्रतिपादनाय वाकूभ: ।
   - अभिव्यक्त्रजेन्द्रकोश.
The precept coming down from one generation to another
- generation among the ācāryas, is also known as pravāda.

In Sūtrakṛtāṅga 1. 1. 3. and 2. 2, the word pāvāya (pravāduka) is used; and the Abhidhānārajendrakosā interprets it as "those who are habituated to speak vehemently" and are heretics.

It may be noted that Sūtrakṛtāṅga 1. 1. 3. 13 uses the word "pāvādyā" for the holders of some special views or theories regarding the creator and the creation of the world.

The Buddhist text Milinda Pañho uses the word pāvādiya (pravādaka) and Rhys Davids interprets it to mean "one who is fond of wordy disputation"; and also "belonging to a disputation". Saṃyutta Nikāya 885 has this word which according to him means "disputing, arguing".

We may infer that the word Pravāduka then had not that strict sense of 'heretic'. But as the followers of several schools tried to establish their views vehemently in a dogmatic manner, 'pravāduka' came to mean one who indulges in worldly disputes, especially referring to an opponent.

1. cf. विभिन्नार्थवित्तकाशि
   - वाचार्यपारप्रत्यक्षापि: प्रवाद: ।

2. प्रवादशब्दित्वात् प्रवादुकः ।
   and प्रवादुकः पालण्डित: । - विभिन्नार्थवित्तकाशि

3. Milinda Pañha, page-


5. Ibid. page-
The Nyāya Sūtra 4.1.14-43 discusses such prāvādūka drṣṭis in eight sections. They are thus named:

1) Śunyatopādānāprakaraṇa (N. S. 4.1.14-18).
2) Īśvaropādānāprakaraṇa (N. S. 4.1.19-21).
3) Ākasmikatvaprakaraṇa (N. S. 4.1.22-24).
4) Sarvāṇityatvanirākaraṇaprakaraṇa (N. S. 4.1.25-28).
5) Sarvanitytvanirākaraṇaprakaraṇa (N. S. 4.1.29-33).
6) Sarvaprthaktvanirākaraṇaprakaraṇa (N. S. 4.1.34-36).
7) Sarvasūnyatānirākaraṇaprakaraṇa (N. S. 4.1.37-40).
8) Saṁkhyaikāntavādānirākaraṇaprakaraṇa (N. S. 4.1.41-43).

In this chapter we shall examine the Śunyatopādānāprakaraṇa.

It is urged by the prāvādūka that "Things are produced out of negation, since no object is produced, unless it has destroyed its cause".(भावार्थव्यापृत्तिः। नानुपूर्व नात्यवाचाः | 4.1.14).

As uddyotakara explains: "An effect is not produced unless the cause is destroyed." To get a better idea of this view, we may turn to the Tātparya-ṭīkā, where there is further clarification. The world has emanated from void. As the scripture says: "In the beginning, there was asat, non-being, that is to say, nothing existed." Today also, we see the production of a thing from asat (non-being) and not from
sat (being). This is so, because negation is the cause
of an entity.

As the Nyāyabhāṣya puts it: "A sprout is produced
only after destroying the seed and not before the seed is
destroyed". It may be noted that the reason 'since a thing
is not produced without destroying its cause' is a suggestion
only, and 'because of production from non-being or the like'
also should be considered. And from such a nonexistence,
something is produced. It is not necessary that some cause must
be there, then it must be destroyed and only after that
destruction, some effect could be produced.

Even if the cause were not there, the effect could be
produced, as it is produced out of negation. What is intended
to be shown is only this much that, "a thing is produced out
of negation."

As the prāvāduka argues, if the destruction of the seed
were not the cause of the sprout, then it would be possible
for the sprout to be produced even when the seed is not destroyed.

1. तत्र तावदेके प्राहुः अभाववेत भावोरपर्वतिः कर्ताः
कुतः न नानुपूर्य प्रादुर्बलोऽद्वैतः तत्साधिति हि वर्षः
विश्वं हि शुन्यताया एव जायते । एवं किंतु दूर्यते ।
अय्यवेकस्या अतर्द्वितीय | कत भावाचिप्त एवं जन्म इत्यते न शतः।
तत्तत्स्यकेतरः । अभावस्तुत्स्य बारुणामिति | — NVTT, 4. 1. 14.

2. उपलब्धाः प्रायेः नानुपूर्य प्रादुर्बलोऽद्वैतः
कत उत्पादादित्विक्यं द्रष्ट्यवः । — NVTT, 4. 1. 14.
Nyāya Sūtra 4.1.15 has an answer to such an argument "the reasoning put forth is unacceptable since there is self contradiction". (व्याघाताद्वयोः: 4.1.15).

A thing which destroys (the cause) cannot be said to have been produced after having destroyed its cause. Because in order to destroy, it must have been already in existence (as a non-existent thing by itself could not destroy anything), and obviously, that which comes into existence, was not in existence before. Hence being non-existent, it could not destroy its cause.

The contradiction can thus be explained in its words of Uddyotakara: Both the things - cause and its effect - cannot be present at the same time. The effect which does the destroying, is not produced just now. Because from the fact that it has destroyed its cause, it is clear that it was existent before. Otherwise being non-existent, it could not have destroyed its cause. And if it is produced just now, it comes to this that it does not destroy its cause as it has been produced only after the destruction of its cause.

In short, there is contradiction because being non-existent, the so-called destroyer (i.e. the effect) cannot be "a destroyer" (Upādākā) in the true sense of the term,
and if it be in existence before, it is not proper to say that it is produced afterwards.

The Prāvāduka defends himself by saying that "What is urged is not proper, since the words denoting the kārakas (causal relations) are equally used in relation to the things of the past as well as the future". (नातीतानानाय: कारकशब्दक्रयोगात्)

Sūtra 4. 1. 16).

1. cf. उपपदक्रयोगात् उपपदक्रयोगात् उपपदक्रयोगात् उपपदक्रयोगात् उपपदक्रयोगात् उपपदक्रयोगात् - Visvanātha's Vṛtti on N. S. 4. 1.15.

2. The Vṛtti explains the term "Kāraka-sābda-prayogāt" as "Kartya-karmādībodhakāsābda-prayogāt", the use of words denoting the agent, object etc.

cf. also - कारक चतुर्य संबंधितं: कारकांनिर्विशेष्याकारकानिर्विशेष्य भवति॥

Mb. on Sūtra. 1. 4. 23. The word 'Kāraka' in short, means: the capacity in which a thing becomes instrumental in bringing about an action. This capacity is looked upon as the sense of case affixes which express it. There are six kārakas in all grammatical treatises: अपादान, संप्रदान, अभिकरण, करण, कपः and कपः, to express which the case affixes or Vibhaktis, प, चनि, चन्तिनि, सप्तमि, तुलिया, बिलिया and हि-सन्ति are respectively used which hence are called kāraka Vibhaktis as contrasted with upapada-vibhaktis which show a relation, between two substances and hence are looked upon as weaker than the kāraka-vibhaktis.

- A dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar,
by K. V. Abhyankara.
Words denoting the Karakas are also used in relation to things of the past and the future, that is to say, things that are non-existent at present, e.g. "The sun will be born," "He rejoices at the sun to be born," "He fixes the name of the son to be born," "The jar existed," "He is sorry for the jar that is broken," "The potsherds are of the broken jar," "The potsherds are of the sons not yet born," and "The cause of anxiety for the father".

Thus we find many examples of figurative usage. And immediate sequence is the basis of such figurative usage. By reason of immediate sequence, the expression comes in to

1. The Tataparya tīkā writes: "These potsherds are of the broken jar" - in this sentence, though the genitive case (kumbhāsya) does not signify the Karaka directly, the relation is shown by the genitive case.

And in this relation the meaning of an action is invariably connected with a Karaka, the genitive case also can be indirectly termed 'Karaka'.

2. The Tatparya-tīkā notes: "In the same figurative sense it is said that the sprout that is going to come in to existence, destroys the seed."
existence after having destroyed the cause" yields the meaning that "while going to come into existence, the sprout destroys the seed" and the agentship (Kartṛtva) (of the sprout not yet born) is purely figurative. As Uddyotakara says, the expression that the sprout destroys the seed signifies that it comes into existence immediately after the seed.

Here the Praväduka is trying to show that his view is quite proper and does not involve self-contradiction as urged by the Siddhántin - Naiyāyika. The siddhántin in fact, does not deny such figurative usages of words denoting kārakas, but he only says that no effect can ever be produced out of a non-existent thing; or cause. The usage of the words denoting causal the kārakas (cause-relations) is accepted by him too for things of all three points of time; past, present and future.

By the phrase, "Upamṛśya prādurbhāvāt," the opponent means immediate sequence" and tries to explain that since the sprout is produced after the destruction of the seed, since the sequence is the effect and the destruction is the cause.

1. By virtue of immediate sequence 'destruction' here means:"coming into existence immediately" See: कः पुनःपत्तायः! बन्नन्तकामप्यवृत्तिः कन्तरोपत्तिः। यथादि बोधोपसारिन्तरश्रुः प्रातुभविति।

- N. V. 4. 1. 16.
The siddhāntin may object that the sequence does not mean that the destruction of the seed is the cause of the sprout. The sprout which is to be produced cannot destroy the seed, being itself non-existent at present. So also, the absence of the seed being non-existent cannot produce the sprout. What actually happens is, that when the composition of the particles of the seeds becomes disturbed, the previous combination ceases, another combination is produced and from this latter composition of the particles of the seed, the sprout is produced. In this way only the seed can be said to be the cause of sprout.

As Vācaspati explains, if the opponent says that immediate sequence itself proves the relation of cause and effect, he is not right. Because the immediate sequence only of those things which are involved in that sequence, can prove the relation of cause and effect. Here the sequence is not of the seed and the sprout, as the original combination of the particles of seed is destroyed, another combination is produced and since it is not the original combination, involved in the sequence, this present combination cannot prove the relation of cause and effect between the destruction of the seed and the production of the sprout.

It may be urged that if an altogether new combination of the particles of the seed is the cause of the production of the sprout, the sprout should be produced when the former combination has not ceased to exist. The Vārtika

1. See NMS 4.1.16.
answers this by saying that unless the former combination has ceased to exist another is not produced

"The opponent may again ask, "continues the Tātparya tīkā, "that if another combination of the particles of the seed is the cause, why do the farmers take up seeds in order to get sprouts?" The answer is that the farmer only takes up particles of the seed. But if the seed also comes along with it he cannot dismiss it.

The above view that sprout is produced out of the destroyed seed is unacceptable (to the Siddhāntin) because in fact, nothing emanates from things that are destroyed, (निर्विवेकित्वान्तित्यावृत्तिः | 4.1.17) As a matter of fact those particles of the seeds, which have abandoned their former combination and adopted another are its cause.

"If mere destruction be the cause of the sprout, why is a sprout not produced from a seed which is destroyed and whose particles are seperated from each other but who have

1. न भाविते पुरुषहृद बुधहारेण संक्षां प्रतिकुल
tत्वान्तोऽक्रमूः प्राप्तमावधारः |
- वार्तिका on NS. 4.1.16.

2. ननु यदि बीजायक्याद्वृहारास्तिष्यरृपमदेनुः, न बीजम, कस्मात् आहृत्वाति: कृष्णिकला बीजपुष्पाददति ईष्यति वाह | ठरा बीजायक्यावृपादाने अवस्थनिविदया बीजमागच्छव्याच्चत्त्वात्यायान-मिक्तवः |
- NVTT. 4.1.16.
not yet formed another new combination? And why is it produced only when a new combination of the particles has taken place? Hence, it follows that in the absence of such a combination nothing can be produced out of mere destruction of the seed.

The Vṛtti also explains that the Siddhāntin does not mind if the expression "Upādyya prādurbhāvat" is taken in a figurative sense, but asks the opponent as to which thing he accepts as the material cause in the production of the sprout; the "destroyed seed" or the destruction of the seed?

If the destruction of the seed be the cause then it could be a material cause, or an instrumental cause.

The first alternative is not proper because destroyed seeds cannot serve as a material cause. Because of the same reason, the destruction of the seed also cannot be a material cause, as it is unable to produce. In this latter case, virāṭa in the sūtra should, signify destruction (virāṭa) - and from that destruction also, nothing can be produced, since, a material cause of an effect which is positively existent must be a "Dravya" (substance).

1. See NVTT 4. 1. 17.
2. 
3. 
The Vṛtti has given two different explanations of the sūtra. According to the first, the words of the sūtra are to be construed as 'Na, Vinasṭebhyah bijebhyah anispatteh'. The sprouts cannot be produced from seeds that are destroyed, so the statement, 'things are produced from negation' is not proper.

According to the other explanation, the sūtra should be construed as 'Na vinästebhyah anispatteh'. 'The sprout cannot be produced from destruction'. Because nothing is seen to be produced from mere destruction. The material (inherence) caused of a positively existent effect (bhāvakārya) must be a dravya (substance) while destruction (i.e. negation) is not a 'dravya'. In fact, it is one of the seven categories, and is known as 'Abhāva' which is other than 'dravya'.

"In so far as sequence is mentioned, we do not deny it"—is the Siddhāntin's statement. He admits that much of the opponent's view is acceptable to him.

The sequence consists of the regular precedence of the destruction (of the seed) and the immediate subsequence of the production (of the sprout). This sequence is given as a reason to prove the theory that things are produced out of negation. So far as the sequence is concerned, the Siddhāntin does not deny it; what he denies is only that this sequence could prove production out of negation.

1. The Vṛtti explains it as किन्तु किन्तु सत्तानात् भिन्न:।
2. बीमन्यास्त्येव शर्तात्यात् भिन्न:।

-Gangānātha Jhā's foot Note 7, p.248
Nyāya Sūtras, Sanskrit Text.
What is meant is that when owing to some unknown cause, the composition of the particles of the seed becomes disturbed, hence these particles abandon their previous combination and assume another one. It is from this latter combination that the sprout is produced. We actually see that the particles of the seed and their composition are the causes of the production of the sprout; and not that the negation is the cause. If negation were the cause of the sprout, then anything would be produced out of anything and everything, because, everywhere the negation is the same. As the Tatparjñāki clarifies, if the destruction of the rice and of the barley does not have any influence, which is continuous in the effect, it is all one and the same; and hence there is no rule as to why the sprout of rice is produced only from the seed of rice and the sprout of barley from the seed of barley and not otherwise? What is the difference of negations from their very inception? Moreover, since the causes are endowed with different qualities, the effects are also seen to have different qualities. If the causes are all alike, what difference in the qualities could there be? And if there is no difference in the qualities of causes; there should be no difference in the effects also.

1. "क्षमार्थस्य सङ्कुच्च्योऽपीदाहिताश्च: स्यात् कान्तिष्ठेयं: हृति शैष: ! - 
If the negation be the cause of the sprout, it is inexpressible." - adds Vācaspati in NṬṬ.

2. See NṬṬ, 4. 1. 17.
According to him, things cannot be produced from non-being or from negation; for all the prior negations (prāgabhāvas) are devoid of any natural difference and are all alike.

Furthermore, as the prior negation (prāgabhāva) is beginningless, the effect also must be beginningless, and this is not what we find, nor could it be admitted.

Of course, the siddhāntin does admit negation as helping another positively existent cause, because he accepts one negation to be quite distinct from the other. And it is because of this that he accepts the destruction of former colour etc., which are produced by the heat (pākaja).

The Vedic expression "Asādeva Saumyedamagra āsit" seems to be in favour of the opponent, but there is also another Vedic expression which is in favour of the Siddhāntin and it is, "Sādeva Saumyedamagra āsit, Kathamasataḥ Sajjāyeta?" O gentle one, there was existence alone in the beginning. How could existence be produced out of non-existence?

1. The Tātparya tīkā adds:

"The view that the worldly phenomena is a false appearance of Śūnyatā has been disposed of while refuting the Anirvacaniyakhaḍayati. Moreover, if everything be void, there would be the absence of knower. So the worldly phenomena cannot be said to have Śūnyatā as its material cause or to be a false appearance superimposed on Śūnyatā.

- NVTT, 4. 1. 18."
The Vartika, laying stress on the same point, explains that according to the opponent, when the seed of rice is destroyed, it has no potency to persist in the effect so the effect which is produced from this should be free from any influence of the cause. But in fact, it is not so. We see that the effects are produced as connected with the cause. It proves that negation is not the cause of entities; and except the component particles of the seed, there is no other cause for the production of the sprout. Hence it is right to say that the seed is the cause of the sprout and not false negation. Because, if the seed is not there, the component particles of the seed cannot be produced.

According to Visvanatha the opponent can either accept the destroyed seed as the operative cause, or the destruction of the seed as such a cause. Both are refuted above. If he accepts a third option, that the destruction of the seed (Vinaśa) is the efficient cause (nimittatvam) in the production of the sprout, this much is not denied, by the siddhāntin, as he also accepts the absence of an obstructing thing as a cause.

1. cf. प्रतिवन्यायाभ्यम हेतुवेनोपनायः - NV. on NS. G. 1. 18.
It is known that when the seed is destroyed, the sprout is produced. This means that the absence of that seed which is impeding, is the cause, of the sprout. It is only when the seed is destroyed and when the component particles of the seed are mixed, with water as well as with the component particles of the earth, that the sprout comes into existence. If mere negation were the cause, then from a seed, turned into powder also, the sprout should be produced; as the negation is there alright. But it is not produced. Hence a positively existent thing cannot come into existence from negation. And this is meant by the Sūtra "Kramanirdeśāt apratisedhah" - insofar as sequence is mentioned, this is not denied.

1. श्रीजे विनिष्टेऽहरो जायत हति प्रत्ययाय बंजस्य प्रतिबन्धकस्य अनावः कारणः ।

- Vṛtti of Viśvanātha on NS. 4. 1. 18.