about 550 B.C. whereas the Nyāya-Sūtras of Akṣapāda were written about 150 A. D. and Katyāyana (4th cent. B.C.) knew the Nyāya Sūtras. Dasgupta, considering this, regards Nyāya to be existent in some form as early as the 4th cent. B.C., admitting that some of the present sūtras were written sometime in the second century A.D.

According to Keith, Gautama should be regarded as later than Nāgārjuna and earlier than Asāṅga (i.e. about 300-350 A.D.)

Vātsyāyana's Nyāya-Bhāṣya, the earliest commentary on the Nyāya-Sūtra is assigned by Keith and Dasgupta to a period before the 4th Cent. A.D., while Jacobi placed it in 300 A. D. He may be placed even about Uddyotakara (about 450-500 A.D.) wrote a Vārttika on the Bhāṣya. Vācaspati's Tātparyaṭīkā on the Vārttika was written in about 840 A.D. (according to some somewhat later). The Pariśuddhi of Udayana (984 A.D.) is well written commentary on the Tātparyaṭīkā, which was commented upon by Vardhamāna (1225 A.D.) in his Nyāya-Nibandha-prakāśa.

1. History of Indian Literature, pp. 46-50.
3. History of Indian Philosophy, p. 279.
Jayanta's Nyāya-mañjarī (900 A.D.) is another well-known work commenting at length on some of the sūtras of Gautama.

All the well-known six Āstika (orthodox) systems of Indian philosophy, in one way or the other, undertake to help one to secure the attainment of salvation or emancipation (sāvarga), and the Nāstika (heterodox) systems of Indian philosophy like the Jaina and the Buddhism preached respectively the series of Āsrava, Samvara Nirjara and Mokṣa, and duḥkha, duḥkkhahetu, duḥkhanirodha and duḥkhanirodhagaminī/pratipad calculated to conduce to the attainment of emancipation.

As its very name signifies, the Nyāya system of thought in spite of having salvation as its final object, seems to represent more of Indian logic than of Indian philosophy. Bulcke says, "Nyāya is primarily a system of logic and dialectics.

In Aksapāda Gautama's 'Nyāya Sūtra', the basic treatise on Nyāya, the author points out the means of salvation as consisting of right knowledge which can be obtained by a clear comprehension of the following sixteen topics:


See also the statement of Bodas in his introduction to the "Nyāya is much more a system of dialectics than one of philosophy".
(i) the means of right cognition (Pramāṇa).
(ii) the objects of right cognition (Prameya).
(iii) doubt (samsāya).
(iv) motive (Prayojana).
(v) example (dṛṣṭānta).
(vi) theory (siddhānta).
(vii) factors of inference (avayava).
(viii) cogitation (tarka).
(ix) demonstrated truth (nirṇaya).
(x) discussion (vāda).
(xi) disputation (jalpa).
(xii) wrangling (vitaṇḍā).
(xiii) fallacious reasoning (hetvābhāsa).
(xiv) quibble (chala).
(xv) futile rejoinder (jāti).
(xvi) ground of defeat or clincher (nigrahasthāna).

After one has acquired full knowledge of the above topics or categories of knowledge the wrong notion (mithyā-jñāna) ceases, and then defects (doṣas), activity (pravṛtti), birth (janma) and pain (duḥkha) are annihilated and this annihilation leads to Salvation, the highest good.

There are in all four pramāṇas (sources of valid knowledge) according to Gautama. They are perception
(pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), analogy (upamāna) and verbal testimony (sabda).

Perception is defined as uncontradicted determinate knowledge, produced by the contact of the object with the sense-organ and free from verbal representation. Inference is of three kinds (i) from cause to effect (Pūrvaṇa) (ii) from effect to cause (Seṣavat) and (iii) inference from common characteristics (Saṁnyatodrṣṭa). Analogy is the knowing of one thing through knowledge of its resemblance to another.

The assertion of a reliable person (Spta) is word or verbal testimony (Sabda).

After enumerating and defining the pramāṇas, Gautama turns to the prameyas, which are twelve in number.

They are (i) Soul (Atman)  
(ii) body (Sarīra)  
(iii) sense-organs (indriya)  
(iv) things or objects (artha)  
(v) apprehension (buddhi)  
(vi) mind (manas)  
(vii) Activity (pravṛtti)  
(viii) defect (doṣa)
There are six indications of soul: desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and cognition. The body is the vehicle of organic actions, the sense-organs and objects. The five sense-organs are produced from the five material substances, viz.,

earth, water, fire, air and ether. Smell (or odour) taste, colour, touch and sound are the five qualities of the said five elements and these are also the objects of the senses. Apprehension (upalabdhi), cognition (jñāna) and intellection (buddhi) are synonymous terms. Remembrance, inference, intuition, dream, imagination, the perception of pleasure, pain, desire etc. and the non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions are the indicatives of mind.

Activity consists in the operating of speech, of mind, and of body.

Defects are those which cause the activity of man towards virtues or vices. Rebirth consists in being born

1. cf. युग्म्वं ज्ञानपुत्रिः — N.S. 1.1.16.
again, fruit is something produced by activity and defect. Pain is that which causes suffering. Absolute freedom from the aforesaid (pain etc,) is the ultimate good or final Release.

After the prameyas, Gautama defines सांस्याय or doubt. Doubts is the wavering judgment in which the cognition of the specific character of any object is wanting. It arises when through confusion of similar qualities or conflicting opinions one wants to settle one of the two alternatives.

The object aiming at which one acts, is called 'Motive'. Example, theory or doctrine, factors of inference, cogitation and demonstrated truth are then defined and here ends the first Āhnika (Daily Portion or Section) of the first Adhyāya.

The second Āhnika, after defining the three kinds of controversy viz. discussion, disputation and wrangling, goes on to describe hetvābhāṣas (fallacious reasons) which are of five types—savyabhicāra (inconclusive), viruddha (contradictory), prakaraṇasama (neutralised) sādvyasama, (unreal or unproved) and kālātīta (mistimed).

Quibble, futile rejoinder and clinchers are then defined at the end of the first Adhyāya.
The second Adhyāya starts with a detailed examination of doubt. Then we find the Purvapakṣa of the Mādhyamika Pātha (according to Vācaspatī Tātparātika) who says that perception and the rest cannot be regarded as instruments of cognition in account of the impossibility of connecting them with any of the three points of time.

Then follows the question of the correctness of the definition of perception. Discussing this, Gautama while refuting the view of the Buddhist, who rejected the existence of the wholes (avayavins), says that though we perceive only parts of things, yet since there is a whole, the part will naturally refer to the whole. Since we can pull and draw things, wholes exist and the whole is not merely parts collected together for if it were so, one could say, "We have perceived the ultimate parts or atoms". Gautama then goes on to examine inference, the nature of time, specially the present (तत्त्वाधार), analogy and verbal testimony.

The second Āhnikā of the second Adhyāya deals with the examination of the exact number of the Pramāṇas and discusses whether they should be regarded as four only.
or more and whether word is eternal or non-eternal; the meaning of words is then said to refer to individual and universal ( vyakti and jati). Akrti is that by which the class notion is manifested. Jati is defined as that which produces the notion of sameness.

The third Adhyaya begins with the examination of the first prameya, the soul. It is proved here that the soul is something distinct from the sense organs, body and mind and also that it is eternal. The body is, according to Gautama, constituted of earth.

It is then established that the sense-organs are made of material substances and are operative by contract and that there are diverse sense-organs (i.e. they are five) since the objects of the sense organs are five-fold, inasmuch as they have their existence indicated by the perceptions of odour, taste, colour, touch and sound, pointing out the objects of the sense-organs, Gautama says that odour, taste, colour and touch belong to earth; taste, colour and touch belong to water, colour and touch belong to fire, touch belongs to air and sound to ether.

The second Āhnika of the third Adhyaya starts with a discussion regarding the non-eternity of cognition.
(buddhi), cognition is a quality of the soul and not of the mind, nor can it subsist in the sense-organs or the objects. After establishing that cognition is evanescent it is shown that consciousness is not a quality of the body. The mind is then said to be one and atomic, since there is non-simultaneity of cognitions.

In the last portion of the third Adhyāya we find several proofs to the effect that the body is formed under the influence of adhṛṣṭa.

The first Āhnika of the fourth Adhyāya after defining activity and defects examines rebirth. Rebirth can be established only if the soul is regarded as eternal. Then in the course of explaining that the production of perceptible things is from perceptible things, Gautama comes to note some views regarding the production of things and these are referred to as being the views of some prāvādūkas, as Yātyayāna says.

This portion deals with the following theories:

1. The things of the world are produced out of Śūnya

2. cf. 3. 2. 60-72.

(void), (ii) that God is the cause of the universe, (iii) the world is the result of chance, (iv) that all things are non-eternal, (v) that all things are eternal, (vi) that all are diverse, (vii) that everything is negation, and (viii) certain sweeping assertions in regard to the exact number of things. At the end of this portion, release, pain and ultimate good or final release are examined.

The second Āhnika contains a short discussion regarding the way in which egoism ceases via the rise of the true knowledge of the causes of defects of the nature of passionate attachment to things and obsession with them. The view of the Nihilists that "all things are non-existent" is then incidentally refuted; and so also the theory of the Idealist Baudhāyas denying the external world. The process of the development of true knowledge is then dealt with, incidental mention being made of Yoga as a means of right (true) knowledge.

The whole of the fifth Ādyāva treats different kinds of futile Rejoinders (Jāti) and grounds of defeat (Migraha sthāna).
We thus see that the chapters on Pramāṇas or means of knowledge (and matters connected with them), and Prameyas or objects of knowledge comprehend most of the philosophy of Gautama. However, as Prof. Max Muller remarks: "Nor is logic the sole or chief end of Gautama's philosophy. Its chief end; like that of the other darsānas is salvation which is promised to all". But in as much as Nyāya is "a realistic philosophy based mainly on logical grounds," it introduces the sources of true knowledge and deals with them logically depicting these in every minute detail.

In order to get acquainted with Gautama's philosophical views, it is necessary to study carefully his detailed treatment of soul, the first and foremost of the twelve prameyas (objects of knowledge).

"There are", as is noted by Chatterjee and Datta, "four views of the self (soul) in Indian philosophy". The Cārvākas have a materialistic conception of the self and in their view, Self is the living body with its consciousness.

1. cf. Max Muller's 'The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy', pp. 369-370.
The Buddhhas accept only a series of point instants of consciousness (self other than this stream. The Vedāntic conception of the self is an idealistic one inasmuch as Advaitādīns hold the self either to be unchanging and self shining intelligence which is neither a subject nor an object or to be an intelligent subject called the 'I' (according to Viśiṣṭādvaita and others). The Nyāya, instead adopts a realistic view.

The existence of the soul, according to Gautama is proved by Inference. According to him, desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and cognition, are the indicatives of the soul.

When a person desires a thing, he strives to obtain it as something pleasurable. While desiring it he judges it to be similar to such objects as were found pleasurable in the past. This wish to acquire is possible only in one who, while remaining one and the same, perceives several things, since such a desire arises from his remembrance of a previous perception only; and thus that desire becomes an indicative of the soul. The same is the case with the aversion which he has towards certain things. And also, if no such one agent were there, who, perceiving a number of things and recollecting his past perceptions, makes an attempt to obtain a thing, effort would never be
possible. Hence a soul is established, who perceives a thing, and being permanent, recollects the perception. The previous experiences of pleasure and pain, thus being remembered, it is established that the soul is the experiencer of pleasure and pain in the past, their rememberer and their experiencer in the present. The desire to know, also proves the same agent as having the previous desire to know, and the consequent ponderings and becomes an indicative of the presence of the common agent in the shape of the 'soul'.

The body which is the receptacle of the soul's experiences of pleasure and pain, is the vehicle of actions, of the sense-organs and of objects.

The question arises: "Is the soul (which is spoken of as 'I') only an aggregate of body, the sense-organs, the mind, the intellect and sensations? Or is it something different from these?

In fact, it often happens that one thing, having been apprehended by sight, that same thing is apprehended by touch also, and the perceiver has the idea in his mind that "that thing which I saw with my eyes, I now touch

1. चेतसनियात्मकम्: सत्यम् | NS. 1.1.11.
with the organ of touch,"; or "that which I touched with
the organ of touch, I now see it with my eyes", which
means that the later idea recognises or recalls the
two perceptions as apprehending one and the same object
and having belonging to one and the same agent. This
agent cannot be an Aggregate (composed of the body and
the sense-organs), or the sense-organs. Hence the agent
is something entirely different from the composite or the
sense-organs and this is the soul.

So also, the soul is distinct from the body. If the
body were the soul, there would be no sin (pātaka) accru-
ing from the burning (killing) of a living body. To
explain, when the 'body' of a living creature is burnt
by a person, there accrues to him the 'sin' of killing
a living creature and it is this 'sin' that is called
'pātaka' in the sūtra. Now if the soul were the same
as the body, there could be no connection between such
'sin' and the agent who did the act. Because in that
case, the aggregate of the body etc. which did the
killing, would not have any connection with the result
of killing as it would perish; and what would be connected

1. दीर्घस्पतींनाध्याने कार्यायत्वाय । । -NS. 3.1.1.
2. शिरम्यादाहे पातकामिरावात । । -NS. 3.1.4.
with the results, would not be that by whom the killing was done. Thus, the doer and the experiencer of results being entirely different, it comes to this that the one who did the act becomes dissociated from what it did and from its consequences, while the one who did not perform the act becomes saddled with the act and its results. And if the said 'Creature' is one that is liable to birth and destruction, the birth of such a creature would not be due to its past actions, and this would mean that there could be no point in leading the life, of a 'religious student' (brahmacaryavāsa) for the purposes of release from birth and rebirth.

Thus, such a state being most undesirable, it follows that the soul must be something different from the aggregate of body etc.

That the soul is something distinct from the aggregate of the body is also inferred from the excitation appearing

1. स्व वति यो देहाभिक्षणातः प्राणिमूलो हिंसा करोति नासा  
हिंसाकलेन संबन्धते | यथा संबन्धते न तेन हिंसा कृता ।
- N. B. 3.1.4.

2. तदेवं सत्यमेवे कृत्यानमकृत्याम्यागमः प्रस्थत्तेऽः - N.B. 3.1.4.

3. सति व सत्योत्पादी सत्यनिरोधे व कार्यनिरूपः सत्यसमः  
प्राप्ताति | तत्र मुक्त्यथार्थः ब्रह्मवर्धास्ते न स्यात् ।
- Ibid.
in another sense-organ (than the one that brought about the preceding perception). So also, since there is recognition with the other eye of what has been seen with the left eye, in the form: "I see now what I had cognised (seem) previously", the soul must be regarded as something distinct from the body.

The fact that pleasure etc. are not cognised by means of visual and other organs, leads one to conclude that there is a distinct organ for the perceiving of pleasure etc. and this organ is the one whose existence is indicated by the non-simultaneity of cognitions. This organ is mind, an 'instrument', by means of which the conceiver does the conceiving of all things and thus the conceiver or the cogniser, i.e. the "soul" is distinct from the instrument of cognising; i.e. the "Mind".

A doubt now arises as to whether such a soul, is eternal or or non-eternal.

The answer to this is that these same arguments that have proved the soul's existence, also go to prove its previous existence, as is clear from the modifications undergone by this body.

1. शिक्षान्तरकाराक । - NS. 3. 1. 12.
2. युगकुल ज्ञानात्मविच मनसैं लिक्षाः । - NS. 1. 1. 16.
3. शाल्यश्चलनोपितमनि गान्येवम्यावघ्यां शिल्पिः ।

Introductory NB. on 3. 1. 18.
And this soul must exist even after the perishing of this body. Because, the new-born infant experiences joy, fear and sorrow, which could follow only from the continuity of remembrance of what has been repeatedly gone through before. Such continuity of remembrance could not but be due to previous repeated experience, which is possible only during a previous life. So that from all this, it is proved that after the destruction of that previous body, the soul continued to exist.

Here is another argument which proves the eternity of the soul. In the infant just born, we perceive a desire for the mother's milk, such a desire being indicated by the child's activity. This desire could not arise except from repeated experience in the past. It is hence inferred that the infant had a body previous to this present one, in which body, it had gone through repeated experiences of feeding which has given rise to its present desire for milk. Therefore, it follows that what happens is that the soul, having departed from his previous body has become endowed with a new body, and on being afflicted with hunger, remembers his repeated feedings in the past and accordingly desires the milk.

1. पूवाभ्यस्तस्मृत्युजन्याभास्तत्व हरि́म्यशोकम्यमन्तिक्षे: | -NS. 3. 1. 18.

2. प्रेत्याहारम्यास्तलाव चतुःमिलाताय | -NS. 3. 1. 21.
from the breast. And it must be the same soul that continues to exist, even after the perishing of the former body.

And also, the eternity of the soul is proved because persons free from longing are never found to be born. When a person is born, he is born as beset with longings, this longing could be due only to the recalling of mind of things previously experienced and this 'previous experience' of things in a preceding life could not be possible without a body. Hence what happens is that the soul, remembering the things experienced and found pleasant by him in his previous body comes to 'long' for them. There are similar links between his previous life and his life preceding that, and between that and a life preceding that and so on, which shows that the connection of the soul with bodies has been without beginning and his connection with longings also is without beginning and from this beginningless series of attachments and consequent bodies, it follows that the soul is eternal. This eternal soul is regarded as vibhu ('all-pervading').

The Nyāya accepts different souls in different bodies. Whether the body, which is the receptacle of the soul's experiences of pleasure and pain, is formed due to man's

2. See NS. 3. 2. 18-19 and the Bhāṣya on it.
acts (karman) or is the product of the substances, independently of any karman is discussed by Gautama in the *Nyāya-sūtra*. He is of the opinion that "The formation of the Body is due to the persistence of the effect of previous acts.

The actions in the shape of the activity of Speech, thought and bodily activities, done by the person in his previous body produce the effect which is in the form of merit and demerit (dharmadharman). This effect of the previous actions, continues as subsisting in the soul, and the formation of the body is out of the material substances as determined by the said persistence of "merit and demerit", and not out of the material substances by themselves independently.

"The body is produced out of material substances, independently of karma and accomplishes the purposes of man, just like the material bodies, in the shape of the grains of sand, Pebbles, Stones, etc." This cannot be accepted as a reason, as what is urged here is still to be proved. And in fact, the material bodies like sand etc.

1. किमप्रथप्रणविनिविच: शरीरस्य: बाहोऽ
   मूलमात्रात्तदप्रणविनिविचः? शरीरस्य:
   Introductory Nyāya Bhāṣya on 3.2.60.

2. cf. पुरुषाक्तिप्रसन्नकार्यकृत्याकृत्यः | NS. 3.2.60.
are produced without seeds, while the body is always produced from seed in the form of blood, semen, etc. of the mother/father. And what bring about the birth of the body out of the material substances in the mother's womb are (i) that 'Karman' of person himself, which is conducive to the experiences to be gone through by him in the mother's womb, and (ii) the Karman of the parents which is conducive to the experiences resulting from the birth of the child.

So also, the food, that is to say what is eaten and drunk, is also the cause of the formation of the Body. Moreover, every copulation of the parents does not bring about conception. It is explained that in the absence of the necessary influence of karman, no conception takes place, and when such an influence is there, conception does take place. If the material substances be independent, of any such influence there should be certainty of conception, but it is not the case. Further more, just as karman is the cause of the formation of the Body, so is it also of the connection of the body (with a particular soul). Only a particular soul is connected with a particular body, due

1. Cf. NS. 3. 2. 63 and the Bhāṣya on it.
2. Cf. NS. 3. 2. 64.
3. Cf. प्राप्तो वाणिज्यात् — NS. 3. 2. 65
   and the Bhāṣya on the same.
4. शरीरश्वरिनिनिमित्तं संयोगोत्पत्तिनिमित्तं कर्म । —NS. 3. 2. 66.
to the karman of that soul, This Destiny, as we might call it, determines the exact body fit for the experiences of that particular soul in which the karmic residuum subsists and connects that body with that soul. And also, the separation (freedom) of the soul from the Body is rendered possible only by the possibility of the exhaustion of karma.

Some assert that the formation of the body is, like the blackness due to very nature or the [Unseen](adrṣṭa) of the atoms, but in that case even after final release there would be likelihood of a Body being produced. And they hold that just as the dark colour of the Atom (of clay) is eternal and yet when it is set aside by fire contact (in baking), it does not appear again,—in the same manner, the Body, though formed (by the Unseen of the Atoms) would not appear again after final Release.

But this would involve the accepting of what is not earned because in the position mentioned above, one would have to experience pleasure and pain, without having done acts which would lead to the same, and then this would be contradictory to perception, inference and scripture.

1. नागुःत्कासद्वितिस्वतात्त्वात् — NS. 3. 2. 71.
2. नागुःत्कासद्वितिस्वतात्त्वात् — NS. 3. 2. 72.
We perceive that the pleasure or pain experienced by each individual soul is distinct. It would not be so if there were no speciality in the cause. In fact, if the advent of pleasure and pain is regarded as due to 'destiny,' the actions being strong or weak, their karmic residuum being correspondingly more or less potent, and acts being of diverse or uniform character, there is the distinction such as strong and weak, belated and quick etc. in the pleasures and pains experienced by each individual soul, and this is not contrary to our experience.

We see that an intelligent person having recognised a certain pleasure as brought about by a certain means, desires the pleasure, makes an effort to obtain the means and thereby obtains that pleasure, and does not obtain otherwise. Similarly a person having recognised a certain pain, makes an effort to avoid the means and thereby avoids the means, and thereby avoids the pain, and not otherwise. But we also find that there are certain pleasures and pains that accrue to a person without any effort on his part, and on the strength of the well known facts just mentioned we infer that the accruing of these pleasure and pains also must be due to some other quality of the intelligent beings and this quality is merit or demerit constituting the person's Destiny. This inference would be contradicted if the accruing of pleasure and pain were held to be not due to destiny.
So also there are scriptures written by several sages containing the instructions imparted by those sages, in regard to the performance and avoidance of actions and the resultant activities of men consisting of performance, or their cessation from activity consisting of their avoidance of action. Both these kinds of action, good or evil, would be impossible under the philosophy of the opponent, whose philosophy is contrary to the view (which is in consonance with the scriptures) that the accruing of pleasure and pain to persons is due to Destiny.

Rebirth (pretyabhāva) is the eighth prameya and as the definition goes: "Rebirth consists in being born again".

Some may say that inasmuch as the Nyāya school regards the soul as eternal, it cannot explain pretyabhāva; an eternal thing never departs and hence is never reborn. The answer to this is: "Rebirth is possible only because the soul is possible only because the soul is eternal". In fact, it is the eternal soul that departs, abandons the former body, and having thus departed, having

1. cf. MB on 3. 2. 78.
2. पुनुगुप्तविवेच्यः प्रेत्यमाबः - MB. 1. 1. 13.
3. भाल्मनिलयबः प्रेत्यमाब सिद्धिः - MB. 4. 1. 10.
abandoned the former body, takes up another one, and it is these two (departing and coming) that have been spoken as Rebirth. Those, in whose philosophy Rebirth consists of the birth of one entity and destruction of another entity, would be faced with the absurdity that one entity would be deprived of the fruit of its deeds while another one would be saddled with the fruits of the actions not done by him. And in the theory of those who hold that there are causes bringing about destruction of the Being in the body, the teachings of the sages would be entirely useless.

Now, as Rebirth does not consist of "destruction and production" it becomes necessary to determine the exact nature of the production.

The production of perceptible (vyakta) things is from perceptible things. We actually see that out of such substances as the clay and the like, which are endowed with the qualities of colour and the rest are produced objects of the same kind, (i.e. possessed of the qualities of colour etc.) - and from this fact (perceived in connection with visible objects) we infer

1. यस्य तु सत्त्वोत्पत्तिः सत्त्वनिर्यायः प्रेत्यभावः तस्य कृत्यानि-
कृत्याम्यागमस्ते दौष्ट्यः (उच्छ्वेदस्यसि अर्युपदेशयामस्यकोपनशीलिः)

- MB. 4. 1. 10.
the same in connection with invisible things also. That is, in the case of the clay etc., we find that the presence of colour and other qualities is common to the material cause as well as its product and from this we deduce the same in regard to the eternal nature of the eternal super-sensuous things (atoms) also.

Here, we see that the Nyāya theory of causation at the time of its origin stands midway between the Satkarya-vāda of Śāṅkhya and the Pratītyasamutpāda based on the Kṣaṇikavāda of the Bauddhas. Buddhists do not recognise any permanent substratum. Things exist only for a moment in this view. At every moment a new entity is produced, the former one is destroyed and the only reality in this situation is a perpetual flux of phenomena. The Śāṅkhya maintained the manifestation of the effect from a permanent material cause; and no new entity is produced in his view, only the one which was already there is manifested.

But for the follower of the Nyāya system the effect is something new, which did not exist before. Inasmuch as it upholds the production of a thing which was non-existent before, it is called atkāryavāda. But the substratum, viz. the eternal atoms, of which all things are made, are permanent, so the effect is made up of all the atoms of its material cause with their eternal specific qualities; and these qualities are not newly produced, but
only manifested in the various perceptible products.

The ultimate material cause therefore remains the same but a new effect can come into existence only after the evanescence of the proximate material cause and the component atoms therein are rearranged. The new effect and its inherent cause are quite different. The effect inheres in the cause.

The cause (karma) is that which invariably and necessarily precedes the effect (kārya-niyata-pūrva-vṛtti), excluding all that does not directly contribute to the result.

Three kinds of causes are here distinguished:

The inherent cause (samavāyi kāraṇa) can only be a substance. It is the material out of which a product is made or a substance in which a quality or a movement inheres.

The non-inherent cause (asamavāyi kāraṇa) is either a quality or a movement which inheres in the inherent cause. The third one is the efficient or operative cause, (nimitta kārma) and all those causes that cannot be included under the two previous headings are included here. It is subdivided into general efficient causes (sāmānya nimitta kārma), which include God, this knowledge, desire and activity, space and time, adṛṣṭa etc.) and particular efficient causes

1. Cf. NS. 3. 2. 16; NB. 4. 1. 18.
(- the agent, and the instumental cause or karana), which by its operation produces the effect). Causality is thus first and foremost a relation of inherence (Samavaya).

Nyāya Sūtra 4.1.11, as we saw above, describes the production of perceptible things from perceptible causes. Then it proceeds to discuss some theories or views of opponents regarding the causation of things. There are, as said above, eight such views, put forth for discussion (NS. 4. 1. 14-43) and Vātsyāyana calls them prāvāduka-dṛṣṭis (heterodox or heretical views).

How such a portion of philosophical discussion was placed in the midst of the exposition of the topics of the Nyāya system is still a riddle. Scholars like Prof. Jacobi are apt to believe that this portion of the work was a later addition and Dasgupta also agrees.

"Hence Bodas comes to the conclusion: the aphorisms of Gotama and the works founded on them treat no doubt of metaphysical and theological questions occasionally but they come in rather as digressions than as inseparable parts of the system."

2. Introduction (pp.XIII-XV) to Tarkasaṅgraha by Bodas.