While reading the Brahma-sūtra Śāṅkara Bhāṣya for my paper on Vedanta Sāstra for the M. A. Examination, I was somewhat intrigued to find one whole pāda of Adhyāya II devoted to the refutation of other systems of philosophy. Later, I tried to find out if similar phenomenon could be traced in any of the other dārśanikā sūtras. Though refutation of some views could be found in the course of the exposition of a relevant topic here and there in other sūtras, it was only in the Nyāya-Sūtra that I came across a whole section separately devoted to the refutation of what were called 'Prāvādika-ḍrṣṭis', this being the only section thus comparable to the Tarka-pāda of the Brahma-sūtra. What is particularly noteworthy however is that while in the Brahma-sūtra, the doctrines that are refuted are the well-known ones of the sāṁkhya, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc, in the Nyāya Sūtra most of the heterodox views which come in for refutation are not so well known except perhaps the views regarding Śūnya and God. But again one is perplexed to find in the Nyāya Sūtra a refutation of the belief in God, especially when the Nyāya-darśana is known to recognize God as the creator of the world. Hence, I felt assured that a careful and comparative study of this section of the Nyāya-sūtra should definitely prove to be a fascinating one.
Gautama is the first to systematize the doctrines of the Nyāya dārśana which also like other philosophical systems of India aims at emancipation. The Nyāya sūtra introduces for critical examination sixteen padārthas, the true knowledge of which is considered essential for emancipation. While discussing 'Rebirth' (pretyabhāva), the seventh prameya (object of cognition), Gautama examines and refutes several philosophical views, keeping in mind that their detailed study would unfold to us ever expanding horizons of knowledge, an attempt is made here to present the same in some detail. I have tried to present these views as they have been interpreted by Gautama and his commentators, and to detect their resemblance if any with ancient theories. Obviously the present work of mine has comparatively little to do with the strictly logical portion of the Nyāya Sūtra.

I have endeavoured in this work to present the relevant text of the Nyāya-sūtra with as much clarity and completeness as I could manage. While presenting the Nyāya-sūtra along with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, in order to elucidate some of the critical points involved in the composition of the more intricate portions of the Nyāya sūtra I have freely drawn on the Nyāya-Vārtika of Uddyotakara, Nyāya-Vārtika Tātparyāṭika of Vācaspati Miśra and Nyāya-sūtra Vṛtti of Viśvanātha. Jayanta's Nyāya-maṅjarī was occasionally consulted. In the exposition of the sūtra and the Bhāṣya I have freely used the translation by
Ganganatha Jha. I have also consulted Ganganatha Jhā's translation of the Nyāya Vārtika and I have referred to it at places where it was found necessary to do so.

I have also undertaken the somewhat more exacting and interesting task of finding out as to whether some such or more or less similar views existed and could be found still earlier in the earlier scriptural literature. Even in the Vedas, we find some similar thoughts or principles expressed in similar terms. In fact, it would be no exaggeration to assert that almost all these views were existent in the time of the Upaniṣads or slightly later. The Buddhist Piṭakas and the Jain Āgamas appear at times to have dwelt at length on them even with greater clarity and with a wealth of detail, ordinarily not found elsewhere. Some difference here and there could naturally be expected, but the treatment throughout appears to have remained more or less philosophical. Some views are found mentioned alike in Buddhist and Jaina works with comparatively negligible additions or alterations, mostly formal - in the matter of choice of phrase and expression rather than in substance as such. I have therefore endeavoured to present their comparative study in as short a compass as possible without embarking upon any undue and elaborate exposition. I have tried to explore the original forms of these views as presented in the Buddhist Piṭakas and the Jain Āgamas, and to trace their relation with the Prāvāduka dṛṣṭis of the Nyāya Sūtra.
And I am glad to say that such a study has enabled me to trace the origin of a number of controversial points under study. This process of exploration was undoubtedly beset with many difficulties because no fixed date can be stated for the various treatises; much less for the views as they were originally propounded.

While going through the various Upaniṣads, Piṭakas and Āgamas, and in presenting their study the idea which was paramount in my mind all along was to seek, to find and to collect such resemblance as could be discerned alike in respect of expression and ideas. It will be noticed that the word Prāvāduka has come to mean 'heretic' or 'heterodox' and who these heretics meant by the Nyāya sūtra were is one of the points taken up for study. It is ironical that the view which is here said to be heretical is at times found to be the orthodox view of the Bauddhas themselves in the piṭakas. It is interesting to observe that sometimes a view described in the Nyāya-sūtras as heretical is presented in the Buddhist or the Jaina works also as belonging to some heretics.

Considerable attention is bestowed by me on the canonical works, especially because they belong to an earlier date. Works of a later date than that of the Nyāya-sūtra are deliberately kept beyond the purview of this study, for the simple reason that they are later. And even the commentators of the early scriptural works seem to be highly indebted to and influenced
by the Nyāya-bhāṣya and the Nyāya-Vārtika. For instance, the arguments used by Uddyaṇotakara to establish the existence of God in his Vārtika, are given almost verbatim by Śīlāṅka in his Vṛtti on the Śūtrakṛtāṅga. This is but one instance I have selected out of many I could find in such texts and these commentaries definitely seem to be indebted to Vātsyāyana and Uddyaṇotakara as the case may be.

Besides the Vedic literature and Buddhist and Jaina canonical works, modern works have also been consulted and they have been referred to by me in this study wherever it was found necessary to do so. Special mention may be made of the "History of Indian Philosophy", by S. Dasgupta, "History of Indian Literature" Vol. I and II by M. Winternitz, and "History of Pre-buddhist Indian Philosophy" by Benimadhab Barua. C. Bulcke's "Theism of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika" and Gopīkāmohana Bhāṭṭācārya's "Studies in Nyāya Vaiśeṣika Theism" also proved to be of considerable help and guidance.

Attempts, though to a limited extent, have already been made elsewhere in the direction of such a study, and more or less on the same lines. In his scholarly introduction to the English translation of the Nyāya-sūtra by Gaṅgānātha Jhā Dr. Gopālānātha Kavirāja has briefly noted these views and suggested that this line of pursuit was likely to yield valuable results. He has also hinted at the doctrines found in Buddhist works.
This paved the way for the study I have presented here. An article in Sanskrit on the same lines by Shri Kisoranātha Jhā is included in the Kṣhetresā Chandra Chattopādyaẏāya Felicitation Volume (Pt.1)( published in the Journal of the Gaṅgānāth Jhā Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyāpeetha, July, Oct., 1971). Jhā also appears to have hinted very briefly at some of the likely sources of these views, or at paralleled views. At places, he has quoted Uddyotakara and Vācaspati to clarify Gautama's idea. An article 'Human effort versus God's effort in the early Nyaya' contributed by H. H. Ingalls to 'Dr. S. K. Belvalkar Felicitation Volume' requires special mention. Ingalls has especially dealt with the problem of Īśvara being the cause of the fruits of man's actions. The portion called Īśvaropādānatāprakaraṇam (NS. 4.1.19-21) has provided material for considerable thought and called for elaborate discussions. The question whether Nyāya believes in God has to be dealt with and resolved on the basis of, and with the help derived from this portion of the Nyāya sūtra only. This being included in the Prāvāduka-dṛṣṭis, this portion presents considerable complications as no mention of God is found everywhere else in the Nyāya sūtra as a whole.

Thus while some of the doctrines mentioned among the Prāvāduka-dṛṣṭis have been dealt with by the above-mentioned scholars, no one, to my knowledge, has yet taken up this section on prāvāduka-dṛṣṭis for a special study, especially on the lines of comparision with views that can be traced in the Upaniṣads and Buddhist and Jaina canonical works.
In chapter I, I have given a brief idea of the contents of the Nyāya sūtra and the relevant topics of Nyāya philosophy; and tried to point out the relevance of the Prāvādukaḍrṣṭis to these. Then from chapter II to chapter IX, I have given a detailed exposition of the prāvādukaḍrṣṭis in the same order as in the Nyāya-sūtras. I have presented the interpretations of Vātsyayana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati, Udayana (on the basis of Gaṅgānāth Jhā's foot notes in his Sanskrit edition of the Nyāya-sūtra-) and Viśvanātha. I have not here allowed my own interpretation to interrupt the exposition as found in the different commentaries, though I have specifically pointed out the difference of view, if any among the different commentators. In chapters X, XI and XII, I have dealt with the more or less similar views I came across in the Vedic literature, the Buddhist Piṭakas and the Jaina Āgamas respectively. In presenting these views, I have remained faithful to the original texts, and taken care to reproduce the extracts from the Upaniṣads, Piṭakas and Āgamas verbatim, though at times these quotations might seem to be rather lengthy. I thought it was necessary to quote at length in order to give an idea of the clearcut method of presentation and also resemblances if any.

In the last chapter I have tried to compare the prāvādukaḍrṣṭis as found in the Nyāya sūtras with different views presented in earlier literature. I must admit, that it has not been possible
to trace point to point similarity of the Prāvāduka drṣṭis with these ancient doctrines. This difference in presentation could be accounted for by a consideration of the different modes of approach, and presentation. The Nyāya sūtra is primarily a systematic work on philosophy; while the Upaniṣāds, though aiming at the presentation of philosophical thoughts, do not contain any logical argument; they even resort to the 'dialogue' method of presentation, or the method of explaining by presenting same analogy. The Buddhist Pīṭakas and the Jaina Āgamas similarly do not indulge in any logical presentation as such; their idea on the other hand is to use appealing and colloquial expressions for preaching the ethical virtues and the religious and philosophical views. Here too we find dialogues or parables. The Nyāya sūtra aimed at a strictly logical and dialectical mode of presenting and refuting these 'prāvādukadṛṣṭis and so perhaps brought out the ideas and arguments implicit in the original presentation, and even added a few arguments of its own to make the pūrṇapakṣa equally strong and appealing, before refuting it. Whatever I could gather as a result of such a comparative exploratory and critical study is presented here with utmost humility in the context of the unexplored vastness which lies beyond.

To my knowledge, no scholar has yet devoted full attention to a detailed, critical and textual study of the prāvāduka drṣṭis of the Nyāya-sūtra on the basis of the Bhāṣya, the Vṛttika,
Similarly, the philosophical views found in the Buddhist Pitakas and Jaina Agamas have not been studied in the light of the presentation of the Prāvādaśīstis of the Nyāyaśūtra. The views in the Upaniṣads especially have not been considered in the light of the views found in the 'heterodox' systems. I have attempted this to some extent.

The difference in interpretation and approach as found in the different commentaries has also not been paid full attention to. I have attempted this, though my field of survey was necessarily a limited one.

Many scholars have tried to give their interpretation of the sutras dealing with the refutation of the theory of God. I have added an interpretation of my own after a study of these researches as also the original texts. I feel that the sutras (NS. 4. 1. 41-43) dealing with 'Saṃkhyaikāntavāda' have similarly not been interpreted in the proper perspective by the commentators, and this has led Ingalls to say in his above-mentioned article that he has not been able to make any sense out of this particular portion. Gopinātha Kāvirāja also regards this as mysterious. I have attempted to interpret there sutras in my own way, and I look to scholars for guidance.
In all humility I submit this work in which I have presented the result of my sincere study pursued out of love for the subject of Indian Philosophy as presented in the original texts. Whatever help and hints I got from the works of scholar, I have greatfully acknowledged. I hope this study of mine will make some contribution, however humble it may be to the advancement of knowledge and to the understanding of the development of Indian philosophical thought in particular and Indian culture in general.