CHAPTER- XIII

Comparison of Views

In the foregoing chapters, we have considered various heterodox or heretical views which seem to have existed in the days of the Upaniṣads, Buddha and Mahāvīra. Some of them appear to bear resemblance to some extent to the heretical views, which we come across in the Nyāya-Sūtra, 4. 1. 14-43. It would be interesting to examine the degree and extent of their resemblance to these views to arrive at some reasonable conclusion regarding their propounders. And we might thus succeed in determining the sources of some of the views that are refuted in the Nyāya-Sūtras.

We have already mentioned and discussed these various heretical views in the foregoing chapters and hence we proceed to compare them with the Prāvāduka-dṛṣṭis of the Nyāya-Sūtras. The Nyāya-Sūtraș, 4. 1. 14-43, as we have seen, discusses the heretical views in eight sections which are named:

(i) Śūnyatopādānāprakāraṇam;
(ii) Īśvaropādānatāprakāraṇam;
(iii) Ākasmikatvanirākaraṇaprapakāraṇam;
(iv) Sarvāntyanirākaraṇaprapakāraṇam;
(v) Sarvanityatvanirākaraṇaprapakāraṇam;
(vi) Sarvaprthaktvanirākaraṇaprapakāraṇam;
(vii) Sarvasunyatānirākarānaprakaraṇam;
(viii) Sāmkhyākāntavādānirākarānaprakaraṇam.

(i) Sunyatopādānaprakaraṇam:

This view pertains to the production of things or entities from negation. It is said in N.S. 4. 1. 14 that things are produced out of Negation because, nothing comes into existence without having destroyed (its cause). The reason given in the latter part of the sutra is, according to Viścāspati, an indicative, illustrative one, since "because things are produced from Asat", also can be adduced as a reason.

This theory of production from negation or non-existence is as old as the Vedas. We have already referred to the philosophic riddle which often confused the Vedic seers as to what there was in the beginning of the world. Was it 'Being' or 'Non-being'? The seer of the Nasādīya hymn said, 'Non-being then existed not, nor being', and proceeded to say in the language of mysticism:

"The bond of being in non-being sages, Discovered searching in their hearts with wisdom". As we have been

1. cf. उपसर्ग चैति नातुपूर्ब्ब प्रादुर्भावादिति।
   कतु उत्पादादिवर्णीपि इष्टायु।
   - NvTT on NS. 4.1.14.

2. RV. X. 129. 1. - नासदास्वन्तोऽसदासितः।

3. सता बन्दुप्रसति निराविन्दनः।
   हृदि प्रतीष्ठा कच्चयो मनोजगः। - कृत्व, १०. १२६. ५.
RV. X. 72.1 expressed the idea a bit confidently that
"In the earliest ages of Gods, from what was not, arose
what is".  

But no further argument or proof was put forth to
strengthen or oppose this view in the Vedas. The Satapatha
Brāhmaṇa also took note of such a view, "Verily in the
beginning, there was the non-existent". We have also
referred to the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, 2. 2. 9. 1; according
to which there was nothing in the beginning, and "Being
non-existent as such; it desired to be".

We may again recollect the Brhadāranyaka view, "that
there was nothing in the beginning". And the Subāla Upanisad
can be said to support it when it says that, "all these
creatures arise being rootless, supportless".

This leads us to suppose that there was a school of
philosophers who thought of creation as having arisen from
Negation. The attempt of Uddālaka Aruni in the Chāndogya-
upaniṣad to explain to his son that existence can never
come out of non-existence, also could enable us to say

1. देवानां पूर्वेऽति अतः सदगायत
2. Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, 6. 1. 1. 1.
that such a view did exist but it was not accepted by all the philosophers; only a certain school of them admitted the view. That is why Uddalaka examines both the doctrines and pronounces his own view:

"Some hold that in the beginning there was that only which is not; one only without a second; and it is from that which is not, that which is was born. But how could it be thus? How could the existent be born of the Non-existent? Being (or Existence) was, therefore, there in the beginning; (from which the creation emerged). And the same passage then explains how things up to the earth were created from it (Being or existence); and made tripartite.

The Sutrakrṣṭāṅga, giving the view of Ātmaśaṣṭhavādins, says: "The non-existent never comes to be; to exist." Sutrakrṣṭāṅga II. 2 also emphatically says that 'What is does not perish; the non-existent cannot come into existence. (like the horns of a hare)" (Gṛṇi). It is likely that there was a view prevalent explaining creation out of Negation, which is denied here.

1. - तद्हैं स्फ ब्राह्मणः
कस्यैव त्रां भाषे द्विकीवाविकिताय तत्प्राध्यत् सज्जायत्
कुलस्तुलु ललोधेयव स्यात्रत्तत्त्व प्रकृतिः सज्जायत्
सदैव सामेजेय गाये मेवेद्य मात्रायांति
- हर्प-रोपयु उपनिषद, ६.२. १-२.

2. Sutrakṛṣṭāṅga, 1.1.1.16.
The Bhagavadgītā (2.16) also refers to such a view; and says: "What is not (or is non-existent), cannot come to be; and what is, cannot perish".

It is evident that this is the same view as noted above. The view that a non-existent thing is always non-existent and never comes to exist and also the view that an existent thing never ceases to be were firmly held by some prominent philosophers. It was hence necessary to come to some conclusion regarding such disputes; consequently, Nyāya and other philosophical systems had to examine them carefully.

Now, what could the thinkers have meant when they said that everything arose out of 'asat', and others, opposing them urged what everything rose out of 'sat'? Of course, they could not have said that nothing whatsoever was there. Either they meant that what was there, lost its identity, and quite a new thing came into existence; or that there was initially nothing of the effect even in an unmanifest form; and quite a new thing came into existence. The former line of thought gradually developed into the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness and the latter into the Asatkar-yavāda of the Nyāya school. As against this, others held that the cause persists in the effect; nothing is destroyed, or the effect is present potentially in the cause; and is only made manifest. This inspired the Jaina and the Sāṃkhyā currents of thought.
Here the Nyāya Sūtra refutes the view that things are produced out of Negation, because the effect arises only after destroying the cause. This refutation seems to be directed against the Vaināśika Buddhists. They uphold the doctrine of momentariness. They can be said to be of the view that things are produced from negation, as in their view, everything is momentary. In one moment, the former entity is destroyed, and a completely new entity is born at the next moment. So, it is from destruction, that the new entity is born.

The Nyāya theory is quite contrary to this. According to it, no production can be there out of a destroyed thing. Destruction and production may be there in a sequence; and such a sequence is certainly accepted by Nyāya. What that Nyaya urges is that this mere sequence cannot prove the rise of existence out of non-existence.

We have already seen earlier that according to Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Visvanātha, this portion (4-1-19 to 21) seeks to establish God as the operative cause of the Universe. Vācaspati, however, has tried to justify the occurrence of

1. श्रीजोपयदेऽश्रुत्वम् पुराणवम्, व न प्रतिष्ठित्यं, किंतू तस्य क्रमस्य क्वात्मायां अंकितार्थनात्मकं प्रतिष्ठित्यं सव।
this particular portion among the Prāvādika drstis (which are supposed to represent mainly the heretical views) by saying that here also the Vedāntic theory that God is the constituent cause (upādana-kārana) of the world is refuted; and God is established as an efficient cause of the world instead in as much as God allots unto man but the fruits of the latter's actions although it is not possible to deny that man's actions are in their turn influenced by God.

In the Vedic Saṁhitās, we see that the belief in one god (Īśvara) was not fully formulated. Any are of the Gods was described as Almighty; the creator of the world; and so forth. Later, more definite ideas emerged and Puruṣa or Hiranyagarbha or Visvakarman was conceived as one Supreme Entity, and the creator of the world. In the Brahmanas and the Upaniṣads, too, we have the concept of the supreme God who transforms himself into the form of the world and is both, immanent and transcendent.

The Vedas and the Upaniṣads believed in God, but schools like Sāṁkhya, Mīmāṁsā etc. did not admit any God or creator. The Bauddhas also did not recognize God, or Creator in the true sense of the term. The Dīghanikāya as we have seen, gives an account where a Brahmā is recognised, but he is not really the Creator of the world. It is said there that when the world system begins to re-evolve, some being falls from the world of Radiance to
this world, in the palace of Brahma which appeared therein. After him come many more beings. But those beings, as well as the first born, all think alike that the latter is Brahma; the great Brahma, Supreme One, the Mighty, the All-seeing, the ruler, the lord of all, the Maker, the creator the chief of all, appointing to each his place, the Father of all that are and are to be. And the other beings are his creation. Because it was he who was there first and the others came after him.

No other firm belief or sound argument is advanced to prove or disprove such a belief in God or the Creator or the Superintendent. Buddha himself never got involved in any such argument regarding the existence or otherwise of God or Creator.

Asanga, in his Yogācārabhūmi, takes note of and refutes the view of those, who hold that the joys and sorrows experienced by man, are created by an Isvara. It is urged that the deeds done by men and their fruits are not always found to be in accordance with the intention of those men (Compare NS. 4.1.19), so it follows that there is someone who brings about this state of affairs and that someone is the creator; the lord, Sṛṣṭa, Nirmātā, like a father of all creatures. (Compare NS. 4.1.21)

1. ....... ये नावमेव पवित्र अक्षित सः कश्चिवल्काः पुष्टा निमित्ता पितृमुल्लो मातामातीश्वरः तदन्यः केति |

Compare NB. 4.1.21, where the expression is similar.
Similarly, in the Jātakamāla, a view is recorded, according to which as the universe cannot possibly exist without a cause, and as there must be someone who rules it, a God should be there, who, according to his will, creates and dissolves the world. And this view is then refuted by the Bodhisattva.

But as Prof. Daniel H. H. Ingalls remarks: "Among the beliefs concerning man which are essential in the old Nyāya is a belief in the efficacy, of human effort". But as we have seen, according to Gautama, karma is the cause of the formation of body and it is karma which invariably determines the connection of a given soul with a particular body. Hence the real problem is: as to what is the efficient cause of the universe, that is to say, how is the origin of things determined?

Now, Gautama does in fact enumerate and describe the soul (ātman) as the first prameya but he altogether omits to include Īśvara in that list. Viśvanātha appears to have noticed this and so perhaps suggests that out of the six indicatives of the soul as enumerated by Gautama, three viz. aversion, pleasure and pain are the indicatives of the ātman.

1. See his article "Human effort versus God's effort in the early Nyāya (NS. 4.1. 19-21)" in Dr. S.K. Belvelkar Felicitation Volume, p. 228.
i.e. soul, whereas cognition, desire and effort are the indicatives of Paramātman, Īśvara. But Visvanātha might only be saying that cognition, desire and effort are the characteristics of all souls in general, whereas the transmigrating soul steeped in ignorance has aversion, pleasure and pain as its characteristic mark.

Anyway, these three sutras, (NS. 4.1.19-21) are the only sutras in which we find Gautama dealing with the concept of Īśvara.

Vātsyāyana also seems to have been puzzled as to in which category (padārtha) Īśvara could be included and hence he has commented that: "God also is a soul distinctly endowed with certain other qualities; in other words, he is a being of the same kind as soul. He cannot be put under any other category save that of 'Soul' with some difference in qualities. Hence, God is defined as a particular soul endowed with certain qualities such as absence of demerit, wrong knowledge and negligence, and with merit, knowledge and moreover, intuitiveness. He is omnipotent in regard to his creation and he supervises and governs the act of fruition of the deeds done by the being he creates.

1. cf., Vṛtti on NS. 1.1.10-

2. NB. 4.1.21
"It is instructive to note" writes M. Hiriyanna, "that in all probability the belief neither in god nor in the Veda was originally a part of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika teaching*. The Vaiśeṣika sūtras expound at length the essential concepts of the soul theory but nowhere do they mention the Highest soul, nowhere is any Īśvara named and there is no passage directly referring to him. Commentators no doubt try to see a reference to Īśvara in V.S. 1.1.3- but all the same that does not sound very proper either. Garbe also says, "The Vaiśeṣika sūtras.....originally did not accept the existence of God.

The early Nyāya also provided no remarkable argument or proof for the existence of God. And the task of finding out such arguments or proof from Nyāya was consequently left to the commentators of Nyāya and the resultant position, in the words of Ingalls, is the later the commentator, the greater the importance which he assigns to God and more severe the restriction he imposes on the anthropocentrism of the sūtras.

1. Outlines of Indian philosophy, p. 259.
2. Philosophy of Ancient India, p. 23.
As we go through the commentaries we find that they tend to become more and more theistic than was the intention of Gautama. The Sūtra portion in question, as included in the examination of the Prāvāduka drṣṭis, however, is obviously inconsistent with the possibility of its being included as a Nyāya view as no one would refute one’s own theory. Hence it is that Vācaspati perhaps tried to interpret these sutras as laying down the refutation of the Vedāntic Upādānākāraṇatva of God. Hence C. Bulcke says, "These sūtras were the starting point of the theism of Nyāya Vaiṣeṣika, all subsequent authors of both systems being undoubtedly theists. The theism of Gautama himself, however is not evident". And C. Bulcke, after discussing the difficult interpretations at length, comes to the conclusion that Gautama gives his siddhānta that, "God is the cause since there are occasional exceptions to the law of karma", and then he adds that since karma is actuated by God, the objection that "God is not the cause, since without karma there is no fruit," is pointless. "Even if this interpretation involves Gautama in self-contradiction, theism being new to the system, all its implications could not be solved at the very beginning".

by C. Bulcke.

2. Ibid. pp. 34-35.
Needless to say no interpretation is thoroughly satisfactory. One would like to handle the task of finding out some consistent meaning without any presuppositions as regards the intention on the part of Gautama, by relying simply on the context and the wording of the sutras themselves. If such an effort is made, one can interpret the sutras as under:

1. Sūtra 19 propounds the view of the opponent viz. God is the cause of the universe inasmuch as we see that human efforts turn out to be fruitless.
2. Sūtra 20 refutes this view, maintaining that no fruit is achieved without human effort or karma on the part of man himself.
3. And sūtra 21 supports the view advanced in sūtra 20 by saying that as the fruit is caused by the actions of man, the argument referred to in sūtra 19 is not sustainable.

It would be pertinent to note at this stage that such an attempt at interpreting these sutras on the strength of their own inherent and intrinsic meaning uninfluenced by any extraneous and irrelevant considerations is made by Prof. Daniel H. H. Ingalls who has interpreted them in the same way with this difference that in respect of the last sūtra he gives the meaning thus: "Since God is caused to act by human effort that which you have given is not a reason."
Thus the Nyāya-sūtra can be said here to be repudiating God or at least a dictator—God for whom his will is this Law. But it is not proper to construe these sūtras as establishing God, and certainly not as admitting God as a nimitta-karna but designating Him as an upādāna-kāraṇa for that is not the point at issue.

Ākasmikatvapra[karanam]:

Introducing the Ākasmikatvapra[karanam; the Sutrakāra says that it is the view of some that things are produced without any operative cause for we see the sharpness of the thorns etc., which are a proof of this. The holder of such a view can be said to accept the constituent cause but he denies the instrumental cause (nimitta-kāraṇa).

It may be argued that animitta itself is the nimitta and hence production cannot be said to be without any cause. The answer given to this by the Prāvāduka is that nimitta (cause) and animitta (non-cause) are always different and hence a non-cause can never be said to be a cause.

Ākāspada does not give any direct answer to this in the sutra. So we naturally turn to the Bhāṣya where it is said that this view is already refuted in the third Adhyāya of the Nyāya Sūtra (3. 2. 60-67).

1. अनिमित्तार्थक वावेश्यत: कष्टकलेष्याविधेयश्च |

    - NS, 4. 1. 22.
The point at dispute there is whether the origination of the body etc. is the result of the previous actions of man or it is due to the elemental substances only.

In the course of this discussion, it is said by the Nyāyayīka that the formation of the body etc. is due to the fructifying of the actions done in a previous birth. Hence it cannot be said that it is without any nimitta. One, who imagines the creation of the body without any previous actions, would get involved in the incongruity of the accruing of what is not earned. It is due to the actions of the previous births only that a particular soul is endowed with a particular body. Thus the production of a body is due to some cause. Moreover, the Nyāya view, as explained in the Bhāṣya is that the entities, cloth etc.; endowed with a particular shape and arrangement, do have a nimitta kāraṇa.

On a critical examination being made of, the view that things like body etc. are produced without a cause, it could lead to the denial of all kinds of nimittas. This denial involved; (i) the absence of something like the acts of the previous births, (ii) hence negation of rebirth, and (iii)

1. पूक्तफलानुवाचबुधुपपि. ।      
   - न्यायदृश्य, २. २. ६०.
consequently, the incongruity of getting fruits of deeds
never done and not getting the fruits of deeds done before.
Thus the theory of chance would involve such beliefs as
perhaps even the upholders did not think of.

We can say that such a theory of production from chance
was also existent in the days of the Upanisads. The Śvetāmbara
Upaṇisad, while enumerating various views regarding the
origin of the world, takes note of this theory of Chance
(yatācchā) also:

"Should Time, or Nature or Necessity or chance or the
elements be considered as the cause?"

A similar mode of thinking is found referred to in some
Bauḍḍha and Jaina texts also. Avāghoṣa in Buddhacarita, 9.52,
describes Svabhāvavāda; the aspect of which is also the same.

We have also seen the doctrine of Fortuitous Origin
(Adhicca Samuppāda), found referred to in the Brahmajāla
sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya; according to which the world
and the soul are viewed to have been produced without a cause? They were not before and came afterwards and there was no cause to it.

So also Pūraṇa Kassapa held Akriyāvāda, according to which no good or evil deed leads to merit or sin. So it can be said that Paraloka and Rebirth do not follow as a result of action, good or bad; and thus one could say that what one has attained is not due to any factor responsible for it.

Makkhali Gosāla denied all causes, either ultimate or remote, for the depravity or rectitude of beings. The beings according to him enjoy life as it is fixed by Fate (Niyati), Chance (Sangati) and Nature (Svabhāva). According to this there would be no freedom of will. Gosāla's is the view called Aketukavāda; where the existence and suffering are all fixed by Fate or something like that and no good or bad conduct can help to add to it or to alleviate it.

If may be, that influenced by this line of thought; Pakūṭa Kaccāyana came to regard seven things (kāyas) including soul, ease and pain; as Akṛta, neither made nor commanded

1. cf. Buddhaghosa explains the term as "Springing up without a cause".
to be made, neither created nor caused to be created, steadfast as a mountain peak; as a pillar firmly fixed. No virtue or penance can help to make the inherited karma mature. Thus the Ākasmikavāda can result straightaway in a view rejecting the effects of the actions of previous births.

It is interesting to note, that the Nyāya Bhāṣya itself refers here to the discussion of karma in an earlier section suggesting thereby that a logical presentation of Ākasmikavāda is intimately connected with the negation of Karma and its effects. This vindicates our suggestion that the author of the Nyāya Sūtras perhaps related Ākasmikavāda to Ākārya-vāda, Āhetuvaṇḍa and Ākṛtavāda, as also Yadrochāvāda, which we have already discussed in earlier chapters.

Āryasura has also referred to such an Ākasmikavāda in his Jātakamālā, the name given there to the vāda being Āhetuvaṇḍa; and he has tried to refute it by saying that the colours of petals and of the feathers of birds etc. are not altogether accidental; (as held by the Ākasmikavādin). But they are intimately connected and even inherent in some particular causes. If it were not so, then such colours should be found everywhere and always, which, we see, is not the case.
Asanga in his Yogācarabhūmi mentions an Āhetuvādin, who observing the strangeness of the things of the world says that, without any cause (that is to say, just accidentally), the wind blows sometimes and sometimes not; the river flows sometimes and sometimes not; the trees blossom sometimes and sometimes not; the world and Soul, are therefore, produced without any cause.

We can say that, such a view arose because of not admitting any causal relation between actions and fruits. The Nyāya recognises the efficacy of action and hence, according to Aksapāda; this is a heretical view and is untenable.

As we have seen, no argument worth the name, is found advanced in the Buddhist or Jaina Canonical works; in favour of Āhetukavāda, Akrtavāda, Akiyavāda and Yadṛcchāvāda or Niyatīvāda. The Nyāya Sūtra has refuted the origination of things, irrespective of Karma, in an earlier section (3.2.66) so no refutation as such is given here;—though Uddyotakara has discussed this point here too.

Sarvanityavatvanirākaranaprakaranam:

There is a view that everything is non-eternal. It is held by some that all things must be evanescent, because they are liable to production and destruction. 'Evanescence
signifies existence only for some time. A thing liable to production is non-existent before the production; similarly, a thing liable to destruction is non-existent after the destruction. Hence all things are evanescent, as they are non-existent in one or the other phase of time.

If such a view is logically examined, it could result only in Ucchedavāda, because, all things, when they are proved to be non-existent; can be said to have been annihilated.

The Upaniṣadīc passages like "विज्ञानस्य स्व स्तेय भूतम् समुलाय तान्यक्षातुविस्मयिते, न प्रेतव समाप्तिः" are often interpreted as representing this materialistic theory. The Buddhist canon describes Ajita and Pāyāsi as believers in this view. They are called Nāstikavādins.

As their view is broadly the same as that of the Ucchedavādins or the Tajjīvatacchārīravādins; all of them can be regarded as criticised here. We have already discussed these views at length. So here we simply summarise the teachings and try to examine the Prāvāduka drṣṭi here in this light. These vādins are known to hold:

(1) The soul is the same as the body.
(ii) Consequently, the soul lasts as long as the body lasts and not thereafter; this is involved the non-eternity of the soul.
(iii) There is no soul remaining after the passing away of the body, hence there is no rebirth.
(iv) As there is no soul surviving the destruction of the body and no rebirth, there can be no result of either good or bad deeds.

The Nyāya - Sūtras; have not directly dealt with all these points. But the discussion of the Nyāya Siddhānta in the 3rd chapter throws ample light on such problems and reveals the Nyāya view; which is quite in contradiction to the above heretical views. We give those arguments briefly here.

(i) The Naiyāyikas hold that the soul is distinct from the body; because if the body were the soul, then there would be no sin accruing to any one from the burning or killing of a living body.

(ii) Moreover, the Nyāya Sūtra, 3. 1. 18-26 proves the eternity of the soul. The argument to prove the same is thus given: "The soul must exist (even after the perishing of body) because the newly born infant experiences joy, fear and sorrow, which could follow only from the continuity of remembrance of what has been repeatedly gone through before."

1. शिरिलाहे पालकावावाल ।
   - न्यायसूत्र, ३. १. ४.

2. पूवांतस्मृत्युज्वन्वस्त्रावत्सः हर्षस्याश्रयस्मित्वः ।
   NS. ३. १. १८.
We have seen in the chapter on "Heretical views in "Early Buddhist Literature" that the Buddhist text Satasastra quotes some views of Uluka. All the more important it is that the views of Nyāya are there regarded as the views of the opponent. We may again mention these three views here. The first one is: "Surely there is an atman; because he feels pain and joy; The second is Because of the experience of former life, a small child (as soon as he is born) knows the objects which bring joy and pain; although there is nobody to teach him.; therefore, we know that there is an atman; and it has the characteristic of eternity", And the third one is that there must be the atman; because, to the left, there is the vision and to the right there is the recognition.

It is interesting to compare these views with the Nyāya arguments here. The first and the second; seem to have the Nyāya - Sūtra 3. 1. 18 in view. Similarly, the third one refers to the Nyāyasūtra 3. 1.7.

2. Ibid., p. 34.
3. Ibid., p. 35.
4. चूरायतस्यस्यन्तुन्यात्यायान्यायस्य हर्षमिश्रेष्ठस्यप्रतिपये।
   - न्यायूत्र, 3. 1. 68.
5. चूरायतस्यस्यप्रतिपये प्रत्ययायान्यायस्य।
   - न्यायूत्र, 3. 1. 7.
Two more arguments put forth by the Nyāya Sūtra to prove the eternity of the soul are:

(i) (The soul should be regarded as eternal) because of the desire for milk from the mother's breast, which is evinced (on birth) after death, and which can only be due to repeated feeding (in the past); and

(ii) (The soul should be regarded as eternal) because persons free from longing are never seen to be born.

Moreover, in the Nyāya view, Rebirth is possible only because the soul is eternal. It is the eternal soul that departs; abandons the former body; and having departed (pretya), takes up another body, and Rebirth comprehends these two only; viz. the abandoning of the previous body and the taking up of another.

The Nyāya accepted that the formation of the body is due to the effects of the previous acts.

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6. प्रेत्याहारम्भा कृतेत्ताश्वत् सत्यामिलाभार 

2. कीतराम जन्मावस्तिनाराम 

3. भात्मनित्यमें प्रेत्यप्रवाचिद्विविण: 

4. पुनरुपचिवः प्रेत्यभावः 

5. प्रवृत्तिमार्गाद्याचारकुपचिवः 

- न्यायसूत्र, 3. 6. 22

- न्यायसूत्र, 3. 6. 24

- न्यायसूत्र, 4. 1. 10

- न्यायसूत्र, 1. 9. 10

- न्यायसूत्र, 3. 2. 60
Asanga has, as we have seen before, mentioned Nāstikavāda and Ucchedavāda in his Yogācārabhūmi. Seven types of Ucchedavādins are described in the Brahmajāla Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya by the Buddha.

It may be said that the controversy seems to centre round mainly the eternity or otherwise of the soul and the emphasis is on proving that the soul is eternal. Besides the Ucchedavādin and others, we have the Buddhists who recognised a continuum of point instants of viññāna (consciousness) instead of an eternal soul. But on the other hand, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika besides believing that the soul is eternal also regards some other things, e.g. the atoms of earth, water, fire, and air, and ākāśa; Time, Space, Mind, and some categories viz. Sāmāṇya, Viśeṣa; Samavāya as eternal, because they are not seen to be liable to production or destruction by any means of right knowledge. Thus the Nyāya position is that everything cannot be said to be non-eternal.

Sarvaniṣtyatvanirakaranaprakaranam:

It is the view of some that "everything is eternal, because the five elemental substances are eternal". According to them, all things are constituted of the five
elemental substances and since the total destruction of
the substances is altogether impossible, the things which
are constituted of these substances, must also be regarded
as eternal.

We may note that there were a number of ancient philoso-
phers, who admitted the emanation of the world and worldly
things from one or more or all the five elemental substances.
Most of them could be said to regard these substances as
eternal and consequently the world and the soul also
could be regarded as eternal.

Even in the days of the Upaniṣads; such views were
prevalent; according to which the world emanated from one
or more of the elemental substances earth, water, fire, air
and space. We have examined such passages before and
we have also seen that some impersonalistic conceptions
regarding the origination of the world were also then
existent; to wit, the conception of 'Being', 'Non-being',
and 'Being and non-being'. So also, the Upaniṣadic sages
admitted the soul to be eternal. However, they never
admitted the world to be so.

Then there were the Carvākas, who were materialists
and held that there are only the elemental substances; and
no soul exists; which is different from these substances.
As the Sarvadarśanasamgraha says, they accepted four substances, instead of five, as they regarded only the perceptual knowledge as valid, and the ether or space, which is the fifth elemental substance can be known only by inference and not by perception. Čārvākas, however, did not regard the world or the soul as eternal. Consciousness, in their view, exists as long as the body lasts, and not thereafter. We have taken note of this view only because it resembles the belief mentioned in the Nyāya Bhāṣya that everything is constituted of these elemental substances only.

In the Buddhist treatises, we find Pakuda Kaccayana who held that "the seven things (viz. earth, water, fire, air, ease, pain, and soul are eternal; neither made nor commanded to be made, neither created nor caused to be created, they are barren (so that nothing is produced out of them), steadfast as a mountain peak; as a pillar firmly fixed".

Buddha in the Brahmajāla Sutta of the Dīghanikāya gives the view of some recluses and Brāhmaṇas, who on eighteen

1. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 1
   - Nyāya Bhāṣya on NS. 4. 1. 29.
2. The view of Pakuda Kaccayana.
3. cf. Dīghanikāya, Sāmaññaphalasutta.
grounds held that "the soul and the world are eternal, giving birth to nothing new, steadfast as a mountain peak; as a pillar firmly fixed, and though, these living creatures transmigrate and pass away, fall from one state of existence and spring up in another, yet they are for ever and ever".

The Buddhist canon often describes Baka Brahmā as the holder of the Śāsvatavāda. He thus thought about his Brahmaloka: "This (loka) is permanent, fixed, eternal, pure and unchanging. This is liable neither to birth nor to death". Buddha, however, considers this to be a wrong attitude and says that only because Baka Brahma is erring, he speaks so.

Again, Buddha describes the Semi-Eternalists in the Dīgha Nikāya, who were Eternalists with regard to some things and non-eternalists with regard to the others. They maintained such a view on four grounds; among which the last one is based on logic and reasoning. But it is strange that though such a belief is said to be held on a logical ground, no logical argument given by them is described there to prove the eternity of the world.

Quoting the view that "that which is soul, the same is the Loka), so after leaving the body, I will be permanent, fixed, eternal, unchanging; "it is asked in the Saṁyutta
Nikāya, how this false view came into existence. Confirming that this is a false view, it is said that it arises because of conceiving the rūpa, vedanā, etc. as the self, rūpa etc. in the self and self as being constituted of these rūpa, vedanā, etc. To avoid both the extremes, viz. Eternalism and Nihilism; Buddha never answered the question, whether there is Astīta or Nāstīta.

Āryadva, in his Sātasāstra, taking note of a view of Kapila, writes: "Kapila is said to have recognised twenty-five substances and an ātman and he says that the ātman is the rector (adhiṣṭhātā) and has the characteristics of being eternal and intelligent ...... he eternally remains and is neither destroyed nor does it perish.

This obviously is the doctrine of Sāmkhya. The view of Ulūka is also taken note of in the same breath that there is an ātman, which is eternal. But nothing is said there of the world and its eternity.

The Yogācārabhūmi of Asaṅga regards the Saśvatavāda as a heretical view which held that the soul and the world are eternal; indestructible and unchanging. In complete agreement

1: Samyutta Nikāya; 22. 15, Etam mama Sutta.
2. Šatasāstra, pp. 19-20.
with the Brahmajala sutta of the Dīgha-Nikāya, the Pūrvāntakalpikas, Aparāntakalpikas, Saṃjñivādins, Asamjñīvādins and Naivasamjñīnasaṃjñīvādins are here described as the holders of the Śāśvatavāda; who establish such a view with the help of certain arguments.

The Jaina canonical work, Sutrakrtāṅga describes a view which according to Jacobi (as we noted above), is of the Nāstikas and Čārvākas. There it is said: Some profess the five gross elements, earth, water, fire, air and space or ether. These five elements (are the original causes of things), from them arise another (thing, viz. atman), for on the dissolution of the five (elements), living beings cease to exist.

In the latter half of this text, the view of such a Saṅcamahabhūtavādin in thus put forth:

"There are five elements through which we can explain whether an action is good or bad................Everything down to a blade of gross (consists of them)".

1. See; Yogācārabhūmi, p. 137 -
2. Sutrakṛtāṅga, 1.1.1.7-8.
And, we should know the intermixture (samavāya) of the elements by an enumeration of the Earth is the first element; water the second; fire the third; wind (air) the fourth; and ether the fifth. These five elements are not created, directly or indirectly; nor made; they are without beginning and end; they always produce effects; are independent of a directing cause or everything else; they are eternal. All living beings; all things, the whole world consists of nothing else but these (five elements). They are the primary cause of the world even down to a blade of grass."

Thus there are the vādins who held a view quite similar to the view described in the Nyāya Sūtra, 4. 1. 29 and in the Bhāṣya on it. They regarded the five elemental substances as eternal; and said that they are the cause of the world. Consequently it implied could have been at least at places, that the worldly things which are made of these must be eternal.

An Ātmasaṣṭhavādin, who recognises a soul as a sixth to the five elemental substances, is described in the Sūtrakṛtaṅga and is said to have regarded the soul and the world as eternal. All things, according to him, are eternal by their very nature.

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1. Sūtrakṛtaṅga, 1. 1. 1. 15:—
— बाया लोगे न बाहिरे ।

2. Ibid., 1. 1. 1. 16.
The views mentioned in the Buddhist texts simply state that the soul and the world are eternal. Hardly any sound logical proof is given in support of this view. And still it can be definitely said that this is not the same as the view in the Sûtrakṛtāṅga. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the views are, broadly speaking very much allied, we have carefully noted them. Whether the world is eternal or moneterminal is a question regarded as unexplainable by the Buddha.

The Theravādin in the Kathāvatthu argues that "if at the dissolution of each aggregate, the 'person' does disintegrate; then it becomes nihilism; and if at the dissolution of each aggregate, the 'person' does not disintegrate; then it becomes eternalism. But to the mind of the Buddha, just as Nibbāna is neither reborn, nor dissolved; so is the soul.

Nāgārjuna also explains the same by saying that "a thing which is existent by its very nature, remains for ever and never ceases to be, and then, as a result; Sasvatavāda comes to be established. Similarly, if it be said that a thing was there previously, but it is not

1. See Points of Controversy; p. 261.
existent now, it would result in Ucchedavāda. But Buddha avoided both the extremes.

The Nyāya professes its disagreement with such a view of the Pañcamaḥabhūtavādins, saying that since we actually perceive the cause of the production and destruction of things it is not proper to hold that everything is eternal.

The opponent tries to reconcile, saying that eternity cannot be denied of things of which the causes of production and destruction are actually perceived; as these things are not something different from the elemental substances; and if the elemental substances are eternal, these things also should be eternal.

The Nyāya answer to this is that it is only because the things are the products of these substances that they have the characteristics of elemental substances and not because they are the same as those substances. Hence the eternity of things cannot be proved. And also, the argument that "everything is eternal; because things are constituted of

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1. बस्ति यद्विव स्माभ्येन
   न तन्नास्त्तीति शास्त्रस्य।
   नास्ति दाती मूलपुर्वस्य
   हन्त्याचे: प्राप्तये।।

   - महामहपुराणम्, १५५. ६२।
five elemental substances only and the five elemental substances are eternal, is inconclusive; as it is not applicable to such things as sound, motion, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort. None of these is an elemental substance, as also none of these is possessed of the characteristics of the elemental substances.

It is interesting to note here that Pakuda Kaccayana regarded even pleasure and pain; as eternal, of course not because he regarded both of them as constituted of the five elemental substances, but in their own right.

So also, the view of those who held that "the original substance remains constant, one property of it ceases; and another property is produced; and thus "all things are eternal" is also refuted by the Naiyayika. He says that in this case, there could be no such differentiation; viz., one property ceases to exist and another is born- because, in their view, even what is produced is present before its production and even when a thing perishes, it is there. Vācaspati refers to this last as the view of the Svāyambhuvas (- followers of the Yoga darsana).

1. See Nyāya Sūtra; 4. 1. 32, and the Bhāṣya thereupon, where is:

शक्तकृष्णन्यायादिवृत्तिः वाय्याफः। पञ्चमूलनित्यत्वतः

तत्वस्यावरूपस्य स हत्यने

शक्तकृष्णद्वितीयस्ते वैविकाद्विभानात्मासः। वाय्याः तस्मादवैकानासः।
The view refuted here is that all must be regarded as different because the names of things denote different entities. All names of things denote combinations, e.g. the word 'Jar' signifies the combination of odour, taste, colour and touch, and also the combination of bottom, sides and neck.

The author of the Nyāya-Sūtra says in reply to this that in fact; several kinds of things go to make a single entity. Moreover, as established in Nyāya Sūtra 2. 1. 33, there is no cognition which cognises only a single component part in any case. There is always the cognition of one component part as well as of the composite which is inseparable from that component part.

As Uddyotakara says, this refutation is meant to contradict the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāṣikas, who hold that "all things must be diverse. There is no such thing as 'substance' apart from colour; odour, etc.; nor is there any such thing as 'composite', apart from the components. Now, these colour odour etc. being distinct from one another, and the components also being distinct from one another; must be diverse".
But this view of the Bauddhas also is not proper; as the author of the Nyāya Sūtra has earlier proved that the Substance is something different from its qualities and the composite is something different from the components.

But it is interesting to see the Buddhist text, Upāyakusumārdhāya mentioning a view, similar to the one which is described above: *It is established by some 'Tīrthikas' that 'everything is different; as for example the head, feet etc. are different from the body. Moreover, the characteristics are different, as for example a bull is different from a horse. So it should be accepted that everything is distinct (or different).*

Thus there must have been some early thinkers who upheld this view which is refuted here.

1. सर्ववृक्षं पृथक्क | कुल हति चैत | यथा सिर्फङ्गादि 
बायायु पृथक्क | अथि तदाद्वपुष्पक्तवम् | यथा 
अभाबास्वाक्षिष्ठानां | तदस्मात् सर्ववृक्षं पृथगिति श्रेयस् 
हति पृथ्वग्ननिस्तीर्थिनः।

- उपायकुसुमार्द्याः, पृ० ५।
Here we find presented for refutation the view of the Bauddhas that everything is of the nature of negation. The Sūtrakāra puts it thus; "All things must be non-entities; because all things are known to be mere negations of each other. The 'Bull' is non-existent in the form of a (Horse) and hence is only 'non-Horse'. Similarly, the 'Horse is only 'non-Bull'.

The Nyāya view is that all things cannot be non-entities; because things exist by virtue of their very nature. And also each thing is recognised as having a distinct individuality of its own. The word 'Bull' also, whenever used, gives the idea of a particular substance and not that of non-entity. And if things are really non-existent; the opponent must say that the horse is "not-Horse". But he does not say so. That proves that the Horse is existent in the form of Horse. In saying that the Bull is non-Horse; what is denied here is the identity of both and not their existence.

According to the opponent, there is nothing like character, or distinct reality of things; and what is so regarded has only a relative existence. A thing
is spoken of as 'long' in relation to what is 'short'; and 'short' in relation to what is 'long'. And neither of the two has an absolute character of its own. But the Naiyāyika discards this view, saying that if a thing is 'long' only relatively to the "short"; then the 'short' should be non-relative; for, to what would the 'short' be relative? The same is the case with the thing that is 'short'.

The arguments here are the same as those of the Śūnyavādin, who also says that nothing can be said to have a nature of its own; everything is nīcayabhāva (essenceless) and so Śūnya of any essential nature.

In the Viṣeṣāvasyaka-bhāṣya of Jinabhadrā, this point is discussed at length. Gaṇadhara Vyakta there argues that nothing has existence, there is merely the void and that our empirical knowledge of 'long', 'short' etc. arises only relatively.

But Mahāvīra, refuting his view, says that if he accepts Nihilism, he cannot accept the concept of relativity as it is not consistent with the fundamental doctrine of nihilism. All things are existent in their own right - are

self-established, appear in their own nature, in their respective cognition without reference to another; and at a later stage, we speak of the object as 'long' or 'short'. And Nature or Svabhāva is one's own existence or character; And if everything were void or unreal; it would be altogether impossible to argue; and discuss in terms of anything's own nature; because things utterly non-existent; cannot have any nature, e.g. the "barren woman's son". Only an existent thing can have Svabhāva. And in the absence of Svabhāva, no such relativity can be explained.

The Nyāya argument against the Sarvāvīṣayatāvāda is: that if there is no such thing as the character or distinct reality of things and everything is only relative, why do we not have the relative notions of 'length' and 'shortness' in respect of two equal atoms; or in respect of any two objects of equal size? It is only when one sees two things and notices a preponderance in one of them that he regards it as long, and that which he finds deficient, he regards as 'short'; this is what is, by 'relativity'.
Samkhyaikantavadanirakaranaprakaranam:\n
The theories which limit things within one definite number only, are criticised here. The Nyāya Bhasya mentions some such theories:

(i) All things are one; all being equally existent;
(ii) All things are two, being divided into eternal and non-eternal.
(iii) All things are three, - cogniser, cognition and cognised.
(iv) All things are four, cogniser; means of cognition; cognised and cognition, etc. etc.

The other assertions, even if not mentioned in the Bhasya, are as under according to the Tātparyaṭīkā:\n
(i) The Samkhya view that the Soul and Primordial Matter are the only two entities.
(ii) The view of the Bauddhas that there are only the five skandhas—rupa (corporeal phenomena), samjñā (cognition), Vedānā (sensation), Saṃskāra (active tendencies) and Vijñāna (consciousness).
(iii) The view of the Pāśupatas that the only things are the Pasus (living beings), their bondage (pāsa), the removal of this bondage and the Lord (pātā)

The view that all things are one, is obviously the doctrine of the Upaniṣads.

The Nyāya argues that if the means of proving the desired conclusion is available as something different from the conclusion to be proved, then the limitation of number cannot be proved, because such a means is not included in the conclusion to be proved. And if there be no such means, then in the absence of means, nothing could be proved. The argument of the opponent that the means of proving is only a part of what is to be proved and hence the above refutation by the Naiyayika is not proper - is also wrong.

Because; the opponent establishes only two things without any exception at all; and then he speaks again of the means of proving as being one part of the subject of the proposition. If such a thing were there as the part; then no absolute limitation of number of things can be established.

If these extreme views deny the proliferation of difference of things which is due to some particular factor, they must be rejected as wrong doctrines as they are going against Perception, Inference and Verbal
testimony. But if they admit such difference, then since they admit that things are classified under one head due to their having a common characteristic, and as different due to their particularities, they are no more extreme views or obstinate views.

Thus this last section on the Brāvīdūka drṣṭis concludes with the examination of sweeping assertions. The absolutistic assertions discussed before are also to be regarded as examined by this.

Regarding this section on Saṁkhyaiñka; Ingalls says in his article "Human effort versus God's effort in the early Nyāya" contributed to the Dr. S. K. Belvalkar Felicitation Volume' that he has not been able to make any sense out of this particular portion. Gopīnātha Kavirāja calls the Saṁkhyaiñkāntavāda very mysterious. He asks, "Could it have any connection with the Vedic notion of ियन or with some form of the Pythagorean Theory of Number?"

1. See Introduction (p. xiii) to the Nyāya sūtra, translated into English by Gāgānātha Jhā.

2. Ibid.
It appears that the ancient commentators also were quite intrigued. Vātsyāyana starts with a brief introduction in which he puts forth the pūrvapakṣa of Saṁkhyaikānta, which sūtra 4. 1. 41 is meant to refute. Sūtra 42 mentions an objection and sūtra 43 refutes it. According to this interpretation, there would be no sūtra written by Aksāpāda himself which states the Saṁkhyaikānta doctrine - which is strange. Moreover, as the commentators themselves admit, if the prāvāduka does not insist that things are just one two........ numerically; but just means that they can be broadly classified under one or two or three..........categories or heads, then this is no extreme view and does not require any refutation. On the other hand if he insists that they are just one or two........etc; then he will not be in a position to prove his point, as the reason will be over and above what he wants to prove. It must be noted that none of the commentators has been able to name any individual philosopher or school of philosophy holding such a view. Here Viśvanātha says that this section ultimately comes to be just a refutation of the Advaitavāda.

Our only question, is, "Could the author of the Nyāya-sūtra have wasted three valuable sūtras over the refutation of such a trifling imaginary misconception and not even cared to present this view in his own words?" And could any one hold such a view? Could we interpret the sūtras differently?
This could prove that it is possible to classify all the things under a certain number of categories, because no means of proof is possible which could cognise the nature of all things, and even if it were possible, this would be over and above what is meant to be proved.

This view is refuted in Sūtras 4.1.32, 43 - न, कारणाक्षयवभावः निर्वक्ष्यवर्धेत्।

"No, the means of proving is only a part of the subject. And if it were not a part, it could not be a means of proof at all". That is to say, even the means of proof would be included under the broad categories one wants to establish (e.g. any one of the pramāṇas would come under buddhi, a guṇa). Thus one should be in a position to say that there are six padārthas or seven padārthas or the like.

The extreme view could seem to be one in which no theory could be tenable for any two or more things, that is to say each has a nature of its own and no generalization
is possible. The Nyāya-sūtra might have attempted to refute such as extreme view.

In Mahābhārata, Vanaparva (13.4. 8 ff) in the dialogue between Aśṭāvakra and Bandin there is mention of things that are one, or two or three........thirteen. Could the Nyāya sūtra have intended to refute such a view?

Vātsyāyana says that the author of the Nyāya Sūtra thought it fit to discuss these pravāduka dṛṣṭis in the midst of his exposition to facilitate a proper understanding of philosophical problems. To a critical scholar, it might appear strange that Aksapāda after discussing pretyabhāva, suddenly starts examining these pravādudṛṣṭis and then turns to an exposition of 'phala' (NS. 4.1. 44) which in its proper order follows pretyabhāva. This requires further serious inquiry but we are not concerned with it at present.

1. एक खामिन्निर्वेष्यां सभिष्टते
   एकः सूर्यः सर्विभवं विवाचति।
   एको बीरो देवराजो शिरः श्रवः।
   यमः पितुभासीवर वैकः एकः।
   वाविन्ध्रायणी चतुर्वे सखायाः।
   ब्राह्मणेऽन्ननास्तवप्रभृताः च।
   ब्राह्मनवनां दे रथस्थापिष च।
   माहन्निर्वेष्यां ब्रव विविश्व विवाच च।

Mahābhārata, Vanaparva, 134. 8-9. Prof. Anantlal Thākur drew the attention of scholars to this in his paper read at the Kurukṣetra session (1974) of the All India Oriental Conference.
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